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Silencing the Seventh Trumpet: Analyzing the Effect of Private Schooling on Voting Behavior

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Abstract

The United States has one of the lowest election turnout rates in the developed world. Consequently, social scientists are perpetually seeking to expand upon their knowledge of what factors are associated with voting, or the lack thereof. Commonly identified factors including age, income, educational attainment and race have been studied extensively (Pew, 2006; Leighley & Nagler, 2013; Hilty, 2013). However, there is one plausible factor associated with voting that might be underappreciated: the effect of private schooling. The limited literature that exists on the topic suggests that private schools, the majority of them Catholic, have a positive effect on civic outcomes, including voter participation. In using a rich, nationally representative dataset--the Understanding America Study based out of the University of Southern California-- I can reexamine whether attending a private school has an effect on whether Americans vote. I can also shed light on a heretofore unanswered question: How does private schooling impact which candidate an individual supports? Overall, the data indicates that private schooling appears to have no impact on voter turnout, but that attending some private school appears to have a liberalizing effect.

Motivation

Democratic norms

Voting matters. From an abstract perspective, we as a democratic society ought to ascribe value to voting, an exercise in democracy that Alexander Hamilton labeled "one of the most important rights of the subject… That right by which we exist as a free people." (Hamilton, 1879, p. 30). From a policy perspective, low voter turnout has practical consequences. Because minorities and low-income voters turn out at disproportionately low rates, their policy objectives go unfulfilled and economic policy is less redistributive than those voters would desire. (Meltzer & Richard, 1983; Hajnal, 2015). Moreover, President Trump secured a victory over Hillary Clinton with only 80,000 additional votes across three states while President Bush triumphed by 537 votes in Florida (Purdum, 2000). Simply put, small changes in who votes or how people vote can and do have dramatic consequences, even in national elections.

Forthcoming education reforms

It stands to reason that childhood experiences influence whether and how people vote. Consequently, it should also be true that school experiences influence voting behavior, as individuals spend a significant amount of their formative years within schools, which help to form their attitudes about the world around them. I seek to understand the effect of private schooling on voting behavior because access to vouchers is likely to increase under the leadership of Secretary DeVos, a battle-hardened voucher advocate. If private school enrollment increases as expected, then rigorous research should inform the consequential effects, which might include changes in voting behavior.

Lack of understanding

2016 was a strange election year that continually defied expectations. In July 2015 Pivit, an interactive data collection platform that combined polls, predictive analysis, wagering markets and social sentiment to generate odds estimated that Donald Trump had a 1% chance of securing the GOP nomination (Diaz, 2015). Four days before the election, Sam Wang, founder of the highly reputable Princeton Election Consortium, pegged Trump's odds of winning the general election at 1% (Revesz, 2016). Suffice it to say forecasting elections remains more art than science, and we have a long way to go in terms of understanding voting behavior.

Literature Review

Private schools and likelihood of voting

There is some high-quality instructive literature examining the effect of private school on the likelihood of voting, as highlighted by Wolf's (2007) meta-analysis of the effect of schools of choice on civic values. Dee (2005) used a probit model and instrumental variables (Catholic religious affiliation, local density of Catholic high schools and availability of mass transit) to find that Catholic school enrollment in the United States is associated with an approximately 10% increase in an individual's likelihood of voting. Similarly, Dill (2009) employs a national dataset to find that private school enrollment is associated with an increased self-report of voting when using logistic regression and controlling for socioeconomic characteristics. Smith and Sikkink (1999) used the National Household Education Surveys Program (NHES) and conducted multiple-variable regression analysis that controlled for socioeconomic factors, age, race, and region and found that Catholic and Christian school-goers are significantly more civically engaged, including voting in recent elections. Moreover, their study revealed that there are

appreciable differences between parents who send their kids to public school and parents who send their kids to private school. Of particular importance is their finding that parents of private school-educated students were up to 15 percent more likely to have voted in recent elections. If civic-minded parents have civic-minded kids as one would expect, then these findings underscore the need for models to properly control for parent-level covariates.

Greene, Mellow, and Giammo (1999) used a logit model with location, age, religious affiliation and socioeconomic controls to find that among Texas adults attending some private school is associated with a higher probability of voting. Interestingly, however, they find that adults who received all of their education in a private school did not have a statistically significant increased probability of voting. That curious finding squares with other literature concerning the effect of private schooling on civic values. For example, Greene & Kingsbury (2017) found that private schooling had a statistically and practically significant positive effect on anti-Semitic attitudes but that the dosage effect became slightly negative after approximately seven years of private education. In other words, an adult who received half of their K-12 education in a private school would be less anti-Semitic than an adult who received none of their education there and also less anti-Semitic than an adult who attended for twelve years. Whatever the cause, these findings underscore the need for the models to allow the relationship between voting outcomes and private school enrollment to be flexible.

