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On the Permanence of Heideggerian Authenticity

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On the Permanence of Heideggerian Authenticity

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
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By

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ABSTRACT

In this essay I pose the following question: is Heideggerian authenticity permanent? To investigate this question I begin with a thorough analysis of what Heidegger means by authenticity. Afterwards I look into the leading figures within the field, seeking guidance in answering the question of the permanence of Heideggerian authenticity. Ultimately I conclude that an amended version of John Haugeland's analysis of resoluteness gives rise to the affirmative response to my question. I conclude by investigating potential problems concluding that Heideggerian authenticity is permanent.

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DEDICATION

On the Permanence of Heideggerian Authenticity is dedicated to my grandmother,
Beverly Morris.

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But one day the “why” arises and everything begins in that weariness tinged with amazement. “Begins” - this is important. Weariness comes at the end of the acts of a mechanical life, but at the same time it inaugurates the impulse of consciousness. It awakens consciousness and provokes what follows (Camus, 448).

On the Permanence of Heideggerian Authenticity

The concept of authenticity is one that much ink has been spilt over. As such it should come as no surprise that there are many different approaches to authenticity and thus a multitude of different understandings. However, very little, if any, ink has been spilt on answering the following question. Is authenticity permanent or ephemeral? Given the multitude of theories, understandings, and interpretations of authenticity I will narrow the focus of this question to only Heideggerian authenticity. Thus, the scope of this analysis will be in answering the question concerning the permanence of Heideggerian authenticity.

However, before we begin answering this question we must first be clear on what it means to be authentic for Heidegger. As both Taylor Carman and Charles Guignon point out, the concept of authenticity can mean several different things. The common understanding of authenticity is seen as “*being true* to oneself” (Carman 2006, 229), where models of authentic individuals take the form of “gangsta rappers and slam poets who are not afraid to get in your face” (Guignon 2008, 281). Another type of authenticity comes from the Romantics in “a less systematically articulated notion of self-fulfillment or self realization” (Carman 2006, 230).

However, as we will see, Heidegger has a very different notion of authenticity. Yet, as Tobias Henschen points out even amongst Heideggerians it is not clear what Heidegger means by authenticity. I propose, and will soon after defend, that Heideggerian authenticity is defined as follows: Dasein’s answering for itself while transparently relating itself to itself as Self-they. As such, I also propose that Heideggerian authenticity properly understood is permanent. With this the structure of my project should become clear.

In what is to follow I will walk us through the concepts relevant to understanding Heideggerian authenticity. Afterwards I will show how Heidegger's discussion of authenticity maps onto my proposed definition. Once done, we will be in position to ask if authenticity for Heidegger is permanent. Turning next to the secondary literature I will look into what some of the leading figures in Heideggerian authenticity have to offer in answering our question. Oddly, as we will see, it is John Haugeland who, despite his denial of the permanence of authenticity, will be most helpful to my proposal of the permanence of authenticity. That is, I will show how Haugeland's analysis of resoluteness helps us see where we need to go in proposing the permanence of authenticity. After walking us through Haugeland's analysis of resoluteness I will show how Haugeland misses a relevant distinction in what it means to be resolute. Thus, in adding to Haugeland's account of resoluteness I will show how this proper understanding of resoluteness entails the permanence of authenticity. Afterwards, I will conclude showing how my account of authenticity already incorporates such an understanding of resoluteness and thus, that Heideggerian authenticity, properly understood, entails the permanence of authenticity.

I. Inauthenticity

Before discussing inauthenticity it would be beneficial to give a brief sketch of Dasein's fundamental structure of care and the three existentialia - thrownness, projection, and being-with - that also make up what it is for Dasein to be Dasein. Heidegger claims that insofar as Dasein is, it is concerned for its being. That is, we are constantly concerned about who we are and who we will become. It is in this way that Dasein is ahead-of-itself; Dasein is concerned about those possibilities that it can take itself up in. Projection is Dasein's ability to actualize or act upon those possibilities. These possibilities, however, are not infinite. They are not free floating

things unaffected by one's background and situation. Rather, Dasein finds itself thrown into its world and those possibilities made available to it. That is, Dasein is not the grounds of its own existence. I did not actively choose to be male, short, born in the United States of America in the late twentieth century. Rather, I found myself thrown into existence making certain possibilities off limits and others available for me to take myself up in. Lastly, the world that Dasein finds itself in is not one in which Dasein is alone. "The world of Dasein is a with-world [*Mitwelt*]. Being-in is Being-with Others" (BT, 118). Part of how the world shows up meaningfully for me is that it is also there for other persons whom I experience as other persons. This experience of others is not just restricted to actual persons but extends to the core of how we understand objects as well. For example, a bench is not merely an object for me to sit on. Rather, part of what it means for a bench to be a bench is that it is available for others to sit on as well. Dasein's being-with also shapes the possibilities I find available for myself. Whether I am at a concert or helping my brother by giving him a ride to the hospital, these different situations – made possible by virtue of there being other persons – help shape the possibilities inherent to my current situation.

Ultimately grounded in Dasein's fundamental structure of care and being-with, inauthentic Dasein is characterized as being accommodated by *das Man* as the they-self. *Das Man*, typically translated as "the-They" or "the-One," signifies the social norms that govern and allow for meaningful human interaction. Heidegger, uses the term "they-self" to designate the Dasein who has relinquished its authority of who it is to *das Man*. Who I am when inauthentic, is merely who society expects me to be. That is, "who" Dasein is, *is das Man*. This is what

Heidegger means when he calls this self the “they-self.” As they-self, I have lost myself in the social norms established by the public sphere in which I find myself.

In Dasein’s concern with other Dasein “there is constant care as to the way one differs from them” (BT, 126). This recognizable difference between Dasein and the other is one that is disturbing to Dasein. As such, we recognize one of Dasein’s existential modes of being-with-one-another as *distantiality*. That is, Dasein, in its being-with, is disturbed by the noticeable difference between itself and other Dasein and makes this an object of its concern. In this concern, Dasein takes note of how different it is from other Dasein in terms of the distance between itself and how close it is to being *like* other Dasein. One way of thinking about this is to think back to grade school. To an extent, a great deal of the common concern in grade school was focused on who was in the “in group” and who was not. The social anxiety brought about by not being considered “cool” or “acceptable” is something that we come to have by virtue of our being-with. This recognition of how alike and different we are to others is what Heidegger has in mind in his discussion of distantiality.

In distantiality, Dasein “stands in *subjection* [*Botmässigkeit*] to Others” (BT, 126). In comparison with the other, Dasein comports itself such that it attempts to lessen the distance between itself and the other. This distance is not lessened by reducing the number of yards between two Dasein but rather, in Dasein’s attempt to become more like the other such that it does not stand out apart from others.

Though this other may be found in the form of any individual Dasein, Heidegger makes clear that the other that Dasein *is* ultimately concerned with is typically no *definite* other. This is made clear by virtue of the fact that any other can stand in place of any other other and Dasein

will equally concern itself with its distanciality. The “who” of this new notion of other, is not to be found in any particular other, in the sum of all others, nor in any particular group. “The ‘who’ is the neuter, *the ‘they’ [das Man]*” (BT, 126).¹ What or who then exactly is *das Man*? David Egan in “*Das Man and Distintiality in Being and Time*” proposes that we read *das Man* as the “wide range of norms that dictate what *one* does” (Egan, 291), and “[a]rticulates the referential context of significance” (BT, 129). This is due to Dasein’s sharing its world in its being-with. “By highlighting the existential role of Being-with and *das Man*, Heidegger emphasizes that the intelligibility of Dasein’s world involves sharing and shaping this intelligibility with others” (Egan, 291). The “who” then of *das Man* is no particular Dasein, but rather the social norms precipitated by our interactions with other Dasein.

In our public living, *das Man* is able to envelope Dasein in such a way that Dasein, along with other Dasein, bleed into *das Man* itself. We go to class as everyone else does. We see scary movies as everyone else does. We stop at stop signs and comport ourselves according to norms of proper decorum while in public areas as others do. As a part of and characterized by *das Man*, Dasein does as they do because this is what one does. It is this “because this is what one does” mentality that Heidegger ultimately finds problematic. “Because this is what one does” indicates a passivity (a lack of choice, responsibility or authority over ones self) in the way Dasein takes itself up. As Egan claims, “[w]e accord ourselves with *das Man* unthinkingly, allowing our actions and opinions to be dictated” by the social norms and public mentality that we find ourselves in (Egan, 292). This mode of being is Dasein’s everydayness.

¹ I will leave *das Man* untranslated from here on, due to the issues in the different translations of *das Man* made evident by David Egan in “*Das Man and Distintiality in Being and Time*”.

Everydayness characterizes the vast majority of Dasein in its most common way of being. However, as Egan points out, the secondary literature makes apparent that there is an issue within Heidegger's discussion of *das Man*. Namely, that it is not clear whether *das Man* is meant to be understood as a conformity that is necessary for a meaningful publicly shared space, or if *das Man* is to be read as a problematic conformism. In fact, as Dreyfus points out in *Being-in-the-world: A Commentary on Heidegger's Being and Time, Division I*, Heidegger "does everything he can to blur this important distinction" (Dreyfus 1991, 154). Dreyfus tells us that this is because Heidegger is walking a fine line between two major influences, Dilthey who "emphasized the positive function of social phenomena" and Kierkegaard who "focused on the negative effects of the conformism and banality of what he called 'the public'" (Dreyfus 1991, 143). The latter signifying "unthinkingly, allowing our actions and opinions to be dictated to us by what *one* does or thinks, reneging on our freedom to take responsibility for these actions and opinions" (Egan, 292). The former, our publicly agreed upon norms that do not dictated how we live, but allow for meaningful social experience to be possible. Keeping this in mind, as I continue I will point out sections that appear to support both readings.

As a part of *das Man*, Dasein's concern with distantiality is grounded in the commonness set forth by *das Man*. This commonness is what Heidegger calls *averageness*. This averageness set forth by *das Man* is the standard to which Dasein compares itself. What is average is what is normal and thus acceptable. For example, when at a coffee shop there is a common way one is to behave with a set norm of common and acceptable activities one can partake in. Acceptable behavior and activities might range from homework study sessions to simple coffee dates, all of which entail certain ways of holding oneself in the public sphere. Causing a scene by being

overly loud, using strong language, or being destructive of company property are not common (or at least, socially acceptable) ways of behaving at a coffee shop. To be apart from this is both disturbing to Dasein and looked down upon by *das Man*. Thus, anything that finds itself outside of this norm “gets noiselessly suppressed” (BT, 127). In our concern for not breaking from this norm our possibilities of being are reduced. What this means is that certain possibilities that might have been possible are off the table due to our certain circumstances and “the socially sanctioned habitually enforced averageness of daily life” (Carman 2000, 20). Certainly it is logically possible that I go to a coffee shop naked. However, because this is not what is socially acceptable (what is average), this option is not only quickly dismissed but, for the most part, not even an option to begin with. This reducing of our possibilities of being is called leveling down. Again, given specific social norms, certain ways of conducting ourselves are no longer recognized as available to us.

These ways of being for *das Man*, distantiality, averageness, and levelling down, all constitute what Heidegger calls ‘publicness.’ “Publicness proximally controls every way in which the world and Dasein get interpreted . . . because it is insensitive to every difference of level and of genuineness” (BT, 127). In publicness everything is obscured and passed off as already known and common. That is, it is leveled down and made average such that Dasein can comfortably conform to the norm and not be burdened by distantiality. In a way this seems both something desirable and troubling. A social conformity should be desired to allow for meaningful public interaction. We recognize that one stops at stop signs as a means for safe transportation. We should desire a social conformity that will allow for a set social norm that is conducive to human flourishing.

What is troubling is that in publicness, Dasein has, for the most part, lost its answerability. That is to say, Dasein itself is no longer in a way its own authority figure and has fallen into a conformism. In such a conformism, we act and take ourselves up socially in a habitual and unthinking way in which, for the most part, our reasons for our actions are reducible to “because this is what one does.” I have not taken up and deliberated about how I will act or who I will be. Insofar as Dasein conforms to *das Man*, Dasein and its world have thus been interpreted from the outset. That is, who Dasein is and how Dasein will take itself up is determined by our socially conditioned circumstances and what we are expected to do in those circumstances. Dasein does not answer for itself, *das Man* has already done so for it.

Because *das Man* has relieved Dasein of its answerability, Dasein is disburdened. Dasein habitually acts according to the social norms constituting it “because this is what one does.” Dasein does not need to concern itself with how it ought to take itself up in any particular situation because *das Man* has already presented Dasein with the appropriate action to be taken. By virtue of disburdening, *das Man* accommodates Dasein in such a way that *das Man* “retains and enhances its stubborn dominion” (BT, 128). *Das Man*’s accommodation of Dasein signifies that in Dasein’s being disburdened, Dasein lets the social norms dictate its actions unthinkingly. I have let the social norms dictate my actions without being too concerned for them myself; a kind of autopilot in which *das Man* is in control. Insofar as Dasein is accommodated by *das Man*, *das Man* itself perpetuates and maintains its dominance over Dasein. That is to say, in letting my actions be dictated by what is socially acceptable, I am, in this action, giving strength to the norm itself by being another instance of that norm.

