"Up Ewig Ungedeelt" or "A House Divided": Nationalism and Separatism in the Mid-Nineteenth Century Atlantic World

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“Up Ewig Ungedeelt” or “A House Divided”:
Nationalism and Separatism in the Mid-Nineteenth Century Atlantic World
“Up Ewig Ungedeelt” or “A House Divided”:
Nationalism and Separatism in the Mid-Nineteenth Century Atlantic World

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in History

By

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Abstract

My dissertation explores the experiences of a group of separatist nationalist from the Dano-German borderland with special emphasis on the 1848 uprisings in Schleswig-Holstein, the secession crisis in the United States, and the unification of Germany. Guiding this transnational narrative are three prominent members of the Schleswig-Holstein uprising: the radical nationalists Theodor Olshausen and Hans Reimer Claussen and the liberal nationalist Rudolph Schleiden. Their perceptions, actions, and writings in the years leading up to 1848 and during the first Schleswig-Holstein war (1848-1851) advance the understanding of separatist nationalism during this period in general and the Schleswig-Holstein uprising in particular. Following the failure of the Schleswig-Holstein uprising, the three men came to the United States, where the two radicals settled down as U.S. citizens and Schleiden joined them as diplomat of a German state. While they had been secessionists in Europe, they looked down on the threats of southern secessionists. Faced with the slavery-based southern nationalism, these men sided, like many Forty-Eighters, with the North against the oppression of slavery. Their decision was in disregard of the many similar arguments used by southerners against northern oppression and violations of southern constitutional rights, which mirrored those used by Forty-Eighters in Europe. During the American Civil War, Olshausen and Claussen once again relied on their radical experiences and challenged the Lincoln government during its greatest crisis, because the government had abandoned liberal principles. The three Schleswig-Holstein Forty-Eighters continued to look to their homeland and took interest in its fate. When the Schleswig-Holstein question reemerged in 1864, Schleiden and Olshausen returned to Europe. Their separatist nationalism had not suffered during their stay in the United States, despite their opposition to southern secession. They once again supported the independence of Schleswig-
Holstein. This dissertation illustrates how the language of secession and nationalism was shared during the mid-nineteenth century but also how secessionist movements failed to cooperate with one another. This study shows how complex and multifaceted the experiences of Forty-Eighters were.
This dissertation is approved for recommendation to the Graduate Council

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Acknowledgments

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Niels Eichhorn
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Abbreviations

AHL Archiv der Hansestadt Lübeck
AHR American Historical Review
APP Christian Friese, ed., Die auswärtige Politik Preussens, 1858-1871
BFSP Great Britain, British and Foreign State Papers
Bund Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Reichstages des Norddeutschen Bundes
CAU Universitätsbibliothek, Christian Albrecht Universität, Kiel
CB Correspondenz-Blatt (Kiel, Germany)
DD Der Demokrat (Davenport)
DZ Dithmarsische Zeitung (Heide, Germany)
LBSH Schleswig-Holsteinische Landesbibliothek, Kiel
MB Mississippi Blätter (St. Louis)
NAUK National Archives, London (Kew Gardens)
Reichstag Stenographische Berichte über die Verhandlungen des Deutschen Reichstages
SAB Staatsarchiv Bremen
SAH Staatsarchiv der Freien und Hansestadt Hamburg
WP Westliche Post (St. Louis)
Introduction

In 1848, Europe was turned upside down. For three years, revolutionary movements eclipsed monarchical power before peace, stability, and monarchy were restored. A little over a decade later, the United States experienced an even worse four-year stint of secession and civil war. It was a period of major upheaval throughout the world. From Auckland to Montreal, from Richmond to Buenos Aires, from Warsaw to Nanking, revolutionary movements, separatists, nationalists, liberals, conservatives, and many other groups competed to imprint their visions on states and nations. From 1840 to 1880, the world witnessed over 140 different conflicts, many of them concentrated around the Atlantic Ocean. The revolts of 1848, the American Civil War, and the Wars of German Unification stand out and have drawn the most historical attention by historians studying the mid-nineteenth century. One group in particular participated in all three of these upheavals, the so-called Forty-Eighters.

Historians have not overlooked the Forty-Eighters, revolutionaries from Europe who came to the United States. Their radicalism, democratic spirit, and desire for national unification contributed to the outbreak of the Civil War. Many of these recent immigrants joined the Republican Party and provided a new language for the sectional struggle that opposed the institution of slavery. These immigrants also contributed to the outcome of the war, since many fought in the Union armies. Although the German-American Forty-Eighters have become a fashionable group to study, the areas of inquiry have shifted little since the first major study on the subject.¹

Over time, historians have devoted much attention to individual Forty-Eighters in order to understand their actions and personalities and thus draw conclusions about the larger group.

However, these biographies focus on major figures, such as Carl Schurz, Friedrich Hecker, and Adolf Douai. Other works provide overviews of the Forty-Eighters or economic histories that explain why Germans, and not just political refugees, migrated to the United States. Finally, there is the scholarship on those Germans who joined or aligned with such political opposition movements as the anti-Lincoln radicals or the abolitionists.

A few problems exist within this scholarship. For example, Germans in the American South have been given scant attention. Historians rarely assess the distinctions in the political backgrounds of the Forty-Eighters. They portray German-Americans as one homogeneous immigrant community. Some historians have provided brief backgrounds to a handful of German-Americans, yet these treatments focus largely on those socialists, communists, or Marxists who remained involved in labor movements. Rarely mentioned are the backgrounds of the Forty-Eighters, their roles in Europe, and their ultimate destinations. More troubling is the

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6 Edith Lenel, *Friedrich Kapp, 1824-1884: Ein Lebensbild aus den Deutschen und den Nordamerikanischen Einheitskämpfen* (Leipzig, Germany: J. C. Heinrichs’sche Buchhandlung,
total lack of geographical distinction among the Forty-Eighters. Historians tend to group together radical revolutionary nationalists from Baden with socialist democrats from the Rhineland and separatist radicals from Holstein. Though convenient to study all of these individuals as one large group, such analysis prevents a clear understanding of the nuances of their revolutionary European experiences and how their subsequent actions in the United States represented breaks or continuations of those experiences.

In order to deal with these shortcomings in the historiography, this work will illustrate some of the strong connections and striking similarities between the secessionist movement in Schleswig-Holstein and the secessionist movement in the United States. The experiences of three separatist-nationalist Forty-Eighters from Schleswig-Holstein who participated in both movements offer a means to understand these connections and similarities. Since very few of these men have left historical records indicating their opinions, observations, and actions on both sides of the Atlantic, this work utilizes three leading figures to demonstrate the importance of assessing Forty-Eighters with attention to both their background and their actions. The three men are the radical separatists Hans R. Claussen and Theodor Olshausen and the liberal separatist nationalist Rudolph M. Schleiden. This approach also shows why historians should pay closer attention to the origins and backgrounds of the Forty-Eighters, whose widely diverse experiences make it difficult to group them in a single mass of German-Americans. Many of the migrants were radicals in Europe. In some cases, their radicalism continued, but others grew more conservative as time passed. Even as there was continuity in their radicalism, their secessionism took a dramatic shift. In Europe, they had been ready to fight all the great powers to win their

1935); Alfred Vagts, Deutsch-Amerikanische Rückwanderung: Probleme-Phänomene-Statistik-Politik-Soziologie-Biographie (Heidelberg, Germany: Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, 1960).
separatist struggle; in the United States, they fought just as hard to suppress the secession of the southern states.

Despite these three men being leading figures in the uprising in Schleswig-Holstein and within their local immigrant community, the historical literature rarely mentions them. Biographical sketches of them fail to illustrate the complexity of their experiences, are plagued with an uncritical (or even plagiarized) presentation of the subject, or present a superficial understanding of the experiences in the United States. This study will illustrate how important it is to connect the experience in Europe with those in the United States since they clearly influenced one another.

By looking at the intellectual transfer of ideas and the legacies Forty-Eighters brought with them to the United States, this study addresses a relatively new scholarship. In the past decade, historians have placed the American Civil War into a larger international, revolutionary framework. While such studies challenge the perception of the war as an exceptional event in the country’s history, they also illustrate how the language and intellectual currents that eventually brought about the war were not solely developed in the United States.

Don H. Doyle recently laid the basis for the study of the American Civil War as part of a much larger struggle over nation-state development. He further showed how secession was an

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international phenomenon during the mid-nineteenth century. In his first study on the subject, Doyle proposed that there were many similarities between the events surrounding Italian unification and those in the United States during the Civil War era. Doyle was especially interested in how southerners in the United States and residents of the Two Sicilies resisted attempts by powerful northern states to impose an alien way of life on them. The connections made in the work were still tentative, but they illustrated that much could be gained from stepping out of the nation-state centered narrative and engaging in comparative or transnational works.

Building on *Nations Divided*, Doyle added two edited volumes that continue the theme of nationalism and secession in the world. In *Nationalism in the New World*, contributors explore the often-overlooked development of nationalism in the Americas, but with the United States and the issue of southern nationalism playing only a marginal role. More useful for comparing the separatism of the U.S. South with other global secession movements is *Secession as an International Phenomenon*. Besides essays on the general questions of secession, this volume looks at secession in the southern states from a variety of angles and introduces a series of other secession movements in world history. The only troubling part is that the U.S. South is given such prominence that the work leaves the impression that the Confederacy became a model for other secession movements. Two essays dealing with pre-1861 secession movements in the Caribbean Basin, on Texas and Yucatan, suggest that New Orleans was central in the formation of secessionist thought in the region. All of the essays explaining secession outside of the

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Americas deal with modern secession movements, totally ignoring nineteenth century secession movements in such countries as Poland, Greece, Sicily, and Hungary.\footnote{Don H. Doyle, ed., \textit{Secession as an International Phenomenon: From America’s Civil War to Contemporary Separatist Movements} (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 2010).}

Doyle’s work laid the foundation for other international studies. An essential study connecting the language of abolition in the United States with events in the Caribbean, especially the slave uprising in Saint Domingue and British emancipation, is Edward Rugemer’s \textit{The Problem of Emancipation}. Rugemer shows how northern anti-slavery supporters looked to the Caribbean for inspiration in their own struggle against slavery and how southerners looked to the same region for evidence that abolitionism was a dangerous and economically disastrous proposal.\footnote{Edward B. Rugemer, \textit{The Problem of Emancipation: The Caribbean Roots of the American Civil War} (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 2008).} Rugemer’s work insures that future historians will have to take emancipation in the Caribbean and other Latin American countries into account when talking about the slavery question and the coming of the American Civil War.

This study will address primarily two other recent works by Andre Fleche and Paul Quigley. Both authors make convincing arguments that the language used in the United States during the antebellum years to describe oppression and constitutional conflicts was employed universally throughout the North Atlantic world. Both scholars also illustrate how Forty-Eighters and their revolutionary language influenced the escalation of sectional tensions in the United States. While Quigley approaches the subject in terms of a struggle over nationalism, Fleche is more interested in the revolutionary character of events and their international contexts. He even shows, for example, how Irish separatists faced a dilemma during the sectional crisis in the
United States, having to decide between support for separatism against outside oppression and the liberty and republicanism of the Union.\(^\text{14}\)

This study will show that secessionism was not restricted to the Americas or modern Europe, but that it also became a vibrant ideology in the Dano-German borderland of Schleswig-Holstein. Furthermore, the careers of the three separatist-nationalists who are the focus of this work will show how important it is to study the Forty-Eighters before their arrival in the United States if we are to understand their actions and decisions in America’s rush toward war. Like the Irish, Schleswig-Holstein’s Forty-Eighters were separatists, but their liberal, even radical, proclivities allowed them to avoid the dilemma faced by their Irish counterparts. This work will thus offer a more nuanced perspective on the Forty-Eighters and build on the connections emphasized in recent scholarship.

The choice of Schleswig-Holstein as a point of departure requires some explanation. Although the Schleswig-Holstein uprising was unique in many respects, it was also very similar to the secession of the southern United States. Both movements were expressions of the larger trend of separatist-nationalism in the nineteenth century, even thought, in contrast to the sectional conflict in the United States, the conflict in Schleswig-Holstein was almost as old as the princely states that occupied the base of the Jutland peninsula. Because of its strategic location, the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein had been battlegrounds since the Middle Ages. In the eighth century, Danes, Franks, and Slaves battled each other for control of the region. In order to stop incursions from the south, a defensive perimeter known as the Danevirke/Dannewerk (both the German and Danish spelling will be used in this work) was constructed. Initially, the land

was broken up into dozens of small fiefs, which over the centuries became consolidated. When, in 1460, the Danish king Christian I established a permanent claim to the duchies, national myth was born as a result of the Treaty of Ripe’s “Up Ewig Ungedeelt” (forever undivided) clause, which stipulated that the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein were never to be separated.

In the following centuries, the Schleswig-Holstein question became increasingly more complicated as the Danish House of Oldenburg broke apart and created additional lines of royal succession. As a result, the House of Oldenburg was not the only family with claims to the duchies, the Swedish kings and Russian tsars having also established family ties and claims in the duchies. The succession question had become so convoluted that by 1860 British Prime Minister John Henry Temple, Viscount Palmerston, exclaimed in agony, “Only three people have ever really understood the Schleswig-Holstein business—the Prince Consort, who is dead—a German professor, who has gone mad—and I, who have forgotten all about it.”

The big clash came in 1848, when a new Danish king tried to institute a constitution that would have integrated the duchy of Schleswig with its mixed German-Danish population, and the Danish kingdom, while leaving the southern duchy of Holstein, with its German population, as part of the German Bund. The conflict escalated into a full-scale war that lasted longer than any of the other European uprisings that year, and among all the uprisings (the Roman Republic potentially excluded), it alone drew the attention of all the great powers of Europe.

Few historians have given this complicated and complex rebellion the attention it deserves. With the exception of a recent short article by Steen Bo Frandsen about the Danish

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15 The German name will be used throughout to avoid confusion with Confederacy in Civil War America
perspective on the uprising, most works on the Schleswig-Holstein question are either dated or written from the German or Danish perspective, which few scholars in North America read. While Schleswig-Holstein is briefly mentioned in most studies of the German revolutions of 1848, these discussions and do not grant the uprising the detailed attention it deserves. After all, the conflict over Schleswig-Holstein may have begun as part of the “Revolution in Europe,” a concept that acknowledges the independent nature and origins of various revolts across the continent, but it became part of the “European Revolution,” drawing all the European powers into the fighting.

It is the unique character of the Schleswig-Holstein uprising among the 1848 rebellions that makes it important to the new Atlantic world of the mid-nineteenth century. The Schleswig-

16 Steen Bo Frandsen, “Denmark, 1848: The Victory of Democracy and the Shattering of the Conglomerate State,” in Europe in 1848, 289-311. A number of Danish works exist but have received only limited attention, see Claus Bjørn, 1848: Borgerkrig og Revolution (Copenhagen, Denmark: Gyldendal, 1998); Claus Bjørn, ed., 1848: Det Mærkelige År (Copenhagen, Denmark: Museum Tusculanums Forlag, 1998).


Holstein uprising was a separatist uprising against what was perceived as oppressive Danish policies. The uprisings became an internal civil war, with radicals and liberals fighting one another while trying to keep the Danes at bay and enlisting German support. The three men featured in this dissertation all took important and unique roles in this uprising.

The first part of this work will focus on the careers of Claussen, Olshausen, and Schleiden in Schleswig-Holstein and their roles in the first Schleswig-Holstein war. The beliefs and values developed during those years stayed with in their trek across the ocean and defined their roles in the American Civil War. While Claussen and Olshausen embraced radicalism and challenged the status quo in the duchies during the Vor-März (pre-1848 period in German history), Schleiden became a nationalist working in what he perceived as a foreign capital, Copenhagen, Denmark. As the conflict started in 1848, the two radicals became nuisances for the governments of the duchies with their demands for democracy and a vigorous prosecution of the war. Schleiden, as a diplomat, tried to win foreign support and assisted in the negotiations for a ceasefire and peace terms. When the uprising failed in 1851, the three men went in search of new homes.

All three men ended up in the United States, the topic of the second half of this study. Two of them arrived as immigrants; Schleiden went as a diplomat for the Hanseatic city of Bremen. They all came in conflict with the growing sectional tensions of the United States. While Schleiden initially remained aloof and focused on his diplomatic work, even he could not ignore the expansionist tendencies and violent sectionalism of the southern states. Olshausen and Claussen as early members of the Republican party and opponents of slavery, opposed everything for which the South stood. Like many other Forty-Eighters, each man contributed to the sectional break in 1860-1861, and it is here that the paradox of these Forty-Eighters emerges.
They had been ardent secessionists in Europe, but when faced with a secessionist movement and a nascent nationalism constructed on the institution of slavery, they abandoned their beliefs to support the Union.

This did not mean that their theoretical devotion to nationalism, radicalism, or secessionism had lost any of its strength. While Schleiden again assumed the role of negotiator in the early war, Olshausen and Claussen remained radicals and challenged the Lincoln administration’s conduct of the war, just as they had challenged the governments in Schleswig-Holstein. While Claussen’s radicalism weakened over time, Olshausen’s remained strong. In 1864, he left the United States because he disapproved of Lincoln’s reelection and the administration’s war-time policies.

By then, as well, the Schleswig-Holstein question had caused another war in Europe. Even while the Schleswig-Holstein Forty-Eighters refused to support the southern secessionists, with whom they shared many experiences, they were ready once again to be secessionists in Europe. They did not always act in unison. Schleiden was glad to support the new Schleswig-Holstein revolt and its princely pretender in 1864, while Olshausen insisted on a democratic-republican government, but neither man wanted Prussian rule. Like their secessionist counterparts in the United States, the German nationalists again failed to gain independence. Nevertheless, just as former Confederates produced a Lost Cause literature to redeem themselves, so the Schleswig-Holstein separatists tried to rescue their legacy by challenging the Bismarck-centric history of German unification.

Concerning terminology in the present work, a few clarifications are necessary. The word “radical” will refer to the various European extremists who supported democracy, republicanism, and the reduction of aristocratic involvement in the judicial process. Radicals also included early
socialists and communists. Radicals were not afraid of the masses and wanted to include them in
the political process. “Liberals,” by contrast, were more concerned about oppression from above
and below. They were predominately middle class and supported limited democracy and
constitutional monarchy. On the right side of the political spectrum were “conservative” and
“reactionary” elements. In looking at events in the United States, southern secessionists will be
referred to as fire-eaters to avoid any confusion between their secessionist movements and the
European agendas.
Chapter One
Schleswig-Holstein’s Sons

Since it is essential to understand the background of the Forty-Eighters and what they stood for in Europe in order to better understand their actions in the United States, the next four chapters are devoted to the background of Hans R. Claussen, Theodor Olshausen, and Rudolph Schleiden. This chapter will present their upbringings, educations, and early careers. For all three men, this was a formative period. They came into contact with the ideas of liberal-nationalism. Olshausen and Schleiden even experienced the policies of the reaction and how the monarchical order suppressed revolutionary activities. These were important lessons to learn, which they carried with them for the rest of their lives.

Theodor Olshausen was the fourth son of Detlev Olshausen and his first wife Ida, who died only two years after Theodor’s birth. Born on June 19, 1802, Theodor grew up in a religious family. His father was pastor in Glückstadt.¹ Theodor’s initial schooling took place in the Gelehrtenschule in Glückstadt. When his father assumed a new position as superintendent in the principality of Lübeck, the son transferred to the Gymnasium in Eutin, where he finished his basic education.² He then had to decide where to pursue a university education, and if he would follow in the footsteps of his father and two brothers and study theology.

Instead of theology, Olshausen opted for law, but his inability to follow and adhere to the law soon brought him into conflict with the reactionary authorities of the post-Napoleonic era. Like many sons of Schleswig-Holstein, Olshausen entered the University of Kiel in 1820. After

² Ibid., 14.
one year, he sought to broaden his education and study at the University of Jena. While in Jena, Olshausen, like many liberal-minded students, became involved with a *Burschenschaft* and the *Jünglingsbund*. *Burschenschaften* were student fraternities, which held liberal-national ideals. The authorities perceived them as threats to the conservative order and frequently cracked down on their activities. In 1823, Olshausen returned to Kiel.³

However, Olshausen’s activities in a *Burschenschaft* drew the attention of the authorities.⁴ His *Burschenschaft* was officially closed in August 1822, and he claimed that he and his fellow students closed their chapter down as ordered.⁵ Nevertheless, the authorities investigated their activities, and seventeen members of the *Burschenschaft* were implicated and faced harsh penalties. For the moment, Olshausen was among the lucky ones. He had no leadership role and he had followed the disbandment order.⁶ Regardless, he had critical words to say about the reactionary authorities, comparing the repression and prosecution of the student group to “Turkish despotism.”⁷ His words soon caught up with him, but he had embraced the radicalism that would define the rest of his political career.

When the Danish authorities launched an investigation into the *Burschenschaft*, Olshausen faced his first major difficult decision, since this investigation could lead to his arrest and imprisonment. Already in April 1824, he had made plans for a possible escape from Eutin to

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⁴ French troops invaded Spain to put down the Cadiz and Austria pushed for an intervention in Italy.


⁶ T Olshausen to J Olshausen, November 18, 1822, ibid., 34-35.

⁷ T Olshausen to J Olshausen, November 27, 1822, ibid., 36-37.
Paris. To mislead the authorities, he had created a smokescreen by telling people that he intended to go to the University of Göttingen. He knew that he could not go to that city because one of his friends from Jena was already incarcerated there.\(^8\) A warrant for his arrest was issued in late July.\(^9\) He went at once to Amsterdam, only to that he had spent so much money on his escape. By the last day of August, Olshausen had reached his temporary safe haven in Paris.\(^10\) It was not the last time that he had to escape from the authorities.

Upon his arrival in Paris, Olshausen discovered that his refuge was not a safe one. In addition to his lofty expectations of Paris, Olshausen had to admit that his inability to speak French would make it difficult to find work. Due to his woeful financial situation, he contemplated returning to Amsterdam, from where he could either return to the German states or go to the United States. He assumed that everything would be better in the United States.\(^11\) Olshausen then discovered another problem beyond his financial woes. All foreign residents had to register with the police in Paris and present a passport, to be issued by the diplomatic representatives of their homelands. Olshausen was in possession of a passport, thanks to his brother Justus, but he had no interest in being arrested by the Danish minister in Paris. Ignoring the registration order, he felt secure\(^12\) until December, when the French authorities in conjunction with the Prussians made arrests of fugitives and rubble rousers.\(^13\) As a result, Olshausen departed for Switzerland, where under a false name, he tried to earn money teaching

\(^8\) T Olshausen to J Olshausen, April 9, 1822, ibid., 42-43.
\(^9\) T Olshausen to J Olshausen, July 31, 1824, ibid., 49.
\(^10\) T Olshausen to J Olshausen, August 26, 1824, ibid., 49-50.
\(^11\) T Olshausen to J Olshausen, August 31, 1824, ibid., 51-52.
\(^12\) T Olshausen to J Olshausen, September 17, 1824, ibid., 56-57.
\(^13\) T Olshausen to J Olshausen, December 31, 1824, ibid., 66.
mathematics at a local gymnasium.\textsuperscript{14} While he felt more comfortable and secure in Switzerland, he could not find a more permanent job.\textsuperscript{15}

After two years in Switzerland, Olshausen, for reason unknown, returned to Paris for a year before heading to southern Germany. In February 1828, he was offered a position as editor of the \textit{Neue Augsburger Zeitung}. He also contemplated the purchase of the paper, but found the price of 1,000 gulden prohibitive. Despite that, Olshausen hoped he could expand the newspaper’s circulation. The only real competition came from the \textit{Augsburger Allgemeine Zeitung}, which, he claimed, was unpopular with the residents.\textsuperscript{16} He worked tirelessly to make a success of the paper, but reactionary censors were a constant problem for the liberal-minded Olshausen, and threats to shut down the paper did occur.\textsuperscript{17} Olshausen also clashed with the owners of the paper, who required more work than the job was worth. In early July 1828, after only five months at the paper, he questioned the owner’s inconsistency in pay and workload. They achieved a compromise that allowed Olshausen to leave his position, but he was again without an occupation.\textsuperscript{18} It was Olshausen’s first newspaper experience but like his revolutionary behavior and exile, journalism would be a mainstay in his life.

Without a job, Olshausen considered his possibilities, including a return to Holstein. He had come to appreciate some of the changes that were occurring in the duchies, especially the

\textsuperscript{14} Lorentzen, “Theodore Olshausen,” 330.


\textsuperscript{16} T Olshausen to J Olshausen, Februar 4, 1828, ibid., 80-82.

\textsuperscript{17} Lorentzen, “Theodore Olshausen,” 330.

introduction of the Norwegian constitution in Denmark, which was more liberal in character. He
decided to return home.\textsuperscript{19} By December 1828, he had requested amnesty from the government
and called on friends and family to write letters to the king on his behalf.\textsuperscript{20} He received a full
pardon, which meant he could finish his law degree and settle down to a legal career.\textsuperscript{21}

However, Olshausen was not interested in a legal career and soon found another calling.
Once more, trying the newspaper business, he took over the \textit{Correspondenz-Blatt} in Kiel.\textsuperscript{22} As
editor, he used the paper to promote the Holstein cause for autonomy from Denmark. In the
following years, he did not limit himself to the newspaper but took on a leadership role in the
community. As a firm nationalist, Olshausen was a driving force behind the construction of the
rail line between Kiel and Altona, which connected the bustling Elbe port near Hamburg with the
Baltic Sea. For his tireless work defending the railroad, he was made a member of the board of
directors, on which he served from 1844 to 1848.\textsuperscript{23} Consequently, by the time of the 1848
uprising, Olshausen was an experienced revolutionary, having been active in the
\textit{Burschenschaften}, a political exile in a series of European countries, and the editor of two
progressive newspaper.

Another leader of the democratic-radical movement in Schleswig-Holstein was born two
years after Olshausen. Hans Reimer Claussen was born into an ancient peasant family in
Fedderingen, near Heide, in Dithmarschen, on February 23, 1804. Despite the agricultural

\textsuperscript{19} T Olshausen to J Olshausen, Juli 25, 1828, ibid., 89.
\textsuperscript{20} T Olshausen to J Olshausen, December 15, 1828, ibid., 94.
\textsuperscript{21} T Olshausen to J Olshausen, April 15, 1829, T Olshausen to J Olshausen, October,
1829, ibid., 95-97.
\textsuperscript{22} Lorentzen, “Theodore Olshausen,” 330.
\textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 331.
background of his family, Claussen enjoyed writing and reading more than working in the fields.\textsuperscript{24} While still in primary school, Claussen had taken a position as a scribe with the church in Hennstedt.\textsuperscript{25} He then attended the \textit{Gelehrtenschule} in Meldorf.\textsuperscript{26} From 1824 to 1829, he studied law at the University of Kiel.\textsuperscript{27} After passing his exams, he established a practice in Heide, not far from his home.\textsuperscript{28} However, it was not the legal practice that allowed Claussen to break out of his provincial background but the marriage to Annina Amalia Claudine Rahbeck, the daughter of a Danish chancellery secretary.\textsuperscript{29}

In 1834, Claussen became involved in the national and constitutional question of Holstein. In that year, he published a series of five articles in the \textit{Dithmarsischen Zeitung}. The articles offered a clear liberal criticism of Holstein’s politics but stopped short of democratic radicalism. Claussen criticized especially the privileged and encrusted order that governed the duchies and prevented the establishment of an efficient political and impartial legal system. He suggested that Holstein’s diet should consist of members who had been elected by enfranchised voters, rather than by appointment or noble status. He suggested that women should have the right to vote, though not to hold office. He proposed that only a third of the diet be elected each


\textsuperscript{26} Schmidt, “Hans Reimer Claussen,” 3. Schmidt does not say if Claussen went to Gymnasium.


\textsuperscript{28} Schmidt, “Hans Reimer Claussen,” 4.

\textsuperscript{29} Ibid.
year, and that the passage of laws should require a two-third majority. He also wanted meetings of the diet opened to the public. However, while Claussen was liberal in questioning the aristocratic and privileged elite’s political position, he also feared that the mob and its unruly character that could influence politics in the wrong direction. Clearly, his suggestions were influenced by other democratic experiments at the time in Britain, France, and the United States. He believed that the two English-speaking countries, in particular, provided examples of how the democratic system should work. It is unclear when Claussen came in contact with those systems, but he would remain an admirer of them for the rest of his life.

After this initial engagement in politics, Claussen moved his legal practice to Kiel to be closer to the chief appeals court, the highest court in the duchies. However, he was unhappy as a lawyer and looked for other possibilities in Dithmarschen. In 1835, he applied for the position of church administrator for Burg and Süderhastedt, but complications arising out of a client’s legal case apparently undercut all possibilities of a return to Dithmarschen.

Another setback in Claussen’s political career came when he took up the defense of his hometown, Fedderingen. The town was under investigation by the authorities because some individuals had gotten behind on tax payments. Claussen argued that it was unjust and without legal precedent to hold an entire village responsible for the actions of a few. The county administrator, Carl Georg Heinrich Lempfert, disagreed and made sure Claussen was removed from the political scene. Lempfert was also in charge of selecting the church administrator, the

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33 Marhencke, Hans Reimer Claussen, 42-43.
position for which Claussen had applied. As a result of the disagreement, Lempfert “questioned Claussen’s loyalty and called him a ‘demagogue.’” 34 He also brought attention to Claussen’s lowly social origins by calling noting, “The hatred, which occurred quite frequently among peasant towards higher officials,” was part of Claussen’s nature. 35 As a result, Claussen’s application came to nothing.

Without a chance to enter the administration of the duchies, Claussen returned to political writing. He contributed more frequently to Olshausen’s Correspondenz-Blatt. 36 He also took up the liberal cause for Holstein and made contacts with such prominent leaders as Otto Fock, Friedrich Hedde, Caspar Engel, Theodor Mommsen, and Wilhelm Ahlmann. 37 As a result, Claussen was characterized as a “Neuholsteiner,” a group of politicians who argued for the complete separation of Holstein from Schleswig. Claussen dismissed the “up ewig ungedeelt” slogan espoused by many Schleswig-Holstein nationalists. Instead, he asked people to focus on the unification of Germany and Holstein’s inclusion in the new entity. 38 The movement remained relatively isolated because most nationalists were unwilling to sacrifice Schleswig, 39 but Claussen had in only a few years developed into one of Schleswig-Holstein’s most radical thinkers.

35 Marhencke, Hans Reimer Claussen, 45.
37 Stolz, Hans Reimer Claussen, 8.
39 Ibid., 12.
In 1842, Claussen won the election to the Holstein diet from the Neustadt-Heiligenhafen district.40 As a representative, Claussen continued to promote liberal values. For example, he supported revisions of the legal system, especially the abolition of secret court proceedings. He advocated public hearings and insisted that decisions be made by a panel of judges.41 Influenced again by the precedents in the Rhineland and the English-speaking world, he made an effort to introduce trial by jury in Holstein.42 Similarly, Claussen supported a suggestion to open the meetings of the diet to the public and to allow journalists to report on the meetings. He justified the changes as a means of preventing corruption among the delegates and providing more public oversight.43 It was during the financial and tax reform debate that Claussen was first attacked by a member of the diet as a radical democrat. He denied the accusation, but it was true.44 Most of his proposed changes went nowhere, but his long political career, eventually to span two-continents, had started.

Ten years younger than Olshausen and Claussen, but no less turbulent in his youth and early adulthood, was Rudolph M. J. Schleiden. After his parents, Christian Schleiden and Elise von Nuys, married on January 25, 1806,45 the couple used some of the money Christian had made in trade to fulfill his dream of returning to his native country, Holstein, and engaging in

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40 Ibid., 13.
41 Ibid., 14.
42 Marhencke, Hans Reimer Claussen, 74-75.
44 Marhencke, Hans Reimer Claussen, 78.
agriculture. He was lucky enough to be offered the large manor of Ascheberg, which had been owned by the prestigious Rantzau family, but unlucky enough to purchase the manor during a time of crisis and war in Europe. The couple struggled during the worker shortages and economic dislocation of the Napoleonic wars, and it was toward the end of those trying times that they had their fourth child, Rudolph, born on July 22, 1815.

Christian Schleiden was able to maintain the manor until 1825, when an agricultural depression, precipitated by reduced import duties on agricultural goods, and heavy taxation forced the sale of the estate. Writing at the end of his life, Rudolph Schleiden recalled with a hint of resentment that Denmark had lowered the tax burden for the kingdom while continuing to collect taxes in the duchies with military vigor. Appeals by the duchies for help from the German Confederation were heard but remained unanswered. The situation got even worse in the midst of the depression, when Sweden acquired Norway, thus eliminating an important export market for Schleswig-Holstein’s agricultural goods. Schleiden wanted to carry on because he knew that selling the manor would bankrupt him, but as his financial resources dwindled, he was forced to sell the manor below his own purchase price. The family found a new home, but

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46 Ibid., 51.
47 Ibid., 52. The purchase was a bargain Schleiden had to pay 265,000 Thaler for the manor, the Meierhof Lindau, three villages, and a few Erbpachtstellen which were worth 419,912 Thaler. He had a few business deals fail (collapse of a merchant house that owed him money and a valuable cargo taken as a prize) but felt sure that he could manage without.
48 Ibid., 58, 84-85.
49 Ibid., 120.
50 Ibid., 122.
51 Ibid., 123.
young Rudolph had been exposed to the national differences between Denmark and German-Holstein, a seed of antagonism had been laid.

To secure his family’s future, Christian Schleiden took a job with the German American Mining Company of Elberfeld. In December 1825, he went to Mexico to direct operations there, but returned to Europe in the summer of 1827 to become managing director of the company. All went well until the summer of 1831, when reports of the company’s faltering operations in Mexico sent him once again to that country. Corruption had so devastated the finances of the company that Schleiden moved its headquarter from Mexico City to the mines in San Simon de Angangueo, Michoacan. Equally troubling, Mexico was in the midst of a civil war. Schleiden faced off against bandits and other lawless elements. Shortly after sending a letter to his son on October 25, 1833, Schleiden contracted a fever, and the expertise of a German doctor could not save him. On November 8, 1833, he died in a distant country, far from his wife and family. It was a tragic loss, and Rudolph Schleiden’s first exposure to the larger Atlantic world.

Rudolph decided to honor his father’s last request by studying law instead of theology, which he preferred. Despite contemplating a career in the Prussian civil service, entering the University of Kiel on October 18, 1834, he began his new career under the guidance of

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52 Ibid., 123. It should be noted here that the Prussian Minister in Washington, Friedrich Joseph Karl von Gerolt (1846-1871), joined the Deutsch-Amerikanischen Bergwerksverein Ebersfeld from 1824-1827 and worked in Mexico, right at the same time that Christian Schleiden was with the Verein in Mexico.

53 Ibid., 146.

54 Ibid., 167.

55 Ibid., 168.

56 Ibid., 171

57 Ibid., 174-175.
Professor Nicolaus Falck. While not interested in joining a *Burschenschaft* or *Corps*, despite his liberal political views, Schleiden did have to learn how to handle weapons. Unfortunately, the dueling skills he acquired would cause two major embarrassments during the latter part of his college career.

In the late summer and early fall 1835, Schleiden participated in the protest surrounding the visit of the well-known but controversial Professor N. David. Joined by a few local citizens, the students offered a chorus of “Hurrahs” in front of David’s hotel as they celebrated well into the night. Their action created concerns for the university’s curator, who, fearing a large student protest, closed the university in September. Schleiden and many of his friends decided to continue their studies in Berlin. He was unimpressed by the Prussian capital, but enjoyed the cultural life of Berlin, with its museums and theatres. He also broadened himself intellectually by attending lectures in political theory, history, and national economics, given by such famous professors as Karl Friedrich von Savigny. After a year in Berlin, he continued his studies in Jena.

Schleiden described his year in Jena as formative for his judicial career because of the lectures given by the Geheim Justizrath D. Christoph Martin on criminal law and Geheimrath Karl Ernst Schmid on state and international law. However, there was also a long shadow over

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58 Ibid., 177.
59 Ibid., 181.
60 Ibid., 196-7.
61 Ibid., 200.
63 Ibid., 205-6.
64 Ibid., 216-7.
his Jena year. When Schleiden overheard a young army officer make some insulting comments about his family, Schleiden told him that his word were not worth his uniform. The officer demanded satisfaction, and on April 11, the two men faced each other with dueling swords at Castle Weissenfels. According to the prevailing dueling code, one of them would have to suffer six deep cuts before honor was restored. Schleiden’s fifth strike hit his opponent directly on the breast. Despite fears that he would live for only a few hours, the officer survived his wounds, but Schleiden, as will be seen, learned nothing from the rather serious incident.65

Regardless of the generally good experience in Jena, Schleiden decided to move to Göttingen, which at the time had one of the best universities in the German states.66 He looked forward to Heinrich Thöl’s lectures on commercial law and Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann’s on politics.67 However, Schleiden arrived in Gottingen at a precarious time. The new king of Hanover, Ernest Augustus, claiming that he was not bound by the old constitution that existed between the Kingdom of Hanover and the United Kingdom, had annulled the agreement. Seven professors in Göttingen protested the change and refused to consent to the new constitution. Their leader was historian and legal scholar Dahlmann.

Schleiden found himself in the middle of the student protests surrounding the so-called Göttingen Seven. He had particularly close ties with Dahlmann, whose house he visited on an almost daily basis and where he met some of the other six professors: Wilhelm E. Albrecht, Jacob and Wilhelm Grimm, and Georg G. Gervinus. Following the submission of the protest against the new constitution on November 18, 1837, many of the students, Schleiden included,

65 Ibid., 221-223.
66 Ibid., 234.
67 Ibid., 234.
welcomed the professors with hurrahs and jubilation. Despite Dahllmann’s objections, the students staged a protest, which was broken up by Hanoverian cavalry.  

Reacting swiftly to these threats, the king dismissed the professors, who were also accused of having instigated the student protests. The leaders, Dahllmann, Jacob Grimm, and Gervinus, had three days to leave the kingdom. Failure to comply would result in their arrest. Schleiden was upset to learn that his favorite professor had been dismissed, but the continued presence of cavalry with drawn sabers, infantry, and police ensured that no new serious protests would emerge. Demonstrations in front of Prorector Friedrich Christian Bergmann’s house and a temporary suspension of lectures by other professors in sympathy with the Göttingen Seven followed, and the protestors did not go unpunished. Schleiden, who had joined the demonstrations, had to appear before the university court. In his memoir, he prided himself on his refusal to accept any leniency from the court. Instead, he stood up for his principles and welcomed a four-day prison sentence. Since some of his favorite professors were leaving, Schleiden seriously considered leaving Göttingen, but he stayed until the end of the term before returning to Kiel. It was his first revolutionary experience, and he would continue to stand up for his principle, even to his personal detriment.

While Schleiden had the clear intention of finishing his law degree at Kiel, in January 1839, he had a knack for getting into trouble, and soon made a serious and far reaching mistake. Stepping in to negotiate a disagreement between two misbehaving corps comrades and a
barkeeper, he was challenged to a pistol duel. On January 20, a Sunday, the duelists and their seconds met in the Düsternbrocker Woods. Schleiden intended only to wound his opponent, but he missed the target. With the next shot, Schleiden was hit on the buckle of his shoulder strap and the bullet pierced the flesh near the shoulder. After some arguing, he and his opponent agreed to continue the duel the next day.

Instead of resuming the contest, Schleiden was called before the prorector and the university court. Initially, it appeared as though he would escape serious punishment, but when one of the doctors was brought before the court, the truth came out and a lengthy incarceration loomed. Based on a local law from 1731, which punished all duels that did not result in death with exile or imprisonment, the court sentenced Schleiden on May 15 to two years incarceration in the castle (city-gate) at Nyborg. On June 12, 1839, Schleiden reported to Nyborg, where the local commander, Colonel von Lützen, tried to make his stay as comfortable as possible. With the help of some locals and friends in Kiel, Schleiden obtained books and continued his studies. Upon the urging of friends, he decided to use the death of King Frederik VI, on December 3, 1839, to apply for a reduced sentence and pardon from the new king, Christian VIII. The first request failed when the chancellery for Schleswig-Holstein and Lauenburg

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72 Ibid., 255-6.
73 Ibid., 256-7.
74 Ibid., 257-61.
75 Ibid., 264.
76 Ibid., 265-8.
77 Ibid., 275-6.
opposed the pardon, but Crown Prince Frederik Carl Christian encouraged Schleiden to try again.  

In early June, Schleiden renewed his request for a pardon based on an elaborate legal argument. The commander of the local troops informed him that the crown prince and the king had decided that he would be pardoned shortly after the coronation. When the king visited Nyborg, he announced to Schleiden that his prison term was over and that it would not affect his possible future in the civil service, which by then became his ambition. Shortly after his return to Kiel, Schleiden applied to finish his exams. On October 5, 1840, the grueling exam process commenced, and Schleiden passed.

Through friends, he secured a third secretary position with the Conferenzrath Ludwig Heinrich Scholtz, head of the local authorities in Storman. Scholtz was responsible for the districts of Reinbeck, Trittau, and Tremsbüttle, as well as for the sovereign’s manors Wandsbeck and Wellingsbüttel. Schleiden was the most junior member of this local bureaucracy, but he bore his fair share of the workload. He learned to make clear decisions and to stick with them. Once Scholtz advised him, “Take your case back with you and present it again as soon as you

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78 Ibid., 277-78, 287.
79 Ibid., 289-90.
80 Ibid., 292-94.
81 Ibid., 298.
82 Ibid., 300-301.
84 Ibid., 4.
have come to a definite decision, I will then tell you if you made the right choice.” Much like his revolutionary college experience in Göttingen, his work in Storman, which at times was almost diplomatic in nature, was another valuable lesson for Schleiden.

Nevertheless, Schleiden aspired to more, and so looked for a career in the Danish civil service in Copenhagen. His first opportunity for a career change came in December 1841, when Schleiden learned that one of his former professors, Dr. Georg Hanssen, had accepted a new academic position in Leipzig. For a time, Schleiden contemplated an academic career for himself, as a professor of political science, but the death of a colleague in Reinbeck obliged him to remain at his post. His superior, in talking with him about the lost opportunity, raised new hopes by indicating that a civil service career would allow faster advancement than an academic one. So for the moment, Schleiden remained in Reinbeck. However, by 1843, a new opportunity had arisen with an opening in the administration of Schleswig-Holstein in Copenhagen. Schleiden seriously considered the change and the possibilities for advancement in Denmark until receiving an invitation from Adolph von Warnstedt to apply for an auscultanten position with the General Customs and Commerz Collegium in Copenhagen.

On June 26, 1843, Schleiden visited Copenhagen to present himself to the king, who promised quick action on his request. On July 25, having received confirmation of his appointment, Schleiden assumed his new position under the director Christian Albrecht

85 Ibid., 4-5.
86 Ibid., 23.
87 Ibid., 24.
88 Ibid., 45-47.
89 Ibid., 48.
Bluhme. The collegium was responsible for collecting tariffs and making custom policy for both the kingdom and the duchies, although the two systems were fully separated. The regimented work pace and more formal language required some adjustment by Schleiden, who missed the independence of his earlier position. However, as the officials gained more trust in Schleiden, he was given, by 1844, more responsibilities under the department head, Karl Francke.

Toward the end of 1844, Schleiden was asked to accompany the customs inspector into the duchies to gain first-hand knowledge of the situation there. Since the trip required the permission of the king, the latter requested additional information concerning the impact of railroads on trade in the German states and Belgium. Like a small child in a candy shop, Schleiden soaked up everything of interest that he saw during his stay in Belgium, the Netherlands, and France. He later claimed, “In the eleven days in Paris, I saw more of the sights, than in any later multi-months stay.” Toward the end of the long journey, he received promising news. Francke had recommended him as the new committirten in the collegium. Schleiden’s youth raised questions about his ability to fill such an important position, but he had the job by November 11, 1845. He was also in position to defend the interests of the duchies against Danish rule.

