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# Hedging in Energy: The Case of LINN Energy, LLC 

An Honors thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of BSBA, Finance
by

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## Executive Summary:

This paper is a case study of LINN Energy, LLC over the period of Q1 2013 to Q4 2015. Due to volatility in commodity prices, energy companies choose to hedge their future production using forwards, futures, swaps, and options strategies. I selected LINN Energy as the subject for this study due to the breadth of detailed historical hedging information available through the company's website. LINN Energy disclosed much more than is required for independent oil and gas companies, making them the perfect case study for this thesis. LINN Energy, LLC is one of the few publicly traded LLC's and is based out of Houston, Texas. They operate domestically and, due to a combination of the current downturn in the energy market and expiring hedge contracts, will likely be facing Chapter 11 bankruptcy within the next year.

## Section I: Introduction

## Motivation:

Fluctuations in oil and natural gas commodity prices expose energy companies to a large degree of risk. Commodity price forecasts are the basis on which the drilling of wells are made. Once a commercial well is producing, it can have a related payback period of up to several years. Energy companies reduce the risk of volatile oil and gas prices by hedging their production. The current environment has seen staggering decreases in the prices of West Texas Intermediate, Henry Hub Natural Gas, and Natural Gas Liquids. Figures 1-8 show each one's historical price data from January 2013 to present, price projections provided by the Energy Information Administration, and lines of best fit for the data provided. Data in these charts contribute to the notion that oil and natural gas prices may not begin to recover until 2017. Changes in oil and gas prices and their effect on the performance of energy companies is an important topic to research because of the recent volatility we have seen, not just in the energy sector, but throughout the entire stock market. CNN Money recently argued that the United States stock market is no longer trading on fundamentals and has become surprisingly correlated with declining energy stocks. When oil prices dropped to $\$ 26$ per barrel, the S\&P 500 followed, dropping to its lowest level since April 2014. The same was seen when prices moved in the opposite direction. When oil prices increased by $23 \%$ over the course of one week in January, stocks were carried "sharply higher." CNN Money's analysis found that "the S\&P 500 is now almost perfectly correlated to the price of oil" even though the energy sector only accounts for $6.53 \%$ of the index [Egan, 2016]. Theoretically, if oil and gas producers are able to hedge their cash flows far enough into the future to withstand downturns, their equity prices would not suffer to the extent that we have seen when oil and gas prices decrease.

Independent oil and gas companies, like LINN Energy, protect themselves from commodity risk through the practice of hedging made possible by imperfect capital markets. Independent oil and gas companies are defined as non-integrated companies that receive almost all of their cash flows from drilling operations. They are exclusively in the exploration and production segment of the energy sector. Hedging is performed in independent oil and gas companies in order to avoid financial distress at the company level and avoid underinvestment problems. Underinvestment problems occur when companies do not invest in low-risk projects. Instead, they elect to take on riskier projects in order to maximize returns in the interest of the shareholders. When this occurs, debt holders are not compensated for taking additional risk.

Two types of commodity risk that independent oil and gas companies encounter include price risk and basis risk. Commodity price risk refers to the risk that an input such as crude oil will narrow a company's profit margin, making it more difficult for independent oil and gas companies to budget appropriately. This is why futures, forwards, swaps, and options are so commonly used to lock in a price at which the future good will be purchased or sold. Commodity basis risk "occurs when spot price and the futures price do not converge when the futures contract expires." Basis, in this case, is defined as the cash price less the futures price. There are other types of basis risk including time, location, and form. By hedging with forward contracts, futures, swaps, or options, energy companies are able to lock in the future price at which they will be able to sell the underlying asset or exchange cash flows, effectively lowering cash flow volatility. Forward contracts are agreements to buy or sell an asset at a specified price and future date. Futures contracts are also agreements to buy or sell an asset at a specified price and future date. The difference between the two is that futures contracts are more standardized and are traded on exchanges. Swaps are derivative contracts that are not traded on exchanges in which two financial instruments are exchanged. Options, on the other hand, are derivatives of securities that are traded on exchanges. Option contracts provide the buyer of the security with the right, but not the obligation, to buy or sell the underlying security at a specified price on a future date. Companies like LINN Energy who hedge $100 \%$ of their cash flows use forwards, futures, swaps, and option contracts as true hedging instruments. Companies that hedge less than $100 \%$ are actually using these investment vehicles as speculative tools.

The majority of forward contracts used in energy hedging are for three to five years in the future. This can be an extremely valuable tool for companies if prices go into decline. With long contract lengths, companies have an extended period of time to react to volatile market conditions. Problems for energy companies arise when declining oil and natural gas prices fail to rebound as hedging contracts expire. One of the current problems companies like LINN Energy are facing is their expiring hedging contracts. As hedges expire, energy companies are left low on cash which prevents them from paying off their debt. Many experts in the energy field are of the opinion that oil and gas prices will not recover until 2017. This is too long of a time horizon for many already struggling companies to ride out. Danny Campbell, chairman of the Permian Basin Petroleum Association was recently quoted saying, "today our goal is to survive...keep your name in the phone book and your debt low." Surviving is really all many American oil and gas producers can do right now seeing as there are "virtually no wells in the United States profitable to drill" to keep them stable as contracts continue to expire [Krauss and Corkery, 2016].

LINN Energy is organized as an LLC and is one of only 20 publicly traded companies with this unique structure. Most companies similar to LINN are organized as MLP's. Both LLC's and MLP's benefit from a tax perspective in that they do not pay taxes at the corporate level. What differentiates them is the presence of General Partners in MLP's. LLC's like LINN Energy only have Limited Partners which means that, unlike General Partners, they do not have voting rights.

This paper examines why energy companies hedge their cash flows, what techniques they employ to do so, and the extent to which they choose to hedge through the examination of case company, LINN Energy, over the period of Q1 2013 to Q4 2015. As we have seen over the past 18 months, energy companies are volatile investments that fluctuate in value with oil, gas, uranium and coal commodity prices. Independent oil and gas companies are exposed to fluctuations in oil and natural gas prices as well as production volumes. When prices are high, independent oil and gas companies behave more aggressively, leasing additional mineral rights and increasing drilling activity. When prices
are low, independent oil and gas companies decrease their drilling presence and sell off assets to finance their debt. This is why it is difficult for these companies to survive in downturns in the absence of cash flow hedging.

This thesis finds that LINN Energy, LLC is at a high risk of filing for bankruptcy due to their highly leveraged position. LINN Energy is currently facing negative gross profits, negative EBITDA values, and negative Earnings Per Share. This coupled with staggering amounts of long-term debt liability, high longterm debt to equity ratios, negative Return on Assets, Return on Equity, and Return on Investment support the assumption of many investors that LINN Energy will not be able to recover. See Tables 9-12. Although the entire energy sector is struggling to stay profitable despite declines in oil and natural gas prices, LINN Energy is struggling more than their direct competitors to stay in business. LINN Energy is most comparable in size and business operations to Carrizo Oil \& Gas Inc., Energen Corporation, Cabot Oil \& Gas, and EQT Corporation. Out of these five competitors, LINN Energy reported the lowest values of Gross Profit, EBITDA, Operating Profit, and Adjusted Net Income. What is arguably more concerning is the amount of Long-Term Debt reported on LINN Energy's Balance Sheet. LINN currently has over 3.5 times more Long-Term Debt than EQT Corporation, which has the next highest long-term debt of the other four competitors. From a leverage perspective, LINN Energy is second only to Carrizo Oil \& Gas. LINN reported a Long-Term Debt to Equity ratio of 226.6 while Carrizo reported 282.8 , both numbers well above their other three competitors. See Tables 13-15.