In addition to these studies, there are two instructive experimental studies. Fleming, Mitchell and McNally (2014) employed survey data from the Milwaukee voucher program to investigate the impact of choice schools on civic outcomes. They polled currently enrolled high school students and find that after controlling for parent-level covariates, 66% of voucher lottery winners claimed they would vote in the future compared to 55% of lottery losers, a spread closely resembling Dee's instrumental variable estimate. Their methodology while ostensibly causal is not without concern, as self-prediction of voting is notoriously unreliable. Indeed, a large share of people who claim that they intend to vote will not do so. More surprisingly, up to half of those who claim that they will not vote do in fact vote (Rogers & Aida, 2012). Asking high school students about their intention to vote years in the future likely only compounds the measurement error.

Carlson, Chingos and Campbell (2016) compared the civic outcomes of winners and losers of the New York Choice Scholarships Foundation Program lottery by matching the

treatment and control groups to official voting records and found no distinguishable differences in outcomes in recent elections. Of course, both experimental studies come with a caveat regarding external validity: Private schools in New York City and Milwaukee are not necessarily representative of private schools nationwide, and it would be unsound to assume that the same effect would hold up in other regions.

Private schools and partisanship

There is scant literature informing how attending a private school might affect political affiliation or partisanship. Paterson (2000) performed a content analysis of textbooks used at Christian parochial schools (which constitute the majority of private schools in the United States) and reported that they espoused ideologically conservative viewpoints by means of integrating religious and nonreligious material and citing conservative thinkers with approval while omitting or downplaying more progressive thinkers. Paterson predicts that this conservative curriculum might influence later-in-life outcomes, opining that "such training might increase the Balkanization of our society" (p. 1).

Data

Data is drawn from the Understanding America Study (UAS) based out of the University of Southern California. The UAS is a nationally representative internet panel of 6,000 American adults in which respondents are asked to complete surveys on a wide variety of topics, from knowledge about the Ebola virus to sleeping patterns. To ensure that the sample is in fact nationally representative and to mitigate concerns about non-response bias, tablets with internet access were distributed to individuals to respondents with unreliable access. Moreover, to ensure an acceptably high response rate respondents were incentivized on a per minute basis up to $20.

For the purposes of this study I combined several datasets which together contain the variables necessary to model whether there are differences in the likelihood of voting between private school educated adults and public school educated adults after controlling for a variety of background characteristics. These datasets range from 1,760 observations to 6,422 observations and from a response rate of 74.25% to 95.34%. One of these datasets, labeled UAS 1, was dispensed to each individual within the UAS and contained post-stratification weights ensure that survey representative of the US population with regard to socio-demographic composition. I have used that weight in the models that follow.

Note that the dependent variable is self-reported voting in a post-election poll; respondents were asked whether they voted in the 2012, 2014 and 2016 national elections and who they voted for. At first glance the percentage of respondents who claim to have voted-92.5% in 2016, 63% in 2014 and 77% in 2012-could generate concerns about whether the sample is in fact nationally representative. However, there are two sensible explanations to allay such fears. First, voter over-reporting is a well-known phenomenon in social science research (Clausen, 1968; Hanmer, Banks & White, 2013), as "people tend to over-estimate the likelihood that they performed a socially desirable behavior in the past and to over-estimate the likelihood that they will perform a socially desirable behavior in the future" (Rogers & Aida, p. 3). Estimates of over-reporting range from about 8 to 14% (Belli, Traugott, and Beckmann, 2001) to as high as 20% (Martinez, 2003; McDonald, 2003). Second, it is likely that respondents within the UAS experienced something akin to Hawthorne effects in experimental research, in which members of the experiment modify their behavior because they are being observed. Specifically, it is likely that being repeatedly polled about the election increases interest in the outcome and one's likelihood of voting, a situation exacerbated by the fact that the rolling poll gained national attention in the summer of 2016 because it was one of few national election polls to predict a Trump victory. Unless private school educated adults and public schools educated adults are misrepresenting their voting history at different rates, something that is not intuitively expected, then the artificially high estimates are not a concern, as the purpose of the models is to observe differentiation in voting between private school and public school educated adults.

Methods and Results

Likelihood of voting

Unadjusted results confirm the original hypothesis that private school educated adults are more likely to vote. Indeed, each additional year of private school is associated with a .25%-.75% increase in voting within the past three national elections. Moreover, unadjusted results indicate that private-school educated adults closely resembled the rest of the population during the 2012 election, but in 2016 each additional year of private school was associated with a 1.1% decrease in the likelihood of voting for Trump.

