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A Statistical Analysis of U.S. Foreign Aid and Latin American Human Rights, 1977-1988

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**A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF U.S. FOREIGN AID AND
LATIN AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS, 1977-1988**

**A STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF U.S. FOREIGN AID AND
LATIN AMERICAN HUMAN RIGHTS, 1977-1988**

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

By

QUENTIN KIDD, B.A.
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INTRODUCTION: SETTING AND PURPOSE

This paper is set in a time when, quite frankly, situations and events around the world are changing much faster than the perceptive abilities of the academic community. During the Cold War period it was relatively common to focus one's research toward a particular direction or specialty and feel safe that the rug would not be pulled out from under it. Many of this century's great political scientists carved their niches and made their names by studying and commenting on the status of the world as defined by the Cold War.

Times have changed though. The Cold War has ended and the Soviet model collapsed. The world is not so neatly divided between "good" and "bad" anymore and demarcating right from wrong is now an even more important debate, with regard to U.S. foreign policy, than it has been for many years. Old excuses, such as the one outlined by former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jeane J. Kirkpatrick, that U.S. support of not-so-democratic regimes is justified within the broader context of the Cold War and that an apology is "neither morally necessary nor politically appropriate", are no longer acceptable to the world (Kirkpatrick 1982, 29). To support a seemingly insupportable regime today without a clearly defined reason would not be nearly as easy for the U.S. government to justify as it might have been during the high tide of the Cold War.

All of this brings us to the topic at hand, namely U.S. foreign aid and Latin American human rights during the late 1970s and 1980s. As this paper will show, U.S. foreign aid has gone through dramatic changes over the years. The origins of U.S. foreign aid can be traced back to World War II, where it began as a desperate effort to aid what was then seen as the only nation left in Europe with a chance of defeating Hitler. During the Cold War, it was often used haphazardly as a powerful weapon of persuasion throughout the less developed world. In Latin America particularly, the charge was frequently leveled that the United States aided some of the most repressive regimes as a part of its grand strategy of keeping Communism from spreading anywhere beyond the beaches of Cuba.

The relationship between U.S. foreign aid and the human rights practices of the countries of Latin America is a topic which has, naturally, produced disagreements among scholars. Since the early 1980s researchers have constructed a number of statistical studies that have claimed to show whether the United States cared about human rights abuses or didn't care about human rights abuses, and how much U.S. foreign aid a particular human rights score was worth to a country. Despite all of this work and the journal articles it has generated, no clear consensus has yet emerged concerning what a human rights abuse is, what the best way to look at foreign aid is, or even whether the U.S. has regularly supported abusive regimes in

Latin America or has been sensitive to the way those nations treated their citizens. This paper will attempt to answer those questions by conducting a different type statistical study, one that will show the association between human rights and foreign aid.

The purpose of this paper is not simply to add to the plethora of literature on this topic. The study is not an effort to determine whether there was a linkage between a particular country's human rights rating and how much aid that country received. To say that human rights had "X" amount of influence on foreign aid is probably not something that can be absolutely proved. To say that a particular human rights rating was worth "X" dollars in aid seems preposterous. Instead, this study attempts to determine whether there was an association or relationship between human rights and U.S. foreign aid in Latin America during the years 1977 to 1988.

This investigation uses a very simple statistical test that determines covariation between two variables. Deciding which is the dependent variable and which is the independent variable is not even technically required. The analysis will tell us whether, after accounting for normal fluctuations in the U.S. foreign aid budget, an improvement or worsening of a nation's human rights score was associated in any way with an increase or decrease in the aid which that country received from the U.S.

This topic is important because the Congress has said so

by passing a number of laws in the last two decades aimed at regulating the distribution of U.S. aid to repressive regimes. In addition, rhetoric coming from the White House often leads one to believe that human rights is important to the executive branch as well. Regardless of what the "New World Order" ultimately ends up looking like, the plight of humanity is still an important issue which requires, even demands, scholarly attention. In addition, since the U.S. government has not shown any great desire to get out of the foreign aid game simply because the Cold War has ended, keeping abreast of how the foreign aid budget is being used is very important.

Though it may not be possible to determine how much influence human rights had on foreign aid, research can determine whether there was an association between human rights and foreign aid. This is important. As the world continues to change and readjust after several decades of *de facto* war, one would hope that the condition of humanity would become a more important concern than it has been. It is hoped that by determining what sort of association or relationship that U.S. foreign aid had with regard to human rights in Latin America during the time covered in this study, one will be able to determine how much the posited relationship has been changing and whether the change has been for the better or worse.

PART ONE

I. AN OVERVIEW OF U.S. FOREIGN AID SINCE WORLD WAR II

W.W. Rostow defines foreign aid as "the voluntary transfer of resources or technology from one country to another at less than market rates" (1985 75). In a more cynical vein, John White calls it "merely a continuation of the very much older practice of bribery" (1974 198) One could easily argue that both definitions, in general, apply to the U.S. foreign aid policies of the recent past. For the U.S. foreign aid is, and has been for many years, an open-ended term covering everything from economic and military assistance to program aid packages and outright loans with high interest and even higher yearly repayment schedules.

A very brief examination of the history of United States involvement as a provider of foreign aid, from the days of Lend-Lease and the European Recovery Program (Marshall Plan) for example, to the mid-1980s, clearly reveals the rapid growth of an increasingly important foreign policy tool. The degree to which the objectives of the various U.S. foreign aid programs have changed is also plainly evident. The evolving nature of U.S. foreign aid interests can generally be described in terms of three stages or phases: (1) to win the war against the Axis powers, (2) to economically recover from the war and finally, (3) to deter the threat of Communist expansion following the war. This last stage has carried on for just over forty years now in the form of the Cold War,

which has been fought largely in the Third World. Concern for human rights has only been a recent phenomenon.

A. Lend-Lease And The War Effort

The first two phases outlined above, winning the Second World War and economically recovering from the war, centered largely on Europe and if human rights were ever a concern they were only so in the sense that stopping Nazi Germany would and did ease the general condition of human suffering. The Third World, especially Latin America, was largely secondary in the minds of most foreign policy-makers. Although nearly every Latin American nation became eligible for defense-oriented funds through the Pittman Act of 1940, it was subsumed under the broader Lend-Lease Act of 1941 before any transfers could occur (Stettinius 1944, 39-39).

The Lend-Lease Act was designed originally to aid England with goods and war materials that she could no longer purchase or procure without some form of help. It eventually extended to over 40 countries and became a blueprint for future U.S. aid programs (Dougherty 1978, 3). President Roosevelt is generally credited with the idea of Lend-Lease as an attempt to "buy time", although everyone knew that the U.S. would eventually have to become more involved in the war effort in one way or another. Roosevelt's plan, developed while on a cruise in the West Indies, was to have the U.S. increase its war production, something it was already beginning to do

anyway, and lend or lease to Britain any supplies she needed to continue the fight against Nazi Germany (Dobson 1986, 25; Martel 1979, 3).

During the war years, 1941-1945, the United States extended \$48.5 billion in this form of aid to 42 countries with almost 90% of that total going to Great Britain (\$32 billion), the Soviet Union (\$11 billion), and France (\$3 billion). The value of reverse lend-lease received back by the U.S. was nearly \$8 billion before the program was terminated on September 2, 1945 (Library of Congress 1968, 12-14).

B. The Marshall Plan And Economic Recovery

The origins of the Marshall Plan can be found in the aftermath of the international economic crisis created by World War II and the need to contain the spread of Communism. For the millions of Europeans left stricken by the war, it meant food, jobs, and the chance to rebuild their ravaged lives. For the governments of most of the nations involved it meant the ability to fight off Communist subversion and stay in power with U.S.-backed economic revitalization help (Price 1955, 4-5).

As originally outlined, all European nations interested in receiving aid were asked to jointly formulate a plan for economic recovery and determine how much it would cost. Estimates submitted in 1948 by the 16 countries of Western Europe that came to constitute the Organization for European

Economic Cooperation (OEEC) totaled \$22.5 billion. By the time that the Marshall Plan ended, the U.S. had allocated just over \$13 billion, nearly 90% of that in the form of direct grants (Library of Congress 1968, 35-45; Wood 1986, 29-31).

By 1952, when the Marshall Plan was officially terminated by Congress, one could easily see that it had been more successful than not. Western Europe was well on its way to economic recovery and the unexpected Communist advances in the Eastern part of the continent had been halted before spreading too far. Obviously many issues relating to European recovery were still left to be dealt with. Harry Bayard Price has noted that the Marshall Plan "was not so much the final solution of transient problems as a series of national and international efforts . . . toward the solution" (1955, 224-225).

