The Cold War in the Eastern Mediterranean: An Interpretive Global History

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The Cold War in the Eastern Mediterranean: An Interpretive Global History

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Abstract

This thesis offers the first global history of the Cold War in the eastern Mediterranean. It examines the international linkages that bound Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus with superpowers, non-aligned states, and transnational movements during the second half of the twentieth century, and it considers the effects of such linkages upon the eastern Mediterranean’s domestic arenas. Throughout, it demonstrates that two forces – synthesis of outside influence alongside consolidation of internal identities – dictated the region’s experiences during the Cold War. And though the international environment furnished the conditions within which the region’s societies pursued the project of nation-building, indigenous forces and factors remained the fundamental drivers of political and social change. Ultimately, the nations of the eastern Mediterranean emerged from the Cold War period changed by decades living under the auspices of superpower competition. But as events in the early twenty-first century would demonstrate, the Cold War served as a catalyst, rather than a cause, for developments long underway in one of the world’s most vibrant – and, at times, volatile – hubs of globalization.
Acknowledgements

This thesis has been years in the making, and in the course of its completion I have accrued many debts. The greatest are to my advisors, who pushed me from the earliest stages to compose a work of history grounded not only in diplomacy – my earliest interest, and still my strongest suit – but also in culture, society, and identity. Alessandro Brogi instilled in me a deep respect for such interdisciplinary approaches during his first seminars, and his mentorship – always flexible, but equally rigorous – provided precisely the freedom I needed to get it all done. I am deeply grateful for his expertise, his feedback, and his patience. The same thanks go to Trish Starks, whose influence loomed large throughout the editing process, and to Laurence Hare, who challenged me to think globally about themes as diverse as agriculture, biology, language, and material culture.

Others across the University of Arkansas, especially in the history, classics, linguistics, and geography departments, also had a hand in the completion of this thesis, whether they know it or not. Tom Paradise’s courses in Middle Eastern geography forced me to consider the eastern Mediterranean as a world-systems nexus, not just a collection of individual states contributing to a composite regional history. Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon, though no longer with the university, served on both of my undergraduate honors committees, directed my first funded research project, and spared no time training me in the literature on British decolonization – all phenomenal experiences I will not soon forget. And during my final course in Fayetteville, a seminar on cross-cultural texts and transmission, Rembrandt Wolpert and Elizabeth Markham demonstrated the great power of an integrated approach in humanities pedagogy.

In a more practical sense, the generosity of numerous organizations and individuals provided me the opportunity to extensively research both primary and secondary material. The
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On this front, a few more personal notes are in order. To George Paulson, instructor of Modern Greek, decades-long Philhellene, and true friend, go warm thanks. Yiorgos truly knows the eastern Mediterranean and its people, and the vast range of his knowledge is secondary only to his many pedagogical gifts. He was a key influence on my intellectual development, and I hope (and strongly suspect) he will have feedback on all of this the next time we share a beer back in Arkansas. Much of the same can be said for Dylan Beschoner, who experienced and absorbed knowledge on the eastern Mediterranean with me over the course of several treasured years.

But the warmest thanks, as always, go to my wife, Lauren. Though the subject matter is about as unromantic as topics come, any merit this thesis has must be shared with you. You are the only one to have heard my many challenges, complaints, and victories throughout this process, and I don’t think you suspect just how crucial you have been to its success. And to our daughter, Evelyn: thank you for your patience while Dad retreated to his office to write another chapter. Perhaps some day we can show you the Athenian agora, or walk with you up the hills overlooking the olive groves near the oracular site at Delphi. Until then, it’s the greatest pleasure of my life to watch you grow up a little bit each day – φασουλι το φασουλι, as the Greeks would say.
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“Ancient Hellenism, like a vast wave, broke and ended at the foot of the last century; the ripples of the wave still break quietly on the shore of some islands and Greek places still enslaved today. And the language, which was spoken by kings, like Theseus, is now looked down upon by street cleaners, because some pseudo-intellectuals were never able to free themselves from the honey of Attica. The mountains are many-hued behind the light colored marbles... In such a land splashed with color and light should not true men reappear?”

I. **Introduction: The Global Eastern Mediterranean**

Manolis owned a bar in the Plaka district of Athens, an old government building repurposed to serve ouzo and mezedes, the perennial Greek appetizers, on its balcony offering breathtaking views of the Acropolis some six hundred feet above. He smoked cigarettes, equally perennial features of Greek life and conversation, as he talked to me about his brothers, who had been imprisoned in the 1960s during the years of the country’s military dictatorship. A man of sixty-five, portly, clean-shaven, with light grey hair fading into white, he seemed a world away from the long-haired, T-shirt-sporting youth of 1968 he described. “We were kids, just like the ones at Berkeley and in Paris,” he said as he sipped raki, the Cretan firewater famous for its pungent bite of resin and lavender. “We heard about the protests on the news and we felt a kind of connection. But we were more interested in drinking and women than in politics. None of that mattered to the colonels.”

Manolis and his brothers had organized a smaller neighborhood protest in support of the first major student uprising at Athens Polytechnic University in the spring of 1968, just under a year into Greece’s dictatorship of 1967-1974. Their efforts failed when a battalion of Athens police forcibly broke the demonstration with batons and tear gas, then locked Manolis, his brothers, and some twenty followers in a communal cell for the next three months. The situation, at first glance, seemed to mirror student protests in the U.S. at institutions like the University of
California at Berkeley, when state police had forcibly disbanded student groups occupying campus lawns. But where California governor Ronald Reagan had at the time gone easy on protestors, favoring political denouncement of their resistance over long-term imprisonment or persecution, George Papadopoulos, the frontman of the Greek junta, opted for harsher penalties. Manolis’s time in jail proved among the most harrowing episodes of his life – and it could have happened to tens of thousands of students in the United States and Western Europe, had they instead been part of the Greek protests. “It was a wake-up call,” Manolis remembered, using the Greek word for “rebirth” – a fitting, though perhaps unintentional, allusion to his later political transformation. “The problems of the world had come to Greece and we were a part.”

My encounter with Manolis, during my first trip to the Mediterranean in the summer of 2011, came as somewhat of an accident. I had just begun my undergraduate studies in Cold War history and had a notion of my research interests, which lay in the experiences of the developing world during the last half of the twentieth century, and my trip to Greece, on the sage advice of an academic advisor to study classics, was the first stop in testing the waters of a robust humanities education. I had roughshod knowledge of the region’s Cold War experiences, but they seemed peripheral to the real contours of Greek history – the timeless elegance of the Acropolis towering above Manolis’s bar, the deeds of Athenians and Spartans and their valiant defenses against the Persian onslaught, the spread of Hellenistic culture under Alexander and – only much later – the final chapters of the nation’s history as it won independence from Ottoman rule. Modern Greece, by contrast, provided the worldly appeal of folk music drifting alongside aromatic spices and the chatter of outdoor restaurants; but its recent past seemed paler, corollary and even tangential to the events that had shaped the true Greek experience millennia ago.
What I discovered as I spoke with Manolis – and, over the course of my trip, with many others like him – was the unanticipated but undeniable centrality of the twentieth century. The contours of Greek culture that conditioned my entire visit were often those that had emerged in recent centuries, ever since the Greeks had thrown off the shackles of Ottoman dominion, and within the conversations I held with Greeks young and old there were lasting memories of a twentieth-century experience rarely discussed in lectures on contemporary European and world history. For Greeks, the period between the First World War to the unraveling of the communist bloc had witnessed political discontents, social upheavals, and economic crises that rivaled those in many of the century’s more infamous, and far more documented, episodes. Nor were such events widely discussed in works of history. As I absorbed literature on the Vietnam counterinsurgency, I wondered why there was no comparable attention to the extensive pacification campaigns the United States waged to wrestle control from communists in the Greek Civil War two decades earlier. Though coups in Latin America, Africa, and Southeast Asia had stimulated countless historical treatments, precious few pages had been written about the regime of the Greek colonels.¹ Where Charles de Gaulle, various British prime ministers, and American administrations throughout the Cold War attracted sustained scholarly attention among specialists in transatlantic relations, accounts focusing on the eastern Mediterranean dimensions of the Atlantic alliance were all but nonexistent.² Upon my return to the United States, I resolved to investigate further. Surely there must be a history that offered a cohesive narrative to the eastern Mediterranean’s Cold War experience. Surely authors had answered the questions that I

¹ I had searched extensively, for instance, for an eastern Mediterranean analogue to works such as Stephen G. Rabe’s *The Killing Zone: The United States Wages Cold War in Latin America* (Oxford, 2015) or Greg Grandin and Naomi Klein’s *The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War* (Chicago, 2011).

² So commanding in Cold War history are France, Germany, the United Kingdom, and their respective leaders that any attempt to document the existing secondary literature would become a thesis in its own right. The transatlantic story has been told from numerous perspectives
had posed – why the region played so little a role in current understandings of the twentieth century, and how its societies had evolved throughout the period.

But at all turns, I found precious little on the eastern Mediterranean in the twentieth century. Key accounts existed, to be sure – the works of notable Philhellene C.M. Woodhouse furnished a fantastic recounting of modern Greek history, told from the top down, but nonetheless illustrative, as did Robert Holland’s masterful narrative of the Cyprus crisis in the 1950s. And historians of the late British Empire had acknowledged the importance of Greece and Cyprus to London’s imperial strategies following the Second World War. A particularly influential mentor of mine even wrote the first history of the Cyprus insurgency within the context of a global system. Yet beyond these works, few syntheses of Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot history had linked the eastern Mediterranean’s experiences to the broader processes of globalization after the Second World War, even though the region had played such an integral role in many of globalization’s most notable subprocesses: decolonization, neutralism and self-assertion in the developing world, and socioeconomic transformation in the wake of the neoliberal turn.