This blindly following social norms in a way in which Dasein is not personally invested is the problematic conformism that *das Man* is sometimes read as being. That is, when *das Man* signifies a group mentality. However, in line with both Carman and Egan I do not read *das Man* as a conformism. Rather, I read *das Man* as a conformity. Again, the distinction is that the former signifies “unthinkingly, allowing our actions and opinions to be dictated to us by what *one* does or thinks, reneging on our freedom to take responsibility for these actions and opinions” (Egan, 292). The latter refers to our publicly agreed upon norms that do not dictate how we live, but allow for meaningful social experience to be possible. Language, as Dreyfus points out, is a great example of conformity. There must be shared understanding in our language that allows for meaningful and effective communication. Otherwise, we would not be able to communicate with each other. Egan suggests this reading of *das Man* because *das Man* itself is not a mode of being but rather the social norms that make public existence meaningful. Carman makes similar claims showing us that Dasein’s discourse itself is formed and conditioned by *das Man*. The point being that *das Man* itself signifies the social norms and articulatability of those norms and ourselves. I can only make sense of myself and the world in a way conditioned from the outset by my facticity and the norms therein. That is, my understanding of the world and myself are conditioned by the thrownness of my existence and how I hold myself in relation to my thrownness. Thus, the social norms themselves do not constitute a conformism. Rather, the way we take ourselves up in them determines whether we have fallen into a conformism or not.

This existentiell modification of *das Man* (how I personally take myself up in *das Man*) is brought about in distantiality. As we have seen, distantiality is my ability to recognize the

difference between myself and the social norms of *das Man*. Though the mere recognition of this difference does not cause my fleeing into *das Man*, the individuation of myself found in distanciality for the most part does. The individuation of my self found in distanciality might be seen as inducing anxiety (to be discussed in the next section) that causes (though not necessarily) Dasein to flee into *das Man*.

This fleeing in the face of one's individuated self into the comfort of *conformism* is what Heidegger calls inauthenticity. That is, inauthenticity is my letting the social norms dictate my actions in an unthinking or unconcerned manner. As inauthentic, Dasein's self has been dispersed into *das Man*. In other words, who I am is handed to me by the social norms and expectations of society. I am polite, not because I actively decided to be. Rather I am polite because this is what one does. Again, "who" Dasein is, is *das Man*. That is, I am the "they-self." As the they-self "Dasein is for the sake of [*das Man*] in an everyday manner, and [*das Man*] itself articulates the referential context of significance" (BT, 129). In other words, in my being accommodated by *das Man* (letting *das Man* be the arbiter of my actions and "choices"), it is *das Man* itself that predetermines from the outset what is significant and what is not, by means of averageness, levelling down, and distanciality. It is important that I be perceived in a specific way, learn specific things, perform specific actions in my community because these things are important according to the social status quo. I have not decided that these things are important for me out of my own deliberation. For example, I go to college because this is what one does and is expected of me. To not do so would be to fail according to the social norms of my society. I have not chosen in any meaningful way that college is important *for me* outside of my desire to avoid facing my differentiation from what is average.

This is to say, inauthentic Dasein is dispersed into *das Man* and as such, accommodated by *das Man*. Who I am is one who merely falls in line with the social norms without taking the norms up for myself; a “choosing not to choose” as Magrini puts it (Magrini, 77). Inauthentic Dasein is factually fleeing into the comfort of *das Man*. That is, the comfort of not having to actively deliberate and choose who I want to be or how I will take myself up in the current situation. Thus, inauthenticity can rightfully be interpreted as Dasein’s being accommodated and disburdened by *das Man* which, in turn, constitutes Dasein’s self as the they-self. Inauthentic Dasein is the they-self; that is, Dasein characterized by conformism, not just conformity.

II. Anxiety

In this section we move on to Heidegger’s discussion of anxiety. As we will see, anxiety is the state-of-mind in which Dasein is disclosed to itself and, as we will see later on, is pivotal for a proper understanding of authenticity. Heidegger begins his discussion of anxiety with an analysis of “fleeing” - which, as we will see, signifies Dasein’s fleeing into inauthenticity. As such we will do the same.

Fleeing, as Heidegger notes, is always a fleeing away from. There are two ways in which one may flee and shrink back from something: in fear or anxiety. For the most part, both are taken as synonymous. However, Heidegger tells us that fear is always, “in each case that in the face of which we fear is a detrimental entity within-the-world which comes from some definite region but is close by and bringing itself close, and yet might stay away” (BT, 185).

I am afraid of the soldier hiding in the bushes. I am afraid of the dog snarling in my direction. Fear is always a threatening entity in the world. However, in my fleeing into *das Man*, I am not fleeing away from any entity that is fearsome. Instead, I am fleeing into *das Man*

because of the disturbing distanciality between myself and others by virtue of my being-with and concern. Thus, I am not fleeing from just any entity, I am fleeing from that which elicits my disturbing comparison of myself with others; that is, myself, my individuality and freedom. Because I myself am not this fearsome entity found within the world, fear cannot be the state-of-mind (the “fundamental states of attunement that color Dasein’s disposition and awareness, out of which it uncovers, or discloses, things that matter”) that characterizes my fleeing into *das Man* (Magrini, 78). This state-of-mind must be anxiety.

Anxiety then turns out to be an anxiety about my very being. As such anxiety is about my being-in-the-world; that is, my very existence. Insofar as anxiety is about my very being and not about any particular entity within the world, anxiety is characterized by an indefiniteness. What I am anxious about is the indefiniteness of my being. As indefinite, anxiety makes one aware of the insignificance of those entities within the world because those entities no longer have a claim on me that can help me understand myself. The object of my concern is rather myself, who I am. Anxiety, as we will see, forces me to recognize my individuality and freedom. Who I am and what I am to do or be are not something the world can dictate for me. Thus, insofar as anxiety is indefinite that which threatens can be said to be nowhere. As an indefinite nowhere, that which threatens can come from any region, “it is already ‘there’, and yet nowhere; it is so close that it is oppressive and stifles one’s breath, and yet it is nowhere” (BT, 186).

Thus, in anxiety, the nothing and nowhere become manifest signifying that “the world as such is that in the face of which one has anxiety” (BT, 187). That is, anxiety is an anxiety about my very existing in a world and the indefinite possibilities therein. Though the entities in the world become insignificant in anxiety, the world itself does not disappear in the nothing and

nowhere. On the contrary it is by virtue of my being-in-a-world that the nothing and nowhere are manifested. That is, it is only because I am invested in existence and the practical roles of my life can something like the nothing and nowhere make itself known. In anxiety, my social identity – student, friend, cohort – no longer help me understand myself because in anxiety I am not concerned about my relations to those roles. My concern is for myself as individual apart from those identities.

Because anxiety suspends me in the nothing and nowhere (an indifference to the world), Dasein is unable to understand itself in terms of the ‘world’, others, or publicness. As such, anxiety individualizes Dasein by throwing “Dasein back upon that which it is anxious about - its authentic potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world” (BT, 187). That is, I am anxious about the possibility to take myself up for myself on my own accord and not be predetermined beforehand by *das Man*. Anxiety therefore discloses Dasein to itself as being-possible. In this disclosure Dasein’s being-free for is made manifest. Embedded within this being-free for is the possibility of Dasein’s choosing and taking hold of itself, i.e., being authentic. In other words, anxiety reveals to Dasein its ability to choose itself and for itself. Anxiety reveals Dasein’s possibility of being authentic.

Thus, being in the state-of-mind of anxiety, suspended in the nothing and nowhere where Dasein cannot be conceptualized by its being-with or *das Man*, forces Dasein to feel uncanny. This feeling uncanny, or ‘not-Being-at-home’, characterizes Dasein because Dasein is no longer predetermined in its disclosure to itself by *das Man*. That is, in anxiety the everyday world collapses as insignificant. Those social norms and relations that used to stand as a reference point for making sense of one’s life no longer hold one tightly to the ground. *Das Man* and my

personal social identities cannot determine who I am. I must do this for myself and as this is a new phenomenon for me I am uncomfortable. The weight of my self has been put on my shoulders and I am heavy. Therefore, we can say that, “we flee *into* the ‘at-home’ of publicness, we flee *in the face of* the ‘not-at-home’; that is, we flee in the face of the uncanniness which lies in Dasein” (BT, 189). Because we are so accustomed to our public identities and allowing what is publicly expected dictate our lives, when we finally (if ever) find ourselves recognizing that we are fundamentally free, the burden and responsibility that is inherent in that freedom is frightening. We are not used to thinking and deciding for ourselves for the most part. It is the burden of our freedom then that we essentially are fleeing from.

Heidegger claims the uncanniness found in anxiety *constantly* pursues Dasein and is a *threat* to Dasein’s lostness in *das Man*. In other words, insofar as I am, there is the possibility of my being-anxious. It is *my* very Being *as* Being-in-the-world that causes this threat. I cannot outrun this because I cannot outrun myself. For this reason, anxiety *constantly* pursues. However, because Dasein for the most part remains lost in *das Man*, “‘real’ anxiety is rare” (BT, 190).

Thus, anxiety is a possible state-of-mind of Dasein, made possible by Dasein’s being-in-the-world, that is rare, and, when actualized, discloses Dasein to itself and the world *as* world. Anxiety discloses Dasein as being-free to its possibilities which include Dasein’s possibility of being authentic or inauthentic. Because Heidegger claims both authenticity and inauthenticity are disclosed, I read anxiety as being neutral between the two. That is, anxiety as such does not determine that I become authentic or inauthentic, but rather discloses both as possibilities for Dasein.

III. Authentic Being-towards-death

Moving into Division II of *Being and Time*, Heidegger tells us that we have not yet grasped Dasein as a whole. What he means by this is that Division I gave us an understanding of Dasein in its inauthentic mode of being. Insofar as it is through Dasein that Heidegger is able to take up the question of being, we must have a complete understanding of Dasein. This includes pursuing an understanding of Dasein and its relation to death. Thus, death will be the topic of discussion in this section.

Grounded in Dasein's structure of care, Heidegger defines death as "*Dasein's ownmost possibility - non-relational, certain and as such indefinite, not to be outstripped. Death is, as Dasein's end, in the Being of this entity towards its end*" (BT, 259). As a structure of Dasein itself (not to be outstripped), Dasein can comport itself either inauthentically or authentically *towards* its ownmost possibility which Dasein's being-with cannot determine for it (non-relational). Dasein knows its death will happen (certain) at *some* point (indefinite). However, it is not clear what exactly Heidegger means by death. As Mathew Burch points out, there are "two major interpretations of Heidegger's account of death: 1) the narrative interpretation [NI] and 2) the existential interpretation [EI]" (Burch, 216).

On the narrative interpretation, Dasein's existence is understood "as a *life course* or *life story*" that spans between birth and biological death (Burch, 216). In this sense Dasein's very identity is found in its "rendering its narrative a coherent unity" (Burch, 216). Anxiety then becomes about whether or not I am actively shaping my life or if I am simply letting *das Man* choose for me. Am I choosing to embrace and take up my freedom or simply choosing not to choose and lose myself in *das Man*? The point being, the focus of the narrative interpretation is

on Dasein's end and whether or not its life between birth and biological death was lived meaningfully. Death is read as biological death.

On the existential interpretation, death is not meant to signify biological death. Rather, death denotes the end of the world's grip on me, as a possibility. That is to say, who I am has collapsed and the world is no longer able to grip me meaningfully. As Carman puts it, "existential bereavement is neither the loss of vital functions nor the end of a life story, but a deprivation of possibilities constitutive of one's existence" (Carman 2003, 284). Or as Burch puts it, death is "the collapse of my practical identity. Since nothing in particular matters to me in this moment, I cannot grasp myself in terms of some worldly role but rather I experience the absolute impossibility of taking up any way of being" (Burch, 218). Thus, death on the existential interpretation is the cessation of the world showing up as meaningful for me. I am no longer able to make sense of who I am in terms of my worldly commitments.

I suggest, in line with Burch and Carman, that the appropriate reading of death is the existential interpretation. Preliminarily I can offer two reasons to support this reading. First, Heidegger uses a specific term, "perishing" (BT, 240), when discussing biological death. This draws a distinction between dying and perishing, suggesting that they are not meant to be read as synonymous. Second, Heidegger explicitly states that the "existential interpretation of death takes precedence over any biological or ontology of life" (BT, 247). This suggests again that what Heidegger has in mind in his discussion of death is not meant to be biological. Though these two points may not be conclusive evidence for an existential reading, they do stand in favor of the existential interpretation. Thus, from here on death is meant to be understood existentially

and not biologically. In line with Heidegger my analysis will begin with death's everyday inauthentic interpretation.

Inauthentic being-towards-death is characterized as evading, covering up, fleeing from, and giving a new explanation of death. Heidegger captures this in his analysis of the, "I know I will die, but not yet," saying of inauthentic Dasein. For example, as a young child concerned about my realization that my mother would one day die, I was able to comfort myself by convincing myself that this would not happen for a very long time. In thinking of my own death I was able to comfort myself in the same way thinking that I wouldn't die for a very long time. In this way I was able to cover up and evade the reality that death could occur at any moment. Thus, an authentic being-towards-death cannot have any of the above characteristics. Instead, Dasein must comport itself towards death *as* death properly understood. That is, as a possibility.