The Soviet Union chose early on not to participate in the U.S.-sponsored economic recovery effort and soon began to draw its Eastern European satellite nations into trade agreements and defense alliances designed to counter those forming in Western Europe. In addition, the Communist Information Bureau (Cominform) was established in 1947 to promote Moscow's international political, social and economic ideals, a move that the West perceived as a clear sign of an increasing Soviet penchant for expansion (Mayne 1970, 132-134). Within a year, Communist insurrections were occurring in Burma, Malaya, Indonesia and the Philippines (Rostow 1985, 13). Even though the Marshall Plan had officially ended, the ideas that it

embodied within the U.S. foreign policy establishment - foreign aid as a foreign policy tool - simply followed the ideological struggle with communism out of Europe and into the Third World (Wood 1986, 65-67).

C. The Cold War And The Geographic Shift In Aid

By the time that thwarting the advances of Communism in the Third World had come to overshadow the war recovery effort in Europe, the entire objective of the U.S. foreign aid policy had shifted. Cold War concerns generally had a life of their own that ultimately centered around ideological differences and the belief arose that if using foreign aid had helped stop Communism in Western Europe why couldn't it do the same in the Third World?

This supposition was first put into practice in Asia in the early 1950s, where U.S. policies concerning aid and strategic interests were rapidly becoming indistinguishable (White 1974, 201-202). It was also during this time, and also within the context of the Cold War, that military assistance was first proposed for Latin America. Congress initially objected, but the crisis in Korea proved too persuasive and \$38 million was appropriated in 1952 to help with internal security concerns. Once begun, assistance to the region, both military and economic, became a permanent part of the U.S. foreign aid budget (Westwood 1966, 32-32).

Perhaps the historian John Lewis Gaddis, in his

interpretation of post-war American national security policy, best describes the magnitude of the changing U.S. objectives when he characterized American foreign policy during the early years of the Cold War as:

". . . a series of attempts to deal with the consequences of the World War II Faustian bargain: the idea [was] to prevent the Soviet Union from using the power and position it won as a result of that conflict to reshape the postwar international order, a prospect that has seemed, in the West, no less dangerous than what Germany or Japan might have done had they had the chance" (1982, 4).

By the late 1950s and into the 1960s, U.S. aid policy, following the overall trend in strategic policy, became more and more concerned with a nation's ideological orientation and position vis-a-vis the Cold War rather than on purely economic or altruistic matters. Economic and military aid to the more susceptible less developed nations was increasingly being used to contain Communism because any Communist success, it was believed, would only add to the Soviet momentum toward expansion (Conteh-Morgan 1990, 210-211). The 1952 revolution in Bolivia and the nationalization of land in Guatemala owned by the United Fruit Company in 1953 sent mild chills through the American foreign policy establishment. Talk of the need to do more in Latin America increased, but the Eisenhower administration chose to use methods other than increased aid to deal with the "leftist tendencies" in the Americas (Westwood 1966, 47-48).

The "loss" of Cuba in 1959, however, was a watershed year

for the U.S. Until then, Latin America had been regarded as safely within the sphere of United States influence. Even though Communist guerrilla activity did certainly exist in the region, U.S. hegemony was never really in question. As Carleton and Stohl point out though, Castro's successful bid for power changed everything, including the geographic allocation patterns of foreign aid. "From the Cuban Revolution onward, U.S. policy, whether guided by Democrat or Republican, has had at its bottom line the prevention of 'another Cuba' in the Western Hemisphere" (1987a, 236)

By the late 1960s the threat of "Castroite" insurgencies in other parts of Latin America led the U.S. to begin using the Alliance for Progress, originally an aid program designed by President Kennedy to help development in the region, as a conduit through which authoritarian regimes were funded. A 1968 Senate Foreign Relations Committee study of the Alliance for Progress even recommended, among other measures, that a greater emphasis be place on "upgrading the civil security forces in Latin America" as well as "upgrading the collection and evaluation capabilities of Latin American intelligence agencies" (U.S. Congress 1968, 3). Whether it meant supporting Donald Reid Cabral in the Dominican Republic in the 1960s or the Somoza dynasty in Nicaragua in the 1970s, U.S. foreign aid objectives, like its overall foreign policy objectives, appeared to be more motivated toward fighting the Cold War than anything else.

By the mid-1970s though, questions began to arise concerning just how atrocious a government could get before the U.S. would respond by halting or reducing aid. The result of these queries was that, between 1973 and the end of the Reagan years, Congress passed a number of laws related to human rights issues. In addition, rhetoric from the Carter administration began to indicate that human rights were becoming an important consideration with regard to who got what (see Forsythe 1987 for a review of the general legislation).

Rhetoric and reality are however often very different. Scholars have yet to approach a consensus on whether the 1970s and 1980s represented an era of increased awareness of human suffering in the world or simply a time when more sophisticated ways of ignoring those issues without causing a great deal of additional criticism were discovered.

This brief historical survey of U.S. foreign aid was designed to help gain a sense of the various directions that aid-giving has gone through since its inception during the Second World War. The overview indicates at what point in time the geographical shift in foreign aid allocations occurred, why this shift appeared necessary and also at what point human rights became, if not an important concern, at least a topic of discussion. The process has been an evolutionary one and perhaps the end of the Cold War marks the beginning of a new stage in which new concerns will replace geo-strategic

security, economic compatibility, and ideological fortitude, as the cornerstones of U.S foreign aid policy.

II. REVIEW OF THE RELEVANT LITERATURE

The literature on U.S. foreign aid is voluminous, as might be expected. It was not until the very late 1950s and early 1960s, though, that critical appraisals of the various U.S. foreign aid programs began to appear. Many of these early studies were theoretical and analytic in nature, relied largely on anecdotal evidence and were aimed primarily at "steady[ing] American foreign aid policy in the face of vicissitudes and surprises of international life" (Feis 1964, vi). During the last half of the 1960s quantitative studies began to appear in monographs and journals, but it was not until the mid-to-late 1970s and into the 1980s that human rights became a relatively important issue within the foreign aid debate. The review of the foreign aid literature that follows is generally divided along the line at which human rights first emerged as an interest of scholars concerned with the U.S. foreign aid policy. The summary of the literature before human rights is not exhaustive by any means, but instead, is designed simply to portray the broad concerns and interests as well as the study methods employed during the earlier years of scholarly work on foreign aid. The review of the literature since human rights became a concern is also not exhaustive but is as thorough as possible with regard to the

quantitative studies that have been produced up to 1992. The aim is to reproduce, or outline in a general way, the debate over methodology in an effort to set the stage for the current quantitative effort that will follow.

A. Foreign Aid Before Human Rights

Some of the earliest studies on foreign aid appeared in the late 1950s and early 1960s. These studies were generally a part of the national re-evaluation of U.S. foreign policy at that time resulting from the relative calm of the post-Korea years. Specific studies concentrated on the effectiveness and role of aid within the overall foreign policy framework. H. Field Haviland, Jr.'s (1957) case study of the foreign assistance budgetary process for fiscal 1958 aid appropriations showed just how uncertain the nation was with the idea of foreign aid. Haviland's study, which appeared in *The American Political Science Review* (689-724), pointed out the various factors which made the environment unfriendly for aid, such as the seemingly less threatening international climate and the opposition to the ever increasing emphasis on military assistance rather than economic assistance. On the other hand, the continued challenge of the Soviet Union and its own "aid" activity in the Third World, tended to lend great support for maintaining foreign aid. In the end, Haviland asserted that the public's interest in the topic generally "follow[ed] the fever chart of world crisis in the

news." In addition he claimed that, despite the concerns and questions of Congress, the legislature was at a great disadvantage in relation to the executive branch, which was "supported by tremendous staff and intelligence resources" that helped buttress the continuation of the aid programs (both quotes from page 717).

Arguing from the realist perspective and advocating what would later be called a donor interest model of foreign aid, Liska (1960), Morgenthau (1962), Feis (1964) and, from a somewhat less doctrinaire perspective, Mason (1964), claimed that the U.S. had lost control of its foreign aid policy and by doing so, aid giving had not always been in harmony with the overall foreign policy aims of the nation. Liska argued that "There must be coherence . . . between the donor's foreign aid policy and his political policies, military policies, and other economic policies" (1960, 223). Feis argued that the U.S. would be "derelict" if aid was not only used to benefit the recipients but also to "support and supplement our diplomacy, interests and ideals" (1964, 115). He asserted that although most Americans would like to give aid out of humanitarian concerns, the continued Cold War had been an overriding factor preventing such altruism on anything but a minor scale, and then only if such humanitarianism didn't counter U.S. strategic goals in any way.

Lowenthal (1965) used a case study of the U.S. aid policy in the Dominican Republic from the assassination of Rafael

Trujillo in 1961 to the overthrow of Juan Bosch in 1963, to argue for a different approach to the use of foreign aid. He claimed that aid could not always be successfully used to influence political developments abroad and concluded that the U.S. had been unsuccessful in using it to impose or keep alive democratic regimes from the outside. Instead, he argued, aid could be better used to support institutions from which democratic activity could emerge.

