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Introduction

A previous article made the case that the Quapaw Indians had played a role in the defense of Arkansas Post, and had entered several colonial wars on the side of the French, during the time that France had claimed sovereignty over the Arkansas country.¹

The purpose of the present effort is to describe and explain the origin and nature of the alliance between the Quapaws and the French, and to identify the considerations that led the tribe to conclude that it was often in its national interest to collaborate with the French in their defensive and offensive military operations. The efforts that the two nations made to keep their settlements close to each other will prove of particular interest because they illustrate the strategic symbiosis that characterized those nations’ relationship for decades.²

The Military Alliance Described

A tentative foundation for possible military cooperation between the Quapaws and the French had been laid quite early in Arkansas’s colonial period. The tribe’s interest in associating with the French when they first came into its neighborhood in the late seventeenth century centered in part on obtaining manufactured goods from the newcomers -- particularly the guns, powder, and shot that would improve the tribe’s lot in combat. But just as interesting to the Indians, if not more so, was the possibility that the French might provide them with direct military support in the form of fighting men.

The Quapaws specifically raised this last prospect with René Cavelier de La Salle in 1682 when they asked him for “assistance against their enemies” during his visit to the village of Kappa on the west bank of the Mississippi River. La Salle assured them that if they would recognize Louis

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² For the various ways in which this symbiosis manifested itself, see Morris S. Arnold, The Rumble of a Distant Drum: The Quapaws and Old World Newcomers, 1673-1804 (Fayetteville: University of Arkansas Press, 2000), passim. See also Kathleen DuVal, “A Good Relationship and Commerce: The Native Political Economy of the Arkansas River Valley,” Early American Studies 1 (Spring 2003): 61-89 at 89 where, speaking of the Quapaws, the author concludes that “During the colonial period, Europeans and Indians became mutually dependent on one another’s goods, information, and good will.”
XIV as “master of their lands” and promise to obey him, “they would be under the protection of His Majesty … and those who attacked them would have to fight all his power and [that of] the French, his subjects, who would avenge any injury done to them.” This was not an isolated assurance. Five years later, Henri Joutel told the residents of the Quapaw village called Tongingua that he and his companions were “going to our country … and would bring back men to go to war with them who would then destroy all their enemies.” According to Joutel, the Quapaws, upon hearing that, cried out in joy and urged the French to waste no time in returning.

Joutel had found the Quapaws in four settlements: Kappa on the west bank of the Mississippi, Tongingua on the east bank, Touriman on Big Island near the mouth of the White River, and Osotouy farther up the Arkansas River (Map 1). There is not much in the numerous pertinent sources to indicate that the villages had moved in the five years since La Salle’s visit.

French gasconades concerning the protection they would provide the Quapaws came virtually to nothing, partly because the number of settlers and soldiers in the colonial Arkansas country bordered on insignificance much of the time. And so, it turned out for the most part that it was Arkansas Post and the Louisiana French who needed and got military assistance, both defensive and offensive, from the Quapaws.

The colonial regime was keenly aware of the contributions the tribe had come to make over the years to the Post’s and the colony’s preservation. In 1758, near the end of the French era in Louisiana, Governor Louis Billouart Chevalier de Kelérec waxed panegyric about the Quapaws. He looked back almost nostalgically, rehearsing

4 Ibid., 3:460.
5 There had been a fifth Quapaw village, called Imaha, that disappeared early on, and it does not figure in this narrative.
the many operations that the tribe had undertaken over the decades against the Natchez, Chickasaws, Yazoos, Coroas, and Choctaws, and implied that their attachment to French offensive military efforts had their origin in La Salle's 1682 sojourn. Kelérec recalled the Quapaws' defensive efforts as well, recounting with special pleasure an anecdote about the time when the Quapaws, harried by the Chickasaws, were searching for a new home following their retreat from their Mississippi River towns in the early eighteenth century. He said that during that time the tribe was always careful not to wander "too far from the French established on" the Arkansas River and "kept watch" over the settlers' safety.  

Twenty years on, in 1777, Captain Balthazar de Villiers, commanding at Arkansas Post, was equally loud in his praise of what he understood had been the longstanding mutual defense pact between the Quapaws and the French, and he worked hard to ensure that this beneficial arrangement remained in place when the Spanish occupied the fort at the Arkansas following the Seven Years' War. He averred that the tribe's "attachment to us has led them to follow this settlement in the various moves it has made" and that "their private and political interests won't allow them to move away." He was disturbed, though, because recent floods had caused the Quapaws to disperse, making it difficult for them to come to the defense of the Post in case of an attack and for the Post garrison, such as it usually was, to come to the aid of the tribe. "Our common security," he told Governor Gálvez, "depends on the ease with which we can rally to each other's assistance." He was clear on the firmness and durability of this reciprocal arrangement, assuring the governor that "our alliance has always been this way."  