Of course, unadjusted results are not a particularly useful measure of the effect of private schooling on voting, as enrolling in a private school is not random but correlated with factors

predictive of voting. T-tests indicate that an adult who was enrolled in any private school is 10.5% less likely to have reported financial struggles during childhood and 40% more likely to identify as Catholic. Both differences are statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. Given that those characteristics are positively correlated with voting, it is readily apparent that the unadjusted results do not render a meaningful look at the effect of private school vis-à-vis voting. Several models will be introduced to estimate the effect of private schooling on turnout and partisanship. I begin with a probit model to estimate the effect on turnout:

$$\Pr(Vote_i = 1|X) = \Phi\Big(\beta_0 + \beta_1 Priv_{Years_i} + \beta_2 Priv_{Years_i^2} + \beta_3 Age_i + \beta_4 Age_i + \beta_5 Relig_{Affil_i} + \beta_6 Stateborn_i + \beta_7 Econ_{Charac_i} + \beta_8 Parental_{Educ_i} + \beta_9 Born_{US_i} + \beta_{10} Race_i + \beta_{11} Female_i + \varepsilon_i\Big)$$

These controls are intended to attenuate the endogeneity in the decision to enroll a child in a private school. Consequently, I control for childhood characteristics rather than adult ones. This has two benefits. First, they are more meaningful in terms of mitigating endogeneity. An adult's income or educational attainment should have no predictive power of whether that individual's parents decided to enroll them in a private school as a child. Rather, the parents' income and educational attainment has explanatory power. Moreover, characteristics such as religiosity, cognitive abilities, income or educational attainment could plausibly be part of the treatment of attending a private school, and controlling for them may be problematic. If being enrolled in a private school effects these outcomes, then controlling for them biases the estimated effect.

Still, post-educational covariates are not entirely without merit. Considering that individuals tend to vote the same way as their parents (Lyons, 2005), controlling for political ideology in voting turnout models does have some benefit, as it proxies for the political beliefs of their parents, which is perhaps the most obvious omitted variable. Measuring religiosity serves much the same purpose. Consequently, I also offer models that control for income using household income brackets, religiosity (proxied by how often the individual attends religious services), intelligence (using combined scores from numerical and literacy tests) and political ideology (measured on a 1-10 Likert scale). Including these covariates also adds the benefit of better understanding the causal mechanism insofar as an effect does exist. For example, it might be observed that a positive effect becomes null once controlling for political affiliation. If that were the case then it could be reasonably deduced that either private school enrollment begets

religiosity which increases voting, or that students enrolled in private schools hail from religious backgrounds, which is what actually driving the effect.

Note that 2012, 2014, and 2016 elections outcomes are not pooled but treated as unique phenomena, as each election is indeed distinctive, and effects vary from election to election. A glance at appendix section A illustrates the rationale: African Americans were about 20 percentage points more likely to vote in Obama's reelection campaign, all else equal, but practically indistinguishable from other groups in the subsequent midterm election.

Overall, I find no statistically significant result in any election year, a finding which is not sensitive to model specification (see appendix A). However, that is not incontrovertible proof that there is in fact no effect, but rather that the estimated effect is not distinguishable from zero. As figure 1 illustrates, there is some evidence to support Greene et al.'s finding that there is a positive effect derived from a few years of education but that civic returns from private education diminish or even become negative over time.

Figure 1: Likelihood of voting in 2014 election



I would ideally consider subgroup effects for several groups, including Catholics, African Americans, and particularly those who report a disadvantaged childhood, as it is plausible that disadvantaged kids might experience a larger positive effect from private schooling. By being placed in a safe school environment with strong community involvement and openness to political discourse, they might be empowered to be civically engaged relative to comparable public school peers, or so the thought goes. Unfortunately, however, there are power limitations. The only subgroups for which I can derive a unique effect is men and women, whom the models estimate are practically indistinguishable with regard to a private schooling effect.

Partisanship

To estimate the effect of private schooling on political party affiliation and how individuals cast their vote, I use the same probit model that I used for voting likelihood but remove the Likert scale partisanship variable from all models, as this would wash out other effects. Moreover, I exclusively employ age as a linear variable within these models, as I have no reason to suspect that the relationship between age and partisanship (ie that increased age is associated with conservative, Republican voting) is non-linear.

These models produce some interesting and perhaps surprising results. While private schooling did not have any practical or statistical significance in explaining how individuals cast their vote in the 2012 election, it did effect voting in the 2016 election, specifically with respect to President Trump. As Figure 2 illustrates, adults who attended some private schools were

significantly less likely to vote for Donald Trump (compared to all other candidates) than adults who only attended public schools.

Figure 2: Likelihood of voting for Donald Trump



Specifically, an adult who attended one year of private school had a 5 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of voting for Trump, all else equal, compared to someone exclusively educated in a public school while an adult who attended seven years of a private school had a 10 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of voting for Trump, all else equal. Those with 12 years of private education are more likely to vote for Trump than individuals with only some private education, but still less likely than those with 12 years of private education. Note that joint significance tests show some sensitivity to model specification, as controlling for educational attainment and intelligence lower the confidence level of the joint significance test below the 90% confidence level. However, these may well be part of the treatment. It is likely that private schools deliver a better or more tailor-made education that promotes higher intelligence or educational attainment. Because intelligence and attainment are negatively correlated with supporting Trump (see Appendix 2D), controlling for them decreases the magnitude of the effect.