The lacunae became all the stranger as I witnessed just how prominent a role the region was playing in global politics at the time of my research. As I completed work for another major in international relations, the headlines I consulted on world affairs revealed a European

4 Indeed, the eastern Mediterranean’s Cold War has long been a story weighted toward the beginning, and told from British perspectives as London faced the pressures of decolonization. Recent works like Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon’s *Imperial Endgame: Britain’s Dirty Wars and the End of Empire* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) have sought to correct this narrative.
5 Some of the more important works to touch on the history of the eastern Mediterranean in British imperial strategy are Lawrence R. Pratt, *East of Malta, West of Suez: Britain’s Mediterranean Crisis, 1936-1939* (Cambridge, 2008). William Roger Louis, perhaps the most respected living historian of the British Empire, also briefly touches on the role of Cyprus in *British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-51: Arab Nationalism, the United States and Postwar Imperialism* (Oxford, 1984), while the best account of the post-WWII Cyprus insurgency (and one I will frequently reference throughout this thesis) is Grob-Fitzgibbon, *Imperial Endgame*. 
integration experiment plagued by the financial downturn of 2008 and the ensuing social
disrepair of the EU’s southeastern member states. Greece and Cyprus, despite consistently strong
tourism revenues and persistent cultural importance, by the mid-second decade of the twenty-
first century had entered their eighth consecutive year of economic decline. Turkey, its internal
politics blighted by ethnic disturbances and withering critiques of the government’s human rights
abuses, likewise stood as an embarrassment to the European Union (the July 2016 coup attempt
and subsequent purges, which have more recently dominated news coverage, only serving to
entrench such perceptions). And all nations in the region had been crippled by the massive influx
of refugees from Syria’s civil war, with attendant domestic political ramifications for the rise of
extremism. The message, regardless of sources consulted, was all too clear. Not even a century
after the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, whose demise heralded a new age of European and
global politics and made way for nations to explore the frontiers of independence and self-
sufficiency, the eastern Mediterranean had become the new sick man of Europe. Journalists and
experts alike pointed to the region’s history as the key to understanding its present predicament.
Some even spoke forebodingly of threats to the stability of government and culture altogether.
“In past weeks and months,” wrote acclaimed Balkan historian Mark Mazower in the run-up to
Greece’s 2012 elections, “Greek institutions have taken a battering in the eyes of the world…
today, with the country’s welfare state in shambles and illegal entry into Greece showing little
signs of easing up, the prospects [for the survival of Greek democracy] are ominous.”

I began to suspect that this was the reason for the lack of a cohesive eastern
Mediterranean Cold War narrative: perhaps the real stories were buried in the recollections of
citizens and in the often-inchoate realms of memory, language, and cultural symbol. To better

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understand the outward appearance of the 21st-century eastern Mediterranean, I might need to look inward. And such an approach, informed by the analyses of scholars like Mazower, initially seemed the best path forward in unraveling the eastern Mediterranean knot. Not satisfied with existing accounts of a nation’s external conduct, the historian of foreign relations can find comfort in investigating the internal workings of a society to examine links between the domestic and diplomatic realms, as scholars of American foreign relations like Kenneth Osgood and Robert Dean had done with great success. But this avenue, while promising, ultimately yielded little fruit. Few works of history dealt with the Greek, Turkish, or Cypriot domestic scenes whatsoever; even fewer diverged from the overarching diplomatic narrative to narrate events on the ground. When I turned to sociology and ethnography, new and fascinating insights emerged – around dramatic changes in civil society during the Greek Cold War, on shifting relationships between religious authorities and the lay population, and on political expression in modern Greek life. Scholars like Neni Panourgiá had trod new ground in illuminating the perspectives of everyday Greeks, and their narratives posed new questions. Yet even these sources were heavily topical, often grounded in case-study approaches and rarely delivering the sort of broader canvas I sought. What could the experiences of a particular Greek village reveal about the nation as a whole? And how could individual cases shed light on deep global linkages?

My first academic forays into eastern Mediterranean history – two honors theses on the region’s twentieth century – stimulated many questions, but I ultimately remained disappointed in what I saw were major gaps in my analyses. I had set out to recount Greece’s Cold War – and had implied as much in my title – but had actually only scratched the surface. While my thesis

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7 For examples of “intermestic” studies, see Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and Abroad (Kansas, 2006) and Robert D. Dean, Imperial Brotherhood: Gender and the Making of Cold War Foreign Policy (Culture, Politics, and the Cold War) (University of Massachusetts, 2003).
had contributed much in the way of diplomatic narrative, it was still, ultimately, a history told from above, and from the perspectives of traditional players – the United States and Great Britain above all – rather than from the indigenous voices I sought to amplify. I had material from a secondary thesis in international relations, *The Cyprus Crisis: 40 Years Later*, that delved deeper into the modern history of Cyprus to consider questions of Cypriot nationhood against the backdrop of ethnic conflict, and this approach had certainly brought me closer to my goal. But its subject matter relied heavily upon a case-study approach, and I was reticent to combine it hastily and haphazardly with my work in history. Scholarship on the eastern Mediterranean, then, remained fragmented. In the words of Linda Colley, speaking of the state of contemporary history in the 1960s and 1970s, it was “thoroughly compartmentalized,” with various strands “operating along parallel tracks” that were destined to coexist without meeting.\(^8\)

Three years later, this thesis aims to redress this imbalance. It offers the first sustained, interpretive global history of the eastern Mediterranean during the Cold War, a period during which the fates of Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus joined those of nations across the globe as the world entered a new and dangerous era of international relations under superpower auspices. It is the story of political deadlock and vociferous parliamentary debate, of individual policymakers and the forces that alternately compelled them into activity and forced them into submission. It recounts invasions, counterinsurgencies, and the shockwaves of falling empires, of economic downturns and unprecedented booms, of terrorism, diplomatic impasses, and cultural warfare. In short, it is a story familiar to students of the Cold War, who know well the influence of superpower actions upon smaller states caught in the vortex of international politics following the Second World War.

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Yet this thesis also tells new stories about the eastern Mediterranean’s societies during the Cold War period, of social transformations, cultural ferment, and identity shifts that all had a hand in shaping the region during the latter half of the twentieth century. It takes much of its inspiration from authors like Theodore Couloumbis, Alexis Alexandris, and Kevin Andrews, whose histories utilized anthropological and ethnographic perspectives to great effect in delivering compelling insights on past experience. To accomplish its task, this thesis engages with a wealth of sources in other disciplines complementary to historical scholarship, but largely unincorporated into histories of the region: economics, demography, anthropology, and, above all, sociology. It also considers the pre-Cold War genesis of eastern Mediterranean identities, expanding analysis to encompass the era of national consolidation and identity formation in the early twentieth century.

For all its attempt to present novel vantage points, however, it would be inaccurate to claim that the eastern Mediterranean’s Cold War years were the story of Greeks, Turks, and Cypriots working in isolation – within a “troubled triangle,” to use the words of one of the region’s most accomplished historians. The regional experiences of the eastern Mediterranean in the era of superpower confrontation are also the mutually reinforcing stories of policymakers in Washington and London, diplomats in Moscow and Bonn, and intellectuals in Cairo, Buenos Aires, and Jakarta, all of whom engaged in worldwide connections – often unknowingly – with developments in Athens, Ankara, and Nicosia. To be sure, the colonels who staged the Greek coup of 1967 were powerfully driven by Greek cultural circumstances, shared long-standing

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9 See works such as Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations, 1918-1974* (Center for Asia Minor Studies, 1983), and Kevin Andrews’ magisterial travel account *The Flight of Ikaros: Travels in Greece During the Civil War* (Reprint: Paul Dry, 2010).

10 I borrow the phrase from Theodore Couloumbis, whose seminal 1983 work *The United States, Greece, and Turkey: The Troubled Triangle* proposed a new paradigm for understanding the trilateral relationship of the three key eastern Mediterranean states during the early Cold War period.
experiences in the Greek armed services, and seized power based on visions of the proper course of the Greek nation. Turkish Cypriots throughout the Cyprus crisis likewise interacted with their Greek Cypriot counterparts according to lifeways and historical memories profoundly influenced by their Turkish heritage. Yet the eastern Mediterranean Cold War was but one of many global cold war experiences, and it is from this perspective that I have sought to write its history – not to diminish the importance of regional specificities so crucial to rich historical understanding, but rather to elucidate the international ties that bound Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus with other world regions. Whether indirectly – as through the influence of Latin American intellectuals and revolutionary movements upon the Greek left – or directly, such as the impact of American Middle Eastern and African policies upon views of the Mediterranean, the global dimensions of the Cold War profoundly shaped the region’s experiences. Readers should therefore expect a regional history in the pages that follow, but one that exchanges deep granularity for holistic scope – and, in so doing, aims to illuminate the longitudinal trends that underpin the region’s current global position.

My thesis is the first to employ a combination of primary materials – memoirs of Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot politicians, intellectuals, and citizens, as well as American, British, and Soviet diplomatic sources – to tell the story of the eastern Mediterranean Cold War. It augments existing understandings of the Cold War in the developing world by forging linkages between Greek and Turkish history and developments in Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East. And it is the first treatment of eastern Mediterranean Cold War history to engage with recent scholarship in ethnography and anthropology to paint a history of identity alongside that of diplomacy.
This thesis is also a response to broader debates on historical methodology in the age of globalization, perhaps best encapsulated in Lynn Hunt’s *Writing History in the Global Era*. Hunt identifies four strands of Anglophone historiography in the twentieth century: Marxism, modernization, the Annales school, and the history of identity. Globalization, a fifth paradigm emerging in recent decades, has, in Hunt’s view, represented a significant challenge to the previous four, for reasons beyond the scope of this introduction. The pages that follow seek to demonstrate that there is no need to choose between such paradigms, at least not with respect to the eastern Mediterranean. I borrow heavily from global history and international relations scholarship as I attempt to paint a truly global view of the region’s Cold War experience. But I also rely on deeper considerations of the region’s longer-run sociocultural character, as well as investigations of its many identities, to recount its path through the twentieth century.

The following chapters are divided into thematic segments, organized chronologically. Chapter 1 traces the pre-Cold War foundations of eastern Mediterranean identities and global roles during what I term the era of consolidation – the momentous century between the 1820s and the end of the First World War during which the region’s key states, through intellectual and social ferment and often violence, formed themselves into modern nations and searched for belonging in the modern global system. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 treat the Cold War period proper by charting the region’s course through the most tumultuous period of its recent history – the thirty years between the outbreak of the Greek Civil War in 1944 and Turkey’s 1974 invasion of Cyprus. During these decades, the region’s age-old ethnic identities and animosities met the full force of bipolar confrontation as Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus became the focus of intense economic, military, political, and cultural competitions between the Western alliance and the

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Soviet bloc. Yet while changing the nature of the eastern Mediterranean’s global involvement, the Cold War period also effected a resurgence of questions around national self-esteem and identity, as sociological and cultural shifts marched alongside the new international role into which the eastern Mediterranean fell. As crises in the 1950s and 1960s reflected, unprecedented changes were underway in the region, exacerbated but not dictated by either Soviet or American influence. This was particularly true for the eastern Mediterranean, where powerful historical memories and cultural legacies found deep expression in the Cold War climate.