By the late 1960s, quantitative studies emerged that focused on finding the determinants of U.S. foreign aid rather than on theorizing about or describing it. Two of the earliest and most widely cited studies were authored by Davenport (1969) and Wittkopf (1972). Both employed regression analysis in an effort to determine criteria used in the allocation process. Davenport's study looked at aid given by various Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (O.E.C.D.) member-nations (emphasis placed on the U.S.) to 34 countries for the years 1962-64. His study confined itself largely to economic related independent variables (i.e., real income, absorptive capacity and foreign reserve position) and tried to ascertain which of those factors determined, beyond population size, the amount of aid a country received. Davenport concluded that donor country political motivations tended to have an effect on the aid allocations patterns, thus making a study of aid allocations based on economic factors hopeless.

Wittkopf examined aid given by the four principal Western donors, the U.S., the U.K., Germany and France, to 96 countries for the years 1961, 1964 and 1967. His independent variables consisted of clusters of variables falling into four categories: political importance; Cold War considerations; recipients' need; and alternative aid sources. General conclusions from the study were that most of the currently existing theories concerning aid allocation processes were not strongly confirmed by the data due to weak relationships between the independent and dependent variables. He did point out, however, that Cold War considerations appeared more important to the U.S. than to the other three donor countries.

Finally, two studies of relative importance for this essay, Kaplan (1975) and Loehr, et al. (1976), looked at Latin America specifically. Kaplan employed multiple and stepwise regression techniques to determine the relationship between aid and a variety of independent variables for 20 nations between 1946 and 1972. He found that aid had largely been a function of population size, balance of payments position and absolute value of military expenditure. Moreover, he concluded that regime type, which had been positively correlated with aid through the Kennedy years, began to decline in importance after that and was only minimally significant as of the early 1970s. To determine this, he assigned each nation to one of four categories: a personalized dictator; military or civilian junta; popular but not elected leader; or free and fairly

elected leader.

Loehr et al., used a cross-sectional discriminant analysis to determine the relationship between aid from four donors (the U.S. and three non-governmental organizations) and four groups of independent variables falling under economic, political, humanitarian or systems-type subject headings. Their sample included 19 Latin American aid recipients for time blocks between 1957 and 1971. In short, they found that aid allocations from all four donors tended to be related to a complex bundle of factors relating to both economic and political conditions.

This brief review of the literature on foreign aid before the appearance of human rights as a concern has pointed out the evolutionary changes in the study of foreign aid from largely descriptive-type analysis based on anecdotal evidence to more rigorous attempts to determine specific relations between foreign aid and various other variables. The next section will continue this review, with a specific focus on the literature concerning human rights as an independent variable.

B. Foreign Aid Since Human Rights

★ Congress first enacted legislation dealing with human rights and foreign aid in 1973 by amending Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 to advise the executive branch that military or security assistance should not be given to ★

countries that violated internationally recognized norms for human rights. After generally being ignored by both the Nixon and Ford administrations, Congress then amended the section in 1978 to make it a binding legal requirement (Forsythe 1987, 383; Cohen 1982, 250). Throughout the mid-1970s, the human rights/foreign aid debate, especially where Latin America was concerned, existed largely within the government and could be followed by examining committee hearings in Congress or the various reports issued by the State Department. It was not until the very late 1970s and early 1980s that the topic began to appear in the academic literature. Many of these works were descriptive in nature (Kommers and Gilbert 1979; Shue 1980; Schoultz 1981a; Wiarda 1982;) but statistical analysis was also undertaken.

Two of the first quantitative studies to focus on human rights and foreign aid were produced by Lars Schoultz (1981b, 1981c). In both studies, Schoultz conducted a questionnaire survey of "experts" to develop human rights scores for 23 Latin American aid recipient nations for 1976. His dependent variable consisted of economic and military assistance, both logged and absolute. The first study, focusing solely on aid given during the years 1975-77 and using correlation analysis, concluded that the U.S. tended to disproportionately aid repressive governments. The second study focused on aid given in 1975 and proposed for 1979 and determined that the Carter administration tended to be more concerned about human rights

violations than did the Ford administration.

A 1984 study by Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson found no strong relationship between human rights abuses and aid when they looked at 23 nations receiving U.S. bilateral aid during the Nixon and Carter administrations. They analyzed the years 1976 and 1981 and were the first to use a compilation of Freedom House, State Department, and Amnesty International reports as the human rights indicator.

A second study by Carleton and Stohl (1985), which essentially replicated their 1984 study using data from the Carter and Reagan administrations, again found no significance between aid and human rights. They conducted rank-order correlations for each year between 1978 and 1982. Their dependent variables consisted of per capita military and economic aid and their independent variable again consisted of a compilation of the Freedom House, State Department, and Amnesty International human rights data.

Cingranelli and Pasquarello (1985) found that human rights violations did seem to influence certain types of aid in 1982. Their study is unique in the sense that it was the first to be constructed as a two-stage analysis using the "gatekeeping" strategy to determine whether a country was systematically rejected from the aid pool because of human rights violations or not. The study involved 29 Latin American and Caribbean nations and used the State Department reports as the single human rights indicator. They concluded that aid was

distributed to Latin American nations based on the two-stage process and that human rights were an important variable where considerations for military assistance were concerned.

Subsequent studies by Carleton and Stohl (1987b) and McCormick and Mitchell (1988) found problems with the Cingranelli and Pasquarello study, mainly centering on its use of the State Department's reports as the sole human rights variable and the fact that El Salvador had been excluded from the study. Both McCormick and Mitchell, and Carleton and Stohl reproduced the Cingranelli and Pasquarello study with El Salvador included to show that any significance disappeared when it was included.

Daniel Hofrenning (1990), countering assertions by previous authors, determined that human rights seemed to be more important to the Reagan administration than to the Carter administration, despite the rhetoric to the contrary. Hofrenning's study looked at all recipients of U.S. aid except for Israel and Egypt for the years 1979 and 1983, and used the Freedom House ratings as its sole independent variable. His dependent variable consisted of total military aid and a subset of economic aid.

More recently, Poe (1991; 1992) has suggested that human rights considerations were comparably important to both the Carter and Reagan administrations. Each of his studies looked at 26 Latin American and Caribbean countries and a 40-country sample from the rest of the world. For an independent

variable, Poe developed a human rights rating mechanism that combined the scores of Freedom House, Amnesty International, and the State Department. His dependent variable consisted of total bilateral economic aid in one study and total military aid in the other.

This brief review of the literature on foreign aid during the era when human rights became a scholarly concern has highlighted some of the serious disagreements among researchers over not only the underlying relationship between human rights and foreign aid, but also over the most appropriate methodological avenues to be followed. On one end, researchers generally tend to codify the human rights data in ways that best fit their own research needs. A consensus has yet to be formed concerning the best possible way to label human rights. On the other end, scholars also tend to codify and analyze the aid in only one of two ways: as either absolute values or as per capita figures. A recent study (Poe 1990) has indicated that other independent variables might need to be considered along with human rights, such as trade interests, geo-political interests, and/or recipient needs, so as to avoid the potential problem of misspecification associated with bivariate rather than multivariate analysis. Several studies (Cingranelli & Pasquarello 1985; McCormick and Mitchell 1988; Poe 1991 & 1992) have also employed control variables for the same purpose.

III. THE METHODOLOGICAL DEBATE

Much debate exists concerning the methodology used in the study of human rights and foreign aid. The literature quite naturally focuses closer attention on some issues and less on others. For example, how best to codify the aid variable and how best to codify the human rights variable are two sources of disagreement. A smaller debate, but no less important, is the issue of which statistical method is most appropriate to examine the relationship between aid and human rights. Each point will be expounded upon below.

First, firm agreement as to whether one should focus wholly on absolute or per capita values for aid amounts, or use some other method, does not exist. Whether the human rights variable is comprised of the Freedom House ratings or any combination of indicators, the difference in scale between it as an ordinal variable and the aid amount represented by either an absolute or per capita monetary value will be disproportionately great. In order to justify using this type of method, one must first make the assumption that policy-makers attach some sort of monetary value to the particular human rights scores. In fact, Poe (1992) claims that a one-point movement in the 1978 human rights score for any particular country amounted to about a \$19 million difference in aid in 1980. Hofrenning (1990) claims that Morocco's 1983 aid allotment would have decreased by \$42.2 million for each one unit increase in the Freedom House scale., If policy-

makers did in fact attach monetary values to human rights scores in such an automated or technocratic way, our ability to predict future aid allocations based on human rights would be relatively simple. Since that is not the case, however, it would appear that the use of absolute or per capita values may be more misleading and confusing than helpful and that perhaps other, more generalizable methods, of codifying aid amounts need to be examined.