As LINN Energy's hedging contracts continue to expire and their leverage increases, they will likely not be able to cover their $\$ 2.3$ billion in outstanding debt. All of the financial statement data accompanied with the high probability that LINN will face another borrowing base decrease from banks in April 2016 leads me to think that their stock price will continue to fall until they either file for bankruptcy or are acquired. It is my recommendation that the stock should be shorted at \$1.20 (February 2016) and put options with a longer maturity date, such as those which mature on January 20, 2017 should be purchased.

The rest of this paper proceeds as follows: literature review, background of case company, analysis, and discussion and conclusion.

## Section II: Literature Review

The literature analyzed covers three topics related to LINN Energy, LLC. These three topics include the current state of the energy sector, hedging in energy companies, and the tax effects of organizing as an MLP of LLC.

## Current State of the Energy Sector:

LINN Energy is part of the Oil \& Gas Exploration and Production sub-industry. According to Glickman (2015), S\&P has a negative outlook on this sub-industry for the next 12 months. S\&P's opinion is that a recovery in oil and natural gas prices driven down by increased production and stagnant demand will be "slow coming." S\&P Capital IQ estimates that even though not all energy companies throughout the industry are directly tied to oil prices, $75 \%$ of the overall market capitalization in the industry is driven by exploration and production. These upstream operations, which LINN Energy also operates in, do directly benefit from high oil and gas prices. Because of S\&P's view that crude oil and natural gas prices will remain low in 2016, they believe that the industry will continue to experience high
levels of M\&A activity, particularly in upstream companies. The energy sector's EBITDA margin, which is a proxy for cash flow, decreased by $25 \%$ over the course of one year to $17 \%$ in Q3 of 2015. According to S\&P, 17\% is the lowest reported EBITDA margin level in 10 years. S\&P also notes that the market is looking at 2016 as a year for recovery although they do not share this particular view. They think the rebound will be slow because of how long it will take to "exhaust the excess supply that has created problems for the industry." S\&P's concerns are amplified by the resiliency of supply and the fact that there are approximately 5,000 uncompleted wells that upstream companies will start to stimulate and bring on-line once crude oil prices increase. If exploration and production companies are not cautious as prices begin to rise, they could "put a dent in the price recovery by building supply back up too quickly" [Glickman, 2015].

Another concern for the industry, and LINN Energy specifically are the upcoming April borrowing base redeterminations. Every April and October banks reevaluate how much money they are willing to lend to oil and gas companies. Depending on what happens in April, small producers like LINN Energy that are already struggling with high debt on their books could face a borrowing base redetermination that puts them in a position they cannot recover from.

## Hedging in Energy Companies:

Standard \& Poor's Directors, Michael Grande and Sherman Myers (2011), stated that it is normal for energy companies to hedge $70 \%$ to $80 \%$ of their volumetric exposure. It is their opinion that companies only do not hedge all of their exposure in case they do not have enough of the physical commodity to act as collateral for the contract in the event of a decrease in production volume. Although hedging ensures the company's future cash flows, hedging in itself creates a separate risk if a company finds themselves "out of the money." The more a company chooses to hedge, the less liquid they become. If a company's hedging contract goes in the opposite direction of what they expected, they are, if they do not have cash to cover the amount owed, required to cover the contract with physical commodities as collateral. These margin calls are part of the problem that the case study company, LINN Energy, is currently facing. The inability for them to cover their positions poses significant counterparty risk to their lenders. Two specific ways companies choose to hedge are by using direct product hedges and proxy hedges. When a direct product hedge is used, a company hedges a particular commodity with a contract for that same commodity. On the other hand, proxy hedges, also referred to as "dirty hedges," are when one commodity is hedged with a contract for another commodity [Grande and Myers, 2011]. One common example of a proxy hedge is hedging crude with a contract for natural gas liquids. In addition to price risk, basis risk needs to be taken into consideration. Differences in basis occur owing to the fact that oil and gas can be stored, also bringing into account potential arbitrage opportunities across time, location, and form. In the latter case, crude oil can be sold as is, or processed into gasoline, diesel, and other refined products before sale aka "cross-hedges."

According to Jin and Jorion (2006), firms hedge in order to minimize the costs associated with volatile cash flows. Their argument is that "hedging reduces the expected cost of financial distress" and that "hedging can also increase a firm's debt capacity". These same themes are reiterated by Artez, Bartram, and Dufey (2007): "higher leverage increases firm value through the tax advantage of debt". The downside of this is that highly leveraged firms are still obligated to their bondholders. If a firm cannot pay back their bondholders, they face the risk of filing for bankruptcy which incurs additional costs for the company. The expected costs of financial distress are highly positively correlated with a firm's leverage and the volatility of their future cash flows and with the risk of bankruptcy. This is why
hedging, which reduces cash flow volatility, is a key component of a firm's survival. The issue of hedging's ability to increase a firm's debt capacity has contributed to issues LINN Energy has faced with their high level of debt and leverage that will be discussed in more detail later in this paper.

Hickey (2011) says oil and gas producers hedge about $33 \%$ of their oil production ( $4 \%$ of oil reserves) and $41 \%$ of their gas production ( $5 \%$ of gas reserves). These numbers are confirmed by Jin and Jorion (2006). Hickey also concludes that larger companies hedged more than their smaller counterparts. He states that as hedging activity increases and earnings volatility decreases, firms are able to increase their debt ratio by $3 \%$. Another interesting point that Hickey (2011) details is the concept of "personal utility maximization for managers." Because managers are heavily exposed to the performance of their firm and cannot diversify as an individual investor can, they make decisions that protect themselves. This means that they will behave in a risk-averse manner, making hedging decisions for their company that protects their personal fortunes.

## Tax Effects of Organizing as an MLP or LLC:

Many energy companies choose to organize themselves as MLP's based on the unique tax structure afforded to them. "MLP's are publicly listed partnerships that invest primarily in the energy sector" [Benham and et al, 2014]. MLP's do not pay taxes at the corporate level and work on a fee basis for handling products without direct commodity ownership. Any company that generates at least $90 \%$ of its income from real estate, natural resources, and commodities is allowed to organize under this structure. Both MLP's, LP's, and LLC's have the potential to generate high profit margins for investors because of their tax structure. The flipside of this is that investors "do not enjoy the same fiduciary duty protections that apply to stockholders of publicly-traded corporations" [Miller and Davis-Nozemack, 2015]. The state of Delaware, which most LLC's and LP's are organized under, permit these companies to waive their fiduciary duties, meaning they are not held accountable for acting in the interest of the stakeholder. MLP's, LLC's, and LP's all file their taxes using Schedule K1's. From the perspective of the company, K1's are less complex than the 1099's Corporations have to file with because they do not account for the entire company on one form. The company does not file a Schedule K1 but each partner in an MLP, LLC, or LP files their own K1 form to report income, losses, and dividends. However, as an investor, K1 filings add more complexity and tax burden to the individual.