Chapters 4, 5, and 6 continue the narrative of the eastern Mediterranean’s Cold War by telling the heretofore-underrepresented story of the region’s indigenous experiences during the 1970s, 1980s, and 1990s, decades during which the Cold War system became increasingly international – with associated repercussions, and deepening global connections, for Greeks, Turks, and Cypriots alike. My goal in these chapters is twofold. I first wish to cover the period beyond which many existing studies end due to a lack of primary sources or narrative focus, engaging with newly released material in U.S. foreign relations and international affairs to paint a picture of the international Cold War system at the end of détente. But I also seek to bridge the story of the eastern Mediterranean with another school of international history scholarship, that of the “global Cold War” championed most notably by Norwegian scholar Odd Arne Westad, and since enriched by pioneering works by historians of Latin America, Asia, Africa, and the Middle East.12 While rarely considered emblematic of the Cold War in the Third World, the post-WWII eastern Mediterranean exhibited several of the most salient characteristics of conventionally acknowledged developing regions. It saw the rise of increasingly powerful

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12 The global Cold War literature is vast, but begins most notably with works such as Robert J. McMahon’s *The Cold War on the Periphery* (Cambridge, 1996) and Odd Arne Westad’s *The Global Cold War* (Cambridge, 2006), both of which redefined research ambitions and encouraged a proliferation of area studies following the opening of archives in the former communist and developing worlds.
nationalist movements. Its leaders began seeking identification with non-aligned camps pledging allegiance to neither bloc, with associated political returns at home. And subaltern forces, wielding new societal and intellectual influence within eastern Mediterranean societies, began exercising new forms of political power. It was during the 1970s and 1980s that such forces reached their apex, bringing the global Cold War to Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus. Such considerations blend a new brand of cultural Cold War history, best represented in the works of authors such as Matthew Connelly, Marc Selverstone and Alessandro Brogi, with an original analysis of the Reagan administration’s global Cold War policies to recount the region’s path through the 1980s and the end of the Cold War. I conclude the thesis with a chapter assessing the legacies of the Cold War period in the last decade of the twentieth century, as well as its continuing significance for events in the twenty-first. Though the seminal events of the period occurred prior to the fall of the Soviet Union in the winter of 1991, the Cold War’s ramifications, I demonstrate, continue to manifest in the realms of political culture and historical memory.

At the time of this writing, the eastern Mediterranean shows no signs of relinquishing its paramount role in global affairs. European integration remains at the top of international concerns, as Britain’s 2016 exit from the European Union casts doubts upon the future of the experiment altogether. The barbarity of terrorist activity throughout the Middle East, as well as the ongoing crisis in Syria, continue to place strains on both Greece’s and Turkey’s relations with its neighbors and major international powers alike. And though the coming decades of the 21st century will be marked by a number of momentous transformations in the balance of global politics – demographic challenges in China, the United States, and other major world powers,

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continuing contestations of sovereignty in key regions, and the challenges of radicalism and globalization – the national fates of Greece, Turkey, Cyprus, and the eastern Mediterranean basin will be intimately tied with the course of global developments writ large. The pages that follow seek to provide a historical perspective on such changes and to serve as a canvas upon which to examine new developments as they unfold in the twenty-first century.
II. The Era of Consolidation, 1821-1923

Ian Dragoumis by 1906 had achieved a sizable following in Hellenic intellectual circles. A diplomat of considerable repute in the legal and academic realms, he had long witnessed the modern Greek nation’s course through European balance-of-power politics and now lamented its path into the future. Writing in an Athens newspaper, he outlined in sweeping terms the marked difference between the current period and the world his ancestors had known. In the past, Greeks had been able to synthesize foreign influences and indigenous strivings to create a composite national character and, in turn, a Hellas strengthened, rather than eroded, by international connection. Now, however, the frequent visits of Western intellectuals and tourists, as well as renewed diplomatic interest in Greece by Westernized nations, threatened to destroy the labor of countless Greek generations toward the formation of a cohesive national identity. “We have lost that which made us Greeks – proud Greeks, a proud people,” Dragoumis lamented in a letter to his brother-in-law, a successful financier in the Greek community of Istanbul. “At all turns, we struggle to find that which once bound us as Hellenes.”

The intensity of Dragoumis’s diatribe against foreign influence, coming on the heels of international humiliation and domestic political instability, is perhaps unsurprising. But it nonetheless reflected the convictions of a modern Greek, of good professional and political standing, looking simultaneously outward and inward to draw connections between the solemn, age-old identity of the Greek nation and the challenges of modern international involvements. And, specific though his warnings may have been to the Greek example, Dragoumis’s thoughts were representative of broader shifts. Against the backdrop of more visible changes in Europe proper, the eastern Mediterranean by the dawn of the twentieth century was transforming in

profound ways. Centuries of Ottoman rule inculcated an ethos of struggle throughout the basin, and the decades immediately following the Greeks’ successful bid for freedom represented a great challenge for the region as the fallout from the first successful war of independence settled. In the shadow of Turkish control, new identities formed – national, civic, and cultural. Age-old animosities and notions of kinship met the more modern forces of nation-state politics and international interconnection. And, as the twentieth century dawned, actions taken by the new government in Athens – and by the ailing administration in the Sublime Porte – propelled the eastern Mediterranean onto the world stage in unprecedented ways. But dramatic as such changes were for the inhabitants of the region, not all shared Dragoumis’s dire assessment. For many, the international era represented opportunities to fulfill long-held dreams regarding the destiny of the Nation.

This chapter traces the era of consolidation in the eastern Mediterranean, which lasted from the end of the Greek War of Independence to the fallout of the First World War. The period covered – nearly a full century – witnessed momentous transformations in both regional and global politics. Any account offering a comprehensive history of these years would be sure to mire in the weight of such developments, just as Alexander’s troops mired in the twin traps of inhospitable climate and modern warfare in Crimea. Yet two key themes emerge in our analysis of eastern Mediterranean developments. The first, implied in the name of this chapter, is consolidation – political, but also cultural, social, and intellectual. As Greece charted the waters of independence, it also confronted the challenges of nation-making – assuaging the discontents of restive political groups who benefited unequally from the achievement of independence, as well as the more pragmatic infrastructural and economic tasks associated with the erection of a new state apparatus. Turkey, too, during these crucial years experienced dramatic transition, as
erstwhile empire transitioned to modern state, and as subjects within that state reacted to the changes. In both instances, consolidation often ran afoul of long-standing ethnic and cultural identities, which persisted even as governing powers sought to fashion new realities for their citizens.

The second major theme of this chapter, deeply interconnected with the first, is synthesis – both within and without eastern Mediterranean societies. In the period between Greek independence and the first global conflagration of the twentieth century, the eastern Mediterranean, entering a prolonged process of consolidation, absorbed intellectual and cultural influences from nations far and wide. As currents of thought and culture from Eurasia and the Americas pervaded Greek society, traditional notions of eastern Mediterranean lifeways increasingly accommodated new conceptions of the nation, civic duty, and even family roles. Amidst such transformations, the character of the Greek nation changed considerably. With such developments mirrored in the late Ottoman Empire in the rise of opposition groups like the Young Turks, the stage was set for a paradigm shift in the ways the eastern Mediterranean powers conceived of their identities and their relationships to one another and the outside world.

Yet the processes of consolidation and synthesis, though seemingly contradictory, in reality progressed with a mutually reinforcing cadence throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The formidable task of creating new nations exposed many of the cleavages that had long defined eastern Mediterranean life; but on the heels of nation-building, the synthesis of foreign ideas and cultural currents facilitated new readings of history and identity that solidified the region’s role in a new global landscape. By the second decade of the twentieth century, Greeks and Turks at all levels of society were irreversibly ingrained in the twentieth-century international system and directed toward the tribulations it held.
Identity Challenges to National Consolidation

The Greek revolutionaries had faced a formidable task in galvanizing popular resistance against Ottoman control, but the task of building a modern nation proved an even greater challenge. While the major endeavor of 1821-1828 had been mustering enough support – and arming enough insurrectionists – to cleave Greece away from a struggling imperial master incapable of adequately defending its fringes, the overriding post-independence imperative was reaching and consolidating control over a nation of some four and one half million residents, sprinkled across the vast geographic expanse of Greece and entrenched in old identities with little connection to a conception of the modern nation-state.15

The most important of these identity strands was the Orthodox faith. At the time of Greek independence, the vast majority of Greeks centered their lives around Orthodoxy, actively attending religious services and rituals with immense significance to the comings and goings of everyday life. The last official Ottoman records of births and deaths in Thessaloniki cite more than ninety thousand Orthodox ceremonies, from baptisms to marriages and funerary rites, in the year 1790 alone – more than twenty times the combined number of Catholic and Muslim rites. And existing accounts of Greek life under Ottoman rule are replete with references to Orthodox ritual, from the organization of village activities according to church bells to the influence of liturgies upon the persistence of ancient Greek.16

16 Among the most insightful anthropological studies of Greece under Ottoman rule are Dimitris N. Karidis, Athens from 1456 to 1920: The Town under Ottoman Rule and the 19th-Century Capital City, which also serves as an impressive primer on eastern Mediterranean urban history. For everyday rituals see also William W. McGrew, Land and Revolution in Modern Greece, 1800-1881: The Transition in the Tenure and Exploitation of Land from Ottoman Rule to Independence (Kent State University Press, 1986).
But in Greece, as elsewhere, religious identities blended with deeply held understandings of ethnicity and history to constitute a more complex sense of community. Orthodoxy held profound spiritual significance and organized the cadences of Greek life, but it derived much of its potency and relevance from connections to concrete historical occurrence and ethnic identities. To be Greek Orthodox was also to be a member of a race whose journey to the present had been marked by struggles and tribulations – a Hellenic climb to Golgotha – and now stood poised to reap the rewards of such trials. As Greece entered the modern era, expanding populations, contact with the Catholic other in the form of Frankish and Venetian presence in the eastern Mediterranean, and, most of all, Ottoman occupation of areas with majority Greek populations turned the focus of Hellenism toward the past tribulations and future fates of geographically defined Hellenic domains.