Second, a topic that has received far greater attention in the literature centers on how best to codify the human rights variable. Critics of many of the current studies, which tend to rely on any number of different sources and use several different types of scales for their human rights measure, charge that almost all of the most widely available data and measurements on human rights and its abuses have an inherently Western bias. The result, they argue, is a negative effect on research, which almost certainly ends up being "culture-bound and so politicized as to defeat its alleged purpose" (Scoble and Wiseberg 1981, 148). Barsh adds that, "In a politically-charged research environment in which scholars look to elites for support and funding, what looks like gold is gold" (Barsh 1993, 98-99).

Respondents to these allegations have claimed that it is largely the availability of data that dictate research methods. When one is attempting to determine the relationship between human rights and foreign aid, the important point is

not whether the definition of human rights being used is politically acceptable in all corners of the world or not, but whether the information generated based on that definition is what the policy maker sees and believes human rights to be. Defenders of current research methods argue that there exist only three well-known and widely-circulated accounting schemes for human rights today, those of Freedom House, Amnesty International, and the State Department. Until a new accounting scheme is developed that is as exhaustive as these three are combined, it must be assumed that these are the places where policy-makers get their information and by extension are the places where academic researchers must also get the information. McNitt suggests that this problem can be solved by following the lead of the natural sciences who, when faced with an important phenomena that is difficult to measure, simply "agree to disagree" (1986, 80).

One final criticism of past studies is their uniform and seemingly universally acceptable way of conducting statistical analysis so that the relationship between foreign aid and human rights for an individual country cannot be determined outside of the overall relationship. Most authors do list the individual countries and the particular human rights scores they choose to use for those countries (see Carleton and Stohl 1985; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; and Poe 1991; 1992, for examples) but when it comes to analysis, the data tend to be pooled, usually in a regression analysis, where any

significance at the country-level or even across time generally gets lost. This approach leaves open the possibility of having results skewed by one or two countries with either very negative or very positive ratings. More likely, the ability to find a clear relationship either way is hindered because the possibility exists that every country with a negative score could just as easily be matched by another country with a positive score. In trying to deal with this dilemma, Cingranelli and Pasquarello excluded El Salvador from their study because it was considered an abnormally high recipient of aid, but as cited, this deviation was considered unacceptable by other scholars. What is needed is a statistical approach that allows one to examine the broad picture and also disaggregate the various units so as to be able to examine individual countries as well.

An additional criticism concerns the lack of more than the minimum required analytic support for the quantitative studies. This concern has been raised specifically by Robert Goldstein (1986) and involves a near-absolute reliance on statistics with little supporting non-quantitative analysis. Goldstein cautions that when studying a topic such as human rights "What must be avoided is a dependence on statistics alone" (1986, 626). The fact that a clear consensus on what constitutes a human rights violation has not been achieved should be warning enough that complete dependence on numbers to describe that particular phenomena is open to criticism.

"What must also be avoided is the orientation that suggests if you can't measure it, you can't study it" (Goldstein 1986, 626). Instead, statistical studies should be placed within a proper context as often as possible.

PART TWO

IV. A STATISTICAL EVALUATION OF FOREIGN AID/HUMAN RIGHTS

The purpose of this current study is to explore the relationship between U.S. economic and military aid to 16 Latin American countries and those recipient nations' human rights records during the years 1977 to 1988.³ In doing this, I hope to add to the general understanding of the role that human rights has recently played in the U.S. foreign aid process and by extension, possibly advance a method by which the relationship can be further explored in the future. A major emphasis of the paper is to address some of the problems found in past studies of the relationship between human rights and foreign aid. I address those issues by focusing the study in such a way as to touch on the methodological criticisms outlined in the previous section. Each of the criticisms will be addressed below as I set up my study. I will also suggest an improved method of codifying the two variables, aid and human rights and, outline the most appropriate statistical method to evaluate the relationship between the two.

A. Aid Codification

As noted above, whether the dependent variable should consist of standardized or unstandardized monetary values is a point that has not yet been clearly settled. The pitfalls of using absolute values have been plainly demonstrated with the inability of researchers to differentiate the human rights

rating from a monetary value of aid.

The most common reasons for using per capita aid figures are standardization and statistical manageability. However, the inherent problem with using per capita aid figures is that it tends to control for the effect that a country's population may or may not have on the aid it receives (Poe 1991). Eric Uslaner argues that per capita transformations should be avoided because "the theoretically relevant variables are the total figures and the transformation is used only to 'filter out' the possible confounding effects of the size of the geographic unit" (1976, 131).

Since my purpose is neither to reduce the effect of population on aid (if one exists) nor to determine whether a specific human rights score is related to a specific aid amount given, I will avoid the use of both absolute and per capita aid figures. Instead, I have converted both the economic and military aid figures to ordinal variables that indicate *directional* changes in aid allotments from year to year. I use subsets of aid figures (military aid and non-military aid) in an effort to evaluate the effect that government sponsored repression may have had on each broad category of aid given by the U.S.

These aid figures, which are a dependent variable (although the particular statistic I will employ does not technically require the distinction between a dependent and an independent variable), are derived from *U.S. Overseas Loans*

and Grants and Assistance From International Organizations (U.S. AID) and Weber (1990) for the years 1977 to 1988. As I am concerned only with shifts in aid that can be plausibly attributed to changes in the human rights status of the target countries, it will be necessary to *filter out* changes in aid levels that result from *normal* U.S. budgetary fluctuations (e.g., overall budget cuts, inflation, etc.) In order to accomplish this, a calculation was used that served to create an aid range based on the percentage change in the total U.S. regional aid budget (either military or economic) from year to year.⁴ For each year, an ordinal variable indicating either a decrease or an increase in the direction of aid was awarded to each country depending on whether their aid allotment from the U.S. fell above or below, this aid range. If the actual aid given fell within the calculated range, no change was considered to have taken place.

B. Human Rights Codification

The most logical solution to the conflict surrounding the codification of human rights involves following the advice of McNitt noted above, which was to agree to disagree. At some point one has to accept the available information and prevailing definitions and conduct as clear and precise a study as possible. There are any number of ways in which the terms human rights, freedom, torture, etc., could be used, but the Freedom House rankings and the reports of Amnesty

International and the State Department are the most consistent surveys available. Although the various definitions each survey has applied to key words are not uniform by any means, consistency is considered more important here than debating the meaning of a word. The acceptance and definition of "torture", for example, from one society to the next varies greatly. However, in order to measure "torture", a subjective weight must be applied to the word that by its very nature will restrain the impact of that meaning in different cultural settings.

For the reason outlined above, the three most consistent sources of human rights abuses were consulted: the reports of Amnesty International, Freedom House, and the U.S. State Department. The Freedom House rankings appear in two 7-point sub-scales, one measuring political freedom and the other civil liberties., For this study the two were combined and averaged, yielding a range from 1 (indicating the highest level of respect for political and civil rights) to 7, (indicating an absolute disregard for political and civil rights). Hofrenning (1990) also uses the Freedom House rankings in a similar combined scale to represent a general level of respect for human rights in his study.

Unlike Hofrenning though, I also combined the Freedom House rankings with scores from the reports of Amnesty International and the State Department. Specifically, the Amnesty International and State Department reports, which

appear in narrative form, were coded using the "Levels of Political Terror" scale outlined by Gastil (1980, 37).⁶ The coding scheme, derived from Gastil's guideline, is as follows:

Level 1: People live under a secure rule of law, are not imprisoned for their views, rarely face torture, and political murder is extremely rare.

Level 2: There is a limited amount of imprisonment for non-violent political activity. Few people are affected, however, and torture and beating are exceptional. Political murder is rare.

Level 3: There is extensive political imprisonment, or a recent history of imprisonment. Political murders, brutality and executions may be common. Unlimited detention for political views is accepted.

Level 4: The practices of Level 3 are expanded to larger parts of society. Murders, disappearances, and torture are a common part of life. Ideological independence on the part of those who interest themselves in politics is punished with large-scale incarceration.

Level 5: The practices and terror of Level 4 has been expanded to the whole society. Leaders place no limits on how to accomplish their personal or ideological goals. This level can be characterized by the worst periods under Nazi Germany or Stalinist Russia.

The coding was accomplished by evaluating the Amnesty International and State Department reports for the years 1975 to 1986 and awarding a score for each year to each country.⁷ These scores were then added with the Freedom House scores and averaged to produce the final human rights rating. Directional labels were attached to each year to indicate whether a

Table I. Variable Symbols For Directional Changes

Human Rights Rating:

Human Rights Worsen = -1
Human Rights Remains Steady = 0
Human Rights Improve = +1

Military and Economic Aid Allocation:

Aid Allocation Reduced = -1
Aid Allocation Remains Steady = 0
Aid Allocation Increased = +1

particular country's human rights record had improved, stayed the same, or worsened. See appendix II for the specific scores that each country received per year.⁸

Described in this manner, the direction of the new human rights rating is counter-intuitive in the sense that low scores equate with better ratings and high scores equate with worse ratings. For the purpose of clarity and continuity, the variable labels attached to each score were reversed in this study (see Table I).