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90 Ibid., 49.
91 Ibid., 78.
92 Ibid., 82.
93 Ibid., 91.
94 Ibid., 114.
95 Ibid., 132.
96 Ibid., 138.
The educational and early career experiences of Claussen, Olshausen, and Schleiden were crucial in shaping their future actions and perceptions. In all three cases, their political views were shaped by their experiences in the Danish-German borderland and their university years. While Schleiden never turned as far to the left as Olshausen and Claussen, all three held liberal views and desired political change. Olshausen and Schleiden had gained valuable experiences with revolutionary politics, reactionary crackdowns, exile, and imprisonment. Furthermore, Schleiden had gained valuable political experience in the Danish civil service that would be used over the years to defend his home country against Danish oppression. Olshausen and Claussen, too, were ready to stand up for their nationalist beliefs, as they used the press and the Holstein diet to propagate their political views. It was in these first thirty to forty years of their lives that their nationalism and liberalism took form, and they would soon have opportunities to put those views into action.
Chapter Two

Helstat:
Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein after the Congress of Vienna

It was in the so-called Vor-März, the years between 1815 and 1848, that the three Schleswig-Holsteiners developed their nationalist and liberal views. As the Danish government’s policies increasingly came to be seen by German nationalists in the duchies as oppressive and unconstitutional, the three men added a secessionist streak to their nationalism, and in the case of Olshausen and Claussen, helped to radicalize the language. All three assumed leadership positions among the Germans in the duchies and in Copenhagen. With the Danish government increasingly under the influence of liberal-nationalists and their demands for the incorporation of Schleswig, and the king wishing to clarify the relation between his German subjects and territories, the tensions escalated. By 1848, the Dano-German relations in this contested borderland had spiraled out of control. Only a small spark was required to cause a major conflict.

The conflict between Denmark and the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein had started with the emergence of nationalism, which had arrived in the duchies in the baggage of the French revolutionary armies. Denmark had long desired to consolidate its territory, and by the last quarter of the eighteenth century, this had become possible.1 Denmark created the so-called helstat (united state), and all dynastic claims were settled in favor of the House of Oldenburg. In Copenhagen, the German Chancellery was in charge of the duchies’ administrative and legal system. In addition, sections within the pension office (Rentenkammer) and the general customs

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office and commerce collegium also dealt with affairs in the duchies. After the Danes sided with Napoleon in the war, Norway was disassociated from Denmark and Lauenburg provided to Denmark in compensation. In response, the German Chancellery became the Schleswig-Holstein-Lauenburgian Chancellery. Since Denmark continued to govern the duchies from Copenhagen, there was a growing dissatisfaction with Danish rule, the result being a slowly developing spirit of liberal-nationalism among the people.

Two major Holstein nationalists of the Vor-März influenced Schleiden’s nationalist views. In 1815, Friedrich Christoph Dahlmann, under whom Schleiden would later study in Göttingen, and with whom he likely had a number of conversations about the future of the German lands, gave his famous “Waterloo Speech.” He hoped that the energy used to fight Napoleon would not go to waste, Dahlmann said, especially not the cooperative spirit between the various peoples who had opposed the emperor. He pointed to the victories at Leipzig and Waterloo to illustrate the newfound strength among the German peoples and to highlight how they had stood united against the French. “The secret of the art of revolutionary warfare is exposed,” he declared, “the universal legacy of the French Revolution, was defeated with its own weapons.” His argument for unity among the “German tribes,” as he phrased it, was based on their shared interest in liberty, justice, and traditionalism. Furthermore, Dahlmann argued, the German states should not allow old quarrels to undermine their new unity. In relation to the

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duchies, he claimed that to Schleswig belonged to the German Bund, his argument based on the close ties between the two duchies. He claimed that Schleswig belonged to the German Bund, his argument based on the close ties between the two duchies. Like Dahlmann, so, too, would Schleiden argue for the unification of Germany and the inclusion of Schleswig in the German Bund.

The other nationalist influence on Schleiden was Uwe Jens Lornsen. On November 5, 1830, Lornsen published a pamphlet dealing with the constitutional question of the duchies. Much like Schleiden later, Lornsen had worked in the administration of the duchies in Copenhagen and criticized their inefficient governance. Based on the problems plaguing the administration of the duchies, Lornsen suggested that the king should call a provisional state diet to represent the entire population and rectify the situation. His suggestions included taxes originating with the state diets of the duchies and a consolidation of the duchies’ administration separate from that of Denmark. His ultimate solution was to replace the helstat with a dual state solution, believing that a separation of the duchies was necessary for a modern and efficient state and economy. In contrast to the “Neuholsteiner,” he wanted to maintain the unity of the duchies, which he emphasized by using the word “Schleswigholstein.” Both Dahlmann and Lornsen had a major impact on the young minds of Claussen, Olshausen, and Schleiden as they searched for a national identity.

At the time, the Danish monarchy realized that political change was necessary. The German Bund had increased the pressure on Denmark to grant Holstein a constitution. In response, the Danes implemented a constitution that created diets for the four parts of the

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8 Rudolph Schleiden, Erinnerungen eines Schleswig-Holsteiners (Wiesbaden, Germany: Verlag von J. F. Bergmann, 1890), 182.

9 Jessen-Klingenberg, Standpunkte zur neueren Geschichte Schleswig-Holsteins, 45-54; Lange, Geschichte Schleswig-Holsteins, 428.
monarchy: Holstein, Schleswig, Jutland, and the islands. However, these diets had only an advisory role and could not engage in law making.\textsuperscript{10} As Claussen would experience during his time in the Holstein diet, many reforms were proposed to the Danish monarch, who always refused them, antagonizing the German nationalists. While all property-owning Christian men over twenty-five were allowed to vote, the liberals criticized the secrecy of the diet meetings.\textsuperscript{11} The reforms were a step in the right direction but far from satisfactory to liberal-nationalist or even radical demands.

Like all nationalists, Schleiden, after his return to Kiel in 1838, had taken a keen interest in politics. That fall, he tried to attend every political meeting held by candidates running in the election for the second Holstein diet. He observed that the peasantry included educated and active men who were German nationalists but conceded that politicians from the cities still gave the best speeches. In particular, the chief editor of the \textit{Kieler Corresponz-Blatt}, Olshausen, impressed the young student. In his speech, which Schleiden lauded for its clarity and simplicity, Olshausen asked the audience to sign a petition that requested the right of the duchy to vote on its own tax laws. While Schleiden was still defining his liberal-nationalism, Olshausen had already taken a leadership role in the radical-nationalist movement.

A perception of Danish oppression was building, especially if the duchies were to have no say in their own affairs. The taxation question had been a heated topic for several years. The Obergerichtsrath Magnus Graf von Moltke had called it an injustice by the king to prevent the state diets of the duchies from determining their own taxes. Schleiden agreed with Moltke but did not think that a king was infallible. Furthermore, being a stickler for legal details, Schleiden

\textsuperscript{10} Lange, \textit{Geschichte Schleswig-Holsteins}, 429.

\textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 431-32.
disapproved of the election of Georg Ludwig Friedrich Balemann and Sven Hans Jensen. According to laws from 1831 and 1834, only landholders could be elected, which these two men were not. Schleiden did not approve of sacrificing the law even for a good cause, including the election of men who had first-hand knowledge of the impact of the heavy tax burden.\textsuperscript{12} While wanting liberal changes, Schleiden respected the law even if it injured the cause he supported.

The death of Frederik VI in 1839 and the rise of Christian VIII did not bring dramatic changes. Christian VIII was well prepared for the national and liberal challenges ahead. He rejected the requests of Copenhagen’s residents for freedom of the press and the repeated request from the duchies for tax sovereignty. Apparently, the new king wanted to copy the Prussian monarchy. Frederick would want to improve the material interest of his subjects, and grant them a more liberal constitution, but only if retaining his rights as sovereign.\textsuperscript{13} Schleiden remained silent in these debates, still trying to rise within the Danish civil service.

The “Neuholsteiners” around Olshausen and Claussen were not silent and protested the changes in taxation imposed on the duchies by Denmark. Olshausen took up the taxation question in his \textit{Correspondenz-Blatt}. Influenced by a remark made by Karl Lorentzen concerning the Holstein diet, Olshausen published a historical review on May 4, 1839. The article was intended to undermine the legacy of the Johann Friedrich Struensee ministry, which had supposedly reduced the national debt. After an elaborate presentation, Olshausen concluded that while Struensee had not been successful in reducing the debt, the duchies had been much better.

\textsuperscript{12} Rudolph Schleiden, \textit{Erinnerungen eines Schleswig-Holsteiners} (Wiesbaden, Germany: Verlag von J. F. Bergmann, 1890), 251-52.

\textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 275.
off under his government. The nationalists were moving toward separatism as their perception of Danish oppression increased.

In early May 1839, the Holstein diet agreed to send Lorentzen’s tax proposal to a committee. One could not fail to notice the challenges this suggestion would face. The Correspondenz-Blatt called it “one of the most difficult political problems.” On May 8, the editor, probably Olshausen, elaborated on the constitutional question and its importance for both Denmark and the German states. After drawing comparisons to Austria, Prussia, and the Netherlands, which also had parts of their territory excluded from the Bund, the Correspondenz-Blatt observed that absolutism prevented a constitution and new tax laws in Holstein. Denmark was in a precarious situation because granting Holstein a constitution could create similar demands in Denmark itself. The author could not but sympathize with the Danish dilemma, which explained why only Holstein among the German states was still without a constitution.

In a follow up article, the Correspondenz-Blatt continued to elaborate on the problem. Noting Holstein’s national character, the author admitted, like a good “Neuholsteiner,” that Schleswig lacked a similar sense of identity. Eventually Schleswig would have to pick a side and deal with its Dano-German division. One could see in the article that the Correspondenz-Blatt was not ready to wait for Schleswig, but not everyone was as impatient as the Neuholsteiner. In the Holstein diet, Joseph Graf Reventlow-Criminil challenged Claussen’s radical argument that the two duchies were fundamentally different. Much like Claussen, the Correspondenz-Blatt remained

14 CB May 4, 1839.
15 CB May 8, 1839.
16 CB May 25, 1839.
17 Ernst-Erich Marhencke, Hans Reimer Claussen: Kämpfer für Freiheit und Recht in zwei Welten (Frankfurt a.M., Germany: Peter Lang, 1999), 82-83.
undeterred and continued to demand more control for the diet in financial matters, including tax rates and general fiscal policy. On the one hand, the duchies and Denmark were drifting apart under the German separatist demands, but at the same time, the liberals and radicals were starting to fight one another within Holstein.

The divisions within Schleswig-Holstein politics were all too apparent by the early 1840s. The *Corresponz-Blatt*, as the organ of the democrats and “Neuholsteiner,” was under fire. On September 16, 1840, the editor complained how the paper was attacked by the “Schleswig-Holstein Parthei,” which stood for unity of the duchies and independence from Denmark. The most recent attack was due to the *Corresponz-Blatt’s* strong opposition to the 1839 language patent, which allowed Danish to be used for official business in northern Schleswig. Olshausen had to confess that a state of Schleswig-Holstein remained unattractive to him. After all, Schleswig was not a German land. Olshausen again argued that Holstein had to decide where it belonged. A constitution and close ties with the German Bund would be politically advantageous. Ties with Denmark might allow changes (freedom of press) impossible in the reactionary Bund. The state needed to chose or remain backwards. Schleswig was still chaotic. Olshausen did feel for the people in Schleswig. After voicing more criticism of the “Schleswig-Holstein Parthei,” He drew attention to their disinterest in German unification and their lack of a program for a united Schleswig-Holstein. The contested borderland in Schleswig with its divided national loyalties crystallized a battleground.

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18 *CB* June 5, 1839.
19 *CB* September 16, 1839.
20 *CB* September 23, 1839.
Meanwhile, Schleiden faced a different situation. Of the principals in this story, he was the only one who worked for the Danish administration in Copenhagen. As a result, Schleiden faced the increasing challenges of the Danish nationalist Eider-Danish Party. He had assumed that going to Copenhagen would place him closer to the “pulse of the nation,” which it did, but that pulse also produced the oppressive policies that angered the German duchies. Still, Schleiden seldom regretted being so far from home. He found ways to assist the duchies in the hostile environment of the Danish capital, and his nationalist spirit only grew there. He was more ready than ever to stand up against the Danes.

The hostile environment made working for the Danish administration difficult. Even fifty years later, Schleiden could recall, “Under the circumstances, it took a high degree of loyalty and sense of duty for the German officials to continue their duties with composure and without denying one’s views to avoid clashed with Danish colleagues and people having other opinions.” Schleiden did not even see eye to eye with his benefactor Karl Francke and many of their political debates must have turned quiet heated. In contrast to Francke, Schleiden believed that rights and ancient laws were more important than the character of the Danish helstat.

In the commerz collegium, Schleiden experienced frequent clashes between Danish and German nationalists. When the collegium dealt with the Elbe shipping revisions commission, the department head for Denmark, Wilhelm Carl Eppingen Sponneck, voiced strong protests against what he perceived as preferential treatment for the duchies. Danish nationalists, like Sponneck, escalated many intradepartmental debates involving Schleswig. Schleiden condemned the new

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22 Ibid., 98.

23 Ibid., 172-174.

24 Ibid., 174.
Danish nationalist organizations. He claimed that “they had set their eyes on the conquest of Schleswig.” In 1844, a renewed effort was made to foster Danish nationalism in Schleswig, especially by emphasizing the Danish language. The German nationalists felt increasingly under attack by Danish nationalist and their desire to incorporate Schleswig into the Danish state.

In October 1844, the mayor of Copenhagen, Tage Algreen-Ussing, declared in the diet for the Danish islands that Denmark was an indivisible empire. With Algreen-Ussing not even being a member of the Eider-Danes, his speech indicated how widespread Danish nationalism had become. Schleiden was still outraged by the speech a half century later. Luckily, opposition within Denmark quickly silenced Algreen-Ussing, who proved to be too radical. Nevertheless, it was clear that the Danish nationalists were prepared for a fight over Schleswig. Their leader in Schleswig, Nis Lorenzen, showed as much by urging the Danish government to use Danish in the administration of North Schleswig, a grave insult to the German nationalists. In an effort to defuse the issue, the Danish king announced a new royal patent in March 1844. The patent allowed members of the diet of Schleswig who could not speak German, to give their speeches in Danish. To the disappointment of the king, both sides criticized his suggestion, which only worsened the conflict.

The debate surrounding the language patent continued to create major misunderstandings between the two nationalities. As part of an inspection tour in Holstein in 1845, Schleiden visited Schleswig, including some of the Danish parts of the duchy. He observed that many of the Danish-speaking inhabitants had been so inundated by the propaganda from Copenhagen that

25 Ibid., 92-93.
26 Ibid., 105-107; see also CB May 4, 1839.
27 Lange, Geschicht Schleswig-Holsteins, 434-435.
28 Schleiden, Erinnerungen eines Schleswig-Holsteiners, 93-95.
they strongly resented Germans. They were “oblivious about the legal relationship within the state,” as he put it. 29 With the two nationalities mistrusting each other more each day, the possibility of a civil war in Schleswig was not out of the question.

Besides these misunderstandings between Danes and Germans, even the German population in Holstein was increasingly divided over the national and liberal questions and how far their separatism should go. Schleiden perceived that the leaders of the “Neuholstein” party overemphasized the irreconcilable differences with Denmark. In a letter to Justus Olshausen, Peter Wilhelm Forchhammer explained that the Danish government purposefully implemented its harsh policies, enumerating some of the recent contentions. Forchhammer continued to accuse the government of Anton Wilhelm Scheel and Moltke of being unwilling to change their policies. He even called Scheel the “Kakodämon of the land,” meaning evil spirit of the land. Foreshadowing events to come in 1848, he said, “I believe that our Schleswig-Holstein one day will come free from Denmark and establish an independent state. I also believe that this will not be possible without a preceding general war.” Forchhammer was not sure that an independent Schleswig-Holstein would be any better off in the European state system than under Danish rule, 30 but as the perception of Danish oppression increased, this sort of separatist language grew stronger.

Theodor Olshausen had taken up the language question as early as 1839. Under a suspicious claim to impartiality, the Correspondenz-Blatt explored the historical roots of both the language and nationality issue. Olshausen noted that the nationality division was older than the

29 Ibid., 124.

political debate about it. Both sides demanded the supremacy of their language because neither one wanted “to turn home into a foreign environment.” At the same time, he admitted, German was the language of instruction. In an emotional diatribe, Olshausen claimed that Denmark was lagging behind intellectually, including in philosophy and theology. As a result, the article concluded, “The Democratic element in Schleswig can not be allowed to force the German education system into a Danish one and thus lower its standards.”

In 1846, tensions increased when the government’s censors began looking more closely at political speeches. On September 3, the Correspondenz-Blatt announced that Theodor Olshausen had been arrested. It was soon clear that his political speeches were the reason. Hans R. Claussen took up Olshausen’s defense in a pamphlet, and thirty-two prominent Holsteiners supported him. Claussen argued that Olshausen had not acted treasonously and demanded that he be released. He speculated that Olshausen’s arrest was an effort to derail his election to the Holstein diet, thus keeping an eloquent speaker out of the politics. Even if Olshausen’s speech had contained disloyal sentiments, Claussen insisted, his incarceration was still illegal, especially since he had not called on anyone to engage in passive resistance, had not engaged in passive resistance himself, and was unlikely to flee the country. Claussen believed that Olshausen’s only crime was to have given speeches concerning the illegitimate July 27, 1846, rescript. From the radical perspective, Denmark was undermining freedom of speech and thus encroaching on the basic rights of the duchies.

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31 CB June 19, 1839; CB June 26, 1839.

32 CB September 3, 1846.

33 Hans Reimer Claussen, Vorstellung und Bitte für den Eisenbahndirektor Theodor Olshausen um Aufhebung dder wider ihn verhängten Haft (Kiel, Germany: Verlag von Carl Schröder, 1846).
In Copenhagen, Schleiden’s recent promotion to committirter gave him a leadership role in his section of thecommerz collegium and a better post in which to protect the rights of the duchies. An opportunity to use his new position came in 1846 in a case involving the merchant ship *Hektor*, whose captain was accused by another section of the commerz collegium of having eradicated the required brand “Dansk Eiendom” from the ship’s beam. The words had been mandated since the Napoleonic wars to clarify ownership. Schleiden protested that this particular section of the collegium had no authority in the matter since his section alone was responsible for the operation of customs offices in the duchies.

Schleiden suspected that a section head named Sponneck was responsible for the interference. In the next meeting of the collegium, Schleiden went on the offensive by delineating his section’s authority. He stood alone in the ensuing debate, but he successfully forced new instructions to be written, the wording fashioned by Schleiden himself. Due to the lateness of the hour, Schleiden left the meeting before everyone had signed the instructions. Later, when presented with the finished document, he spotted some revisions written by Sponneck. Schleiden angrily erased them. There was no verbal exchange between the two that evening, but subsequent meetings brought heated exchanges.34 Schleiden’s superior defended his actions, but the rift between Denmark and Holstein was growing. The frontlines had hardened, and the nationalists were fighting each other over even the smallest issues.

In July 1846, the Danish king tried again to reduce tensions in an “open letter” to the Prince of Augustenburg and the duchies that addressed the issue of succession to the throne. The letter began with the controversial statement that Schleswig was historically part of Denmark. From that point, the king elaborated on the circumstances of how the Danish crown had received

34 All material related to Hektor incident and debate in collegium from Schleiden, *Erinnerungen eines Schleswig-Holsteiners*, 141-43.
the dukedom of Schleswig and the provision that the king/duke “should succeed to both territories undivided.” Only when the House of Gottorf had relinquished its claim to the throne of the duchies could Schleswig be “incorporated” into Denmark and a clear succession established. Thereafter, any heir of king Frederik III would be ruler under “an Agnate hereditary rule of succession.”

Despite the Augustenburgs paying homage to the Danish king in 1721, they lodged a reservation in 1806 concerning the succession question. The Danish king explained that the Augustenburgs were under the erroneous assumption that they had some right to the succession.³⁵ Few in the duchies agreed with the king’s “open letter.” Instead of clarifying the succession question, the king’s claim caused new excitement and anger. The letter was a final confirmation that the Danish state was willing to ignore the laws of the duchies, its constitutional rights, and the succession rights of the princes of Schleswig-Holstein.

As a result of the open letter, the popularity of Christian VIII among the German population declined dramatically.³⁶ In 1847, more evidence emerged that the king planned to alter the relationship between Denmark and the duchies to the disadvantage of the duchies. Anxious to avoid another mistake like the open letter or the 1844 language patent, the king wanted to draft a new constitution, based on the Prussian model, to unite his realm.³⁷ It was clear that the idea would cause problems. However, after the controversy following the open letter, the idea of a new constitution seemed the best hope of solving the succession question.³⁸ With both

³⁵ Patent of the King of Denmark, July 8, 1846. FO 22/153, NAUK.
³⁶ Schleiden, Erinnerungen eines Schleswig-Holsteiners, 187-188.
³⁷ Ibid., 219.
³⁸ Ibid., 225.
sides dug in and the nationalists in Holstein having developed a separatist attitude, the constitution could unravel the Danish kingdom.

In early 1847, following the election for the next Holstein diet, the Danish government further alienated the German nationalists by denying the elected representatives Deseler, Wiggers, and Tiedemann their patents, and thus preventing them from taking their seats in the diet. Balemann told Schleiden that the government’s action “made the break with the country evermore difficult to heal.”39 The king was certainly aware of the issue, but failed to intervene. The separatists were given more ammunition against Denmark.

Additional affronts to the German nationalists came during the king’s annual birthday tour of his realm. Knowing the hatred that existed against him in the German regions of his state, the king snubbed them completely. It was not the first time Christian misstepped on such tours. Previously, Scheel had “shielded” the monarch because he feared attacks on the sovereign. On another occasion, the king told Hermann Graf von Baudissin-Sophienhof, who accompanied the royal coach through his land, that he was not to visit the king in Plön. The reasons are unknown. A similar incident happened to Graf Friedrich von Reventlou-Preetz, who was refused an audience with the king because he was “another member of the disloyal diet.”40 The king had shown much insensitivity toward his German subjects, and not visiting Holstein in 1847 made him look more so. Likely with some hindsight, Schleiden wrote in his memoirs that without a solution, the death of Christian VIII could bring major problems.41 For the German nationalists, the king added fuel to the fire of separatism by ignoring their legitimate demands.

39 Ibid., 237.
40 Ibid., 182-183.
41 Ibid., 239.
The national question escalated when on January 20, 1848, Christian VIII died. The duties of state fell to the new king, Frederik VII. Danish nationalists of the Faedreland Partei immediately sought to influence the new king in hopes of achieving the incorporation of Schleswig. Initially, Frederik resisted the pressure from such Danish nationalists as Henrik Nicolai Clausen, Joakim Frederik Schouw, and Lauritz Nicolai Hvidt to reform the state.

Soon the question of the new constitution was again on the table. The Danish privy council debated the merits of a new constitution. Frederik endorsed the results of the debates on January 28. The new constitution conceded some independence to the various parts of the kingdom. There would be a common diet that included representatives from Denmark and the two duchies, although, the diet would have no say in fiscal matters. Laws that dealt with the entire kingdom were to come before the diet, but it would not replace the local diets. While the people would not ratify the constitution, Frederik did allow a body of advisors to inspect the document. The local authoritative bodies and orders, but not the local diets, would select these advisors. Even though the drafting of the new constitution would take time, its mere promise awakened critics on both sides of the issue. Schleiden welcomed the proposal, because it put the duchies and Denmark on equal levels. Others nationalists would disagree.

In Copenhagen, Danish nationalists were concerned, because they saw the new constitution as a first step toward losing both duchies to the German Bund. The parity between

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42 Ibid., 242; Wynn to Palmerston, January 13, 15, 18, 20, 21, FO 22/162, NAUK.
43 Schleiden, Erinnerungen eines Schleswig-Holsteiners, 243.
44 Ibid., 247.
45 Ibid., 248-249; Wynn to Palmerston, January 28, 1848, FO 22/162, NAUK.
46 Schleiden, Erinnerungen eines Schleswig-Holsteiners, 249-250.
the German and Danish representatives in the new diet especially raised questions.\textsuperscript{47} In the duchies, too, the proposed constitution was greeted with suspicion that had been fostered over the previous decades.\textsuperscript{48} The Germans, which had developed their nationalist-separatism and liberal-radicalism over the past decade, questioned if they should participated in drafting the document. However, their absence would have allowed the Danes to dominate the proceedings and write a constitution unfavorable to the duchies.\textsuperscript{49}

Since the Danish king was willing to have the draft constitution inspected by leaders of the various parts of the kingdom, the German nationalists saw an opportunity to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with Danish policy. Schleswig-Holstein instructed its delegates to support only a constitution that retained the old relationship between Denmark and the duchies. It was not a good omen. The British minister to Denmark, H. William W. Wynn wrote the British foreign secretary, Lord John Palmerston, “This early demonstration of hostility is of course most unwelcome to the Government, but of which it is not likely that any advice will be taken.”\textsuperscript{50} The separatist nationalists’ opposition indicated that more conflict was still to come; there was a revolutionary fervor in the air.

In the midst of this heated debate over the constitution came news on February 29 of revolutionary events in Paris. Schleiden recalled the moment in his memoir:

My trust in the values of the constitutional system were not shattered by the quick toppling of a throne that had lasted for seventeen years and had the support of the majority of the delegates in the legislature. The majority had, based on the way it was composed, supported the government, but not represented the vast majority of the people. I believed that every people had and must have the right to political

\textsuperscript{47} Ibid., 251.
\textsuperscript{48} Ibid., 252.
\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 253.
\textsuperscript{50} Wynn to Palmerston, February 23, 1848, FO 22/162, NAUK.
representation, if the people are politically educated. Not only in England but also in the south German states had representative bodies illustrated their ability to secure legal liberty against despotism. My countrymen place their hope with a representative constitution to secure their rights because the provincial diets had shown themselves incapable.\textsuperscript{51}

Not everyone took such a cautious liberal view. The animosity between Denmark and Schleswig-Holstein continued to grow, and some Danes knew that rebellion was just over the horizon, and with rebellion, there would be war.\textsuperscript{52}

While Copenhagen was abuzz over the new constitution, a joint meeting by the diets of Schleswig and Holstein took place in Kiel. As members of the Holstein diet, both radical-separatist-nationalists Theodor Olshausen and Hans Reimer Claussen were present. The meeting called on the people of the duchies to reject all attempts to tie Schleswig-Holstein closer to Denmark. The separatists had won the day and were ready to oppose Danish oppression. During the joint meeting, news of the impending overthrow of the government in Paris arrived. Additional meetings under the national colors of the German nationalists took place in the following days. During these early March meetings, the Neuholsteiners continued to argue for the independence of the duchies.\textsuperscript{53}

At the same time, the Danish nationalists saw an opportunity to incorporate Schleswig. Hvidt called for a meeting of the \textit{Faedrelands Partei} on March 7 to define their policy concerning Schleswig. The leading voices in the meeting, besides Hvidt, were Clausen, Orla Lehmann, and Anton Frederik Tscherning.\textsuperscript{54} The proceeding of that meeting and a second one on March 20, which called on the Danish monarchy not to surrender Schleswig, indicated that

\textsuperscript{51} Schleiden, \textit{Erinnerungen eines Schleswig-Holsteiners}, 257.

\textsuperscript{52} Ibid., 258.

\textsuperscript{53} Marhencke, \textit{Hans Reimer Claussen}, 137-139.

tensions were close to fever pitch. The demand to retain Schleswig closed with a call for a new ministry that consisted only of loyal Danes.\textsuperscript{55} In contrast to the separatism of the Germans and showing that they could be just as radical as their German counterparts, the Danes called for the unification of all Danish nationalists in a Danish state.

As the rebellious spirit spread across Europe and the Danes remained silent about the demands of German nationalists, the people of the duchies elected a new diet on March 13. Radicals like Claussen and Olshausen won. At a meeting of liberals from both duchies in Rendsburg, a call was issued for a united diet of Schleswig and Holstein to debate the constitution of the duchies and the inclusion of Schleswig in the German Bund. A five-man deputation that consisted of Olshausen, Claussen, Lucius Carl von Neergaard-Oevelgönne, Jacob Guido Theodor Gülich, and Casper Engel submitted these demands to Copenhagen.\textsuperscript{56} All five were either left-wing radicals or left leaning and had gained a separatist nationalist reputation.\textsuperscript{57} One has to wonder if the diet of the duchies intended to provoke the Danes by sending these radicals to Copenhagen. At the same time, with the demand to include Schleswig in the German Bund, the duchies had made another separatist statement that threatened the integrity of the Danish helstat.

Misunderstandings caused some of the tension. Each side was unaware of the true intentions of the other, so that rumors were given credence they did not deserve. Wynn informed Palmerston on March 22 that much excitement had been caused by “false and exaggerated accounts . . . of the proceedings of an ultra-Danish meeting.” He likely referred to the March 20

\textsuperscript{55} Ibid., 264-265.

\textsuperscript{56} Ibid., 261-262; Marhencke, \textit{Hans Reimer Claussen}, 139

meeting of the *Faedrelands Partei*. While the radicals seemed to be temporarily blocked in Holstein, Wynn was still worried about the agitations there. Rumors still circulated that the separatists had created a provisional government designed to sever all ties with Denmark. Radical nationalists on both sides had made Schleswig their prize and were unwilling to give ground.

In light of this escalation, the Danish king made a fateful decision. Either scared by the events across Europe or concerned about the rumors from the duchies, Frederik VII announced to his ministers on March 21 that Schleswig should be incorporated into Denmark. The entire ministry resigned in protest, and the king faced the difficult task of forming a new ministry. As a result of the developments, some of Schleiden’s German colleagues wondered if it was not time to resign and return to the duchies to assist their compatriots. Schleiden did not participate in the meeting but urged them, to remain since a mass resignation would undermine any reconciliation attempts. Furthermore, there was as yet no reason to resign. The monarchy had not officially announced the incorporation of Schleswig, and no treaty or law had yet been breached. Also, they did not know who the new ministers would be or what program they would implement. “Only once a clear intrusion in the independence of the duchies had occurred would the time have come for action,” he insisted They did not have to wait long for clarity.

On the morning of March 22, Schleiden caught his department chief Francke before work. He learned that after a long night of discussion Francke had agreed to join the Carl Emil von Bardenfleth ministry on the condition that the Schleswig question be left open. The promise

58 Wynn to Palmerston, March 22, 1848, FO 22/162, NAUK.
60 Ibid., 265.
61 Ibid., 266.
was soon broken. As a result, Francke resigned from the cabinet. The king asked him to remain, granting him unlimited powers within his ministry. However, the king cautioned, there would be no compromise on the Schleswig issue and Francke would have to support the monarchy. When Francke still refused to cooperate, the king gave him a kind goodbye. Wrongfully assuming that the king had also dismissed him from his position in the commerce and customs collegium, Francke prepared to depart Copenhagen.\footnote{Ibid., 266-67.}

During the morning conversation between Schleiden and Francke, a steamship from Kiel arrived with the radical delegation from Holstein. Schleiden went on board to meet them, but it became clear the mission had little chance to succeed when a mob seized the delegates and escorted them to the house of Consul Hage. The consul promised not to allow the delegates to leave the city until they had seen the king. However, the danger from the mob increased when rumors emerged that the duchies were already in a state of open rebellion. These were confusing hours, with one of Schleiden’s acquaintances even claiming that the revolution was underway.\footnote{Ibid., 268.}

Being a pacifist, Schleiden continued to hope for peace. On March 23, he loyally executed his duties by dispatching a series of requests for reports from various officials in Holstein. He then went to meet with the commission, which had just returned from an unproductive meeting with the king. The crowds in Copenhagen further disheartened them. At the same time, Francke had changed his mind again and conditionally agreed to head the Schleswig-Holstein government, replacing the disliked Scheel. He voiced doubts, however, that the visiting commission would succeed. Rumors continued to claim that the duchies were in
Pacifism was not going to work any longer, the separatist-nationalists had assumed control of events.

March 24 brought more bad news. Expecting a speedy answer to the delegation from the duchies, the steamer to Kiel, carrying Schleiden’s dispatches, had been delayed. The delay helped to escalate the situation in the duchies, where the separatists assumed the delay was caused by Denmark preparing for war. Meanwhile, the commissioners had been removed to the royal castle for their own safety. An attempt by Schleiden to see them failed. He then heard that Olshausen had already been escorted to the harbor and that the other four were to follow soon. Their security could no longer be guaranteed, not even in the royal castle.

Later that day, Schleiden learned that the boundaries of Denmark had been extended to the Eider, thus incorporating Schleswig. Schleiden knew what he had to do. After writing his resignation, he fled the capital, and advised others to do likewise. Francke, too, tendered in his resignation and prepared to depart. All Germans who had served in Copenhagen and who had submitted their resignations tried to leave on the steamer to Kiel, a kind of Holstein Ark. Trying to avoid suspicion (after all, they were about to commit treason), Schleiden left his baggage in his room and was prepared, if necessary, to use his official position to board the steamer. Twenty Germans joined Schleiden on board, some with their families, to await departure, but Schleiden was equally anxious about the political situation that awaited them in the duchies.

The royal document that had escalated the crisis was soon widely known. It started rather favorably, promising to guarantee Holstein’s status in the German Bund. Freedom of the press,

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64 Ibid., 273-275.
67 Ibid., 277-281.
electoral reforms, and the possibility of arming the people were also mentioned. The king even
granted the duchy its own civil administration, military organization, and financial
responsibilities. However, the bone of contention was Schleswig, which the king referred to as
“our duchy of Schleswig.” As a result, the king emphasized his desire to strengthen the ties
between Denmark and Schleswig with a new constitution. At the same time, some local and
provincial institutions, like Schleswig’s own diet, would maintain the independence of the
duchy. Despite this appeal for peace, Denmark had made a serious blunder.68 The letter was
unacceptable to German nationalists, whose passions for separation was only increased by the
Danish refusal to acknowledge the rights of the duchies.

The uncertainty of the news from Copenhagen, especially the delayed steamer, escalated
events in the duchies. Without clear information from Copenhagen, and expecting that the
mission would not bring any successful news, the leaders in Holstein called for a provisional
government, to be constituted by Wilhelm Hartwig Beseler, Jürgen Bremer, Friedrich Graf von
Reventlow-Preetz, Martin Thorsen Schmidt, Theodor Olshausen, and Friedrich von Nör.69 They
emphasized in their proclamation that they acted in the name of an “unfree sovereign” who had
been forced by the people in Copenhagen to take a hostile position toward the duchies. While the
provisional government condemned the Danish nationalist attack on the sovereign German land,
it made sure to explain that the government was not in rebellion but merely seeking to rule in the

68 Danish king to deputation from Holstein, March 24, 1848, Fasc. 6, Nachlass Schleiden, CAU.

69 Lange, Geschichte Schleswig-Holsteins, 442.
duke’s name. At the same time, the provisional government prepared to support the liberal
German unification movement. The separatists had taken over and the uprising had started.

The separatists and radicals had come a long way. While German nationalism in the
duchies had emerged with such influential figures as Dahlmann and Lornsen, its revolutionary
separatist streak was not exposed until German and Danish nationalists moved apart. The
perception that Denmark was passing oppressive laws, imposing illegal tax burdens, ignoring
justified demands for reform, violating the constitutional relationship between Denmark and the
duchies, and, of course, attempting to integrate Schleswig into Denmark and thus rupturing the
Treaty of Ripe’s “up ewig ungeedelt” clause added fire to the German separatists and their desire
to establish an independent Holstein or Schleswig-Holstein. As the tensions increased, the
radicals on both sides gained influence. By 1848, the relations had escalated to such a degree that
mistrust between the two nationalities was unbridgeable. The Danish king’s decision to integrate
Schleswig in conjunction with the new Danish constitution was the spark that set the long
simmering conflict ablaze. The next few months would show the strength of the separatist
nationalists in the duchies and whether they would be able to sustain the duchies’ independence.

70 Provisional Government, Proclamation, March 24, 1848, Aktenstücke zur neuesten
Schleswig-Holsteinischen Geschichte, edited by Rudolph M.Schleiden (Leipzig, Germany:
Chapter Three

Schleswig-Holstein in 1848: A Special Case

After the Danish king had proposed a new constitution that integrated Schleswig into the Danish kingdom and the five-member commission from Schleswig-Holstein to Copenhagen was delayed in its return, the nationalist, separatist, and radical leaders in the duchies decided to take action. In the name of the duke of the duchies, who had been cornered by Danish nationalists, the provisional government assumed power and intended to protect the duchies against Danish oppression. Of course, the king of Denmark, the duke of Holstein, and the duke of Schleswig were one and the same person. In effect, the people of the duchies rose up against the king in the name of the duke. Since the separatists had won the day in late March, and the duchies had risen up against Danish rule, the question was whether they would be able to maintain their newfound independence. While the German nationalists were secessionists within the Danish state, they favored unification of the German states. The new question was whether the unity of the Schleswig-Holstein movement would last or if the old conflict between liberals and radicals would reemerge.

This chapter will explore the internal dynamics of the Schleswig-Holstein uprising from its start on March 24 until the conclusion of the Malmö ceasefire on August 26. The attention given Olshausen and Claussen will show how their radicalism influenced their political decisions, and how they promoted their political agendas, including democracy and a vigorous conduct of the war, in both the German states and Holstein. In Schleiden’s case, the diplomatic and negotiating skills that would be central to his success in the coming decades would be tested for the first time in 1848. Many of the experience of the three men are illustrative for their future work.
After Wilhelm Hartwig Beseler, Jürgen Bremer, Friedrich Graf von Reventlow-Preetz, Martin Thorsen Schmidt, Theodor Olshausen, and Friedrich von Nör had assumed power, the first order of business was to protect their fragile creation against Denmark, which aimed to put down the rebellion. Troops of the new government quickly occupied the fortress of Rendsburg and seized the arsenal,¹ but weapons for untrained soldiers would be useless against the well-trained Danes. As a result, on March 24, the government asked the Prussians for military assistance. To gain military support, the duchies needed diplomats to fight the war abroad.²

After Schleiden arrived in Kiel and discovered that the duchies had rebelled by claiming loyalty to their duke, he was ready to work for the provisional government. Schleiden and Karl Francke immediately went to Rendsburg to offer their services to the provisional government.³ For unknown reasons, the provisional government decided to employ Schleiden in a diplomatic role.

Soon, Schleiden had instructions to go to Hanover and Frankfurt to request assistance from both the Kingdom of Hanover and the German Bund. Schleiden recalled, “It was a strange start of my diplomatic career . . . I was representing a government, which, as long as it was not recognized by the German Bundestag, was not legitimate and could not be recognized from the government in Hanover.”⁴ Schleiden was to serve as a diplomat without being appointed as a

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diplomat. As a result, his negotiations were slightly more complicated than his work in later years. However, this was the foundation of an almost two decade long career as a diplomat. His role as a negotiator in these difficult circumstances would help him many times in future talks.

The mission to Hanover was successful. The government agreed to concentrate 10,000 soldiers along the Elbe, to be deployed if a Danish invasion of Schleswig occurred and the German Bund authorized their use. With this diplomatic success, Schleiden went to Frankfurt. On March 29, he arrived in time for the first meeting of the Vor-Parlament, which was to work out the preliminaries for the Frankfurt Parliament. He met unofficially with the Austrian and Prussian ministers, who gave him their full attention but not their support. After all, he was the representative of a separatist revolutionary movement.

A much trickier problem was to convince the Danish representative at the Bundestag, Friedrich Christian Ferdinand Rigsfriherre von Pechlin von Löwenbach, to vacate his post in favor of Schleiden. Schleiden had met Pechlin fifteen years earlier and was now in the awkward position of replacing him. His own uncertain legal status made Schleiden cautious, not wanting to overstep his authority and hurt the duchies’ cause. He did have a lengthy conversation with Pechlin, who after much contemplation submitted his resignation. However, Pechlin, with no intention of accepting Schleiden as the new representative of Holstein, insisted that the legation

5 Schleiden to provisional government, March 27, 1848, Fasc. 1, Nachlass Schleiden, CAU; Schleiden, Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung, 3-4.

6 Schleiden to provisional government, March 29, 1848, Fasc. 1, Nachlass Schleiden, CAU, Germany; Schleiden, Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung, 6-7.

7 Rudolph M. Schleiden, Jugenderinnerungen eines Schleswig-Holsteiners (Wiesbaden, Germany: Verlag von J. F. Bergmann, 1886), 152.

8 Schleiden to provisional government, March 30, 1848, Fasc. 1, Nachlass Schleiden, CAU.
archives be handed over to a duly appointed new minister from Denmark. Schleiden still lacked international legitimacy, as did the separatist uprising in the duchies.

While Schleiden negotiated with Pechlin, he paid a visit to his old acquaintance Karl Theodor Georg Philipp Welcker, whom he accompanied to the Vor-Parlament. As a liberal, Schleiden found the speeches of radicals like Gustav von Struve and Friedrich Karl Franz Hecker inflammatory, and hoped that a constitutional, parliamentary, monarchical system would prevail. Claussen, once elected to the Frankfurt Parliament in April, agreed with Schleiden, even though he was a radical democrat himself. Claussen called it criminal to force democracy and republicanism on people by force of arms. His statement was likely influenced by Hecker’s activities in Baden. Instead, Claussen preferred to create a democratic republic by peaceful means. As the diplomatic representative of Schleswig-Holstein, Schleiden was invited to participate in the Vor-Parlament. Despite making it sound in his memoirs like an invitation, Schleiden seems to have lobbied for permission to join the parliament.

Despite the Vor-Parlament being intended to discuss preliminaries for the Frankfurt Parliament, Schleiden treated his role within the assembly in diplomatic terms, intending to advance the cause of the duchies. As a result, he pushed for the inclusion of Schleswig in the

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9 Schleiden to provisional government, March 30, 1848, Fasc. 1, Nachlass Schleiden, CAU; Schleiden, Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung, 8.


11 Schleiden to provisional government, March 30, 1848, Fasc. 1, Nachlass Schleiden, CAU; Schleiden, Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung, 9-10.

12 Schleiden to provisional government, March 29, 1848, Fasc. 1, Nachlass Schleiden, CAU.

13 For studies of the Frankfurt Parliament see Ludwig Bergsträsser, Das Frankfurter Parlament in Briefen und Tagebüchern: Ambrosch, Rümelin, Hallbauer, Blum (Frankfurt a.M.,
German Bund and affirmation of the perpetual unity of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein. To his surprise, Carl Georg Heinrich Lempfert, Claussen’s old nemesis from Dithmarschen, had not brought up these matters when he addressed the parliament.¹⁴ In his speech, Schleiden explained that he had expanded his original mandate to the Bundestag to participate in the debates because “one who today is sent to the princes, is at the same time sent to the people.” He reminded the parliament that there were foreign enemies against whom Schleswig-Holstein needed help from a united Germany. Schleiden explained that Schleswig, despite its Danish population, was and had been tied to Holstein for centuries, and that based on those ties, it should be made part of the German Bund.¹⁵ Here, Schleiden not only showed his diplomatic ability but also his strong national allegiance to both Schleswig-Holstein and Germany.

Schleiden’s request was supported in a March 28, 1848, proclamation by the provisional government. It explained that the independence of Schleswig had been threatened and that the unity of the duchies had to be preserved. As a result, the provisional government called on the German Bund to incorporate Schleswig, and so prevent future Danish attempts to do so.¹⁶

The Danish monarchy disagreed. On March 27, the king declared that Holstein was a separate entity and should have its own constitution. The king appealed to the people of Schleswig to stand by the monarchy, which would unite the duchy with the kingdom and provide

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¹⁴ Schleiden to provisional government, March 31, 1848, Fasc. 1, Nachlass Schleiden, CAU; Schleiden, Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung, 12.

¹⁵ Dr. Jucho, Verhandlungen des Deutschen Parlaments (Frankfurt a.M., Germany: J. D. Sauerländers Verlag, 1848), 1:30-31.