While the LLC structure of LINN Energy shares the same tax benefits, the difference lies in the company structure. MLP's have both General Partners and Limited Partners. Limited Partners are investors that do not manage the company and, therefore, have limited voting rights. The units of the company that they own entitle them to receive the cash distributions from the company that other shareholders would. General Partners, however, own a small stake in the company but act as managers and receive voting rights. As seen in Figure 16, LLC's like LINN Energy do not have General Partners or Incentive Distribution Rights. It should also be noted that the vast majority of LLC's are not publicly traded. In fact, LINN Energy is one of 20 with this unique structure traded on an exchange compared to 110 MLP's that are publicly traded.

On the other hand, many companies in this sector still choose to organize as traditional corporations even though this corporate structure is more expensive from a tax and regulatory perspective. Profits under this structure are "double taxed" because profits are taxed as they are earned and again when they are distributed as dividends. One main benefit of corporations is the liability protection that comes with it because company debt is not personal debt to the owners. The
corporation itself, not the shareholders, are liable for the actions and debts incurred by the business. Corporations also have more flexibility when it comes to how they use their profits. MLP's and LLC's have to distribute their profits to shareholders while corporations can retain some of their earnings or buy back shares of stock.

## Section III: Background of LINN Energy, LLC

I selected LINN Energy, LLC as the subject for this thesis because of the breadth of information provided on their company website regarding their historical commodity hedge positions. Independent oil and gas companies are not required to disclose their hedging strategies in as much detail as LINN Energy chose to which made LINN an excellent case study company for this thesis paper. LINN Energy is an independent oil and natural gas company based out of Houston, Texas. "Its properties are located in the Rockies, the Hugoton Basin (in Kansas), California, east Texas and north Louisiana, the MidContinent, the Permian Basin, Michigan/Illinois, and south Texas. As of December 31, 2014, the company had proved (gas) reserves of 7,304 billion cubic feet equivalent; and operated 19,591 gross productive wells" [LINE Profile \| Linn Energy, LLC Stock, 2016]. LINN Energy is interesting in the fact that many of its direct competitors are organized as MLP's. LINN, however, is one of the few publicly traded LLC's.

The Discounted Cash Flow (DCF) and Comparisons (Comps) Models attached to this report further explain LINN Energy's current financial situation. The 85\% drop in their equity value over the course of 2015 has led to their extremely low equity price compared to Carizzo Oil \& Gas Inc., Energen Corporation, Cabot Oil \& Gas, and EQT Corporation. Additionally, LINN Energy has, by far, the lowest EBIT and EBITDA values for the last 12 months. The Comps Model from Table 17 shows that LINN energy has the lowest Enterprise Value to EBITDA ratio out of the five companies. It also forecasts that they will have the lowest EV/Revenues and EV/EBITDA values in 2016. It also should be noted that, while LINN and three of the four comparable companies have no P/E value because each one failed to report earnings for the most recent quarter, LINN is the only company that has lost nearly all of its equity value. The DCF Model from Table 18 values LINN Energy shares of common stock at $\$ .88$ using the Fair Value Perpetuity Method and $\$ .16$ using the Fair Value Multiple method.

These facts highlight the going concern problems of LINN Energy. It is likely that they soon will not be able to cover their extreme levels of debt and will be forced to file for bankruptcy. In addition, LINN Energy is delaying filing their most recent 10K, leading more industry professionals to believe they have going concern issues. The company disclosed on March 1, 2016 that "it does not expect to remain in compliance with all of the covenants contained in its credit facilities throughout 2016." In April, the credit lines of LINN Energy and their subsidiary, Berry Petroleum, will be up for their semi-annual redeterminations. If their borrowing base is decreased again, they will be liable to make debt payments in a shorter time frame [Zeits, 2016]. All of these factors greatly increase the chance that they will have to file for bankruptcy.

## Section IV: Analysis

My analysis finds that energy companies hedge the majority of their exposure to commodity price fluctuations. LINN Energy, typically hedges $100 \%$ of their production four to six years into the future. By locking in prices this far ahead in time, they are afforded more flexibility in the event of a commodity downturn to make key business decisions from a position with stabilized cash flows. Their
strategy is to maintain a hedging mix with $70 \%$ of their exposure hedged using swaps and $30 \%$ using put options [Presentations, 2015].

The case of LINN Energy does bring up some interesting anomalies. For a company that is so well hedged how could they be failing? How is it that their stock price has dropped 85\% from January 1, 2015 to January 1, 2016? Even more dramatically, the stock was trading at $\$ 24.45$ at the start of 2014 and opened at $\$ 0.48$ at the start of 2016. In 2013, Gue (2013) said LINN Energy was one of his two favorite companies. He explicitly stated that LINN Energy's $100 \%$ hedging strategy would lock in the company's profit margin for the next seven years. Now we find ourselves three years into the seven and LINN Energy is in terrible shape. It is the opinion of Stifel analyst Brian Brungardt that LINN Energy could stay afloat through 2016 due to their cash flow and hedges but will probably be forced to file for bankruptcy [Blum, 2016]. This proves that even hedging $100 \%$ of a company's exposure still is not always enough to secure the future of a company during a prolonged downturn in the energy sector. LINN Energy's failure is linked to their highly leveraged position and the decisions by management to acquire parts of ExxonMobil and Devon Energy in 2014, before prices had reached the lows we have seen in 2016.

The 2015 capital budget for LINN Energy was based off of a $\$ 60$ per barrel average for oil and a $\$ 3.50$ per MCF average for natural gas. The company was too bullish on both oil and gas prices, creating a bad position for them when energy prices continued to trade at low levels as their hedging contracts continues to expire. This contributed to their financial distress forcing them to suspend distributions to shareholders and delay the release of their 10Q for the first quarter of 2016. Although LINN Energy paid off $\$ 1.8$ billion in net debt last year, they did not prioritize their debt retirement in the most efficient way and still owe an additional $\$ 9$ billion. They chose to pay off long-term debt instead of allocating cash to bank debt. The result of this mistake was that banks pulled back on the credit line that had previously been extended to LINN, lowering their available liquidity [LINN Energy, LLC's Worst Moves in 2015, 2015].

Aside from the company's loss of nearly all of their equity value, their bonds were recently downgraded to $\mathrm{D}+$. All ten existing issues are callable and have very attractive coupons given their shortterm maturity dates. Their maturity dates range from $5 / 15 / 2019$ to $9 / 15 / 2022$. The reason for their attractive yields, of course, is the risk that the company will be forced to file for bankruptcy and the debt will not be repaid. See Figure 19. Insider trading activity shown in Figure 20 should also be noted. Since 2014, all large transactions have been sales. It is arguable that if insiders thought the company would survive the downturn, they would be buying shares now that the equity price has dropped by $85 \%$ over the last year. However, they have continued to sell their stakes in the company throughout 2016.