C. Statistical Method,

The statistical technique used in this study is by far the most striking difference with previous studies that compare the relationship between human rights and economic and military assistance. The most common statistical technique used in previous studies has been the regression analysis (Cingranelli & Pasquarello 1985; McCormick & Mitchell 1988; Hofrenning 1990; and Poe 1991; 1992). Ultimately statistics

are used so that scientific investigation of complex issues can be better facilitated and research findings can be reported in clearly understood and explained formats. Regression analysis is designed to specify the nature of a relationship among interval variables, but most of the previous studies have instead measured an interval variable (represented by the aid amounts) against an ordinal variable (represented by the human rights rankings).

Using a regression equation to measure an ordinal scale against an interval scale appears to create a needlessly complicated study. Two questions emerge in such a situation. First, and the one probably least answerable, is whether the researchers are making an assumption of interval measurement out of the ordinal scale. If such an assumption is being made then it, in turn, violates a basic assumption of regression analysis. To move down from an interval level of measurement to an ordinal level of measurement for the purpose of statistical manageability is possible without much complication. To move up, however, from an ordinal level of measurement to an interval level of measurement, tends to create more problems than it solves.

Second, due to the possibility that there is an assumption of interval measurement, one has to question whether the studies produced have distorted findings. Since the regression analysis is measuring the association between the independent variable, represented by an ordinal scale of

human rights scores (such as Hofrenning's (1990) 14-point scale or Carleton & Stohl's (1985) 5-point scale), and the dependent variable, represented by an interval scale of absolute or per capita aid amounts ranging from zero to the millions, distortion is certainly a possibility. Labovitz (1970) argues that certain interval statistics can be used interchangeably with ordinal statistics; however, he cautions that dichotomizing or creating dummy binary variables could cause faulty interpretation. In addition, he warns that the desire to attach a certain property to the ordinal scale is difficult to resist.

Labovitz's warning certainly appears to ring true in several past studies examined here. As noted before, both the studies of Hofrenning (1990) and Poe (1992) claimed that their findings showed how much aid each point of the ordinal human rights scale was worth. In another article dealing with military aid and human rights, Poe (1991) attaches percentages to the human rights abuse scale in claiming to show whether a country was more or less likely to be allocated military assistance in 1984. By attributing such properties to the human rights scale, the chance that distorted findings could result certainly exists.

Although the bulk of the criticism so far has been directed toward the use of regression analysis, it should be noted that there are also studies that have employed different types of statistics (Schoultz 1981b; 1981c; Stohl, Carleton &

Johnson 1984; and Carleton and Stohl 1985). Both Schoultz studies performed Pearson correlations testing an ordinal scale of human rights scores (although he treated them as interval scales) against absolute levels of U.S. aid. The Stohl, Carleton & Johnson and Carleton and Stohl studies both performed Spearman's correlations on ordinal scaled human rights ratings against per capita military and economic aid. However, all of these studies suffered from methodological errors. Both Schoultz studies appear to have employed the wrong statistic and used human rights data from 1976 to test aid distributed in 1975. The studies by Stohl, Carleton & Johnson and Carleton and Stohl also measured both variables from the same year, which made causal implication suspect because it failed to allow for a time-lag between the occurrence of the human rights rating and the distribution of the aid.

Because it is believed that the scaling of the data in the previous studies mentioned is inappropriate for using parametric tests, I have instead employed a nonparametric inference test to measure association between the two variables for the current study. Normally the main reason for using parametric statistics over nonparametric statistics is that the former are generally more powerful and versatile than the latter because the permissible variation of the parameters is more clearly defined. However, what the current study may be losing in power and versatility it is making up for in ease

of understanding.

Specifically, I employ Kendall's tau-*b* measure of association using collapsed ordinal data with three possible values per variable: +1, 0, and -1. Kendall's tau-*b* is a conservative rival to the more popular Gamma in the measurement of ordinal association largely due to the fact that Gamma ignores tied pairs and can technically reach +1 even under conditions of less than perfect association. Kendall's tau-*b*, on the other hand, takes tied pairs into account and will only reach +1 under conditions of near absolute association. For this study, for example, a T value of .40 indicates that there is a probability of moderate strength that the direction in which one variable moved is the same as the direction in which the other variable moved. In addition, a T value of -.40 indicates that there is a probability of moderate strength that the direction in which one variable moved is not the same as the direction in which the other variable moved.

Tau-*b* does not have the ability to indicate how good or bad an association is, but simply whether the association is positive or negative and its strength. Determining virtue or fault in an association is a subjective decision that can only be made by the researcher going back to the data. It is only by going back to the data that one can determine whether the .40 is representative of an improving human rights score and an increasing aid amount or a worsening human rights score and

a decreasing aid amount. The same is also true to determine exactly what kind of relationship a T value of $-.40$ is describing.

An important question to consider with this type of analysis is one raised by Moore (1979) and concerns the issues of association and causation. Specifically, when conducting a test to measure association between human rights and foreign aid, one should question how much of the association found is actually a collective response as well as a causal response? For instance, countries that generally tend to disrespect or violate the rights of their citizens on a relatively consistent basis are probably also more inclined to engage in activities that may be equally unacceptable to U.S. policy makers when the issue of aid, especially military aid, is being considered. This study is purposefully avoiding any claim related to determining causation. Although certainly implied, it is believed that true causation, especially involving such a complicated issue as this, cannot be determined based on a simple nonparametric, largely bivariate, analysis. It is believed that causal relationships cannot be matter-of-factly proved, but instead, that they can only be considered reasonably plausible in relation to other alternatives.

V. RESULTS

The findings which follow are arranged in such a way as to make explanation easier. The results obtained by testing the direction of human rights against the direction of military aid are outlined first and are followed by the results obtained by testing the relationship between human rights against economic aid.

A. Human Rights In Relation To Military Aid

The results obtained by testing the directional movement in human rights against the directional movement in military aid flows to the Latin American region from 1977 to 1988 are presented in Table II. Taken as a whole, the (-.24) T value indicates that the direction in which the human rights scores moved and the direction in which aid amounts moved were generally not the same. In other words, there is little evidence to suggest that the two variables are associated in any other than a purely coincidental way. The value is weak and conventional levels of statistical significance were not obtained here, but the result is close enough to the level of significance to at least be suggestive.

When the analyses is disaggregated into Central America and South America, the fit between the two variables was even worse. Neither of the results achieved are greatly different from zero. Although the findings for the Central American region suggest a slightly negative relationship, the

Table II. Tau-b Results Measuring Military Aid Against Human Rights

	<i>N</i>	Tau- <i>b</i> Value
Latin America = all	16	-0.24
South America	10	.03
Central America	6	-0.09
Carter Administration (1977 - 1980)	16	-0.21
Reagan First Administration (1981 - 1984)	16	.06
Reagan Second Administration (1985 - 1988)	16	.04

None significant

conclusion has to be, as it was for all of the Americas together, that there was little or no relationship, or association, between human rights and military aid flows during the years under study.

A major focus of previous studies has been to compare the relationship between various U.S. presidential administrations and their policies concerning human rights and aid. Stohl, Carleton & Johnson (1984), for example, compared the Nixon and Carter administrations while both Hofrenning (1990) and Poe (1992) compared the Reagan and Carter administrations. For the current study, the relationship between military aid and human rights was examined for the Carter administration (1977-1980) and both Reagan administrations (1981-1984 & 1985-1988). The findings clearly show that no relationship of statistical significance emerges. However, the negative relationship from the Carter administration comes the closest to being

statistically significant.

Finally, an analysis on a level that appears to be more meaningful than that above was conducted by evaluating the relationship between military aid and human rights for each country individually during the entire 12-year period. Table III. shows results that make it easier to discern the relationship between the directional movement in human rights scores and directional movement in military aid flows. The method here is comparative, but the comparison is conducted in a far different way than that in previous studies.

The findings show nine of the 16 countries with significant Tau-*b* values, five positively and four negatively. The values for those nine countries generally range in strength from weak (Honduras), to moderate (Argentina), to strong (Peru). Five other countries registered below conventional levels of statistical significance (El Salvador registered an absolute zero). No value was produced for Chile since there was not a military aid relationship between the U.S. and Chile during the years under study, which made statistics impossible. However, the fact that Chile did not receive military aid from the U.S. during this period may be deceiving. This point will be discussed further in the next section.