¹⁶ Provisional govt, March 28, 1848, Aktenstücke, 2:22-23
a constitution that would maintain some part of Schleswig’s independence. He implied that the rebels in the duchies were without honor.\textsuperscript{17}

Among the German nationalists in Frankfurt, Schleiden’s proposal was greeted with cheers of support. However, when the presiding officer asked if all were in favor of Schleswig joining the Bund, Professor Carl Gustav Schwetschke of Halle challenged a request for unanimous support. By including an area that was not in the Bund and inhabited by non-Germans, there were legal questions, he said, that needed to be addressed. Unknowingly, Schleiden had precipitated a debate that would plague the German experiment throughout 1848, a debate characterized by the concepts of \textit{Grossdeutsch} (Germany with Austria) and \textit{Kleindeutsch} (Germany only). A representative from Mecklenburg proposed that West and East Prussia should also be included in the Bund. Again, supportive cheers indicated the assembly’s approval. Most important, Schleswig had been added to the Bund. The new question before the meeting was the inclusion of Prussian territories. These territories, if included, would also participate in the debates about the future of Germany.\textsuperscript{18}

Schleiden became even more prominent when the Vor-Parlament selected from among its own members the representatives for the \textit{Fünfziger-Ausschuss}, which was to lay the groundwork for the future parliament. Schleiden and Julius Gülich were elected to represent Schleswig-Holstein. In a few weeks, Schleiden had been transformed from a mid-level Danish bureaucrat to one of Schleswig-Holstein’s primary representatives abroad.\textsuperscript{19} In the \textit{Fünfziger-Ausschuss},

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{17} Frederik to Schleswiger, March 27, 1848, \textit{Aktenstücke}, 2:42
\item \textsuperscript{18} Jucho, \textit{Verhandlungen des Deutschen Parlaments}, 1:31.
\item \textsuperscript{19} Schleiden to provisional government, April 4, 1848, Fasc. 1, Nachlass Schleiden, CAU; Schleiden, \textit{Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung}, 18-19; Jucho, \textit{Verhandlungen des Deutschen Parlaments}, 1:161
\end{itemize}
Schleiden continued to promote the inclusion of Schleswig in the Bund and its participation in the upcoming elections for the Frankfurt Parliament.\textsuperscript{20} He was gaining both parliamentary and diplomatic experience in Frankfurt that would become essential in years to come.

However, Schleiden’s parliamentary experience would not last long; his energies were more essential as a diplomat. With Prussian support and the troops necessary to protect the duchies against Denmark, the \textit{Fünfziger-Ausschuss} agreed with Schleiden’s suggestions that a representation be made to Prussia. Frankfurt decided to send Schleiden and Karl Mathy from Baden.\textsuperscript{21} The Prussians needed little motivation from the Frankfurt representatives; however, their initial support had already come under European scrutiny. As a result, the duchies’ diplomats would face a difficult task.

The Danes were quick to recruit foreign support. On March 28, 1848, the Danish foreign minister held a conference with the representatives of Russia and Great Britain in Copenhagen. After explaining the situation, the foreign minister blamed the Prussians for the escalation of revolutionary fervor in the duchies. According to him, the Prussian proclamation of March 23, with its appeal to the German people, was to blame for the uprising in Schleswig. The Danes hoped for Russian and British aid in dealing with Prussia and settling the Schleswig-Holstein question.\textsuperscript{22} While their hope for a direct intervention would not be fulfilled, international pressure soon came to bear on the Prussians.

Meanwhile, in the duchies radicals, like Claussen, who remained in the legislative branch of the Schleswig-Holstein government, continued to press for the implementation of their

\textsuperscript{20} Jucho, \textit{Verhandlungen des Deutschen Parlaments}, 2:4-5.

\textsuperscript{21} Schleiden to provisional government, April 14, 1848, Fasc. 1, Nachlass Schleiden, CAU; Schleiden, \textit{Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung}, 20-23; \textit{Aktenstücke}, 2:85

\textsuperscript{22} Protocol of March 28, 1848, \textit{Aktenstücke}, 2:44-46.
political program, including a broad, unrestricted electoral franchise. Claussen took especial issue with the ancient electoral system of voting by estates, which he said was outdated. He suggested that a committee be established to look into electoral reforms, but his attack on the privileged orders did not sit well with some members of the diet, such as Theodor Graf Reventlow-Jersbeck. Claussen, now a strong supporter of an independent and democratic Schleswig-Holstein, who argued that the ties between the duchies and Denmark should be severed, had moved away from his earlier “Neuholsteiner” position to support German unification and a united Schleswig-Holstein. However, this radical challenge at a time of national crisis was not appreciated, and Claussen and Olshausen would continue this agitation much to the detriment of their cause.

While the radicals challenged the provisional government at home, Schleiden faced diplomatic challenges abroad. Upon their arrival in Berlin, he and Mathy met with minister president Gottfried Ludolf Camphausen and discovered that their task had eased significantly. Prussia had already ordered its troops into Schleswig, knowing that Denmark would not voluntarily evacuate the duchy. Unfortunately, the order had arrived too late for Schleswig-Holstein’s troops. The Danes had planned to surround the enemy in the Flensburg area. After a diversionary landing at Holdnaes, east of Flensburg, the Schleswig-Holstein army was divided and weakened. On April 9, the armies met at Bov/Bau. The disorganized troops of the duchies retreated all the way to the Eider. Prussian and German support was badly needed to avoid

25 Ibid., 33.
early defeat, but at the same time, this meant an escalation from a regional rebellion into an international war.

But for the duchies, the Schleswig question was of equal importance. The Prussians insured Schleiden and Mathy of British neutrality. However, Camphausen was reluctant to endorse the entrance of Schleswig into the Bund until the end of the war.27 As a result, the duchies again requested that Schleswig be formally included in the Bund,28 although, with Frankfurt losing influence over that question, attention now focused on Berlin. On May 12, 1848, Schleiden was recalled from Frankfurt and appointed to represent the duchies in Berlin. He replaced Georg Waitz, who had been elected to the Paulskirchen Parliament in Frankfurt.29 In Berlin, Schleiden would not only face Prussian’s political situation but also be exposed to the international pressure of the great powers. His diplomatic skills would be put to the test.

While Schleiden continued his diplomatic work, the radicals were gaining ground. After he had departed Frankfurt, the new representatives for the Paulskirchen Parliament assembled in the city, among them the radical Hans R. Claussen. Having been elected as a radical democratic with socialist leanings, Claussen became an active participant in the debates on the future of the new Germany. As a strong supporter of a German republic, he had to explain to non-republicans that a republic would not mean statelessness, anarchy, or worker-run governments.30 Claussen supported a state structure in which the rulers were legally held to the same standards as the

29 Schleiden, Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung, 37.
average person.\textsuperscript{31} He pointed to the United States as the best blue print on which to model a German executive.\textsuperscript{32} As a supporter of the independence of Schleswig-Holstein, he also endorsed the U.S. federal system, which left considerable powers with the states.\textsuperscript{33} Few of these radical ideas would appear in the final constitution of 1849. However, Claussen continued to demonstrate in his radical views his love for the American political system.

Meanwhile, always looking to after the interests of the duchies, Claussen and two other delegates proposed on July 11 that any ceasefire or peace negotiations with the Danes adhere to German laws. Furthermore, Frankfurt had to be kept well informed of the progress of such talks. The resolution was meant to deal with rumors that Prussia had prepared an independent treaty detrimental to the duchies.\textsuperscript{34} In a speech defending the resolution, Claussen not only referred to the authority given to Prussia to negotiate an honorable peace, but he also reminded his listeners that the Treaty of Ripen united the duchies and that the Danish king had treasonously abrogated it with his new constitution. Here, the presiding official stepped in to remind Claussen that the personal union was not subject to debate and could only unnecessarily complicate matters. After the reminder, Claussen continued his speech, making sure to impress upon his listeners that peace at any price was not acceptable. While many delegates disagreed with his arguments and language, Claussen’s proposal that the negotiations needed to be closely monitored to insure an

\textsuperscript{31} Schmidt, “Hans Reimer Claussen,” 36; Wigard, Stenographischer Bericht, 1:446.
\textsuperscript{32} Marhencke, Hans Reimer Claussen, 191.
\textsuperscript{33} Schmidt, “Hans Reimer Claussen,” 38.
\textsuperscript{34} Marhencke, Hans Reimer Claussen, 192; Wigard, Stenographischer Bericht, 1:606-638.
honorable peace received the support of a majority. Nationalism and support for the separatists still ran strong among the German parliamentarians.

At the same time, fears that Great Britain might intervene increased international pressure on the Bund. It reacted by dispatching Hamburg’s Syndicus Edward Banks to London to assist Christian Karl Josias von Bunsen, the Prussian minister, in negotiations with the British government. The representative of Frankfurt was provided with all the necessary historical documents to address any British concern. The question faced by the German diplomats was if in a gesture of good faith, the German troops should withdraw from Schleswig. While Schleiden supported the idea of Great Britain assisting in a negotiated settlement, he vehemently opposed an evacuation of Schleswig. Like all the nationalists, Schleiden was unwilling to sacrifice the diplomatic or military position of the separatist movements in Schleswig-Holstein.

To improve the duchies’ diplomatic situation, Prussian military aid was needed to turn the war around. On April 23, 1848, the troops under General Friedrich Heinrich Ernst Graf von Wrangel, the new commanding officer of the German forces in the duchies, won the Battle of Schleswig. The defeat forced the Danish army to retreat to Flensburg, which Wrangel’s troops occupied on April 25. The two sides faced each other on the heights west of Sonderburg/Sønderborg near Düppel/Dybbøl. The order for Wrangel to continue to push the Danes out of Schleswig had come directly from Berlin after Denmark rejected a Prussian peace

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36 Schleiden to provisional government, April 24, 1848, Fasc. 1, Nachlass Schleiden, CAU, Germany; Schleiden, Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung, 27.

offer that included the evacuation of Schleswig. Denmark had rejected it because the islands of Alsen/Als and AeroÆrø, which were officially part of Schleswig, were also to be evacuated.

As the German army continued to advance into Denmark, international pressure increased.

Schleiden arrived in Berlin during these military victories in Berlin. In his first meeting with Prussian foreign minister Heinrich von Armin, he addressed the military and diplomatic situation, including the Russian and British fears about a German advance into Denmark and the increasing lack of enthusiasm in Berlin to support the uprising. Prussian policy adjusted under international pressure, and as opportunities arose to curtail the revolutionary movement at home, Wrangel’s troops were needed in Berlin. Schleiden’s diplomatic work was becoming more complicated as the Prussians desired to appease the great powers.

Still, Schleswig remained the main topic of discussion, as Schleiden pressed von Armin on the issue of Schleswig’s incorporation in the Bund. The Prussian foreign minister remained reluctant to agree since such a policy could undermine international negotiations. While the representatives of the warring states discussions a ceasefire in London, Schleiden worried that the withdrawal from Jutland would be interpreted as a sign of German weakness.

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38 Reventlou and Beseler to Schleiden, April 15, 1848, Fasc. 4, Nachlass Schleiden, CAU.

39 Wynn to Palmerston, May 4, 1848 FO 22/162, NAUK.

40 Schleiden, Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung, 42; Wynn to Palmerston, May 8, 1848, FO22/162, NAUK.

41 Schleiden, Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung, 44.

42 Ibid., 47.

43 Schleiden to provisional government, May 20, 1848, Fasc. 3, Nachlass Schleiden, CAU; Schleiden, Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung, 52.

44 Schleiden, Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung, 57.
probably the case. Certainly, in the course of the negotiations in London, the Danes did not change their terms.\footnote{Ibid., 58.} Confidentially, foreign minister Frederik Marcus Lensgreve Knuth told the British minister in Copenhagen, H. William Wynn, that all recent problems stemmed from the Germans in Holstein. While the loss of Holstein was acceptable, Schleswig as part of the German Bund would not be tolerated.\footnote{Wynn to Palmerston, May 20, 1848, FO 22/162, NAUK.} With both sides wanting to claim the hopelessly divided Schleswig, negotiations stalled. The Schleswig-Holstein question was no longer a internal Danish or Dano-German conflict but an international one, which made Schleiden’s work in Berlin that much more difficult.

As the Danes and Prussians made proposals for the settlement of the conflict in Schleswig-Holstein, British foreign minister Lord Palmerston had no easy task bringing the two sides together. Even when a second round of suggestions arrived in London at the behest of Palmerston, the Danes had left their demands unchanged. Palmerston was not amused but he still favored the Danish side in the conflict. As a result, the Prussian minister refused to negotiate any further.\footnote{Schleiden, \textit{Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung}, 58.} For the moment, Palmerston was unable to get the two sides to agree. Diplomacy had failed to solve the Schleswig-Holstein question.

If this failure had not been bad enough, a new power entered the picture, ready to join the Danes militarily. An altered balance of power was the last thing the Swedish government wanted. In mid-May, the Swedish consulate in Hamburg informed the provisional government that troops would be sent to Denmark, though they were not yet to engage in combat. The
duchies regretted that Sweden felt the need to protect the “security of the north” in this way. 48 Soon 4,000 Swedish soldiers arrived on Fünen/Fyn with orders to intervene in the conflict if Denmark needed them to defend against German invaders. When German troops crossed into Denmark, Great Britain and Russia became extremely concerned. The two governments suggested again a ceasefire to allow the diplomats to do their work. 49 Besides their military role, the Swedes were also preparing a diplomatic initiative. With the Swedes joining the Russians and British, Schleswig-Holstein was more than revolution-plagued Germany or Prussia had bargained for.

As the summer months brought mob violence and barricade fighting across Europe, Berlin, too, suffered political upheaval that brought down the government. 50 On June 25, the diplomatic novice Rudolf von Auerwald took over the government. 51 The changes promised to have an impact on the duchies, which relied on Prussian support. On June 19, Alexander Gustav Adolf Graf von Schleinitz, who had temporarily taken over the foreign office, tried to use the Swedish government, instead of the already established British connection, to negotiate an armistice. 52 The Prussians focused their attention on the Swedes and Russians. Since Great Britain would not militarily intervene, they wanted to dispel Swedish fears. 53

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48 Provisional Govt to general consulate, May 18, 1848, Aktenstücke, 2:242-243.
49 Schleiden, Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung, 42; Wynn to Palmerston, May 8, 1848, FO22/162, NAUK.
50 Schleiden, Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung, 59.
51 Ibid., 66, 68.
52 Ibid., 80.
53 Schleiden to Provisional Govt, June 20, 1848, Aktenstücke, 2:320-321.
Regardless of the talks between Sweden and Prussia, Great Britain remained involved, with Palmerston making a new ceasefire proposal on June 23. The Prussian government was surprised that talk of a ceasefire and peace preliminaries had been revived, and that the concerns voiced by Bunsen had been dismissed by Lord Palmerston. Palmerston was obviously not favorably disposed towards Schleswig-Holstein. The duchies’ separatism and its threat to the integrity of the Danish monarchy were too much for Europe to accept at mid-century.

Around June 20, the Prussian government authorized Albert Graf von Pourtalès to proceed to Sweden and negotiate. The Prussians could not have picked anyone less qualified. Pourtalès, who had been assigned to Constantinople, was unfamiliar with the issues in northern Europe. He proved as much on July 2 in a ceasefire agreement he signed with his Danish counterpart Knuth, under the supervision of the Swedish minister Friherre Gustaf Nils Algernon Adolf Stierneld and cabinet secretary Christoffer Rutger Ludvig Manderström. The deal established a six-month ceasefire and included temporary administration of the duchies run by a five-member commission. In the agreement, the hostilities would stop and prisoners would be exchanged. All captured ships would be returned, and German and Danish troops would leave Schleswig. On July 5, Pourtalès returned to Berlin with the agreement. Prussia, under international pressure, was anxious to have the ceasefire implemented, and so it turned to the diplomat from Schleswig-Holstein to convince the duchies of this necessity. Schleiden was to go

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57 July 2, 1848, *Aktenstücke*, 2:332-335
with Pourtalès to the provisional government and promote the agreement. He faced one of the
difficult diplomatic challenges of his career. This could spell the end of Schleswig-Holstein
independence.

Back in the duchies, Beseler joined Pourtalès and Schleiden on their way to Wrangel’s
headquarters, where they talked about the terms. Interestingly, only Pourtalès knew them, and his
lack of understanding of the Schleswig-Holstein question soon became apparent. The Prussian
did not know that men from Schleswig served in the Danish army. They could be stationed in
Schleswig, while the Danish army formally evacuated. Unhappy with being kept in the dark,
the provisional government informed the Prussian government that they could not agree to the
ceasefire’s terms until its exact details and wording were known. As a result, the provisional
government dispatched Schleiden and Reventlou to Berlin to renegotiate.

Through loyal supporters, the provisional government learned the details of the ceasefire.
When Reventlou and Schleiden, during their stay in Berlin, visited Wrangel’s residence, they
found that the general had left for an inspection tour. He had hidden the agreement under a stack
of newspapers, easy for the two visitors to find. The two men could demand specific revisions
of the treaty. In the meetings with Auerwald and Hans Graf von Bülow, they were able to obtain
some concessions and clarification. They were unable to complete renegotiations, but that did
not trouble them for long.

59 Schleiden, Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung, 89-91.
60 Schleiden, Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung, 92.
61 Schleiden to von Auerswald, July 9, 1848, Aktenstücke, 2:341-342.
62 Schleiden, Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung, 93.
63 Schleiden, Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung, 94.
64 Protocol Reventlou and Schleiden, July 12/13, 1848, Aktenstücke, 2:345-347.
When in late July, the representatives of the warring nations, Great Britain, and Sweden met at Bellevue to discuss the ceasefire terms in more detail, they failed to come to an agreement in regard to the prisoner of war question. A new ceasefire had to be negotiated. The duchies had won a respite, but it was increasingly clear that their diplomats would be unable to exercise much pressure in this game of great power diplomacy. Prussian support was increasingly a liability, and antagonism for Prussia increased.

In the duchies, opposition to the ceasefire was strong. The radicals, especially, opposed any deal that would compromise the separatist agenda of the uprising. On July 8, 1848, Friedrich Hedde, a member of the radical Olshausen clique and Olshausen’s successor as editor of the *Correspondenz-Blatt*, published a short pamphlet to explain the ceasefire and its implications. He drew particular attention to the most humiliating parts of the treaty. Listing the withdrawal of German troops from the duchies, the payment for damages done in Jutland, and the replacement of the provisional government by a new government, Hedde called the document “one humiliation piled upon another.” He predicted that things might get worse and pointed to a paradox. The victor in this ceasefire, he marveled, was bowing to the defeated and paying them instead of taking their territory. “As a result of such a humiliating ceasefire,” he declared, “grow an even more humiliating peace will probably grow out of it.”

Hedde had no good words for the diplomats responsible for this fiasco. The negotiators, he said, had been “totally incompetent.” After dealing with the known details of the treaty, Hedde closed by once more leashing out against the diplomats. He accused them of being stuck in the past, still adhering to the Congress of Vienna. As a result, they would not side with an

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uprising that tried to alter the existing balance of power. The only people that Schleswig-
Holstein could trust were the German people. “On our own power and the German people must
we rely,” Hedde insisted. “Otherwise, at the end, we have suffered through the revolution and
war without victory or honor.”\textsuperscript{67} Unfortunately, an honorable peace was increasingly unlikely.

While Hedde voiced the radicals’ opposition to the ceasefire and the government’s
representatives, Olshausen’s disgruntlement with the provisional government increased as well.
The radicals prepared to oppose the moderate and even conservative provisional government of
the duchies. In mid-August, Theodor Olshausen tendered his resignation. Schleiden
sympathetically wrote that Olshausen departed because he realized the downhill track forced on
the government by the sacrifices it had made.\textsuperscript{68}

Olshausen’s resignation was accompanied by a debate in the diet and the provisional
government over the direction of the uprising. The debate in the diet pitched the radicals once
more against the more conservative and moderate elements. Claussen commented on
Olshausen’s resignation with a political statement of his own. The seven members of the
provisional government, he argued, had no legitimate right to rule. They had not been elected
and did not have the consent of the governed. They were, in effect, usurpers. He spoke of the
“revolution” that had given the provisional government its right to exist, and which had been
confirmed by the diet. Conservative members like Bremer challenged Claussen’s use of the word
“revolution.” They argued that they had acted in the name of the duke of the duchies. Claussen
continued by saying that by whatever definition, the nation was caught up in momentous
changes. While this debate over semantics was going on, the diet refused to accept or refuse the

\textsuperscript{67} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{68} Schleiden, \textit{Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung}, 115.
resignation of Olshausen. Instead, they merely thanked him for his service. While the radicals had not directly challenged the government, their opposition was growing.

As violence threatened the residence of the Prussian minister president Rudolf von Auerwald, the Prussians realized that a military presence was required in Berlin, and to achieve that, and, the duchies needed to be pacified. In mid-August, the ceasefire negotiations between Prussia and Denmark recommenced in Malmö. Christian Hoyer Bille, a Swedish official negotiated for the Danes, and Gustav von Below represented Prussia. On August 26, von Below signed the official ceasefire agreement with Denmark. It was a disadvantageous treaty for the duchies, but all attempts by Schleiden to prevent the inevitable ratification failed. Great power diplomacy was outclassing the diplomacy of the duchies, whose separatism was increasingly isolated.

The ceasefire was to be in effect for seven months. German and Danish troops were to withdraw from the duchies except for two small contingents from each side to protect the hospitals and arsenals. The soldiers from the duchies were placed under the authority of a new government, which consisted of a president and vice-president selected by the kings of Denmark and Prussia. The president was to be Carl Graf von Moltke-Nütschau, with Adolf Blome as his second. The ceasefire nullified all laws passed since March 17 except those deemed necessary for governing the duchies.

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71 Ibid., 121.
74 Ibid., 128-131.
With this challenge to the separatist experiment in the duchies, outrage was widespread among the politicians in Schleswig-Holstein. Schleiden was among those angered by the treaty. On August 27, the provisional government notified him that they would not support the treaty. A new diplomatic initiative was needed to convince the Prussians that the ceasefire was unacceptable. The Prussians had expected as much, but they also expected, as von Below told Schleiden, that the duchies would accept the agreement in due course. Below’s statement did little to calm the anger.

In Frankfurt, Olshausen informed his brother Justus about the reactions in the parliament when the news of the ceasefire terms arrived. While some delegates in the ensuing debate spoke favorably of the treaty, Olshausen was one who demanded the release of all documents related to the negotiations a halt to the withdrawal of the troops. The latter demand was not accepted, much to Olshausen’s disgust, but he was pleased, as was Schleiden, that the people in the duchies did not overreact and turn to violence. He now assumed, as did some leaders in Frankfurt, that the duchies could establish a more permanent government and cut ties with Denmark. The radicals and moderates were united in their nationalist enthusiasm and opposition to an imposed treaty. However, while the Malmö ceasefire signaled a possibility for a fully independent Schleswig-Holstein, little could be done about the ceasefire’s implantation.

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75 Ibid., 127.

76 Reventlou and Beseler to Schleiden, August 27, 1848, Fasc. 4, Nachlass Schleiden, CAU.

77 Schleiden to provisionasl government, August 29, 1848, Aktenstücke, 2:462.

On August 31, the Prussian government informed the duchies of the terms of the ceasefire. People now saw that the Prussians had clearly gone too far and exceeded the powers granted to them by Frankfurt. The German government was similarly outraged by the results of the Malmö talks, and this general lack of support opened the door for the provisional government to view the ceasefire as non-binding. The government was equally concerned that, while many promises had been made by Prussia, Denmark had made very few. It fell again to Schleiden to approach the Prussians and asked for a clarification of the terms. For the nationalist, peace at any price was not acceptable.

Hoping that Frankfurt would intercede, the Schleswig-Holstein diet asserted on September 4 that it could not be disbanded against its will and that any changes to the governing of the duchies would require the support of the diet. Von Below and Moltke-Nütschau, the ceasefire commissioners, soon realized that resistance in the duchies would make the assumption of office by the new administration difficult. Disgruntled that the members of his government had refused his orders, Moltke-Nütschau departed Holstein. Von Below tried to get a member of the provisional government to assume the presidency. Beseler refused unless major alterations were made to the ceasefire. Others made similar demands.

79 Auerswald to provisional government, August 31, 1848, Aktenstücke, 2:469-471.
80 Schleiden, Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung, 131, 133.
81 Reventlou and Beseler to Schleiden, August 4, 1848, Fasc. 4, Nachlass Schleiden, CAU.
82 Schmidt, Olshausen, and Reventlou to Schleiden, June 10, 1848, Fasc. 4, Nachlass Schleiden, CAU.
83 Schleiden, Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung, 133.
84 Ibid., 135.
While the duchies hoped for support from Frankfurt, it was not forthcoming. Initially, a majority in Frankfurt had voted against the implementation of the ceasefire, but with new pressure exercised in Prussia and Frankfurt, and the realization of a possible escalation, the Frankfurt parliament by September 16 had changed its mind and urged acceptance of the ceasefire. The representatives of the duchies favored its implementation, and hoped for its speedy implementation. The next task was to get the provisional government and diet to agree to the ceasefire. Schleswig-Holstein agreed to the ceasefire, but there were clear signs of continued resistance.

The duchies had held elections for a constitutional assembly that would draft a constitution for Schleswig-Holstein. The duchies hoped to create a fait accompli, which would place the duchies on a better political footing than if they had remained an insurrectionary government. The uprising was moving away from a government ruling in the name of the duke toward an independent Schleswig-Holstein.

In response to Malmö, the provisional government once again called for a meeting of the diet. After Bremer, as representative of the provisional government, had presented the details on the ceasefire, Claussen requested that additional documents of the negotiations be made available. He was in line with the demands his radical colleague Olshausen had made in Frankfurt. At the same time, the diet made sure that its legitimacy was not questioned by stating that it could not be abolished and that new laws would require its endorsement.

85 Ibid., 136.
86 Ibid., 143; Wigard, Stenographischer Bericht, 3:2166; Aktenstücke, 2:488-489.
87 Schleiden, Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung, 145.
89 Marhencke, Hans Reimer Claussen, 158-160.
duchies moved to the next chapter in their uprising, the politicians in the duchies and the diet tried to maintain some of their authority.

During these five months, March 24 to August 26, 1848, the Schleswig-Holstein uprising built on many developments of the previous decades. The mistrust that had developed between the duchies and Denmark was clearly visible in the opposition to detrimental or ambiguous ceasefire terms. While the separatist-nationalists initially focused on governing the duchies in the name of the duke of the duchies, international pressure moved the uprising farther and farther away from this goal. Three men at the center of this narrative were in the midst of the developments. Schleiden faced a new task with the diplomatic duties pressed upon him. While he was an able diplomat when dealing with the German states, he was less successful in exerting pressure on Prussia. By August, it was clear that the duchies’ separatist challenge was going to bring international pressure and cause the desertion of its allies. It was an important lesson that was largely overlooked at the time. For Claussen and Olshausen, the events of 1848 offered many opportunities to voice their radical demands. They continued to agitate for democratic reforms, but when it came to the independence and separate status of the duchies, they stood with the other liberals. Clearly, the first Schleswig-Holstein war was far from over, and continuation of the war would escalate the internal differences within Schleswig-Holstein and bring new diplomatic challenges.
Chapter Four
First Schleswig-Holstein War: Crushed by Great Power Diplomacy

The first five months of the Schleswig-Holstein uprising had been characterized by misunderstandings developed over the past two decades, and which would continue to define the conflicts to come. While Schleiden had left behind his civil service career to become a diplomat, his efforts to gain support for the duchies would be checked by the European powers. The radicals, including Olshausen and Claussen, had shown their cards in discussion about political reform, but they had not yet broken with the nationalists. As the first Schleswig-Holstein war entered its next stage, the conflicts within the separatist-nationalist camp grew. The radicals were increasingly willing to challenge the government of the duchies and risk international war despite the consequences. Other nationalists, such as Schleiden, continued to support the government of the duchies, but the increasingly bleak situation and deteriorating war effort made success seem unlikely. The resilience of Schleswig-Holstein forced the continuation of the conflict until early 1851, when international and German pressure forced the duchies to give up the separatist struggle. The separatists were willing to fight until the bitter end; their nationalist sympathies were strong. However, they faced obstacles too large to overcome.

In September 1848, the duchies were faced with the unpleasant task of implementing the hated ceasefire. However, the composition of the interim government continued to cause problems. The Danes insisted on the leadership of Carl Graf von Moltke-Nütschau, who was unable to take over because of resistance in Schleswig-Holstein. The Danes demanded that Prussia should act more forcefully to implement the ceasefire. ¹ At the same time, Frankfurt

demanded the replacement of the Prussian commissioner in the duchies be an imperial commissioner. In the ensuing diplomatic crisis, Schleiden was again called on to help find a settlement.

On September 25, the new Prussian foreign minister August Heinrich Hermann Graf von Dönhoff called on Schleiden to suggest possible leaders for the new government. The two men also thought about how to satisfy the Danish demands and make sure future Danish requests for revisions or adjustments were not detrimental. On September 27, the Prussian government acknowledged the difficulty of implementing the ceasefire in respect to a new government. Prussia decided to pick five men to direct governmental affairs.² For the moment, Prussian support, while tenuous, seemed still in favor of the duchies.

Back in Rendsburg, Schleiden and the leaders of the provisional government debated how they should proceed. In a decision by the diet, Adolph von Moltke, Alexander Friedrich Wilhelm Preusser, Theodor Graf von Reventlow-Jersbeck, Paul Johann Boysen, and Ernst Freiherr von Heintze were selected as the five officials who would oversee government affairs once the ceasefire took effect.³ The new government demanded that the legal code worked out by the diet in the preceding months should remain at least partially in effect.⁴

The duchies had started to draft a constitution during the ceasefire talks in Malmö and intended to sever their ties with Denmark. The constitutional assembly offered an opportunity for the radicals to voice their opinion. In one of his speeches, Claussen used rather provocative


language to indicate that the ties between the duchies and Denmark had been cut. Only upon
direct invitation by the duchies could the Danish king reassume his duties as duke. However,
Claussen’s radical suggestion, which would have lifted the uprising to a completely new level,
was dismissed for a less sternly worded compromise. Other members attacked Claussen for
suggesting the end of the personal union and questioned his nationalism. Some men even thought
Claussen a dangerous troublemaker.\(^5\) The radicals were starting to move challenge the moderate
nationalist of the duchies.

In contrast to other radicals, Claussen was pragmatic enough to realize that at times
compromise was necessary. As a result, he abandoned his radical viewpoints by stepping back
from his support for a bicameral legislature, which would have provided more stability, in favor
of a unicameral system.\(^6\) Despite the radical challenges in the drafting process, on September 15,
the constitutional assembly finished its work on the legal code. The code soon became law of the
land and would remain so until abrogated by the Danish authorities after the war.\(^7\)

Schleswig-Holstein entered the second phase of the first Schleswig-Holstein war with a
new legal code and both Prussian and German support. Despite the radical challenges, their
views remained checked. Things looked promising. Schleiden was able to gain Prussian
acceptance of the new government under Reventlow-Jersbeck.\(^8\) By October 12, all formalities in

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\(^7\) Ibid., 165.

respect to the new government had been accomplished.\textsuperscript{9} On October 19, the new government of the duchies assumed office.\textsuperscript{10}

As a result, Schleiden’s work in Berlin was done, although he was not immediately recalled,\textsuperscript{11} despite his requests.\textsuperscript{12} He was still thought to be essential to the duchies’ cause in Berlin, but his duties changed. In the following weeks, the government directed Schleiden to buy war material, allowing him half a million marks for the purchases. The duchies had to prepare in case war broke out again. He also had to manage large sums to pay for the trip to Schleswig-Holstein of recently hired officers. This was an obligation he did not relish.\textsuperscript{13} Schleiden had turned from being a diplomat to being a purchasing and recruitment agent, although he did not have to wait long for new diplomatic challenges to arise.

In the duchies, the new government had reinstituted almost all laws of the provisional government by decree on October 22, and in anticipation of Danish protests, it issued a memorial to explain the action. However, there were still many who were dissatisfied with the ceasefire agreement. Olshausen and his radical followers continued to protest the ceasefire and new government.\textsuperscript{14} The Danish monarchy was also angry at the blunt refusal to follow the ceasefire terms, even threatening to resume the war.\textsuperscript{15} However, the Danes were hardly innocent in this regard. They continued to occupy the islands of Alsen/Als and Aero/Ærø, which belonged to

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{9} Schleiden, \textit{Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung}, 166.
  \item \textsuperscript{10} Ibid., 176.
  \item \textsuperscript{11} Ibid., 180.
  \item \textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 181.
  \item \textsuperscript{13} Ibid., 184-185.
  \item \textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 174.
  \item \textsuperscript{15} Ibid., 216.
\end{itemize}
Schleswig. While the Danes saw a reason to insist that the ceasefire had been violated, the Germans could claim that the Danes were purposefully trying to reignite the war. The nationalists continued to keep the Schleswig-Holstein question alive.

With the government in the duchies unresponsive, resisting the ceasefire, and trying to find a way to interpret the treaty to the duchies’ benefit, the Danish government increased the pressure. The Danes announced that unless its requested changes were implemented, Schleswig-Holstein’s governmental leaders would be considered “insurrectionists.” Much concerned by the threat, the government of the duchies again appealed to the imperial government in Frankfurt for assistance. However, Frankfurt, while still supportive of the cause of the duchies, remained ambivalent.

A slight breathing space opened for the duchies in mid-November. Much like the government in Prussia, Denmark faced a change in its government. On November 15, the Danish March ministry collapsed. Christian Albrecht Bluhme, Ditlev Gothard Monrad, Anton Frederik Tscherning, and Orla Lehman joined the already retired Lauritz Nicolai Hvidt. The king asked August Adam Wilhelm Lensgreve Moltke to form a new government, which was a relatively easy task. In respect to the duchies, no policy change occurred; the influence of Danish nationalism remained strong. The new government continued to insist on the full implementation of the ceasefire and threatened to declare Schleswig-Holstein in insurrection. With Denmark willing to call on the population of Schleswig to resist the German separatist-

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16 Ibid., 223.
17 Ibid., 221.
18 Ibid., 225.
19 Ibid., 228-229.
20 Ibid., 231-232.
nationalists, civil war loomed. The duchies, concerned about these pronouncements, continued to appeal to the imperial government in Frankfurt.\textsuperscript{21} Luckily, the Danes undermined the ceasefire agreement themselves by placing additional troops on the contested islands of Alsen/Als and Aero/Ærø, thus allowing the German states to do likewise along the southern border of Holstein.\textsuperscript{22} At this point, the duchies still enjoyed the full support of the German states; but it was not to last.

By November 29, Schleiden had returned from Berlin, but was sent back within a few days. New orders from Prussia questioned the continued service of the Prussian officers in the Schleswig-Holstein army. Schleiden’s diplomatic skills were needed again. Schleiden requested that the government should allow the officers to stay with the army of the duchies until a permanent peace had been negotiated. Prussia could not ignore that these officers were essential if the army of the duchies was to remain intact.\textsuperscript{23} Furthermore, Schleiden requested that General Eduard Wilhelm Ludwig von Bonin, who had replaced Wrangel, remain in the duchies as well.\textsuperscript{24} While these requests showed the military weakness of the duchies, they also showed that Prussian support still existed despite international pressure. It was, however, a question of how long the Prussians, and thus by default the duchies, would be able to maintain this position.

Upon the conclusion of his latest mission, Schleiden once more requested an assignment closer to home. In Berlin, he was replaced by Eugen Graf von Reventlow-Altenhof and Rochus Wilhelm Traugott Heinrich Ferdinand Freiherr von Liliencron.\textsuperscript{25} On January 2, 1849, after a

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 234-236.
\item \textsuperscript{22} Ibid., 241.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Ibid., 244-245.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Ibid., 246-247.
\item \textsuperscript{25} Ibid., 284.
\end{itemize}
brief vacation with his family, Schleiden arrived in Schleswig and assumed a position with the
government of the duchies. He was assigned to Adolph von Harbou’s department on foreign,
domestic, religious, and educational matters. Schleiden had finally returned to his Vor-März
roots and the civil service, although was mainly consulted on foreign questions that needed his
critical and knowledgeable input. In his new capacity, Schleiden would draft many of the
letters to foreign governments and representatives abroad. He was still deeply involved with the
future of the separatist struggle.

Since the ceasefire was intended as a precursor to peace negotiations, Great Britain made
a new attempt to negotiate. On December 12, 1848, Lord Palmerston proposed a plan that would
prevent the incorporation of Schleswig into Denmark and maintain the territorial integrity of
Denmark. In Frankfurt, Francke explained to the authorities that the inclusion of Schleswig
into the German Bund and a resolution of the succession question were essential for a lasting
peace. However, Francke had exceeded his instructions. While Schleiden made some effort to
defend Francke, whom he knew personally and who had been his superior in Copenhagen, the
government of the duchies could not allow Francke to make another mistake. The indivisible
nature of the duchies, which Francke had downplayed, was reemphasized in the new instructions
from Schleswig. In order to avoid further miscommunication, department chief von Harbou went
to Frankfurt. The nationalists remained uncompromising when it came to the unity of the
duchies.

26 Ibid., 250.
27 Ibid., 261-262.
28 Ibid., 264-265.
Nevertheless, the new negotiations commenced in London under the auspicious of Lord Palmerston. The British reestablished themselves in their position as mediator. The pressure for success was enormous because the ceasefire would end on March 26. On February 3, 1849, the Germans accepted the British suggestion to use Schleswig’s independence as the basis for the peace talks. Officially, Bunsen was to work toward a relationship between Denmark and Schleswig that resembled the personal union that had existed between Denmark and Norway from 1536 to 1814. In the interest of peace, Bunsen downplayed the importance of the succession question. However, the Danes, with the frequent requests for instructions, slowed the proceedings. They did not act in good faith.

Denmark gave notice that the ceasefire would end as agreed upon on March 24 and that no extension would be granted. War would resume before formal peace negotiations had commenced. The Germans negotiators called off the preliminary talks. The Danes justified their policy by claiming that their announcement was intended to speed up the peace negotiations and not to signal imminent war. The claim was in stark contrast to their actions.

With the ceasefire ending, the Danish monarchy prepared to resume hostilities. The question would be whether Schleiden’s work in Berlin would pay off, with the German states continuing to support the duchies. On March 27, the blockade of the duchies’ coast resumed, much to the surprise of the European powers, which had been given assurances that it would be lifted.

29 Ibid., 286-287.
30 Ibid., 280-281.
31 Ibid., 291.
32 Ibid., 308-309.
33 Ibid., 320.
Since the second phase of the first Schleswig-Holstein war seemed imminent, the government of the duchies acknowledged the new political reality. If war broke out again, the ceasefire ministry would lose its legitimacy and would have to make room for a new government. Soon plans were in place for a new government. Wilhelm Hartwig Beseler and Friedrich Graf von Reventlow-Preetz, who had been part of the provisional government, assumed power as the Statthalterschaft but failed to agree on a third member. The two men would face the difficult task of both governing the duchies and conducting a war. The new government had 23,000 soldiers, but relied on foreign officers to lead the local recruits. Despite the relatively strong army, the threat of a foreign intervention remained. Separatist nationalism was increasingly under pressure in a Europe that was returning to conservative-monarchical rule.

On April 3, Danish troops crossed the border into northern Schleswig. The second phase of the war had begun. On the following day, the Danish navy sent a seven-ship fleet against Eckernförde. The outcome of the land to sea artillery duel was nothing less than a total embarrassment for Denmark’s navy. The Danes lost the ship-of-the-line *Christian VIII* and another vessel, while three other ships sustained heavy damage. However, the Battle of Eckernförde was a pyrrhic victory for the duchies. At the same time, the armies of Denmark advanced from their position in Sonderburg/Sønderborg toward the German army of General von

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34 Ibid., 334.


37 Ibid., 349.

Bonin near Flensburg. Luckily for the duchies, the Danes were unprepared for war. In the coming days, the Schleswig-Holstein armies and its German allies pushed the Danes back to the northern border of Schleswig. In early May, the combined forces advanced into Denmark itself, which had the undesirable effect of attracting European attention.

By then, the German revolution had run its course. The Frankfurt parliament went out of business when the Prussian king refused a “crown from the gutter,” a decision that Claussen observed with satisfaction. He, as a member of the Frankfurt parliament, had opposed a constitutional monarchy. Instead, he had argued for a republic, with a president as head of state. In the end, the ideas of Claussen and his democratic friends were defeated. Claussen himself did not engage in the debates related to the head of state. Even more surprisingly, he voted with the majority to give the German crown to a German prince. Despite being a radical, he was moderate enough to understand the political reality of the day.

The refusal of the Prussian king likely pushed Claussen to return to his democratic-republican viewpoints. He joined the 104 die-hards radicals of the Rumpfparlament who had relocated to Baden to continue the work started in Frankfurt. However, by June 1849, radicalism was on the decline, and the princes were reasserting their authority. These changed did not bode well for Schleswig-Holstein. “With the disappearance of the national assembly and


40 Marhencke, Hans Reimer Claussen, 203.

41 Ibid., 205. Marhencke should not ask why a person with such clear vision and sense for reality would take part but more why he had not participated like that earlier. Claussen had been a radical for a long time and considering which political grouping he belonged to in Frankfurt his participation is not really surprising.
the shadow existence of the central power,” Schleiden observed, “the duchies lost their most important moral support.”\textsuperscript{42} They were at the mercy of Berlin and Europe.

Meanwhile, the armies of the duchies and their German allies had penetrated deep into Jutland. Operating in enemy territory had its logistical difficulties, and the hostile population kept the Danish army well-informed. While the Danes of Olaf Rye retreated to Fünen/Fyn by way of Århus, General von Bülow’s Schleswig-Holstein army laid siege to Fredericia on May 7, 1849. However, with no naval force to cut off access to Fredericia from the sea, reinforcements soon poured into the city. After two months under siege, the Danes broke out of Fredericia on July 6 and forced the Schleswig-Holstein army into full retreat.\textsuperscript{43} The incursion into Jutland had placed the duchies’ German supporters under tremendous international pressure.\textsuperscript{44}

A new ceasefire was immediately contemplated. Graf von Schleinitz, Prussia’s new foreign minister, and Holger Christian von Reedtz, the Danish minister in Berlin, met on June 4 in Berlin under the auspicious of Great Britain’s representative Earl John F. Westmoreland to discuss the possible terms for a new armistice and final peace.\textsuperscript{45} By mid-June, the Prussian government had made a proposal that would have left Schleswig independent. The plan appealed to the Danish representative, who immediately dispatched his secretary, Mr. von Quaade, to Copenhagen to present it.\textsuperscript{46}

The biggest problem was Prussia’s insistence on coupling the ceasefire with an agreement on preliminary peace terms. When the Danes provided terms, Prussia found them

\textsuperscript{42} Schleiden, \textit{Schleswig-Holstein im zweiten Kriegsjahre}, 54.

\textsuperscript{43} Svendsen, \textit{The First Schleswig-Holstein War}, 88-103

\textsuperscript{44} Schleiden, \textit{Schleswig-Holstein im zweiten Kriegsjahre}, 102-103.

\textsuperscript{45} Ibid., 109.

\textsuperscript{46} Ibid., 114-115.
unacceptable. However, on July 8, two days after the siege of Fredericia ended, both ministers worked out a deal, with Westmoreland overseeing negotiations. Prussia accepted the fact that Holstein and Schleswig were not connected. Thus, the main reason for the conflict was discarded and the door opened for future peace talks. However, while the Danes were allowed to retain troops on Alsen/Als and AeroÆrø, the Germans had to withdraw their troops and officers from the duchies. Overall, the deal looked like a sell out. Schleiden had harsh words for this ceasefire agreement. He suspected that Prussia wished to withdraw from the conflict altogether, leaving the duchies to standalone. Antagonism toward Prussia was building, but since a continuation of the war in defiance of the ceasefire was impossible, the duchies had to accept the terms.