The resultant irredentism of modern Greeks – the sought-after redemption of what I term “the captivity of Hellenism” – blended a quasi-mythical reading of history that placed Greeks and their sufferings at the center of Western history with a calculation of geopolitical factors that made possible the correction of historical wrongs through reclamation of Hellenic lands. Per this interpretation of the past, the Hellenic ethnus – the nation-as-ethnicity – had since ancient times come under assault from outside forces, first in the form of the great Persian Wars of the 5th century BC, later by barbarian invasions from the east, and, most notoriously, from Ottoman conquests. Temporal waypoints marked nadirs of the narrative: 1204, when the Fourth Crusade had led Frankish mercenaries to loot Constantinople, and especially 1453, when the armies of Mehmet II had conquered the city and defiled the greatest bastion of Orthodoxy, the Hagia Sophia. In the face of such ignominies, it was the duty of all true Greeks to strive for the reunion of ancestral Greek lands – and their sizable Greek populations – with the mother country. In this
endeavor, the dictates of the Orthodox Church and its officials assumed near-otherworldly significance as the avenue through which Hellenic culture could be redeemed. As Ecumenical Patriarch Dorotheos asserted to David Lloyd George in February 1920, speaking on behalf of Istanbul’s Greek minority at a key moment of crisis in the captivity narrative:

The Greeks of Constantinople and the neighborhood assembled today in their churches and proclaimed their unshakeable wish to obtain complete national re-establishment. They regard Union with the mother-country Greece as the only firm basis for natural development in the future... and entrust the Ecumenical Patriarchate, their supreme national authority, with the task of transmitting the present resolution [for Great Power support of Greek control of Istanbul]. The idea of a Greek nation will not be realized So long as Constantinople is not united to Greece by a strong tie.\(^{17}\)

The Greek War of Independence only intensified such yearnings, giving rise to new opportunities for the achievement of Hellenism’s greatest territorial objectives. If the mother country could be freed from the Ottoman yoke, in short order other prizes – especially the grandest, Constantinople – could be reclaimed as well. At all levels of society, political goals seemed commensurate with Orthodox faith. The legendary Greek revolutionary Yiannis Makriyannis spoke in his memoirs of pervasive associations of insurrection with religious fervor, and upon the outbreak of hostilities, Orthodox priests in more than one hundred Greek villages enjoined their flocks to aid in the coming struggle, often through direct enlistment.\(^ {18}\)

The challenge involved marrying long-standing ties to Orthodoxy with the newer notions – and goals – of the Greek nation-state, a task requiring the redefinition of ethno-historical and religious identity to include modern nationalism. If Greeks found in their religious practice a connection to ancestors and their deeds, the erection of a new state apparatus – much less one

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\(^ {17}\) Quoted in Alexis Alexandris, *The Greek Minority of Istanbul and Greek-Turkish Relations, 1918-1974* (Center for Asia Minor Studies), pp. 56-61.

seeking to become part of the modern world – was an endeavor at odds with tradition. As discussed below, the exigencies of geopolitics provided just such an avenue for the marriage of custom and modernity.

Orthodox ethnic nationalism represented the key identity point upon which Greeks organized their lives, and stood as the most formidable force for the new Greek government to harness in its efforts to gain and sustain regional and international legitimacy. But other identities persisted in the age of the modern Greek state. Other than religion, none had as much daily impact on Greek life as socioeconomic status. By 1800, the majority of Greeks within the Ottoman Empire were employed in agricultural work. But a substantial number – some four hundred thousand – had achieved solid standing and commercial success as members of the imperial merchant class. Often regarded as the exemplar of such groups, the Greek minority of Istanbul by the first decade of the nineteenth century wielded considerable influence in Ottoman social circles, frequently ingratiating themselves to high-ranking Ottoman officials through service or intermarriage. The community also wielded great influence among mainland Greeks, whose institutions – particularly the Orthodox Church – all benefited from extensive minority patronage. Aside from such economic considerations, the Istanbul minority stood as a powerful symbol of Hellenism’s captivity at the hands of the Turkish enemy. The fact that Istanbul Greeks enjoyed considerable privileges – including the right to speak Greek when petitioning the government – mattered little in the eyes of ethnic nationalists.\textsuperscript{19} Wealthy Greeks, however, also symbolized the power of an emergent bourgeoisie to demand sociopolitical and diplomatic influence commensurate with their considerable economic sway – a prospect sure to clash with

the designs of early Greek politicians, who arose largely from the military and religious classes or had returned from foreign education and residence to take up governmental roles.

The importance of socioeconomic identities in the decades following Greek independence should not be inflated. To Greeks of all stripes, ethnicity, religion, and history constituted by far the most relevant identity matrix in the first decades after independence. But as the Greek state sought to consolidate control over its far-flung lands – which, as will be discussed, grew by the beginning of the twentieth century to encompass the territories of ancient greater Hellas – differences in socioeconomic standing constituted a formidable barrier to widespread support for state initiatives. It was one thing to be an agricultural laborer in the Peloponnese whose life would be exponentially improved by the installment of modern city technologies and trade networks with major powers; it was quite another to face the ramifications of independence as a successful merchant based in Istanbul and forced to do business with erstwhile Ottoman subjects, and another entirely to relinquish power in the form of taxes and property to a distant and young government. To aid in the cooptation of such potentially restive identity groups, the modern Greek state absorbed, and in some cases turned outward toward, international influences in order to forge a new – though historically conscious – national identity.

While Greece contended with the myriad facets of nation-building, the dying Ottoman Empire likewise faced the challenges of competing identities among its populace. Throughout the empire’s history, Ottoman sultans had sought to promulgate a cohesive imperial identity premised upon a mythical history. But their efforts had never been entirely successful. The empire’s vast territorial expanse encompassed hundreds of ethnic groups whose incorporation
into the sultan’s dominions fell short of adherence to a deep identification with Ottomanism. As a result, ethnicities as diverse as Greek and Armenian, Kurd and Arab waged constant struggles against the homogenizing tendencies of sultanic rule.20

By the nineteenth century, a new identity – secular nationalism – had begun to gain ground throughout the empire. As Western European influence penetrated the Ottoman Empire through the establishment of educational institutions, military advisorships, and mercantile activity, groups of young students and military cadets in the late 1800s began organizing in underground societies to protest the authoritarianism of the current regime in Istanbul. The Young Turks – as the aggregate of such groups came to be known – favored the inauguration of a constitutional monarchy and quickly gained support throughout the amits of the empire, with key chapters emerging in Thessaloniki, Epirus, and across Anatolia.21 Where Greece recognized and responded to such challenges, the Ottoman state not unreasonably regarded groups like the Young Turks as existential threats to be vigorously managed if not eliminated. The last sultans devoted considerable resources to stamping out underground organizations through the employment of secret police and informants akin to the czarist policies of the later Romanovs. The result was a political system that by the end of the nineteenth century proved incapable of adapting to wide-ranging regional and international changes.

Tasked with ensuring consolidation of fragile political gains – or, in the case of the Ottomans, teetering political systems – the governments of the eastern Mediterranean invested great energy in allying the goals of nationalism with traditional identities. For both the Greek

21 On the Young Turks and Young Ottomans, the best accounts are Feroz Ahmad, *The Young Turks and the Ottoman Nationalities: Armenians, Greeks, Albanians, Jews, and Arabs, 1908-1918* (Utah, 2014) and Hasan Kayali, *Arabs and Young Turks: Ottomanism, Arabism, and Islamism in the Ottoman Empire, 1908-1918* (University of California, 1997).
revolutionaries and their Ottoman counterparts, various segments of society simultaneously represented opportunities to ensure national cohesion and potential pitfalls in the way of its achievement. The solution was to employ such segments strategically to forge national identities that synthesized old and new in the service of the state. For help, both Greece and Turkey – often consciously, but frequently involuntarily – turned outward.

**Intellectual and Artistic Synthesis**

It is a characteristic behavior of new states to look outward for inspiration in forging their governmental and sociopolitical systems. This was certainly the case for Greece, which in the decades following independence directly and indirectly absorbed influences from the greater European continent and beyond. Starting during the war of independence, foreign influence contributed greatly to both tangible and intangible goals of the new Greek state. It also aided in the consolidation of power and national identity over the various segments of Greek society unevenly benefited by the new regime.

The greatest influences on Greek life were British and French. European interest in the Hellenic world had been strong prior to the country’s war of independence, with “grand tours” of the classical world by European youth echoing the prominence of classical training in university educations across the Continent. But as the storm clouds of revolution against Ottoman rule mounted in the first decades of the nineteenth century, Greece’s northern neighbors, led by the British example, flocked to the seat of Western culture to participate. Between 1801 and 1820, more than thirty thousand British youths journeyed to Greece during or after their university educations – many choosing extended stays, and some opting for a more permanent stay altogether.\(^{22}\) Inspired by ongoing currents of Enlightenment thought that held social contracts

and self-rule as the new standards of modern civilization, the Philhellenes – lovers of Greece and Greek culture – sought to offer their services to the birthplace of democracy, now crushed under the boot of Muslim dominion:

Greece… that land, the fostering nurse of civilization, where the spirit of antiquity still seems to linger amidst its olive groves, its myrtle bowers, and the precious relics of its splendid edificies; where both sacred and profane history unite in forming the most interesting associations; where Socrates taught the lessons of his incomparable ethics, and a still greater than Socrates disclosed the mysteries of the ‘unknown God’ to those that sat in darkness.  

Their lasting impact proved immense. In their connection with Europeans further north, Greeks saw reflections of an ancient past whose legitimacy in the modern world appeared validated by the willingness and enthusiasm of cultural kin to aid in the independence struggle.

But the Anglo-French influence often took second place to the Slavic/Orthodox, which frequently drove the military and diplomatic orientations of the new Greek state. Russia had played a minimal role during the War of Independence, wary of the impact that a loss of Ottoman territory would have on an increasingly delicate eastern Mediterranean and Balkan balance of power. But from the 1830s onward, the strategic importance of Greece to Russia’s long-term planning vis-à-vis the declining Ottoman regime, as well as the considerable cultural exchanges between Greece and Russia, gave rise to a burgeoning military and religious exchange. Russian imperial advisors played integral roles in the Greek War of Independence, providing training and strategic support to militias and a nascent Greek fleet – the latter of which would go on to crucial importance in the military campaigns of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. And in the czar, Greeks found a champion of the faith unafraid to intervene

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in favor of Hellenic interests. St. Petersburg, always seeking to maximize its influence relative to the Ottoman Empire, throughout the late nineteenth century closely monitored the sultans’ treatment of Orthodox communities, on several occasions threatening commercial and diplomatic repercussions for perceived abuses.\textsuperscript{24}

But more surprising than the European influences were those from even further abroad. As a result of close ties established with the United States soon after independence, Greece enjoyed a thriving mercantile relationship with the western hemisphere that blossomed during the era of Greek independence, when the Hellenes’ struggle against Turkish rule attracted the interest of revolutionaries old and young in the New World. Such interactions mirrored the interest of Western European Philhellenes, but were far more political. Nicholas Biddle, the distinguished financier who would go on to serve as the final president of the Second Bank of the United States, wrote fondly of Greece and its revolutionary history in journals he kept of his sojourns across the eastern Mediterranean in the summer of 1806-1807. “I had long felt an ardent desire to visit Greece,” he reflected in the first of his many journals. “The fate of a nation whose history was the first brilliant object that met my infancy, & the first foundation of my early studies was so interesting that I had resolved to avail myself of any opportunity of witnessing it.”\textsuperscript{25} Given the ensemble cast of American patriots who soon joined the Greeks’ bid for independence – including the nephew of George Washington himself – Biddle stood in good company.