Interestingly, there is no practically or statistically significant effect of private schooling with respect to support for Hillary Clinton (see appendix 2D), as many private-school educated adults opted for a third party candidate. These findings call into question whether there is in fact

a private school liberalizing effect, or whether private school educated adults simply turned away from Trump. An illustrative way to consider this is to employ the same probit model and examine the effect on individuals who claim to identify with the Republican platform.

Figure 3: Likelihood of aligning with GOP platform



As figure 3 illustrates, the results are basically replicated: A few years of private school has a large effect on identifying as Republican while those with 12 years of private school and 12 years of public school are roughly equivalent. As figure 4 illustrates, the effect of private schooling on Democratic alignment roughly mirrors it, though the model is more sensitive to model specification.

Figure 4: Likelihood of aligning with DNC platform



Discussion

Evidence presented in this study is descriptive. After all, being enrolled in a private school is not random, and it would be impossible to fully control for everything that distinguishes private school educated adults from public school educated adults. Nevertheless, it does offer suggestive evidence that private schooling has no observable effect on voting turnout, but an appreciably large effect on how individuals cast their vote.

At first blush, the observation that some private schooling is associated with progressive ideology is surprising. Paterson's content analysis of Christian parochial school textbooks would give one the impression that private schools should produce conservative graduates. A cursory consideration of the modern politics of school choice only reinforces that belief. After all, advocacy for market-based education reform can be traced to the vanguards of the Old Right, whose anti statist views led them to caution, in the words of Frank Chodorov, that "What is known as 'free education' is the least free of all, for it is a state-owned institution; it is socialized education." (Demarrais, 2006). Promotion of market-based solutions (and by extension, opposition to monopolistic government control) also became tenets of libertarian and religious right policy. Schools were one of the main battlegrounds in Patrick Buchanan's "cultural war for the soul of America," for public schools were, according to Pat Robertson, "destroying democracy in America… (Their leaders) a group of ideological extremists who are so fixated with their illogical educational theories that they have lost touch with reality." (Edwards, 1998, p. 9).

Logically many religious or anti-statist parents opposed to public school politics and curricula would place their kids in private institutions where pedagogy and practice (eg school prayer) are aligned with their values. Given the frequency with which kids adopt the views of their parents, it seems that private school-educated adults *should* be disproportionately conservative, their education notwithstanding. So why is attending a private school associated with progressive ideology? Part of the answer is that the decision to enroll a child in a private school is rarely a political one. Indeed, most families that opt for a private school do so because they feel that it offers a better education, better learning environment, and smaller class sizes (CAPE, 2013). Going further, Catholic Schools, composing a majority of private schools nationally, often have explicit social justice themes. In *Catholic Schools and the Common Good*, Bryk, Lee and Holland (1993) explain that with the election of President Kennedy in 1960, the

perceived importance of Catholic Schools to protect and nurture Catholic students in a hostile new world faded. However, in the tumult of the era they found a new raison d'être: social justice. Catholic Schools openly and sometimes even defiantly embraced pluralism, a clear affirmation of the spirit of the recently convened Vatican II which asserted that schools should be "enlivened by the spirit of freedom and charity." (Byrk, Lee and Holland, p. 51).

While Catholic Schools' commitment to social justice might explain the overall private school liberalizing effect, an intriguing question remains: Why do adults with a few years of private education appear to be more progressive than those with none, while adults who spend their entire educational career in one setting closely resemble one another? One potential explanation is that those who are observed to have some years of private education have been exposed to a diverse range of settings, which might give them more progressive sensibilities, especially if the demographics of their public and private schools were unique from one another. Another is that parents who send their kids to private school for 12 years are fundamentally different in some unobservable way. In seeking to explain their finding that some private school exposure increases measures of tolerance but an exclusively private school setting does not, Greene et al. posit that "those whose families chose to send them to private school for all 12 years did so for clear and purposeful reasons. They may have an ideological opposition to the type of educational experience they believe that the government-run public schools provide, for example." (p. 441).

Perhaps the most sensible explanation is that the liberalizing effect is being driven by students who were enrolled in a private school during their elementary schools but not later during their academic years, as it plausible that the politics of private elementary schools and private secondary schools are quite distinct. Indeed, many private elementary schools boast high levels of integration and engage students with social justice themes at a young age (Miller, L. 2015). Private high schools, on the other hand, are perhaps comparatively more religious and conservative (Paterson). I attempt to test this hypothesis by running the same Republican affiliation probit model with years of private high school instead of overall private years and a quadratic term. The results do not support my hypothesis: each additional year of private high school is associated with a 1.2 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of aligning with the Republican platform and a 1.9 percentage point increase in aligning with the Democratic platform, all else equal. Meanwhile, taking the same approach but using a private elementary

school dosage variable also fails to support my hypothesis: each additional year of elementary school is associated with a .3 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of aligning with the Democratic platform and a 1.9 percentage point decrease in the likelihood of aligning with the Republican platform, all else equal. All of these estimates are statistically insignificant and must be interpreted with caution, as there are only 205 adults in the sample with any private high school education and 294 with any elementary high school education.