Since the duchies had been unaware of the dealings between Prussia and Denmark, the news of the ceasefire “hit like a lightning out of the blue” in the duchies. Prussia had completely misled the duchies’ representatives in Berlin. On July 12, Freiherr Otto Theodor von Manteuffel officially notified the government of the duchies of the ceasefire. All attempts to renegotiate its terms came to nothing. Especially offensive was the fact that pro-Danish Swedish troops would be stationed in northern Schleswig to enforce the ceasefire. The separatists were losing

47 Ibid., 120.
48 Ibid., 121.
49 Ibid., 131-132.
50 Ibid., 123.
51 Ibid., 76, 83, 130.
52 Ibid., 138.
53 Ibid., 133.
54 Ibid., 137.
influence among the German states, which desired a return to normalcy and end of revolutionary upheaval.

On July 24, the retreat of the German troops started, and all attempts to convince the officers, commanding general, and soldiers to remain failed. The nationalists were angry, and many of them would long remember this “desertion.” In his memoirs, Schleiden commented that he hoped history would condemn General von Bonin for abandoning the duchies in their moment of greatest trial and need. Seeing the troops depart had a negative impact on the morale of the duchies. People started to think about leaving their homes. Kammerherr Lucius Carl von Neergaard-Oevelgönne confessed to Schleiden that the ceasefire decision had robbed him of all hope for future victory and that he intended to leave. Schleiden admitted that he, too, was thinking about flight, but not if he appeared to be “running away from a breach.” As a nationalist, Schleiden would stand with the duchies until the very end.

With Schleswig neutralized, the government had to evacuate the duchy. Faced with the situation, the radicals started to mount their first major attack on the Statthalterschaft. Olshausen’s radicals suggested that south Schleswig should not be abandoned. Since such defiance would mean war, the Statthalterschaft countered the radicals’ demands by threatening to resign if the radicals prevailed. The radicals failed to realize that all of Europe had turned against them and that the ceasefire was the only thing that kept the Statthalterschaft, and thus the nominal independence Schleswig-Holstein, alive.

55 Ibid., 144-145.
56 Ibid., 145.
57 Ibid., 151.
58 Ibid., 151.
As if the Statthalterschaft had not already enough problems, the radical challenged continued after the election for a new legislative body. Claussen, who had only recently returned from Stuttgart and the Rumpfparlament, won a seat in the new diet, which held its first meeting on August 10, 1849. The radicals immediately addressed the military defeat, which they blamed on the war ministry. Claussen proposed an investigation into its alleged mismanagement, although he was soon under attack because other members of the diet believed his suggestions were politically, not militarily, motivated. In fact, Claussen’s real target was the chaotic political system in the duchies, which he blamed on the war minister, Carl Friedrich Jacobsen. Other radical representatives, including Hedde, endorsed Claussen’s position. Claussen’s old nemesis Lempfert countered that to blame one person in the small, weak, and dependent duchies was unrealistic. The duchies, on their own, could do nothing against Russian and British pressure. Considering the events in other parts of Europe at the time, it was easy to challenge Claussen’s political views. In the end, the majority prevented his proposal from going through. The radicals had finally come out of hiding and attacked the political system of the duchies. At the most trying time, when political infighting was the last thing the duchies needed, radicals like Olshausen and Claussen not only suggested a detrimental continuation of the war, but also sought major political changes.

60 Ibid., 211.
61 Ibid., 213.
62 Ibid., 216.
63 Ibid., 216-217.
64 Ibid., 218.
On August 10, a representative from Saxony, Mr. von Bonin, arrived in Schleswig to assume administrative authority in the duchy of Schleswig. He would be complemented by a Danish counterpart. Bonin explained that there was no intention to create a separate administration for Schleswig. The two officials were to govern the duchy in the same way it had been governed thus far. They were to do so in the name of the king of Denmark, but in his role as duke of Schleswig. Unfortunately, the new commission was unable to overcome all suspicions, and their official announcements did not make clear that they governed in the name of the duke and not king. It was not until late August that the administrators assumed their official duties.

The creation of a new government for Schleswig raised the question of what the Statthalterschaft should do. They could, like the radicals suggested, openly resist, but that would have been suicidal. Neither could they remain in Schleswig. They decided to move the seat of government to Kiel. After the previous confrontation with the radicals, their new challenge to this change came as no surprise. Among the leading voices against the decision to leave Schleswig were again those on the political left, although for the moment, they remained unable to force their program. Olshausen and most of his followers temporarily accepted defeat.

National liberals, such as Schleiden, were sad that the situation had deteriorated to such a degree.

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66 Ibid., 173.

67 Ibid., 160-161.

68 Ibid., 163-165; August 25, 1849, p. 7, book 12, LBSH.

69 August 23, 1849, p 6, book 12, LBSH; also see Schleiden, *Schleswig-Holstein im zweiten Kriegsjahre*, 164.
Schleiden was unsure if he would ever see Schleswig again. To his diary he confessed, “The future lay so dark ahead that it was impossible to tell what the next few days would bring.”

Despite the hope that many of the local officials would remain loyal to the Statthalterschaft, many of them accepted the new situation and worked with the new commission for the best of the duchy. The future prospects for the separatists looked bad; Denmark had reasserted control in Schleswig without any checks by German authorities. The changes implemented included for the first time instructions to officials in northern Schleswig written in Danish, rather than in the official language of German. The disagreements between the commission in Schleswig and the Statthalterschaft continued for quite some time.

The Statthalterschaft appealed to the Prussians for assistance, but their requests were dismissed. To Prussia, no further changes were necessary. Even more, the Prussians suggested that a strongly worded proclamation by the Statthalterschaft could end the resistance in Schleswig and help restore peace in the region. Violence and mob actions made it difficult for the commission to control Schleswig. The Statthalterschaft even encouraged civil disobedience, such as telling people to mail letters to Holstein without postage to insure postage was paid to the authorities in Holstein and not Schleswig. These actions left their mark. By early October, the Prussian authorities were clearly siding with the commission in Schleswig and

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70 Schleiden, Schleswig-Holstein im zweiten Kriegsjahre, 166-167; August 18, 1849, p 1, book 12, LBSH.

71 Schleiden, Schleswig-Holstein im zweiten Kriegsjahre, 169.

72 Schleiden, Schleswig-Holstein im zweiten Kriegsjahre, 174.

73 Ibid., 194-195.

74 Ibid., 201.

75 Ibid., 213-214.
thus the Danes. Pressure on the Statthalterschaft to make a clear declaration concerning
Schleswig increased.\textsuperscript{76} The separatists had lost their most important supporter and were left
alone in their struggle for independence.

On November 1, 1849, the diet of the two duchies reassembled. This was another
opportunity for the radicals to voice their opinions. Unhappy with the situation, the diet increased
its pressure on the Statthalterschaft to do something about the “anarchical” situation in Schleswig
and the “violent rule” there.\textsuperscript{77} During the session, a series of petitions arrived. All of them called
for an end to foreign rule in Schleswig and indicated the willingness of the petitioners to resume
the war if an honorable peace was impossible, even if that meant fighting Denmark alone. Since
these were arguments close to the radicals’ line of thought, Schleiden wondered if the opinions
voiced in the petitions reflected the people’s will. The Statthalterschaft was in the precarious
position of addressing these questions and avoiding war.\textsuperscript{78} Under pressure, it prepared for war.\textsuperscript{79}
The third phase of the first Schleswig-Holstein war was coming closer.

As a result of the violent spirit in the diet and the precarious military situation, the
Statthalterschaft decided to engage in direct negotiations with the Danish monarchy.\textsuperscript{80} Since the
official peace negotiations had not yet commenced, the Statthalterschaft suggested that the king
appoint prominent members of both states to find solutions to their conflict.\textsuperscript{81} The offer was
well-received in Copenhagen and greeted as a sign of change. While the Danes were willing to

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid., 208-209.
\textsuperscript{77} Ibid., 228-229.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid., 230-231.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid., 235.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid., 235.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid., 236-237.
engage in direct negotiations, they would only accept one location, the royal palace in Copenhagen. They also explained that the negotiations with Prussia would not be delayed. In the interest of peace, Graf Otto zu Rantzau, Friedrich Mommsen, and Christian M. Steindorff went to Copenhagen.

While the duchies awaited the response from Copenhagen, the Prussian negotiator, Karl Georg Ludwig Guido Graf von Usedom, was on his way to the duchies for an inspection. Since Schleiden had been personally acquainted with von Usedom, the Statthalterschaft asked him to meet with the Prussian and impress upon him the duchies’ viewpoints. Schleiden claimed in his memoir that he staged his meeting to make it look like a coincidence. He had two lengthy conversations with the Prussian representative. They discussed how Schleswig should be governed in the future, the possibility of dividing Schleswig, and the independence of the duchies. However, von Usedom warned that a failure of the negotiations could leave the duchies isolated in their fight against Denmark. Even worse, the German Bund might be forced occupy Holstein under a federal execution. He was concerned that a failure could bring war and inquired in detail about the military capabilities of the duchies.

Despite the temporary optimism for a peaceful reconciliation, the hope was smashed by mid-January 1850. The three representatives in Copenhagen were unable to gain access to the king. The impasse between the two sides remained. With the three-man commission on its way back to Holstein, people asked if Denmark had only given the impression of desiring peace in

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82 Ibid., 246-247.
83 Ibid., 248.
84 Ibid., 242-242; November 24, 1849, November 25, 1849, p 103-109, book 12, LBSH.
85 Schleiden, Schleswig-Holstein im zweiten Kriegsjahre, 266-267.
order to avoid an attack by the duchies during the winter.\textsuperscript{86} In any event, both sides again prepared for conflict. Denmark appointed a new commanding officer for Jutland and issued a call to arms for all men of military age, even in Schleswig.\textsuperscript{87}

Meanwhile, peace negotiations resumed in Berlin. Usedom’s sickness had delayed the start, as did the insistence by the Danish representatives, Friedrich Christian Ferdinand Rigsfriherre von Pechlin, von Reedtz, and Ludvig Nicolaus von Scheele, that Prussia should also have authority to negotiate for the German Bund.\textsuperscript{88} The Bund, which had resumed its power in late December 1849, quickly granted Prussia the necessary authority. However, progress remained slow as the end of the six months armistice approached in mid-February.\textsuperscript{89} In Great Britain, Lord Palmerston suggested a renewal of the ceasefire for another six months, which was rejected by Prussia.\textsuperscript{90} As a result, attention focused on the men in Berlin and their work. The duchies were completely shut out of the discussion surrounding their fate and future.

While negotiations for peace continued in Berlin, the diet of the duchies debated the new budget and the situation in Schleswig. The radicals around Claussen and Olshausen again were defeated when they suggested legal reforms. Frustrated by their impotency, Olshausen called on his supporters to abstain from other votes, which would have immobilized the Statthalterschaft and resulted in its collapse. The delaying tactic was, nonetheless, unsuccessful, and still other radical suggestions debated in the diet, including the invitation of foreign officers to serve in the

\textsuperscript{86} Ibid., 269.
\textsuperscript{87} Ibid., 271-272.
\textsuperscript{88} Ibid., 276.
\textsuperscript{89} Ibid., 292.
\textsuperscript{90} Ibid., 284.
army of the duchies and the immediate reoccupation of Schleswig, were rejected.91 The radicals, in their stubborn insistence on reform, endangered the government of the duchies and, with it, the future of the separatist movement.

During this political in fight in the duchies, Schleiden embarked on another diplomatic mission, this one more complicated than any of his previous ventures. Schleiden had become interested in French opinion and its opposition to the cause of the duchies. Inquisitive as always, he investigated the historical relations between France and Schleswig-Holstein. As a result of his research, the Statthalterschaft decided to send him to Paris and stimulate support for their cause.92 Schleiden was under no illusion about gaining French support, but he was willing to do his best to change French public opinion.93 As it turned out, France, preoccupied with the rise of Louis Napoleon and the Roman Republic, was not a major player in the first Schleswig-Holstein war.94 Nevertheless, Schleiden had some major obstacles to overcome.

Schleiden did not initially use the press in Paris to achieve his goals, but relied instead on pamphleteering. His first pamphlet, “L’Intérêst de la France dans la Question du Schleswig-Holstein,” appeared in early April 1850. An official meeting with Louis Napoleon or a member of his cabinet was not possible because the Danish minister had blocked access.95 However, the pamphlet did open some doors for Schleiden, and he was able to meet with such influential Frenchmen as François Pierre Guillaume Guizot, Alphonse Marie Louis de Prat de Lamartine, and Marie Joseph Louis Adolphe Thiers. Despite the political setback, Schleiden continued to

91 Ibid., 298-302.
92 Ibid., 306-307; February 9, 1850, p 188, book 12, LBSH.
93 Schleiden, Schleswig-Holstein im zweiten Kriegsjahre, 316.
94 Ibid., 314.
95 Ibid., 317.
oversee the translation and publication of other important works on the Schleswig-Holstein question, including books by Johann Gustav Droysen and Karl Samwer.\textsuperscript{96}

On the newspaper front, Schleiden found it difficult to locate a respectable paper that did not support the Danes until, on May 1, 1850, he was able to work out a contract with the Orleanist \textit{Assemblee Nationale} and \textit{Courrier Français}. For 3000 francs, he could publish four major articles on the duchies each month, daily news reports, and other small references to events in Schleswig-Holstein. The first article so infuriated the Danish minister that he went personally to the editors to complain.\textsuperscript{97} The newspapers would not win French help, but they were another noble effort to reverse the fortune of Schleswig-Holstein. Schleiden’s ability as a diplomat had again borne fruit, but it remained to be seen if the efforts would make any difference in the outcome of the first Schleswig-Holstein war.

While Schleiden was away in Paris, Prussia warned the Statthalterschaft that a reoccupation of Schleswig would be an act of war.\textsuperscript{98} The Statthalterschaft faced additional problems with an inadequate military budget that made conducting a war nearly impossible. The diet was overwhelmingly in support of intervention in Schleswig but unaware of the disastrous consequences such an intervention would bring.\textsuperscript{99} The radical left, meanwhile, insisted on intervention. Eventually, after two unsuccessful attempts, the Statthalterschaft was able on April 4 to get some funds for the military, but the relationship between diet and government was at a

\textsuperscript{96} Ibid., 321-324, 333.
\textsuperscript{97} Ibid., 321.
\textsuperscript{98} Ibid., 346.
\textsuperscript{99} Ibid., 360-361.
low point. With the radical challenges to its authority, the governing of the duchies had become so difficult that a collapse of the government was possible.

In mid-April, a new attempt to communicate directly with Denmark was made. On April 18, Ernst Graf von Reventlow-Farve, Ludwig Gustav Heinzelmann, and Friedrich Christian Prehn arrived in Copenhagen to talk with the king. As part of the new offer, the Statthalterschaft gave up its demand to incorporate Schleswig into the German Bund. It was even willing to accept the status quo ante-bellum. However, the three representatives encountered intense hostility in Copenhagen and mistrust toward the Statthalterschaft. The Danes would not even engage in official negotiations, although they let it be known that at the very least, the Statthalterschaft had to reduce its army and stay out of southern Schleswig. The new peace mission failed. The separatist demand for an independent Schleswig-Holstein would be settled on the battlefield and not with diplomacy.

In face of such foreign resistance and domestic pressure, the Statthalterschaft buckled. In late May, the minister for foreign affairs, von Harbou, resigned. Francke succeeded him. Schleiden was sad to see von Harbou depart. He had worked under both men and thought Francke’s foreign policy was disastrous. By this point, the duchies had few choices left, in terms of either personnel or policy. The separatists were isolated.

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100 Ibid., 362.
101 Ibid., 369-371.
102 Ibid., 371-373.
103 Ibid., 378-379.
104 July 16, 1850, p 54, book 13, LBSH.
Left to fend for themselves, the duchies decided to go to war against Denmark for a third time, this time, however, without German support.\textsuperscript{105} By July 18, the Statthalterschaft had news that Danish troops had crossed the border into Schleswig. They occupied Flensburg the following day.\textsuperscript{106} The army of the duchies moved out to meet them. At the Battle of Idstedt, the largest land battle in the Nordic countries,\textsuperscript{107} on July 25, Schleswig-Holstein’s army suffered a resounding defeat. The commanding general withdrew to Rendsburg.\textsuperscript{108} The army of the duchies was falling apart. General Karl Wilhelm Freiherr von Willisen was unsure if he would be able to defend Kiel, the seat of government.\textsuperscript{109} However, the Danish army did not intend to attack or invade Holstein, but only wait for the enemy to strike them. Willisen obliged with small, badly managed excursions against Mysunde and Friedrichstadt. As a result of the three defeats, Willisen resigned, to be replaced by General Ulrich Angelbert Freiherr von den Horst.\textsuperscript{110} The duchies had failed dismally against the Danes, and their separatist attempt to bring independence to the duchies was all but lost by August 1850.

With the deteriorating military situation, diplomatic support was more important than ever before.\textsuperscript{111} The duchies again looked to Berlin and debated who to send as diplomatic representative. In late September, Francke suggested that Schleiden should return to Berlin and

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\textsuperscript{105} Schleiden, \textit{Schleswig-Holstein im zweiten Kriegsjahre}, 384.

\textsuperscript{106} July 19, 1850, p 57, book 13, LBSH.

\textsuperscript{107} Svendsen, \textit{The First Schleswig-Holstein War}, 114

\textsuperscript{108} July 25, 1850, p 61, book 13, LBSH; Svendsen, \textit{The First Schleswig-Holstein War}, 107-114

\textsuperscript{109} July 27, 1850, p 64, book 13, LBSH.

\textsuperscript{110} Svendsen, \textit{The First Schleswig-Holstein War}, 116-121

\textsuperscript{111} August 9, 1850, p 76, book 13, LBSH.
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take over from Liliencron. Knowing that he and Schleinitz did not get along, Schleiden doubted that he would be able to accomplish much, but he did accept the assignment.\footnote{September 20, 1850, p 111, book 13, LBSH.} Schleiden was pragmatic enough to understand that the game was lost, but he was unwilling to let down his homeland in its hour of greatest need.

On October 12, 1850, Schleiden departed Kiel for another tour of the German capitals to gather last minute support. He was to visit Frankfurt, Brussels, and Paris.\footnote{October 11, 1850, p 129, book 13, LBSH.} However, when he was unable to contact the British representative Henry Richard Charles Wellesley, Earl Cowley in Frankfurt, Schleiden decided to returned to Kiel.\footnote{October 22, 1850, p 136-137, book 13, LBSH.} In November and December, he went once more to Hanover and Braunschweig to ask that Austrian troops be prevented from crossing through their territory, a concession that would have delayed the Austrian occupation of Holstein under the authority of the Bund.\footnote{November 14, 1850, p 152, book 13, LBSH.} His mission failed. The defeat on the battlefield had made diplomatic measures useless, and it became necessary to find a graceful and honorable way to end the struggle.\footnote{October 22, 1850, p 136-137, book 13, LBSH.}

The German states were moving to put the regrettable Schleswig-Holstein episode behind them and restore peace to Jutland. On November 6, Schleiden confessed the latest rumors to his diary: the Prussian troops in Holstein would soon be replaced by Austrian soldiers under the authority of the Bund. Schleiden was ashamed of the Prussian weakness.\footnote{November 6, 1850, 146, book 13, LBSH.} The two German
powers and the Bund had agreed on a new commission for Holstein. On January 6, 1851, General Wilhelm von Thümen and General Alexander Graf von Mensdorff arrived and prepared to take over the government. In the meeting between the two commissioners and the Statthalterschaft, in which Francke as minister for foreign affairs and Schleiden participated, the commissioners made the mistake of urging the Statthalterschaft to ask the people to disband the army. The wording of their request gave the impression that the people had risen up against their lord. The Statthalterschaft immediately corrected the commissioner by insisting that they had rebelled against Denmark, not their duke. The separatists were still concerned about the legacy of their cause and clothed it in national terms to give the impression of legitimacy.

A short time after the federal commissioners took over in the duchies, the Austrian troops authorized by the federal execution approached Holstein. For a short time, the Statthalterschaft had contemplated a two-front war against the Danes and the German troops. However, with victory against the Danes unlikely, and most of the officers reluctant to engage the Austrian, Prussian, or other German troops, all resistance died. On February 1, 1851, the Statthalterschaft announced to the people of the duchies that it had handed over the powers of government to the commission of the German Bund. The first Schleswig-Holstein war was over, or almost.

118 January 2, 1851, p 197, book 13, LBSH.
119 January 6, 1851, p 200-201, book 13, LBSH; Thumen and Mensdorff to Statthalter, January 3, 1851, Aktenstücke, 1:9
120 Protocol of January 6, 1851, Schleiden, Aktenstücke, 1:11-13
121 Staathalter to Staatsrath, January 8, 1851, Aktenstücke, 1:33
122 Proclamation of February 1, 1851, Aktenstücke, 1:113.
Following the end of Holstein’s occupation by Austrian troops, new negotiations commenced in London involving the European principle powers. These negotiations culminated in the Protocol of London of 1852, signed by Prussia, Great Britain, Denmark, Sweden, and Russia, Denmark. In the protocol, Denmark promised to maintain Schleswig’s independence. Unfortunately, this return to the status quo ante-bellum was to nobody’s liking, and it only increased the bitterness on both sides of the nationality divide. In addition, the Augustenburg pretenders were formally but inadequately removed from the succession question. A door for future claims by the family remained open. The Schleswig-Holstein question was not solved, but the conflict surrounding the duchies had temporarily ended.

The second and third phase of the first Schleswig-Holstein war had offered more opportunities for Schleiden to test his diplomatic skills. However, in coming up against the foreign political power pressure on Prussia, there was little even a man with Schleiden’s skills could accomplish. Dissatisfied with the lack of success, Schleiden returned to his civil service job in the administration of the duchies, although, as before, he would continue to be used for temporary diplomatic assignments.

Meanwhile, the radicals around Olshausen and Claussen openly challenged the politics of the Statthalterschaft, and some of their reform and policy suggestions made it difficult for the Statthalterschaft to conduct the war. They were more than willing to wage war against both the German and Danish armies. The pressure exerted by the European powers, the unprepared state of the army of the duchies, and the diplomatic isolation of the duchies doomed the separatist-nationalist experiment.

123 Aktenstücke, 1:96
It was a turbulent half century in the duchies of Schleswig-Holstein and for the three men featured in this part of the story. They had gained valuable experiences, learned important lessons, and formulated their political and personal views as they and their homeland suffered under oppressive Danish policies that violated the independence and constitutional rights of the duchies. Olshausen had early on come into conflict with the law and the reactionary governments and experienced exile and repression. He had become a radical nationalist, and over time, he was ready not only to take his homeland out of the Danish purview, but also to fight anyone who stood in the way of a democratic, independent Schleswig-Holstein. Claussen was less radical than Olshausen but not far behind him. While he had fewer conflicts with the law, he had experienced the encrusted administration. As a worshiper of the democratic system of the United States, Claussen was a radical who never failed to promote his ideas. As well, he gained valuable parliamentary experience in two legislative bodies. However like Olshausen, he was also ready to fight for the independence of a democratic homeland. Both men had taken their radicalism to a higher level in the course of the first Schleswig-Holstein war, when they opposed the government and were even willing to risk its demise in the face of a growing number of foreign enemies. Moreover, Olshausen and Claussen would maintain their radical, separatist views, even after their defeat in the duchies.

In contrast to these two radicals was the much more moderate but no less separatist-minded Schleiden. Having early in his life experienced the unfair Danish policies toward its German subjects, Schleiden, nevertheless, returned to Holstein and a Danish civil service career. He continued to see Danish oppression and worked against it whenever his work in the commerz collegium in Copenhagen allowed him to do so. Transformed from a Danish civil servant, he became a revolutionary diplomat in 1848 and made every effort to assist his home country in
gaining much needed foreign support. However, despite his abilities and resilience, Schleiden could do little when faced with the combined opposition of Great Britain, Russia, and Sweden, and with the European and Austrian pressure on Prussia to end its embrace of revolutionary ideas.

All three men had been strong-minded separatist-nationalists; they had fought against Danish oppression and constitutional challenges. With the defeat of their cause, they searched for new opportunities, and all three turned to the United States. While the Schleswig-Holstein question temporarily moved into the background of European politics, overshadowed by the Crimean War and Italian unification, the three men’s experiences in the United States would tell much about the legacies they carried with them. At heart, they would always be separatist nationalists from Schleswig-Holstein.
Chapter Five

No Amnesty and Uncertain Future

When in February 1851, the Statthalterschaft handed over power to the German representatives in Holstein, the first Schleswig-Holstein war ended. The failed revolutionaries faced a bleak future. They were traitors to the Danish state and could face prosecution and, like some Hungarians, end up in front of firing squads. Many searched for a new home. Some went to other German states, some went into temporary exile in London, and some embarked on the long crossing of the Atlantic. In the baggage of those who crossed to the United States were the ideas they had stood for in Schleswig-Holstein, namely, radicalism, liberalism, nationalism, and secessionism. They entered a heated arena of sectional conflict when they arrived after 1851, and they would play a role in the escalation of the sectional tension while also posing challenges to the government at a time of crisis. The next four chapters are devoted to the experiences of Claussen, Olshausen, and Schleiden in the United States and their unique and vastly different experiences there. This chapter will briefly chronicle their migration to and early impressions of the United States.

In April 1852, the Danes announced the names of twenty-two men not included in the armistice granted to Holstein rebels. The list was the who-is-who of the Schleswig-Holstein uprising. First were the Fürst Christian Carl Frederik August von Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg and Prinz Friedrich Emil August von Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg. Next came all the prominent members of the Schleswig-Holstein government, including Wilhelm Hartwig Beseler, Friedrich Graf von Reventlow-Preetz, M. Andreas Paul Adolph von Harbou, Georg Friedrich von Krogh, Karl Philipp Francke, Freiherr Friedrich Nicolaus, and Adam Ludwig von Liliencron. Lesser political figures on the list
included Theodor Olshausen, Rudolph Schleiden, and Hans Reimer Claussen.\textsuperscript{1} As a result, these twenty-two men would join an array of lesser leaders and economic migrants in exile. Some of them had already, during the conflict, chosen to leave the embattled duchies, but all had to make difficult decisions regarding their future.\textsuperscript{2}

Theodor Olshausen had experience with political exile. He had already, following the Danish investigation in the Burschenschaft in Jena, sought refuge in Paris, Switzerland, and in the south German states. Therefore, he was much better prepared than many of his countrymen for the difficult transition to exile. Olshausen was the first of the three principals in this story to leave Europe. Apparently, he had wanted to leave with Claussen, but that idea did not work out for some unknown reason.\textsuperscript{3} On July 14, Olshausen boarded a ship in Hamburg bound that night for New York. His departure was kept secret in order to prevent a last minute arrest. Even a letter to his brother announcing his departure was cryptic.\textsuperscript{4} For the second time in his life, Olshausen was running from the authorities. Upon reaching New York, he decided to leave the city and move west.

Little is known of why he settled in St. Louis, Missouri, but the presence of a large German population, among them many Forty-Eighters, likely contributed to the decision to remain in the town on the Mississippi. Olshausen had, like many liberals, read about the United

\textsuperscript{1} Lettres Patentes du Roi de Danemarc, concernant l’Amnistie pour les Duches de Slesvig et de Holstein, March 29, 1852, \textit{BFSP}, 41:1059-1060.

\textsuperscript{2} October 29, 1850, p 140, book 13, LBSH.


\textsuperscript{4} T Olshausen to J Olshausen, July 12, 1851, ibid., 141. While the letter to his brother indicated his departure to New Orleans, historian Reppmann has claimed that Olshausen had arrived in New York instead.
States. Four months after his arrival, he had come to realize that most of the travel reports had been accurate. The people in the East, Olshausen wrote, were preoccupied with “material interests and a puritanical way of life.” In the new territories of the West, he observed a more welcoming atmosphere.⁵

St. Louis felt like home to Olshausen, due to its large German population. He estimated that about half the city was German-born. As other parts of the country, the German-Americans immigrants and native residents were at odds with one another. Even after four years in the United States, Olshausen still mused about the informal separation between Germans and the native population. He divided the natives into two distinct groups, either dignified and formal or nasty and rude.⁶ A side effect of the large German population in St. Louis was that Olshausen was able to communicate in his native tongue. He did not seem happy about that since its prevented him from improving his spoken English. Professionally, Olshausen wondered what he could do for a living. Temporarily, he decided to write a series of books about the geography, economics, and culture of the United States for the German immigrant market.⁷

Like many travelers to the United States, Olshausen was impressed by his new home country. He was appalled by how easily and frequently accidents happened. Somebody could be crushed by a train with no measure taken to improve safety. In other parts of the country, people faced lynch justice instead of a regular court. Regardless, Olshausen believed that the freedom, security, and openness of life in the United States made it superior to Europe.⁸ Olshausen certainly had his own experiences. Never subjected to lynching, Olshausen was one of only a

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⁵ T Olshausen to Zoe Olshausen, April 20, 1855, ibid., 179.
⁶ T Olshausen to Zoe Olshausen, April 20, 1855, ibid., 179.
⁷ T Olshausen to J Olshausen, November 16, 1851, ibid., 141-146.
few uninjured survivors when a newly-constructed railroad bridge collapsed on the opening run.\(^9\) Despite its many drawbacks, Olshausen still perceived the United States a better place.

Another thing to which Olshausen and others had difficulty adjusting was the oppressive summer heat in America. He frequently and at length complained about the high temperatures. The twenty degree Celsius difference during the day were startling and he noted that the thermostat could climb as high as thirty degrees. As a result, Olshausen required at least three to four suits a day. Interestingly, the heat did not seem to depress his spirit.\(^10\) Overall, Olshausen adjusted well to his new situation in the United States.

In St. Louis, Olshausen was soon joined by friend and fellow radical revolutionary Hans R. Claussen and his family. It is unknown when Claussen arrived in the United States. He must have reached the country shortly after Olshausen, and like him, went first to St. Louis. However, Claussen did not find the opportunities in that city to his liking.\(^11\) From the start, he worked hard to get acquainted with his new home. He spent much time learning the language and studying the legal and constitutional system of the United States. His studies strained the family’s finances. Claussen could not earn a sufficient income. He was not happy about this inability to provide for his family, but he considered it a necessary evil. In contrast to Olshausen, who seems to have accepted St. Louis as a permanent residence, Claussen intended to stay only briefly in the city. He visited Illinois and other neighboring states before deciding to settle in Iowa. Building on his background in law, Claussen took up residence in Davenport, first as a farmer, later, and more

\(^8\) T Olshausen to J Olshausen, May 26, 1853, ibid., 160-161.
\(^9\) T Olshausen to J Olshausen, November 5, 1855, ibid., 180-182.
\(^10\) T Olshausen to Sophie Olshausen, July 17, 1852, ibid., 155-156.
\(^11\) T Olshausen to J Olshausen, November 16, 1851, ibid., 141-146.
successfully, as a notary public.\textsuperscript{12}

Since Davenport had been the destination of many immigrants from Holstein, Claussen likely found a number of familiar faces, or at least people who knew of him as a radical leader in the duchies, and so brought their business to him. Claussen estimated that well over forty percent of the population of Davenport was German, and they would need a notary for contracts and other legal documents. After only about two month in business, Claussen was very satisfied with the income. He claimed that he and his family would have a good life if business continued as it had done. It certainly helped that his partner, a Mr. Corbie, was also a respected member of the community.\textsuperscript{13} However, in 1855, Claussen, for unknown reasons, left Davenport for Lyon, where he became involved in a corn milling business.\textsuperscript{14} His agricultural roots had returned in this new world environment.

Even though Claussen seems to have adjusted well to life in the United States and his new occupation, he still loathed his European lifestyle. As a result, he seemed rather unimpressed by the architectural and construction styles of the United States, and decided that his family’s house would be constructed in a European style. He could rely on European expertise for its construction since there was a large immigrant population. Claussen selected


\textsuperscript{13} H. R. Claussens to Ahlmann, September 17, 1852, reprinted in Andersen, \textit{Idstedt und Danach}, 87.

\textsuperscript{14} Marhencke, \textit{Hans Reimer Claussen}, 291.
what he claimed to be a beautiful location on high ground overlooking the Mississippi River, but it is unclear, whether, the house was ever built. 15 Nevertheless, Claussen, like many exiled revolutionaries, was still more European than American.

Having arrived in the United States at the time of the 1852 presidential election campaign, Claussen witnessed the American political system, which he so admired, at first hand. He was fortunate to see various speakers in person. Most impressive to him was the civilized manner in which political debates were conducted. Audiences even granted the opposition speaker the benefit of the doubt. Initially, Claussen was drawn to the Democratic party, which presented itself to immigrants as the party of progress while stigmatizing the Whigs as conservative, even reactionary. Most impressive to Claussen were the possibilities for personal success offered by a constitutional and democratic system. He wrote of Stephen Douglas, “In Europe, he would have made it only to a good mastercraftsmen, but here he has the bright future of one day being an equal of a crowned head, he might even be able to crush them to dust. Here you see the power of a constitution, which fosters the development of strength and does not hinder it.”16

Of the three men, Schleiden was an exception in many respects. Only he had previous personal contact with the Atlantic world, if only indirectly. His father and brother Emil had worked in Mexico, and his brother had taken up residence there in 1850. His two sisters and mother, to whom Schleiden was very close, created a strong bound that would not allow him permanently to leave the European continent.17 Still, after 1851, Schleiden, too, searched for new

15 H. R. Claussens to Ahlmann, September 17, 1852, reprinted in Andersen, Idstedt und Danach, 82-83.
16 Ibid., 90-91.
17 December 29, 1850, p 191-192, book 13, LBSH.
opportunities and relied on his first Schleswig-Holstein war experiences in diplomacy to find them.

Schleiden looked to Bremen for a possible diplomatic assignment. Two months after the amnesty proclamation, on June 8, 1852, he visited Bremen and made contact with the governing oligarchy, some of whom, Arnold Duckwitz and Johann Smidt, he knew from his days in Frankfurt. While unsuccessful in his quest, he intended to return in the fall to continue lobbying for a foreign post.¹⁸ Meantime, Schleiden returned to his sister’s residence at Nette-Hammer, where he read about Bremen’s trade, politics, and international relations in order to prepare for any opportunity.¹⁹ Also eager to know more about the economy and politics of the United States, Schleiden devoured issues of the Economist.²⁰

Bremen’s trade with the United States had grown over the past decades, to such an extend that about a quarter of Bremen’s trade went or came from the United States. Because of these trade interests, a desire for better communication, and a perception that the Prussian representative in Washington could no longer adequately represent Bremen the city contemplated sending a representative of its own. There was also a need to support the often unreliable merchant-consuls.

A candidate for public office always had to be cautious. While continuing to lobby for a diplomatic position, Schleiden wrote newspaper articles for various North German newspapers, among them the Hamburger Nachrichten and the Weserzeitung. Most of his articles dealt with recent events in Europe. In February 1853, Duckwitz warned Schleiden that he needed to be


¹⁹ 142-143, p 15, book 15, LBSH.

²⁰ January 3, 1853, p 172, book 15, LBSH.
careful. It was well-known that Prussia had an espionage group in Bremen, and Denmark still wanted Schleiden in prison. Duckwitz warned that if the Berlin government filed a complaint against him, the Senate of Bremen would not to approve his appointment.21

Meanwhile, Schleiden’s friends and acquaintances started the bureaucratic work to create a new position for him in Washington. On February 22, Gröning informed Schleiden that Kulenkampff, a wealthy merchant and senator, had requested that the senate debate subject.22 The next day, Schleiden learned that the senate would, indeed discuss the issue that evening. In the afternoon, shrewd politician that he was, Schleiden went to Smidt, who would preside over that evening’s debate. Smidt asked Schleiden if he was still interested in the position.23 Schleiden reiterates his interest in the post.

On March 11, the senate agreed to the creation of a new mission. That evening, Duckwitz informed Schleiden that the committee of foreign affairs had decided to recommend Schleiden for the mission to Washington. The senate of Bremen unanimously confirmed his appointment on April 4. Schleiden rejoiced. The mission would not start immediately. The senate wanted Schleiden to read and master the documents related to his post before leaving for Washington.24 The next day, after meeting Smidt, Schleiden accompanied him to the senate archives and started to look through what he described as mountains of documents. Of special interest to Schleiden were documents related to the negotiations on steamship lines, with which his predecessors, Rumpff and Gevekohl, had been involved.25

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21 February 9, 1853, p 190, book 15, LBSH.
22 February 22, 1853, p 195, book 15, LBSH.
23 February 23, 1853, p 195, book 15, LBSH.
24 March 11, 1853, p 201, book 15, LBSH.
25 April 6, 1853, p 211, book 15, LBSH.
Smidt told Schleiden that he would receive $4,000, a thousand dollars more than the previous temporary envoy.²⁶ That was peanuts compared with the salaries of the other representative at Washington but a substantial salary for Bremen.²⁷ However, there remained the issue of citizenship, since Schleiden needed to be a citizen of Bremen in order to assume the post. On the evening of the following day, Smidt moved that the senate confer Bremen citizenship on Schleiden, which was done.²⁸ His appointment secured, Schleiden was ready to depart. As things turned out, he would be the first and last permanent minister resident of the Hanseatic City of Bremen in Washington, D.C.

In late April, Schleiden delayed his departure in order to better familiarize himself with the bureaucracy he would encounter.²⁹ He met with the U.S. consul in Bremen, Ralph King, which was Schleiden’s first exposure to the spoken English language.³⁰ These meetings would soon become a daily routine for him in Washington. Having departed from Liverpool, Schleiden reached New York on June 21, 1853. His first impression of the city was not favorable. The temperature was hot, and he was kept waiting in the summer sun for two hours before being allowed to leave the docks. The first thing he did upon reaching his hotel was to bath and change into lighter summer clothes. Workaholic that he was, he then started to look into the steamship

²⁶ April 5, 1853, p 209, book 15, LBSH.  
²⁷ Enno Eimers, Preussen und die USA 1850 bis 1867 (Berlin, Germany: Dunker and Humblot, 2004), 28 .  
²⁸ April 7, 1853, p 211, book 15, LBSH. In the Hanseatic Cities, like in Hamburg, there was a clear distinction between the small and the large citizenship. Both had to be purchased. The large citizenship (Grosses Bürgerrecht)“ allowed for an unrestricted commercial and industrial freedom and could be elected into the senate, Bürgerschaft, and other offices.” Matthias Wegner, Hanseaten: Von Stolzen Bürgern und Schoenen Legenden (Berlin, Germany: Siedler, 1999), 34.  
²⁹ April 30, 1853, p 226, book 15, LBSH.  
³⁰ May 2, 1853, p 227, book 15, LBSH.
line to Bremen. He also met with the Prussian consul-general, Johann Wilhelm Schmidt. Schleiden wondered if Schmidt’s vanity could be put to good use for Bremen’s purpose. All the while, he continued to complain about the temperatures, which for him were depressingly hot. The high humidity only increased his suffering.31

On June 28, a week after his arrival, Schleiden was on his way to Washington. He could not help but think of his father’s grave in Mexico, which was closer than ever but a visit had to wait another four years. For the moment, his diplomatic work had priority.32 Spending a day in Baltimore, Schleiden met with the consul general of Bremen, Albert Schumacher. He inquired about the people with whom he would deal in Washington, especially the Prussian minister, Friedrich Karl Joseph Freiherr von Gerolt, Assistant Secretary of State A. Dudley Mann, and First Assistant Postmaster General Selah R. Hbbie.33

On June 30, 1853, Schleiden arrived in Washington by train from Baltimore. He intended to stay at Willard’s Hotel, to where he had directed his mail, but finding it closed, took lodgings in the National Hotel. He went that same day to meet with Gerolt at his residence in Georgetown. Unfortunately, the Prussian minister was not at home, but his wife invited Schleiden for dinner that evening. In the interim, Schleiden stopped at the State Department to meet with Mann, who had been consul in Bremen from 1842 to 1847.34

On the following day, Schleiden again visited Gerolt and went with him to the Capitol. Schleiden was impressed and wrote prophetically, “I will probably visit this proud building many

31 June 22, 1853, p 275-8, book 15, LBSH.
32 June 28, 1853, p 284, book 15, LBSH.
33 June 29, 1853, p 285, book 15, LBSH.
34 June 30, 1853, p 285-86, book 15, LBSH.
times in the future.” 35 On the next day, he returned to the State Department where he was introduced to Secretary of State William L. Marcy. The meeting was cut short when President Franklin Pierce walked in to inquire about a cabinet meeting later that day. From there, Schleiden went to Attorney General Caleb Cushing. He was again warmly welcomed, in no small part because of his letters of introduction and greetings from Friedrich von Rönne, the temporary all-German minister to the United States between 1848 and 1849. Schleiden also went to the General Post Office to talk with First Assistant Postmaster General Hobbie. The two men discussed the idea of a new postal treaty and the possibility of a contract for a steamship line between the United States and Bremen. 36 Schleiden’s work had started. He had transitioned from a stateless former revolutionary diplomat to a respectable diplomat.

What is striking is that after only a week in the country, Schleiden was already aware and critical of the political corruption in the United States. He wrote, almost in disillusionment, “It is not all gold that shines.” 37 Further disillusionment set in when he encountered the rude manners of some government officials. He was appalled that the postmaster general and the secretary of state propped their feet up on their desks while talking with him. When Schleiden vented about this inappropriate behavior to a fellow diplomat, the minister of Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Honduras, Luis Molina, he was told that it was normal behavior. Molina told Schleiden that in a recent interview Secretary of State Marcy had appeared to pay no attention to him, although he later acted according to Molina’s wishes. 38 The well-mannered European gentleman had difficulty fitting in with rude Yankees.

35 July 1, 1853, p 287, book 15, LBSH.
36 July 2, 1853, p 288, book 15, LBSH.
37 June 29, 1853, p 285, book 15, LBSH.
And so all three Schleswig-Holsteiners, forced from their homeland for participating in the recent uprising, had arrived in the United States. While Olshausen was the first to arrive, he was slow to settle down. His temporary home in St. Louis offered him a chance to acclimatize and to earn some money writing books. Claussen was quick to adjust and integrate into his new home. He shifted between his agricultural family roots and his legal education. In the first three years after his arrival, his only interest in politics was to observe U.S. democracy, which he so admired. Schleiden continued to build on his experience as diplomat and the connections he had made in Frankfurt to obtain a diplomatic post in Washington. Bremen had picked an able man who had experience in wartime diplomacy. While all three men took issues with aspects of American life, they had settled in rather well by the end of their first year. The biggest challenges were still to come in a country where competing nationalism and sectional differences centered around the institution of slavery and its territorial expansion.

38 Schleiden to Smidt, October 15, 1853, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.a.I, SAB.
Chapter Six

Schleswig-Holsteiner in the Antebellum United States

The three Schleswig-Holstein revolutionaries entered a United States torn by sectional tensions. The competing nationalism of North and South exasperated the conflict over the expansion of slavery and increasingly made compromise impossible. While both sides complained about the impossibility of being able to have a civilized discussion with the other, the South increasingly believed that it suffered under an oppressive northern political desire to alter the southern way of life. While the language used by southerners to describe the oppression mirrored that of the nationalists in Schleswig-Holstein, the newcomers from Europe had little sympathy for the slave-holding South. Instead, like many Forty-Eighters, the secessionist-nationalists from Schleswig-Holstein were just as ready to stand against the secessionists of the South.