Insofar as death is a possibility for Dasein, Dasein's being-towards-death is being-towards a possibility. As such, it must be maintained in its possibility *as* a possibility. That is, death must be maintained as an ability to be something; something Dasein can experience before perishing. Death then is interpreted in terms of Dasein's *Existenz*: *who* Dasein is. Existential death as a possibility then is Dasein's ability to be and not be; to exist in a world absent of meaning in which I fail to be able to take myself up meaningfully. If death is not maintained as a possibility then death will be seen as something present-at-hand or ready-to-hand. Death will be maintained as an object in the world coming for me, either as something that I am currently focusing on (present-at-hand) or as something coming for me that is not currently the object of my attention and has bled into the background of my current environment (ready-to-hand).

Insofar as Dasein is not something present-at-hand or ready-to-hand (an object out there), death itself, as a possibility of Dasein, cannot be treated as such.

It is in anticipation that Dasein is able to comport itself towards death in such a way that it maintains death *as a possibility*: a kind of readiness for death that holds the possibility of my existing in a meaningless world as something that can occur at any time. In maintaining death as a possibility I am not evading death by viewing death as something out there coming for me or as something that will not happen for a long while. Anticipating death maintains death as a possibility for Dasein without being concerned about its actualization. Heidegger claims that, in anticipation, the closer we get to an understanding of this possibility, its being possible becomes greater and not turned into a concern for something actual (BT, 262). That is, in anticipation, our understanding of death demands that death remain disclosed as a possibility. The understanding only illuminates death *as possibility*. That is, death is “the possibility of the impossibility of every way of comporting oneself towards anything, of every way of existing” (BT, 262). Death is understood as the possibility of Dasein’s inability to comport itself towards anything.

Heidegger’s analysis of anticipation shows us that, like anxiety, the object of my anticipation is myself. Thus, in anticipation Dasein discloses itself to itself with regards to its uttermost possibility. In such a disclosure it becomes manifest that “in this distinctive possibility of its own self, [Dasein] has been *wrenched* away from [*das Man*]” (BT, 263 italics added). Death is a possibility for *me*, to be taken up by *myself, alone*. My everyday self lost in *das Man* cannot help me understand who I am, I must do this for myself.

Insofar as I and I alone can take up my death, the possibility of death is non-relational. “[D]eath *lays claim* to [Dasein] as an *individual* Dasein,” it “individualizes Dasein down to

itself” (BT, 263). Dasein’s being-with and being-alongside fail Dasein in its attempt to understand its dying. In this failure Dasein is freed to take itself up authentically on its own accord. However, this “does not signify at all that these ways of Dasein have been cut off from its authentically being-its-self. As structures essential to Dasein’s constitution, these have a share in conditioning the possibility of any existence whatsoever” (BT, 263).

In anticipation’s disclosing Dasein to itself, Dasein is aware that its death is grounded in its very being. As such it is impossible for Dasein to outstrip its own death because it is something that constitutes Dasein *as* Dasein. Insofar as I am, death is a possibility for me. Insofar as Dasein is, Dasein is dying. There is no escaping this fact. Interestingly, Heidegger seems to be making a subtle distinction between death and dying. In our acting upon certain possibilities there is at all times those possibilities that I did not take myself up in. In choosing to go to school I did not choose to go into the military. In choosing to be a competitive athlete I chose not to party or partake in activities that would stunt my athletic carrier. In this sense, in choosing to be something I have also chosen not to be something else. Those possibilities have died to me in my choosing not to take myself up in them. This is what Heidegger has in mind when he says Dasein is dying. Briefly, death then by contrast is the full collapse of every possibility, not the mere closing off of a specific set of possibilities.

In anticipation, if one decides to accept the fact of one’s dying and the possibility of death, one becomes liberated from the enslaving inauthentic evading of death. That is, the belief that death is avoidable or something that can be put off. In this belief, death becomes enslaving insofar as we think we can outrun or outwit death. The thought being that insofar as death is able to be put off, one must do so as long as possible. However, in anticipation Dasein is liberated

because it knows with authentic certainty that it will die to its current factual possibilities. It's easy to forget that Heidegger is talking about existential death here. Primarily because, as we will soon see, Heidegger claims that being-towards-death essentially is anxiety and anxiety, as we noted earlier, is rare. Though we surely will die biologically, how are we to account for the certainty of existential death? I suggest that what Heidegger has in mind is the certainty of the closing off of possibilities. What I have in mind is that I am unable to go back in time and choose to take myself up in my possibilities a second time. For example, I cannot go back to when I was a gymnast and do things differently. I have died to those possibilities. Insofar as it is impossible to take myself up in every possibility, my death to specific possibilities is certain. This seems more in line with the existential reading of death. The driving force to evade thus loses its potency. In other words, in anticipation I have accepted that what it means to be Dasein is to have the possibility of death at all times. In this acceptance I would no longer desire to evade death as a possibility. This is not to say that we give into death. Rather, we recognize the teleologically irrational desire to evade death and embrace the fact that a part of what it means to live is to have some possibilities be taken up and others closed off. One's tenaciousness towards evading death is shattered, freeing Dasein to its possibilities.

Heidegger later claims that in "anticipation, Dasein guards itself against falling back behind itself, or behind the possibility-for-Being which it has understood" (BT, 264). This means that in anticipation I recognize that anticipation is the only appropriate way to comport myself towards death. Anticipation *as* anticipation discloses this to Dasein.

In this appropriate relation of Dasein to death, Dasein must take it up on its own terms; that is, authentically *as* a possibility. This means Dasein's taking up its death for itself as that

possibility which is certain and yet indefinite. As indefinite, the threat of death is constant. As a constant threat, Dasein's being-towards-death "must maintain itself," Dasein must continuously comport itself in anticipation towards its death (BT, 265). "So little can it tone this down that it must rather cultivate the indefiniteness of the certainty" (BT, 265).

Insofar as anticipation requires an understanding of Dasein itself and understanding is always accompanied by a state-of-mind, anticipation then must also be accompanied by a state-of-mind. The state-of-mind that accompanies anticipation is anxiety, insofar as it is in the state-of-mind of anxiety that Dasein becomes disclosed to itself. As such, "Being-towards-death is essentially anxiety" (BT, 266).

Though Heidegger is correct that these two structures of Dasein are similar in their effects, we must maintain them as not being synonymous. The difference lies in anxiety being a state-of-mind which discloses Dasein's possibilities to itself. Being-towards-death is a mode of being which then is responsive to that which is disclosed in anxiety. In authentic anticipation (how one comports oneself), anxiety is held as a constant state-of-mind (how the world and Dasein are disclosed).

Now, with our characterization of death and how it necessitates that authentic Dasein comport itself towards its death in anticipation, we can give Heidegger's existential definition of authentic being-towards-death:

Anticipation reveals to Dasein its lostness in the they-self, and brings it face to face with the possibility of being itself, primarily unsupported by concerned solicitude, but of being itself, rather, in an impassioned freedom towards death - a freedom which has been released from the illusions of [*das Man*], and which is factual, certain of itself, and anxious (BT, 266).

In essence, authentic being-towards-death is Dasein's comporting itself appropriately towards its ownmost possibility, death. Again, recall that death is not equivalent to biological death, but rather the collapse of one's worldly identity. As certain, non-relational, and a possibility grounded in Dasein's existence, Dasein can only appropriately be towards its death in a mode that holds the possibility of death *as* a possibility. This mode of being is anticipation. Thus, authentic being-towards-death is Dasein's transparently relating itself to itself with respect to death and comporting itself accordingly to what is disclosed. Put differently, authentic being-towards-death is akin to being open to the collapse of one's identity.

IV. The Call of Conscience and Being-guilty

Like our need to reach an understanding of death, Heidegger moves on to ask if "in any way Dasein *gives testimony*, for its ownmost potentiality-for-Being, as to a possible *authenticity* of its existence, so that it not only makes known that in an existentiell manner such authenticity is possible but *demand*s this of itself" (BT, 267). That is, how are we, through an analysis of Dasein, to attest the possibility of authentic existence? Heidegger tells us that such an attestation comes from an analysis of the call of conscience.

Heidegger tells us that conscience "is revealed as a call [*Ruf*]", a type of discourse and appeal between Dasein and its factual situation. Heidegger goes on to say that this call calls Dasein "to its ownmost potentiality-for-Being-its-Self" by means of a "summoning" (BT, 269). What Heidegger has in mind here is that conscience is my awareness of my situation and the need for me to take myself up in my current factual situation. Because Dasein is for the most part inauthentic, it listens to and allows *das Man* to respond for it.

Thus, if Dasein is to find itself such that it can become authentic, it must be able to hear itself being called over the ‘hubbub’ of *das Man* (BT, 271). Dasein must be able to recognize that the social norms and expectations do not have to necessitate who it is. It is possible for me to choose for myself who I am and who I will become. It must be able to break from that hearing which corresponds to *das Man*. Otherwise the call would be my responding to the demands of *das Man*. However, if the call of conscience is not to be assimilated by *das Man* it must take on a mode of discourse not compatible with the hearing of *das Man*. It must not be a response to what is understood as a demand of *das Man*. The call must call Dasein in itself while passing over *das Man*. As such, the call calls to Dasein’s own self, the “They” of the they-self is passed over and collapses. This gives Dasein a radical recognition of its own individuality and self-authority.

Thus, in the call of conscience, the self is called and as such is “robbed of its lodgment and hiding-place” in its comforting accommodation by *das Man* (BT, 273). To avoid assimilation into *das Man*, the call takes the form of a silent summoning of Dasein to itself as being-in-the-world, to its ownmost potentiality-for-being. Again, this is to say the call brings me to face my individuality and self-authority. As Carman puts it, “[c]onscience calls Dasein away from all its ordinary self-interpretations back to itself, [. . .] back to the bare fact of its existence in all its concrete particularity” (Carman 2003, 293). As a silent summoning there is nothing said that can then be warped by the hubbub of publicness and idle chatter.

Because the call is silent, the caller is unable to be defined. This is because the call is not reducible to any factual identity I find myself in or the social norms of one’s community. Thus, the caller must be Dasein in its uncanniness. Insofar as Dasein’s uncanniness is made

known in anxiety, the call, from that uncanniness, makes possible Dasein's ability to project itself upon its ownmost potentiality-for-being (BT, 277). The call then makes one aware of one's individuality and ability to be who one chooses to be. *Das Man* does not have to choose for Dasein who it will be or how to respond to certain situations. Because this is something rare (again, Dasein, for the most part, is inauthentic), Dasein feels lost. This is not the same as being lost in *das Man*, but rather, Dasein is lost in its freedom. *Das Man* does not disappear, but I now recognize that I am the one who chooses who I am. By analogy, this is akin to the young child who before had his parents do everything for him and is just now beginning to do things on his own. No longer being told exactly how to do things and when to do them, the child feels lost in recognizing his ability to be who he wants to be. Attuned by anxiety, the call makes Dasein aware that its uncanniness pursues it continuously and is a continuous threat to its they-self.

In its calling itself to itself the call then is a call of care, calling itself to itself unaccommodated by *das Man*. But what is it the call tells us? Heidegger tells us that “[a]ll experiences of interpretations of the conscience are at one in that they make the ‘voice’ of conscience speak somehow of ‘guilt’” (BT, 280). This is to say that what is interpreted in the call takes many forms but ultimately what penetrates in every interpretation is Dasein's being-guilty. As such, our analysis will now turn to Heidegger's discussion of guilt.

What we mean by being-guilty is not having “the character of ‘coming to owe something to Others,’” as one does when one enters into a debt to someone else, or in the breaking of a law (BT, 283). These forms of guilt ultimately take the form of something present-at-hand. I broke that traffic law, I did not return the favor for lunch the other day. These forms of guilt come from my relation to something or someone. Though I am guilty of these things this is not what

Heidegger has in mind. Because guilt is something ‘I am,’ and I am not something present-at-hand, guilt must be defined differently. This definition must come from Dasein itself.

As thrown, Dasein projects itself upon its possibilities. In its projecting, Dasein takes over its being-a-basis (BT, 284). In other words, I am not a *causa sui*; I find myself in a world already with possibilities and impossibilities handed to me. I can be an engineer or a policeman, but I cannot set sail with Christopher Columbus or travel beyond our solar system. However, I can choose who I will be within my given possibilities. In Dasein’s projecting itself, there are possibilities that Dasein takes up and those that it does not. Thus, in the structure of thrownness and projection there lies essentially a nullity; those possibilities which I choose *not* to take myself up in (BT, 285). In choosing to be a full time student, I chose not to be a police officer. Insofar as these structures are grounded in care, care itself is also “permeated with nullity,” which means that care itself is “Being-the-basis of a nullity” (BT, 285). A part of who I am is who I am not. A part of what it means to be a thief is to *choose not* to follow the law. It is ultimately I who choose and therefore *am* responsible. This is why Heidegger uses the term ‘guilty.’ He is capturing the fundamental responsibility found in Dasein’s care structure. Thus, insofar as Dasein *is*, Dasein is guilty! In taking itself up, Dasein is the one that takes itself up in certain possibilities. It is Dasein itself that is the basis of its choosing. Dasein is responsible for its choosing. As responsible, Dasein is guilty!, for it is Dasein who must be the one to answer for itself and to itself who it will be and what it will do in its current set of circumstances. Only I can decide for myself what possibilities I will take myself up in. Of course, I can take guidance from a mentor, friend or family member, but in the end it is I who must choose who I will be and

what I will do given the circumstances into which I have been thrown. Ultimately, insofar as I am Dasein, I am guilty!