Villiers was right that French and Quapaw national interests had often been aligned, and that the two nations had made a concerted effort to live relatively near each other, principally because they shared a longtime common enemy in the Chickasaw tribe that required them to be ever on the qui vive. It may have been the Chickasaws whom the Quapaws feared most when La Salle first met them, but, in any case, a bitter and prolonged enmity existed between the two tribes throughout the French period. 

The Quapaws and the French Coordinate their Movements

A summary of the movements that the French and Quapaw settlements made during that time will lay bare the strategy they pursued to defend themselves from the Chickasaw threat. An early example comes from 1721. The mission given that year to Lieutenant Agnan Guérin de La Boulaye, when he moved his small command from the Y azoo Post to a position farther up the Mississippi, was to protect the Quapaws living at Kappa from Chickasaw incursions.9 The colonial government hoped the soldiers' presence would encourage the tribe to remain on the Mississippi and become


7 See Villiers's census of the Arkansas nation, August 3, 1777, Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain (hereafter AGI), CUBA, 190, fol. 112-113.

8 Villiers to Gálvez, September 27, 1778, AGI, CUBA, 191, fol. 270.

9 The Y azoo Post was located on the Y azoo River about ten miles above Vicksburg. The Natchez destroyed it in 1729.
Map 2. Locations of Quapaw villages and French outposts, late March, 1722. Map by Joseph Swain, courtesy of the author.

reliable provisioners for French convoys plying the
great waterway between the lower colony and the
Illinois country.10 When La Boulaye left the village
later in 1721 to join Law’s colony on the Arkansas
River (Map 2), the Quapaws at Kappa and its-as-
associated villages soon resolved to withdraw to join
the Osotouy village there. They put that plan into
action in April 1722 after the Chickasaws mount-
ed an attack against Quapaws operating on the
Mississippi (Map 3). Governor Jean-Baptiste Le
Moyne de Bienville summarized these events four
years later. The Quapaws, he said, had lived at one
time on the banks of the Mississippi, but “hostili-
ties from their enemies obliged them to retreat six
leagues up the river that bears their name where
they have made four villages which are not far
distant from each other.”11

If a withdrawal of French troops might imperil
the Quapaws somewhat, the prospect of Qua-
paws leaving the neighborhood of the Post could
cause the French some considerable apprehen-
sion. When colonial officials ordered the garrison
removed from the Arkansas in 1725, a noisy local
opposition arose because the Quapaws were think-
ing about returning to their old fields on the Mis-
sissippi, which would leave the French residents,

10 Glenn R. Conrad, Joan Cain, and Virginia Koe-
nig, eds., The Historical Journal of the Establishment of
the French in Louisiana (Lafayette: Center for Louisi-
ana Studies, 1971), 146-147; Charles René Bouguès,
Colonie de la Louisiane, Journal historique, contenant
cel qui s’est passé de plus remarquable au fort Louis à la
Nouvelle Orléans et les marveiles et avis qu’on a receu
des differentes postes de la colonie, commence par le
Sieur Bouguès le 5 avril 1722. Howard-Tilton Memo-
rial Library, Tulane University, Special collections, M
955, 5, 7, 19.

11 Ralph A. Smith, “ “Exploration of the Arkansas
River by Benard De La Harpe, 1721-1722: Extracts
from His Journal and Instructions,” Arkansas Histori-
cal Quarterly 10 (Winter 1951): 339-363 at 362; Mé-
moire … sur la Louisiane, [1726], in Dunbar Rowland
and Albert Godfrey Sanders, eds., Mississippi Provin-
cial Archives: French Dominion, 1704-1743 (Jackson:
Press of the Mississippi Department of Archives and
History, 1932), 3:526-539 at 531 [quotation]. See also,
hunters, *voyageurs*, and convoys on the Arkansas River completely exposed to attack.\(^{12}\)