In the antebellum years, Olshausen rediscovered his professional calling and returned to his own roots as a newspaper editor. His work in Davenport, Iowa, and St. Louis, like the work of many Forty-Eighters, contributed, with its anti-slavery language, to the escalation of sectional tensions. After his legal and agricultural experiences, Claussen, in the latter part of the 1850s, returned to politics and became a founding member of the newly created Republican party. Both men had determined to establish new careers in America. It remained to be seen how much their radical political ideology would affect their work. In contrast to these westerners, Rudolph M. Schleiden remained in Washington at his diplomatic post and, as in Schleswig-Holstein, tried to navigate the difficult terrain of international relations. All three men would become more and more involved in the tensions caused by the sectional differences in the United States.
The start of the most recent outbreak of sectional tensions dated to the war with Mexico and was part of the Atlantic world’s 1848 revolutionary upheavals. While the war added a huge amount of new territory, the gains also raised the question of slavery in these new territories. As long as the war was conducted, the question lay relatively dormant. However, the election of 1848 and California Gold Rush stoked a smoldering sectional conflict when California applied for statehood as a free state. Despite these events not being comparable to those in Europe in 1848, the United States experiences with the “free-soil” revolt experienced its own 1848.1 Much like the complex Schleswig-Holstein question, the territorial question was not solved until the passage of the Compromise of 1850. Under that agreement, California entered the Union as a free state, but the doctrine of “popular sovereignty” would decide the future of slavery in the remaining territory of the Mexican Cession. The territorial question was settled prudently by not allowing it to escalate.

However, the United States had its fair share of rabble-rousers and radicals, comparable to Uwe J. Lornsen, Theodor Olshausen, and Orla Lehman. For the most part, their influence had been muted. Despite the tireless efforts of William L. Garrison and others, abolitionism had remained a fringe movement. There had been an attempt to politicize it, but neither the Liberty nor Free Soil parties became a serious challenger to the established parties. Fire-eaters in the South had thus far met the same fate. Playing up perceptions of northern oppression and the

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minority status of the South, something that sounded very similar to the arguments made by the
duchies, they made a bold, but ultimately failed, attempt to create a united front at the Nashville
Convention in 1850. Much like the “extremism” of Lornsen in the 1830s, these efforts were not
yet finding fertile ground. However, the political landscape of the United States was shifting,
and, as in the duchies, the more extremist voices were gaining strength.2

As a result, an anti-immigration party arose out of the many reform movements that had
developed over the previous two decades. The arrival of hundreds of thousands of Irish refugees
and political exiles from Europe had inspired fears that unruly foreign elements would overrun
the United States. The economic and social tensions created by the influx of so much cheap
labor, much of it Catholic in allegiance, gave additional ammunition to the nativists. The
American, or Know Nothing party, grew in the first half of the 1850s to such proportions that it
helped to supplant the declining Whig party.3 Forty-Eighters looked with suspicion and revulsion
on this party.

However, 1848 also cast another long shadow over the United States. In his search for
support, the exiled Hungarian leader Lajos Kossuth had visited the United States from December
1851 to July 1852. While Kossuth was warmly welcomed in the North and by the “Young
Americans” of the Democratic party, the South looked with concern at this revolutionary, as did

2 Henry Mayer, All on Fire: William Lloyd Garrison and the Abolition of Slavery (New
York: St. Martin’s Griffin, 1998); Elizabeth R. Varon, Disunion! The Coming of the American
Civil War, 1789-1859 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2008); Eric H. Walther,
The Shattering of the Union: America in the 1850s (Wilmington, DE: Scholarly Resources,
2004).

3 Tyler Anbinder, Nativism and Slavery: The Northern Know Nothings and the Politics of
the 1850s (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992); Ira M. Leonard and Robert D. Parmet,
American Nativism, 1830-1860 (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold Company, 1971); Alice F.
Tyler, Freedom’s Ferment: Phases of American Social History to 1860 (Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press, 1944); Ronald G. Walters, American Reformers, 1815-1860 (New York: Hill
the Austrians. When Kossuth gave a speech before Congress, it caused such a rupture in the relations with Austria that the Austrian minister, Dr. Johann Georg Ritter von Hülsemann, left Washington in protest. But it was not the Kossuth but the Koszta affair that would raise difficult questions for the newly appointed minister from Bremen.

The Koszta affair developed in June 1853 when the Hungarian refugee Martin Koszta was abducted by the Austrian authorities in Smyrna, Ottoman Empire. Since Koszta had declared his intention to become a citizen of the United States, the U.S. consul and the commander of the U.S.S. *St. Louis* gave him protection. While Captain Duncan N. Ingraham almost created an international incident by trying to force Koszta from an Austrian warship, the ministers of Austria and the United States in Constantinople were able to agree on a compromise. The incident happened at an inopportune time, since Hülsemann had just returned to the United States.

As a member of the diplomatic corps and former revolutionary and fugitive, Schleiden paid close attention to the case, but he apparently never felt much sympathy for Koszta or his possible fate in Austrian hands. Schleiden was concerned about the implications of the incident and the illegal action of the U.S. naval captain. Schleiden believed that only an apology by the United States could rectify the damage done to international law. While Schleiden did not join

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5 For a detailed account of the incident, see Andor Klay, *Daring Diplomacy: The Case of the First American Ultimatum* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1957).

6 R. Schleiden to Johann Smidt, September 23, 1853, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.a.1, SAB.
the Prussian and Russian protests in support of Austria, he was appalled by the support Ingraham received from knowledgeable men, such as Robert Walker and Edward Everett. Schleiden’s reaction indicated his deep-rooted belief in international and maritime law, which dated back to his university days. Based on his past experiences, he held that politicians should only support actions that were in line with the principle of law, and not those designed to foster national prestige. One has to wonder why Schleiden, who could easily face a similar fate as a Danish fugitive and would not be able to rely on Bremen’s nonexistent navy for protection placed international law above the well being of a fellow Forty-Eighter. It may have been an aspect of nationalism that prevents even those people united in a revolutionary, separatist struggle against monarchy from cooperating with one another, perhaps it was an early indication that revolutionaries in the Atlantic world were not willing to join forces.

However, while the diplomatic legacies of 1848 were important, the focus in the United States was on the escalating tensions over slavery’s expansion westward and into the Caribbean. The leader of the Compromise of 1850, Stephen A. Douglas reopened the territorial question when he proposed to organize the northern half of the Louisiana Purchase into territories. This organization would have benefitted Chicago, in his state of Illinois, as the eastern terminus of a proposed transcontinental railroad. The political wrangling concluded on May 30, 1854, with the Kansas-Nebraska Act, which altered the Missouri Compromise by potentially opening the two new territories to slavery, based on popular sovereignty. The North was outraged, and opponents


8 R. Schleiden to Johann Smidt, September 23, 1853, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.a.1, SAB.
of slavery pushed ahead with plans to form a new political party, the Republican party.\textsuperscript{9} The separatist tensions increased, much as they had done in the 1840s in Schleswig-Holstein. However, the Forty-Eighters from Schleswig-Holstein looked no more favorably on southern separatists than they did on northern nativist.

As the issue of slavery in the western territories became the dominant question in U.S. politics, the nativist movement lost momentum, but it never disappeared. In 1855, Olshausen observed that the “Know Nothings had lost all of their power” as the Republican party gained in strength. His animosity for nativism caused him to see the process of party realignment in favor of the Republicans proceeding more rapidly than it did in fact, but this may be attributed to his disappointment, as a political radical, in the generally conservative nature of America, especially of its upper classes. Olshausen would have his own problem in dealing with this more conservative political system.\textsuperscript{10}

Regardless of their political differences with the conservative leanings of the native populations, radical Forty-Eighters were all too happy to assist the new Republican party. Especially in the western territories, where many Forty-Eighters had settled, the ideology of “free men, free soil, free labor” was making great strides. Iowa was an important state for the young party, and there it would oust the Democratic party from most political offices between


\textsuperscript{10} T Olshausen to J Olshausen, November 5, 1855, reprinted in Olshausen, \textit{Theodor Olshausen}, 189.
1854 and 1856. Immigrants and their leaders, including Claussen and Olshausen, played a major role in this change.\textsuperscript{11}

Like Claussen, many Holsteiners had left St. Louis for parts of the country where new opportunities existed. Many went to Iowa.\textsuperscript{12} Olshausen was anxious to see Iowa and Davenport, where so many former friends, acquaintances, and colleagues had gone.\textsuperscript{13} In mid-April 1856, he moved from St. Louis to Davenport. His old friend and political colleague Claussen had by then moved to Lyon, Iowa. Olshausen’s move was stimulated by an offer to take over \textit{Der Demokrat}, a local German newspaper. As editor of a daily publication, Olshausen became deeply involved in the nation’s political discourse. Like most major newspapers and virtually all local and regional newspapers, \textit{Der Demokrat} had a political affiliation, in its case, Republican.\textsuperscript{14} Olshausen’s job was not an easy one. In contrast to his days as an editor in Europe, he had few reliable assistants. The depression of 1857 also hurt the newspaper. People had to spend more money on food and other basic necessaries, leaving little for newspaper subscriptions.\textsuperscript{15} Like some Forty-Eighters, who continued to migrate without ever permanently settling down,


\textsuperscript{12} T Olshausen to J Olshausen, July 17, 1852, reprinted in Olshausen, \textit{Theodor Olshausen}, 153.

\textsuperscript{13} T Olshausen to J Olshausen, April 10, 1854, ibid., 170-171.

\textsuperscript{14} T Olshausen to J Olshausen, May 12, 1856, ibid., 187-189.

\textsuperscript{15} T Olshausen to J Olshausen, April 18, 1858, ibid., 191.
Olshausen wanted to improve his position. In 1860, the independent-minded Holsteiner was in negotiations to take over a paper in Chicago, but he found the terms not to his liking.\textsuperscript{16}

Claussen was much more ready to make the United States his new home, likely because of his family. He became Americanized and engaged in some of the speculative activities that the Kansas-Nebraska Act and the construction of the transcontinental railroad offered. Claussen was well aware of the future possibilities of Davenport as a railroad town. As a result, he bought additional plots of land for speculative purposes.\textsuperscript{17} He knew that cheap land in the right location could be worth a lot more once the railroad arrived. He bought a plot of 320 acres for $400 in 1852. Two years later, he sold 80 of those acres for $480. It was certainly not a bad investment for a person without much personal wealth.\textsuperscript{18} For the moment, though, he remained politically inactive.

Schleiden, too, was more concerned with proving his worth to Bremen, and less with the escalation of political tensions in the United States. His main task was to negotiate a new postal treaty that would lower postage between Bremen and the United States and subsidize a regular steamship line between Bremen and New York.\textsuperscript{19} He had experience with this type of dialogue. In Copenhagen, he had dealt with a variety of trade-related questions. Even during the uprising,

\textsuperscript{16} T Olshausen to J Olshausen, March 18, 1860, ibid., 197.

\textsuperscript{17} H. R. Claussens to Ahlmann, September 17, 1852, ibid., 82-83.

\textsuperscript{18} Ernst-Erich Marhencke, \textit{Hans Reimer Claussen: Kämpfer für Freiheit und Recht in zwei Welten} (Frankfurt a.M., Germany: Peter Lang, 1999), 289.

\textsuperscript{19} April 5, 1853, p 209, book 15, LBSH.
he had negotiated treaties that included postal issues with Hamburg and Lübeck in April and May 1849.\textsuperscript{20} Schleiden thus directly built on his Old World experience.

The negotiations were not easy and Schleiden frequently communicated with first assistant postmaster general Selah R. Hobbie.\textsuperscript{21} When Schleiden assured Hobbie that a company in Bremen stood ready with two steamers to start a line between there and New York, negotiations progressed swiftly.\textsuperscript{22} The treaty was signed on August 4, 1853. Postage rates were lowered to 10 cents, and New York and Bremen were designated as entrepots. Bremen could offer the same rate to the rest of the German states, thus gaining an advantage over its European competitors. The treaty also stipulated the transport of mail on steamships. Schleiden’s first major diplomatic negotiation was a success. The positive impact of the treaty was soon realized. Olshausen, unaware of his countryman’s role in the changes, commented on how easy sending mail had become.\textsuperscript{23}

Initially, the partly German-owned Ocean Steam Navigation Company (OSNC), headquartered in New York operated the new line. However, the OSNC was plagued by inefficiency and financial woes, which eventually forced the company out of business. Later, as new ships became available, a company from Bremen, the North German Lloyd, took over the mail runs. In 1857, the Lloyd suffered from accidents that made the regular runs difficult to conduct. Knowing the importance of the line, Schleiden urged his superiors to insure runs;

\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{20} Jensen, Harbou, Reventlou and Beseler to Schleiden, May 9, 1849, Fasc. 5, Nachlass Schleiden, CAU; Rudolph M. Schleiden, \textit{Schleswig-Holstein im zweiten Kriegsjahre, 1849-1850} (Wiesbaden, Germany: Verlag von J. F. Bergmann, 1894), 76.
  \item \textsuperscript{21} July 2, 1853, p 288, book 15, LBSH.
  \item \textsuperscript{22} R Schleiden to J Campbell, July 4, 1853, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.a.I, SAB.
  \item \textsuperscript{23} T Olshausen to J Olshausen, May 26, 1853, T Olshausen to J Olshausen, July 30, 1853, reprinted in Olshausen, \textit{Theodor Olshausen}, 162, 164.
\end{itemize}
otherwise, the line’s reputation would suffer. To further strengthen the Lloyd’s financial basis, Schleiden negotiated a revision of the postal contract. The Lloyd would twice a month carry the Southampton mail to and from New York. The new contract required an adjustment to the mail schedule.⁴⁴ Schleiden’s diplomatic work had laid the foundation for a successful north Atlantic shipping business that would endure for decades to come. He had shown himself worthy of Bremen’s trust.²⁵

Despite settling in the United States, Olshausen and Schleiden remained European at heart, and so paid close attention to the disputes between the maritime powers and Russia that resulted in the Crimean War.²⁶ As a consequence of the war, the old wounds of 1848 were reopened for the Schleswig-Holstein Forty-Eighters, who still felt betrayed by Prussia’s desertion of them in the first Schleswig-Holstein war. Nevertheless, they did not wish Prussia any ill will, in as much as that kingdom was the most liberal among the German states and likely to accomplish their future unification. Faced with the prospect of war in central Europe, Olshausen worried that Prussia might become a target when it declared neutrality in the Crimean War.²⁷ He hoped that Prussia, if forced to pick a side, would be smart enough to go along with the Western

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²⁴ Schleiden an J Smidt, November 18, 1858, Schleiden an J Smidt, January 19, 1858, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.b.II, SAB.


²⁷ T Olshausen to J Olshausen, April 20, 1855, reprinted in Olshausen, Theodor Olshausen, 176.
Radical that he was, Olshausen hated the autocratic Russians and was not ready to embrace the idea circulating in the United States that U.S. support for Russia could counterbalance Great Britain.  

While Olshausen debated the implications of the Crimean War, southern expansionism and the possible acquisition of Cuba gained ground. The opportunity arose when on February 28, 1854, the Spanish-Cuban authorities in Havana sized the *Black Warrior*, a U.S. merchant vessel that had violated local mercantile laws by not declaring its transit cargo. The case created tensions in relations with Spain. Some expansionists saw an opportunity to press for the purchase of Cuba. War was also considered a possibility, but the eventuality of Great Britain and France joining forces with Spain made that undesirable. Still, talk of a filibuster expedition remained. 

While Schleiden was concerned about the warmongering that surrounded the *Black Warrior* affair, and suggestions by the U.S. government to revise the neutrality law, his legal presentations at the State Department had little impact. In order to gain a better understanding of Cuban affairs, he determined, without prior approval from Bremen, to visit the Spanish colony. In November 1854, Schleiden toured the island. He observed that Cubans were favorably

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28 T Olshausen to J Olshausen, April 10, 1854, ibid., 172-173.
29 T Olshausen to J Olshausen, April 10, 1854, ibid., 173.
31 R Schleiden to Johann Smidt, March 17, 1854, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.a.II, SAB.
32 Schleiden to Johann Smidt, March 17, 1854, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.a.II, SAB.
33 Magallon to Pezuela March 22, 1854, quoted in Henry L. Janes, “The Black Warrior Affair” *AHR* 12 (January 1907), 293.
disposed to a peaceful annexation by the United States. However, all of them were willing to take up arms and defend the island against an invasion by adventurers or the U.S. army. Schleiden, who had just three years earlier been part of a revolutionary movement bound to defend his homeland against Danish invasions, could sympathize with such a nationalist attitude. What he could not understand was how the Cuban creoles could be so naïve as to provide money to filibuster activities in the United States, which they were ready to fight against. Schleiden’s Cuban trip offered the diplomat important insights into Caribbean expansionism and the reaction to it by the local population.

While he did not comment on another aspect of the reasons behind the U.S. expansionism in his correspondence during the trip, Schleiden was fully aware of the changes within Cuban slavery. The pressure for emancipation, even in Cuba, was growing. With war between the United States and Spain a possibility, rumors appeared that indicated Spain had plans to emancipate the slaves on the island. The idea was universally condemned in the United States. Southern slaveholders opposed emancipation in general because it would challenge the foundation of their society. Northerners, with their significant trade interests and the substantial investments in the island’s slave-based cash crop plantations, feared a decline in Cuba’s economic well-being and thus their own investments. Even though Schleiden did not say anything, he likely saw and privately criticized this hypocrisy.

Recent diplomatic events had not ingratiated the United States to Schleiden. For the gentlemanly European with his high ethical standards, the undiplomatic behavior illustrated by

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34 Rudolph M. Schleiden to Dr. Johann Smidt, November 9, 1854, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.a.II, SAB. With the incomplete material at the authors disposal it is impossible to precisely say how long Schleiden was in Cuba, but it appears that he was in Havana somewhere between October 27 and December 25.

35 R Schleiden to Johann Smidt, April 27, 1854, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.a.II, SAB.
members of the foreign service of these United States in the handling of the *Black Warrior* affair was appalling. In light of the events, Schleiden assumed that the Democratic administration of Franklin Pierce utilized the war scare to gain political popularity. Since many members of the administration had gained their laurels and early political experience during the Mexican War, Schleiden considered men like Pierce, Cushing, Marcy, and Mason to be warmongers. Some of them belonged to the expansionist-minded “Young America” movement.\(^{36}\) Schleiden singled out Marcy for particular criticism. Marcy was too quiet, and his personality made it difficult to discuss serious, urgent, and complex questions. In the previous twelve months, Schleiden had found it difficult to get anything out of Marcy. As a result, Schleiden had communicated mostly with the undersecretary.\(^{37}\) As a revolutionary diplomat who had faced major challenges in Europe, Schleiden was not afraid to hand out bad marks.

Schleiden did not say if the personalities reminded him of any of the diplomats or politicians he had dealt with in Europe. He was probably more concerned with the impact that changes to the navigation act or a war could have on Bremen’s trade interests in the region. East coast merchants had similar fears about the disruptions a war could cause. Similarly, some politicians had opposed the idea of a war and stood up to the southern desire for empire and expansion.\(^{38}\) The southern dreams did not go away easily, no more so than Schleswig-Holstein’s dreams of independence. Louisiana’s Senator Judah P. Benjamin stated during a party in honor of Queen Victoria’s birthday at the British legation that he would be upset if Spain accepted all

\(^{36}\) R Schleiden to Johann Smidt, May 29, 1854, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.a.II, SAB.

\(^{37}\) R Schleiden to Johann Smidt, June 13, 1854, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.a.II, SAB.

of the demands made by the United States. He wanted war and Cuba.\textsuperscript{39} Despite the bellicose language of some politicians in Washington, the desire for peace prevailed in Washington, much as it had done in the years before 1848 in the duchies.

Schleiden soon had another opportunity to try his diplomatic skills, but here he would face challenges similar to those like in the second phase of the Schleswig-Holstein war. On May 16, 1855, the \textit{Routh}, one of the steamers of the Accessory Transit Company, ran into a smaller vessel on the San Juan River, in Nicaragua. When the dark skinned captain of the damaged vessel protested, the captain of the \textit{Routh}, T. T. Smith, shot him. Once the \textit{Routh} reached Greytown, a vessel with armed men came along side to arrest the captain. At this point, the former U.S. minister to the Central American Republics, Solon Borland, intervened and drove the arresting party away. Later that day, when Borland visited the U.S. consul, Joseph W. Fabens, an armed mob tried to arrest Borland. In the ensuing chaos, Borland was injured. The U.S. government sent the U.S.S. \textit{Cyane} and Captain George Hollins on a punitive mission to Greytown. Hollins burned down the town and with it the property of the consul of the Hanseatic City of Hamburg.\textsuperscript{40}

It was another gross violation of international law, but it required that Schleiden deal with the U.S. government in the matter of compensation. Hollins had clearly exceeded his instructions, which did not authorize him to burn the city, but the government appeared willing to sanction his actions.\textsuperscript{41} This complicated the compensation demands of injured residents of Greytown. In early October, the British minister in Washington, Sir John Fiennes Twisleton

\textsuperscript{39} R Schleiden to Johann Smidt, May 29, 1854, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.a.II, SAB.


\textsuperscript{41} R Schleiden to Johann Smidt, August 4, 1854, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.a.II, SAB.
Crampton, who had criticized the destruction of Greytown, communicated the demands of
British subjects for compensation to Marcy and was told that anybody living in as lawless a town
as Greytown had no right to compensation. Schleiden got a similar answer when he informed
Marcy that he also would file claims.\textsuperscript{42} Schleiden must have felt almost as powerless as he had
done in 1848, when faced with international pressure against the duchies.

His frustration increased when he presented one of the aggrieved residents of Greytown
to the U.S. government. In February 1855, Henry Wiedemann, who was Hamburg’s consul in
Greytown, visited Washington. Schleiden took him to Marcy, who felt uncomfortable with this
confrontation. Refusing to discuss the matter of compensation, the secretary of state asked,
instead, for a written statement of Wiedemann’s grievances. The two Hanseatic representatives
then went across the street to the Navy Department, followed by a trip to the executive mansion.
President Pierce reiterated Marcy’s theory that all habitants of Greytown were responsible for the
actions of a few.

As appeals to international law were getting them nowhere, Schleiden and Wiedemann
unveiled their trump card. Wiedemann explained to the president events from his perspective,
and said that he had done everything in his power to correct the insult to Borland. He had also
asked that the consular building be spared from the naval bombardment, only to have it burned
by U.S. marines. This break with international custom made some impression on Pierce, who
assured his visitors that he would look favorably on the request for compensation, although he
cautioned that he would have to verify their report with the agents in Nicaragua.\textsuperscript{43} The
 correspondence does not indicate how the issue was resolved, but it is unlikely that

\textsuperscript{42} R Schleiden to Johann Smidt, October 27, 1854, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.a.II, SAB.

\textsuperscript{43} R Schleiden to Johann Smidt, February 11, 1855, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.b.I, SAB.
compensation was ever paid. While Schleiden had a solid case, he could do little when faced with such stubborn resistance, no more than he could do against European powers in 1848.

The events in the Caribbean and their connection to the Crimean War were not lost on observers. Schleiden assumed that the U.S. warships off Greytown were intended to exploit European preoccupation with the Crimea.\(^{44}\) In Iowa, Olshausen thought that British reinforcements signaled a possible conflict but, like Schleiden, he also thought the United States totally unprepared for war, even if some Americans believed they could “conquer the entire world if they so wanted.”\(^{45}\) Here he was a critical observer who realistically assessed the military situation of the United States, but five years earlier, he would have been willing to fight all of Europe. Perhaps he had learned from that previous experiences; more likely, he did not believe as strongly in a conflict to expand the United States. By the spring of 1856, Olshausen assumed that war with both Great Britain and France to be possible. He assumed Great Britain wanted war. “But the English Cabinet will force a war because it treats the United States like dirt,” he observed, “and regardless of how the wretched Pierce tries to escape, he will eventually have to pick up the glove.”\(^{46}\) The analogy could have just as well described the Vor-März relationship between the duchies and Denmark, where the duchies eventually, in 1848, picked up the glove. The Pierce government wisely never did so.

Meantime, sectional tensions continued to escalate. By 1856, the South was losing its parity in the Senate, with fifteen slave states versus sixteen free states and two more free states, Oregon and Minnesota to join shortly. With the northern perception of a conspiratorial slave

\(^{44}\) R Schleiden to Johann Smidt, October 27, 1854, 1855, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.a.II, SAB.

\(^{45}\) T Olshausen to J Olshausen, November 5, 1855, reprinted in Olshausen, Theodor Olshausen, 186.

\(^{46}\) T Olshausen to J Olshausen, November 5, 1855, ibid., 189-190.
power emanating from the South, and a southern perception of an anti-slavery, even abolitionist, North trying to undermine the southern way of life, politics became hostile. The Whig party had already disintegrated because of its inability to maintain unity between its northern and southern constituencies. The Democracy, too, faced a rift between its northern and southern wings. Northern Democrats had to defend themselves against accusations of being part of a slave power conspiracy. Southern Democrats increased their demands for protection of their way of life and their peculiar institution. It was increasingly clear that the Republicans, a sectional party based on the prevention of an expansion of slavery into the western territories, would succeed the Whigs.47 As in Schleswig-Holstein in the second half of the 1840s, the future looked dark and uncertain.

The inaugural of James Buchanan on March 4, 1857, brought many changes to Washington. On April 2, Schleiden had his first interview with the new secretary of state, Lewis Cass, whom Schleiden found more friendly, cordial, and accommodating than Marcy.48 However, there lingered the question of whether Buchanan would implement the Ostend Manifesto, which he had authored with Pierre Soulé and John Y. Mason in 1854 in response to the Black Warrior incident. The manifesto declared, “Cuba is as necessary to the North American republic as any of its present members, and that it belongs naturally to that great family of states of which the Union is the Providential Nursery.”49 The concern was misplaced. When in 1855, William Walker invaded Nicaragua on the invitation of the Nicaraguan

47 William J. Cooper, jr., The South ad the Politics of Slavery, 1828-1856 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1978); Freehling, The Road to Disunion; May, The Southern Dream of A Caribbean Empire; Potter, The Impending Crisis.

48 R Schleiden to Johann Smidt, April 2, 1857, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.b.I, SAB.

49 Potter, The Impending Crisis, 190
Democratic party, the United States did not provide military aid to the filibuster. Later, the Buchanan government even made efforts to enforce its neutrality laws.

It was, however, not the filibustering Walker who drew the country’s attention in 1857, but rather Kansas and the debates surrounding the constitution of the future state of Kansas. The violence in that territory had grabbed national headlines.\(^{50}\) Always the pacifist and opponent of mob violence, Schleiden was not pleased with the situation. In a private conversation with Governor Robert J. Walker, the governor intimidated that Buchanan had violated the powers of his office in Kansas.\(^{51}\) Schleiden’s official report does not indicate which side he favored in the dispute, but his diary betrays a free-soil sentiment. He was glad when the House of Representatives voted down the bill to incorporate Kansas under the pro-slavery Lecompton Constitution on April 1, 1858.\(^{52}\) Since the free soilers in Kansas fought against efforts to force slavery on the people of Kansas, Schleiden’s choice of sides makes sense in light of his background. After all, Schleswig-Holstein had stood against Danish oppression when Denmark forced its ways on the German population in Holstein.

Further evidence of Schleiden’s sympathy for the anti-slavery elements in government came in his response to William H. Seward’s speech concerning the Kansas question on April 30. Schleiden thought that the speech was aggressive, and seemed to signal both Seward’s and the Republican party’s ambitions to win the White House in the next election.\(^{53}\) While Schleiden felt sympathy for the North, he clearly was not as involved in the conflict emotionally and


\(^{51}\) Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, April 24, 1860, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.b.II, SAB.

\(^{52}\) April 2, 1858, p 150, book 18, LBSH.

\(^{53}\) April 30, 1858, p 150, book 18, LBSH.
personally as he had been in 1848.

The same was not true for his fellow Forty-Eighters out West. In Iowa, Hans R. Claussen returned to politics in 1858. Since the Republican party had to carefully maneuver between its strong immigrant constituency and its nativist supporters, it was not unusual that candidates backed anti-immigration or anti-immigrant laws.\(^{54}\) The Republican congressional candidate, William Vandeveer, faced this dilemma. Running in a state with a large foreign-born population, Vandeveer would not be able to rely on nativist voters and an anti-immigrant campaign to carry him to victory, especially not since many immigrants were naturally attracted to the more open Democratic party. Nevertheless, because of the strength of nativism, candidates like Vandeveer could not ignore anti-immigrant sentiments.

The immigration-related debate that Claussen participated in with Vandeveer symbolized the conflict that still plagued the Republican party at the time. The Holstein radical asked Vandeveer publically how he would deal with proposed laws to make immigration more difficult and the right to vote harder for immigrants to obtain. Obviously, Claussen had his own and the immigrant community’s interest in mind. Despite having been absent for politics since his arrival, he apparently had come to see himself as a community leader, and so was returning naturally to his political roots. Fellow radical Olshausen seconded Claussen’s inquiry. Vandeveer indicated in his response that he was not inclined to support any changes to naturalization or voting rights.\(^{55}\) Vandeveer had succumbed to the political power of the German vote in Iowa. As a result, there was no need for the two radicals to inquire further.\(^{56}\) In any event, the slavery


question had gained irresistible attention by that time.

The slavery question’s prominence and divisiveness was equivalent to the succession and constitutional questions that drove a wedge between Danes and Germans in Schleswig-Holstein. Many newly arrived immigrants did not understand the political dilemma associated with slavery. The country had previously been able to solve controversies surrounding slavery and its territorial expansion through compromise, but the radical political background of many leading immigrants was more in tune with the hardening lines of the 1850s. Among the Holsteiners, Olshausen and Schleiden left detailed remarks of their hostility towards slavery. While Schleiden kept his views private, Olshausen published his opposition in books and newspapers, and thus contributed to the escalation of the issue.

Olshausen viewed slavery as a major problem for the United States. Shortly after his arrival, Olshausen started to work on historical, geographical, and statistical handbooks for four western states, which he intended for the German market. Even though, he did not say as much, they were likely for immigrants who wished to gain a better understanding of where they were headed.57 In his first book, *Mississippi Thales*, Olshausen offered a general description of the Mississippi Valley and the states surrounding it.58 Some New York papers had reviewed the

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58 Theodor Olshausen, *Das Mississippi Thal* (Kiel, Germany: Akademische Buchhandlung, 1854).
book and praised its critical opinion of slavery, but Olshausen knew that a translation would not sell in the United States, certainly not the South, unless he made major changes.  

In *Mississippi Thales*, Olshausen called slavery a “shocking institution” that should have long since been eradicated. There was, he declared, no widespread support for slavery, even in the South. Olshausen pointed to how slaveholders hypocritically prohibited the education of slaves while, at the same time, insisting that educating slaves would be impossible. Slaveholders feared, he said, that education would instill a desire for freedom and thus undermine the institution.

Olshausen further dismissed claims that slaves were treated well, by pointing to this same lack of education. In addition, slaves and free people of color had limited legal rights. Olshausen did not go so far as to say that slavery was holding back the South, but his book implied as much. During his days as a “Neuholsteiner” and editor of the *Correspondenz-Blatt*, Olshausen had voiced similar criticisms of Denmark and the Danes when German was replaced as the language of instruction in northern Schleswig.

Olshausen understood the racial and economic fears of whites when having to compete with emancipated slaves for work. There were also concerns over vagrancy and African-Americans not being ready for freedom. Olshausen, as a democratic radical, saw no reason for further compromise, which only protected an inhumane and unjust institution. The Compromise of 1850 drew particular criticism. Similarly offensive was the idea that a party would call itself “Democratic” and yet support slavery. As a result, Olshausen supported the idea of a free soil

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60 For how other Forty-Eighters worked with the abolitionist movement see Honeck, *We are the Revolutionists*. 
party. Based on these arguments, he continued to stand against oppression and for the spread of democracy to all people.

As in Europe, the crisis in the United States eventually forced people to pick sides. A disillusioned and radical-minded Olshausen saw the U.S. system of government drifting backwards, with civil war the inevitable result. Olshausen knew that abolitionists were in a minority. He further argued that free-soilers were also a small group. For the moment, western expansion was the nation’s primary focus. However, Olshausen cautioned that a foreign war or the question of emancipation could easily stir up trouble and slow down the western movement. He had seen similar problems in the years leading up to 1848 in Schleswig-Holstein. The core issue was slavery and the constitution’s inability to deal with it. In Olshausen’s opinion, democrats and slaveholders were institutionally so at odds that they could no longer form a united nation. “The question is of separation or of emancipation,” he insisted. Again, the situation was reminiscent of his Schleswig-Holstein years, when he and others had argued for a separation from Denmark. He and his fellow Holsteiners never realized how close they were to southerners in argument and spirit. The European radical sensed conflict and was ready to help bring it about, much as he had done in the 1840s. The only difference was that in 1848 he had fought for a separate nation against Danish oppression; in the United States, he stood opposed to a secessionist movement that argued against northern oppression.

61 Theodor Olshausen, *Das Mississippi Thal* (Kiel, Germany: Akademische Buchhandlung, 1854), 24-39.


63 T Olshausen to J Olshausen, April 20, 1855, ibid., 175-176.

The fear in North and South that Kansas would join the other side had precipitated violence in the territory. Free-soil and pro-slavery settlers, both supported by their respective section, engaged in guerrilla warfare, murder, arson, and intimidation. The political tone in the country as a whole had changed, much as it had in the 1840s in the Danish helstat. The divisiveness even reached Congress, where Senator Charles Sumner of Massachusetts was brutally beaten by Representative Preston Brooks of South Carolina after the New Englander had made comments about a relative of Brooks’ in the Senate.65 While the escalation of tensions in Schleswig-Holstein had not involved violence, except for minor and isolated mob actions, the tone leading up to 1848 had been just as emotionally charged. The Danes had even arrested Olshausen for treasonous talk. Interestingly, based on their anti-slavery attitudes, the Holsteiners, who in 1848 had rebelled against foreign oppression and the undermining of Schleswig-Holstein’s state rights by Denmark, now looked down on state rights and thus drew comparatively closer to the arguments of the hated Danes. Apparently, human liberty mattered more than the protection of constitutional rights or the right to separate from an oppressive union.

Olshausen could not shake the feeling that a civil war was coming. He predicted that the slavery question would present the next Congress with major difficulties. “It is very likely,” he said, “that in the near future an attempt be made will to separate the free and slave states. It will likely remain only an attempt because I do not think that the slave states will maintain themselves alone because a war over slavery would occur.” With the country’s attention focused on slavery, all other issues had lost importance. Olshausen believed that a civil war was already

being fought on a small scale in Kansas, and that it was only a question of time until the rest of
the country would be drawn into war as well.66

In contrast to Olshausen, Schleiden had been in earlier and much closer contact with
slavery. In the late 1840s, Denmark had abolished slavery in its Caribbean colonies. Schleiden’s
government department had not been directly involved in the debates, but “he [had] paid lively
attention and studied the history of emancipation in the English colonies.” While he
acknowledged the wealth generated by the colonies, Schleiden feared that “the curse of slavery”
laid heavily on them. The remedy adopted by the Danes was one of gradual emancipation,
although, in contrast to Great Britain, Denmark did not provide financial incentives to the
planters. Slavery officially ended in its colonies on July 28, 1847. Schleiden, despite knowing
that gradual emancipation was not perfect, countersigned the law.67 However, he was still far
removed from slavery during Denmark’s emancipation debates; contrastingly, he would be
constantly surrounded by it in Washington.

While Olshausen probably saw few slave auctions, Schleiden found them all around him
outside of Washington and during his trips into the South. During a stay at the St. Louis
Exchange Hotel in New Orleans in 1854, he observed an auction of slaves in the hotel’s rotunda.
Remembering one of the first books he had read in his recent study of English, Schleiden found
the tumultuous scene very much in agreement with the descriptions in Uncle Tom’s Cabin. The
sight must have been memorable, seeing a mother and baby auctioned off for $700 while an old
man went for only $60. Schleiden could not fail but notice the sadness in slaves’ faces. He

66 T Olshausen to J Olshausen, November 5, 1855, reprinted in Olshausen, Theodor
Olshausen, 185-186.

67 Rudolph M. Schleiden, Erinnerungen eines Schleswig-Holsteiners (Wiesbaden,
Germany: Verlag von J. F. Bergmann, 1890), 227, 229-230.
regretted being a poor man; otherwise, he would have bought at least two slaves, set them free, and provided for their futures. Schleiden visited other auctions during his stay in New Orleans. He found them “interesting but gruesome.” That the experience left a mark on him may be seen by the inclusion of four newspaper clippings from New Orleans related to slave auctions and searches for runaway slaves in his diary.68

In early July 1857, Schleiden again came in contact with slavery. He had learned that a thirteen-year-old slave boy named Bob who brought Schleiden his food at his Washington house was to be sold. He speculated that Bob’s owner needed the money for a trip. Schleiden found out that in order to get a higher price, the boy was to be sold in Richmond, Virginia, and not in the Washington area. Schleiden felt sorry for the boy, and regretted that he did not have enough money to set him free.69 These experiences with slavery were repulsive. However, Schleiden’s remarks about slavery remained confined to his diary and private correspondence. Olshausen commented on slavery in his newspaper, and thus had a much broader audience for his predictions of a coming civil war.

As the election of 1860 drew closer, tensions continued to escalate, and in 1859, yet another event gave southerners the impression that the northern states stood ready to use violence to overthrow slavery. Much like Christian VIII’s open letter of 1846, John Brown’s raid on Harper’s Ferry served as a turning point, in this instance, by escalating tensions over the slavery issue. After unsuccessfully soliciting northern abolitionist support, Brown tried to instigate a slave uprising in Virginia on the evening of October 16. From the start, the raid was a disaster. By the evening of the next day, U.S. marines under Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Lee and his

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68 December 5, 1854, p 206, book 16, LBSH.

69 July 7, 1857, p 29, book 18, LBSH. As it is difficult to read Schleiden’s handwriting, it appears that he assumed she needed the money for a trip to the beach.
aide Lieutenant J.E.B. Stuart had taken Brown prisoner. After a swift trial, Brown was executed and became a martyr to northern abolitionists. For the South, he was a symbol of northern fanaticism. While no violence followed Christian’s open letter, the arrest of Olshausen and others for treasonous language did represent a similar hardening of the lines in the duchies. In the same way that the Danish helstat drifted toward conflict in 1847, so did the United States seem to be moving toward civil war.

Despite his own anti-slavery feelings, Olshausen called John Brown’s raid an insurrection. Nevertheless, Olshausen saw the raid as a precursor to a civil war that would finally solve the impasse between the northern and southern states. He even saw connections to his own experiences in Europe. “The large slaveholders are reckless and brutal, similar to the Junkers of Mecklenburg,” he observed, “and unwilling to give in to any point of contention, of which many exist in politics.” It was a rather one-sided view, and indicated how much this separatist was willing to fight a secessionist doctrine was based on slavery. Yet, one could argue that Olshausen, with his distaste for slavery, had unintentionally assumed the position of Denmark and the oppressor.

The Forty-Eighters from Schleswig-Holstein had put down roots in the United States. Olshausen and Claussen were slow to engage in the political conflict of the 1850s, but they kept a keen eye on national developments. Olshausen again engaged in the newspaper business as he had done in the duchies, and his arguments had changed little since those years. He still stood against oppression, in this case, against the institution of slavery. He still stood for radical

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71 T Olshausen to J Olshausen, November 27, 1859, reprinted in Olshausen, Theodor Olshausen, 196.
principles, but could not abide southern separatism. Claussen reentered politics in the last years of the 1850s. He, too, was still a radical, but he also tried to become a respected member of the Iowa German community. As a result, he picked the issues he fought over more carefully.

Schleiden continued to build on his diplomatic experiences from 1848, although, as had been true in the first Schleswig-Holstein war, his negotiating skill failed when confronted by issues involving national prestige or international power. All three men showed how important their European experiences were to their new lives in America. Just as he had seen the conflict between the duchies and Denmark coming, so did he assume a conflict between North and South was imminent.

In addition, their experiences in the United States and the Danish helstat were strikingly similar. In each case, they faced sectional tensions that had developed from the oppression of one people by another. Like the German population in the duchies, the southern population perceived itself as being under attack. With the expansion of slavery prevented in both the West and South, the southern states had feared they had nowhere to expand, and that they would soon be in a permanent minority, at the mercy of an oppressive and hostile North. Similarly, the duchies had believed that the Danes were trying to divide the duchies and impose Danish rule on Schleswig at the expense of their constitutional rights. In their eyes, separatism had taken a similar form on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean, be it in their native duchies or the American South.
Chapter Seven

Secession:
A Revolutionary’s Dilemma

On December 20, 1860, South Carolina seceded from the Union and precipitated the American Civil War. Forty-Eighters stood united behind the North and the incoming Abraham Lincoln administration. Historians, by presenting Forty-Eighters and German-Americans as one large mass, have never questioned if one group might have faced a dilemma when secession occurred in the United States.¹ The one group that should have faced a serious dilemma was the Schleswig-Holstein Forty-Eighters, whose revolution in 1848 had been a separatist one, and whose language against Danish oppression had been similar to that used by southerners against the North.² Of course, the slavery issue was a serious difference between the two secessionist


² As Andre M. Fleche points out in The Revolution of 1861: The American Civil War in the Age of Nationalist Conflict (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 2012), 93-95,
movements, and the Schleswig-Holstein Forty-Eighters were willing to overlook the perception of constitutional and legal oppression, which they had risen up against, to emphasize the human oppression of slavery in the South. Nevertheless, even if they were not fully aware of it themselves, the Forty-Eighters from Schleswig-Holstein faced a dilemma in secession. Would they be willing to fight just as hard against a secessionist movement as they had fought for one?

Some historians have argued that the southern revolution was built on a distinctive southern nationalism. While this nationalism was centered on the institution of slavery, it was also a separatist nationalism. Southern separatism had much in common with the secessionism of places like Yucatan (Mexico), Rio Grande de Sol (Brazil), Sicily (Italy), or Hungary. Like the divided Border South, Schleswig had been divided between Germans and Danes. As in the first Schleswig-Holstein war, these border regions would witness most of the fighting. The reactions of the three Schleswig-Holsteiner during the secession year (defined here as April 1860 to May 1861) would be heavily influenced by their experiences in Europe during their own separatist uprising.³

Theodor Olshausen had several times indicated that he thought war was likely between North and South. He even claimed that an undeclared war already existed in Kansas territory. Olshausen believed that the election of Stephen A. Douglas or of a southern candidate as president could cause war. Conflict was less likely, he believed, if a northern radical, such as William H. Seward, were elected. Olshausen’s personal choice for the Republican nomination was John C. Frémont, little suspecting that it would be the election of another northern sectional candidate from the Republican party that would prompt southern secession.

A more optimistic Rudolph M. Schleiden ended his traditional New Year’s Eve diary entry for 1859 by commenting on the quietness on the streets of Washington that night. He wished “to see this quietness as a sign that the New Year would maintain and foster the just recreated peace in the nation.” Schleiden doubted that either section would be so foolish as to allow an election to cause conflict. He hoped that moderates would force the extremist to back down. He did anticipate that the coming year would bring major political conflict that might escalate beyond mere debate, but he thought that mutual material interests made a splintering of the nation unlikely. Apparently, he had forgotten the origins of the conflict between his home state and Denmark, when moderation had been pushed aside and conflict started regardless of material interests.

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5 December 31, 1859, p 47, book 19, LBSH.

6 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, December 16, 1859, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.b.II, SAB.

7 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, January 20, 1860, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.b.II, SAB.
Under these dark clouds, the parties selected their candidates for the highest office. As was the tradition, the Democratic party met first. On April 23, its convention assembled in Charleston, South Carolina. The convention immediately ran into problems when the platform committee could not agree on the inclusion of a clause protecting slavery. As southern delegations departed in protest and the convention unraveled, the party failed to nominate a presidential candidate. The party decided to reconvene six weeks later in Baltimore. In the intervening weeks, supporters of the Democratic front-runner, Stephen A. Douglas, tried to replace the seceded southern delegations and southern Democrats continued to demand a platform plank in regard to slavery.