From the period of Q1 2013 through Q4 2015, LINN Energy has modified the specifics of their hedging strategy. Throughout the period of study, their methods for hedging natural gas positions has remained constant. However, in 2013, LINN Energy reported hedging their oil exposure with fixed price swaps and put options. In 2014, they expanded their oil position hedging by adding collars and three-way collars to their hedging mix. In 2015, three-way collars remained a part of their strategy while traditional collars were removed. The benefit to hedging with a three-way collar option is the cost at which the company can purchase the option. Collars are protective options strategies that are implemented after a long position has experienced substantial gains. A collar is created when an out of the money put option is purchased at the same time that an out of the money call option is sold. In a three-way collar, an additional out of the money put option is sold. This option strategy creates additional risk to the
company in the event that prices decline and the lower priced put option expires in the money [Presentations, 2015].

LINN Energy's most recent hedging data from Q4 2015 is shown in Figures 21 and 22. From analyzing their quarter over quarter Commodity Hedge Positions reports, it seems as if LINN only made strategic changes in the first quarters of each year. The volume hedged using fixed price swaps for natural gas positions increased from 22,002 in Q4 2013 to 24,017 in Q1 2014. Similarly, 24,550 MMBtu's were hedged in Q4 2014 and 29,106 MMBtu's were hedged in Q1 2015. The same can be seen in their oil positions. In Q4 2013, 2,992 MBbl's were hedged. In the quarter following, they increased their hedged volume to $\$ 4,150 \mathrm{MBbl}$ 's. From Q4 2014 to Q1 2015, LINN decreased their hedged volume from 4,242 to $2,860 \mathrm{MBb}$ 's. The intermittent quarters showed little or no change in production volume hedged [Presentations, 2015].

## Section V: Discussion and Conclusion

While, in theory, hedging strategies are supposed to protect energy companies from declining oil and gas prices, we still see examples of companies like LINN Energy losing almost all of their value. LINN Energy's prevailing issue is their leverage. They merged with Berry Petroleum in 2013, not long before oil prices began dropping in mid-2014. Then they went on to acquire parts of ExxonMobil and Devon Energy in 2014. These transactions were leveraged and locked LINN Energy into high costs of debt. The debt the company would have to repay from 2019 to 2022 would take place following their hedges reaching maturity. By the time energy prices dropped even lower, LINN Energy had no money to invest in even better deals and lost out on the opportunity to dollar cost average down. Because of this, they are stuck with high costs of debt and leverage working against them [LINN Energy: Why Oil \& Gas Limited Partnerships Fail, 2015]. Hedging strategies can only help them so much, and for so long. Since the terms of their debt are longer than their protective hedges, they have to wait out the high costs and de-leverage as much as possible.

Given the information provided in this thesis, I am recommending to short the equity at $\$ 1.20$ (February 2016) and purchase put options. This leads me to the conclusion that the best put options to purchase are those with a maturity date of January 20, 2017. By the time this maturity date approaches, there is a high probability that LINN Energy will be in even deeper financial trouble because of additional expiring hedging contracts. It is also my recommendation to buy those available lots with strike prices of $\$ .50, \$ 1.00, \$ 1.50$, and $\$ 2.00$ because of the low trading value of the shares of common stock. See Figure 23. By purchasing put options, the buyer is protected in the event of bankruptcy. The Options Clearing Corporation requires the seller of the put option to fulfil their obligation to sell shares to the option buyer at the higher price, guaranteeing profits for the put option buyer. The insolvency of the company is separate from the option selling entity, meaning that a buyer of put options is still guaranteed profit and delivery from the option writer if the company files for bankruptcy.

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Figure 1: West Texas Intermediate Spot Price


Figure 2: West Texas Intermediate Price Projections

## West Texas Intermediate (WTI) Crude Oil Price



Figure 3: West Texas Intermediate Line of Best Fit Price Projections


Figure 4: Henry Hub Natural Gas Spot Price


Figure 5: Henry Hub Natural Gas Price Projections

## Henry Hub Natural Gas Price



Note: Confidence interval derived from options market information for the 5 trading days ending Feb. 42016. Intervals not calculated for months with sparse trading in near-the-money options contracts.

Figure 6: Henry Hub Natural Gas Line of Best Fit Price Projections


Figure 7: Natural Gas Liquid Spot Price


Figure 8: Natural Gas Liquid Line of Best Fit Price Projections


Table 9: Quarterly Income Statement and Projections
QUARTERLY INCOME STATEMENT
(\$ MILLINSS, EXCEPTP PER SHARE)


Table 10: Quarterly Balance Sheet and Projections
LINN ENERGY, LLC
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Hosson TX77002
Tiker: LINE