Luckily for the meagre French population at the Arkansas, the Quapaws resolved to stay close by (Map 4). Mutual anxiety over the safety of Arkansas Post continued even after the garrison was reestablished there in 1731 (Map 5). The Quapaws saw that the fort had no palisade and expressed their discontent. They asked that one be built “to provide refuge for their families in case of an attack from the Chickasaws during the time their warriors were on a campaign,” and the French complied.\(^{13}\) The *ordonnateur* of Louisiana admitted in 1736 that “the fort at the Arkansas, where there are only ten or twelve men, could not resist the slightest attack. It is only the Indians who are there who can keep them safe *[les garantir]*.”\(^{14}\)

The *ordonnateur*’s misgivings proved prescient. In 1749, when the Chickasaws succeeded in destroying the tiny settlement at the Post because floods had driven the Quapaws upriver to Écores Rouges leaving the French unprotected, the French accepted the Quapaws’ invitation to join them, moved their settlement, and rebuilt their fort there (Map 6).\(^{15}\) Governor Pierre de Rigaud de Vaudreuil reasoned that since “this nation has always been loyal to us” and given “us proof of its attachment by its frequent raids upon the Chickasaws,”

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15 Écores Rouges (Red Bluffs) is what the French called the heights on the Arkansas River where the Arkansas Post National Memorial is located today.
he had “assented to the request” and had “ordered that the fort be built near a bluff where the Indians have established themselves.” He was convinced that “since the garrison and the soldiers were now in their new location, they will no longer be exposed to the surprise attacks of the enemy.”

Yet the Quapaws’ movements were hardly at an end. They moved again, this time downriver, when the French fort relocated to Desha County in 1756 in response to the beginning of the Seven Years’ War. The Quapaws resituated their villages about twelve, nine, and six miles by land from the new Post, presumably, given what Villiers had said about the tribe’s motives for relocating, to thwart any expedition the Chickasaws might mount against their villages and the Post during the war.

The Quapaws continued their habit of remaining close to the Post after the French regime had withdrawn from the Arkansas country and the Spanish had replaced it. In the spring of 1771, the Quapaws even laid out a road connecting their villages with the Post, and it is a reasonable assumption that they opened that road for mutual defense purposes, though of course it facilitated trade and diplomatic visits as well. Post commandant Captain Josef Orieta said that the closest village (it went unnamed) was now only two hours away (Map 7). Barely six years later, the villages were even closer to the fort: Osotouy was five miles upriver, Touriman was two miles above Osotouy, and Kappa two and a half miles farther on (Map 8). The French and the Quapaws had taken care not to wander too far from each other lest they fall victim to some enemy surprise. The momentum that carried this custom into the Spanish epoch is evidence of its strength during the French era.

16 Vaudreuil to Rouillé, Mississippi Provincial Archives, 5:30-37 at 35.
17 Orieta to Unzaga, March 31, 1771, AGI, CUBA, 107, fol. 174; Orieta to Unzaga, April 19, 1771, ibid., fol. 178.
18 Villiers’s census of the Arkansas nation, August 3, 1777, AGI, CUBA, 190, fol. 112-113.
Map 7. Locations of Quapaw villages and Arkansas Post, 1771. Map by Joseph Swain, courtesy of the author.

Map 8. Locations of Quapaw villages and Arkansas Post, 1777. Map by Joseph Swain, courtesy of the author.
The Quapaws’ Motives for Military Cooperation with the French

The Quapaws’ willingness to watch over the Post along with their numerous forays against adversaries of the French earned them many encomia from colonial grandees. They often described the tribe as a “faithful nation” and praised its constancy, it being “the only tribe,” as Governor Kelérec put it, “that has never wet its hands in French blood.”

The French, or some of them, believed that the Quapaws had a genuine affection for them. Antoine-Simon Le Page du Pratz, a chronicler and sometime romanticist who lived at Natchez, wrote that the tribe had shown “an unfailing fidelity to the French without being moved by fear or self-interest,” adding that “they live with the French who are near them more as brothers than as neighbors.”

Governor Kelérec, no mere sentimentalist, opined, speaking of the Quapaws, that “inclination has a greater part than self-interest in the services that they render us.” Post commandant Baltazar de Villiers described the relationship with the Quapaws as an unshakable mutual defense pact, but, as already remarked, he had a realpolitik explanation for it, allowing that the tribe’s “private and political interests” were what bound it to the alliance.