The second convention at Baltimore witnessed its own controversy when southern delegates who had walked out of the Charleston convention were denied credentials. They continued their secession. Sympathizers from other state delegations joined them and the two groups formed a separate convention. The Democratic party split along sectional lines. The northern Democrats nominated Stephen Douglas; the southern Democrats selected John C. Breckinridge on a pro-slavery platform. The only national party had thus broken apart.8 One thing seemed certain to Schleiden: “The election campaign will be more bitter and hard fought than ever before, ‘sectionalism,’ by way of the slavery question sharply increased visibility of the different interests of North and South, will manifest in the use of abominable methods for certain.”9 The future of the Union was uncertain.

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9 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, April 24, 1860, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.b.II, SAB.
On May 16, the Republican party opened its convention in Chicago, Illinois. While Seward was considered the party’s front-runner, things would not go in his favor. The party searched for a moderate candidate with a broader platform who could build on Frémont’s 1856 success. However, some delegates thought neither man would do.

In Iowa, the Republican party had long debated whom to support in Chicago. The two Schleswig-Holstein radicals, Olshausen and Claussen, had their own ideas about who the party’s candidate should be. In March 1860, the time had came for the Republican party in Iowa to select a presidential candidate and agree on a platform. In the process of these debates, Claussen and Olshausen showed how much they failed to understand American political realities. They agreed that a further expansion of slavery should be opposed, which would be the party’s main plank for the upcoming election. When it came to the nomination of a presidential candidate, they took a different route. They opposed Edward Bates because he seemed not Republican enough. They criticized him for staying in the race in 1856 and for supporting the Know-Nothing Millard Fillmore in order to hurt the Frémont ticket. His support for the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law further irritated the Schleswig-Holstein radicals.\textsuperscript{10} This debate among the German immigrant community resulted in the Davenport resolutions, which other German groups adopted.\textsuperscript{11} The Holstein radical made a major impact on the development of a German-American bloc within the Republican party.

\textsuperscript{10} Marhencke, \textit{Hans Reimer Claussen}, 317-321. Due to the awkward organization of the book it is unclear how the author can claim Claussen’s entry into politics in both 1858 and 1856. Marhencke also presents a rather one-sided narrative.

\textsuperscript{11} Marhencke, \textit{Hans Reimer Claussen}, 323. For the German role in the Republican party convention of 1860 also see James M. Bergquist, “The Forty-Eighthers and the Republican Convention of 1860,” in \textit{The German Forty-Eighthers in the United States}, 141-156.
While Seward remained the leading candidate because of his strong opposition to slavery, some Iowans apparently considered Abraham Lincoln the party’s best choice.¹² How this is possible is unclear, since Lincoln’s managers had prevented his name from being included in the list of possible candidates.¹³ It might be an assumption made in hindsight by later historians.¹⁴ As long as the candidate had a strong anti-slavery record, the Holstein radicals would be satisfied. However, the party was unwilling to risk a repetition of 1856 by selecting an outspoken anti-slavery candidate. This eliminated both Seward and Salmon P. Chase from the running, and opened the door for the more moderate Lincoln. Lincoln emerged as a moderate candidate who could carry the party into the executive mansion. The party platform did not abandon the party’s opposition to the expansion of slavery, but the Republicans found it necessary to broaden their appeal by also adopting such issues as a homestead act, internal improvements, the construction of a transcontinental railroad, and lower tariffs.¹⁵ The idea was to gain additional support from moderate northerners with old Whig leanings and disgruntled northern Democrats.

In contrast to many contemporaries, Schleiden had a relatively positive opinion about the Republican presidential candidate. When he reported the selection to the government in Bremen, Schleiden gave a brief biographical sketch that was remarkably neutral. He highlighted Lincoln’s southern origins and return to politics after the Kansas-Nebraska Act. He also lauded Lincoln’s “agility, honesty, and energy” during the debates with Douglas in 1858. The debates had made

¹² Marhencke, Hans Reimer Claussen, 324.
¹⁴ Marhencke, Hans Reimer Claussen: 322.
Lincoln famous, Schleiden reported, but large parts of the country were still unfamiliar with him. Schleiden quoted an unidentified member of Lincoln’s party, though it was likely his friend Charles Sumner, saying that Lincoln was, “a man of fair ability, thoroughly pure and honest, but rather rustic and rude, and without the slightest knowledge of the world and of foreign affairs.”

After the former Whigs and American party supporters nominated John Bell of Tennessee and Edward Everett of Massachusetts as presidential candidates of the Constitutional Union party, the race for president took shape. In effect, the election campaign consisted of two separate contests, Douglas competing against Lincoln in the North and Bell competing against Breckenridge in the South. The sectional division of the electoral process made a sectional break that much more likely.

By late October, after news from several northern states indicated Republican victories, Lincoln’s election victory was beyond any doubt for Schleiden. He was still not convinced that Lincoln’s election would bring about secession; however, he could foresee problems with the enforcement of federal laws in the southern states. He continued to believe that economic interests would keep the two sections together. He was a little worried about the southern reaction. He knew that some states, like Mississippi, prepared to call conventions in case Lincoln was elected. Schleiden was hopeful that calmer voices, such as that of James H. Hammond of South Carolina, would prevent an irrational reaction. After all, the Republicans had only campaigned to prevent the expansion of slavery. The South, Schleiden believed, had exaggerated

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16 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, May 22, 1860, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.b.II, SAB.

17 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, October 26, 1860, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.b.II, SAB.

18 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, October 26, 1860, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.b.II, SAB.
the Republican threat to slavery. “The south had unknowingly played with fire,” he reasoned. “It is more the agitation about the slavery question in the South than the one in the North which has created the feeling among slaves that it was their freedom that has penetrated here and there among the slave population.” Unfortunately, the ties that bound them were not as close as Schleiden had expected, and men like Hammond were silenced or pushed aside. Schleiden could have looked at the events in Schleswig-Holstein to predict events in the winter of 1860-61.

Lincoln’s election victory triggered a shockwave among fire-eating southerners, with South Carolinians taking immediate steps to leave the Union. As a former revolutionary, and being concerned with the respectability of revolutions, as he had been in 1848, Schleiden criticized the undue haste of the secession movement. He saw no genuine political threats to the South. Knowing how long he had waited before deciding to join in the uprising in the duchies, one can easily understand his response, and why he would refuse to support this separatist-nationalist revolution. However, the Schleswig-Holstein uprising had also started as a reaction to perceived threats, so Schleiden was, in fact, consistent. He had been critical in 1848 of Friedrich Hecker and Gustav von Struve because they had not waited on events and had acted rashly. He had even accused them of not being good republicans. The same criticism would apply to the South, for despite the surge in political agitation, Schleiden continued to doubt the possibility of a final and permanent division of the Union.

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19 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, October 26, 1860, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.b.II, SAB.


21 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, November 9, 1860, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.b.II, SAB.
The 1848 legacy also appeared in Schleiden’s continued emphasis on the importance of compromise. Compromise had not been high on the agenda of the duchies during their uprising. In his memoirs, Schleiden mentioned how the Statthalterschaft had given way on many issues, only to have Denmark abuse the compromise spirit by making additional demands.22 At the same time, the duchies had been unyielding on the Schleswig issue. Regardless, the representatives of the duchies, Schleiden claimed, had tried to avoid illegal actions until forced to do so by Denmark.23 While there is room for Schleiden to claim that a preemptive secession by the South was not acceptable, one can also see how Schleswig-Holstein’s cause and the southern cause were similar. After all, Schleiden justified the action of the provisional government by saying, “Not opposition or indignation caused the proclamation of the provisional government but a desire for self-preservation.”24 No southern fire-eater could have said it better.

Nonetheless, the Union was breaking apart. On December 20, a convention dominated by large planters and slave-owners declared South Carolina independent. Schleiden commented on the decision of the South Carolina convention by saying, “The union is with this decision in effect gone and it is now only a question if it will be possible to reestablish it or if this is just the first step in its disintegration.”25 Following the secession of South Carolina, six more states left the Union. In February 1861, leaders of the seven rebellious states came together in Montgomery, Alabama, to form the Confederate States of America. Appointed to the highest


23 Rudolph M. Schleiden, Erinnerungen eines Schleswig-Holsteiners (Wiesbaden, Germany: Verlag von J. F. Bergmann, 1890), 263.

24 Schleiden, Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung, 1.

25 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, December 21, 1860, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.b.II, SAB.
office was a moderate U.S. senator from Mississippi who had opposed secession, Jefferson Davis. The decision to appoint a moderate, rather then a fire-eater as president mirrored the decision of the provisional government in Schleswig-Holstein to appoint a broad group of similarly moderate leaders. Both rebellions, as is often the case, replaced the radicals who had precipitated the separation with more cautious leadership.

While Schleiden had sought sympathy and support in 1848, he could not grant the same to the southerners in Washington. On January 26, news arrived in Washington that Louisiana had seceded. Schleiden visited John Slidell, a U.S. senator from the state, shortly after he received the news. Supposedly, Slidell’s wife was rather upset about their departure from Washington, and even Slidell appeared upset that it had come to this. He had apparently hoped that the North would again surrender to southern threats. Schleiden did not feel much sympathy for the senator, who, in Schleiden’s mind, had contributed his fair share to escalate the situation. When, in 1848, the constitutional controversy escalated over Schleswig and Denmark finally moved to incorporate the duchy, Schleiden, too, had probably hoped that Denmark would once again back down, as it had done in the past. The episode indicated how different the situation looked when the secessionist did not favor secession.

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27 January 26, 1861, p 203, book 19, LBSH. This is also confirmed in Schleiden’s official letter to Bremen on February 4, 1861.
With his many contacts in Washington, especially to Charles Sumner, Schleiden was soon aware that Lincoln would offer no compromise that undermined the Republican platform. However, one means for reunion apparently remained in play. In private conversations, the congressional leader of the Republican party, William H. Seward, suggested that a foreign war could bring unity to the United States. The idea was not far fetched, as many divided nations searched for a foreign “other” to restore unity at home. On some level, the first Schleswig-Holstein war had provided just such a means for the German experiment in 1848. That war had been a dramatic failure, accomplishing neither internal unity or independence for the duchies, but that made Seward’s threat no less real.

It was Schleiden who recorded Seward’s most famous mention of instigating a foreign war as a panacea for the Union’s ills. “If the Lord would only give the United States an excuse for a war with England, France, or Spain,” Seward supposedly said, “that would be the best means of reestablishing internal peace.” This is probably one of the most widely quoted remarks in Civil War diplomatic history. In addition to his April Fools Day memoranda to President Lincoln, it provides the basis for believing Seward might try to reunite the country in that way. However, he built his plan on an underestimation of secessionist sentiments in the South and an overestimation of Unionist strength.

There is no denying that Seward was something of a lose canon, or that he used anti-British feelings among the electorate for his own political gains. Thus, when Schleiden recorded


29 Howard Jones, Abraham Lincoln and a New Birth of Freedom (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1999), 41.
Seward’s thoughts about a foreign war, they were nothing new. However, because few historians have consulted Schleiden’s original January 29 letter, in which he quotes Seward, they have not realized that they are actually quoting Schleiden and not Seward himself.\(^{30}\) At the start of the paragraph, Schleiden explained that Seward still believed that the Union could be reestablished, even without a compromise. Seward supposedly saw secession as just another form of the party conflict, though an unpredictable potential to turn violent. A desire for peace and union, he was convinced, would reunite the people soon after inaugural day. Schleiden then mentioned the famous sentence. There are no quotation marks around it, which indicates that Schleiden, not Seward, is speaking, and that the words placed in Seward’s mouth are actually those of Bremen’s minister resident.\(^{31}\) The meticulous Schleiden would not have forgotten to add quotation marks if the words were directly from Seward, something he did routinely in other letters and diary entries.

Even though Schleiden and Seward disagreed on the means, they both believed it expedient to maintain peace in the United States. Seward’s foreign war panacea was an outgrowth of this desire.\(^{32}\) While Seward remained committed to the idea of preserving the Union, Schleiden believed that his own diplomatic experience could help the secretary of state achieve that end. Of course, Schleiden had to be cautious. His diplomatic post did not give him immunity, and he was not interested in repeating his Schleswig-Holstein experience, when he was refused amnesty and considered disloyal to the Danish state.

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31 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, January 29, 1861, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB.

32 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, February 12, 1861, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB.
However, before Schleiden would apply his talents to the American Crisis, the two sides made their own efforts. The Lincoln administration faced the difficult task of what to do about the two remaining federal installations in the Confederacy, Fort Sumter in Charleston and Fort Pickens in Pensacola Bay. Should the government maintain them in order to maintain at least some semblance of Union, or passively relinquish the last two U.S. flags flying in the seceded states? The Confederates also seemed to want a peaceful resolution of the issue, and so sent Andre B. Roman, Martin J. Crawford, and John Forsyth as envoys to Washington. 33 Like their five counterparts in Copenhagen in 1848, these three men sat in a hostile capital, trying to find a basis for peaceful coexistence. They also dealt with a government that had still not defined its policy.

The Confederate emissaries were as unsuccessful as their Schleswig-Holstein counterparts were in 1848. The government in Washington had determined not to surrender either fort, and instead prepared for conflict. After a March 16 cabinet meeting, it was still not clear if Lincoln would be willing to risk war to maintain both forts. Only Seward was in communication with the three commissioners through Supreme Court justices John A. Campbell and Samuel Nelson. Being unaware of the president’s plans, Seward gave the erroneous impression that the fort’s evacuation was imminent. The Schleswig-Holsteiners in Copenhagen in 1848 had fared little better, although they had at least been able to talk with the king. Until the very end, Seward continued to support evacuation. 34 He delayed the inevitable because he did not consider Lincoln up to the challenges of the presidency. 35


34 Ibid., 9, 12.

35 McClintock, Lincoln and the Decision for War, 238.
By late March, the escalation was increasingly obvious. Schleiden had come into contact with Crawford, one of the Confederate commissioners who, like Schleiden, knew that Seward worked within the cabinet to prevent an outbreak of hostilities. Crawford did not agree with Seward that a delay would allow Unionists in the South time to take back control. He thought it was to make the people in the North accept the inevitability of separation. Schleiden knew that secessionists were making inroads in the upper South, which undermined Unionists and thus Seward’s hope for southern allies. As war became more likely, Seward became more reluctant to give new information to the Confederate commissioners. The uncertainty that had plagued Washington since the secession crisis was reminiscent of the uncertainty faced by both Danes and Schleswig-Holsteiners in Copenhagen in the first three month of 1848. Similarly, as in 1848, clarity would soon come with violent force.

By early April, Lincoln had to make a decision. No news had arrived in Washington from the Fort Pickens relieve mission and it was unclear if the fort could be maintained. The president determined not to surrender Fort Sumter. When Lincoln informed South Carolina’s Governor Charles Pickens that he intended to resupply Fort Sumter, the governor asked the government in Montgomery for advice. President Davis ordered the capture of Fort Sumter and with the first shot on April 12, the American Civil War commenced. On April 15, Lincoln called for 75,000

36 Ibid., 205, 216.

37 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, March 26, 1861, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB.

38 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, March 26, 1861, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB.


40 McClintock, Lincoln and the Decision for War, 241.
ninety-day volunteers to serve in the Union army. The population of the free states flocked in overwhelming numbers to the colors.41 The difficulties the early arrivals in Washington encountered on their way and the prospect of an attack on Washington, gave Schleiden a reason to pursue his peace mission, which would also benefit the trade interests of Bremen.

On April 19, the Sixth Massachusetts passed through Baltimore on its way to Washington. The sympathetic southern population of the city pelted the soldiers with rocks and a fight ensued. Four soldiers and twelve residence of Baltimore were killed, with many more wound on both sides. The incident of mob action raised fears about Washington’s security, defended by only 3,500 soldiers. In addition, secessionist cut the telegraph line between Washington and the North. The foreign ministers in Washington prepared for the eventuality of a Confederate attack. The Prussian minister was of faint heart, and on April 19, Schleiden caught him packing his belongings for a speedy evacuation.42 Some of Schleiden’s colleagues put out their national flags to distinguish their houses as the residences of foreign ministers and thus protect their property in case of an invasion.43 Schleiden had to send his aid Johannes Rösing to the Navy Yard to obtain a national flag.44 The Lincoln administration faced a situation similar to that in the duchies when Danish troops invaded and approached the capital.

Faced with bloodshed and the carnage of war, Schleiden’s humanitarianism reemerged. There had been talk about the diplomatic corps mediating the conflict, but neither the French nor


42 April 19, 1861, p 234, book 19, LBSH.

43 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, April 22, 1861, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.1, SAB.

44 April 23, 1861, p 234, book 19, LBSH.
the British minister was ready to engage in such a delicate and potentially dangerous undertaking.

As a former rebel, Schleiden approved of the right to revolution. In contrast to 1848, he believed that southerners had acted preemptively. All the perceived threats that had led to secession were in the future, and thus no violation of the rights of southerners had yet occurred. Schleiden claimed later that he had only resigned from his position in the Danish government when he had confirmation of a violation of Schleswig-Holstein’s rights. But the early stages of the insurrection in 1848 had been based on perceptions. On a personal level, Schleiden would fit with some of the moderate southerners, like Jefferson Davis, who had either waited for their states to act or worked against secession. It is understandable that Schleiden looked down upon the fire-eaters, as he had on the radicals in 1848.

In addition, Schleiden knew from his experience in Schleswig-Holstein how difficult it could be for a state to survive against larger, more powerful foes if the international situation was against that state. Schleswig-Holstein in 1848 had relied heavily on the support of the German states. However, European pressure on the most important ally, Prussia, had ended the support and placed Schleswig-Holstein at the mercy of the Danish monarchy.

Another issue that Schleiden explicitly refers to in his diary and correspondence is the prevention of bloodshed. While he had not witnessed the recent carnage of the Crimean War, which had given rise to a humanitarian movement, and had never been a soldier, he had seen the Battle of Eckernförde during the first Schleswig-Holstein war. Even than, the Danish ships and Schleswig-Holstein’s artillery had engaged in a relatively bloodless firefight, but the experience

45 Schleiden, Erinnerungen eines Schleswig-Holsteiners, 266, 277.
46 Schleiden, Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung, 25.
47 Ibid., 54, 71.
touched a humanitarian impulse in Schleiden that was laced with pacifism. By 1861, he genuinely wanted to prevent any war if possible.

Despite having said in the past that the time for compromise had passed, Schleiden continued to believe that it should be possible to mediate some kind of truce between North and South. He determined to throw all his ambitions and strength into the matter. He wanted to propose a three-month ceasefire, which would allow Congress to meet in extraordinary session on July 4 and determine a policy that could govern the conflict. At the same time, the maritime war would also be delayed, thus benefitting trade. Bremen’s weakness might allow Schleiden to undertake this risky enterprise. Before officially suggesting the plan to the U.S. government, Schleiden talked with the Prussian minister Friedrich Freiherr von Gerolt, who likely responded cautiously to the idea. While laying the groundwork for his attempt, he could not expect any backing from his government until after the fact.

Schleiden’s desire to protect Bremen’s interests is not without importance. The United States was an important trade partner for Bremen, and the closure of the southern ports and likely other disruptions due to the war could have a negative impact on the city’s trade. Seward had acknowledged the importance of Bremen’s trade when on the afternoon of April 18, he had called both Schleiden and Lyons to the State Department for a conference. The conference followed Davis’ announcement the day before that the Confederacy would issue letters of marque and reprisal. The purpose of the meeting was to consult the two ministers about the


49 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, April 22, 1861, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB.

50 April 22, 1861, p 234, book 19, LBSH.

51 November 21, 1859, p 31, book 19, LBSH.
legal ramification of a blockade of southern ports. Schleiden had already dealt with blockades and belligerent threats to merchant vessels during the first Schleswig-Holstein war, when Denmark engaged in both activities. He saw an opportunity and hoped that his presentation would benefit the commercial classes. Schleiden warned about the ramifications of a blockade. He felt better able to do so because of the physical size and military weakness of his state. He assumed that had Lyons made the same comments, they would have appeared as threats.\(^52\)

Seward had initially intended to keep the meeting totally secret but had to allow confidential letters to be sent to the home governments. The two ministers conceded that the United States had the right to close its ports without falling under the international rule of blockades. However, the ministers also suggested that if the government decided on such a measure, an effective blockade would be the best means to avoid legal questions. With the escalation of secession into war, Schleiden again wondered what he could do to restore peace.

On the morning of April 24, 1861, Schleiden had word that the vice president of the Confederacy, Alexander Stephens, was in Richmond. Knowing Stephens from the Georgian’s time in Congress, when the two had resided in the same house, Schleiden saw an opportunity to communicate with one of the highest officials in the Confederacy.\(^53\) That morning, he secretly suggested to Chase and Seward that he be allowed to speak with Stephens.\(^54\) Chase declined to comment on the proposal.\(^55\) Not so Seward. Schleiden knew that Seward was unlikely to comment until he had consulted with the president, although the secretary assured him that were

\(^{52}\) April 19, 1861, p 234, book 19, LBSH.

\(^{53}\) May 4, 1858, p 159, book 18, LBSH.

\(^{54}\) Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, April 24, 1861, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.1, SAB.

\(^{55}\) April 27, 1861, p 235, book 19, LBSH.
he to make contact with Stephens it would not be held against him. Nevertheless, Seward cautioned him that the president and the government could not publicly acknowledge such negotiations, or give Schleiden specific terms, and he decided that before going any further, Schleiden should present his ideas to Lincoln himself. Schleiden was well aware of the tremendous responsibility he was taking on, and hoped that the proposal would not be to Bremen’s detriment. Gerolt and Rösing were the only foreign officials that Schleiden took into his confidence.56

In the afternoon, Seward took Schleiden to see Lincoln. Like Seward, Lincoln thanked Schleiden for his willingness to help prevent bloodshed. The president confessed that he was still not acquainted with diplomatic protocol and, therefore, “very apt to commit great blunders.” He expressed a certain regret that Schleiden had not gone to Richmond on his own, without consulting him or Seward. Schleiden countered that it would have been incorrect for him to do so because it would have exposed him and the Danish government to accusations of conspiring with the enemy against the U.S. government. Lincoln accepted that explanation.57 Obviously, Schleiden was painfully aware of why he was in the United States. His participation in an insurgency had made him an outcast once, but there was no need to reprise that role for a cause in which he did not believe.

Lincoln continued that his peaceful intentions, which he had expressed more than once in official proclamations and conversations with citizens from the seceded states, had too often been misinterpreted. He no longer intended to give credence to the rumors of his weakness and

56 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, April 24, 1861, morning letter, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB.

57 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, April 24, 1861, evening letter letter, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB.
timorousness. Lincoln insisted, therefore, that the conversation be kept completely confidential. He stressed, in addition, that his military preparations were not aggressive in nature and carried out only for the defense of Washington. The president believed that he could not give any authority “to enter into negotiations or to invite propositions,” but he promised to consider “with equal respect and care” all propositions he received from Schleiden. Schleiden gained the impression that Seward and Lincoln wished that he would unofficially consult with Stephens to reach an agreement prevented bloodshed. He tried to find out if an offer of a three-month truce were acceptable, but Lincoln maintained his silence on specific terms.58

Schleiden had accomplished less than he had hoped to do, but he remained undeterred, and based on his assumption that both Seward and Lincoln wished him to see Stephens, he decided to take the gamble.59 He held one last conference with Gerolt and gave instructions to Rösing to tell everybody that he had gone to Baltimore, where a ship under Bremen’s flag was held.60 That evening, Schleiden and his loyal servant Bernhard Bätjer went to Alexandria, where they boarded the morning train to Richmond. One has to wonder if, as Schleiden crossed the bridge to Alexandria, his mind wandered back to his departure from Copenhagen thirteen years earlier. Both ventures were similar in the uncertainty that awaited Schleiden at the end of the trip.

In contrast to Kiel in 1848, Schleiden found Richmond more of an army camp, due to all the troops that were arriving from across the South.61 The railroad stations he passed had been

58 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, April 24, 1861, evening letter letter, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB.

59 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, April 24, 1861, evening letter letter, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB.

60 April 27, 1861, p 236, book 19, LBSH; Rösing to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, April 27, 1861, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB.

61 April 27, 1861, p 236, book 19, LBSH.
filled with young volunteers eager to fight. The newspapers also had a belligerent tone.
Richmond itself appeared even more excited. In the lobby of the Spotwood Hotel, Schleiden
found Senator Robert M. T. Hunter and other prominent southerners who were anxious to find
out what had brought Schleiden to Richmond and to give their opinions about recent
developments.62

Schleiden immediately contacted Stephens, and the two had a three-hour long
conversation. Stephens was willing to help foster peace, but he saw little prospects for success.
Reminding Schleiden of the treatment the southern commissioners had received in Washington,
Stephens argued that the Confederacy would not renew steps toward peace. Seward’s intentions
were fully discredited because he had countersigned Lincoln “war proclamation.” Even Judge
Campbell, who had been an intermediary between Seward and the southern commissioners, had
sent an outraged letter to Jefferson Davis to protest the Lincoln government’s intentions.
Stephens believed that the attack on Fort Sumter could have been avoided. He also thought
Lincoln had used the rumors that the Confederate army was about to attack Washington to draw
troops to the capital, even though the government of neither the Confederacy nor Virginia had
shown any inclination to attack.

Distrust of the federal government had only increased due to the reinforcement to Fort
Pickens and Fortress Monroe, and the destruction of the arsenals at Harper’s Ferry and the
Norfolk Navy Yard. The recent events in Baltimore, according to Stephens, placed Maryland in
the secessionist camp, and the Confederacy was honor bound to come to the state’s assistance if
requested. Thus, one aspect of the cease-fire had to be either Maryland’s inclusion in the
Confederacy or the end of troop movements thought the state. In addition, the high spirit of the

62 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, May 2, 1861,
evening letter letter, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.1, SAB.
population would not allow for a ceasefire. The final and gravest problem was that Stephens had no authority to negotiate. At the end of the three-hour conversation, he requested time to think about the offer.63

Schleiden requested a formal written statement of whatever terms Stephens thought appropriate to foster peace. He discovered that Stephen’s terms were almost word for word what Davis had told the Confederate Congress on March 29.64 The vice president regretted the “threatening prospect of a general war,” and stressed that it was not the intention of the Confederacy to provoke a war with the Union. However, peace without independence was not acceptable. The bombardment of Fort Sumter had occurred only after all possibilities for peace had been exhausted. The main point, which would never be acceptable to Seward or Lincoln, was the following: “From all evidence and manifestations of their design which have reached me, it seems to be their policy to wage a war for the recapture of former possessions looking to the ultimate coercion and subjugation of the people of the Confederate States to their former dominion. With such an object on their part possessed in no power on Earth can arrest or prevent a most bloody conflict.” Stephens then left it up to the Lincoln government to offer.65

With this letter as a basis for negotiations, Stephens and Schleiden debated for another two hours, during which time Schleiden was able to impress upon Stephens the need to modify some passages. Most significantly, he told Stephens that “a significant amount of mistrust shined through the letter coupled with, in his opinion, a substantial amount of misplaced honor which

63 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, May 2, 1861, evening letter letter, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB.
64 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, May 2, 1861, evening letter letter, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB.
65 Stephens to Schleiden, April 28, 1861, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB.
threatened the impact of the letter because in Washington the letter would meet a similar mistrust and false, misplaced honor that shied away from making the first step.” At the end of their conversation, both men agreed to keep their talks confidential for the moment.66 Schleiden did not record a second conversation with Stephens in his diary, perhaps because he had lost hope of an agreement. Instead, he only mentioned his cold, the meeting with a Mr. Garnett (likely Muscoe R. H. Garnett), Matthew Fontaine Maury, and Bremen’s consul in Richmond Edward William de Voss, to whom he gave a few instructions about how the changed situation would influence commerce and international law.67

After the final conversation, Schleiden could do little but return to Washington on April 27.68 Upon his return, he immediately set to work to make a copy of the correspondence with Stephens and prepare a cover letter for Lincoln, which he then personally delivered to Seward. The secretary of state listened attentively to his verbal report, but his reserved attitude signaled that the attempt would be unsuccessful.69 Conveying Lincoln’s reaction to the terms, Seward assured the diplomat that his position with the government was not compromised “The President desires you to be fully assured not only that he finds no cause for disapproving of your intervention in the civil contention which you so justly deplore, but that on the contrary he respects your proceedings as eminently friendly towards the government and People of the United States,” Seward reported. “The Republic of Bremen is entitled to thanks for the good

66 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, May 2, 1861, evening letter letter, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB.


68 April 27, 1861, p 238, book 19, LBSH.

69 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, May 2, 1861, evening letter letter, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB.
offices of its Minister in so important a matter.” Beyond these reassurances, Seward confirmed that restoration of the Union was the primary goal of the government. Consequently, Lincoln saw no use in pursuing the matter any further. The only thing left for Schleiden to do was inform Stephens of the failure. Saddened, Schleiden wrote, “I have therefore to abandon the endeavor towards attaining a truce at this time but I cannot abandon the hope that peace will be observed de facto until the sober second thought renders a definite peaceful understanding between the United States government and the dissatisfied people of he South possible.”

In the course of these conversations and negotiations, one has once more to wonder if Schleiden ever noticed how his roles had changed. In 1848, he had been on the insurgent side of the talks, much like Stephens. Seward and Lincoln were closest to King Frederik VII and men like Orla Lehmann. Schleiden himself, as the go between, would hold the position that Great Britain, Sweden, and Russia had occupied, even to some degree Prussia. Remembering how much he despised the Prussians in 1851, and what critical words he had for some of the other intermediaries and diplomats, one wonders if he realized whose role he had assumed during his trip to Richmond in April. After all, the statements made by Stephens could just as well have come from a Schleswig-Holsteiner in 1848, who had similarly mistrusted Denmark after a series of broken promises. To dismiss the obvious similarities to 1848 would be to deny Schleiden’s background and present a shallow and skewed picture.

A different situation developed in the West, particularly in St. Louis. Here the radical Olshausen illustrated how a separatist nationalist could fight a secessionist movement with the same ferocity. Being in St. Louis at the start of the war, Olshausen observed the turbulence

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70 Seward to Schleiden, April 29, 1861, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.1, SAB.

71 Schleiden to Stephens, April 30, 1861, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.1, SAB.
between the various immigrant communities in this rather complicated state. His radical ideals led him to believe that slavery was a major cause of the war and that everyone’s freedom was at stake. He was well aware of the torn political situation in Missouri, and claimed that most of the early unionists in that state were Germans. He associated the “freedom fighters” of 1848 with the defense of the Union. Based on his experiences, support for separatism would have made equal sense. Olshausen had harsh words for people who did not support the Union. Most people, he believed were disinterested, while those who took an interest were war speculators. For the South, Olshausen had even harsher words. He called secessionists a band of guerrillas, and believed that all people in the South were barbarians, worse than their Indian allies. He must have forgotten that he himself had been considered a barbarian at one time.72

Secession in the United States witnessed Forty-Eighters flocking to the colors of the Union, but by grouping all German-American Forty-Eighters into one category, historians have overlooked the major differences in the backgrounds of these former revolutionaries. In the case of the separatist nationalists from Schleswig-Holstein, a unique legacy came into play. All three men featured in this chapter built on their European experiences in reacting to the secession crisis. Schleiden, as Bremen’s representative, drifted between humanitarian and pacifist impulses, his revolutionary and diplomatic experiences, and the trade interests of Bremen. Despite his opposition to slavery and preemptive nature of southern secession, Schleiden was still eager to prevent bloodshed. In the process, he faced probably the most difficult negotiations of his career and failed to overcome the mistrust of the two sides. He had dramatically changed sides in comparison to his diplomatic duties of 1848.

72 T Olshausen to Zoe Olshausen, September 8, 1861, reprinted in Olshausen, Theodor Olshausen, 199-201.
The radicals had again assumed an uncompromising position. They were willing to throw away the possibility of a Republican victory by suggesting a more radical presidential candidate and program. For the moment, their ambitions and political views were checked. As the nation broke apart and Olshausen in St. Louis was on the frontline of the guerrilla war in the Trans-Mississippi theater, he continued to argue against southern nationalism. The radicals, who had been fighting for decades in Schleswig-Holstein for the separation from Denmark’s oppressive and unconstitutional actions, were ready to fight with the same commitment against what they perceived as an oppressive southern separatism.

As in Schleswig-Holstein, battles and not words would determine the future of the United States. None of the Schleswig-Holstein Forty-Eighters seemed to have realized how close their own 1848 experiences were to that of the South. The final word in relation to this secessionist dilemma should go to Schleiden. In his memoirs, he recounted a conversation with Prussian negotiator Karl Georg Ludwig Guido von Usedom, who at the time had respected the rebellion in the duchies. As Schleiden recalled it, “He [Usedom] did not misunderstand that not the one who hits first starts a civil war, but the one who made the first strike necessary.”73 Confederates could not have said it any better.

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73 Schleiden, Schleswig-Holstein im zweiten Kriegsjahre, 246.
Chapter Eight

Civil War and Radicalism

Once the Union and Confederate armies started to meet on the battlefields of North America, any potential dilemma the separatist nationalists might have faced in regard to southern secession disappeared. Like other Forty-Eighters, the men from Schleswig-Holstein stood by the Union. In the course of the war, the legacies of their experiences during the first Schleswig-Holstein war reappeared. They still had no sympathy for the southern secessionists. While Rudolph M. Schleiden faithfully continued his diplomatic work and tried to advise Seward during the difficult decisions surrounding the *Trent* affair in December 1861, he also increasingly considered developments in Europe. He extracted many Germans helped them return to Europe. On the radical side, Hans R. Claussen and Theodor Olshausen, much as they had done during the first Schleswig-Holstein war, made the work of the Lincoln administration more difficult by challenging the government’s policies and trying to prevent the reelection of the president by supporting the candidacy of John C. Frémont.

Upon the outbreak of war, the Lincoln administration stressed reunification over slavery as the main issue, much to the dismay of many abolitionists and to the detriment of the country’s foreign policy. Radical Forty-Eighters also took issue with the Union’s goal. However, Lincoln’s decision to avoid the slavery issue was necessary, considering that the slave states of Maryland, Missouri, and Kentucky remained half-heartedly in the Union. Emancipation early on in the war would have driven those states into the Confederacy. The policy made Olshausen a lasting enemy of the Lincoln administration.

In Missouri, where the start of the conflict had already pitched the German and native populations against one another, the Union commander, John C. Frémont, imposed martial law
in August 1861 and issued an emancipation proclamation for the slaves of disloyal masters. Concerned about the impact of the proclamation, Lincoln countermanded the decree and was eventually forced to remove Frémont from command.\textsuperscript{1} Olshausen was outraged by Lincoln’s actions, and sympathized with the disgraced general. Having already observed that slavery was a major factor driving the sections apart, Olshausen looked favorably on Frémont’s attempt at emancipation. He called it, one of the most important gestures of the war, and he had expected the proclamation to expand beyond the state’s borders.\textsuperscript{2} It was regrettable, Olshausen thought, that the general’s effort had put him in such rough waters, for only the total end of slavery would restore peace and harmony to the United States.\textsuperscript{3} Olshausen had returned to a familiar posture, opposition to government policies during wartime.

In Iowa, Claussen too was dissatisfied with the Lincoln administration’s decision to stress unification over slavery. Like Olshausen, he abhorred slavery and wanted nothing less than its complete abolition. As during the election campaign of 1860, no Republican was worthy of support, he said, who did not subscribe to abolition. For that reason, Claussen had worked against Bates and for Seward in 1860. He wanted slavery to be a much more prominent political and military issues. In a newspaper article reacting to the dismissal of Frémont and the end of his emancipation edict, Claussen made another one of his exaggerated claims that the vast majority

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{1} Louis S. Gerteis, \textit{Civil War St. Louis} (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 2001), 147-148, 155-159.
\end{itemize}
of northerners wanted the end of slavery.\textsuperscript{4} Claussen’s radicalism and narrow mindedness, which had made the radicals demand the continuation of the first Schleswig-Holstein war against all of Europe, had resurfaced.\textsuperscript{5}

The decision to emphasize union over slavery was a political necessity for Lincoln. The president had to placate slaveholders in the loyal slave states, but he also had a broader political purpose. He created a certain Burgfrieden. Democrats, who opposed emancipation, would support a war effort to end disunion. Despite the relative cooperative spirit in the North, opposition existed, and the government wasted little time in arresting opposition leaders, closing newspapers, and suspending the writ of habeas corpus.\textsuperscript{6}

Even in Missouri, the anti-Lincoln press was challenged. Frémont’s successor, Henry W. Halleck, notified Olshausen at the \textit{Westliche Post} that unless the tone of the paper changed, the paper would be suspended.\textsuperscript{7} Later in the war, Olshausen complained to Lincoln about the censorship and policies undermining freedom of speech.\textsuperscript{8} He had done the same in Schleswig-

\textsuperscript{4} DD September 28, 1861; Ernst-Erich Marhencke, \textit{Hans Reimer Claussen: Kämpfer für Freiheit und Recht in zwei Welten} (Frankfurt a.M., Germany: Peter Lang, 1999), 328.

\textsuperscript{5} Marhencke, \textit{Hans Reimer Claussen}, 329-331.


\textsuperscript{8} Ernst W. Heemann and Theodor Olshausen to Lincoln, September 8, 1862; Theodor Olshausen, et. al. to James Taussig, May 16, 1863, Abraham Lincoln Papers, Library of Congress, Washington, D.C.
Holstein. He was still the radical who was willing to challenge the government for undermining civil liberties.

While Olshausen and Claussen contested wartime policies, the diplomatic corps in Washington had many other pressing worries. The European members of the diplomatic corps had frequent visits from European soldiers and officers seeking commissions in the Union army. In many cases, these men had letters of introduction or recommendations. If they were from the German states, their first stop upon arriving in Washington was to see either Schleiden or Friedrich Freiherr von Gerolt. The soldiers were then taken to Lincoln or Seward, who would recommend them to the War Department. Schleiden had a number of such cases, including an instance when his old friend Karl Georg Ludwig Guido von Usedom recommended an officer from Baden to him. Usedom acknowledged that he was not personally acquainted with the man, but a friend had recommended him to Usedom in glowing language. The officer had family problems, and desired a fresh start. Schleiden brought him to Seward’s attention, and the officer was likely in the field within a few weeks. A much more significant diplomatic challenge during which Schleiden took an active part occurred in the final month of 1861.

Faced with the inability of the Confederate diplomats in Europe, Pierre Adolphe Rost, Ambrose Dudley Mann, and William Lowndes Yancey, to secure European support, the Confederate government decided to replace Rost and Yancey with James Mason of Virginia and

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10 Usedom to R. Schleiden, January 18, 1862, LBSH.
John Slidell of Louisiana. The South looked for foreign aid in its fight against the Union. After finding their initial blockade running idea impossible to implement, the commissioners decided to slip out of Charleston and into the Caribbean to catch a British mail packet. After their escape from Charleston and a stop in Nassau, they awaited passage to Europe in Havana. On November 7, 1861, Mason, Slidell, and their entourage left Havana aboard the R.M.S. Trent for St. Thomas.

On November 8, at 11:40 a.m., the British vessel came in sight of the U.S.S. San Jacinto, which lay in waiting in the Bahama Canal. Things did not go as smoothly as the ship’s commander Charles Wilkes had anticipated, but he was able to achieve his goal of appending Mason, Slidell and their secretaries. However, he failed to search the Trent or put a prize crew on board to have the ship adjudicated by a court, he had skirted the requirements of international law. It would be up to others to resolve diplomatically the precarious situation Wilkes had created.

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13 Mason to Hunter, October 5, 1861, printed in Richardson, A Compilation of the Messages and Papers of the Confederacy, 2:97-99.


News of the capture of Mason and Slidell soon reached Washington. As a former student of law, employee in the Danish commerce ministry, revolutionary diplomat at a time of war, and minister to the United States, Schleiden had lots of experience in questions of international law, and enough common sense to spot a weak legal case. On November 16, William H. Seward told him about the capture of Mason and Slidell and of their incarceration at Fort Warren as prisoners of the state. Schleiden speculated that the men had been taken by force. He immediately sensed problems. Seward listened to Schleiden’s concerns but remained largely indifferent. Aware of the workings of American democracy, Schleiden worried that the government would not have the courage to defy public opinion. He thought the best solution was to release the prisoners and apologize to London.\(^\text{16}\)

Schleiden talked with Seward again on the following day. He impressed on him the uniqueness of the incident, but Seward again brushed aside his concerns by telling Schleiden that neither the United States nor Great Britain wanted war and would, therefore, find a peaceful solution.\(^\text{17}\) Seward was correct. Despite the frequently presented story of Civil War diplomatic brinkmanship in the Trent affair, intervention by Great Britain was not a serious threat.

The diplomatic representatives looked anxiously to the opening of Congress in early December for some clarity in the Trent affair. Congress approved resoundingly a congratulatory note to Captain Wilkes for his brave and patriotic service,\(^\text{18}\) but Lincoln’s annual message was surprisingly silent on the incident. Only Secretary of the Navy Gideon Welles’s annual report

\(^{16}\) November 16, 1861, p 308, book 19, LBSH.

\(^{17}\) Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, November 19, 1861, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB.

lauded Wilkes’ actions and tried to excuse his oversight in not bringing the vessel into port. Nevertheless, Wells cautioned, “It must by no means be permitted to constitute a precedent hereafter for the treatment of any case of similar infraction of neutral obligations by foreign vessels engaged in commerce or the carrying trade.”¹⁹ The United States was still uncertain about how to deal with the incident, not so the British.

On November 28, the British cabinet met to discuss the Trent.²⁰ Based on suggestions by the Law Officers of the Queen, who were present at the meeting, Lord Russell submitted to Queen Victoria a draft communiqué that demanded an apology and the release of the prisoners. A second dispatch ordered Lyons to leave Washington within seven days if the United States did not cooperate.²¹ On December 1, Queen Victoria returned Prince Albert’s edited version of these demands.²² The message remained largely unchanged, but the spirit was more conciliatory. Russell advised Lyons to seek an interview with Seward prior to delivering the demands. He also suggested that Lyons not tell Seward about the seven-day ultimatum.²³ The note was soon on its way to Washington, where the final decision would be made.

Before the demands arrived, Schleiden had another meeting with Seward about the Trent on December 17. Bremen’s representative again impressed upon the secretary the seriousness of

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²¹ ibid., 115-16.

²² Queen Victoria to Lord John Russell, December 1, 1861, *The Letters of Queen Victoria: A Selection from Her Majesty’s Correspondence and Journal between the Years 1837 and 1861* (New York: Longmans, Green, and Co., 1907), 3:469-70.

the situation. By then, news of the angry British reaction had arrived in Washington, and Seward complained that his peaceful policy had been called into doubt in Europe. He clarified once more that the government had not instructed Wilkes to capture Mason and Slidell; the captain had acted on his own. Schleiden pointed out that Welles’ statements cast doubt on that explanation. Seward replied angrily, “I don’t care a bit what Mr. Welles says.” It was he, the secretary of state, who made policies, and he asked Schleiden to communicate that fact to Lyons. Schleiden perceived that Seward was still interested in seeking a peaceful resolution of the affair. He was less certain that Great Britain could be pacified. The new secretary at the British legation, William Stuart, had on previous occasions in Brazil and Naples acted alone as temporary charge d’affaires and might do so again if relations broke down.24 As happened on his Richmond trip eight months earlier, Schleiden was again seeking international peace, this time by impressing upon the secretary the illegality of Wilkes’ action.

On December 19, 1861, the British messenger, Conway Seymour, reached the legation in Washington and delivered the demands from London. It was up to Lyons and the government of the United States to handle the situation and resolve the question peacefully. That very afternoon, Lyons went to the State Department and talked with Seward. Lyons mentioned the arrival of the demands for a release of the prisoners and for a suitable apology. He indicated to Seward that he was flexible in dealing with the prisoner question and could delay the delivery of the communiqué. Seward asked Lyons for forty-eight hours in order to communicate with the president and consider the question.25

24 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, December 17, 1861, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB.