Conclusion

Progressives winced when President Trump appointed Betsy Devos Secretary of Education. Parroting her call that market-based education reforms would "advance God's Kingdom," they successfully fashioned a narrative that school choice is driven by conservative and corporate machinations and that private schools are factories of future conservative voters (Segar, M., 2017). Empirical evidence casts doubt over that narrative: Spending a few years in a private school appears to have a large liberalizing effect while spending 12 years in one makes an individual practically indistinguishable from their exclusively public school educated counterparts. This does not mean that increased access to vouchers would have been the difference in the 2000 or 2016 elections; it is impossible to say whether the effect would be the same in magnitude or even direction with a different population. Similarly, one should be cautious in concluding that increased access to vouchers in the future will shrink the Republican voter base. However, it does provide evidence that private schools are not the path to God's Kingdom as Devos and likeminded allies hope nor the road to political ruin that progressives fear.

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Appendix

1A.

2012 Voter turnout							
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Private years	0.011 (0.016)	0.012 (0.016)	0.010 (0.016)	0.007 (0.015)	0.015 (0.016)	0.007 (0.015)	0.010 (0.015)
Private years^2	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.000 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Age	0.022*** (0.004)	0.022*** (0.004)	0.020*** (0.004)	0.018*** (0.004)	0.020*** (0.004)	0.019*** (0.003)	0.016*** (0.004)
Age^2	-0.000*** (-0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Female	-0.013 (0.023)	-0.011 (0.023)	0.009 (0.024)	0.005 (0.022)	-0.013 (0.023)	-0.024 (0.022)	-0.005 (0.022)
Black	0.200*** (0.049)	0.208*** (0.050)	0.230*** (0.049)	0.221*** (0.049)	0.175*** (0.050)	0.191*** (0.050)	0.184*** (0.051)
Catholic	0.072** (0.032)	0.072** (0.032)	0.071** (0.032)	0.051* (0.030)	0.069** (0.032)	0.046 (0.030)	0.034 (0.029)
Protestant	0.073*** (0.028)	0.072*** (0.028)	0.056** (0.028)	0.055** (0.027)	0.066** (0.028)	0.051* (0.027)	0.034 (0.026)
Not enough money	-0.086* (0.045)	-0.088** (0.044)	-0.079* (0.044)	-0.061 (0.045)	-0.087* (0.045)	-0.064 (0.045)	-0.056 (0.046)
Liberalism	-	-0.004 (0.005)	-	-	-	-	-0.001 (0.005)
Intelligence	-	-	0.019*** (0.005)	-	-	-	0.004 (0.005)
Household Income bracket	-	-	-	0.022*** (0.003)	-	-	0.015*** (0.003)
Church attendance	-	-	-	-	0.054*** (0.014)	-	0.045*** (0.014)
Educational attainment	-	-	-	-	-	0.102*** (0.012)	0.079*** (0.013)
Prob>chi2 (private years and private years^2)	0.591	0.578	0.687	0.813	0.5199	0.899	0.799
Observations	1,644	1,643	1,644	1,641	1,610	1,644	1,606

1B.

2014 Voter turnout

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Private years	0.008 (0.019)	0.009 (0.019)	0.006 (0.018)	0.005 (0.018)	0.007 (0.018)	0.000 (0.017)	0.001 (0.017)
Private years^2	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Age	0.024*** (0.005)	0.024*** (0.005)	0.023*** (0.005)	0.022*** (0.005)	0.023*** (0.005)	0.023*** (0.005)	0.021*** (0.005)
Age^2	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000*** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
Female	-0.058** (0.027)	-0.056** (0.027)	-0.040 (0.028)	-0.042 (0.027)	-0.066** (0.027)	-0.073*** (0.026)	-0.067** (0.027)
Black	0.077 (0.058)	0.086 (0.059)	0.102* (0.060)	0.088 (0.059)	0.073 (0.060)	0.068 (0.059)	0.072 (0.064)
Catholic	0.055 (0.040)	0.055 (0.040)	0.055 (0.040)	0.038 (0.039)	0.053 (0.040)	0.026 (0.038)	0.017 (0.038)
Protestant	0.083** (0.033)	0.081** (0.033)	0.069** (0.033)	0.068** (0.033)	0.076** (0.033)	0.053* (0.032)	0.043 (0.033)
Not enough money	-0.074 (0.054)	-0.071 (0.054)	-0.066 (0.053)	-0.044 (0.055)	-0.054 (0.055)	-0.040 (0.054)	-0.013 (0.056)
Liberalism	-	-0.005 (0.006)	-	-	-	-	-0.002 (0.006)
Intelligence	-	-	0.016*** (0.005)	-	-	-	-0.000 (0.006)
Household Income bracket	-	-	-	0.022*** (0.004)	-	-	0.013*** (0.004)
Church attendance	-	-	-	-	0.065*** (0.017)	-	0.052*** (0.017)
Educational attainment	-	-	-	-	-	0.110*** (0.014)	0.092*** (0.016)
Prob>chi2 (private years and private years^2)	0.905	0.877	0.895	0.869	0.866	0.629	0.502
Observations	1,532	1,531	1,532	1,529	1,506	1,532	1,502

1C.