Therefore, the call of conscience is a call to Dasein's Self in its they-self, back to itself in its uncanniness which, as Dasein, is guilty. The call calls me to my individuality and responsibility for myself. As such "the hearing which corresponds to such a call would be *taking cognizance* of the Fact that one is 'guilty'" (BT, 287). The call of conscience is Dasein's summoning itself to itself *as* being-guilty.

In understanding the call properly, one has an understanding of one's ownmost potentiality-for-being. I recognize that I can choose for myself who I will be with respect to my possibilities. "In understanding the call, Dasein is *in thrall to* [*hörig*] its ownmost *possibility of existence*. It has chosen itself" (BT, 287). This means that in my understanding the call of conscience, I understand that insofar as I am, I am guilty. As such, to choose to evade this guilt is in itself a perpetuation of my being-guilty and thus pointless. To do so would be the equivalent of trying to outrun my own skin; though I may try, I will always fail. Like death, guilt cannot be outstripped. In this impossibility I am in thrall to my guilt and thus must choose myself.

To evade my being-guilty would be to remain lost in *das Man*, because I would think that my guilt is something that could be evaded. This in itself would not be a proper understanding then of the call of conscience. Thus, it seems that a proper understanding of the call necessitates my choosing myself. However, one might wonder if Dasein wants to be authentic, and if so then why? I suggest that in a paradoxical way, Dasein, for the most part, does and does not desire to be authentic. What I mean by this is that Dasein desires the "sham of authenticity" and the

comfort and ease of inauthentic being (BT, 178). In this way Dasein does desire to be authentic but this is only because it has confused inauthentic living with authentic living. Dasein does not desire the type of authenticity that Heidegger has in mind because that would require Dasein to wrestle with itself as a responsible individual. I suppose that once Dasein has become truly authentic then this will change. That is, what comes along with authenticity (which we will see shortly) could allow for something like an existential flourishing where Dasein can take itself up more freely (though always restricted to its factual situation) than it did in inauthenticity and that this is something desirable. What I have in mind here is that, once authentic Dasein is no longer lost in the conformism that characterizes inauthentic Dasein. As such, there would be an increase in one's possibilities. I no longer have to do what one does. Rather, I can take myself up on my own terms according to my thrownness. I suggest that this freedom would be something desirable.

As I have mentioned earlier, Dasein for the most part finds itself lost in *das Man*. Thus, the call itself is to the self in the they-self. In understanding, Dasein chooses itself over the they-self. This means that, "[u]nderstanding the call is choosing" oneself, which as itself, it chooses to have-a-conscience, which, in doing so, liberates Dasein to its ownmost being-guilty (BT, 288). I choose to affirm who I am and the responsibility that comes with it. I am a being that has a conscience and I am responsible for who I am. In understanding the call I do not evade the facts of myself but embrace them. Thus, a proper understanding of the call entails wanting to have-a-conscience in which one is ready for the call itself.

Thus, the call of conscience is the silent call that calls Dasein from its lostness in *das Man* and puts it face to face with itself. In facing itself Dasein understands that to be is to be

guilty. As such, Dasein necessarily must choose itself (otherwise it would not have a proper understanding of the call). In choosing itself, Dasein takes itself up on its own accord as guilty and is not determined by *das Man*, and wants-to-have-a-conscience. This entails that my understanding the call is ultimately to bring myself to answer for myself.

V. Resoluteness and Anticipatory Resoluteness

Insofar as there is an understanding that corresponds to the call of conscience, there also corresponds a state-of-mind appropriate to what it is that is disclosed. The state-of-mind associated with such a disclosure is anxiety. In being disclosed to itself in anxiety, Dasein recognizes its possibility of the call and that of anxiety. Ultimately, in anxiety one is able to understand the call properly, in which “one’s *constant* Being-guilty is presented, and in this way the Self is brought back from” its lostness in *das Man* (BT, 296 italics added).

The mode of the discourse that takes place silently from Dasein to itself in the call, understood in anxiety, is reticence. Only in reticence can the call be understood in its silence. Otherwise, the call will be suppressed by *das Man*’s hubbub; levelled down, made average, and interpreted as something other than it is. This distinctive disclosedness, “*this reticent self-projection upon one’s ownmost Being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety*” is what Heidegger calls resoluteness (BT, 297). This is to say, Dasein is resolute when Dasein has taken up its individuality and responsibility for who it is.

In resoluteness Dasein is authentic. As resolute, the world and others are *modified* accordingly to authentic disclosedness. This is not to say that authentic Dasein becomes “detached” as a “free-floating I,” but rather, that the world and others are disclosed in a way that is not the same as inauthentic disclosedness (BT, 298). As authentic, the world and others are no

longer predetermined for me by *das Man*, but rather according to resoluteness. That is, on my own accord. How I take myself up in who I will be and my relation to others will be how I choose to do so with respect to my factual condition and thrownness.

This resoluteness is always “of some factual Dasein at a particular time” (BT, 298). It is Dasein itself that is resolute. Insofar as resoluteness frees Dasein to itself, in its choosing itself, what Dasein is to resolve is not determined beforehand. The choices (who I will be, how I will act, what I will do) are contextual to when and where I am. However, resoluteness is not merely acting on those possibilities disclosed. Rather, resoluteness’ resolution *is* “precisely the disclosive projection and determination of what is factually possible at the time” (BT, 298). Resoluteness itself then is one’s being disclosed to the possibilities pertaining to Dasein at a particular time, according to Dasein’s facticity. Thus, resoluteness itself is indefinite and only becomes definite in its resolution, in choosing one of its factual possibilities. Again, what I do will be contingent on my current circumstances and thus not something defined or determined ahead of time. This is not to say I cannot plan for the future. I can choose now that I want to be someone who stands up for others. How I do this will depend on the situation I find myself in.

Contrary to resoluteness is irresoluteness, which pertains to the disclosure of inauthentic Dasein. This type of disclosure, as inauthentic, predetermines the possibilities beforehand for Dasein. In irresoluteness, no Dasein can be resolved because *das Man* has already done this for Dasein. Who one is has been determined already according to the social norms. There are a few acceptable ways to be at a dinner party according to what type of dinner party one is at. Inauthentically, I fall in line with these expectations unthinkingly. This is not to say resolute Dasein must choose the contrary to these expectations. For the most part I presume most

resolute Dasein would do as expected. The difference then being that resolute Dasein has chosen for itself to do so, it has willfully decided to do so.

Though resoluteness entails Dasein's being summoned 'out of' *das Man*, the irresoluteness of the "they" remains dominant notwithstanding, but it cannot impugn resolute existence . . . resolutions remains dependent upon the "they" and its world . . . Resoluteness does not withdraw itself from 'actuality', but discovers first what is factually possible; and does so by seizing upon it in whatever way is possible for it as its ownmost potentiality-for-Being *in* the "they" (Bt, 299 italics and bold added).

Prima facia this may seem problematic insofar as it seems to suggest that authentic Dasein is still inauthentic insofar as it is still dependent upon *das Man*. Rather, resoluteness as a form of disclosure does not alter what is factually disclosed. It discloses those possibilities contingent upon Dasein's facticity *as* possibilities. These possibilities are still presented to Dasein by *das Man*, but rather than being predetermined by *das Man*, they are freed in resoluteness to be chosen by Dasein itself. Again, this is because *das Man* is meant to be read here as the necessity of conformity and not as a conformism. As resolute I am able to see this and am no longer lost in the conformism of the they-self. That is, *I* am the one taking myself up in *das Man* in relation to myself *as* I am and not as I am presented by *das Man*. I cannot escape my being socialized. That is, I cannot escape my history, background, way of understanding and interpreting the world in terms of the social structures I was brought up in. What I can do is take up these things and not let them determine me to the best of my abilities. Again, I cannot change the fact of when and where I was born, but I can choose who I will be within these limitations.

In Dasein's resoluteness there lies those possibilities illuminated for Dasein itself to resolve on. In this possibility of being resolute lies what Heidegger calls a Situation. "The situation is the 'there' which is disclosed in resoluteness - the 'there' as which the existent entity

is there” (BT, 299). In my finding myself in a situation my being-*there* is only disclosed as such in resoluteness, as resolved Dasein, resolved in my being-there. That is, only in resoluteness can Dasein recognize its possibilities of who it can be or what it can do in its current circumstances *as* possibilities. Resolute Dasein can see that it has a choice to make. Inauthentically one’s situation is merely general, in its being already determined by *das Man*. Who I am to be or what I am to do are already determined by what is average and acceptable. My choices have already been decided on and handed to me by *das Man*. Thus, it is only in resoluteness that Dasein can be disclosed in its “there” and find itself in a situation.

Thus, as thrown being-in-the-world, Dasein in its resoluteness finds itself in a situation already. In being resolved in this situation, Dasein is “already *taking action*” (BT, 300). That is, one’s situation is something one finds oneself in already, *as* acting. In other words, insofar as I am, it is impossible for me to not act. At every moment I am taking myself up in accord with my specific set of circumstances. It is not a process of deliberating and then acting. The deliberation itself would be to act. Thus, one’s situation is only adequately expressed in taking action.

Insofar as resoluteness pertains to Dasein’s understanding and choosing itself, it “is only that authenticity which, in care, is the object of care [*in der Sorge gesorgte*], and which is possible as care - the authenticity of care itself” (BT, 301). This quote suggests that, in resoluteness, one of the objects of its concern is Dasein’s resoluteness. That is, in resoluteness, Dasein can only be this resoluteness insofar as it is disclosed to itself and actively relating itself to itself. This disclosure discloses to Dasein its resoluteness which is an object of concern in my resoluteness. In resoluteness, Dasein is concerned for its own resoluteness which is only maintained in the fact that it is resolved in its self as being resolute. All of this is to say, as

authentic, one of Dasein's 'objects' of concern is Dasein's being authentic; a circularity I will take up in my analysis of Haugeland and his understanding of resoluteness. However, for a full attestation of authenticity we must account for Dasein's authentic being-towards-death.

As we have seen in resoluteness, Dasein is disclosed to itself. In this disclosure Dasein is fully disclosed to itself, which means that insofar as death is a possibility for Dasein, death is also disclosed. As we have seen earlier, the understanding appropriate to Dasein's death is its anticipation of death. Thus, resoluteness itself "harbors in itself authentic Being-towards-death, as the possible existentiell modality of its own authenticity" (BT, 305). In other words, resoluteness is only as such in Dasein's taking itself up in itself understandingly. Put differently, resoluteness necessitates Dasein's awareness of itself and how to properly comport itself towards itself. This is to say, I can only be resolute if I am in a proper relation to both who and what I am. This understanding, appropriated in anxiety, discloses to Dasein its potentiality-for-being. Death is one of these possibilities. As we have seen, the appropriate way to comport ourselves towards death is in anticipation. That is, I can comport myself appropriately towards death only in anticipation - a readiness for death that is held at all times. Thus, resoluteness itself, in Dasein's taking itself up for itself in understanding necessitates Dasein's being-towards-death in anticipation. That is, resoluteness necessitates anticipation. I can only be resolute insofar as I am appropriately comporting myself to who and what I am according to who and what I am. As Dasein I can only appropriately relate myself to the possibility of death in anticipation. Thus, insofar as Dasein is resolute, it is anticipating. This then is what is meant by anticipatory resoluteness. Therefore, "resoluteness is authentically and wholly what it can be, only as anticipatory resoluteness" (BT, 309).

With anticipatory resoluteness thus explicated, we may now illuminate its correspondence as a whole with the definition of authenticity I offered earlier.

VI. Authenticity: The Self-they

As I have claimed earlier, Heideggerian authenticity can be defined as Dasein's answering for itself while transparently relating itself to itself as Self-they. Having now explicated the structures relevant to authenticity, we may now map these structures onto my definition.

As we have seen, inauthentic Dasein is lost in *das Man*. As inauthentic, Dasein is accommodated and disburdened by *das Man*. Inauthentic Dasein, does not answer for itself, *das Man* does. Inauthentic Dasein is also not transparently relating itself to itself. On the contrary, *das Man* discloses Dasein to itself and its possibilities-for-being pre-determined on its own accord, leveled down and made average. Who I am to be or how I am to take myself up in given situations are generally answered for me according to the social norms and expectations of my society. Insofar as my definition appears to be the opposite of inauthentic Dasein, it appears we are off to a good start.

For Dasein to transparently relate itself to itself, Dasein must understand itself appropriately according to its being. All understanding corresponds to a state-of-mind. Anxiety is that state-of-mind which discloses Dasein to itself un-adulterated by *das Man*. Thus, my use of the word 'transparently' entails the state-of-mind-of anxiety.

What is being transparently disclosed is Dasein itself to itself. Dasein's being disclosed via anxiety entails Dasein's being face to face with itself transparently. As such, Dasein's essential structures, death, Guilty!, the call of conscience, are appropriately disclosed to Dasein.