|  | Dect 18 | Decl7 | Dec16 | Dect5 | Sep15 | Jun15 | Mar15 | Decl4 | Sep14 | Jun 14 | Mar14 | Decl3 | Sepl3 | Jun13 | Marl3 | Dec12 | Sep 12 | Jun 12 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ASSETS |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cash \& Short-Term Investments | 615.326 | 532.381 | 460.617 | 398.527 | 344.806 | 3.943 | 48.312 | 1.809 | 59.161 | 38.339 | 68.314 | 52.171 | 27.480 | 1.152 | 6.034 | 1.243 | 1.154 | 1.883 |
| Net Receivales | 483.894 | 418.666 | 362.230 | 313.402 | 271.156 | 305.404 | 340.838 | 471.684 | 522.633 | 549.589 | 522.945 | 488.202 | 349.426 | 343.002 | 320.609 | 371.333 | 436.132 | 321.012 |
| Inventories |  |  |  |  | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Other Curent Assets | 2,220.679 | 1,921.335 | 1,662.342 | 1,438.261 | 1,244.386 | 1,148.973 | 1,267.301 | 1,233.097 | 2,367.796 | 199.493 | 207.246 | 275.567 | 272.400 | 347.226 | 472.838 | 438.852 | 399.088 | 559.414 |
| Total Current Assets | 3,319.900 | 2,872.382 | 2,485.190 | 2,150.190 | 1,860.348 | 1,458.320 | 1,656.451 | 1,706.590 | 2,949.590 | 787.421 | 798.505 | 815.940 | 649.306 | 691.380 | 799.481 | 811.428 | 836.374 | 882.309 |
| Gross Plant,Property \& Equipment | 33,506.465 | 28,989.847 | 25,082.062 | 21,701.040 | 18,775.774 |  |  | 18.738 .049 |  | 19,360.503 |  |  |  |  | 12,045.827 | 12,080.518 | 11,703,351 | 10,423.650 |
| Accumulated Depreciation | (14,527.697) | (12,569.387) | (10,875.053) | (9,409.114) | (8,140.780) | $(5,686.453)$ | $(5,751.083)$ | (5,011.964) | $(3,248.452)$ | $(4,187.077)$ | $\begin{aligned} & 1,(, 99.095) \\ & (3,920.032) \end{aligned}$ | $(3,657.223)$ | $(2,645.994)$ | $\begin{aligned} & 12,404.0 .915 \\ & (2,49,515) \end{aligned}$ | $(2,256.605)$ | $(2,09.377)$ | (1,650.153) | (1,484.828) |
| Net Plant,Property \& Equipment | 18,978.768 | 16,420.460 | 14,207.008 | 12,291.926 | 10,634.994 | 12,975.636 | 13,178.586 | 13,726.085 | 15,523.443 | 15,173.426 | 15,031.661 | 14,879.218 | 10,114.339 | 9,950.854 | 9,789, 222 | 9,981.141 | 10,053.198 | 8,938.822 |
| Investments Long-Term-Total |  |  |  |  | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA |
| Goodwill |  |  |  |  | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Intangibles- 0 ther |  |  |  |  | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Assets Long.Term Other |  |  |  |  | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA |
| Other Assets | 1,932.903 | 1,672.351 | 1,446.921 | 1,251.878 | 1,083.127 | 1,078.070 | 1,085.138 | 990.834 | 453.961 | 307.817 | 644.522 | 809.806 | 809.113 | 788.760 | 631.122 | 658.669 | 694.623 | 1,358.971 |
| TOTAL ASSETS | 24,231.571 | 20,965.194 | 18,139.119 | 15,693.994 | 13,578.469 | 15,512.026 | 15920.175 | 16,423.509 | 18,926.994 | 16,268.664 | 16,474.688 | 16,504.964 | 11,52.758 | 11,430.994 | 11,219.825 | 11,451.238 | 11,584.195 | 11,180.102 |
| LIABILITIES | . | - | - | - |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dett In Current Liabilities | - | . | - | - | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 1,300.000 | 0.000 | 207.502 | 211.558 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Accounts Payable | 1,014.252 | 877.532 | 759.242 | 656.898 | 566.349 | 579.289 | 608.226 | 814.809 | 826.976 | 860.171 | 797.460 | 849.624 | 659.170 | 673926 | 662.687 | 707.861 | 688.968 | 667.541 |
| Income Taxes Payable |  |  |  |  | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Other Current Liabilities | 327.716 | 283.541 | 245.320 | 212.251 | 183.640 | 160.717 | 185.329 | 167.736 | 330.046 | 198.285 | 224.909 | 191.551 | 168.602 | 103.331 | 154.167 | 115.271 | 171.958 | 112.302 |
| Total Current Liabilities | 1,341.968 | 1,161.073 | 1,004.562 | 869.149 | 751.989 | 740.006 | 794.255 | 982.545 | 2,457.022 | 1,058.456 | 1,229.871 | 1,252.733 | 827.772 | 777.257 | 816.854 | 823.132 | 860.926 | 779.843 |
|  | 1789694 | 15,48386 | 13065io | 11.500 |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Deferred Taxes \& Investment Tax Credits |  |  |  |  | @NA | @NA | @NA | $13.877$ | @NA | @ NA | @NA | $12.375$ | @NA | @NA | @NA | $6.307$ | @NA | $6,005.547$ @NA |
| Other Liabilities | 1,077.693 | 932.422 | 806.733 | 697.986 | 603.899 | 586.14 | 600.929 | 587.673 | 527.693 | 404.734 | 395.307 | 389.771 | 191.955 | 166.532 | 163.54 | 156.802 | 316.596 | 263.049 |
| total Labilities | 20,315.705 | 17,577.181 | 15,207.805 | 13,157.817 | 11,384.164 | 11,650.697 | 11,793.672 | 11,879,904 | 13,994.861 | 11,107.541 | 10,883.736 | 10,613.537 | 7,532.600 | 7,199.462 | 7,174.389 | 7,024.058 | 8,019.192 | 7,048.439 |
| Redeemable Noncontrol ling Interest | - | - | . | - | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| EQUTTY | - | - | $\cdot$ | - |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Preferred Stock |  |  |  |  | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA |
| Common Stock |  |  |  |  | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA |
| Capital Surplus |  |  |  |  | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA |
| Retained Earnings |  |  |  |  | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA |
| Less: Treasury Stock |  |  |  |  | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Common Equity | 3,915.865 | 3,388.013 | 2,931.314 | 2,536.178 | 2,194,305 | 3,861.329 | 4,126.503 | 4,543.605 | 4,932.133 | 5,161.123 | 5,590.952 | 5,891.427 | 4,040.158 | 4,231.532 | 4,045.436 | 4,427.180 | 3,565.003 | 4,131.663 |
| Shareholders Equity Parent | 3,915.865 | 3,388.013 | 2,931.314 | 2,536.178 | 2,194.305 | 3,861.329 | 4,126.503 | 4,543.605 | 4,932.133 | 5,161.123 | 5,500.952 | 5,891.427 | 4,040.158 | 4,231.532 | 4,045.436 | 4,427.180 | 3,565.003 | 4,131.663 |
| Nonredemable Noncontrolling Interest | . | . | . | . | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| STOCKHOLDERS EQUITY TOTAL | 3,915.865 | 3,388.013 | 2,931.314 | 2,536.178 | 2,194,305 | 3,861.329 | 4,126.503 | 4,543.605 | 4,932.133 | 5,161.123 | 5,590.952 | 5,891.427 | 4,040.158 | 4,231.532 | 4,045.436 | 4,427.180 | 3,565.003 | 4,131.663 |
| TOTAL LIABLITIES \& EQUITY | 24,231.571 | 20,965.194 | 18,139.119 | 15,693.994 | 13,578.469 | 15,512.026 | 15920.175 | 16,423.509 | 18,926.994 | 16,268.664 | 16,474.688 | 16,504.964 | 11,572.758 | 11,430.994 | 11,219.825 | 11,451.238 | 11,584.195 | 11,180.102 |
| Common Shares Outstanding |  |  |  |  | 355,050,000.000 | 355.205 | 336.887 | 331.975 | 331.820 | 331.668 | 331.406 | 329.661 | 235.178 | 235.209 | 235.074 | 234.513 | 199.646 | 199.557 |

Table 11：Quarterly Cash Flow Statement and Projections
LINN ENERGY，LLC 600 Travis
Houston，TX 77002 Fiscal Year： 12

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| $\stackrel{n}{\ddot{z}}$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { ब̈ } \\ & \text { © } \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { è } \\ & \text { ©े } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { no } \\ & \text { 育 } \\ & \text { 首家 } \end{aligned}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{\circ} \\ & \stackrel{\rightharpoonup}{c} \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  | 年筞 |
| $\frac{0}{\square}$ |  |  |  |  | $\frac{\text { à }}{\stackrel{\text { In }}{1}}$ | $\begin{aligned} & \text { en 筑 } \\ & \text { 守会 } \end{aligned}$ |  |  |  | ¢ | 長 |
| $\overline{\mathrm{I}}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { oin } \\ & \text { ion in } \\ & \text { en } \end{aligned}$ | $\frac{\mathscr{Y}}{\stackrel{\Phi}{9}}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { İ } \\ & \text { ® } \end{aligned}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { ప్ర. } \\ & \text { O. } \end{aligned}$ |  |  | 产 | శ్ర |
| $\stackrel{\infty}{\text { ¢ }}$ |  |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 念 } \\ & \text { 问 } \end{aligned}$ | Eie | $\stackrel{\otimes}{\stackrel{\circ}{\text { I }}}$ |  | $\begin{gathered} \stackrel{8}{6} \\ \underset{\ddagger}{\#} \end{gathered}$ |  | $\begin{aligned} & \text { 㸗䨚 } \end{aligned}$ | $\frac{\otimes}{\check{\Sigma}}$ | 끄응 |