2016 Voter turnout							
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI	VII
Private years	0.009 (0.010)	0.009 (0.009)	0.010 (0.009)	0.006 (0.009)	0.011 (0.010)	0.008 (0.009)	0.009 (0.010)
Private years^2	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Age	0.006** (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)	0.006** (0.003)	0.005* (0.003)
Age^2	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)	-0.000 (0.000)
Female	-0.004 (0.017)	-0.005 (0.017)	0.004 (0.017)	0.001 (0.017)	-0.004 (0.017)	-0.005 (0.017)	-0.002 (0.017)
Black	-0.004 (0.029)	-0.007 (0.030)	0.006 (0.029)	0.002 (0.028)	0.009 (0.030)	-0.003 (0.029)	0.005 (0.032)
Catholic	0.016 (0.021)	0.017 (0.021)	0.015 (0.021)	0.012 (0.021)	0.017 (0.021)	0.011 (0.021)	0.011 (0.021)
Protestant	0.053*** (0.020)	0.054*** (0.020)	0.047** (0.020)	0.047** (0.020)	0.044** (0.020)	0.046** (0.020)	0.036* (0.020)
Not enough money	-0.007 (0.029)	-0.008 (0.029)	-0.006 (0.029)	-0.000 (0.029)	-0.015 (0.029)	-0.006 (0.030)	-0.011 (0.029)
Liberalism	-	0.002 (0.003)	-	-	-	-	0.005 (0.003)
Intelligence	-	-	0.007* (0.003)	-	-	-	0.003 (0.003)
Household Income bracket	-	-	-	0.007*** (0.002)	-	-	0.004* (0.002)
Church attendance	-	-	-	-	0.037*** (0.010)	-	0.038*** (0.011)
Educational attainment	-	-	-	-	-	0.024*** (0.009)	0.016 (0.010)
Prob>chi2 (private years and private years^2)	0.611	0.632	0.569	0.735	0.411	0.618	0.458
Observations	1,369	1,368	1,369	1,367	1,312	1,369	1,309

2A.

Supported Obama in 2012						
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Private years	0.003 (0.017)	0.003 (0.017)	0.006 (0.017)	0.006 (0.017)	0.000 (0.017)	0.006 (0.017)
Private years^2	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.000 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Age	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Female	0.124*** (0.027)	0.125*** (0.029)	0.115*** (0.028)	0.132*** (0.027)	0.121*** (0.027)	0.110*** (0.029)
Black	0.770*** (0.089)	0.771*** (0.090)	0.749*** (0.090)	0.758*** (0.084)	0.777*** (0.090)	0.734*** (0.086)
Catholic	0.062 (0.042)	0.062 (0.042)	0.064 (0.042)	0.080* (0.042)	0.053 (0.042)	0.071* (0.041)
Protestant	-0.080** (0.035)	-0.081** (0.036)	-0.073** (0.035)	-0.052 (0.035)	-0.093*** (0.035)	-0.057* (0.034)
Not enough money	-0.042 (0.057)	-0.042 (0.057)	-0.064 (0.056)	-0.035 (0.056)	-0.031 (0.056)	-0.052 (0.053)
Intelligence	-	0.001 (0.006)	-	-	-	-0.006 (0.006)
Household Income bracket	-	-	-0.013*** (0.004)	-	-	-0.019*** (0.005)
Church attendance	-	-	-	-0.079*** (0.017)	-	-0.086*** (0.017)
Educational attainment	-	-	-	-	0.051*** (0.014)	0.081*** (0.014)
Prob>chi2 (private years and private years^2)	0.865	0.864	0.887	0.910	0.752	0.868
Observations	1,295	1,295	1,292	1,276	1,295	1,273

2B.