Americans further south likewise took note of events in Greece. Simón Bolívar, envisioning a sovereign future for the present-day nations of Venezuela, Colombia, Bolivia, and

\textsuperscript{24} Alexandris, pp. 32-33.
\textsuperscript{25} Quoted in R.A. McNeal, ed., \textit{Nicholas Biddle in Greece: The Journals and Letters of 1806} (University of Pennsylvania, 1993), 49.
other South American states, sought to emulate the Archaic Greek example of league diplomacy through his formation of the Amphictyonic League, an alliance of Latin American republics bound by their former relationship with the Spanish Empire. But Bolivar also enthusiastically followed the modern Greek struggle against foreign influence, seeing the insurrectionists as brethren in a worldwide struggle against imperial rule and a model for the forcible reclamation of ancestral identities: “In absolute systems, the central power is unlimited… but, in the final analysis, the satraps of Persia are Persian, the pashas of the Grand Turk are Turks… Subject to the three-fold yoke of ignorance, tyranny, and vice, oppressed people the world over have been unable to acquire knowledge, power, or civic virtue.”\(^{26}\) (The same sentiments moved revolutionaries in Ireland, who watched both the Latin American and Greek examples with great enthusiasm. Writing of convicted insurrectionary William O’Connell, an observer of the Irish independence movement reflected: “Countries have been driven mad by oppression. He hoped that Ireland would never be driven to the system pursued by the Greeks. He trusted in God they would never be so driven. He hoped Ireland would be restored to her rights; but if that day should arrive, if she should be driven mad by persecution, he wished that a new Bolivar might arise, and that the spirit of the Greeks and of the South Americans might animate the people of Ireland.”\(^{27}\)

The ramifications of foreign influence for later Greek life were profound. Among the most obvious impacts, Greek artists, intellectuals, merchants, and everyday citizens were now tied more than ever to the Western tradition, in which they found both admiration for their own past and avenues to the future. Greek military officers through interactions with the Russian


Empire found a champion in an era of complex balance-of-power politics, and a cultural tradition that offered a distinct and welcome counterpart to Greek Orthodoxy. While Western Europe served as a political, civic, artistic, and intellectual model for the modern Greek nation, the Slavic world represented a powerful tie to the Orthodox tradition. And such relationships were frequently bilateral, as Greece represented an emergent nation in geopolitically valuable real estate that melded well with Russia’s self-appointed role as protector of the Orthodox world.

Foreign interactions also gave Greece a crucial stake in the modern international system. Invigorated by the military, commercial, and moral support of nations outside its borders, the Hellenic Kingdom now counted itself among the powers of Europe proper. It could fashion its political workings, social relations, and diplomatic conduct upon European lines – and as it did so, could rely upon European support as it navigated an impetuous international arena.

Regional Conflict, The Great War, and the Triumph of Irredentism

The dual forces of consolidation and synthesis transformed the internal workings of eastern Mediterranean society throughout the nineteenth century, engendering a marriage of long-standing ethnic identities with more modern civic and intellectual currents and offering the region’s governments a path toward consolidated nationhood. But the period also witnessed large-scale shifts in the realm of foreign affairs, which frequently dovetailed with domestic developments. For both Greeks and Turks, the last decades of the nineteenth century presented diplomatic challenges centering on the legitimacy of the state within the international arena. Greece, its independence secured, now faced the formidable task of establishing normal relations with its neighbors – which included its erstwhile Ottoman overlord and territories in the Balkans and eastern Europe still nominally under its control. The ailing Ottomans, more so than ever before, sought to prevent the outright collapse of the ruling regime as foreign powers encroached
on old territories and exploited new weaknesses. In both nations, the pressures of foreign policymaking were exacerbated by internal calls for the reclamation of lost lands or the redemption of past ignominies. Irredentism would become the closing chapter of the age of consolidation, and through bitter irony would inaugurate the era of dissolution.

Irredentism had enjoyed a long pedigree in Greece prior to the nineteenth century, borne along on waves of history and myth. The ancient Greek epics of Homer, Aeschylus and Thucydides instilled in every Hellene an abiding pride in the exploits of ancestors whose valiant struggle against Persian incursions redeemed fallen Greek lands and peoples; the fall of Constantinople in 1453, though several centuries past, by the late 1800s had been burned into the Greek national fabric as an equally legendary infamy whose reversal would eventually come at the hands of Hellenic resilience. But by the age of the modern Greek nation-state, more pragmatic geopolitical factors had also entered the irredentist lexicon. Britain and France, the Mediterranean’s traditional European protectors, now viewed the region through the lens of emergent imperial powers whose competition promised to change a delicate strategic calculus. And, as ever, the Greek minority of Istanbul – by 1890 some two hundred thousand in number – represented the strongest symbol of Greece’s claim to the ancestral lands of Byzantium.

Early Greek governments moved swiftly to consolidate control over unredeemed lands. As early as 1844, Ioannis Kolettis, the first modern Greek prime minister, voiced his support for the conquest of Greek-speaking lands in an impassioned speech to the National Assembly:

The Kingdom of Greece is not Greece; it is merely a part: the smallest, poorest part of Greece. The Greek is not only he who inhabits the Kingdom, but also he who inhabits Ioannina, Salonika or Serres or Constantinople or Trebizond or Crete or Samos or any other region belonging to the Greek history or the Greek race… There are two great centers of Hellenism. Athens is the capital of the Kingdom. Constantinople
is the great capital, the dream and hope of all Greeks.\textsuperscript{28}

The early conquests came soon, and the international environment proved the catalyst for Greek irredentism’s first triumphs. Wary of the new Greek state’s instability following the rule of Bavarian-born king Otto, Britain in 1862 informed the Greek government of its intention to transfer administration of the Ionian Islands to Athens. Fourteen years later, growing tensions between the Great Powers over colonial conflicts in Africa and the Middle East forced their consideration of Greece’s claims on the collapsing Ottoman Empire, resulting in the cession of Thessaly and parts of Epirus to the Hellenic Kingdom under the treaties of Berlin and Constantinople.\textsuperscript{29}

Territorial expansion also involved more active initiatives by the Greek state, and here, too, international motivations played a key role. When in January 1897 rebellions in Crete against the Ottoman administration reached a fever pitch with widespread massacres of the island’s Orthodox population, Greek public opinion, its fury stoked by impassioned outcries from clergy, compelled the Athens government to send supplies and naval support to aid in the insurrection. In response, the Ottoman government deployed troops along Greece’s eastern border, provoking border clashes that soon erupted into skirmishes and, within a week, a full declaration of war on the Hellenic Kingdom. The ensuing campaign revealed the ill-preparedness of the Greek military and the determination of its Ottoman counterpart to prevent territorial losses. Throughout April and into early May, initial Greek advances into Epirus were steadily reversed by Ottoman forces under Ahmed Hifzi Pasha, resulting in nearly nine thousand Greek casualties. An armistice signed on September 20 forced Greece to cede border areas and pay

\textsuperscript{28} Llewellyn Smith, \textit{Ionian Vision}, pp. 2.
\textsuperscript{29} Ibid, pp. 150-155.
hefty reparations to Istanbul, the latter provision enforced through international supervision of the proceedings.

Humiliated, Greek society continued to look abroad for new conquests to complete the kingdom’s expansion and redeem the shame of 1897. Led by Eleftherios Venizelos, a Cretan-born officer who had distinguished himself in the island’s recent rebellion and thereafter played a prominent role in domestic Greek politics, the nation’s armed forces in 1912 joined with Bulgaria, Serbia, and Montenegro to form the Balkan League, an alliance of newly independent states of the former Ottoman Empire intent upon expanding their territorial reach and eliminating vestiges of Istanbul’s control. A series of armed conflicts over the next year resulted in the August 1913 Treaty of Bucharest, by which all Balkan League states claimed substantial gains. The Kingdom of Greece took the greatest share of the spoils – large regions of Epirus, Macedonia, formal control of Crete, and a revised border with Bulgaria that greatly expanded Greek access to the Aegean. Venizelos was quick to warn the nation that “expansion should not proceed so fast or so haphazardly that Greece’s backbone – the solid, Greek-inhabited land mass which had to support the territorial accretions – was distorted or broken.”

For now, the Kingdom could rest on the laurels of its greatest victory since independence.

The eastern Mediterranean had no choice as to the terms of its involvement in the European conflagration of 1914. For several reasons – not least the region’s geographical proximity to the Balkan powder keg, as well as age-old ties to transnational Orthodox identities – Greece was all but forced to take sides in the growing storm clouds engulfing Europe. Turkey, though taking a more forward role with its attack on the Russian Black Sea fleet in October 1914, likewise was doomed to participate. With a long history of Russo-Turkish conflict on the

Ottoman fringes, confrontation between the sultan’s armed forces and those of the Entente was all but a foregone conclusion.\textsuperscript{31}

Much less certain was the domestic fallout of the eastern Mediterranean’s entry into the First World War. Neither the Greek nor the Ottoman governments had vested interests in the outbreak of war, with social discontents, economic instability, and political cleavages weakening the domestic front in both nations. Yet victory for either side promised massive territorial shifts with similarly momentous implications for the eastern Mediterranean powers. From the beginning, influential segments of Greek society viewed the war as an opportunity to consolidate gains made in the late nineteenth century and to redeem its disappointments over recent Balkan conflicts. While the Greek government under Constantine I favored neutrality, liberal factions under the charismatic Venizelos, their eyes and dreams on a share of postwar territorial spoils, pushed for entry into the conflict on the side of the Allies. When war did come in early 1917 at a moment of great weakness for the Central Powers, the fruition of the Megali Idea seemed closer than ever before.

**Postwar Fallout: The Asia Minor Catastrophe and the Making of the Modern Eastern Mediterranean**

No student of modern history will fail to acknowledge the Great War’s profound effects on the shape of European politics, culture, and society in the early twentieth century. Its aftermath for eastern Mediterranean politics was likewise transformative. In the wake of the Central Powers’ defeat, the region’s fate hinged upon the terms of the numerous postwar agreements by which victorious powers sought to prevent a return to the competition and

\textsuperscript{31} On the crucial role of the Balkans in the genesis of the First World War, see especially Gordon Martel, *Origins of the First World War*. 
conflicts that had given rise to unprecedented bloodshed. Yet the actions and inactions of the Great Powers were far from the only decisive factors influencing the trajectory of the eastern Mediterranean’s future. The Greek and Ottoman governments – and, by war’s end, the political successors to the rule of the Sublime Porte – also played key roles in the shape of events.