Such disclosedness is what Heidegger ultimately calls anticipatory resoluteness. Thus, in transparently relating itself to itself, there lies anticipatory resoluteness, in which Dasein has chosen itself.

To anticipatory resoluteness there pertains Dasein's being in a situation and the possibility of Dasein being resolved within that factual situation. In this lies Dasein's actively taking action; that is, answering for itself in that situation. That is, anticipatory resoluteness makes Dasein aware of its current situation and the possibilities inherent to that specific situation. Thus, embedded within 'Dasein's answering for itself' is Dasein's choosing itself and taking action in its situation.

Thus, embedded within my definition of authenticity lies the corresponding structures Heidegger lays out as being relevant to authenticity. However, there is one last thing to be said.

As I have alluded to earlier when discussing resoluteness, Heidegger claims that Dasein's resoluteness remains dependent upon *das Man*. As Heidegger makes clear, my being authentic does not separate me from *das Man*, but *modifies* my relation to it. I suggest that this modification lies in Dasein's no longer being accommodated by *das Man*. *Das Man* still discloses the world to Dasein but, in resoluteness, it does not determine the world or level down my understanding of myself beforehand. The possibilities thus disclosed by *das Man* are seen as just that, as those possibilities presented by *das Man* which no longer predetermine me and my possibilities. As such, in a way I remain in *das Man* but in such a way where I am my own arbiter. I accommodate and take up myself *in das Man*. I capture this sense in the switching of the terms they-self, which signifies my lostness in *das Man*, to the Self-they, which will signify my being in *das Man* but no longer characterized by lostness nor being accommodated. Thus,

authentic Dasein is the self that has chosen itself while in *das Man*; it is the self characterized by conformity, but not conformism.

In conclusion, if we are to take my definition of authenticity and couple it with the Self found in it, I propose that a proper definition of authenticity is Dasein's answering for itself while transparently relating itself to itself as Self-they.

VII. Returning to the Question

Now that we have given a formal definition of authenticity as Dasein's answering for itself while transparently relating itself to itself as Self-they, we can properly address the question at hand. That question being, is authenticity for Heidegger permanent or is authenticity ephemeral? Prima facie we might think to answer that authenticity is ephemeral and hold that at times we act authentically and other times inauthentically. However, as of right now, we cannot answer this question. It is not clear with both what Heidegger has said in *Being and Time* and what I have said in my earlier analysis of authenticity that Dasein's being authentic will entail Dasein's permanently remaining authentic or not. Thus, further analysis is needed to allow for a supported claim in either an affirmative or negative response to the question at hand. In what is to follow, I will offer such an analysis. I will begin with an analysis of some of the leading figures that tackle the concept of authenticity with a focus on what they might have to say regarding the question at hand. Once done, I will investigate Haugeland's analysis of resoluteness suggesting that, even though he denies the permanence of authenticity, his analysis is the most fruitful springboard for an account of the permanence of authenticity. After my analysis of Haugeland, I will offer an account in favor of the permanence of authenticity grounded in Haugeland's discussion of resoluteness with some additional insight. I will then

conclude showing that this analysis of resoluteness is also captured in my original definition of authenticity.

VIII. A Dialogue between Dreyfus, Guignon, and Carman.

In turning to Dreyfus, Carman, and Guignon we quickly find that the question concerning the permanence of authenticity is a question that simply is not explicitly considered.² If anything is to be said, then it will come from a charitable reading and subtle hints made within their discussions of authenticity. However, at no point is any one of them clearly falling on the affirmative or negative side regarding our question.

In Hubert Dreyfus' article, "*Could anything be more intelligible than everyday intelligibility? Reinterpreting division I of Being and Time in the light of division II*" Dreyfus articulates two forms of authenticity in which one form is superior or fully authentic and the other is not. The first form of authenticity is what Dreyfus refers to as the social virtuoso. For Dreyfus, the social virtuoso is able to immediately and appropriately respond to the situation she finds herself in. The social virtuoso's ability to aptly respond to her situations is due to her past experiences and her desire to be better than what is average.

In comparison, the social virtuoso is akin to resolute Dasein insofar as what "he does is not the *taken-for-granted, average* right thing - not what *one* does - but what his past experience leads him to do in that particular Situation" (Dreyfus, 163). However, though there seems to be a similarity between the social virtuoso and resolute authentic Dasein, the social virtuoso is not fully authentic. Dreyfus makes this explicit when he claims, "[s]uch a person's understanding of

² To my knowledge, no one considers this question explicitly as I have formulated it here. Though others have hinted to the permanence of authenticity, it is only Haugeland who makes a definitive claim. Because of this I have chosen to focus my analysis to those I take to be some of the leading scholars on authenticity.

his society is richer and deeper than the average understanding and so he is generally more effective. But he is not yet fully authentic” (Dreyfus, 166). Thus, though the social virtuoso is authentic for Dreyfus, there is a second form of authenticity that is understood to be fully authentic.

To be fully authentic, Dasein must be what Dreyfus calls the cultural master. The difference between the social virtuoso and the cultural master resides in their differing levels of resoluteness. The social virtuoso is resolute only insofar as he faces the anxiety of guilt. As such he “merely experiences his thrownness and so has the sense that the social norms are not roles to be rigidly followed” (Dreyfus, 167). Yet, the cultural master faces the anxiety of both guilt and death in *anticipatory* resoluteness. In doing so, the cultural master does not take “for granted the agreed-upon current cultural issues” and thus, “transforms his generation’s understanding of the issues facing the culture and produces a new authentic ‘we’” (Dreyfus, 167). Thus, for Dreyfus there are two forms of authenticity that are derived from two forms of resoluteness. The first form is resolute in the face of guilt alone, and the other faces both guilt and death and is said to be fully authentic. Given these forms of authenticity we may now ask if they support or deny the permanence of authenticity.

Looking first to the social virtuoso, it seems that we might *prima facie* claim in the affirmative, saying yes authenticity is permanent. The amount of experience required to reach such a level where one’s responses to situations are immediate and correct, even in the face of unfamiliar situations, suggests that authenticity (of this type) is akin to riding a bike. After riding a bike long enough, in all terrain and weather conditions, the expert cyclist takes in her experiences to a degree where cycling becomes second nature; her bike becomes an extension of

her body. Dreyfus uses a similar analogy in which the expert driver is said to be able to feel the car and is able to shift gears appropriately based on the hum of the engine.

However, like the above analogy, the social virtuoso has its limits. Most professional athletes will claim that being away from constant practice will leave them rusty. Certainly they can get back on the horse in a position better than most beginners, but they feel as if they are not in peak condition. This raises the question as to whether or not this applies to the social virtuoso as well. In not keeping vigilant in their social interactions, could the social virtuoso lose a level of authenticity or be considered authentically rusty? If so, then it might be possible to reject our intuitions that the social virtuoso offers an account of authenticity that is permanent.

Yet, perhaps our stretching an analogy to its limits is not sufficient grounds for denying the permanence of the social virtuoso. A more promising investigation might be found in analyzing Dreyfus' claim that there are two forms of authenticity grounded in the two forms of resoluteness. Again, Dreyfus claims that the social virtuoso is resolute in only facing the anxiety of guilt, whereas the cultural master faces the anxiety of both guilt and death. I propose that it seems more plausible to deny the wedge Dreyfus places between the two different notions of resoluteness than it does to have two different types of resoluteness.

In Heidegger's discussion of authenticity it is true, as Dreyfus points out, that Heidegger's first stab at defining resoluteness is concerned with the call of conscience and guilt. However, and oddly enough as Dreyfus points this out as well, Heidegger claims that "[r]esoluteness gains its authenticity as *anticipatory* resoluteness" (Dreyfus, 166). It seems here that Heidegger is suggesting not two forms of authenticity and resoluteness but rather a more proper and explicit form of resoluteness in which death is also disclosed. As we will see in the

next section, Haugeland will have more to say about this. However, for the time being, if I am correct in my definition of authenticity, then it is only in an incorporation of being-towards-death as anticipation that Dasein can be said to be authentic. Thus, insofar as Dreyfus' social virtuoso only faces the anxiety of guilt, it seems more appropriate to ask whether the social virtuoso is what Heidegger has in mind as authentic Dasein. I claim that it is not – for the reasons just offered. Yet, insofar as Dreyfus' cultural master does face the anxiety of both guilt and death we can now ask the question of permanence focusing on the cultural master.

Again, we might be inclined to think that a cultural master might be permanently authentic. However, like the social virtuoso, it is ultimately unclear. That is, it is not clear whether A) the cultural master is restricted to her own culture or if her mastery extends to the world as a whole, and B) if the cultural master's readiness for death extends to her identity as cultural master. Finally Dreyfus's idiom does not help push us in any particular direction (whereas, as we will see, both Carman's and Guignon's does) in clearing up these concerns and thus, does not help us with the question of permanence.

First, though the cultural master "radically transforms his generation's understanding of the issues facing the culture and produces a new authentic 'we'" (Dreyfus, 167), it is not clear if this cultural transformation is restricted to his own culture or not. Dreyfus does not tell us one way or the other. If there is such a restriction in place, then authenticity it seems would be restricted to the cultural master's own cultural interactions. Yet, Heidegger makes no claims as to authenticity being restricted to Dasein's factual culture or not. Thus, it seems wrong to suggest that one can only be authentic within one's own culture. Ultimately Dreyfus does not help us in this conundrum.

Second, it is not clear if death for Dreyfus extends to the cultural master being a cultural master. That is, insofar as Dreyfus understands death existentially and authentic Dasein's identity as a "radical innovator" that "transforms his generation," it would follow that death would extend to Dasein's authenticity as well. If so, then we could assuredly make the claim that authenticity is not permanent.

However, again, it is not clear that this is what Dreyfus actually holds to be true. Rather, this seems to be a problem more so with Dreyfus' pushing authenticity too far. That is, Heidegger's discussion of resoluteness claims that we cannot say what Dasein will resolve on in its current situation. This means that authentic Dasein could in fact take itself up as a cultural master *or* as a humble clerk. Who authentic Dasein is, is ultimately up to Dasein itself.³ Authentic Dasein might very well be the cultural master, but not out of necessity.

Finally, Dreyfus offers no hints whether he understands authenticity as being permanent or not. Given that his analysis of authenticity primarily focuses on who authentic Dasein will be and what she will do, it is not clear if authenticity is permanent. At best we must rely on the analogies offered and the claims of who authentic Dasein will be. Thus, I suggest we move on from Dreyfus in search of richer pastures, concluding that at best it is uncertain if Dreyfus' understanding of authenticity entails permanence.

Next, turning to Charles Guignon's article "Heidegger's "Authenticity" Revisited", we find that "[t]o be authentic is to be resolute about one's ability to live one's life as a coherent

³ In Dreyfus' article he recognizes that a lot of what Heidegger has to say about authenticity is a mixing between Aristotle and Søren Kierkegaard. As such, it would be helpful here to remember that Kierkegaard's Knight of Faith in *Fear and Trembling* (which is very similar to Heidegger's authentic Dasein) is someone who "looks just like a tax collector! [. . .] a pen-pusher [and is] impossible to distinguish [. . .] from the rest of the crowd" (Kierkegaard, 39).

totality” (Guignon, 333). Thus, for Guignon the emphasis in authenticity is on my relation to death. However, Guignon has a different understanding of death than the one I suggested in my analysis of death, and his narrative account allows him to define authenticity as he does.

For Guignon, Dasein is to be seen as a “‘happening’ or ‘event’ extending ‘from birth to death.’ Just as the being of an event is defined in terms of its outcome (i.e., ‘what happened’), so to the being of Dasein is defined in terms of the achievement of its life as a whole” (Guignon, 330). However, because this cannot occur after death, in which I am no longer existing, Heidegger defines “Being-*towards-death* [. . .] as a way of living in relation to one’s end” (Guignon, 330). The point being that to live authentically is to attempt to live one’s life as a coherent unity throughout the entirety of one’s life.

Though in Guignon’s 2008 article “Authenticity”, he explicitly claims that death for Heidegger is existential, he has clearly tied existential death to the completion of Dasein found in Dasein’s biological death. Under such a view, it should be clear that Guignon is walking a fine line between reading death biologically and existentially. As such, it then becomes clear why his definition of authenticity is as he suggests.

If we were to ask if such a view of authenticity is permanent, it seems that at best we can say it is not clear. Surely it is possible for someone to live a life that is a coherent unity up until biological death, which might suggest our answer to our question would be in favor of the permanence of authenticity. Guignon hints to the possibility of prolonged authenticity when he says “[b]eing authentic obviously requires that an individual have other virtues, such as honesty (with oneself, certainly), courage, *constancy* (*no one could be authentic for just one minute*), and a capacity for self-knowledge” (Guignon 2008 emphasis added, 287).

Clearly, Guignon thinks authenticity lasts for some extended period of time. However, at best we can only say that it is possible for someone to be authentic her whole life. I can fail to live my life as a coherent unity. Guignon recognizes this when he says,

I can only *be* an atheist all my life, for example, if I do not fall prey to any last-minute conversions. If I succumb to my family's entreaties and repent on my deathbed, the description "life-long atheist" is no longer true for me (Guignon 1984, 330).