 Acquisitions Acquistions
Investing Activities－Other
Investing Activites－Net Cash Flow FINANCING ACTIVITIES Sale of Common and Preferred Stock
Purchase of Common and Preferered Stock Cash Dividends Long－Term Debt－Isuance Long－Term Debt－Reduction Current Debt－Changes Financing Activities－Net Cash Flow Exchange Rate Effect Cash and Equivalents－Change
DRECT OPERATING ACTIVITIES Interest Paid－Net

Table 12: Annual Ratio Analysis and Projections
ANNUAL RATIO REPORT
(Ratio, Except As Noted)

| Dec18 | Dec17 | Dec16 | Dec15 | Dec14 | Dec13 | Dec12 | Dec11 | Dec 10 | Dec09 | Dec08 | Dec07 | Dec06 | Dec05 | Dec04 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 2.552 | 2.318 | 2.105 | 1.912 | 1.737 | 0.651 | 0.986 | 1.260 | 2.256 | 1.956 | 2.371 | 0.743 | 3.867 | 0.404 | 0.731 |
| 0.439 | 0.449 | 0.460 | 0.471 | 0.482 | 0.431 | 0.453 | 0.579 | 1.335 | 0.628 | 0.730 | 0.605 | 1.427 | 0.335 | 0.710 |
| 4.960 | 4.039 | 3.289 | 2.678 | 2.181 | (1.325) | (0.050) | 0.722 | 2.489 | 1.540 | 2.859 | (0.523) | 1.207 | (1.845) | (0.097) |
| 24.408 | 16.548 | 11.219 | 7.606 | 5.157 | 3.538 | 1.496 | 2.925 | 1.704 | 3.285 | 1.574 | (0.394) | (0.159) | (1.061) | 0.409 |
|  |  |  |  | @NA | @ NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | 174.897 | 71.327 | 74.183 | 132.090 | @ NA |
| 42.455 | 29.856 | 20.996 | 14.765 | 10.383 | 5.399 | 5.345 | 6.916 | 5.255 | 2.149 | 10.120 | (0.092) | 10.548 | (2.417) | @ NA |
| 0.367 | 0.349 | 0.333 | 0.318 | 0.303 | 0.166 | 0.180 | 0.233 | 0.150 | 0.060 | 0.337 | (0.003) | 0.320 | (0.137) | @ NA |
|  |  |  |  | 35.153 | 67.602 | 68.294 | 52.776 | 69.461 | 169.835 | 36.067 | ( $3,980.351$ ) | 34.604 | (150.998) | @ NA |
|  |  |  |  | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 2.087 | 5.117 | 4.920 | 2.763 | @ NA |
|  |  |  |  | 34.075 | 75.741 | 76.269 | 63.141 | 86.063 | 144.068 | 36.346 | $(6,892.238)$ | 44.718 | (239.264) | 87.596 |
| 0.384 | 0.379 | 0.373 | 0.368 | 0.363 | 0.156 | 0.176 | 0.233 | 0.153 | 0.074 | 0.393 | (0.002) | 0.253 | (0.110) | 0.221 |
| 0.742 | 0.818 | 0.902 | 0.995 | 1.097 | 0.394 | 0.396 | 0.473 | 0.277 | 0.111 | 0.520 | (0.004) | 0.424 | 0.565 | 2.031 |
| (3,173.669) | (892.483) | (250.979) | (70.579) | 19.848 | 26.987 | 34.152 | 70.488 | 57.260 | (0.426) | 79.829 | 2,333.121 | 66.526 | 156.977 | 65.410 |
| $(1,359.519)$ | (320.717) | (75.659) | (17.848) | (4.210) | (8.968) | (0.545) | 49.897 | 21.375 | (74.298) | 64.198 | 3,641.177 | 54.398 | 184.521 | 48.175 |
| (124.819) | (64.640) | (33.475) | (17.335) | (8.977) | (29.888) | (21.899) | 27.360 | (14.250) | (109.853) | 57.725 | 4,985.160 | 39.665 | 212.515 | (18.288) |
| (123.723) | (64.372) | (33.492) | (17.426) | (9.066) | (29.793) | (22.058) | 27.023 | (14.799) | (109.168) | 69.658 | 5,034.531 | 41.446 | 212.798 | (18.288) |
| (0.654) | (0.725) | (0.805) | (0.894) | (0.992) | 0.317 | (0.727) | 1.231 | (3.854) | 1.407 | 0.327 | (0.990) | (4.489) | (0.133) | 0.000 |
| (4.013) | (3.652) | (3.323) | (3.023) | (2.751) | (4.189) | (3.376) | 5.480 | (1.926) | (6.816) | 17.485 | (9.597) | 8.642 | (20.158) | (3.741) |
| $(1,904.259)$ | (511.898) | (137.607) | (36.991) | (9.944) | (11.735) | (8.733) | 12.787 | (4.099) | (12.065) | 29.908 | (17.978) | 17.559 | 120.328 | (37.139) |
| (211.591) | (53.690) | (13.623) | (3.457) | (0.877) | (1.019) | (0.067) | 7.812 | 2.156 | (3.000) | 14.604 | (7.570) | 11.814 | (20.150) | @NA |
| 0.291 | 0.281 | 0.270 | 0.260 | 0.251 | (0.639) | (0.005) | 2.696 | 0.434 | (2.226) | 9.682 | (2.999) | 3.973 | (6.994) | (0.127) |
| 0.282 | 0.272 | 0.262 | 0.253 | 0.243 | (0.634) | (0.012) | 2.675 | 0.412 | (2.181) | 9.653 | (3.039) | 4.106 | (7.004) | (0.127) |
| 589.488 | 464.164 | 365.483 | 287.782 | 226.600 | 152.063 | 136.381 | 116.470 | 98.375 | 64.797 | 59.897 | 71.241 | 94.962 | (441.618) | 679.208 |
| 589.488 | 464.164 | 365.483 | 287.782 | 226.600 | 152.063 | 136.381 | 116.470 | 98.375 | 64.797 | 59.897 | 71.241 | 94.962 | (441.618) | 679.208 |
| 694.940 | 390.635 | 219.581 | 123.430 | 69.382 | 60.885 | 57.695 | 53.804 | 49.590 | 39.319 | 37.460 | 41.615 | 48.759 | 121.326 | 87.175 |
| 388.707 | 246.329 | 156.102 | 98.924 | 62.689 | 55.560 | 52.726 | 49.920 | 46.230 | 36.607 | 35.018 | 38.048 | 46.830 | 95.308 | 68.471 |
| 25.579 | 15.683 | 9.616 | 5.895 | 3.615 | 2.802 | 2.587 | 2.333 | 2.128 | 1.770 | 1.710 | 1.873 | 2.032 | (5.969) | 9.928 |
| (1,077.970) | (718.647) | (479.098) | (319.399) | (212.932) | (98.684) | (154.400) | 106.397 | (319.991) | (101.718) | 29.003 | (42.531) | 40.482 | @ NA | @ NA |
|  |  |  |  | @NA | @ NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @NA | @ NA | @NA |