By far the most dramatic shifts occasioned by the war’s end occurred in the former Ottoman Empire, which had finally and decisively collapsed. Imperial policymakers who had hoped to forestall the inevitable through alliance with the Central Powers found their diplomatic designs utterly destroyed in the postwar settlement. Under the Treaty of Sevres, the Empire ceded all non-Turkish lands under its control to the Allied administration, marking the beginning of the partitioning frenzy that would see the establishment of British and French mandates in Palestine and Syria, respectively.32

The sociocultural effects on the Ottoman polity were equally momentous. Seeing in the collapse of the empire a final opportunity to pursue their dreams of parliamentary government, opposition groups scrambled to make their impact upon the emergent postwar settlement. The successors of groups like the Young Ottomans and Young Turks, who had embraced Tanzimat reform in the late 1800s and the establishment of a parliamentary democracy in the early twentieth century, clamored louder than ever for the realization of their visions. Ethnic discontents grew in tandem with the calls by the Young Turks’ descendants. In 1919 alone, more than seventy disturbances rocked Anatolia and other regions of eastern Turkey as Arabs, Albanians, Russians, Kurds, and other minority groups of the former empire demanded a share of voice in the coming territorial and governmental settlement. The most powerful opposition

32 The secondary literature on the fall of the Ottoman Empire and the responses of the Great Powers is immense. Among the best overviews are David Fromkin, *A Peace to End All Peace: The Fall of the Ottoman Empire and the Creation of the Modern Middle East* (Holt, 2001) and Margaret Macmillan’s acclaimed *Paris 1919: Six Months That Changed the World* (Random House, 2003).
group, the Turkish National Movement under army officer Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, rapidly gained ground in such developments and by May of 1919 had begun to wage war against occupying Allied forces. The most promising faction to many by virtue of Atatürk’s ambitious reform platform, the Nationalists soon emerged as the clear successor to centuries of rule by the sultans. But Atatürk’s goals included far more than the expulsion of foreign influence and the establishment of a self-sufficient Turkish state. He also sought to effect a wholesale transformation of Turkish society through the elimination of the vestiges of Ottomanism and the inculcation and erection of modern, secular values and institutions.

Though falling short of an outright regime rupture, the years coinciding with and directly following the conclusion of the First World War stimulated similarly dramatic developments in Greek politics and diplomacy. As the Central Powers’ war effort faltered in late 1916 and early 1917, the rift between Constantine and Venizelos over Greece’s wartime stance reached fever pitch. Frustrated by his lack of influence and seeking to marshal pro-Entente elements of Greek society, Venizelos in April of 1916 erected a shadow government in northern Greece and continued to push for Allied support in his campaign against the king. His efforts paid off in May of 1917 when Constantine, forced into abdication and exile, relinquished the government to Venizelos. The former prime minister wasted no time in signaling his irredentist aims. Almost immediately, he ordered the Greek military to assault Bulgarian forces near Greece’s northeastern borders and began planning his long-awaited campaign against the Ottomans.

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33 M. Sukru Hanioglu, Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography (Princeton, 2013); see also Andrew Mango, Atatürk: The Biography of the Founder of Modern Turkey (Overlook Press, 2002).

34 Paschalis M. Kitromilides, Eleftherios Venizelos: The Trials of Statesmanship (Edinburgh, 2008), pp. 290-312; see also Walter Harrington and Crawford Price, Venizelos and the War: A Sketch of Personalities and Politics (Cornell, 2009).
The collapse of the Ottoman polity gave the Venizelos government an unprecedented opportunity to fulfill the Megali Idea. With enormous tracts of land in Asia Minor detached from formal control, Greece could stage its most ambitious operation yet to reclaim its ancestral lands and expand the ambit of the modern Hellenic republic. The Venizelist offensive began on May 15, 1919, when twenty thousand Greek troops, supported by Entente navies, landed at Smyrna and quickly took control of the city. Sporadic Turkish resistance represented an aberration from the norm of surrendering or fleeing enemy troops, allowing Greek forces to advance far into Asia Minor with great speed. By the spring of 1920, Venizelos’s armies had erected a broad strategic perimeter along the western and northern borders of Anatolia in preparation for deeper thrusts into the heart of Turkey. Nearly a century to the day after its independence, Greece stood poised to fulfill the ancient dream of retaking Constantinople for greater Hellas.35

Its victory would be short-lived. As the Turkish National Movement gained political influence throughout Turkey, its military strength grew commensurately – as did Allied unwillingness for continued intervention in the course of developments. Faced with profound instability at home and violent situations across other areas of the empire and in new mandate possessions, Britain in early 1920 ended formal military involvement in Anatolia by withdrawing advisors and material support. France followed suit soon thereafter, and the United States maintained only humanitarian and official diplomatic presence in the region.36 Greece was left alone to wage a rapidly expanding war against a numerically superior enemy increasingly

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35 By far the most comprehensive account of the Megali Idea and Greek foreign policy during the early years of the twentieth century is Michael Llewellyn Smith’s magisterial Ionian Vision: Greece in Asia Minor, 1919-22 (London, 1973).
36 The Greco-Turkish War has attracted the attention of numerous scholars in the Greek, Turkish, and Anglophone historical communities, with the result that many accounts are highly politicized and deeply influenced by contemporaneous events. Perhaps the best objective works are Marjorie Housepian Dobkin, Smyrna 1922: The Destruction of a City (Newmark, 1998) and Bruce Clark, Twice a Stranger: The Mass Expulsions that Forged Modern Greece and Turkey (Harvard, 2009).
gaining domestic and – amidst global calls for self-determination and Atatürk’s promises to endorse new Middle Eastern protectorates – international support from Europe’s great powers.

Ultimately, the strength of Atatürk’s movement proved overwhelming. The Asia Minor campaign resulted in a decisive victory for Turkey, and Atatürk, hailed as a hero for his resistance to both Allied pressures and Greek aggression, embarked upon an ambitious program of national consolidation to ensure the stability and safety of his new state. His endeavors soon transformed the nation, washing away many of the adverse effects of Ottoman bureaucratic inertia and civic inefficiencies. Abroad, his triumph against a disciplined, relatively well-equipped Balkan military supported by the Entente inspired deep respect. The anticolonial Khilafet Committee of Bombay, a key instrument of Muslim resistance to British imperial rule in India, wrote personally to Atatürk shortly after the Asia Minor campaign to express its admiration: “Mustafa Kemal Pasha has done wonders and you have no idea how people in British India adore his name… We are all waiting to know the terms on which Angora [Ankara] offers peace to the Greeks.”37 This would not be the first time foreign revolutionaries looked to Ankara’s example. As coming decades would show, Turkey had assumed a crucial role in the growing global non-aligned movement.

But peace, when it came, was bitter. Sensing an opportunity to consolidate his party’s political, military, and territorial gains in one motion, Atatürk pressed Western diplomats, still haggling over the ultimate fate of the eastern Mediterranean, on the ethnicity question. His principal target was the Turkish Greek community. Well versed in the history of the minority’s preponderant influence in Ottoman affairs, and with his thoughts increasingly turned toward solidification of national strength against the irredentist designs of the Hellenic Kingdom,

Atatürk sought a wide-ranging population exchange by which some half a million Muslims residing in Greek lands would be repatriated in Turkey along with the *de jure* denaturalization of a million and a half Turkish Greeks. He did not have to wait long. Fridtjof Nansen, a Norwegian scientist and diplomat commissioned by the League of Nations to handle postwar refugee resettlement, regarded such a population exchange as the only viable option to settle, if only temporarily, the volatile region’s long-standing ethnic disputes. Only through such an exchange would the League stand any chance of satisfying both the security demands of Atatürk’s regime and the Greeks’ ancient desire for reunion with diaspora Hellenes. And, speaking from his experiences resettling refugees from the Russian Empire on the war’s eastern front, Nansen regarded a population exchange as an ideal opportunity to devolve decision-making power onto Greece and Turkey – a significant gesture of support for the legitimacy of both regimes, but especially for the new Ankara government. “The amelioration of the lot of the minorities in Turkey [depends] above all on the exclusion of every kind of foreign intervention and of the possibility of provocation coming from outside,” Nansen wrote to the League after a meeting with Turkish representatives. “Such an exchange will provide Turkey immediately and in the best conditions with the population necessary to continue the exploitation of the cultivated lands which the departed Greeks have abandoned.”

The final transfer accomplished precisely what Nansen had outlined. Under the terms of the Convention Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations concluded in Lausanne in January of 1923, some two million individuals – the majority of them Anatolian Greeks – would be forcibly expelled and relocated to their “native” lands. “As from 1st May, 1923,” the treaty stipulated, “there shall take place a compulsory exchange of Turkish nationals

of the Greek Orthodox Religion established in Turkish territory, and of Greek nationals of the Moslem religion established in Greek territory.” The net effect for Turkey, therefore, fulfilled Atatürk’s wishes – an acknowledgement of the Turkish state’s legitimacy on the playing field of the modern nation-state, as well as a purge of a powerful commercial class capable of challenging his party. As historian Caglar Keyder concluded, “With this drastic measure, Turkey lost around 90 percent of the pre-war commercial class, such that when the Republic was formed, the bureaucracy found itself unchallenged.” Atatürk and the Republican Party in the aftermath of the exchange set about deepening their consolidation projects, with the formidable barriers of external influence and internal opposition at long last eliminated.

For Greece, the outcome of the Asia Minor expedition could hardly have been more catastrophic. The Greek government, reeling from the financial and human costs of a brutal, protracted conflict far from its borders, was ill prepared for the influx of millions of refugees following the population exchange. Between October 1922 and mid-1925, nearly two million Greek refugees poured into the homeland, placing unsustainable strains on an economy and body politic already mutilated by the myriad physical and sociocultural costs of domestic political conflict and foreign war. In processes similar to those underway in other major European urban centers, disillusioned veterans and destitute immigrants mourned their economic and human losses in the port communities of Piraeus and slums of Athens. Struggling to cobble together new lives, they found hope, purpose, and inspiration in the revolutionary dictates of communism now bleeding through the cracks of Greek society. The Greek Communist Party (Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Ελλάδας, KKE), constituted in 1918 just months after the Bolshevik Revolution, now

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discovered a ready supply of followers. Its days of limited influence in Greek politics had come to an end.\textsuperscript{41}

Greece would reel from the numerous costs of wartime defeat for decades. But perhaps most significant was the irreparable blow dealt to the Greek psyche. With the failure of Greek governments to achieve the Megali Idea put on full and painful display, a prolonged period of national soul-searching – and deep internecine conflict – commenced. Political divisions would only become greater as the bankruptcy of both adventurist, nationalist foreign policy and traditional monarchical rule gave fodder to ongoing arguments about the ideal shape of the modern Greek state. And the twin pillars of ethnic identity and irredentism, while by no means banished to the realm of history, would forever have to contend with the ghosts of Asia Minor and the memories of humiliation at the hands of the Turks. Eternal Greece, the land of the Hellenes, would have to wait for the fulfillment of its dreams – and when it came, it would not be as a result of a triumphal entry onto the modern world stage, supported by allies long thought to share a unique connection to Greek civilization. The mood among Greeks was perhaps best captured by an Englishman named Winston Churchill, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, watching the Greek drama unfold as he began an illustrious career in postwar British politics:

\begin{quote}
This story carried us back to classic times. It is true Greek tragedy, with Chance as the ever-ready handmaid of Fate. However the Greek race might have altered in blood and quality, their characteristics were found unchanged since the days of Alcibiades. As of old, they preferred faction above all other interests, and as of old in their crisis they had at their head one of the greatest of men. The interplay between the Greek love of party politics and the influence exercised over them by Venizelos constitutes the action of the piece. The scene and the lighting are the Great War; and the theme, ‘How Greece Gained the Empire of her dreams in spite of herself, and threw it away when she awoke.’\textsuperscript{42}
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{41} See especially Clark, \textit{Twice a Stranger}.
Conclusion

The age of eastern Mediterranean consolidation witnessed the transformation of the region from an imperial basin to a globally networked system of nation-states. In just under a century, the character of the region’s two great powers – the newly independent Greek state and its former master, the ailing Ottoman Empire – shifted dramatically under the weight of both domestic and international developments. If the nineteenth century recast the world according to a new balance of power between globally committed nations, it also remade identities. Nowhere was this truer than in the eastern fringes of the Mediterranean basin.