If the goal of authenticity for Guignon is to live out our lives as a coherent unity, then such examples as deathbed conversions suggest the possibility of failing to live authentically. Thus, we must conclude for Guignon, that authenticity is not permanent.

Turning next to Taylor Carman, we can find two claims about authenticity that might illuminate an answer to the permanence of authenticity. The first is found in Carman's 2000 article "Must We Be Inauthentic?" in which Carman holds that authenticity is to be seen as an ongoing resistance to inauthentic understanding (Carman 2000, 25). The second claim is found in Carman's later works "Authenticity" (2005) and "The Concept of Authenticity" (2006) in which Carman gives a more formal definition of authenticity as "forerunning resoluteness" (Carman 2006, 234).

Turning first to Carman's later works we will begin with an examination of forerunning resoluteness. Resoluteness, Carman claims, "is to remain sensitive to the unique demands of the concrete 'situation' (*Situation*), as opposed to subsuming it under generic rules and categories of thought, thus reducing it to a mere 'general state of affairs' (*allgemeine Lage*) and responding with rigid preconceived attitudes and behaviors" (Carman 2006, 234). For Carman, the resolute Dasein will "*maintain* a subtle feel for the situation they confront" (Carman 2006 emphasis added, 234). Thus, resoluteness for Carman is to remain steadfast and grounded in my being

sensitive to my factual situations and not allowing them to fall prey to the levelling down and generalizing understanding of inauthenticity.

Forerunning (Carman's translation of the German word typically translated as "anticipation"), Carman tells us, "means running up against or even *into* death" where death for Carman is read existentially. As such, I am as a forerunning agent "ready, willing and able to embrace a particular and inherently fragile set of possibilities, even as they tend to fall apart under their own weight" (Carman 2006, 234). Thus, forerunning resoluteness is Dasein's maintaining an openness to its current situation, all while holding to the fragility of its current identity and possibilities.

In Carman's earlier article we find a slightly different, though not incommensurable, definition of authenticity. This difference is partly due to the purpose of the paper. In "Must We Be Inauthentic" Carman is concerned with the possibility of authenticity in light of Heidegger's discussion of falling and discourse. The concern there, it seems, is that because Dasein's mode of discourse is fundamentally grounded within "more or less generic, commonly intelligible terms" (Carman 2000, 24), and insofar as the very way we understand all intelligible things is levelled down, it seems that Dasein fundamentally is and must remain inauthentic.

This concern pushes Carman to claim that authenticity must be portrayed in negative terms. Carman says, "[r]esoluteness is not a subtle, self sufficient mode of existence, but a perpetual struggle against the reifying and banalizing forces inherent in discursive practice. Authentic existence is thus constituted by the very forces against which it has to push in its effort to grasp itself in its facticity" (Carman 2000, 24). As a perpetual struggle, Carman offers the analogy that being a resolute agent is akin to swimming against the current. As such,

“authenticity consists in nothing over and beyond our ongoing resistance to the banalizing, levelling pressure that pulls us away from any explicit recognition of the ‘mine-ness’ at the center of our existence” (Carman 2000, 25). In other words, to be authentic is to keep to my mine-ness in a perpetual cosmic struggle against the inauthentic idiom that constitutes discourse.

Interestingly, we find Carman combining both definitions of authenticity in his 2005 article “Authenticity.” Here Carman claims that

Attending to the fine grained details of the concrete situation [(resoluteness)] and wholeheartedly embracing the inherent inertia and dissolution of possibilities [(forerunning)] both require that I hold fast to my first-person self-understanding and resist letting it be assimilated into any generic or impersonal conception of people like me in situations like this (Carman 2005, 292).

Here Carman has combined both definitions, where both forerunning resoluteness and our perpetual resistance against the levelling down and banalizing effects of my first-personal experiences via discourse entail each other. That is, what it means to “swim against the current” of our inauthentic discourse *is* to be forerunning resolute Dasein. And, to be forerunning resolute Dasein entails a perpetual struggle to maintain an “explicit recognition of my mine-ness.” Both necessarily entail the other.

Under such light it seems that Carman’s description of authenticity is highly suggestive of the permanence of authenticity. Both resoluteness and forerunning “*require that I hold fast to my first-person self-understanding*” (Carman 2005 emphasis added, 292). As resolute Dasein I am in a “*perpetual struggle*” (Carman 2000 emphasis added, 24). Also, as resolute Dasein, I “*maintain a subtle feel for*” my situations (Carman 2006 emphasis added, 234). Finally, as forerunning Dasein I am “*continually exposed to the essential instability and vulnerability of my world and my identity*” (Carman 2006 emphasis added, 234).

Carman's way of describing authenticity strongly points in the direction that authenticity is meant to be understood as permanent. Sadly, however, I do not think we can conclude here that authenticity is permanent. Though Carman appears to point in favor of authenticity's permanence, he has not A) made such a claim explicit and B) his analysis at best supports Guignon's claim that no one can be authentic for only one minute. That is, it is possible that the "current" we are fighting as authentic agents may overwhelm us and we fall back into inauthenticity (even if only for a moment). Thus, Carman's analysis and strong idiom cannot support the permanence of authenticity on its own. At best, it seems that Carman has offered a possible existential account of the permanence of authenticity that describes how it feels to be authentic; maintaining ourselves in a perpetual struggle against the current. Thus, in need of a more in-depth analysis that supports the permanence of authenticity, I will now turn to John Haugeland's article, "Truth and Finitude: Heidegger's Transcendental Existentialism."

IX. Haugeland and Resoluteness

Contrary to Carman, Dreyfus, and Guignon, Haugeland does have something to both say and offer in support of my claim that authenticity is permanent. Haugeland's claim is that authenticity is not permanent, however, but rather is a way of being that varies from case to case (and, quite possibly in degrees). Nevertheless, though authenticity is not permanent for Haugeland, Haugeland's analysis of resoluteness will prove to be the perfect springboard for the proposal of authenticity's permanence.

Haugeland's claim that authenticity is not permanent comes across loud and clear when he says:

Thus, ownedness and unownedness are alternative *ways* in which Dasein, in any given case, can be respectively "its own" ("mine"). Dasein is invariably *its own* (mine) in each

case. But it may or may not be *owned* - ownedness is something over and above mineness that varies from case to case (Haugeland, 62).

Thus, authenticity for Haugeland is something that varies from time to time and case to case, and as such, is not something permanent. Yet, skipping ahead some, Haugeland offers an analysis of resoluteness that seems to suggest the opposite.

Haugeland reminds us that the “word ‘resolute’ means firmly and unwaveringly determined or decisive” and that Heidegger captures this meaning in his claim that “resoluteness resolves to ‘repeat itself’ - that is, to keep at it or stick to it by, as it were, constantly ‘re-resolving’” (Haugeland, 68). And yet, “resoluteness cannot become rigidly set in its ways about its situation, but rather must be held open and free for whatever its current possibility is [. . .] it must hold itself free from a possible - and, in each case, necessary - *taking it back* [. . .] retracting or withdrawing it - that is giving up on it” (Haugeland, 68). What Heidegger is referring to in a readiness for “taking it back” is existential death. Again, this means the collapse of my worldly identity. Thus, resoluteness is both committed to remain and repeat what it is resolved upon in its situation while constantly being open to the possibility of taking it back.

Haugeland goes on to claim that the freedom in resolute Dasein’s holding itself free for the possibility of taking it back is “the freedom of *responsible* decision” (Haugeland, 71). This is to say, the responsibility of resolute Dasein “is responsible to that very disclosing of self and being that, as a resolute decisiveness, resoluteness as such is” (Haugeland, 74). What Haugeland means by this can best be described by analogy.

The authentic physicist holds herself resolutely to the history she has inherited in her field of study. She believes the Earth revolves around the sun, objects fall at 9.82 meters per second squared, and that unadulterated water in normal conditions freezes at zero degrees Celsius, etc,

etc. That is, she holds true the framework of how our current understanding of the physical world works. However, this is not to say that she remains stubbornly resolved. Part of her responsibility as a scientist is to wrestle with the data she finds in her research. If she were to discover a new phenomenon that our current scientific framework could not account for or, to go even farther, phenomena that contradict what was thought to be possible or impossible, then her world, so to speak, becomes up for grabs. She will either need to show how the data is somehow incorrect, show how the current theories in place can account for this new phenomena, amend the current relevant theories, or give a complete overhaul of the current theories.

One example of this recently occurred when a team of physicists recorded particles traveling faster than the speed of light (which later turned out to be an error in their instruments). If such a discovery were to turn out to be true, then it would undermine some of our most fundamental laws of physics. As such, there would not have been a simple tune-up of our current theories to reconcile such a finding; rather, there would be a wholesale uprooting of our current understanding of physics. Thus, as a responsible scientist, not only must she hold fast to her identity as a scientist and her inherited history of what it means to be a scientist, she must also, as another part of what it means to be a scientist, remain free for taking it back. This is to say that part of what it means to be a physicist is to be open to the possibility of scrapping the current understanding of the physical world. Though she is not quick to do so, if the evidence cannot be accounted for and is overwhelming, then the only course of action available is to start over. This means that as a scientist she is both holding fast to her heritage (resoluteness) and she must be open to the possibility of taking it back (anticipatory being-towards-death).

As Haugeland points out, the freedom of taking it back “doesn’t mean [Dasein] *does* take it back, still less that it does so easily or casually” rather, this freedom is “a burden - the most onerous of burdens” one that “resolute Dasein must *hold* itself” in (Haugeland, 72). Haugeland’s wording here suggests that the responsibility of resolute Dasein is something that Dasein must hold at all times. Yet, Haugeland does not push farther to say that this entails or even suggests the permanence of authenticity.

However, Haugeland does go on to suggest that this understanding of resoluteness is why Heidegger also speaks of death. “Taking responsibility resolutely means living in a way that explicitly has everything at stake” (Haugeland, 73). This is to say, as I claimed earlier, that resoluteness necessarily entails anticipatory being-towards-death. Thus, a part of what it means to be resolute is to also remain open to the possibility of taking it back.

Though inauthentic Dasein flees from the risk of its being (the possibility of existential death), “though it can never escape it [. . .] resolute Dasein faces up to it by taking over responsibility for itself - that is, by resolving to repeat itself, while holding itself free for taking it back” (Haugeland, 73). Again, Haugeland seems to be leaning towards a reading of authenticity that is permanent in the sense that it would responsibly perpetuate itself. As responsible resolute Dasein, Dasein both recognizes and owns the impossibility of fleeing itself *as* an impossibility. Seen and maintained as an impossibility, it would be irresponsible to project oneself into it as if it were a possibility. Thus, as responsible resolute Dasein, Dasein would not flee in the face of itself but own its self and as resolute repeat this ownership. However, it is not clear with Haugeland’s understanding of “taking it back,” if it extends to my owning (facing up to and accepting what it is to be Dasein) myself.

Thus, for Haugeland, resoluteness has two essential features. The first is that resoluteness repeats itself. Second, resoluteness also holds itself open to the possibility of taking it back. Though at times Haugeland's discussion comes close to a proposal for the permanence of authenticity, he never goes so far as to cross that line and explicitly make such a claim. Therefore, we must hold to his earlier claim, that authenticity is contextual.

However, though Haugeland's discussion of resoluteness does not claim a permanence of authenticity, I believe that there is a distinction within resoluteness that Haugeland overlooks (or, at the least, never makes explicit); namely, that there are objects of concern for resolute Dasein that cannot be taken back. Thus, in the following section I will build on Haugeland's discussion of resoluteness and suggest that this new reading does support the permanence of authenticity.

X. On the Permanence of Authenticity

I do not wish to suggest that what Haugeland offers in his analysis of resoluteness is incorrect. Rather, I suggest that he has not grasped everything about resoluteness. That is, Haugeland's reading of resoluteness seems to suggest that what Dasein is resolute upon is Dasein's identity (who Dasein is and the possibilities pertaining to that particular identity) and Dasein's factual situation. However, Heidegger seems to suggest there are more things for Dasein to be resolved upon; namely, resoluteness itself and Dasein's own ontological structures. If correct then it will also follow that it is impossible for authentic Dasein to return to inauthenticity. That is, I suggest there is an object of resoluteness that does not allow for the possibility of "taking it back" such that once resolute, Dasein cannot cease to be resolute.

Haugeland's reading of resoluteness, for the most part, is both identity and situation-centric. That is, his discussion of resoluteness revolves around the "who" of Dasein, and how

this identity illuminates Dasein's awareness of its factual situation and possibilities. As such, he is correct to focus on resoluteness as Dasein responsibly repeating itself and yet holding itself open to taking it back.

As a responsible agent, if I am given sufficient evidence that suggests my current understanding of the world is incorrect, I must be open to a wholesale giving up of that understanding and identity. Recall our physicist who discovers something that completely and irreconcilably undermines the current laws and theories that make up our understanding of the universe and what it means to be as a physicist. In such a situation, she must be willing to give up this identity and start anew. However, this reading of resoluteness, though correct, revolves around the specific practical identity of Dasein; something that can, though reluctantly, be given up. Is it possible for there to be something that Dasein could be resolute about that could not be given up? I suggest that there is and that it is Dasein itself *as* Dasein.