The findings indicate that those five countries with positive values (Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, Guatemala and Uruguay) are cases in which human rights scores and aid flows

Table III. Tau-b Results Measuring Military Aid Against Human Rights For Individual Countries - 1977-1988

	N	Tau-b Value
Brazil	12	.58*
Chile	12	-
Colombia	12	-0.11
Argentina	12	.43*
Peru	12	-0.61*
El Salvador	12	0
Bolivia	12	-0.11
Venezuela	12	.39**
Guatemala	12	.49*
Honduras	12	-0.37**
Costa Rica	12	-0.19
Panama	12	-0.18
Nicaragua	12	-0.47*
Ecuador	12	-0.51*
Paraguay	12	.07
Uruguay	12	.50*

*P<.05 (two-tail);**P<.10 (two-tail)

tended to move in the same general direction. Specifically, the yearly human rights scores for Uruguay begin to improve beginning around 1977 or 1978 and continue that way to the end of the period under investigation. The military aid picture for Uruguay looks similar in the sense that, having had no aid relationship with the U.S. during the early part of the study, transactions begin in 1983 and continued on a general upward trend. Similarly, the human rights record in Argentina during this time period is characterized by high negative ratings which did not begin to improve until around 1983. Those indicators compare favorably with Argentina's military aid relationship with the U.S., which went to zero in 1978 and remained at that level until 1988.

A similar analysis for the countries with a significantly negative association (Peru, Honduras, Nicaragua and Ecuador) is also possible. For Honduras, a generally steady and moderate human rights record from year to year is matched with a military aid allocation from the U.S. that jumps dramatically in 1983 and continues to either increase or remain at the same high level throughout. For Nicaragua, a generally steady and moderate human rights record is matched by a complete cutoff of military aid from the U.S. in 1979. Both cases are examples of human rights scores that did not move in the same direction of U.S. aid flows to the country. The remaining countries with relatively low and insignificant Tau-*b* values appear to be cases where no particular pattern or association could be determined between the directional flow of aid and the directional movement of human rights scores.

B. Human Rights In Relation To Economic Aid

The second set of analysis focused on the relationship between human rights and economic aid. The results are presented in Table IV. and, following the same general pattern as did the relationship between human rights and military aid, show a negative association that is extremely weak and far from being statistically significant. The findings indicate that between 1977 and 1988 there was a negligible correlation between the directional movement in human rights ratings and the way that the U.S. distributed economic aid in Latin

Table VI. Tau-b Results Measuring Economic Aid Against Human Rights

	<i>N</i>	Tau- <i>b</i> Value
Latin America = all	16	-0.15
South America	10	-0.14
Central America	6	-0.17
Carter Administration (1977 - 1980)	16	-0.20
Reagan First Administration (1981 - 1984)	16	-0.20
Reagan Second Administration (1985 - 1988)	16	-0.10

None significant

America. The findings change little when the sample is split in two, between South and Central America. In both instances the resulting values are again negative and very weak.

When the sample is divided into four year blocks, commensurate with each presidential administration, the model continues to produce little. For each administration, the relationship between economic aid and human rights is negative and statistically insignificant. Surprisingly, the Carter administration and the first Reagan administration produce identical results.

The above findings are not inconsistent with current assumptions and the results presented in Table V. exhibit additional support by explaining the relationship even better. Again, conducting individual country-level analysis for the 12 year period, Kendall's tau-*b* is able to reveal that four of the 16 countries had statistically significant negative

associations between their human rights ratings and the economic aid they received or didn't receive from the U.S. These associations ranged from moderate (Brazil) to relatively strong (Nicaragua). Three other countries had tau-b values that, although did not achieve acceptable level of statistical significance, were high enough to be suggestive.

Such findings, it is important to remember, not only indicate whether a relationship is negative (meaning that the direction that each variable travels is opposite) or positive (meaning that the direction that each variable travels is generally the same), but also the strength of the relationship. The findings do not indicate whether the relationship *good* or *bad*, however. For example, a negative association between economic aid and human rights does not necessarily mean that the U.S. aided a repressive regime with economic aid but, rather, that the direction the two variables traveled in was generally opposite one another. It could just as easily mean that the human rights variable traveled in a generally positive direction while aid generally dropped.

Viewing the two analyses (economic aid and military aid against human rights) separately may not be as revealing as comparing the two may be. For example, a relationship that does not reveal itself in one situation could very well reveal itself in another. Chile is a case in point. Chile's human rights rating for the period 1977 to 1988 was generally very negative. On the 1 to 7 scale, Chile's lowest score during the

Table V. Tau-b Results Measuring Economic Aid Against Human Rights For Individual Countries - 1977-1988

	<i>N</i>	Tau- <i>b</i> Value
Brazil	12	-0.40**
Chile	12	-0.23
Colombia	12	.3
Argentina	12	-0.46*
Peru	12	-0.14
El Salvador	12	-0.03
Bolivia	12	.12
Venezuela	12	0
Guatemala	12	.22
Honduras	12	-0.05
Costa Rica	12	-0.40**
Panama	12	-0.29
Nicaragua	12	-0.59*
Ecuador	12	.03
Paraguay	12	-0.35
Uruguay	12	0

* $P < .05$ (one-tail); ** $P < .10$ (one-tail)

12-year period was 4.6 but, it received a score of 5 or above during eight of the twelve years. The U.S. gave absolutely no military aid to Chile during the period under study yet, economic aid ranged from a high in 1978 of \$53.1 million to a low of \$1.1 million in 1987. The negative T value for Chile in Table V. reflects this relationship and although the value did not reach an acceptable level of statistical significance, it is close enough to imply that the relationship has some merit.

Even more important than analyzing a specific case though, is determining what the results tell us about U.S. foreign aid in general. The findings reveal that it is difficult to discover any type of relationship or association when the variables are arranged so that the entire region is

examined. Instead, clear and concise relationships between the directional movements in human rights and foreign aid become clear only when the individual country is examined. This implies that the U.S. distributes foreign aid in a more complex and country-specific fashion rather than based on a set of regional or global standards. Further, it is also clear, as others have asserted, that human rights seems to be a more important concern when military aid is being dispensed than when economic aid is being dispensed.

The implication of such a relationship is that the U.S. may have been more willing to adjust military aid because highly negative human rights ratings made that type of aid more politically sensitive. Economic aid, however, may not have been adjusted in the same fashion and one is led to question further the relationship between the economic aid given by the U.S. and the human rights of the recipient nations. This study, however, is not equipped to answer questions of that nature in as much detail as it raises them.

VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

As I made clear at the beginning, the purpose of this paper was to examine the relationship or association between the directional changes in human rights in Latin America and the directional changes in both economic and military aid from the United States. The purpose was not necessarily to try to show, as other studies have tried to do, that there was a

cause and effect relationship between U.S. aid and a particular human rights score.

The importance of looking at human rights and foreign aid from the perspective of an association is that it improves upon existing ways of analyzing the topic. Previous studies all postulate that U.S. aid allocations are based on some sort of formula which links human rights scores with specific aid amounts. The fallacy of such an approach is that it views the foreign aid process in terms that are unrealistic for two reasons. First, it is improbable that a certain human rights score is worth a certain amount of aid. Second, such an approach fails to see foreign aid for what it is: a tool to reward good behavior and punish bad behavior. Instead, existing ways of analyzing the topic view foreign aid as a static and non-dynamic tool of foreign policy. The approach used in this study is more realistic and seeks to determine whether increases or decreases in U.S. foreign aid, regardless of the magnitude of those changes, are matched by improvements or deteriorations in recipient country's human rights practices.

The study showed that when an entire region with many countries is viewed, clear negative or positive distinction with any strength is very difficult to discern. Instead, it often appears as if there was no relationship between human rights and foreign assistance. When, however, the analysis is disaggregated to a smaller unit level, a more lucid

relationship emerges. It is at the country level, I assert, where true comparison of foreign aid can be most productive. Noticeably absent from the essay are causal explanations. Why human rights was more associated with aid in one country and not in another is beyond the scope of this paper. The fact that a distinction was found is an improvement in itself from past studies.

NOTES

1. It is interesting to note that although Morgenthau titled this article "A Political Theory of Foreign Aid", Wittkopf (1972, 49 note #5) claimed that it was in fact not a theory but rather was simply a typology, and not a useful one at that.
2. For both of these studies, an increasing human rights score was an indication of a worsening human rights condition and a decreasing human rights score was an indication of an improving human rights condition.
3. The 16 countries included in this study are: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Argentina, Peru, El Salvador, Bolivia, Venezuela, Guatemala, Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama, Nicaragua, Ecuador, Paraguay and Uruguay. The study concentrates on the years 1977-1988. However, the human rights scores are for the years 1975-1986. The explanation has to do with the two-year lag in a normal budget cycle. See Appendix I for the particular human rights and aid variables for each country.
4. The measure used for developing the aid range, from which direction changes for both military and economic aid were derived, is as follows. The actual military aid data for Honduras for 1977 are used as an example:

$$[ca] \quad pa + (pa * (pc)) = fa \text{ +/- } 5\% = AR$$

$$[\$3.1] \quad \$3.5 + (\$3.5 * (-72.4\%)) = \$0.97 \text{ +/- } 5\% = \$1.1 \text{ to } \$0.90$$

if $ca > AR$ then directional change is positive (+1)
 if $ca < AR$ then directional change is negative (-1)
 if $ca = AR$ then there is no directional change (0)

where:

ca = current year's aid to country
 pa = previous year's aid to country
 pc = percent change from previous year to current year in the total U.S. (military or economic) aid budget to the Latin American region
 fa = forecast (or adjusted) aid
 AR = Aid Range

I use +/- 5% as an aid range simply because it is an assumption that a range of that magnitude is large enough to account for the year to year fluctuations in the regional U.S. foreign aid budget, but yet still small enough to show dramatic changes in U.S. aid allocations to individual countries when they occur.