Despite trying to maintain secrecy, Schleiden, who had connections all over Washington, among them an unnamed source close to the secretary, knew by the evening that Great Britain had asked for a “reparation of this ill advised step.” Schleiden guessed that Great Britain was preparing to break with the United States, an impression reinforced when a British warship arrived at Annapolis, supposedly to take Lord Lyons away.\(^26\) There were two possible sources for Schleiden’s information, his friend Charles Sumner or Adam Gurowski, the translator at the State Department. Schleiden had met both men at Sumner’s residence on December 19. Despite disliking each other, and Gurowski making comments about the “rotten governments of Europe,” there was a possibility that either one of them mentioned the British demand during their conversation with Schleiden.\(^27\) Schleiden had always had good connections among influential policy makers, and this situation was no exception.

On Monday, at 10 a.m., Lyons presented the demand to Seward, who promised to bring it immediately to the attention of the president and respond to it as soon as possible. Lyons also told Seward that he must have a formal reply within seven days. Seward feared that the ultimatum would make it more difficult for him to deal with the issue in the cabinet, but he preferred to keep that information to himself.\(^28\) Lyons confessed that he was not very hopeful

\(^{26}\) Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, December 20, 1861, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB.

\(^{27}\) December 20, 1861, p 321, book 19, LBSH.

that the U.S. government would give in,\textsuperscript{29} although he was grateful that only Lincoln, Lyons, and Seward knew about the British request.\textsuperscript{30}

On Christmas Day, Lincoln’s cabinet met to discuss the British ultimatum. Lincoln had called Sumner to the meeting to read the letters from John Bright and Richard Cobden, Members of Parliament, who had expressed their outrage at the action of Captain Wilkes.\textsuperscript{31} Because of Sumner’s presence at the meeting, Schleiden knew about the details of the discussions.\textsuperscript{32} However, the debate that day ended without a solution.\textsuperscript{33} On Lincoln’s request, Seward prepared an apology and on the next day, Seward convinced his colleagues that the prisoners had to be released.\textsuperscript{34} Four days later, Seward informed Lyons that the United States would release Mason, Slidell, and their secretaries.\textsuperscript{35} On January 1, 1862, the four men were transferred at

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\textsuperscript{30} Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, December 23, 1861, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB.


\textsuperscript{32} Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, December 27, 1861, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB.


\textsuperscript{34} Adams, \textit{Great Britain and the American Civil War}, 206.

\textsuperscript{35} Lyons to Russell, December 27, 1861, \textit{The American Civil War through British Eyes}, 1:256-57.
\end{footnotes}
Provincetown, Massachusetts, to H.M.S. *Rinaldo*, which carried them to Canada. The *Trent* affair had been settled peacefully.

While the crisis unfolded, France, Austria, and Prussia had sent notes in support of the British demands to the U.S. government. The notes from the two central European powers had been inspired by events in Europe, rather than those across the Atlantic. Initially, Seward received the Austrian and Prussian notes, which arrived well after the settlement of the *Trent* affair, as confirmation of each country’s support and friendship. However, that perspective quickly changed. At the end of January, Seward had become upset and bitter that Prussia “had been whipped” by England into sending its note. He told Schleiden that any such communiqué must be regarded as “ungracious” after a decision had been made. There is no evidence that Great Britain and France had “whipped” Prussian into sending its note. Rather, European issues had forced the Prussians response.

After settling the *Trent* affair, Seward and the British continued to debate the finer details of international law, but the danger of a trans-Atlantic war had subsided, to be replaced by other, more pressing matters on both sides of the Atlantic. For Schleiden, these other issues involved a return to Europe, where he worked with the governments of the three Hanseatic Cities to expand his authority to represent them in Washington. Over the years, Hamburg had made inroads when it came to the lucrative transatlantic trade. The city had already requested Schleiden’s help in finding lost relatives or obtaining death certificates. Despite being in some commercial

36 Lyons to Russell, December 31, 1861, *The American Civil War through British Eyes*, 1:258-59; Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, January 6, 1862, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB.

37 It could be that this statement has a different reason. Schleiden cautioned later in the letter that he had observed that Seward had shown a bad mood. Rudolf Schleiden to Heinrich Smidt, January 24, 1862, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB.
competition, with one another, the three cities did appreciate the benefits of a united representation in Washington. The talks were successful, and Schleiden returned to Washington with an expanded mandate.

When Schleiden returned to Washington in the fall of 1862, he entered a political hornet’s nest. Much like the radicals in Schleswig-Holstein during the first Schleswig-Holstein war, with their outrageous and often counterproductive demands of the government, so, too, did radicals in the Republican party challenge the Lincoln administration. The so-called radical Republicans, including Sumner and Chase, had taken issue with the conduct of the war. Knowing they could not attack Lincoln directly, they picked on the man they mistakenly took to be the power behind the throne, Seward. Believing the secretary of state had grown too powerful, based on their information from Seward’s chief cabinet rival, Chase, the radicals wanted to gain influence by removing Seward from office. Early in 1862, Schleiden had already perceived that a reshuffling of the cabinet was likely to come, but he assumed that Seward was safe. To the contrary, Seward’s opponents were determined to undermine the secretary.

Schleiden’s accreditation as minister resident of the Hanseatic Cities was delayed because of a cabinet crisis, brought about by the radicals, in December 1862. Determine to end the radical challenge to Seward’s position, Lincoln cleverly discredited Chase at a meeting of his cabinet and select radical leaders. Both Seward and Chase submitted their resignations. Lincoln

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38 See US 26, Errichtung eines gemeinsamen Hanseatischen Ministerresidenten in Washington, Dr. Schleiden, 1862, AHL; CL VI, no 16p, Vol 4a, Fasc 7a, Invol, 111-1 Senat, SAH.

39 For studies on the cabinet crisis see Donald, Lincoln, 399-406; Myers, Caution and Cooperation, 127-141.

40 Schleiden to Senats-Commission für die auswärtigen Angelegenheiten, January 28, 1862, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.I, SAB.
as a result retained both men, and by December 22, 1862, with Chase and the radicals having been chastened, Schleiden could present his documents. The situation was reminiscent of the radicals attempt to remove the war minister in Schleswig-Holstein, even though, in this case, the radical Schleswig-Holstein radicals played no role.

The new year of 1863 signaled not only the demise of slavery, but also an end of the Burgfrieden in the United States. The northern Democracy, which had been willing to support a war for the Union, was unwilling to support one for abolition. Interestingly, the same people who had seen slavery as a divisive factor also withheld their support for the “Great Emancipator.”

The conduct of the war and the limits on civil liberties drew criticism from radical Forty-Eighters like Olshausen. Olshausen called Lincoln’s government a “pitiful administration, the country overrun by corruption and fraud, and a miserable war effort.” He had equally harsh words for the Confederates, whom he called “barbarous rebels.” This came, again, from a separatist nationalist who himself had been a rebel only fifteen years earlier.

As a result of his low opinion of Lincoln, which had only increased with the restrictions on freedom of speech and press, Olshausen became active in the political campaigns of 1864. He wanted the Republican party to adopt a radical program. If the party refused such a program, he was in favor of running a third presidential candidate against Lincoln. To foster these views, Olshausen attended the Louisville Freedom Convention of the Slave States in late February.

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42 T Olshausen to Zoe Olshausen, April 18, 1864, reprinted in Olshausen, *Theodor Olshausen*, 206.
1864. In the following months, he sought a radical candidate to challenge Lincoln. The choice was easy, since the radicals had already found their hero in 1861: John C. Frémont. He lauded Frémont as a “noble, educated, and reasonable man,” while casting Lincoln as a narrow-minded, finance political Illinois rural lawyer. In early May, the call went out for a radical nominating convention, separate from the general party convention. The radical Schleswig-Holstein Forty-Eighter was doing the same thing he had done during the first Schleswig-Holstein war, challenging the government during a time of crisis.

The radical Forty-Eighters in Iowa welcomed the call. Like Olshausen, Claussen had been critical of Lincoln’s polices. After their fight in 1861, he and the editor of Der Demokrat had made peace and together opposed Lincoln’s renomination. At a public meeting, which voiced the German opposition to Lincoln’s reelection, Claussen criticized Lincoln’s policies toward Missouri, which he did not explain further, and the non-acceptance of African-American recruits in Kentucky. This Schleswig-Holstein radical also gave Frémont his support. Der Demokrat continued until the election to carry a small notice promoting Frémont. Furthermore, Claussen criticized the Lincoln administration’s patronage, foreign policy, and military policy. Like Olshausen, he had no good words for the president. He characterized Lincoln as a brakemen

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45 T Olshausen to Zoe Olshausen, April 18, 1864, reprinted in Olshausen, Theodor Olshausen, 206.

46 DD February 18, 1864.

47 Marhencke, Hans Reimer Claussen, 332-33.
who had prevented liberty from coming to terms.\footnote{DD February 25, 1864.} United in their opposition to Lincoln, the delegates went to the radical convention in Cleveland intending to nominate another candidate and provide him with a radical program.

State conventions gave their delegates to Cleveland some guiding principles. The radicals in Missouri nominated Olshausen to represent them. The convention convened as the nominating convention of the Radical Democracy.\footnote{Bärner, “A Forty-Eighter Who Retruend,” in \textit{The German Forty-Eighters in the United States}, 99.} The title was ill-advised because many moderate politicians in the United States already viewed the radical Forty-Eighters with suspicion, considering their background in Europe. In Olshausen’s case, that suspicion was not far from the truth.\footnote{Jörg Nagler, \textit{Fremont contra Lincoln: Die deutsch-amerikanische Opposition in der Republikanischen Partei während des amerikanischen Bürgerkrieges} (Frankfurt a.M., Germany: Peter Lang, 1984), 111.} Olshausen was one of many Forty-Eighters present, although, with many non-German delegates also present, this wing was far from being a German opposition group.\footnote{Ibid., 213; Honeck, \textit{We are the Revolutionists}, 164-165.}

The Cleveland Convention agreed to a diverse program that included the restoration of the Union, the suppression of secession, and the end of slavery, insured by a constitutional amendment. However, the delegates also voiced again their criticism of Lincoln’s attack on civil liberties by calling for a guarantee of freedom of speech and press except in areas under martial law. They also wanted to amendment the Constitution by limiting a president to a single term. In response to the French supported monarchical experiment in Mexico, the Radical Democracy supported a vigorous enforcement of the Monroe Doctrine against that un-republican regime. Looking toward the end of the war, the radicals also opposed Lincoln’s Ten Percent Plan and
wanted limits on executive power during reconstruction. Like Congressional radicals, they, too, wanted postwar reunion under the control of Congress.\textsuperscript{52} Having written its platform, the convention then nominated Frémont as its candidate, and waited to see what the Republicans would do in Baltimore, and if they would be able to sustain themselves.

As in Schleswig-Holstein during the war, the moderates quickly checked the radicals. The Republican national convention adopted many of the Cleveland convention’s proposals. Since it was not advisable to split the party in the face of the strong Democratic challenge under George B. McClellan, Frémont reevaluated his position. As a result, the Frémont candidacy lasted only to September. Until then, however, Olshausen was an active supporter, giving speeches in support of the Radical Democracy candidate.\textsuperscript{53} Frémont’s decision to drop out of the race angered many radicals. One letter to the editor denigrated the radicals in Missouri as the “Olshausen Clique.”\textsuperscript{54} As in 1848, the radicals and their unwelcomed challenges were just as despised in the United States as they had been in Schleswig-Holstein.

While Olshausen remained committed to the Frémont nomination until the end, Claussen was quick to explain the failure of the Radical Democracy and the renomination of Lincoln by the Republican party. He blamed the Cleveland convention for nominating Frémont instead of working toward a broader opposition to Lincoln and not selecting any candidate.\textsuperscript{55} Apparently, he, like many others, believed that the strong presence of Germans in Cleveland undermined the movement’s success. \textit{Der Demokrat} even pointed to the hypocrisy of those German immigrants

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\textsuperscript{52} Nagler, \textit{Fremont contra Lincoln}, 215-216; Honeck, \textit{We are the Revolutionists}, 165-167.
\textsuperscript{53} Nagler, \textit{Fremont contra Lincoln}, 234.
\textsuperscript{54} Ibid., 248.
\textsuperscript{55} \textit{DD} October 27, 1864.
\end{flushright}
who had opposed the nomination of Lincoln but than supported him in the election and ridiculed the radical elements of the party.\textsuperscript{56}

The election campaign between Lincoln, who by early September could rely on the fall of Atlanta and Philip H. Sheridan’s successes in the Shenandoah Valley to bolster his campaign, and his Democratic opponent, George B. McClellan, was hard fought. Lincoln carried the nation with a comfortable margin of the popular votes and an even stronger showing in the Electoral College.\textsuperscript{57} With the reelection of Lincoln, Olshausen faced a personal crisis. He despised the president and was unwilling to stay another four years in a country governed by him. In January 1865, Olshausen believed that his time in the United States must come to an end. He informed his family that with the defeat of Frémont had supported since the start, there was nothing left for him in the United States. He sold his newspaper and prepared to return to Europe.\textsuperscript{58} Like many other radicals, Olshausen loved the concept of democracy but when democracy did not work in his favor, he ran or fought the results.

He was not the only Forty-Eighter who longed for a return to Europe. Since 1860, and despite having been given an expanded responsibilities in Washington, Schleiden had been asking for a reassignment to Europe. He had no intentions of dying in the United States,\textsuperscript{59} and he wanted to be closer to his aging mother in Europe. London or Paris was his preferred new post.\textsuperscript{60} Heinrich Smidt was rather supportive of Schleiden’s request but there were no vacancies for him

\textsuperscript{56} Marhencke, \textit{Hans Reimer Claussen}, 338.


\textsuperscript{58} T Olshausen to Zoe Olshausen, January 23, 1865, reprinted in Olshausen, \textit{Theodor Olshausen}, 208.

\textsuperscript{59} Schleiden to Smidt, August 30, 1860, 2-C.4.b.2.h.1, SAB.

\textsuperscript{60} Schleiden to C.H. Merck, November 27, 1863, 7,116-1-2, SAB.
in Europe. The government of Bremen had sent Johannes Rösing to Washington in late 1860 to work as Schleiden’s charge d’affaires and thus prepare for the minister’s eventual departure, but it had no desire to leave the position in Washington vacant.

The only place Schleiden could be reassigned was London. A vacancy had opened up in Paris in 1863, but experience had shown that a Schleswig-Holstein revolutionary would not be welcome at the court of Napoleon III. There was talk of reshuffling the small diplomatic corps of Bremen to allow Schleiden to return to Europe. Bremen even considered assigning Rösing to London and maintaining Schleiden in Washington. Schleiden himself suggested temporarily appointing Rösing to London until the war in the United States was settled, at which point Rösing would take over Schleiden’s position in Washington and Schleiden would assume the minister’s post in London. It would take another year before an opportunity would arise for Schleiden.

During the American Civil War, the three Schleswig-Holsteiner continued what they had done during the first Schleswig-Holstein war. Schleiden continued his diplomatic work by advising Seward especially during the Trent affair. For the most part however, he was occupied

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61 Smidt to Schleiden, February 17, 1860, 2-C.4.b.2.h.1, SAB.
62 Schleiden to C.H. Merck, November 27, 1863, 7,116-1-2; Smidt to Schleiden, November 3, 1860, 2-C.4.b.2.h.1, SAB.
63 Smidt to Curtius, October 10, 1860, 2-C.4.b.2.h.1, SAB.
64 Smidt to Schleiden, October 20, 1860, 2-C.4.b.2.h.1, SAB.
65 Curtius to Smidt, January 27, 1863, 2-C.4.b.2.h.1, SAB.
66 Smidt to Curtius, June 11, 1863, 2-C.4.b.2.h.1, SAB.
with the protection of German citizens and presenting Germans who wanted to fight for the Union to the U.S. government, duties similar to those he had carried out during the first Schleswig-Holstein war. In the western states, the radicals continued their habit of criticizing government policy. As a result of Olshausen criticisms of the Lincoln government, the commanding officer in Missouri threatened to shut down his paper, adding to the Forty-Eighter’s resentment of the government. Olshausen promoted a radical challenge to the government in the presidential election of 1864. Failing in that, he determined to leave the country. In contrast to the resentful Olshausen, Claussen tried to make the best of the situation. Schleiden looked back to Europe for a European assignment, but he did not seek to leave the United States for political reasons.

After a turbulent revolutionary period in Europe, the Schleswig-Holstein rebels had come to the United States seeking a new homes and professional opportunities. They brought with them their old ideological and personal views, which resurfaced when they faced the deteriorating sectional conflict in the United States. The Schleswig-Holstein Forty-Eighters were a unique group; they were not only left leaning politically. They were also separatist-nationalists. However, as they embraced their 1848 legacy, the three men broke with it. Schleiden continued throughout this period to work as a diplomat and promote international peace. At times, as in the Greytown affair or during his Richmond trip of April 1861, he came up against hurdles as high as those faced in the first Schleswig-Holstein war, but and his diplomatic skills and experiences were unable to overcome them. The radicals continued their politic activism by opposing oppression, but they found its most virulent form not in northern challenges to southern rights, which they supported, but in the institution of slavery.
When, in 1860, the southern states determined that they had suffered enough oppression and would not risk further infringement on their constitutional rights by a sectional candidate, they did what Schleswig-Holstein had done in 1848: they started a revolution. In this conflict, the separatist-nationalists from Schleswig-Holstein refused to sympathize with or support the southern secessionists, despite the many similarities between their two movements. Instead, the Schleswig-Holstein Forty-Eighters fought just as hard against the secessionism of the South as they had fought in favor of their own right to secede.

Similar to their roles during the first Schleswig-Holstein war, the radicals challenged the Lincoln government and its policies. Despite the wartime crisis in the North, the radicals believed that no infringement on civil liberties should occur. As these infringements continued, Olshausen joined other dissatisfied radicals in the Republican party to promote John C. Frémont as a challenger in the presidential election.
Chapter Nine

The Second Schleswig-Holstein War and German Unification

Having spent eleven years in the United States, Olshausen, for political, and Schleiden, for personal, reasons returned to Europe at a crucial time in the history of their home country. Few historians who have dealt with the Forty-Eighters have explored their lives in detail, and even fewer have looked at the return migration. Olshausen and Schleiden are not unique in their return to Europe; others, such as Friedrich Kapp, did the same.\textsuperscript{1} Yet, this return migration is an important aspect of the Forty-Eighters’ story, and shows both the continuity of European nationalism and how the immigrants’ years in the United States may have changed them. The separatist, or secessionist, tendencies of the Schleswig-Holstein rebels seemed to diminish during their American sojourn, but had their secessionist tendencies changed, or simply been altered by circumstances in the United States were it largely the circumstance in the United States.

Olshausen and Schleiden had both personal and political reasons for returning to Europe. The Schleswig-Holstein issue had reemerged and caused new controversy in Europe. By November 1864, former revolutionary friends from Europe had reestablished contact and urged Schleiden and other former leaders of the first Schleswig-Holstein war to return and once more support their legitimate prince, Friedrich Christian August von Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-

Augustenburg (the future Herzog Friedrich VIII of Schleswig-Holstein). 2 Olshausen, who had paid close attention to developments in Europe and the reemergence of the Schleswig-Holstein question, had even been invited in December 1863 to return to Europe and assume a position of leadership. 3 In order to better understand the developments in Schleswig-Holstein a historical survey of events after 1852 is in order.

Schleswig-Holstein, immediately after the war, started to case problems again. The Protocol of London of 1852 was supposed to have solved the Schleswig-Holstein question and end the claims by the Augustenburgs. However, the treaty left much to be desired especially in regard to the succession question in the duchies. 4 Immediately, the new Danish constitution ran into opposition in Holstein because King Frederik VII promulgated it without legislative approval. In 1855, another constitution, the Common Constitution, was announced and submitted to the diets for support. 5 Further problems emerged when Denmark tried to impose its currency on the duchies. 6 The duchies, in turn, caused problems of their own.

Increasingly, the German Bund took issue with Danish defiance of the Protocol of London. For Prussia and Austria, it was a national question worth their efforts. 7 As a result, by

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2 Schleiden to Th. Curtius, February 15, 1864, 7,116-2-7, SAB.


5 Ibid., 36-37.

6 Hodges to Clarendon, January 12, 1856, FO 97/135, NAUK.

7 Malet to Clarendon, November 26, 1857, FO 97/137, NAUK.
1856, the threat of a federal execution loomed over Jutland and Dano-German relations. The British believed the duchies had a legitimate grievance and that the new constitution should be abrogated. They also asked the Danes to end their provocative policies in Holstein and avoid a new conflict with the Bund. No one desired for another war. However, since the Schleswig-Holstein question was in part an international one, the British remained involved in the discussions. The tensions in Jutland continued to escalate.

During the summer 1857, the Danish government prepared a new constitution but limited the debate when submitting the document to the Holstein states. This was another infringement on the rights of Holstein. On February 11, 1858, the Bund appointed a commission to look into the concerns voiced by Holstein. Frederik VII, finding himself in a precarious position, pressured by the German Bund to implement the Protocol of London and Danish national demands to incorporate Schleswig, tried to solve some of the problems. On November 6, 1858, he announced a more conciliatory edict, but the Bund misinterpreted the document as a precursor to the incorporation of Schleswig. The old question, which had caused the first Schleswig-Holstein war, had reemerged.

By 1860, the threat to European peace had returned. A commission implemented by the German Bund reported on January 17, 1861 that both the Danish Patent of September 1859 and

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9 Ward to Clarendon, May 28, 1857, FO 97/139, NAUK.
11 Buchanan to Clarendon, August 4, 1857, FO 97/141, NAUK.
13 Ward to Malmesbury, November 17, 1858, FO 97/150, NAUK.
the Finance Law of 1860 were illegal since they lacked the approval of the Holstein diet.\textsuperscript{14} The threat of a federal execution loomed again. The German governments fostered the perception of an imminent conflict.\textsuperscript{15} Denmark was reluctant to accept the terms of the Bund. Compared with the federal execution, convoking the Holstein diet was the lesser of two evils. However, for Denmark’s president of the council of ministers and foreign minister Carl C. Hall, convoking the Holstein estates was comparable to “a sort of tribunal of censure over the Danish Monarchy.” Hall believed incorrectly that the Bund’s demands would mean that every law passed by the Danish Rigsdag would have to be submitted to the Holstein diet. He feared that, “the result of this would be to give to Holstein, and through Holstein to Germany, a power of interference in the affairs of Denmark.”\textsuperscript{16} This was not the intention, but misunderstandings had often prevailed in the contested Dano-German borderland.

While the British and Prussians talked about possible avenues out of the Schleswig-Holstein dilemma,\textsuperscript{17} the Danish king unexpectedly convoked the Holstein diet to meet in an extraordinary session on March 6.\textsuperscript{18} However, the German states were not appeased easily. They had learned their lessons from the first Schleswig-Holstein war, when their weakness had made them susceptible to pressure from the great powers and prevented the accomplishment of national goals. As a result, Schleinitz asked Graf von Usedom, who had been involved in the negotiations at the end of the first Schleswig-Holstein war, to prepare a blueprint for a new


\textsuperscript{17} Graf von Schleinitz to Hermann von Balan, December 5, 1860, \textit{APP}, s. 2, 2:5-7.

conflict. Usedom advised Schleinitz that events should develop as follows: first, the Bund would enact an execution and occupy Holstein; second, Denmark would declare a blockade; and third, lacking a strong navy, German troops would march into Schleswig. By that point, Denmark and the German states would be in a state of war. Usedom argued that it would be best for Denmark to break the Protocol of London of 1852 and allow the German states to blame her for the war. In contrast to 1848, the German states would enter the second Schleswig-Holstein war with a more viable plan and more powerful leaders.

When the Prussian king called on Otto Eduard Leopold von Bismarck-Schönhausen in the fall 1862 to solve the constitutional impasse in Prussia, a dramatic shift in foreign policy occurred. The conservative Junker immediately took the initiative in the Schleswig-Holstein question. In late 1862, Bismarck suggested an abrogation of the Protocol of London and a return to the status quo ante bellum. Not yet ready for war, he wondered how he could use the German Bund to get around Prussia’s obligations under the protocol. With Bismarck, a belligerent spirit had entered the Schleswig-Holstein question.

In 1863, the tensions in the Dano-German relationship escalated. Influenced by Europe’s distraction with the Polish insurrection and its fallout, the Danish king attempted a new constitution that would incorporate Schleswig. Meanwhile, Bismarck was working to recruit Austrian support for an eventual conflict in the duchies. He wanted Austrian troops to be among the first to enter Holstein and so diffuse European concerns, prevent Austria from deserting

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19 Usedom had been involved in the peace negotiations between Prussia and Denmark in 1850. Karl Georg Ludwig Guido Graf von Usedom to Alexander Graf von Schleinitz, May 21, 1861, APP, s. 2, 2:349-359.

20 Promemoria des Auswärtigen Amtes, December 6, 1862, APP, 3:104-105.

21 Promemoria des Auswärtigen Amtes, December 6, 1862, APP, 3:225-29.
Prussia, and avoid a repetition of the first Schleswig-Holstein war.\textsuperscript{22} As a result of this escalation, Denmark attempted to appease the Bund by offering to suspend the normal budget of Holstein if Holstein paid its share of the national debt. Denmark was even willing to grant the Holstein diet more power. Bismarck was non-committal.\textsuperscript{23}

The tensions increased when, on November 15, King Frederick VII of Denmark died and left the proposed constitution to his successor. Initially, it was unclear whether the new constitution had already taken effect. The much bigger problem was that Christian IX had come to the throne through the female line of succession, which was not permitted in the duchies.\textsuperscript{24} The old 1848 questions regarding succession had returned in force.

With the succession question reopened, the Augustenburg pretender laid claim to the throne of the duchies and called on his followers to come to his assistance. From the United States, Schleiden watched the reopening of the Schleswig-Holstein question with growing interest.\textsuperscript{25} In February 1864, he wrote to Hermann von Roggenbach that he was “more in Europe” than with the events in the United States.\textsuperscript{26} Part of the distraction was because of letters, he received from fellow Augustenburg supporters who urged him to return and assist them. Schleiden was torn between his duty to the Hanseatic Cities and his duty to his home.\textsuperscript{27} Initially,

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{22} Karolyi to Rechberg, June 5, 1863, Promemoria des Auswärtigen Amtes, June 27, 1863, \textit{APP}, 3:606-607.
\item \textsuperscript{23} Buchanan to Russell, November 7, 1863, \textit{APP}, 4:119.
\item \textsuperscript{24} Bernstorff to Bismarck, November 16, 1863, \textit{APP}, 4:158-60.
\item \textsuperscript{26} Schleiden to Hermann von Roggenbach, February 4, 1864, Fasc 33, Nachlass Schleiden, SAB.
\item \textsuperscript{27} Schleiden to Th. Curtius, February 15, 1864, 7,116-2-7, SAB.
\end{itemize}
he obtained permission for a leave of absence, but he hoped to be reassigned to London and thus be closer to the events in Jutland.

Knowing their minister’s torn interests, some politicians in the Hanseatic Cities worried that Schleiden was not serious about the London post. Rumors had appeared that he only wanted the position until the duchies had gained their independence and Augustenburg appointed him to London.  

In response, Schleiden told Heinrich Smidt and his supporters in Bremen, “I can only repeat that I have never thought about becoming minister for the duke and even today do not think about it.” Interestingly enough, Schleiden immediately qualified those words by saying that “only the combination of a dual representation of the Hanseatic Cities and Schleswig-Holstein” could alter the situation. Schleiden’s eleven years in Washington had done no damage to his separatist-nationalism. His opposition to southern secessionism had not indicated any change of heart.

As a pacifist, Schleiden faced a dilemma with the possibility of a Dano-German war. He arrived in Europe too late to witness the initial escalation of the conflict. Around Christmas 1863, troops of the Bund had occupied Holstein, and when, on January 1, 1864, the new Danish constitution took effect, the Austrians and Prussians prepared to escalate the conflict. On January 13, Bismarck sent an ultimatum to be delivered by his minister in Denmark, which, if not fulfilled within forty-eight hours, would mean war. The instructions to present the ultimatum came three days later, on January 16. The Dano-German War had started and Austrian and Prussian troops moved into Schleswig.

28 Merck to Smidt, October 24, 1864, 2-C.4.b.2.h.1, SAB.
29 Smidt to Schleiden, November 5, 1864, 2-C.4.b.2.h.1, SAB.
30 Bismarck to Balan, January 13, 1864, APP, 4:427-28.
For Schleiden, the federal execution had already been a regrettable development. He did not say why but it likely related to his pacifist nature. He also was probably concerned that an escalation might bring the European powers into the conflict. Especially Napoleon III and his ambitious plans could especially complicate the Schleswig-Holstein question. It would be important to present a united front, move quickly, and not let opportunities slide as they had done in the first Schleswig-Holstein war. Schleiden hoped that the combined German forces would brush aside the Danish army, as Karl XII of Sweden had done a hundred and fifty years earlier. Success on the battlefield would allow the German states to dictate peace. He had learned from his own experiences and hoped the German states had learned from their own.

The new war might even offer the opportunity to bring about German unification, which had failed in 1848. Schleiden could not help but compare the death of Frederik VII to that of Christian VIII twenty-four years earlier. However, the legacy and mistrust of Prussia was difficult for Schleiden to shake off. He confessed that the “oneness and willingness to sacrifice” might come to nothing because of the “weakness, half-heartedness, and slowness of the Prussians and Austrians.” Yet, Schleiden remained hopeful that the Schleswig-Holstein question might finally be solved and with it, the German question. Even if diplomacy failed, the unity of the German people and their united military power might accomplish things diplomacy could not achieve. Unlike most of his contemporaries, Schleiden believed that a division of Schleswig was the best way to create a permanent peace. Denmark should look toward a union with Norway and

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31 Schleiden to C.H. Merck, November 27, 1863, 7,116-1-2, SAB.

Sweden, resembling the old idea of a Scandinavian union. Schleiden had still hoped for peace, but Bismarck’s politics had made that impossible.

The war progressed swiftly, and despite the legacy of 1848, when the crossing into Jutland had brought international pressure, the Austrians and Prussians prepared for the invasion of Denmark. The invasion was temporarily delayed as the British, much as in 1848, suggested that peace talks to be held in London. With both sides agreeing, British foreign minister Lord John Russell, on April 8, sent a formal invitation to the belligerents. Bismarck delayed the start of the conference by insisting on the participation of the German Bund. His tactic benefitted the German side by giving them a stronger bargaining position following their victory at Düppeln/Dybbøl on April 18.

As in the first Schleswig-Holstein war, the initial goal of the meeting was to agree on a four weeks armistice. The two sides were at first unable to agree on the maritime questions, but on May 4, 1864, Great Britain proposed a new armistice plan, which found Bismarck’s approval and Denmark’s reluctant agreement. Hostilities ceased for four months starting on

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33 Schleiden to Rösing, December 25, 1863, ibid., 93.
34 Karolyi to Bismarck, February 15, 1864, APP, 4:553.
35 Buchanan to Bismarck, February 23, 1864, APP, 4:597.
36 Bismarck to Werther, April 8, 1864, APP, 4:706.
37 Goltz to Bismarck, April 17, 1864, APP, 4:735.
38 Bernstorff to Bismarck, April 25, 1864, APP, 5:32-33.
39 Bernstorff to Bismarck, May 4, 1864, APP, 5:77-78.
40 Bismarck to Bernstorff, May 7, 1864, APP, 5:87.
May 12.\textsuperscript{41} The peace talks could start in earnest. It was at this point that the exiled Schleswig-Holstein nationalists saw their opportunity to push for Augustenburg’s claim.

Like a few other Schleswig-Holsteiners, Schleiden was in London for the conference. Having experienced the betrayal of the Prussians during the previous uprising, Schleiden watched their every step. He continued to believe that only a division of Schleswig would provide a lasting solution to the Schleswig-Holstein question. The contentious problem was where to draw the line.\textsuperscript{42}

Even though he was not in London in any official capacity, Schleiden was in frequent contact with the representative of the German Bund, Beust. Their similar views on Schleswig-Holstein provided common ground. Beust had suggested that the Bund and Austria should immediately recognize Friedrich von Augustenburg as the legitimate ruler of the duchies.\textsuperscript{43} Schleiden was adamant in his support for division of Schleswig and Augustenburg’s claim. His frequent reminders to the government in Bremen were likely intended to have them initiate a plan to achieve this with the German Bund. Schleiden suggested to Beust that he seek instructions for a recognition of Augustenburg’s claim and an agreement on the principal of division. Schleiden was well aware of the European diplomatic problems that played into the negotiations and war in southern Jutland. Schleiden mentioned that an annexation of one or both of the duchies, and thus territorial expansion, would most likely trigger a demand by France for

\textsuperscript{41} Bernstorff to Bismarck, May 9, 1864, \textit{APP}, 5:92-93.

\textsuperscript{42} Schleiden to Smidt, May 19, 1864, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.II, SAB.

\textsuperscript{43} Schleiden to Smidt, May 27, 1864, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.II, SAB.
compensation along the Rhine River, especially in the Saar region.\(^4^4\) However, Schleiden knew that Prussia intended to forestall the Augustenburg succession.\(^4^5\)

While Schleiden was active supporting Augustenburg and the independence of the duchies, Olshausen remained reluctant to become involved. He was still a separatist but also a radical. He had been invited to return to the duchies and take a leadership role among his fellow democrats. However, Olshausen was not sure if he should follow this call from the homeland, since the ends did seem to favor democracy. He informed his brother, “It was clear to me from the start that the thing would take the same path as the events in 1848 had, because the Schleswig-Holstein elite had once more clung to the Duke of Augustenburg and the German princes.” Most importantly, Olshausen believed that “German politics were just obnoxious” to him.\(^4^6\) He admitted that Schleswig-Holstein had little pull on him when he determined to leave the United States. He was unhappy with the prospects of the Augustenburg succession, which was still supported by members of the Schleswig-Holstein expatriate community, but not enough to actively oppose it. In addition, as much as he wished the yoke of Danish rule removed, Prussian-Austrian rule was not much better.\(^4^7\) Despite his opposition to American-style secessionism, Olshausen was still a separatist, and he still stood for the radical views he had espoused on the 1848 uprising.

Schleiden only slowly realized that his diplomatic tactic to cooperate with the representative of the Bund was as misplaced as was the diplomacy of the duchies in the first


\(^4^5\) Schleiden to Smidt, May 31, 1864, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.II, SAB.

\(^4^6\) T Olshausen to J Olshausen, April 18, 1864, reprinted in Olshausen, *Theodor Olshausen*, 205.

\(^4^7\) T Olshausen to Marie Olshausen, January 24, 1865, ibid., 212.
Schleswig-Holstein war. The Bund did not make the decisions in the Schleswig-Holstein question; Bismarck made them. On May 28, the representatives of the Bund proposed the independence of the duchies and the appointment of Augustenburg to rule the duchies. Bismarck replied that Schleswig-Holstein’s independence was acceptable but not the Augustenburg succession. Denmark was not ready to discuss any proposal that took away part of the kingdom. As the negotiations led, the resumption of war seemed likely. Such a fate would make the national desires of the duchies more difficult to achieve.

Despite the two sides agreeing in early June to a two-week extension of the cease-fire, Schleiden knew that negotiations had failed. He had gained enough experience in the Schleswig-Holstein question to know that war and not diplomacy would bring the final settlement. On June 26, the time for talks ran out, and the London Conference had failed to bring about a settlement. Since the diplomatic route had failed, Schleiden, reliving his 1848 experience in Prussia, was at a loss as to where to go next. He thought that the next logical place to assist the Augustenburg candidacy was Paris. However, Karl Friedrich Lucian Samwer, a fellow Augustenburg supporter, discouraged him. There was little Schleiden would be able to do in Paris, he explained. If he still decided to go, Samwer asked Schleiden to impress upon the Prussian minister in Paris, Robert Heinrich Ludwig Graf von der Goltz, that the duke of Augustenburg did not have a negative opinion of Prussia. Schleiden continued the nationalist struggle he had begun fifteen years earlier.

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52 Samwer to Schleiden, June 24, 1864, Fasc 29, CAU.
The resumption of the second Schleswig-Holstein war kept the hopes of the supporters of Augustenburg alive. Continuing his diplomatic work in the nationalist cause, Schleiden went to Gastein to meet with Bismarck. However much alike the circumstances of 1848 and 1861 may have been, he was going up against a politician whom even his diplomatic skills could not sway. His attempt to meet with the Prussian king was forestalled by Bismarck and Albrecht Theodor Emil Graf von Roon, who had incorrectly portrayed Schleiden as a member of the provisional government of 1848.53 Schleiden was impressed with but also concerned about Bismarck. He described the Prussian as a clever and smart man who was also dangerous and careless.54 Schleiden noted that Bismarck had the same character flaw as Seward: “He understands it better to get out of embarrassing situations and to use the mistake of his opponents, instead of avoiding such situations in the first place.”55

After Roon introduced Schleiden to Bismarck, the two had a conversation that lasted over three hours. Bismarck explained his view on the succession question in the duchies and his understanding of the complicated nature of the succession titles. However, with Denmark surrendering the claim to the duchies, the chancellor said, the two German powers would determine the future of the duchies. Bismarck further dismissed the German Bund, arguing that it no longer had a say in the duchies.56 In addition, Schleiden and Bismarck talked about the future of Germany. Bismarck mentioned that he had suggested to Austria a division of the country

53 Schleiden to Oscar Wydenbrugk, August 17, 1864, Fasc 33, CAU; Schleiden to Rösing, September 8, 1864, Rheinromantik and Civil War, 106.

54 Schleiden to Smidt, August 19, 1864, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.II, SAB.

55 Schleiden to Rösing, September 8, 1864, Rheinromantik and Civil War, 107.

56 Schleiden to Oscar Wydenbrugk, August 17, 1864, Fasc 33, CAU; Schleiden to Smidt, August 19, 1864, 2-B.13.b.1.a.2.c.II, Staatsarchiv, Bremen; Schleiden to Rösing, September 8, 1864, Rheinromantik and Civil War, 107.
along the Main River. Schleiden was not happy with that prospect, but did not indicate if he mentioned his disagreement to Bismarck.\(^{57}\) This would be the first but not last time the two men squared off over their visions for the duchies.

Fears that Bismarck might squander the possibility of German victory and possible unification were misplaced.\(^{58}\) The resumption of the Dano-German War was a disaster for Denmark. On July 18, the Danes had to agree to a new armistice. On October 30, 1864, the final peace was ratified. Denmark ceded the three duchies, Schleswig, Holstein, and Lauenburg, to the German Bund. However, with their incorporation, the question of who should govern them arose. As Bismarck indicated in his conversation with Schleiden, the Prussians opposed both an Augustenburg take over and the involvement of the Bund. The Schleswig-Holstein question was far from settled.

Following the peace with Denmark, the Austrians and Prussians agreed in the Convention of Gastein that the two duchies should be administered separately. The “up ewig ungedeelt” nationalism that had brought about the past two conflicts was abrogated in the treaty. Wisely, the Prussians took over Schleswig, the northern duchy, giving the southern duchy of Holstein to the Austrians. The Prussians, due to the disjointed territory, forced the Austrians to allow Prussian troops to cross Holstein freely. Gastein was a major sellout for the Austrians. More than that, Bismarck immediately set to work to isolate the Austrians and prepare for another conflict. This conflict would finally determine the leader of the new Germany.

In the process of escalating the diplomatic relations with Austria, Bismarck relied on the Schleswig-Holstein question. With Prussian pressure mounting, the Austrians turned to the

\(^{57}\) Schleiden to Rösing, September 8, 1864, Rheinromantik and Civil War, 107-108.

\(^{58}\) Schleiden to Rösing, June 17, 1864, ibid., 103.
German Bund. On June 1, 1866, the Austrians asked the Bund to step in and assist in the search for a final settlement of the Schleswig-Holstein question. Bismarck was offended and decided to use the incident to claim that Austria had violated the Convention of Gastein. Prussian troops marched into Holstein. In response to this open hostility by the Prussians, Austria asked for the mobilization of the army of the Bund. The Bund complied. In response, the Prussians on June 14, 1866, declared war on the Bund. Only two years after fighting side by side in the Dano-German War, the Austrians and Prussians engaged in the Austro-Prussian War.

This was not how liberals had envisioned German unification. The north-south division of the German states in the coming war smacked of the recently concluded American Civil War. Many Germans were not ready for a Prussianization of Germany that resembled Italian unification under Comte Camillo Benso de Cavour. Already in the summer 1862, Schleiden noticed that the south German states were not at all interested in having the north German states, or more precisely Prussia, dominate them. “[Ludwig Karl Heinrich Freiherr] von der Pfordten frankly said to me that a determined majority in south Germany and especially in Bavaria was more likely to follow the example of the American slave states and let it come to a war with the north than to subject themselves to Prussian hegemony,” he commented. Nationalism had its limits, and the Schleswig-Holstein nationalist would have agreed with the sentiment of the south Germans, having already experienced the unreliability and self-centeredness of Prussia in 1848.

By the time tensions escalated between Austria and Prussia, Schleiden was in London, having assumed the post of minister to Great Britain. The sentiment in London was that Austria would again give way to Prussia at the last moment, thus preventing war. Despite this sentiment, Schleiden realized that this would be a much larger conflict. Austria was in a difficult position,

and its empire could unravel. The Austrians, Schleiden speculated, might have to buy the loyalty of Hungary at too high a price. What was clear to everyone was that the great powers would not intervene; after all it was a domestic conflict within the German states. That however, did not mean, the British looked favorably on events. Lord Clarendon hated Bismarck. He had called him “a public nuisance which must be abated.” Schleiden’s most difficult and trying moment in regard to the escalation of the German question was still to come.

As the tensions escalated, Prussia demanded that all states pick a side. Faced with the unthinkable, the Hanseatic Cities determined to side with Prussia. Bremen’s usual neutrality was no longer tenable in a divided Germany, where smaller north German states were already losing their independence under Prussian occupation. Bremen’s senate saw but one solution: join Prussia in its fight against Austria and its German allies and thus retain independence. For a proud and once powerful city, this was a bitter pill to swallow.

Based on his many disagreements with the Prussians and Bismarck, Schleiden was angered and shocked when the Hanseatic Cities accepted the Prussian demands. After making his employers aware of his revulsion with Prussia and his inability to work for anyone who sided with them, he urged the cities to resist. He was willing, despite his small private wealth and the expensive London society, to continue his work even if the cities were occupied and thus unable to pay him. He was a loyal nationalist who stood on principle. One can see here how different the new European situation was from the one experienced by Forty-Eighters in the United States.

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60 Schleiden to Smidt, March 5, 1866, 2-C.4.b.2.h.1, SAB.
61 Schleiden to Smidt, April 10, 1866, 2-C.4.b.2.h.1, SAB.
62 Senate to Bürgerschaft, June 29, 1866, 7,116-2-14, SAB.
63 Schleiden to C.H. Merck, June 20, 1866, 7,116-1-2, SAB.
Professionally, Schleiden understood the precarious situation of Bremen. He even supported and justified the city’s decision in his meetings with British officials. However, personally, he was unable to do so. As a result, Schleiden tendered his resignation. He was glad the governments immediately accepted it and granted his pay until the end of the year, making his transition into private life much easier. Some of Schleiden’s friends from the duchies approved his decision. Agreeing with him politically, Samwer was pleased that Schleiden had not compromised his political honor by remaining in London. Friend and foe alike would have to respect him, said Samwer, and Schleiden agreed that Prussia’s politics were immoral and rapist. The idea of a unified Germany with a republican government and an independent Schleswig-Holstein was fading rapidly. Nevertheless, for the separatists from the duchies, personal principles still dominated.

The Austro-Prussian war was swift and decisive. In quick succession, Prussian armies invaded and forced the surrender of Hanover, Saxony, and Hesse-Kassel. The Austrians, left without reliable allies, were attacked in the south by the Italians and quickly invaded by the Prussian armies. On July 3, 1866, the Prussians won the Battle of Königsgrätz/Sadowa. Austria was defeated and, while not surrendering any territory to Prussia, had to accept that Prussia was in control of Germany’s destiny.