A resolute stance of Dasein towards itself *as* Dasein will involve two objects of concern for the resolute Dasein. The first is *what* Dasein is, Guilty! being-towards-death, thrown projection, etc.,. The second concern is resoluteness itself. That is to say, I am resolute about myself as Dasein and I am resolute about my being resolute.

In the first case, in my being resolute about my being Dasein, both Haugeland and Dreyfus have something to offer. As I mentioned earlier, Haugeland claims that resolute Dasein faces up to itself. Though not explicit, I read this as saying that resolute Dasein takes ownership of its ontological structures. As inauthentic we flee in the face of our ontological structures, we do not want to face up to the possibility of existential death, our being an individual and responsible. We do not wish to walk in Atlas' shoes, carrying the weight of existence on our

backs. For the most part, we would rather float in the lazy river of inauthenticity. As authentic, Dasein is resolute and accepts these facts about itself, taking ownership of its individuality, responsibility and has a readiness for death.

However, if this is what Haugeland means, then we have a problem. Haugeland's discussion of "taking it back" accounts for the possibility of existential death. Existential death, as we recall, is the death of a "who," (my being a scientist, athlete, actor). That is, death is the death of my identity. Yet, insofar as the ontological structures of Dasein are what it is to be Dasein, it is impossible for Dasein to die to these structures (as a whole or individually) and remain Dasein.

As Haugeland tells us, a part of what it is to be resolute is also to be responsible, which means to only project ourselves into those possibilities that are possible and not those that are impossible. Remembering that as authentic, Dasein is opened to its current factual situation, authentic Dasein is aware of both the possibilities and impossibilities of its situation. In conjunction with authentic Dasein's being responsibly resolute and being resolute in its taking itself up, it would then be impossible for Dasein to attempt to flee itself. Why?

As resolute about my being Dasein and facing up to what it means to be Dasein, I recognize the teleological impossibility of successfully fleeing myself. As responsible and both seeing and holding this impossibility as an impossibility I would not choose to attempt to flee myself. To do so would be to be irresponsible. Finally, insofar as it is impossible for me to die to my being Dasein, the possibility of fleeing myself successfully is seen as something that will never be possible. Authentic Dasein recognizes that it can never die to its ontological structures

and thus, it will never be a possibility to successfully flee itself. As an impossibility, authentic Dasein will never attempt to flee itself and thus remain authentic.

One might suggest what I have said is based on a misreading of Haugeland's claim that "resolute Dasein faces up to it by taking over responsibility for itself" (Haugeland, 73). If I am wrong, then it does not follow that one of the objects of resolute Dasein's concerns is Dasein's ontological structures, and thus it does not follow that authenticity is permanent. However, regardless if I am right or wrong we can return to Dreyfus' claim of two forms of resoluteness and thus, two forms of authenticity.

Recall that Dreyfus believes that Heidegger was confused when he claimed that resoluteness is Dasein's "*Self-projection upon one's ownmost being-guilty, in which one is ready for anxiety*" (Dreyfus, 166), and then later claimed that resoluteness is only fully authentic when it faces the anxiety of both guilt and death. Dreyfus reads this as suggesting two different types of resoluteness. However, in light of Haugeland, it seems more so to be the case that Heidegger was not confused, but rather is illustrating that there are different objects of concern for resolute Dasein. That is, resolute Dasein is concerned about Dasein's ontological structures, who Dasein is, and Dasein's response to its factual situation. In making this distinction we do not fall victim to there being different levels or types of authenticity and we can see that it is the case that at least one of the objects of concern for resoluteness is Dasein's ontological structures. This is to say that Dreyfus' mistake in claiming two types of resoluteness helps us see that there are other objects of concern for resolute Dasein - namely, Dasein's ontological structures which cannot be taken back.

Yet, let us suppose this is an unsatisfactory account of the permanence of authenticity. Maybe authentic Dasein is not necessarily permanently resolute about its structures and thus can choose to be inauthentic. I suggest that there is a second way to propose the permanence of authenticity.

Recall Heidegger's following claim, "*Resoluteness, however, is only that authenticity which, in care, is the object of care [in der Sorge georgte], and which is possible as care - the authenticity of care itself*" (BT, 301). I read this as saying that one of the objects of authentic Dasein's resoluteness is its being resolute. That is, one of the objects of resolute Dasein's concern is Dasein's being resolute. As such, a part of what it is for resolute Dasein to be resolute then is to be concerned about its being resolute.

This, I suggest, places authentic Dasein into a vicious circle of concern. As authentic, in every situation I find myself in, my being authentic is an object of my concern. Even if I were to consider the possibility of being inauthentic, I would approach such a thought from an authentically concerned mode of being. Thus, once I am authentic and my being authentic is a concern of my authenticity, attempting to be inauthentic becomes a logically absurd task. How can one authentically be inauthentic? Any attempt would always be from within an authentically concerned manner which then itself defeats the possibility of being inauthentic.

One might offer the following example as a counter example to disprove my claim that it is impossible to authentically be inauthentic. Suppose I am Dostoevsky's Underground Man from *Notes from the Underground*. "I am a sick man. . . . I am a spiteful man. No, I am not a pleasant man at all. I believe there is something wrong with my liver" (Dostoevsky, 193). However, instead of refusing to see a doctor out of sheer spite, I choose to go to the doctor.

“However, I don’t know a damn thing about my liver” (Dostoevsky, 193). Assuming that I am authentic, without a medical degree it seems impossible for me to make a fully informed decision about the proper course of action (at least, informed to the extent that I understand the situation on the same level as my doctor). Knowing nothing about my liver, I must defer to the medical expertise of my doctor - and oh how I despise him for this.

In such situations, most relinquish their decision to the medical expertise of their doctor. One might claim that in doing so one is being inauthentic insofar as they are relinquishing the responsibility of making the decision for their self. As such, they would authentically be inauthentic in such a situation. However, this would be based on an incorrect understanding of authenticity.

In such a situation as the one above, the authentic Dasein is not relinquishing its authenticity by allowing someone else to choose for it. Rather, Dasein in this situation is actively taking itself up in its situation. As such, she recognizes her lack of medical expertise and actively (responsibly, resolutely, and owned) decides for herself to defer to the advice of her doctor. This is not a failure to own one’s self; just the opposite, Dasein here responds for itself and owns its decision based on the current situation it finds itself in. I propose that in all cases in which it seems that one is authentically relinquishing one’s responsibility of taking oneself up authentically (authentically being inauthentic) will be similar to the above case. Even an active attempt to be inauthentic (which I take it no authentic Dasein would do) from within authenticity will always be undermined by its own authenticity.

Another possible objection to the suggestion of the permanence of authenticity grounded in resoluteness’ concern for its being resolute could be found with a return to death. In other

words, in the case of existential death does Dasein cease to be resolute? I suggest the answer is no.

Recall again the objects of resoluteness' concern, one being Dasein *as* Dasein, another being the "who" of Dasein, and now additionally, resoluteness itself. Existential death is only concerned with the "who" of Dasein, which will affect Dasein's ability to take itself up in its possibilities. It is not, however, concerned with Dasein *as* Dasein or authentic resoluteness' concern for its being resolute. As such, we could, in one response, defer back to what I have previously said about Dasein's being responsibly resolute in its acceptance of its ontological structures. Thus, even in death, because these structures remain, my being resolute in them is not extinguished.

A second response can be offered by considering resoluteness as one of the objects of concern for resolute Dasein. Recall what Haugeland had to say about resoluteness; primarily, that what it means to be resolute is to be open to the possibility of "taking it back" - that is, death. Taken together, we again find ourselves in a similar situation as before. Before we asked if authentic Dasein could authentically choose to be inauthentic. Now we are faced with the question of the possibility of resolutely resolving to not be resolute. Again, I suggest that it is logically absurd to claim the affirmative to this question for the same reasons we claimed that it is absurd to think we could be authentically inauthentic.

Insofar as death is held as a possibility in my being resolute, in the event of death I am resolute about death. Going back to the example of our physicist who discovers something traveling faster than the speed of light, we see that insofar as it is impossible to reconcile such a discovery within the current understanding of physics, she resolves to scratch her current

understanding of physics (or those areas affected by such a discovery). That is, she has resolutely died to her being a physicist as it is currently understood. Surely she is still a physicist, but no longer in the same way as she was before the discovery. Yet, this death occurred from within resoluteness. Again, this is possible because resoluteness is not only concerned with who Dasein is but also its being resolute. As such, Dasein, in death, remains resolute about its concern for being resolute. Thus, again, I suggest that once Dasein is authentic, Dasein will remain authentic and that it is impossible for authentic Dasein to actively return to being inauthentic.

But can we take this claim to further to suggest the structural impossibility of falling back into inauthenticity? I suggest we can, but we will need to see if there is a way to overcome a few concerns that arise out of Heidegger's discussion of falling and thrownness. That is, as it is now, I have merely shown that once authentic, Dasein cannot purposively return to being inauthentic. I have not shown that once Dasein is authentic, despite Dasein's existential structure of falling and thrownness, that it cannot lapse back into inauthenticity. To better understand this problem it will be beneficial to return briefly to Heidegger's discussion of falling, thrownness, and moods.

Heidegger's discussion of moods shows us first that "in every case Dasein always has some mood" (BT, 134). Moods for Heidegger disclose "*in every case, Being-in-the-world as a whole, and makes it possible first of all to direct oneself towards something*" (BT, 137).

Furthermore, moods for Heidegger are thrown. What this means is that the "whence" and "whither" they come from "remain in darkness" (BT, 134). Thus, moods are something we find ourselves thrust into that color what shows up as mattering in the world. Heidegger captures the idea of the thrownness that determines how the world shows up meaningfully with the term

attunement. Thus, the first objection to my account as a structural permanence refers to thrownness and the attunement that discloses it. In other words, is it possible, once authentic, to be thrown into a mood that will simply thrust Dasein back into inauthenticity?

The second objection is concerned with what Heidegger calls falling. We are told that through idle talk, curiosity, and ambiguity “there is revealed a basic kind of Being which belongs to *everydayness*; we call this the ‘*falling*’ of Dasein” (BT italics added, 175). Falling signifies Dasein’s “absorption in. . .” which “has mostly the character of Being-lost in the publicness of the ‘they’” (BT, 175). Thus, falling for Heidegger is in essence a more penetrating analysis of inauthentic Dasein lost in *das Man* as the they-self and why it remains lost for the most part.

Heidegger then goes on to describe the effects of falling. We are told that through idle talk, in which everything is publicly interpreted, the possibility for Dasein to lose itself in the “they” presents itself as a possibility and as such is “*tempting*” (BT, 177). This temptation to be inauthentic is due to the “*tranquility*” the “they” brings with inauthentic being. Remember, Heidegger spoke of the “they” earlier as “disburdening” (BT, 127). It is this that Heidegger has in mind when he says that falling into inauthenticity is both “tempting” and “tranquilizing.” Yet, this tranquilizing effect of the “they” does not subdue Dasein but further “*aggravates* the falling” (BT, 178). This aggravation “forces [Dasein] into its inauthenticity” in which Dasein becomes “*entangled*” with its self (BT, 178). In other words, what Heidegger is describing is the power of inauthentic being and its ability to ensnare Dasein. Brought up in a world where everything is made average, normal, and understandable, the ease of such living can rightfully be said to be intoxicating. As we witnessed earlier, inauthentic living is life made easy. I do what one does and there is no need to think too hard for myself.

Heidegger captures the entangling, tranquilizing, and tempting way of being with what he terms the “*downward plunge*” (BT, 178). Heidegger tells us that this “downward plunge [. . .] has the kind of motion which constantly tears the understanding away from the projecting of authentic possibilities” (BT, 178). This is because inauthentic Dasein’s possibilities are restricted by the conformism it finds itself lost in. It is this “constant tearing” within falling that Heidegger calls turbulence. Finally, and most concerning, Heidegger tells that falling “is a definite existential characteristic of Dasein itself” (BT, 176).

Thus, the objection concerning falling is as follows: by virtue of being-with and being-in-a-world, Dasein is existentially characterized by falling. This signifies that by Dasein’s being, Dasein is perpetually torn away from taking itself up authentically and is intoxicated with the tempting tranquility and ease of inauthenticity. How then can authentic Dasein be structurally shut off from falling back into inauthenticity?

In responding to the second objection it would be beneficial to note that Heidegger’s discussion of falling captures two aspects of Dasein. The first is that falling is an existential structure. The second is that the thrust of falling into inauthenticity is meant to capture Dasein that is already inauthentic. The point of making such a distinction is to suggest that we read falling like we read *das Man*. That is, falling as an existential structure strongly leads to inauthenticity but does not necessitate that I remain inauthentic. A good reason for suggesting this reading is also grounded in Heidegger’s claim about authentic Dasein’s relation to falling. He claims that “*authentic* existence is not something which floats above falling everydayness; existentially, it is only a modified way in which such everydayness is seized upon” (BT, 179). This relation between authentic Dasein and falling is exactly what we encountered with authentic

Dasein's relation to *das Man*. Thus, it seems that a proper understanding of falling is as follows. Falling is an existential structure of Dasein by virtue of Dasein's being-in-a-world and being-with. As such, Dasein is perpetually presented with the possibility of being inauthentic. This is what Heidegger seems to have in mind when he speaks of the turbulence and the constant tempting. However, Heidegger's downward plunge and entanglement seem to be meant to capture the ensnaring effect of being inauthentic. Thus, the existential modification of how Dasein relates to its falling is a modification of Dasein's being tranquilized and thrust into inauthenticity. This is not to say that authentic Dasein is no longer falling. Even while authentic, Dasein will be surrounded by the possibility of inauthenticity. The difference is that authentic Dasein will recognize such inauthentic ways of being *as* inauthentic (and only a "sham of authenticity") and responsibly avoid them (BT, 178).