5. I derived the Freedom House rankings for 1974-86 from the 1988-89 issue of *Freedom in the World: Political Rights and Civil Liberties*, by Raymond D. Gastil.

6. This method is comparable to Poe (1991; 1992), who analyzed all three sources in a similar fashion and developed a single variable that indicated the general level of respect for human rights per country for the particular years in his study.
7. The score awarded was between 1.4 (corresponding with Level 1 of the Gastil scale) and 7 (corresponding with Level 5 of the Gastil scale) so as to best fit the State Department and Amnesty International scores with the seven-point Freedom House scale.
8. For example, Chile's 1980 Freedom House ranking of 5.5 was combined with the 1980 Amnesty International ranking of 4.2 (level three on the Gastil scale) and the 1980 State Department ranking of 4.2 (also level three on the Gastil scale). The total score of 13.9 was then averaged to produce a final human rights score for Chile in 1980 of 4.6. This process was repeated for each country in the study from 1974 to 1986. Once a final score had been produced for all years, direction labels, as seen in Table I, were attached to each year to indicate whether the total human rights score had improved, stayed the same, or worsened. See Appendix II.

Although the Freedom House, Amnesty International, and State Department reports on human rights practices are certainly the most consistent and longest running annual sources for this type of information, coverage is by no means universal. For example, the State Department *Country Reports on Human Rights Practices* only began in 1977 (covering 1976) and even then, certain countries such as Brazil, Chile and Argentina, received little or no attention until 1980 (covering 1979). In addition, Amnesty International's reports often excluded various countries during certain years. It is presumed that a country was excluded in this manner only when there were no human rights cases to report on. Examples include Costa Rica from 1975 to 1980 and Ecuador from 1981 to 1985. Panama was excluded from the Amnesty reports for all years except 1985, when it received a 1.4 rating. By contrast, there is not a single year between 1974 and 1986 in which Freedom House fails to rate a country's human rights performance. In cases where a particular human rights score was not available for a given year, the available scores were simply averaged by two.

9. General sources for this section are: Howell (1987); Pagano (1990); Siegel and Castellan, Jr. (1988); and SAS Institute, Inc. (1987).

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APPENDICES

Appendix I. Country, Year, and Ordinal Variables for Human Rights and Military and Economic Aid

	<u>Brazil</u>			<u>Chile</u>		
YEAR	HR	M.AID	E.AID	HR	M.AID	E.AID
1975	0			0		
1976	-1			0		
1977	1	-1	-1	0	0	-1
1978	1	-1	1	1	0	1
1979	0	0	1	1	0	-1
1980	1	0	-1	1	0	-1
1981	0	0	0	0	0	-1
1982	1	0	-1	0	0	-1
1983	0	0	-1	0	0	-1
1984	0	0	-1	0	0	-1
1985	1	0	-1	-1	0	0
1986	1	0	1	0	0	1
1987		0	-1		0	-1
1988		1	-1		0	1
	<u>Columbia</u>			<u>Argentina</u>		
YEAR	HR	M.AID	E.AID	HR	M.AID	E.AID
1975	0			0		
1976	-1			-1		
1977	1	-1	-1	-1	-1	1
1978	-1	1	1	0	-1	1
1979	0	-1	1	1	0	0
1980	0	-1	-1	-1	0	1
1981	-1	-1	-1	1	0	-1
1982	0	1	1	0	0	1
1983	0	-1	-1	1	0	-1
1984	0	1	1	1	0	0
1985	-1	-1	1	0	0	0
1986	0	1	-1	1	0	0
1987		1	0		0	1
1988		1	1		1	1
	<u>Peru</u>			<u>El Salvador</u>		
YEAR	HR	M.AID	E.AID	HR	M.AID	E.AID
1975	0			-1		
1976	1			-1		
1977	0	1	1	0	1	-1
1978	1	-1	1	-1	-1	1
1979	0	1	-1	-1	0	0
1980	1	-1	-1	-1	1	1
1981	0	-1	-1	-1	1	1
1982	-1	-1	-1	1	-1	0
1983	-1	-1	1	0	-1	0
1984	0	1	1	1	1	-1
1985	0	1	-1	1	-1	1
1986	0	-1	0	-1	0	0
1987		-1	0		0	1
1988		1	1		1	-1

Appendix I. Country, Year, and Ordinal Variables for Human Rights and Military and Economic Aid, Cont.

<u>Bolivia</u>				<u>Venezuela</u>		
YEAR	HR	M.AID	E.AID	HR	M.AID	E.AID
1975	0			0		
1976	1			0		
1977	0	-1	1	1	-1	-1
1978	1	-1	-1	0	0	1
1979	-1	1	-1	0	0	-1
1980	-1	-1	-1	-1	0	1
1981	1	0	-1	1	1	-1
1982	1	0	0	-1	-1	-1
1983	0	0	1	1	1	-1
1984	0	1	1	-1	-1	-1
1985	0	1	-1	0	1	0
1986	0	-1	1	0	1	0
1987		0	-1		1	0
1988		-1	1		0	0
<u>Guatemala</u>				<u>Honduras</u>		
YEAR	HR	M.AID	E.AID	HR	M.AID	E.AID
1975	0			0		
1976	1			1		
1977	0	-1	-1	0	1	-1
1978	0	0	-1	0	-1	1
1979	0	0	1	0	1	1
1980	-1	0	-1	1	1	1
1981	-1	0	0	-1	-1	-1
1982	-1	0	-1	1	1	1
1983	0	0	1	-1	1	0
1984	1	0	-1	1	-1	-1
1985	1	1	1	1	1	1
1986	1	1	1	0	0	-1
1987		1	1		1	1
1988		1	0		0	1
<u>Costa Rica</u>				<u>Panama</u>		
YEAR	HR	M.AID	E.AID	HR	M.AID	E.AID
1975	0			0		
1976	-1			0		
1977	0	1	1	0	1	-1
1978	0	-1	0	1	-1	1
1979	0	0	1	0	1	0
1980	-1	0	-1	1	-1	-1
1981	0	0	-1	0	-1	1
1982	0	1	1	1	0	-1
1983	0	1	1	1	0	-1
1984	0	-1	-1	1	1	1
1985	0	1	-1	1	0	1
1986	1	-1	0	-1	-1	-1
1987		-1	0		-1	-1
1988		-1	-1		-1	-1

Appendix I. Country, Year, and Ordinal Variables for Human Rights and Military and Economic Aid, Cont.

YEAR	<u>Nicaragua</u>			<u>Ecuador</u>		
	HR	M.AID	E.AID	HR	M.AID	E.AID
1975	-1			0		
1976	1			1		
1977	0	1	1	0	1	-1
1978	-1	-1	-1	0	-1	1
1979	1	0	1	1	-1	1
1980	1	0	1	1	1	-1
1981	1	0	1	0	-1	1
1982	0	0	-1	0	-1	-1
1983	0	0	-1	0	-1	-1
1984	-1	0	0	0	-1	0
1985	0	0	0	-1	1	0
1986	-1	0	0	0	-1	1
1987		0	0		1	1
1988		0	1		-1	-1
YEAR	<u>Paraguay</u>			<u>Uruguay</u>		
	HR	M.AID	E.AID	HR	M.AID	E.AID
1975	0			-1		
1976	1			-1		
1977	0	0	-1	1	-1	0
1978	1	-1	0	0	0	-1
1979	0	0	1	0	0	0
1980	0	0	-1	1	0	-1
1981	0	0	1	1	0	1
1982	-1	0	1	1	0	-1
1983	1	1	-1	1	1	0
1984	0	-1	-1	1	-1	-1
1985	1	1	-1	1	1	-1
1986	-1	1	1	0	1	1
1987		1	-1		1	-1
1988		1	1		-1	-1

Appendix II. Human Rights Scores for Amnesty International, the State Department, Freedom House, and Averaged Total