Quick Ratio Cash Flow Per Share

## ACTIVIY Turnover

 Receivables Turnover Total Asset Turnover Average Collection Period (Days)Days to Sell Inventory Days to Sell Inventory
Operating Cycle (Days) PERFORMANCE
Sales/Net Property, Plant \& Equip Sales/Stockholder Equity
完
 Pretax Profit Margin (\%)
Net Profit Margin (\%) Return on Assets (\%)
Return on Equity (\%) Return on Investment (\%)
LEVERAGE
Interest Coverage Before Tax
Interest Coverage After Tax
Long-Term Debt/Common Equity (\%) Long-Term Debt/Shrhldr Equity(\%) Total Debt/Invested Capital (\%) Total Debt/Total Assets (\%)
Total Assets/Common Equity DIVIDENDS
Dividend Payout (\%)
Dividend Yield (\%)

Table 13: Comparative Income Statement as of 12/31/15
COMPARATIVE INCOME STATEMENT
(\$ MILLIONS, EXCEPT PER SHARE)

|  | LINN ENERGY, LLC Sep15 | $\begin{aligned} & \text { CARRIZO OIL \& } \\ & \text { GAS INC. } \\ & \text { Dec } 15 \end{aligned}$ | ENERGEN CORP. Dec 15 | CABOT OIL \& GAS Dec15 | EQT $\substack{\text { CORPORATION } \\ \text { Dec } 15}$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Sales | 4,454.329 | 429.203 | 763.261 | 1,357.150 | 2,339.762 |
| Cost of Goods Sold | 5,731.850 | 1,341.357 | 449.770 | 623.803 | 834.938 |
| Gross Profit | (1,277.521) | (912.154) | 313.491 | 733.347 | 1,504.824 |
| Selling, General, \& Administrative Exp. | 427.863 | 67.224 | @ NA | 96.904 | @ NA |
| Operating Income Before Deprec. | (1,705.384) | (979.378) | 313.491 | 636.443 | 1,504.824 |
| Depreciation,Depletion,\&Amortization | 879.343 | 300.035 | 600.897 | 737.086 | 819.216 |
| Operating Profit | (2,584.727) | (1,279.413) | (287.406) | (100.643) | 685.608 |
| Interest Expense | 593.262 | @ NA | 43.108 | 96.911 | 146.531 |
| Non-Operating Income/Expense | 516.439 | @ NA | $(1,177.422)$ | 10.281 | 9.953 |
| Special Items | 213.527 | (38.137) | 27.200 | 0.000 | (122.469) |
| Pretax Income | (2,448.023) | (1,298.760) | $(1,480.736)$ | (187.273) | 426.561 |
| Total Income Taxes | (5.917) | (140.875) | (535.005) | (73.382) | 104.675 |
| Minority Interest | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | @ NA | 236.715 |
| Income Before Extraordinary |  |  |  |  |  |
| Items \& Discontinued Operations | (2,442.106) | $(1,157.885)$ | (945.731) | (113.891) | 85.171 |
| Preferred Dividends | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Available for Common | (2,442.106) | $(1,157.885)$ | (945.731) | (113.891) | 85.171 |
| Savings Due to Common Stock Equiv. | (3.909) | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Adjusted Available for Common | (2,446.015) | (1,157.885) | (945.731) | (113.891) | 85.171 |
| Extraordinary Items | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Discontinued Operations | 0.000 | 2.731 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Adjusted Net Income | (2,446.015) | (1,155.154) | (945.731) | (113.891) | 85.171 |
| Earnings Per Share Basic - <br> Excluding Extra Items \& Disc Op | (7.226) | (22.502) | (12.431) | (0.275) | 0.559 |
| Earnings Per Share Basic Including Extra Items \& Disc Op | (7.238) | (22.449) | (12.431) | (0.275) | 0.559 |
| Earnings Per Share DilutedExcluding Extra Items \& Disc Op | (7.226) | (22.502) | (12.431) | (0.275) | 0.557 |
| Earnings Per Share Diluted Including Extra Items \& Disc Op | (7.238) | (22.449) | (12.431) | (0.275) | 0.557 |
| EPS Basic from Operations | (7.658) | (22.020) | (12.660) | (0.280) | 0.850 |
| EPS Diluted from Operations | (7.658) | (22.020) | (12.660) | (0.280) | 0.847 |
| Dividends Per Share | 2.487 | @ NA | 0.080 | 0.080 | 0.120 |
| Com Shares for Basic EPS | 337.954 | 51.457 | 76.078 | 413.696 | 152.398 |
| Com Shares for Diluted EPS | 337.954 | 51.457 | 76.078 | 413.696 | 152.939 |

[^0]Table 14: Comparative Balance Sheet as of $12 / 31 / 15$
COMPARATIVE BALANCE SHEET (\$ MILLIONS)