Following the conclusion of the Austro-Prussian War, Bismarck set to work on German unification. He consolidated the German states, except for Baden, Württemberg, and Bavaria, in the North German Confederation. Despite the long cherished liberal goal of unification, and with

64 Schleiden to Geffken, July 3, 1866, 7,116-2-6, SAB.
65 Schleiden to C.H. Merck, July 19, 1866, 7,116-1-2, SAB.
66 Schleiden to H. Smidt, July 1, 1866, 7,116-2-3, SAB.
many liberals jumping on the Bismarckian bandwagon, Schleiden remained skeptical. He wondered if the approach used by Bismarck was the right one. Loyalty toward the individual states was strong and a Prussian domination not desired. Schleiden had always disagreed with the use of war for the purpose of unification, although he favored the revolutionary creation of a new German state. He found himself in a position similar to that of the southern states after Lincoln’s election. Should he support the union of Germany, or stand on the principles of liberalism and the independence of the duchies against unification.

Others faced similar questions. For the radical Olshausen, German unification under a monarchical principle was unacceptable. Nevertheless, Olshausen was again thinking about politics. He confessed to his brother that he would have liked to sit in the new North German parliament, but he had little interest in taking up residence in Holstein, and thus losing his U.S. citizenship. Nevertheless, Olshausen paid close attention to the first democratic election in Germany. He had critical words for some of his fellow former revolutionaries, including Schleiden. He was and remained the radical. Olshausen would unfortunately never witness the unification of Germany. After returning to Europe, he suffered severe health problems. On March 31, 1869, he died in Hamburg from the effects of a stroke. Schleswig-Holstein had lost an important radical supporter.

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68 Schleiden to Rösing, August 28, 1862, ibid., 14.


70 T Olshausen to J Olshausen, February 19, 1867, ibid., 259.

Schleiden was ready to take on a new challenge and built on his parliamentary experience from the Frankfurt Vor-Parlament. Having many contacts in the United States, he would have returned to North America in a heartbeat, but his aging mother kept him in Europe. Public service still attracted Schleiden, even if he was uncertain of what direction Prussia would take in the coming years. He was still not reconciled to the way in which the North German Confederation had come about, and the incompleteness of German unification, but he hoped to work in some capacity for the new entity.\(^{72}\)

In the end, his German nationalism won out, as he looked to his homeland for a possibility to serve in the North German parliament. He soon made contact with a party in Schleswig-Holstein that wished to nominate him for a parliamentary district, but they first had to oust the previous candidate. Peter Wilhelm Forchhammer cautioned that Schleiden should not raise his hopes too high. Some voters had already told Forchhammer that they would not vote for Schleiden. Regardless, Schleiden had the support of the merchant, artisan, and burgher groups of Altona, who asked, through the party, that he come immediately to Altona and present himself to the voters. Forchhammer corrected Schleiden’s misunderstanding that the party program had supported the implementation of the 1849 constitution by explaining that the party stood for strength in foreign policy and freedom at home.\(^{73}\)

While Schleiden had parliamentary experience, seeking an elected position was a new experience for him. For the first time, he had to appeal directly to the voters. In February 1867, he gave a campaign speech, probably his first one, in Altona. The speech clearly indicated his nationalist hopes for Schleswig-Holstein. Schleiden emphasized that the new North German

\(^{72}\) Schleiden to Rösing, July 24, 1866, Rheinromantik and Civil War, 164-166.

\(^{73}\) Forchhammer to Schleiden, January 29, 1867, Fasc 27, CAU.
Confederation could only be a temporary solution, and that, because Prussia regarded it as a replacement for the old German Bund, the southern German states would eventually have to be brought into the new entity. Aware that a strong military would be necessary to uphold the confederation, Schleiden emphasized that the new German parliament must have the same power in budget questions as the Prussian diet. He was not hopeful, however, that Prussia would allow such a limitation after the constitutional crisis of the early 1860s.\(^{74}\)

Schleiden had stronger words for what the Prussians had done to Schleswig-Holstein. He called the integration of the duchies into the Prussian state illegal. The people should at least have been asked their wishes in the matter, he insisted. Even worse was what had been done to Augustenburg, who for such a long time had been accepted as the representatives of the duchies. Despite an acknowledgement of Augustenburg’s rights, Prussia had “shuffled him aside.” Adding insult to injury, the Prussians had granted a foreign prince of the Oldenburg line a substantial piece of the duchies. Yet, despite his outrage, Schleiden urged his fellow Holsteiners to pay the same respect to the new monarch that they had granted the old.\(^{75}\) Despite being a separatist, anti-Prussian, and loyal to Augustenburg, he was also a loyal and law-abiding subject.

While Prussian rule was not desirable, Schleiden continued, the prosperity in Prussia gave hope for a better future. After all, Prussian rule and constitutional rights were far superior to those of Denmark, and notably better than those granted by Denmark in the 1854 constitution. He promised to keep the legal wrongs done to the duchies before the people and use every

\(^{74}\) February 9, 1867, Hamburger Correspondent, No 35, Fasc 14, CAU.

\(^{75}\) Ibid.
opportunity in parliament to do the same, but he also trusted that Prussia would improve the political situation in the duchies.\textsuperscript{76}

Finally, Schleiden remained as independent minded, as he had been all his life. He concluded his speech by saying that he would be proud to represent a district of his homeland, but that he would only seek office if the voters fully agreed with his views. They should trust him to keep his promises but not question the means he might use to achieve them. His strong-willed, direct way of speaking drew the applause of the 3,000 to 4,000 attendees. His party considered the rally a success, especially since Schleiden had been largely unknown before giving his speech.\textsuperscript{77}

Schleiden’s revolutionary past clouded the start of his parliamentary career. In the February 13, 1867 election, he received 3,587 out of 6,175 votes cast.\textsuperscript{78} Even five months after the election, his victory had not been officially confirmed. Amid rumors that the authorities intended to prevent him from receiving his appointment, he turned down the offer of a temporary position, for fear of giving the impression that he accepted the suspension of Altona’s election rights. Schleiden wondered if he had made the right decision to seek office, although now that he had been elected, he would not rest until he had served the people who had voted for him.\textsuperscript{79} After six months of waiting, Schleiden was confirmed.\textsuperscript{80} Legality still mattered more to Schleiden than mere victory.

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{77} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{78} February 13, 1867, p 285, book 21, LBSH.

\textsuperscript{79} Schleiden to Rösing, August 23, 1868, \textit{Rheinromantik and Civil War}, 182.

\textsuperscript{80} Schleiden to Rösing, November 22, 1868, ibid., 184.
Schleiden was never shy about standing up for his principles and especially not if those principles were to protect the duchies in the north. He soon showed his “natural” spirit when, in 1867, he spoke for the first time in the North German Parliament. Taking issue with criticisms made by the president of the Bundes-Commissarien of the Augustenburg faction in the duchies, he challenged, “If the president of the Bundes-Commissarien, or if any other member of the assembly, at any time wishes to provoke me by making attacks against the land, in whose name I am standing here, or the noble prince, in whom the land until recently had vested and recognized the rights of legitimate rule, than they will find me at any time ready, to assume the defense, based on unquestionable facts and documents.” The exchange concerned events during the Dano-German War, and Schleiden still found it hard to hide his strong opposition to the annexation of territory by Prussia following the war with Austria.81 He was still a separatist nationalist.

Schleiden’s liberal view appeared a few times during the debates concerning the new constitution of the North German Confederation. He was critical of the different titles used to refer to the King of Prussia in his capacity of leader of the North German Confederation. He also desired the integration of the states of south Germany.82 In another instance, Schleiden took issue with the word “colonization,” and wondered if it referred only to the establishment of coaling stations, or to the creation of colonies. He asked the commissioner of the Prussian government, whose constitution also had a reference to colonies, if there was a concrete plan by the Prussians to establish German colonies overseas. If no colonization projects were intended, than the word “colonies” could be erased from the document. The Prussian official confirmed that only naval

81 Bund 1867, 1:159
82 Bund 1867, 1:159-160
stations had been intended for the time being, though in the future that might change. These were the easier and less controversial challenges Schleiden would present.

More important was the protection of the regional interests of Schleswig-Holstein. Schleiden was aware that the economic prosperity of Altona had decreased since the Prussian takeover, and that there was a danger the city would become a mere suburb of Hamburg. Like the Hanseatic Cities, Altona was a free port (with no or very small tariffs to encourage transshipment), but unlike those three cities, Altona was under pressure to join the German Zollverein. That would be a mistake, said Schleiden. He explained that Altona and Hamburg were located so close to each other that one hardly noticed where one of them started and the other ended. Their intimate connection was also represented in their united tariffs and ports, so that making Altona part of the Zollverein would create an impossible situation. Preventing the easy exchange of goods between the cities would be impossible, and patrolling a tariff border posed an insurmountable challenge. In the following years, Schleiden continued his defense of the tariff freedom of Altona.

Schleiden’s most important contribution during his first term as representative came on October 16, 1867, when he submitted a petition from former Schleswig-Holstein officers for pensions. Their request was grounded, Schleiden explained, in the acceptance of the Schleswig-Holstein government by the Bund. The service of these veterans, he insisted, should be rewarded, not punished. As the successor of the Bund, the North German Confederation should honor the pensions of these devoted officers.

83 *Bund* 1867, 1:271

84 Schleiden to Rösing, November 22, 1868, *Rheinromantik and Civil War*, 189.

85 *Bund* 1867, 1:492

86 *Bund* 1868, 1:576
Bismarck became involved in the debate by answering Schleiden directly noting that the Prussian government had once supported the proposition of paying pensions to its officers, but that the Bund had not. He then raised the question of whether the obligation to take care of the officers rested with the North German Confederation or with Prussia, since Holstein belonged to Prussia. Personally, Bismarck sided with the military authorities of Prussia on the question and not with the finance minister. Other representatives, voicing their opinions, supported the notion that the officers should receive a pension regardless of who financed it. Schleiden was given the last word, and he used it primarily to defend himself against Bismarck’s accusation that he had misquoted him in the debates. It was finally decided that the North German Confederation would pay the pensions of the former Schleswig-Holstein officers.87 Schleiden had won two major concessions for the duchies.

The next year, Schleiden, most likely due to his long tenure as minister resident in the United States, was the co-sponsor of a treaty between Prussia and the United States concerning immigration and citizenship. The issue had caused many controversies over the years because of disagreements between Prussia and the United States about the terms of citizenship. Could, for example, Prussian subjects who had not fulfilled their military obligations to the state be given U.S. citizenship? Schleiden could rely on his extensive diplomatic background and work in the United States to assess the treaty, after going over every article and pointing out its strengths and weaknesses, he recommended ratification. Bismarck immediately objected to Schleiden’s negative comments and confronted him in debate to say they were unnecessary. Schleiden let

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87 *Bund* 1867, 3:434-437
this “seitenhieb,” or gibe, pass without comment. Their disagreement did not stand in the way of ratifying the treaty.  

In the next session, Schleiden once more defended the officers of the first Schleswig-Holstein war, which would become a signature issue for him throughout his legislative career. He became the reporting member of the committee of pensions for Schleswig-Holstein officers. After some lengthy debate, he was displeased when the parliament rejected the suggestions made by the committee. He again urged the parliament to consider the desertion by Prussia in 1848, which still clearly angered him. Speaking as a nationalist, Schleiden told the representatives that the people of Schleswig-Holstein were already dissatisfied, by their union with Prussia, and that to refuse the pension amendments would only increase that discontent.

The debate continued when representative Karl Twesten offered a lengthy rebuttal that dismissed the need for the Prussians or any other German state to compensate officers who had served a failed revolution. Of course, Twesten was aware of the destitute condition of many of the officers and their urgent need for assistance. He also understood that the situation of veterans of the recent wars against Denmark and Austria was different from those who had fought in 1848. The latter, having formed to repel an enemy on very short notice, would have some of the burdens of the Olmütz dictate lifted from their shoulders with the pension. There was, however, the problem of honoring the promise made by a failed revolutionary body. Twesten noted that the United States was unlikely to keep any promises made by the Confederate government to its

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88 Bund 1868, 1:40-46
89 Bund 1868, 1:234
90 Bund 1868, 1:244-245
citizens. In the same way, the Danish monarchy was under no obligation to maintain the laws and promises made by the governments of the duchies during the revolution.91

In referring to the similarities between the Schleswig-Holstein experience and that of the Confederate states, Twesten’s analogy was not far-fetched. However, to compare the former revolutionaries and their glorious cause in Schleswig-Holstein with the dehumanizing slave-holder cause of the Confederacy was offensive to Schleiden, and he quickly opposed that particular line of Twesten’s speech. Schleiden emphasized that the Statthalterschaft was an internationally recognized government, although he did not say recognized by whom. Certainly not by the most important powers of Europe. In contrast, no international power had recognized the Confederacy, he said. Then, returning to the main question, Schleiden urged support for the suggestions made by the commission,92 which were finally accepted a few days later.93

The following year, Schleiden again raised the question of pensions. Having been told that the pension payments had stopped, he asked Robert Viktor von Puttkamer for an explanation. The representative of the government explained that there had, indeed, been some irregularities, but that they were not due to an unwillingness to pay.94 A year later, Schleiden and Puttkamer engaged in another exchange over the amount of money being paid and the different classifications between the officers of the Bund and those of the army of Schleswig-Holstein. In contrast to the more personal debate between Bismarck and Schleiden, Puttkamer and Schleiden concentrated on the facts, which involved adding another category to the officer pension system and agreeing on the amount of money to be paid to the widows and orphans of officers. The

91 Bund 1868, 1:245-246
92 Bund 1868, 1:248-249
93 Bund 1868, 1:271-272
94 Bund 1869, 2:940
proposal made by Schleiden and Lorentzen was debated by the parliament despite Puttkamer’s concerns.95

All such issues further aroused Schleiden’s anti-Prussian feelings. The more he experienced the operation of the Prussian state, the more he found in it to criticize, and the more his desire for change grew. He was realistic enough to understand that such a change would take a long time, but the Prussian takeover of the duchies, their integration into the Prussian state, and the establishment of Prussian law in the states irritated him. He complained that the Prussians were so set on forcing their system on all new provinces that they never realized that good laws and institutions were eliminated in favor of less useful Prussian ones. Even more, Prussia was unwilling to grant independence or autonomy to the duchies. The only positive change had been the separation of the justice system from the administration of the land.96 Schleiden now leveled the criticisms that had been leveled against Denmark against Prussia, he apparently did not think about another comparison, the southern states of the United States, which suffered a similar fate during this period.

However, many internal problems the North German Confederation may have suffered, the unification of Germany was still incomplete. Bismarck was again beating the war drums, this time by directing the energy of the German nation against France. Pacifist Schleiden was not happy about a potential war with France, but the major question was how would the great powers react to such a conflict?97 In early 1867, a Franco-German conflict was narrowly averted when Bismarck indicated to Napoleon III that he would not oppose the French seizing of Luxemburg

95 Bund 1870, 1:37-39
96 Schleiden to Rösing, November 22, 1868, Rheinromantik and Civil War, 187.
97 Schleiden to Rösing, November 22, 1868, ibid., 188.
but then changed his mind and opposed the acquisition. However, while not ready for war in 1867, Bismarck was ready in 1870, when a new opportunity emerged.

When a vacancy occurred on the Spanish throne, Bismarck promoted the candidacy of Leopold Stefan Karl Anton Gustav Eduard Tassilo von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen. The Hohenzollern had initially refused to accept the volatile Spanish throne, but Bismarck pushed him to reconsider. Bismarck’s plan to present Europe with a \textit{fait accompli} was dashed when news of the Hohenzollern candidacy leaked out. Napoleon immediately acted but made a strategic mistake. The French insisted on a declaration that the Hohenzollerns would not again seek the Spanish throne. The progression of events allowed Bismarck to turn the intended humiliation of Prussia into a humiliation of France. The French emperor had little choice but to declare war on July 15, 1870. After less than a year of fighting, during which the French overthrew the empire and declared the Third Republic, France had to surrender. Bismarck used the opportunity to bring the German princes together at Versailles and announce, on January 18, 1871, the creation of the German Reich under Kaiser Wilhelm I. The dream of German nationalists was achieved.

As member of the new Reichstag, Schleiden continued to support the policies that he had already been involved with in the North German parliament. When the question of Altona and the Zollverein once again emerged in 1872, he protested that Altona’s proximity to Hamburg would make it uncompetitive if new tariffs were forced on the city. As things stood, Altona had an advantage over Hamburg with a slightly lower import duty and better accommodations for unloading the ships. Schleiden blamed Prussia for not having maintained and fostered that advantage. The incorporation of Schleswig-Holstein, he explained, had imposed some ancient Prussian laws on the duchies that significantly undermined Altona’s position. As a result,
Schleiden opposed a suggestion that all import duties in Hamburg be abolished.\textsuperscript{98} Even with unification complete, Schleiden still maintained his anti-Prussian attitude and protected the national interests of the duchies.

In the German Empire, politics started to change, and Schleiden’s national liberal views had to make way for new political ideologies. In 1873, he returned to Altona and gave a series of campaign speeches in his reelection bid. Under pressure from the Social Democrats, he faced a meeting of some 4,000 hostile voters. He described them as noisy and uncontrolled. It was impossible for him to speak. He threatened to leave, but the crowd still abused him, leading Schleiden to say they were unwilling to hear the truth. As usual during public meetings, the voters elected a “Bureau” to manage the meeting. Schleiden refused what he perceived as intolerable oversight and left. With the representative’s departure, the meeting was officially over, and the chief of police dispersed the crowd. Schleiden wondered if he should bother to seek reelection.\textsuperscript{99} His political views and style of politics were no longer working in a Germany dominated by social issues that had little in common with liberal nationalism.

Friends convinced him to continue his reelection bid, but the campaign did not end well for Schleiden. He was defeated by a Social Democrat, 11,658 to 8,300 votes. Despite the loss, Schleiden claimed that he was glad to return to retirement.\textsuperscript{100} Yet, even with his political career over, he had not said the last word in his fight for Schleswig-Holstein.

While Olshausen and Schleiden had seemingly lost their enthusiasm for separatist causes, those old passions were rekindled upon their return to Europe. The call of the duchies and its

\textsuperscript{98} Reichstag 1872, 2:643.

\textsuperscript{99} Schleiden to Rösing, July 7, 1873, \textit{Rheinromantik and Civil War}, 196, Schleiden also recorded the incident in his diary: July 1, 1873, p 19-20, book 25, LBSH.

\textsuperscript{100} Schleiden to Rösing, January 15, 1874, \textit{Rheinromantik and Civil War}, 200-201.
ruler was too strong for Schleiden to ignore. He returned to Europe and immediately reassumed his old diplomatic role in fostering the interests of the duchies and Augustenburg. Much as in 1848, when he came up against the interests of the great powers, he found that Bismarck’s long-term schemes for Prussian greatness did not include a compromise on the Schleswig-Holstein question. Despite the many setbacks suffered and the exchange of Prussian autocracy for Danish rule, Schleiden remained loyal to the cause he had fought for in 1848. He aimed to protect the interests of the duchies and the men who had fought bravely during that conflict. Schleiden maintained his anti-Prussian and pacifist feelings even when the wars of Germany unification achieved their goal. While Schleiden continued to oppose any attempt to connect the failed Schleswig-Holstein uprising of 1848 to the southern Confederacy, Prussian rule in the duchies during the 1860s strongly resembled the Reconstruction governments imposed upon the postbellum South. In contrast to the active Schleiden, Olshausen’s return had not brought renewed labors on behalf of the duchies. However, he continued to stand by his radical democratic principles and, despite wanting the independence of Schleswig-Holstein, he would not support the monarchical pretender of Augustenburg. Olshausen and Schleiden had come full circle, their hiatus from the Schleswig-Holstein question having done their separatist-nationalism and political ideologies no harm.
Chapter Ten
Memory and Memoirs

After observing the separatist nationalists from Schleswig-Holstein through their Atlantic world migration and revolutionary, nationalist, separatist experiences, there remains one final aspect to consider in connecting the two separatist movements in Jutland and North America. Since both movements ended in failure at the hands of failed diplomacy and superior military forces, and since the oppression they had intended to end returned in slightly altered form, the leaders of the two movements engaged in one final battle to save their causes from historical obliteration. Like the arguments used against their respective oppressors, attempts to safeguard their historical legacies brought many shared commonalities.

The writings of the Schleswig-Holstein nationalists can be grouped into three waves, which will be discussed in sequence below. Some early writings concerning the duchies and the role of certain participants appeared while the battles of the first Schleswig-Holstein war were still on going. Another outburst of analysis and explanations came around the time of the second Schleswig-Holstein war. A third and final wave appeared as the participants grew older and wished to correct misconceptions about their cause or the roles they had played in the fight.

In the direct aftermath of the 1848 uprising, many participants wrote about their experiences. Many used their published memoirs or diaries to vindicate themselves and their cause. Schleiden took a special interest in these works. One of the earliest publications to catch his attention was the diary of Jacob Venedey. Schleiden lauded the good intentions of the author, but also took note of his “intellectual limitations” and “blind and inhibited” narrative. Schleiden disagreed with some of Venedey’s assessments of prominent rebels, and took particular offense at how Venedey talked about him. He never confronted Venedey about the errors, and instead
confessed to his own diary that he found the text amusing.¹ Venedey’s diary was only one of many works published during or shortly after the first Schleswig-Holstein war.

As in the Confederacy in the United States, where from the start of 1861, publications appeared to justify secession, so, too, did Schleswig-Holsteiners, the Danes, and the Germans attempt to justify their roles in the first Schleswig-Holstein war. The German perspective is particularly interesting because it came closest to duplicating the Southern experience. The writings of Wilhem Beseler and Christian Bunsen are representative. Wilhelm Beseler had been a member of the provisional government of the duchies in 1848 and again shared power during the Statthalterschaft. When Denmark refused to grant Beseler amnesty, he went into exile in the Duchy of Brunswick. Christian Freiherr von Bunsen was the Prussian representative in London from 1841 to 1854. He had been appointed to lead the negotiations by both Prussia and the authorities in Frankfurt. As a result, Beseler and Bunsen came at the Schleswig-Holstein question from different directions but with similar arguments.

Bunsen was the first of the two to publish. His Denkschrift über die verfassungsmässigen Rechte der Herzogthümer Schleswig und Holstein appeared shortly after the uprising started. The work came out first in English and shortly after in German translation. It had been intended originally to explain the Schleswig-Holstein question to the British foreign minister Lord Palmerston. Bunsen differentiated between the succession question and the constitutional relationship between the duchies and Denmark. Delineating the relationships between the duchies and the one between Schleswig-Holstein and Denmark, he concluded that the Danes had been in the wrong when it came to the Schleswig-Holstein question. They had undermined the rights of the duchies, which were independent from Denmark. Furthermore, Bunsen insisted that

the duchies were “indissolubly connected,” and that if the parts of Schleswig, that had been
governed by the Gottrop line opposed a female line of succession, they had a right to do so.
While Bunsen claimed impartiality, the work smacked clearly of German nationalism.²

The exiled Wilhelm Beseler introduced his 1856 work by saying that he intended to
clarify some of the misunderstandings that existed in the German states. He started with the
premise that the duchies in 1848 fought for their “freedom and independence,” and in describing
their subsequent struggle, he lifted Uwe Jens Lornsen, Theodor Olshausen, and Friedrich Graf
von Reventlou to hero status. In explaining the lead up to the events of 1848, Beseler condemned
the Danes for undermining the duchies’ legal and political independence. He also made clear that
all aggression was clearly on the Danish side, which had called for military measures well before
1848 to force obedience in the duchies. Beseler illustrated that the uprising had been in defense
of the rights of the duchies. He wrote bitterly about the withdrawal from Jutland in 1848 and
Prussia’s desertion, although he remained hopeful that Germany would overcome the defeat of
1851 and stand up once more for the duchies.³

The years following the uprisings saw little activity on the propaganda front. However,
when the Schleswig-Holstein question reappeared in its full ugliness in late 1863, a literal deluge
of new justifications appeared, constituting the second wave of polemics. Many of them centered
on the Protocol of London of 1852 and the succession question. Some prominent and already
familiar Schleswig-Holsteiners engaged in this new debate.

² Christian Carl Josias Freiherr von Bunsen, Denkschrift über die verfassungsmässigen
Rechte der Herzogthümer Schleswig und Holstein (Berlin, Germany: Verlag der Deckerschen
Geheimen Ober-Hofbuchdruckerei, 1848); Memoir of the Constitutional Rights of the Duchies of

³ Wilhelm Beseler, Zur Schleswig-Holsteinischen Sache im August 1856 (Braunschweig,
Germany: C. A. Schwetschke und Sohn, 1856).
Georg Beseler, the younger brother of Wilhelm Beseler, argued that a detailed examination of the protocol was long overdue. He concluded that the protocol was worthless because it had not made the claims of Christian of Glücksburg universally accepted, and because the German Bund, the duchies, and the other pretenders were not included in the agreement. Even worse, and making the protocol completely unsustainable, was the fact that it forced the Austrians and Prussians to break with much older treaties. Of course, there was no question in Beseler’s mind that, regardless of its legality, Denmark had violated the protocol and would have to suffer the consequences.4

In a second defense of the German position, Georg Beseler believed that the guarantee Great Britain and France gave to the Danish monarchy in 1720 had to shown that the British had no legal claim to intervene in the question of who should be the next ruler of the duchies. The guarantee, according to Beseler, extended only to that part of Schleswig occupied in 1713, further insisting that the old succession laws, outside of the Gottrop parts of Schleswig then occupied, should remain in place. The guarantee, he claimed, had no legal basis, the treaties of 1767 and 1773 having superseded it. While Beseler tried to keep the British and French out of the renewed conflict, he did emphasize that the duchies were historically united and should remain so.5

Others followed Beseler’s lead in condemning the 1852 agreement. Karl Lorentzen took a slightly different approach, starting with the premise that the only long-term peaceful solution to the relationship between the duchies and Denmark was the complete separation of the two. He


called the helstat foundation of Denmark outdated and rotten to the core. While not as anti-
Danish as Beseler, Lorentzen noted that the idea of a Danish expansion all the way to the Eider,
thus incorporating all of Schleswig, was unacceptable. He suggested that Denmark should seek a
closer relationship with the other Scandinavian countries.  

Friedrich Mommsen’s work on the protocol took the character of an appeal. He too
denied that the protocol had created or recreated any legitimate relationship between the duchies
and Denmark. He called on the German Bund to uphold the rights of the duchies and their
legitimate ruler, who was not the Danish king.  

Mommsen denied the Glücksburgs’ claim to the
Danish throne and thus the duchies. Others tackled the succession question as well. Some even
made outrageous claims on behalf of the Hohenzollern or other Oldenburg dynasties.

Following the Dano-German War and the events leading up to German unification, the
participants in the 1848 uprising entered the last stretches of their lives. Many determined, in
looking back on those turbulent times, to write memoirs or autobiographies to justify and explain
their actions. Others determined to write histories of Schleswig-Holstein to explain the duchies’
unique historical status. Many Schleswig-Holstein nationalists did not publish their memoirs and

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7 Friedrich Mommsen, Die Nichtigkeit des Londoner Vertrages (Göttingen, Germany: Bandenhock und Ruprecht’s Verlag, 1863).

8 Ernst Pelwing, Preussen und die Schleswig-Holsteinische Staats-Erbfolge: Eine polemische Erörterung (Berlin, Germany: A. Bath, 1865); A. von Warnstedt, Die Oldenburger und Brandenburger Erbansprüche auf die Herzogthümer Schleswig-Holstein (Hanover, Germany: Schmorl und von Seefeldt, 1865); Staats- und Erbrecht der Herzogthümer Schleswig-Holstein (Hanover, Germany: Schmorl und von Seefeldt, 1864); Dr. Zachariä, Staatsrechtliches Votum über die Schleswig-Holstein’sche Successionsfrage und das Recht des Augustenburgischen Hauses (Göttingen, Germany: Dieterich’schen Buchhandlung, 1863).
histories of the conflict until the 1890s, but, as seen with Schleiden during his time in parliament, the intervening years had not dulled their memoires or lessened their zeal.

In 1896, Werner Frölich published a history of the duchies up to the Treaty of Vienna of 1864. Aware that few people knew about the history of the duchies, Frölich placed the conflict of 1848, which he described as a justified war for independence, in the context of a long series of struggles for freedom and independence against an oppressive Denmark. Searching for blame outside of the duchies, he found it in the weakness of the German Bund, which was unable to support the duchies adequately in their fight. He used strong language when describing the suffering of Schleswig under Danish rule in the thirteen years before 1864, and he celebrated the duchies’ liberation. He blamed the Danes for losing the war, the peace, and, as a result, the duchies.\(^9\) While his revision of events was clearly anti-Danish, the author was not as critical of the Prussians as some Schleswig-Holstein nationalists would have been.

Karl Jansen wrote a more narrowly defined history that dealt with the “liberation” of Schleswig-Holstein. The book’s agenda was clear from the first page, where the dedication to Friedrich of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg appeared. Karl Samwer, who had edited the work posthumously, added in his foreword that the duchies had always given their support to the duke of Augustenburg. The duke was not to blame for the situation in the duchies. Samwer sounded as though he not only supported the close ties between the duchies and Germany, but also supported their incorporation into Prussia. He seemed to have adjusted his opinion during the thirty years since the second Schleswig-Holstein war. The work implied that the defeat in 1851 and the Protocol of London were equivalent to a military occupation, from which the duchies needed to be liberated. Similarly, the events of 1863 and 1864 were described

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as another struggle for liberation from Danish oppression. The entire work provided a favorable view of Prussia, and so fit the spirit of the times.

By the last two decades of the nineteenth century, Schleiden was no newcomer to the writing of historical polemics. Already during the fighting, he had begun annotating a collection of documents related to the Schleswig-Holstein crisis in order to justify the duchies’ cause. The first volume of this compilation, the so-called Aktenstücke, came out in 1851, and dealt specifically with the recent end of the Statthalterschaft. It provided all the relevant and available documents on the issue. At the appropriate places, Schleiden defended men, such as Beseler, who had been criticized for resigning. He also stressed that the government of the duchies had done everything that was expected of it, unlike the Danes. The work was clearly intended as a defense, and as such, considered dangerous by the censors. Schleiden was proud that the work was banned in Austria. In the rest of the German states, the book was a success. He claimed that 500 to 600 copies had been sold in Hamburg and the duchies alone, where the Aktenstücke was strangely not prohibited.

In 1852, he published two more volumes of the Aktenstücke. These books dealt with the work of the provisional government and its diplomacy up to the Malmö ceasefire. Again the purpose was clear, a defense of the duchies’ policy. Schleiden had intended to edit and compile a fourth and fifth volume, which unfortunately never saw the light of day, although they exist in

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12 August 26, 1851, p 42, book 14, LBSH.
manuscript form.\textsuperscript{13} When Schleiden started to write his memoirs in the early to mid-1880s, he would fall back on these document collections for the historical context of his personal experiences.

Even so, Schleiden had not reconciled himself to the defeat of the Schleswig-Holstein nationalist movement. At the time, new work on the history of Germany had started to appear, much of it written by Bismarck apologists like Heinrich von Sybel and Heinrich von Treitschke. Both their works emphasized a direct line between Friedrich the Great, who made Prussia a powerful state, and the achievements of Otto von Bismarck, whose unification of Germany built on those accomplishments. Treitschke, in particular, explained the unification of Germany by the Prussians in historical terms, and thus legitimized Bismarck political work. The main thrust of this interpretation, which in the historiography of the United States would become known as Whiggish history, was that events culminated naturally in a Prussian-created unification.\textsuperscript{14} In a similar fashion, Sybel downplayed the liberal experiment of 1848 as misguided. For Treitschke, German unification under Prussia was a natural progression of history, and the creation of a Prussian-Germany made the new country superior to its neighbors, not only militarily, but also culturally.\textsuperscript{15}

Schleiden does not clearly state the purpose of his memoir, but his criticism of Sybel and others indicates that Schleiden wished to correct the historical legacy of the Schleswig-Holstein

\textsuperscript{13} October 19, 1851, p 53, book 14, LBSH.

\textsuperscript{14} Heinrich von Treitschke, \textit{Deutsche Geschichte im Neunzehnten Jahrhundert} (Leipzig, Germany: Verlag von S. Hirzel, 1886).

\textsuperscript{15} Heinrich von Sybel, \textit{Die Begründung des Deutschen Reiches durch Wilhelm I} (Munich, Germany: Verlag von R. Oldenbourg, 1890).
movement and his role in the uprising.\textsuperscript{16} While the first two of the four-volume set are largely about Schleiden’s family and personal history, he frequently tied the history of Schleswig-Holstein to his own life.

Few family documents have survived to verify Schleiden’s account before 1848. He destroyed all the letters of his mother. In addition, the family correspondence and his first eleven diaries are lost as well. Corroborating evidence suggests that Schleiden was fairly thorough in his research and likely used these lost materials in his writing. However, he also, and unsurprisingly for an autobiographical account, made some cosmetic changes. For example, the Victorian moral standards of the time did not allow Schleiden to mention the promiscuity of his grandmother, Wilhelmina von Nuys.\textsuperscript{17} He more clearly referred to his diaries, correspondence, and other materials in writing about the post-1847 period. Many of the original documents still show his underlining of important passages that he had in some form included in the memoirs. As a result, one can assume that his work offers a fairly reliable eye-witness account.

Of course, his involvement in the Schleswig-Holstein war overshadows the entire work. Schleiden tried to present a balanced story. The Danish side, while not given the same prominence, and often looked at with critical eyes, did get fair attention. In addition, Schleiden’s criticism of the Danes was equaled by similar criticism of the Prussians, whom he hated for deserting the duchies in their hour of need. Even more, Schleiden criticized members of the duchies’ government. The radicals around Olshausen are often presented as trigger-happy maniacs, who by 1850, would risk war knowing that it would be a lost cause. Even Christian


\textsuperscript{17} Private correspondence of author with Professor Emeritus Dr. Ulrich Hauser of July, 1, 2010.
Bunsen, Frankfurt’s representative in London, was treated skeptically by Schleiden.\textsuperscript{18} The four volumes thus present a major defense of the Schleswig-Holstein cause, and so act as an important correction to the German national histories of Sybel and others.\textsuperscript{19} They are in line with works published by other Schleswig-Holstein nationalists to defend their cause against Danish oppression, and in Schleiden’s case, there is implicit opposition to Prussian control after 1864.

These nationalist were not alone in defending their cause following defeat on the battlefield. This study has already pointed to a number of similarities between the experiences of the Confederate states and Schleswig-Holstein. However much Schleswig-Holstein nationalists wished to deny any parallels, their commonalities may also be seen continued in how the two defeated separatist movements dealt with the memory of defeat. In the United States, the literature associated with the Confederacy became known under the broad title of the “Lost Cause.” As with the Schleswig-Holstein literature, which first appeared during a disastrous war and then continued into the Wilhelmine era in Germany, the early Lost Cause literature appeared in rudimentary forms during the war, if one wishes to consider the justifications for secession, and continued well into the Progressive era.

Like Wilhelm Beseler and Christian Bunsen, who had published legal justifications for their cause, early Confederate writers propagated their “War between the States” interpretation and argued that secession was a legal means to escape a coercive national government. Much like the Schleswig-Holsteiners, these early writers presented a historical background to illustrate

\textsuperscript{18} Schleiden, \textit{Schleswig-Holsteins erste Erhebung}, 111.

how the northern states had, over time, engaged in policies that undermined the southern economy and southern society.\textsuperscript{20}

After the Civil War, with the Confederate armies surrendered and Confederate President Jefferson Davis in prison, the conflict between North and South continued. Almost immediately, President Andrew Johnson, who succeeded the assassinated Lincoln, was at odds with Congress over how the reconstruction process should work and who should control it. At first, Johnson promoted a lenient policy that allowed the southern states to reenter the Union with few stipulations. However, with the old political elite still in power, and determined to control the South politically, Congress took charge of Reconstruction and implemented a set of policies to oust former Confederates from office and grant African-Americans political power in the region. The perceived harsh treatment brought new violence, thus creating, or even continuing, a form of guerrilla warfare in the South in defense of state rights and southern white autonomy.

In the midst of this conflict, new histories were published. Much like Schleiden used his \textit{Aktenstücke} to write his memoir later in the century, so too did one of the first writers of the Lost Cause, Edward A. Pollard, use his wartime publications to explain the conflict’s origins and outcome. For Pollard, the war had been one between two distinct nations that had quarreled for decades. He argued further that the North, by turning to materialism, had insisted on a coercive majority rule that had left the South no other alternative but escape. Based on the principle of state rights and self-government, he constructed a defense of secession. Much like the rebels in Schleswig-Holstein, who argued that they had risen up in support of their duke when he fell

victim to Danish nationalists, Pollard insisted that the southern revolution was about the preservation of southern institutions and the southern way of life.  

After a depressing period of military rule and anti-Reconstruction violence, home rule slowly returned to the South. National attention shifted away from the South during the 1870s as fraud and industrial growth preoccupied the country, and violence, corruption, and breaks in the Republican coalition allowed southern Democrats to return to power. Once the Depression of 1873 hit the country, northern Congressmen had to refocus on issues closer to home. Following the withdrawal of federal troops and the return to power of white southern Democrats, a new political regime eradicated the last vestiges of Reconstruction. Southern resilience stood in contrast to the Schleswig-Holstein outcome, where the duchies continued to be ruled by an oppressive outside power. Nevertheless, southerners persisted in justifying secession and explaining their defeat.

As a result, former Confederates wrote about their war. With the creation of the Southern Historical Society in 1869 and the work of such apologists as former rebel general Jubal Early, the Lost Cause had outlets and writers ready to promote a Confederate interpretation of events. Like their European counterparts, Lost Cause writers had a clear-cut agenda. They intended to set the record straight and leave for future generations a “correct” history of the events leading up to the Civil War and explain the defeat of their country. In order to make the history of the South fit their romantic and apologetic agenda, proponents had to dismiss the role of slavery in

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secession and play up the role of the abolitionist radicals. They argued that slavery was a benevolent institution, from which slaves benefitted. In explaining the military defeat of the Confederacy, they stressed northern superiority and duplicity. Southern gentlemen, such as Robert E. Lee, were heroic fighters and culturally superior to their northern counterparts. Like the Schleswig-Holstein rebels, southerners did not consider themselves rebels or revolutionaries. They had acted in agreement with the law.\textsuperscript{23}

While Confederates retained a life-long commitment to the defense of their legacy, history in the United States, much like in Schleswig-Holstein and Germany, increasingly moved toward a nationalist interpretation of the war. While Frölich and Jansen wrote histories that presented the occupation of the duchies by Prussia in a favorable light, historians in the United States tried to mute the Civil War tragic legacy by presenting a new, balanced interpretation of the war. According to early nationalist historians, such as James Ford Rhodes, the Civil War was a regrettable incident of fratricide that had been made irrepressible by the stark differences between the North and the South. In contrast to his predecessors and in common with other writers of this period, Rhodes tried to distribute blame evenly.\textsuperscript{24}

As the leaders of the southern and Schleswig-Holstein revolutionary generations passed away, the legacies of their respective causes were left in the hands of future professional historians. On February 25, 1895, Schleiden died in Freiburg im Breisgau, unable to write additional volumes of his memoirs, which his workaholic nature probably would have produced.


\textsuperscript{24} Pressly, \textit{Americans Interpret their Civil War}, 166-181.
Additional volumes might have explained his opinions on both the American Civil War and German unification. However, by the time Schleiden was buried, historians would be responsible for retracing the steps of Schleswig-Holstein’s Forty Eighters and for bringing the two revolutionary separatist groups together as representatives of a revolutionary nationalist separatist Atlantic world.

Claussen, Olshausen, and Schleiden had developed their separatist-nationalist ideology in a time of heightened crisis in the Danish helstat. As the 1840s progressed, Danish infringements on the constitutional rights of the duchies of Schleswig and Holstein increased. Tensions were high and arrests for treasonous speech were common occurrences. The state rights of the duchies were continuously ignored, with the Danish king rejecting any suggestions for reform passed by the diets of the duchies. As a result, talk of separatism increased. While Theodor Olshausen and Hans R. Claussen gave it voice in the diet and the press, Rudolph M. Schleiden actively protected the right of the duchies in the Danish administration.

When the Danes decided to incorporate Schleswig into the kingdom and thus appease Danish national liberals, separatist sentiments in the duchies escalated into revolution and the first Schleswig-Holstein war. Testing the belief of the European power in the balance of power, the duchies faced a series of obstacle. While Schleiden put his best diplomatic efforts to work to overcome European opposition and insure German support, the radicals around Olshausen and Claussen placed increasing burdens on the governments of the duchies by challenging the maintenance of civil liberties and the continuation of the war. These were formative years for all three individuals.

When the three men came to the United States, they entered a figurative hornet’s nest. The sectional conflict in the United States had increased since the conclusion of the war with
Mexico, and the clash between northern and southern nationalism was becoming more violent. While many northerners saw the oppression of slavery, southerners saw an attack on the section’s constitutional rights and way of life. The separatists from Schleswig-Holstein differed little from other Forty-Eighters on this issue, in that they, too, stood against the institution of slavery and predicted its demise a civil war.

However, these men were unique in that they had been separatists themselves, and very much in the same position as the South. Nevertheless, they felt no sympathy for southern secession. The European separatists were ready to fight the southern separatists just as hard and relentlessly as they had fought for the separation of Schleswig-Holstein. A study of Forty-Eighters that explored their backgrounds and their experience in the United States shows a break with their earlier separatist ideology.

Schleiden, as a diplomat, worked for a peaceful solution in the American conflict. However, as had happened in Europe, his diplomatic skills failed him when he came up against long held mistrust or questions of power and prestige. The radicals, Olshausen and Claussen, as they had done in Schleswig-Holstein, challenged the restrictions of liberty imposed by the Lincoln administration and its conduct of the war. They even attempted to prevent Lincoln’s reelection by supporting a third party challenger in the election of 1864. Faced with political defeat and a reemergence of the Schleswig-Holstein question in 1864, Olshausen and Schleiden bid the United States farewell.

In Europe, it became clear that the opposition of all three men to secessionism was restricted to the United States. Olshausen and Schleiden still desired the independence of Schleswig-Holstein. While Schleiden was happy to assist the Augustenburg pretender in his attempt to gain the throne, Olshausen continued to support the idea of a democratic and
republican Schleswig-Holstein. In the end, neither one achieved their goals. Like southern secessionists across the ocean, Schleswig-Holsteiners continued to be ruled by an oppressive outside government after their failed war of rebellion. Schleiden continued the struggle as a nationalist in the German parliament. However, the time of territorial nationalism was fast giving way to a new brand of social nationalism.

While historians have looked at the Forty-Eighters in the United States, they have grouped them into one large German-American category that obscures the distinct views Forty-Eighters held and how their work in the United States was the same or different from their revolutionary experience in Europe. By looking at three Schleswig-Holstein separatist nationalists, this work illustrated the need to understand the political and cultural assumptions Forty-Eighters brought with them and their experiences in Europe. By including two revolutionary separatists who then returned to Europe, this work further shows that the experience in the United States did little to change the radical and/or nationalist views Forty-Eighters held. Many of them remained, at heart, German nationalists.

The mid-nineteenth century witnessed many secessionist movements and their accompanying nationalist desires for independence and government change. Schleswig-Holstein in 1848 and the southern Confederacy are only two such uprisings. The language of these two secessionist movements, as shown, was remarkably similar. Both the German and American secessionist claimed that their rights had been infringed upon and that their state rights had been attacked. They seceded and went to war to protect their rights and autonomy. Like all secessionist movements of the era, they were unsuccessful in achieving their goals on the battlefield, and so traded in one form of oppression for another. However, the separatist-nationalist leaders remained unrepentant and strong in their beliefs. After all, both Schleswig-
Holsteiners and southern Confederates would agree that “not the one who hits first starts a civil war, but the one who made the first strike necessary.”²⁵

²⁵ Schleiden, Schleswig-Holstein im zweiten Kriegsjahre, 246.
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