YEAR	BRAZIL				CHILE			
	A.I.	S.D.	F.H.	AVG	A.I.	S.D.	F.H.	AVG
1974	5.6	*	4	4.8	5.6	*	6	5.8
1975	5.6	*	4	4.8	5.6	*	6	5.8
1976	5.6	5.6	4.5	5.2	5.6	*	6	5.8
1977	4.2	*	4.5	4.4	5.6	*	6	5.8
1978	4.2	*	4	4.1	5.6	*	5.5	5.6
1979	4.2	4.2	4	4.1	5.6	4.2	5.5	5.1
1980	2.8	2.8	3.5	3	4.2	4.2	5.5	4.6
1981	2.8	2.8	3.5	3	4.2	4.2	5.5	4.6
1982	2.8	2.8	3	2.9	4.2	4.2	5.5	4.6
1983	2.8	2.8	3	2.9	4.2	4.2	5.5	4.6
1984	2.8	2.8	3	2.9	4.2	4.2	5.5	4.6
1985	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.7	5.6	4.2	5.5	5.1
1986	2.8	2.8	2	2.5	5.6	4.2	5.5	5.1

YEAR	COLUMBIA				ARGENTINA			
	A.I.	S.D.	F.H.	AVG	A.I.	S.D.	F.H.	AVG
1974	2.8	*	2	2.4	5.6	*	3	4.3
1975	2.8	*	2	2.4	5.6	*	3	4.3
1976	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.7	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.6
1977	2.8	1.4	2.5	2.2	7	*	5.5	6.3
1978	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.7	7	*	5.5	6.3
1979	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.7	7	5.6	5.5	6
1980	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.7	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.6
1981	4.2	4.2	2.5	3.6	4.2	4.2	5.5	4.6
1982	4.2	4.2	2.5	3.6	4.2	4.2	5.5	4.6
1983	4.2	4.2	2.5	3.6	4.2	2.8	3	3.3
1984	4.2	4.2	2.5	3.6	2.8	2.8	2	2.5
1985	5.6	4.2	2.5	4.1	2.8	2.8	2	2.5
1986	5.6	4.2	2.5	4.1	2.8	2.8	1.5	2.4

YEAR	PERU				EL SALVADOR			
	A.I.	S.D.	F.H.	AVG	A.I.	S.D.	F.H.	AVG
1974	2.8	*	6	4.4	*	*	2.5	*
1975	2.8	*	6	4.4	2.8	*	2.5	2.6
1976	2.8	2.8	5	3.5	4.2	2.8	3	3.3
1977	2.8	2.8	5	3.5	4.2	2.8	3	3.3
1978	2.8	2.8	4.5	3.4	4.2	4.2	4	4.1
1979	2.8	2.8	4.5	3.4	5.6	4.2	4	4.6
1980	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.7	5.6	4.2	5	4.9
1981	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.7	5.6	5.6	5	5.4
1982	4.2	2.8	2.5	3.2	5.6	5.6	4.5	5.2
1983	4.2	4.2	2.5	3.6	5.6	5.6	4.5	5.2
1984	4.2	4.2	2.5	3.6	5.6	5.6	4	5.1
1985	4.2	4.2	2.5	3.6	5.6	5.6	3	4.7
1986	4.2	4.2	2.5	3.6	5.6	5.6	3.5	4.9

Appendix II. Human Rights Scores for Amnesty International, the State Department, Freedom House, and Averaged Total, Cont.

YEAR	<u>BOLIVIA</u>				<u>VENEZUELA</u>			
	A.I.	S.D.	F.H.	AVG	A.I.	S.D.	F.H.	AVG
1974	2.8	*	5.5	4.1	2.8	*	2	2.4
1975	2.8	*	5.5	4.1	2.8	*	2	2.4
1976	2.8	2.8	5	3.5	2.8	2.8	1.5	2.4
1977	2.8	2.8	5	3.5	2.8	1.4	1.5	1.9
1978	2.8	2.8	4	3.2	2.8	1.4	1.5	1.9
1979	4.2	2.8	4	3.7	2.8	1.4	1.5	1.9
1980	4.2	4.2	6	4.8	2.8	2.8	1.5	2.4
1981	2.8	4.2	6	4.3	*	2.8	1.5	2.2
1982	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.8	1.5	2.4
1983	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.7	*	2.8	1.5	2.2
1984	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.8	1.5	2.4
1985	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.8	1.5	2.4
1986	2.8	2.8	2.5	2.7	2.8	2.8	1.5	2.4

YEAR	<u>GUATEMALA</u>				<u>HONDURAS</u>			
	A.I.	S.D.	F.H.	AVG	A.I.	S.D.	F.H.	AVG
1974	5.6	*	3.5	4.6	*	*	4.5	4.5
1975	5.6	*	3.5	4.6	4.2	*	4.5	4.4
1976	5.6	4.2	3.5	4.4	2.8	2.8	4.5	3.4
1977	5.6	4.2	3.5	4.4	2.8	2.8	4.5	3.4
1978	5.6	4.2	3.5	4.4	2.8	2.8	4.5	3.4
1979	5.6	4.2	3.5	4.4	2.8	2.8	4.5	3.4
1980	5.6	5.6	5.5	5.6	2.8	2.8	3.5	3
1981	5.6	5.6	6	5.7	4.2	4.2	3	3.8
1982	7	5.6	6	6.2	4.2	4.2	2.5	3.6
1983	7	5.6	6	6.2	4.2	4.2	3	3.8
1984	7	5.6	5.5	6	4.2	4.2	2.5	3.6
1985	5.6	5.6	4	5	4.2	2.8	2.5	3.2
1986	4.2	4.2	3	3.8	4.2	2.8	2.5	3.2

YEAR	<u>COSTA RICA</u>				<u>PANAMA</u>			
	A.I.	S.D.	F.H.	AVG	A.I.	S.D.	F.H.	AVG
1974	*	*	1	*	*	*	6.5	6.5
1975	*	*	1	*	*	*	6.5	6.5
1976	*	1.4	1	1.2	*	2.8	6.5	4.7
1977	*	1.4	1	1.2	*	2.8	6.5	4.7
1978	*	1.4	1	1.2	*	2.8	5	3.9
1979	*	1.4	1	1.2	*	2.8	5	3.9
1980	1.4	1.4	1	1.3	*	2.8	4	3.4
1981	1.4	1.4	1	1.3	*	2.8	4	3.4
1982	1.4	1.4	1	1.3	*	2.8	5	3.9
1983	1.4	1.4	1	1.3	*	2.8	4.5	3.7
1984	1.4	1.4	1	1.3	*	2.8	3.5	3.2
1985	1.4	1.4	1	1.3	1.4	2.8	4.5	2.9
1986	*	1.4	1	1.2	*	2.8	4.5	3.5

Appendix II. Human Rights Scores for Amnesty International, the State Department, Freedom House, and Averaged Total, Cont.

YEAR	<u>NICARAGUA</u>				<u>ECUADOR</u>			
	A.I.	S.D.	F.H.	AVG	A.I.	S.D.	F.H.	AVG
1974	4.2	*	4.5	4.4	2.8	*	6	4.4
1975	5.6	*	4.5	4.8	2.8	*	6	4.4
1976	4.2	4.2	5	4.5	2.8	1.4	5.5	3.2
1977	4.2	4.2	5	4.5	2.8	1.4	5.5	3.2
1978	5.6	5.6	5	5.4	2.8	2.8	4	3.2
1979	4.2	5.6	5	4.9	*	1.4	4	2.3
1980	2.8	5.6	5	4.5	*	1.4	2	1.7
1981	2.8	4.2	5.5	4.2	*	1.4	2	1.7
1982	2.8	4.2	5.5	4.2	*	1.4	2	1.7
1983	2.8	4.2	5.5	4.2	*	1.4	2	1.7
1984	4.2	4.2	5	4.5	*	1.4	2	1.7
1985	4.2	4.2	5	4.5	4.2	2.8	2.5	3.2
1986	4.2	4.2	5.5	4.6	4.2	2.8	2.5	3.2

YEAR	<u>PARAGUAY</u>				<u>URUGUAY</u>			
	A.I.	S.D.	F.H.	AVG	A.I.	S.D.	F.H.	AVG
1974	4.2	*	5	4.6	4.2	*	5	4.6
1975	4.2	*	5	4.6	5.6	*	5	5.3
1976	4.2	2.8	5.5	4.2	7	5.6	6	6.2
1977	4.2	2.8	5.5	4.2	5.6	5.6	6	5.7
1978	4.2	2.8	5	4	5.6	5.6	6	5.7
1979	4.2	2.8	5	4	5.6	5.6	6	5.7
1980	4.2	2.8	5	4	5.6	4.2	5	4.9
1981	4.2	2.8	5	4	4.2	4.2	5	4.4
1982	4.2	4.2	5	4.5	4.2	4.2	4.5	4.3
1983	4.2	2.8	5	4	4.2	2.8	4.5	3.8
1984	4.2	2.8	5	4	4.2	1.4	4.5	3.4
1985	2.8	2.8	5	3.5	1.4	1.4	2	1.6
1986	4.2	2.8	5.5	4.2	1.4	1.4	2	1.6

* Indicates that the country was not reviewed or ranked that year. In this situation the scores from the other two sources were simply added and divided by two instead of three. In cases where two of the three sources did not rank a country for a year, the average was simply the score of the only ranking for that year.