Date of Graduation
Master of Science in Agricultural Economics (MS)
Agricultural Economics and Agribusiness
Bruce L. Ahrendsen
Bruce L. Dixon
Second Committee Member
Charles B. Dodson
This thesis examines the possible outcomes (expired with no loss, settled for loss, still performing) of loans and the time to hazard events of over 19,000 guaranteed operating and farm ownership loans which were provided by the Farm Service Agency (FSA). Loans guaranteed by FSA are made by commercial banks, Farm Credit System (FCS), or other lenders to farmers who have limited ability to obtain loans from normal sources without the Federal guarantee. The guarantee allows for payment up to 95 percent when borrowers default. Cox proportional hazards models for operating loans and farm ownership loans are estimated to identify borrower characteristics, loan characteristics, lender types, and farm and macro-economic environment factors that influence loan outcomes. The estimation results indicate that beginning farmer loans are more likely to expire and more likely to have loss claims and loans with interest assistance are less likely to expire and less likely to have loss claims than are regular loans. Loan outcomes also differ by loan amount, loan term, lender type, and region. In addition, preferred or certified lenders are less likely to have operating loan loss claims. Finally, contemporaneous variables, in particular delinquency status, have a significant impact on loan outcomes.
Long, Deng, "Competing Risks Models of Farm Service Agency Guaranteed Operating and Farm Ownership Loans" (2013). Theses and Dissertations. 984.