Villiers’s evaluation of the incentives that led the Quapaws to act as they did was closer to the mark. In sometimes characterizing Quapaw motives for defending the Post and raiding French enemies as selfless, the French were indulging a kind of colonial Tonto fantasy. The truth is that the tribe was almost always discernibly pursuing an independent foreign policy of its own, quite naturally accepting all the French aid it could get, when it undertook military operations. That aid usually took the form of guns and munitions and included various incentives as, for example, a bounty for enemy scalps taken and presented to the governor. Though a desire to retain the annual present the French provided must have played some part in informing the Quapaws’ actions, the Quapaws were not mercenaries, nor were they mere cats’ paws or agents of the French. They were fighting their own wars, not someone else’s.

The tribe’s separate policy aims are usually not difficult to discern. Their interest in defending themselves and having someone else to help them do so is manifest on its face. Their incentives for undertaking operations against other tribes are equally easy to divine, especially when it came to raids on their archenemies the Chickasaws and their allies. The Quapaws had long-time scores to settle by avenging past Chickasaw slave raids against them, a retaliation that could in its turn generate a vengeful reaction from the Chickasaws, the whole making for repetitive, self-renewing responses that bid fair to become endless.

There was also the related matter of territory. The Chickasaws had expelled the Quapaws from their villages on the banks of the Mississippi and it is likely that the Quapaws were seeking to reacquire some of their hunting territory, perhaps even to repossess and occupy some of their lost ground. These kinds of self-interested actions on the tribe’s part redounded incidentally to the benefit of the French colonial government in Louisiana, but that was not their principal aim. They meant, though, that by fighting a proxy war the French were better

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21Memoir on Indians by Kelérec, Mississippi Provincial Archives, 5:211.
22See Villiers’s census of the Arkansas nation, August 3, 1777, Archivo General de Indias, Seville, Spain (hereafter AGI), CUBA, 190, fol. 112-113.
23Between ca. 1670 and 1725, the British and their native allies enslaved between 30,000 and 50,000 southern Indians, including hundreds of Quapaws. Alan Gallay, The Indian Slave Trade: The Rise of the English Empire in the American South, 1670-1717 (Yale University Press, 2002), 296-297, 299.
able to maintain a tenuous political and military equilibrium in the middle Mississippi Valley and ensure that the vital commerce between Upper and Lower Louisiana went uninterrupted, without having to commit troops of their own to combat. The arrangement, illustrated most vividly in the siting of their settlements, was a model of strategic symbiosis.

Conclusion
The Quapaws and the French had very early discovered common ground in a common enemy and so their military aims had converged. But different motives fueled the convergence. The Quapaws were protecting territory, homes, and families. The French were trying to cling to a toehold on the rim of empire, to keep a colony cobbled together, and to advance a continental project.

When the end of the Seven Years’ War saw all these French ambitions collapse, the Quapaws saw a chance to establish a new international order with themselves at the center. They sought friendly relations and peaceful coexistence with both the English and the Spanish regimes, but, most dramatically, they ended their decades-long enmity with the Chickasaws and made a peace with them. This last rapprochement undermined the foundation of the French-Quapaw alliance and rendered the tribe’s connection to their new Spanish neighbors tenuous and fluid. The Quapaws’ dramatic shift in geopolitical strategy may account in some measure for its lack of enthusiasm for the Spanish project when Spain, scarcely a decade after it occupied the decaying French fort on the Arkansas river, made common cause with American revolutionaries.

Some Notes on the Maps
The maps that appear in this article reflect the best approximations that the surviving sources will support for the locations of the Quapaw villages and nearby French settlements in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. In only one or two instances is there any pretense to an exact precision. The limitations in the sources, some of which are imprecise, contradictory, interpolated, or even corrupt, not to mention the many changes the relevant river courses have made in the intervening years, makes a complete confidence in a location almost always impossible. On the other hand, the maps are hardly impressionistic. There is every reason to be confident that they are correct in a general sense and that no element on them is significantly misplaced. Most important, the maps are meant mainly to depict the locations of the settlements relative to each other and not their absolute locations. In short, they are more than sufficiently accurate to serve their purpose, which is to portray in a visual way the movements the Quapaws and the French settlers made over time in response to various incentives and pressures.

The meander line of the Mississippi River that the maps employ is taken from the map drawn about 1765 and published in Philip Pittman, *The Present State of the European Settlements on the Mississippi* (London: J. Nourse, 1770), Plate 2, following page 54. The meander of the Arkansas River follows its current course for several reasons, not least because, in the absence of other more specific information, it is as good a generic representation as any other.