Though regional identities expanded during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries to encompass modern notions of nationalism and citizenry, new currents failed to replace the long-standing importance of religion, ethnicity, and history to the eastern Mediterranean’s inhabitants. As Greeks entered the late 1920s, they took with them many of the patterns and allegiances that had long organized life. The Orthodox faith emerged from the cataclysms of the era almost wholly unscathed – and even reinvigorated by a resurgence of ethnic identity in the wake of national humiliation. Greeks from all walks of life continued to seek encouragement and direction in the words of the Patriarch and his priests, and the ways they conceived of politics, diplomacy, and the nation’s future still passed through the prism of Orthodoxy.

But in some realms, the age of consolidation effected lasting changes. Perhaps nowhere was this clearer than in foreign affairs. At the outbreak of the rebellion for independence, Greeks had regarded the outside world with suspicion, their understandings conditioned by deeply ingrained ethnic histories of conflict and civilizational clashes with the Other. The struggle for freedom forged crucial new linkages with both Western and Eastern Europeans, as well as with revolutionaries in the Americas. Such connections proved essential to the health of the new
Greek government, as those segments of society most capable of challenging its rule – particularly the growing intellectual and merchant classes – found new roles within the nation’s international relationships and devoted their energies to the goals of the nation-state.

The remainder of the era would shatter Greeks’ initial hopes for a future defined by international participation. As ethnic identities met the realities of the modern global system, calls for reclamation of Hellenic lands drove the Greek government into adventurist foreign policies that ultimately foundered alongside broader European dreams in the hecatomb of the First World War. Turkey, site and symbol of ancient animosities and seat of irredentist Hellenes’ most important claims, had gained international legitimacy at the expense of Athens. Ethnic Greeks, far from reunited triumphantly as citizens of an expansive Greek empire, faced an uncertain future as the fallout of catastrophic defeat and demographic flux settled. As Greece sought to heal its wounds and Turkey found a new path into the future, both nations explored new terrains defined by the conflicts between age-old identities and new international roles.
III. The Special Relationship Confronts Ethnic Conflict in the Eastern Mediterranean, 1947-1960

On March 12, 1947, President Harry Truman addressed a joint session of Congress convened to discuss the worsening strategic situation in the Mediterranean and Near East. In one of the most momentous declarations of the postwar period, Truman spelled out the dire circumstances of Greece and Turkey, the two great allied powers of the region. The struggling Turkish government faced mounting pressure on its northern border from the Soviet Union, which sought to gain naval access to the crucial Dardanelles. The Greek monarchy, newly reinstated after years in exile, was likewise beleaguered by the threat of international communism, though in this instance an indigenous branch prosecuting an intensifying guerrilla war. Only the United States, unique among a world of war-weary nations in its capability to offer extensive military and economic assistance, could stem the tide. “The very existence of the Greek state is today threatened by the terrorist activities of several thousand armed men, led by Communists,” Truman warned. “No other nation is willing and able to provide the necessary support for a democratic Greek government… the United Nations and its related organizations are not in a position to extend help of the kind that is required.” Laying the template for Greece’s involvement in America’s global strategy, he concluded soberly: “Should we fail to aid Greece and Turkey in this fateful hour, the effect will be far reaching to the West as well as to the East.”

The Truman Doctrine profoundly shaped postwar international relations. Tangibly, it set the stage for the unprecedented military and economic influence the United States would come to exercise in Europe over the next decades. Rhetorically, it codified America’s commitment to

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global involvement in order to prevent the spread of communist influence wherever it threatened
friendly regimes. Moscow did not miss the message. While Soviet U.N. spokesman Andrei
Vyshinsky’s accusation that Truman’s statement sought to “split Europe into two camps” may
not have accurately described its intent, it certainly captured its repercussions. If the Cold War
had seemed possible from an assessment of the geopolitical balance at the conclusion of the
Second World War, the Truman Doctrine made such confrontation unavoidable. In little over a
year, the European Recovery Program began in earnest; by 1949, bloc polarization was in full
swing, with Soviet crackdowns on the peoples’ democracies of Eastern Europe, the formation of
NATO, and the beginnings of Eastern bloc integration through organizations like Comecon
presaging the solidification of the Warsaw Pact in 1955.

For the eastern Mediterranean, Truman Doctrine aid accelerated the processes of change
sweeping the region. Now part of Washington’s global strategy, Greece’s foreign relations would
from the late 1940s be driven by its role in the Western alliance. In many respects, such ties
represented a continuation of Greece’s steady drift into international involvement since the late
nineteenth century. But the sheer scale and significance of the nation’s stake in the early Cold
War dwarfed anything it had previously experienced. Greek politicians could no longer control
the foreign factor for domestic gain, as they had in prior decades; now, it forcibly intruded upon
the comings and goings of political life, an unavoidable and omnipresent topic of national
discourse. And debates that once had a regional audience now found themselves broadcast on the

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44 Andrei Vyshinsky, “Speech to U.N. General Assembly.”
45 On the solidification of bloc tensions in the late 1940s and early 1950s, see especially Melvyn Leffler, A
Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War (Stanford Nuclear Age
Series) (Stanford, 1993) and The Specter of Communism: The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, 1917-
National Security Policy during the Cold War (Oxford, 2005); and Vojtech Mastny’s splendid edited documentary
collection A Cardboard Castle? An Inside History of the Warsaw Pact (National Security Archive Cold War
Readers) (Central European University Press, 2006).
grandest of stages, as Anglo-American policymakers eyed Greek political and cultural tensions with strategic interest.46

Turkey likewise cast its lot with the Western bloc following the promulgation of the Truman Doctrine, and for Ankara the 1950s proved equally global. Like its western neighbor, Turkey’s foreign policy elites embraced the Atlantic alliance as a safeguard against the ongoing threat of the Soviet Union, which still loomed on the nation’s northern border and sought to foment insurrection from within. They also used Marshall Plan aid to pursue their ambitious domestic agendas, which by the postwar era had frequently come to question the secular, modernizing tendencies of Kemalism. And, just as had happened in Greece, the conjunction of foreign influence and domestic transformations resulted by the end of the 1950s in a state of political deadlock, with ideological polarization exacerbated by the resurgence of often-militant indigenous identity. Though historians of modern Turkey have conspicuously overlooked the foreign factor as a key driver of historical developments, it was Turkey’s increasingly prominent international role that laid the foundations for shifting domestic climates and ultimately shaped its experience of the early Cold War period.47

But grassroots domestic transformations accompanied these broader diplomatic shifts, often as corollary effects of the region’s growing importance to the Western alliance. As Marshall Plan aid facilitated modernization and recovery in Athens and Ankara, old elites – often at the service of Washington and London – regained standing in fractured political arenas only tenuously supported by the rule of law and the defense promises of the Atlantic community. As

they assumed or reassumed the mantle of leadership, these elites clashed with segments of society inspired and empowered by changing international dynamics. Reduction in regulations and trade barriers subjected Greek and Turkish markets to the vicissitudes of the new global economy, bringing unprecedented – but in all cases, unevenly distributed – benefits to the societies of the eastern Mediterranean. Surges in labor union membership, a natural result of increasing productivity across industries, raised the specter of communism – a prospect all too real following the near-victory of leftists in the 1948 Italian election, and increasingly on the minds of American policymakers as they confronted communism in Latin America and Asia.\footnote{On the Marshall Plan and its effect on the postwar European economic order, see especially Michael J. Hogan, \textit{The Marshall Plan: Britain and the Reconstruction of Western Europe, 1947-1952} (Studies in Economic History and Policy: USA in the Twentieth Century) (Cambridge, 1989).}

With populist segments in Greek and Turkish society embracing centrist and leftist parties’ messages, elites who had assumed or reassumed the mantle of leadership found themselves challenged by opposition movements with real potential to seize governing power – often for the first time.

The resultant tension between newly reinstated conservative elites and leftist groups with growing influence – a mirror of parallel tensions between the peculiarities of national situations and the growing role of global concerns in policy – dominated the domestic politics of both Greece and Turkey in the first decade of the Cold War. And, in common with other regions seeking a new path in the postwar international order, domestic developments in the eastern Mediterranean continued to share close links with events on the foreign policy stage. As Great Britain and then the United States deepened their involvement in the region, they replaced traditional foes as the locus of outward condemnation. Their presence also provided a canvas upon which Greeks and Turks painted ongoing struggles over ethnic and national identities.
Haunted by the monolith of international communism, the two leading Atlantic powers confronted the twin specters of political instability and ethnic conflict in the eastern Mediterranean. Despite their preponderant standing in world affairs, neither proved capable of forestalling or resolving the centrifugal forces of the 1950s.

**U.S. and NATO Influence: Questions of National and Regional Direction**

Through its key role in bringing the Greek communist insurrection to an end, the United States by 1950 had cemented its preponderant influence on the nature and course of the nation’s domestic affairs. America’s supremacy, though thought by some to represent but one facet of its “architecture of intervention,” was in fact as much a simple function of America’s global reach as its deliberate intervention in Greek life. Post-civil war Greece could pursue no action with bearing on U.S. foreign policy interests outside of the strategic umbrella of Washington – precisely because such interests had become truly global. While the Greek case was regarded as a pressing foreign policy matter in its own right due to the recent attempt by communist guerrillas to seize the reins of power, the nation’s proximity to Eastern Europe, the Middle East, and North Africa, as well as its strategic ties to a now-declining British Empire, would have rendered it a centerpiece of U.S. policy in any case.