|  | LINN ENERGY, Sep15 | $\begin{gathered} \text { CARRIZO OIL } \\ \text { \& GAS INC. } \\ \text { Dec } 15 \end{gathered}$ | ENERGEN CORP. Dec15 | CABOT OIL \& GAS Dec15 | EQT CORPORATION Dec 15 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| ASSETS |  |  |  |  |  |
| Cash \& Equivalents | 344.806 | 42.918 | 1.272 | 0.514 | 1,601.232 |
| Net Receivables | 271.156 | 54.721 | 63.097 | 124.552 | 176.957 |
| Inventories | 0.000 | 0.000 | 11.255 | 17.049 | @ NA |
| Prepaid Expenses | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA |
| Other Current Assets | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA |
| Total Current Assets | 1,860.348 | 232.182 | 246.340 | 144.786 | 2,251.019 |
| Gross Plant,Property \& Equipment | 18,775.774 | @ NA | 7,756.842 | 9,573.100 | 15,635.549 |
| Accumulated Depreciation | 8,140.780 | @ NA | 3,454.510 | 4,596.221 | 4,163.528 |
| Net Plant,Property \& Equipment | 10,634.994 | 1,716.861 | 4,302.332 | 4,976.879 | 11,472.021 |
| Investments at Equity | @ NA | @ NA | 0.000 | @ NA | @ NA |
| Other Investments | @ NA | @ NA | 48.358 | @ NA | 0.000 |
| Intangibles | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA |
| Deferred Charges | @ NA | @NA | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA |
| Other Assets | @ NA | @NA | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA |
| TOTAL ASSETS | 13,578.469 | 2,026.905 | 4,613.693 | 5,261.899 | 13,976.172 |
| LIABILITIES |  |  |  |  |  |
| Long Term Debt Due In One Year | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA |
| Notes Payable | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA |
| Accounts Payable | 568.349 | 141.873 | 64.742 | 107.375 | 291.550 |
| Taxes Payable | 0.000 | @ NA | 5.801 | 0.000 | 44.925 |
| Accrued Expenses | @ NA | @NA | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA |
| Other Current Liabilities | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA |
| Total Current Liabilities | 751.989 | 285.484 | 287.521 | 235.552 | 795.819 |
| Long Term Debt | 10,028.276 | 1,255.676 | 776.087 | 2,005.000 | 2,793.343 |
| Deferred Taxes | @ NA | 0.000 | 552.369 | 807.236 | 1,972.170 |
| Investment Tax Credit | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA |
| Minority Interest | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | @ NA | (71.317) |
| Other Liabilities | 603.899 | 41.691 | 101.856 | 204.923 | 386.798 |
| EQUITY |  |  |  |  |  |
| Preferred Stock - Redeemable | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Preferred Stock - Nonredeemable | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 | 0.000 |
| Total Preferred Stock | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA |
| Common Stock | @ NA | 0.583 | 0.818 | 42.377 | 2,153.280 |
| Capital Surplus | @ NA | 1,411.081 | 980.995 | 721.997 | 0.000 |
| Retained Earnings | @ NA | (967.610) | 2,046.279 | 1,551.649 | 3,028.590 |
| Less: Treasury Stock | 0.000 | 0.000 | 132.232 | 306.835 | 104.079 |
| Common Equity | 2,194.305 | 444.054 | 2,895.860 | 2,009.188 | 5,077.791 |
| TOTAL EQUITY | 2,194.305 | 444.054 | 2,895.860 | 2,009.188 | 8,028.042 |
| TOTAL LIABILITIES \& EQUITY | 13,578.469 | 2,026.905 | 4,613.693 | 5,261.899 | 13,976.172 |

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Table 15: Comparative Ratio Report as of 12/31/15

## COMPARATIVE RATIO REPORT (RATIO, EXCEPT AS NOTED)

|  | $\begin{gathered} \text { LINN } \\ \text { ENERGY, } \\ \text { Dec14 } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { CARRIZO OIL } \\ \text { \& GAS INC. } \\ \text { Dec15 } \end{gathered}$ | $\begin{gathered} \text { ENERGEN } \\ \text { CORP. } \\ \text { Dec15 } \end{gathered}$ | CABOT OIL \& GAS Dec15 | EQT CORPORATION Dec 15 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| LIQUIDITY |  |  |  |  |  |
| Current Ratio | 1.737 | 0.813 | 0.857 | 0.615 | 2.829 |
| Quick Ratio | 0.482 | 0.342 | 0.224 | 0.531 | 2.234 |
| Working Capital Per Share | 2.181 | (0.914) | (0.523) | (0.219) | 9.539 |
| Cash Flow Per Share | 5.157 | 6.493 | 9.075 | 1.790 | 7.977 |
| ACTIVITY |  |  |  |  |  |
| Inventory Turnover | @ NA | @ NA | 35.268 | 40.148 | 402.865 |
| Receivables Turnover | 10.383 | 5.889 | 6.914 | 7.832 | 9.688 |
| Total Asset Turnover | 0.303 | 0.171 | 0.142 | 0.254 | 0.180 |
| Average Collection Per (Days) | 35.153 | 61.981 | 52.789 | 46.602 | 37.677 |
| Days to Sell Inventory | 0.000 | 0.000 | 10.349 | 9.091 | 0.906 |
| Operating Cycle (Days) | 34.075 | 45.898 | 38.769 | 42.878 | @ CF |
| PERFORMANCE |  |  |  |  |  |
| Sales/Net PP\&E | 0.363 | 0.250 | 0.177 | 0.273 | 0.204 |
| Sales/Stockholder Equity | 1.097 | 0.967 | 0.264 | 0.675 | 0.461 |
| PROFITABILITY |  |  |  |  |  |
| Oper.Margin Before Depr (\%) | 19.848 | (228.185) | 41.073 | 46.896 | 64.315 |
| Oper.Margin After Depr (\%) | (4.210) | (298.090) | (37.655) | (7.416) | 29.302 |
| Pretax Profit Margin (\%) | (8.977) | (302.598) | (194.001) | (13.799) | 18.231 |
| Net Profit Margin (\%) | (9.066) | (269.139) | (123.907) | (8.392) | 3.640 |
| Return on Assets (\%) | (2.751) | (57.126) | (20.498) | (2.164) | 0.609 |
| Return on Equity (\%) | (9.944) | (260.753) | (32.658) | (5.669) | 1.677 |
| Return on Investment (\%) | (0.877) | (38.495) | (4.422) | (1.587) | 4.184 |
| LEVERAGE |  |  |  |  |  |
| Interest Coverage Before Tax | 0.251 | (17.770) | (33.349) | (0.932) | 3.319 |
| Interest Coverage After Tax | 0.243 | (15.734) | (20.939) | (0.175) | 1.463 |
| Long-Term Debt/Common Eq.(\%) | 226.600 | 282.776 | 26.800 | 99.792 | 55.011 |
| Long-Term Debt/Shrhldr Eq.(\%) | 226.600 | 282.776 | 26.800 | 99.792 | 34.795 |
| Total Debt/Invested Cap.(\%) | 69.382 | 73.875 | 21.136 | 50.196 | 27.808 |
| Total Debt/Total Assets (\%) | 62.689 | 61.950 | 16.821 | 38.484 | 22.126 |
| Total Assets/Common Equity | 3.615 | 4.565 | 1.593 | 2.619 | 2.752 |
| DIVIDENDS |  |  |  |  |  |
| Dividend Payout (\%) | 40.482 | @ NA | 21.553 | 5.891 | 31.932 |
| Dividend Yield (\%) | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA | @ NA |

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Figure 16: Company Structure Comparison

| LINN LLC STRUCTURE \& BENEFITS |  |  | LINN <br> Energy |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Characteristic | LINN Energy | Typical MLP | Typical Corporation |
| Non-Taxable Entity |  |  | $x$ |
| Tax Shield on Distributions / Dividends | Distribution ${ }^{(1)}$ | Distribution | Dividend |
| Tax Reporting | Schedule K-1 | Schedule K-1 | Form 1099 |
| General Partner |  |  | $x$ |
| Incentive Distribution Rights |  | (Up to 50\%) | x |
| Voting Rights |  |  | $\checkmark$ |

(1) Management and the Board have elected to suspend LINN's distribution indefinitely. effective September 30, 2015

Table 17: Comps Model

Discounted Cashilow Model - Valuation


Figure 19: Fixed Income Offerings


Note: Berry Petroleum is a subsidiary of LINN Energy, LLC
Figure 20: Insider Trading


Figure 21: Specifics of LINN Energy Oil Hedging Positions as of 12/31/15

## Oil Positions



Figure 22: Specifics of LINN Energy Natural Gas Hedging Positions as of 12/31/15


Figure 23: Put Options



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