I have not included a map indicating the locations of the Quapaw villages when La Salle visited them in 1682 because his activities lay mainly outside the scope of this article. A useful bibliographical guide to and commentary on relevant La Salle documents is available in Patricia K. Gallo- way, “Sources for the La Salle Expedition of 1682,” in *La Salle and His Legacy: Frenchmen and Indians in the Lower Mississippi Valley* (Jackson: University Press of Mississippi, 1982), 11-40. For my purposes, the most valuable of these sources have proved to be Jacques de la Métairie’s procès-verbal in *Margry, Découvertes et établissements des français, 2: 181-185; Father Membre’s letter to Le Roux in Maron A. Habig, The Franciscan Père Marquette: A Critical Biography of Father Zénobe Membre, O. F. M., La Salle’s Chaplain and Missionary Companion 1645(ca.)-1689* (New York: Joseph F. Wagner, 1934), 207-214: letter of Henri de Tonti, ibid., 215-229; Father Membre’s narrative in John Gilmary Shea, ed. and trans., *Discovery and Exploration of the Mississippi Valley* (New York: J. S. Redfield, 1852), 165-184; Minet’s relation in “Voyage Made from Canada Inland Going Southward during Year 1682,” Anna Linda Bell, trans. and Patricia Galloway, annot., in Robert S. Weddle, ed., *Three Primary Documents: La Salle, the Mississippi, and the Gulf* (College Station: Texas A&M Press, 1987), 29-68 at 46-49; and Nicolas La Salle’s account in Melville B. Anderson, ed. and trans., *Relation of the Discovery of the Mississippi River* (Chicago: The Caxton Club, 1898), 17-25.

**Map 2.** The principal sources for the late March 1722 map are *Journal Historique de l’établissement des français a la Louisiane* (Nouvelle Orleans: A. L. Boimare, 1831), 306-307, 313-317; and “Exploration of the Arkansas River by Bénard de la Harpe, 1721-1722: Extracts from His Journal and Instructions,” Ralph A. Smith, ed. and trans., *Arkansas Historical Quarterly* 10 (Winter 1951): 339-363 at 346-350. This map puts the French troops and Law’s Colony around Little Prairie, near the present community of Nady.

**Map 3.** The configuration of the Indian and European settlements later in 1722 is uncertain because of the extreme instability that the Chicka- saw threat had caused in the Arkansas country. But by late February 1723, the troops were still situated in the vicinity of Little Prairie and the bare remnant of Law’s Colony had moved downriver to be close to the Indian villages. See “Journal of Diron D’Artaguiette,” in Newton D. Mereness, ed., *Travels in the American Colonies* (New York: The MacMillan Co., 1916), 17-96 at 55-57; and Diron’s 1723 census in Morris S. Arnold and Dorothy Core, eds., *Arkansas Colonials: A Collection of French and Spanish Records Listing Early Europeans in Arkansas, 1686-1804* (Gillet: Grand Prairie Historical Society, 1986), 2. The late February 1723 map draws mainly from these sources.

**Maps 4 and 5.** The chief sources for the 1727 and 1738 maps are “Journal of Father Vitry of the Society of Jesus, Army Chaplain during the War against the Chickasaws,” Jean Delanglez, ed., *Mid-America*, 28 (1946): 30-59 at 49; and “Arkansas and the Jesuits in 1727 – A Translation,” W. H. Falconer, ed., *Publications of the Arkansas Historical Association* (Conway: Arkansas Historical Association, 1917) 4:352-378 at 368-369. By 1727, the Quapaw villages had again become disaggre- gated and Kappa and Osotouy had moved upriver, opposite Arkansas Post, which remained at Little Prairie. The only difference between these two maps is that Tonguingua has disappeared from the narratives. It remains absent from future accounts.

**Map 6.** For the location of the Quapaws and the French in 1749, which was at Écores Rouges,
currently the site of the Arkansas Post National Memorial, see Morris S. Arnold, “The Relocation of Arkansas Post to Ecores Rouges in 1779,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 42 (Winter 1983): 317-331 and the sources cited there. The sources imply that the Quapaws, at least at first, combined themselves into one settlement at Écores Rouges in 1748, so that is the way the map portrays the situation.

Maps 7 and 8. The maps depicting the situation in 1771 and 1777 are based on the distances by land between the relevant elements as reported in the commandants’ letters cited in the notes to the text accompanying the maps. Of course, the commandants’ figures are not straight-line distances, so separations are estimates resting on a generalized appreciation of the probable path taken from element to element. (The map in Morris S. Arnold, “The Quapaws and the American Revolution,” Arkansas Historical Quarterly 69 (Spring 2020): 1-39 at 10 inadvertently shows the Quapaw villages in reverse order.)