However, this is not all that needs to be said. Heidegger mentions that "turbulence makes manifest that the thrownness which can obtrude itself upon Dasein *in its state-of-mind*" (BT italics added, 179). Thus, it seems that it is not enough to have a resolute resistance to falling. That is, it is possible to be thrown into a state-of-mind that allows the downward plunge to take hold and thrust me back into inauthenticity. Therefore, we are back to the first objection offered above. It is to this objection that I now turn.

As we mentioned above, moods color Dasein's world, determining how the world shows up meaningfully, and moods are thrown. How then is authentic Dasein to guard itself from being thrown into a mood that will thrust it back into inauthenticity? Is this resistance even a possibility? I suggest that we can and that a careful reading of specific passages suggest that Heidegger thinks so as well.

The first passage is found in Heidegger's first discussion of moods and states-of-mind. In this section we find three sentences that will be our grounding point for any claim about the structural permanence of authenticity. The following quote captures two positive statements in favor of a permanent authenticity:

Factically, Dasein can, should, and must, through knowledge and will, become master of its moods; in certain possible ways of existing, this may signify a priority of volition and cognition. [. . .] And furthermore, when we master a mood, we do so by way of a counter-mood; we are never free of moods (BT, 136).

The first part of the quote is crucial. It makes the imperative claim (must), a normative claim (should), and an existential claim (can), about Dasein's ability to master its moods. Heidegger immediately suggests how this is done - through knowledge and will, certain ways of existing, and a priority of volition and cognition. This does not suggest that these are the only ways to master one's moods, nor does it explain exactly how we are to go about using knowledge, will, cognition, and volition to master our moods. Nor does this tell us which ways of existing allow one to do this. Perhaps there is no specific way to live that allows one to master one's moods, suggesting that this is a task that Dasein must learn for itself. However one actually masters one's moods, the point is clear - Dasein can, should, and must master its moods.

The second major point in this passage is that Heidegger qualifies how we master a specific mood - "by way of a counter-mood." But which mood is the appropriate counter-mood? How are we to counter a mood with another mood when moods are thrown and we know not the "whence" and "wither" of our moods? How is this a "mastery" of a mood if the mastery of a mood is only in a counter-mood that supposedly is thrown? And how is this helpful when just prior to this claim Heidegger reminds us that moods disclose Dasein "*prior to* all cognition and volition, and *beyond* their range of disclosure" (BT, 136)? Sadly, Heidegger does not answer

these questions. However, what we can take from this is a firm grounding with one foot in the door for a proposal for the structural permanence of authenticity.

Moving on we find our next helpful passage near the end of Heidegger's analysis of moods. Here we find Heidegger praising Aristotle's *Rhetoric* "as the first systematic hermeneutic of everydayness of Being with one another" (BT, 138). Here Heidegger claims that the orator in Aristotle's *Rhetoric* speaks of the moods most common with publicness of *das Man*. Heidegger says that, "it is into such a mood and out of such a mood that the orator speaks. He must understand the possibility of moods in order to rouse them and guide them aright" (BT, 138-139). Now, it isn't altogether clear whether Heidegger agrees with Aristotle's orator or not, but what does seem to come through is Heidegger's appraisal of Aristotle. Two things could be said here. The first is that Heidegger was merely admiring Aristotle as the first to give a hermeneutic of the public sphere of everyday life. The second is that Heidegger is also agreeing with Aristotle. If we read the former then it leaves the reader asking what purpose this appraisal played. If we read it as the latter, and especially considering the previous passage, it seems we can say a little more about Dasein's mastering its moods. More specifically, that Dasein can "rouse" and "guide them aright." If we accept this reading we find another instance of Heidegger suggesting that we can master our moods, and that this is done by "understanding the possibility of moods." Again, we find that Heidegger does not say more about what it means to understand the possibility of our moods, or how one guides a mood aright. Luckily, this is not all Heidegger has to say about moods that suggests a mastery of moods.

Moving on to Heidegger's discussion of *the temporality of state-of-mind* (BT, 339), we find a couple of interesting claims regarding moods and authentic Dasein. The following list of

quotes, I suggest, will give the final grounding for constructing how authentic Dasein is effected by and can master its moods.

On the contrary, anxiety brings one back to one's thrownness as something possible which can be repeated (BT, 343).

The character of having been is constitutive for the state-of-mind of anxiety; and bringing one face to face with repeatability is the specific ecstatic mode of this character (BT, 343).

He who is resolute knows no fear (BT, 344).

This latter mood [equanimity] springs from resoluteness, which, in a moment of *vision*, looks at those Situations which are possible in one's potentiality-for-Being-a-whole as disclosed in our anticipation of [zum] death (BT, 345).

Looking to the first two quotes, it seems that Heidegger is suggesting that anxiety is repeatable. However, we are left asking: how so, and in what way? Am I the one repeating the mood of anxiety, actively thrusting myself into a state-of-mind of anxiety? Or does my having experienced "'real' anxiety" (BT, 190) cause me to experience anxiety more often? That is, does my experiencing anxiety entail that I will repeatedly experience anxiety?

Oddly, both disjuncts seem to be supported by Heidegger. Heidegger's discussion of moods have always supported the claim that moods are thrown. Thus, the majority of Heidegger's ink is spilt in the direction of favoring the second disjunct. In other words, what is meant by the repeatability of anxiety is that it is possible to be thrown into the mood of anxiety more than just once.

However, Heidegger's claim that Dasein can, should, and must become master of its moods by way of counter-moods, knowledge, will, ways of existing, and a priority of volition and cognition, along with his claim about Aristotle's orator, seems to suggest that we have sufficient grounds for the first of the disjuncts. That is, given the recent quotes I have mentioned

above it seems reasonable to think that Heidegger thinks the repeatability of anxiety is something active, that I bring about myself. Again, the orator must understand the possibility of moods in order to “rouse them and guide them aright” (BT, 139). How this is done is not clear, but the point is that if we take seriously the quotes I’ve offered above, then at least it seems that we must entertain the idea of anxiety being actively repeatable.

In the second two quotes we find that resolute Dasein knows no fear and that the mood “equanimity” springs from resoluteness. Is Heidegger suggesting here that resolute Dasein knows no fear because by definition to be resolute is to not be afraid? Is he suggesting that when resolute, the possibility of being thrown into a mood of fear is closed off? Or is it possible that resolute Dasein knows no fear because what it means to be resolute is to not allow one’s self to be lost in the mood of fear - suggesting a kind of mental dexterity or resistance to falling prey and being lost in fear? Given the second quote it does not seem too far of a stretch to suggest that we read the first quote as hinting towards a mental dexterity or resistance toward moods that force Dasein into inauthenticity. That is, if resoluteness gives rise to the mood of equanimity, then it seems that Dasein would be in a state of resistance to other moods. More specifically, as responsibly resolute, Dasein is resistant to inauthentic moods such as fear. This would be one way to justify Heidegger’s claim that resolute Dasein knows no fear. With this we may now attempt to construct an account in which we can overcome the concern of authentic Dasein’s being thrown back into inauthenticity.

As we have seen, equanimity is a mood that springs from resoluteness. Insofar as resolute Dasein is responsible the mood of equanimity will take the form of being resistant to those moods that threaten Dasein’s authenticity. Thus, equanimity could be a possible “counter-

mood” Heidegger mentions in his discussion of moods (BT, 136). Insofar as a counter-mood allows for Dasein to master its moods, we might say that a part of what it is to be authentic entails a mastery of one’s moods by virtue of the counter-mood of equanimity. However, even if equanimity is a counter-mood that resists being thrown into inauthenticity, this is not to suggest that we are cut off from the throw of moods. Even authentic Dasein is still subject to the throw of moods despite its resistance.

To respond to this concern, I draw from the remaining quotes concerning the repeatability of anxiety and Aristotle’s orator. If anxiety is repeatable, the orator is able to rouse and guide moods aright, and if a part of mastering one’s moods is grounded in knowledge, will, and a priority of volition and cognition, then I suggest that anxiety should be understood as a second possible counter-mood and one that can be elicited at will. How so?

As we have seen, anxiety nullifies the world’s claim on Dasein, forcing it face to face with its “naked” self (BT, 343). This forcing of Dasein into the uncanniness suggests a nullification of all other moods as well. That is, insofar as all other moods present the world as meaningful for Dasein and anxiety nullifies the world’s claim on Dasein, anxiety seems to counter any other mood’s grip on Dasein. As such, anxiety then seems to be the ultimate counter-mood.

As we have also seen, anxiety discloses Dasein to itself. As such, it follows that Dasein’s being thrown into moods would also be disclosed. If so, then we have a leg to stand on to support the orator’s ability to understand the possibility of moods such that he may rouse and guide them aright. What I have in mind here is that, like death, the possibility of being thrown into a mood must be authentically comported towards. Taking death as our example, I suggest

that moods are authentically taken up in anticipation - a readiness for being thrown into a mood. This readiness I take it, is something Heidegger had in mind when he says that equanimity is a mood that springs from resoluteness. However, we have yet to suggest how anxiety is to be repeated in the event of my being thrown into another mood.

To respond to this concern, I propose we take note of something Mathew Burch claimed in his article "Death and Deliberation." Burch suggested that one way to avoid Dasein's bootstrapping itself out of anxiety is to recognize that "the momentary inability to act brought on by anxiety cannot do away with [my] living memory" (Burch, 222). That is, anxiety does not reduce Dasein to a *tabula rasa*. In a similar way, I suggest that once Dasein returns to the world it does not forget the experience of anxiety. In fleeing from this experience, Dasein runs back into the comfort of inauthenticity. In taking itself up on its own accord, responsibly and resolutely, Dasein becomes authentic in which the existential modification of *das Man* and falling take place. This existential modification and the experience of the full force of what has been disclosed in "real anxiety" I suggest takes the form of an existential scarring. As such, in the throw of a mood one will responsibly remember what was disclosed in anxiety which will allow one the possibility of rousing anxiety and appropriately guiding it as the counter-mood to whatever mood I find myself in.

Taken in conjunction with the mood of equanimity, I suggest that authentic Dasein will comport itself anticipatorially towards the possibility of being thrown into inauthentic moods whilst in the mood of equanimity, with a readiness to rouse and guide anxiety in order to counter inauthentic moods. As such, it seems that authentic Dasein can rightfully be said to have mastered its moods. If this new development holds, then I suggest that the concern for authentic

Dasein's being thrown into a mood that forces it back into inauthenticity to have been overcome. As such, I again propose that authentic Dasein will permanently remain authentic.

XI. Conclusion

In conclusion, I have shown that Dreyfus and Guignon's accounts, though suggestive for an account of the permanence of authenticity, do not claim such an answer to the question of permanence. Nor do they supply the groundwork to support such a claim. Carman's account seemed to be the most supportive of such an account, but fell short for the same reasons as Dreyfus and Guignon. In Haugeland's case we found that despite his analysis of resoluteness, he denied the permanence of authenticity and claimed that it was something contextual and situational. However, as I have suggested, Haugeland's account of resoluteness provides the perfect springboard for an account that is affirmative in its response to the question of the permanence of authenticity. However, we must ask if such an account of resoluteness can be tied back to the definition of authenticity I proposed earlier.

Recall my definition of authenticity: Dasein's answering for itself while transparently relating itself to itself as Self-they. As I have claimed earlier, my use of the word "transparently" entails the state-of-mind of anxiety, which discloses Dasein itself to itself ("relating itself to itself"). In such a disclosedness, Dasein comes face to face with its essential structures of death, Guilty!, and the call of conscience and chooses itself. In choosing itself there is anticipatory resoluteness. Anticipatory resoluteness directly corresponds to Haugeland's resoluteness that is free for taking it back. That is, I am equating the role of "anticipatory" to Haugeland's "taking it back" insofar as both are used to account for the possibility of existential death.

However, unlike Haugeland, the use of “transparently relating itself to itself” is also meant to capture Dasein’s resoluteness that is resolved on both its ontological structures and Dasein’s being resolute itself. That is, my phrasing is meant to also capture my additions to Haugeland’s analysis of resoluteness that claim that there are things that resolute Dasein can be resolved upon that do not allow for a “taking it back.” Again, these being Dasein’s ontological structures and resoluteness itself. Thus, in “Dasein’s answering for itself while transparently relating itself to itself as Self-they,” there corresponds both objects of resoluteness; those that can be taken back (identity, particular ways of responding for itself in similar situations) which are seen as such, and those that cannot be taken back (Dasein’s being resolute about its ontological structures and resoluteness itself) which are also seen as such. Thus, I conclude that with such an understanding of resoluteness and authenticity, my account of authenticity holds that authenticity is permanent.

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