Supported Romney in 2012

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Private years	-0.007 (0.020)	-0.008 (0.020)	-0.011 (0.020)	-0.011 (0.019)	-0.005 (0.019)	-0.014 (0.019)
Private years^2	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)	0.001 (0.002)
Age	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)	-0.001 (0.001)
Female	-0.150*** (0.030)	-0.145*** (0.032)	-0.139*** (0.030)	-0.159*** (0.030)	-0.148*** (0.030)	-0.130*** (0.032)
Catholic	-0.012 (0.048)	-0.012 (0.048)	-0.018 (0.047)	-0.030 (0.048)	-0.005 (0.047)	-0.0267 (0.046)
Protestant	0.152*** (0.039)	0.150*** (0.040)	0.141*** (0.039)	0.123*** (0.039)	0.162*** (0.039)	0.120*** (0.039)
Not enough money	-0.005 (0.065)	-0.002 (0.065)	0.028 (0.064)	-0.011 (0.065)	-0.018 (0.065)	0.0169 (0.063)
Intelligence	-	0.004 (0.006)	-	-	-	0.009 (0.006)
Household Income bracket	-	-	0.017*** (0.005)	-	-	0.022*** (0.005)
Church attendance	-	-	-	0.081*** (0.019)	-	0.088*** (0.018)
Educational attainment	-	-	-	-	-0.040** (0.016)	-0.076*** (0.017)
Prob>chi2 (private years and private years^2)	0.788	0.787	0.789	0.793	0.725	0.699
Observations	1,217	1,217	1,215	1,201	1,217	1,199

2C.

Supported Clinton in 2016						
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Private years	-0.000 (0.016)	-0.003 (0.017)	0.002 (0.016)	0.001 (0.016)	-0.004 (0.017)	-0.001 (0.017)
Private years^2	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.002)	0.000 (0.002)
Age	0.002** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)
Female	0.107*** (0.025)	0.124*** (0.027)	0.101*** (0.026)	0.115*** (0.026)	0.105*** (0.025)	0.113*** (0.027)
Black	0.779*** (0.076)	0.798*** (0.078)	0.768*** (0.076)	0.808*** (0.081)	0.778*** (0.077)	0.808*** (0.086)
Catholic	0.057 (0.038)	0.059 (0.037)	0.058 (0.037)	0.063* (0.038)	0.046 (0.037)	0.053 (0.036)
Protestant	-0.007 (0.032)	-0.015 (0.032)	-0.004 (0.032)	0.000 (0.032)	-0.016 (0.032)	-0.008 (0.031)
Not enough money	0.017 (0.051)	0.025 (0.050)	0.001 (0.050)	0.017 (0.050)	0.034 (0.051)	0.013 (0.048)
Intelligence	-	0.015*** (0.005)	-	-	-	0.009 (0.005)
Household Income bracket	-	-	-0.008** (0.004)	-	-	-0.015*** (0.004)
Church attendance	-	-	-	-0.073*** (0.016)	-	-0.079*** (0.016)
Educational attainment	-	-	-	-	0.060*** (0.013)	0.074*** (0.014)
Prob>chi2 (private years and private years^2)	0.893	0.922	0.817	0.829	0.963	0.925
Observations	1,455	1,455	1,452	1,430	1,455	1,427

2D.

Supported Trump in 2016						
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Private years	-0.032* (0.018)	-0.030* (0.018)	-0.036** (0.018)	-0.033* (0.017)	-0.030* (0.018)	-0.033* (0.018)
Private years^2	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.002 (0.002)	0.003 (0.002)
Age	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)
Female	-0.111*** (0.026)	-0.132*** (0.028)	-0.104*** (0.027)	-0.119*** (0.027)	-0.108*** (0.026)	-0.119*** (0.028)
Black	-0.805*** (0.093)	-0.825*** (0.095)	-0.796*** (0.094)	-0.804*** (0.091)	-0.805*** (0.095)	-0.808*** (0.097)
Catholic	-0.085** (0.038)	-0.086** (0.038)	-0.086** (0.038)	-0.087** (0.039)	-0.074* (0.038)	-0.079** (0.038)
Protestant	-0.026 (0.033)	-0.016 (0.034)	-0.030 (0.033)	-0.029 (0.033)	-0.018 (0.033)	-0.017 (0.033)
Not enough money	-0.028 (0.054)	-0.035 (0.053)	-0.011 (0.053)	-0.008 (0.054)	-0.043 (0.054)	0.002 (0.052)
Intelligence	-	-0.018*** (0.006)	-	-	-	-0.013** (0.006)
Household Income bracket	-	-	0.010** (0.004)	-	-	0.017*** (0.004)
Church attendance	-	-	-	0.070*** (0.017)	-	0.075*** (0.016)
Educational attainment	-	-	-	-	-0.059*** (0.014)	-0.070*** (0.014)
Prob>chi2 (private years and private years^2)	0.114	0.175	0.071	0.090	0.203	0.133
Observations	1,438	1,438	1,435	1,414	1,438	1,411

3A.

Democratic affiliation						
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Private years	0.029* (0.016)	0.029* (0.016)	0.030* (0.016)	0.028* (0.016)	0.027 (0.017)	0.029* (0.017)
Private years^2	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)
Age	0.000 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)	0.000 (0.001)	0.001 (0.001)
Female	0.070*** (0.024)	0.071*** (0.025)	0.063** (0.025)	0.075*** (0.024)	0.067*** (0.024)	0.058** (0.026)
Black	0.558*** (0.054)	0.559*** (0.055)	0.543*** (0.054)	0.557*** (0.055)	0.555*** (0.056)	0.533*** (0.058)
Catholic	0.036 (0.035)	0.036 (0.035)	0.040 (0.035)	0.041 (0.036)	0.029 (0.035)	0.035 (0.035)
Protestant	-0.040 (0.029)	-0.041 (0.030)	-0.036 (0.029)	-0.037 (0.029)	-0.048 (0.029)	-0.040 (0.030)
Not enough money	0.054 (0.049)	0.055 (0.049)	0.041 (0.048)	0.057 (0.049)	0.064 (0.049)	0.052 (0.049)
Intelligence	-	0.001 (0.005)	-	-	-	-0.003 (0.005)
Household Income bracket	-	-	-0.009** (0.003)	-	-	-0.013*** (0.004)
Church attendance	-	-	-	-0.040*** (0.015)	-	-0.043*** (0.015)
Educational attainment	-	-	-	-	0.034*** (0.013)	0.056*** (0.013)
Prob>chi2 (private years and private years^2)	0.195	0.201	0.144	0.191	0.257	0.207
Observations	1,686	1,686	1,683	1,651	1,686	1,648

3B.

Republican affiliation						
	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Private years	-0.058*** (0.017)	-0.055*** (0.017)	-0.062*** (0.017)	-0.058*** (0.017)	-0.055*** (0.017)	-0.058*** (0.017)
Private years^2	0.005*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.002)	0.005*** (0.002)
Age	0.002** (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)	0.002** (0.001)	0.002*** (0.001)	0.002* (0.001)
Female	-0.080*** (0.026)	-0.104*** (0.027)	-0.067** (0.026)	-0.086*** (0.026)	-0.077*** (0.026)	-0.086*** (0.026)
Black	-0.584*** (0.080)	-0.608*** (0.078)	-0.564*** (0.084)	-0.576*** (0.080)	-0.590*** (0.080)	-0.583*** (0.085)
Catholic	-0.035 (0.038)	-0.034 (0.033)	-0.047 (0.037)	-0.050 (0.038)	-0.022 (0.038)	-0.049 (0.037)
Protestant	0.036 (0.032)	0.049 (0.033)	0.025 (0.032)	0.019 (0.032)	0.048 (0.032)	0.031 (0.032)
Not enough money	-0.033 (0.053)	-0.040 (0.053)	-0.010 (0.052)	-0.018 (0.053)	-0.046 (0.054)	-0.010 (0.051)
Intelligence	-	-0.019*** (0.005)	-	-	-	-0.017*** (0.005)
Household Income bracket	-	-	0.019*** (0.004)	-	-	0.025*** (0.004)
Church attendance	-	-	-	0.103*** (0.016)	-	0.106*** (0.015)
Educational attainment	-	-	-	-	-0.050*** (0.013)	-0.070*** (0.014)
Prob>chi2 (private years and private years^2)	0.002	0.005	0.000	0.001	0.004	0.002
Observations	1,686	1,686	1,683	1,651	1,686	1,648

3C.

Liberal self-identification

	I	II	III	IV	V	VI
Private years	0.083** (0.039)	0.083** (0.039)	0.090** (0.039)	0.075* (0.040)	0.080** (0.039)	0.078* (0.041)
Private years^2	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.008** (0.004)	-0.009** (0.004)	-0.008** (0.004)
Age	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.002)	-0.001 (0.002)
Female	0.205*** (0.062)	0.207*** (0.064)	0.184*** (0.062)	0.237*** (0.064)	0.200*** (0.062)	0.201*** (0.065)
Black	0.895*** (0.125)	0.897*** (0.125)	0.850*** (0.125)	0.975*** (0.130)	0.892*** (0.127)	0.920*** (0.136)
Catholic	0.017 (0.094)	0.017 (0.094)	0.028 (0.094)	0.047 (0.094)	0.003 (0.094)	0.036 (0.094)
Protestant	-0.133* (0.077)	-0.134* (0.077)	-0.122 (0.077)	-0.116 (0.077)	-0.147* (0.077)	-0.125 (0.078)
Not enough money	-0.037 (0.144)	-0.037 (0.144)	-0.069 (0.144)	-0.075 (0.149)	-0.023 (0.145)	-0.093 (0.150)
Intelligence	-	0.001 (0.012)	-	-	-	-0.001 (0.012)
Household Income bracket	-	-	-0.023*** (0.009)	-	-	-0.032*** (0.009)
Church attendance	-	-	-	-0.210*** (0.041)	-	-0.211*** (0.041)
Educational attainment	-	-	-	-	0.059* (0.031)	0.109*** (0.036)
Prob>chi2 (private years and private years^2)	0.035	0.035	0.032	0.074	0.029	0.055
Observations	1,689	1,689	1,686	1,654	1,689	1,651