And the American official presence, while conspicuously represented in the form of military equipment and political advisors, needed little concerted effort to emerge as a determining factor in postwar Greek life. It found a crucial internal vehicle via a cadre of

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50 There is no shortage of scholarly attention to postwar Anglo-American strategies in the region, but among the best works are two classics in the field by William Roger Louis, *The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-51: Arab Nationalism, the United States, and Postwar Imperialism* (Oxford, 1984) and *Imperialism at Bay: The United States and the Decolonization of the British Empire, 1941-1945* (Oxford, 1978).
conservative figures lifted to political ascendancy after the government’s war victory and only too happy to accommodate the new hegemon. In the words of Andreas Papandreou, a young politician soon to play a key role in Greek history, “There was no attempt to hide the fact. It was taken for granted, both by Washington and by Athens. Cabinet members and army generals, political party leaders and members of the Establishment, all made open reference to American wishes or views in order to justify or to account for their own actions or positions. And the Americans in Greece, for their part, found it necessary frequently to make public comments on the economic and political situation in order to guide public opinion into the paths that they considered desirable.”

As with its commitments in other regions, the United States saw its mission in Greece primarily through the lens of concerns over the growing strength of international communism. KKE’s insurgency, admitted a 1947 policy paper, had not been a “friend or ally of the USSR.” But as an “instrument of Soviet policy,” it highlighted the virulent potential of Soviet influence in unstable regions. Specificities in the Greek domestic situation may have influenced the nation’s communist movement, but at their heart remained Moscow’s determination to extend its hand into the fragile underbelly of Europe. “It remains true that the paramount factor in the Greek political scene,” the paper maintained, “is the international rivalry and that all other questions… are subsumed in and assimilated to this larger question.” Among a transatlantic foreign policy apparatus increasingly sharing the notion of monolithic communism with London, such views – largely ignorant of Greece’s recent past – went unchallenged and unqualified.

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53 On the hardening consensus around monolithic international communism in the late 1940s, see especially Marc J. Selverstone, *Constructing the Monolith: The United States, Great Britain, and International Communism, 1945-1950* (Harvard, 2009).
From Athens, the story was different, even if its characters remained consistent. Greek politicians, too, viewed international events through the prism of budding East-West confrontation. But their overriding preoccupations in the aftermath of the civil war were the reconsolidation of domestic legitimacy and assertion of Greek foreign policy goals on the diplomatic stage. Disagreements over how best to assert such goals and chart the proper course of Greek diplomacy arose from competing visions of Greece’s relationship to American hegemony and European integration schemes, in turn underscoring divisions between right and left. Conservatives, who after the civil war enjoyed a monopoly of governing power, embraced U.S. advisory assistance and economic aid, emphasizing what they viewed as the axiomatically beneficial aspects of Greek alignment with the Atlantic alliance. For such figures, America represented the best safeguard against both external aggression from Greece’s communist northern neighbors, as well as the surest buttress against the incessant threat of a resurgent communist movement. By virtue of its geography, the Greek state had no option of maintaining neutrality in the budding conflict. Siding with the West promised defense benefits Greece could not provide herself, while offering a framework within which the country’s own foreign policy goals – particularly vis-à-vis Cyprus, whose union with Greece under enosis remained a top priority – could be negotiated.

Among opposition figures on the left – and, increasingly, among large segments of the Greek public – the role of a U.S.-led West in the nation’s future offered more uncertainty than benefit. Haunted by memories of the Asia Minor catastrophe and the crippling depression that followed, progressive politicians advocated for the renunciation of nationalist aims and the embrace of international organizations governed not by hegemonic powers but through collectively legislated, mutually beneficial relationships. Unchecked nationalism on the part of
world governments, such voices argued, had been responsible for the twin cataclysms of global
c warfare and economic depression in the first half of the twentieth century; cooperation was a sine
qua non in ensuring a prosperous and peaceful second. “We believe in the need for true, fair, and
sincere international cooperation, [which is] necessary because of the progress of technical
independence of nations… The problems which humanity will face after the war will be so
difficult and threatening that their solution will demand [application of policies to] geographical
areas wider than today’s national organizations,” asserted a 1942 statement by radical group
PEAN (Πανελληνιος Ενοσις Αγωνιζομενον Νεων, the Panhellenic Union of Struggling Youth).
Such sentiments found postwar resonance in the platforms of parties such as NUP (Εθνικο
Ενωτικο Κομμα, the National Unionist Party), whose leader Panagiotis Kanellopoulos endorsed
the notion of a pan-European organization devoted to continental cooperation and the
preservation of peace among member-states:

My thoughts are constantly there [Europe]. It is impossible for me to distinguish
my concern for Greece from my concern for Europe as a whole.
Nationalism in our days is provincialism. How could a new Greece be
comprehensible without a new Europe, without a new world? Only naïve
or retarded people could imagine that an enlarged Greece is sufficient for
the happiness of the Greek people. The nineteenth century is one thing,
the twentieth quite another. For the happiness of the Greek people it is
necessary to have that which is necessary for the happiness of all European
peoples: a new Europe, truer, founded on a new and comprehensive,
organically integrated, supranational political regime.54

Despite the ferocity of recent Greco-Turkish acrimony, the scene from Ankara closely
mirrored the one in Athens. Catapulted to ascendancy in the aftermath of the Second World War,
the Turkish Democratic Party, like Greece’s conservatives, had by the late 1940s utilized

54 Quoted in Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, “Greek Reformism and its Models: The Impact of the Truman Doctrine and
Marshall Plan aid and Anglo-American strategic support to cement its control of the government and to implement long-desired reforms. These included a wide-ranging agricultural mechanization program, modernization of energy and transportation systems, and the rehabilitation of metropolitan infrastructures – sweeping transformations that resulted in average economic growth of ten percent per-annum, as well as unprecedented surges in support among the working and agricultural classes. Led by noted opposition leader Adnan Menderes, the Turkish Democrats acted strategically to enrich Atatürk’s investments in public education and welfare programs, winning widespread popular support before indigenous communist influence made further inroads. Menderes’s own actions – most notably his public redistribution of inherited estates and enterprises – only served to reinforce the party’s postwar mandate.55

Menderes’s reforms in Turkish society and culture, by contrast, while best encapsulated in gestures and attitudes rather than legislation or official pronouncements, reached even further and represented a distinct break with past governments. In contrast to Atatürk’s strict emphasis on modernization at the expense of traditional customs, Menderes early on indicated his tolerance of Turkey’s Islamic heritage. During his 1950 election campaign, the candidate had vigorously supported the legalization of Arabic-language Islamic calls to prayer, banned under Atatürk in an attempt to rid the republic of Ottoman influences. Once in office, Menderes reopened mosques and Islamic ritual sites across Turkey, a prelude to his 1951 overtures to Iran and Saudi Arabia, among other Muslim states.56

The Democratic Party maintained popular support throughout the early 1950s, riding it to another victory in the 1954 elections. But by mid-decade changing economic fortunes,

56 Ibid.
occasioned by high importation of foreign products and failure to sustain investments in agricultural technologies, led to the rise of opposition groups advocating a new approach to Turkish politics based on a return to the Kemalist cultural paradigms. Though such groups often constituted groups of vocal figures with little concrete influence at the polls, Menderes reacted swiftly. In 1955 he began crackdowns on opposition press outlets, jailing journalists critical of his regime’s reforms and instituting tribunals for the trial of “disloyal” elements among the intelligentsia. The prime minister’s moves deeply alarmed senior military officials, whose foremost charge had long been the defense of Kemalist ideals. In secret they began contingency plans – akin to those assembled in Greece and other NATO nations – for a forcible takeover of power in the event of constitutional crises leading to political instability and the threat of a communist coup.57

Though Menderes and his party registered widespread support until the end of the decade, the Democratic Party’s reign and sudden crackdown revealed significant cleavages in postwar Turkish society. The economic miracle that had so benefited Western European nations in the aftermath of the ERP hit Turkey in waves, boosting employment and productivity in aggregate but delivering the typical shocks of innovation and modernization to many industries. The resulting discontent among marginalized or threatened groups provoked expressions of opposition that, while engendered by economic factors, reflected a broader question over Turkey’s role vis-à-vis the globalized world. Henceforth, the republic would have to choose between national concerns and international involvement – and the choice, more often than not, proved painful, as resurgent ethnic identities clashed with the realities of postwar global politics.

57 On Operation Gladio – a clandestine “stay-behind” plan for Italy during the Cold War emblematic of military efforts toward anticomunist contingency plans – see Ganser Daniele, NATO’s Secret Armies: Operation GLADIO and Terrorism in Western Europe (Contemporary Security Studies) (Routledge, 2004).
As we will see, the Cold War conflicts of the 1950s gave fuel to these tensions, often with disastrous results.

Perhaps more importantly, the Menderes years highlighted the importance of the military as a political and social force in postwar Turkey. Though the martial tradition had played important roles during the Ottoman era, Atatürk’s years had signaled a sea change toward democratic means of power transition and consolidation. For more than three decades since the Greco-Turkish War, political debates in Turkey had unfolded through the channels of parliamentary discourse and regular elections – punctuated by ethnic disturbances and the grievances of restive identity groups, but always within the confines of a state with widespread legitimacy. As the Democratic Party’s repression and subsequent events were to prove, such was not to be the case for long in the maturing Cold War climate.

The clearest effect of U.S. and NATO influence in the postwar eastern Mediterranean was a transformation in the strategic roles of the Greek and Turkish governments. Athens and Ankara had long served as the southeastern gateway to Europe, with all the attendant involvement of great powers with vested interests in the region. But now, from the perspective of Anglo-American policymakers overseeing transitions of power in a volatile area, the eastern Mediterranean carried the potential either to facilitate communist infiltration or to stem the tide of Moscow’s influence. London, Washington, and their pro-Western proxies were determined to see the latter happen, and their policies – crafted with the goals of ensuring regional stability and of preventing emergent states from embracing socialism in the post-imperial era – reflected such concerns.

But such stances in foreign policy had residual domestic effects as the diplomatic, economic, and sociocultural dimensions of foreign influence trickled into each society. For
Greek and Turkish citizens, the chief transformations of the early Cold War were psychological – forging new identities from the ruins of civil war, exploring the opportunities and weathering the challenges of economic boom and bust, or negotiating clashes between old and new identities altogether under the auspices of new governments. The Anglo-American foreign factor, in short, coexisted with and mutually reinforced new frontiers of regional identity in the eastern Mediterranean. It would be precisely these identity questions that would prove inflammatory when they met the full force of the new international order.

**Cyprus, Diplomacy, and the Istanbul Riots**

As we have seen, the Greek and Turkish governments, their internal politics driven by the deepening Cold War dominance of the United States and its allies, contended with shifting dynamics in politics, society, and culture on the home front. But regardless of their internal debates or diplomatic concerns, the unifying focus of American, British, Greek, and Turkish governments during the 1950s was on the status of the island of Cyprus. Perhaps the most acute concern came from Whitehall, as it watched with growing apprehension the role of the eastern Mediterranean in the coming decline of the British Empire. As unrest shook the Middle East throughout the late 1940s, with oil crises in Iran and the 1948 Palestinian uprising capturing the attention of both British and American leaders, maintaining a firm foothold for London in an area so prone to revolutionary influence became a sine qua non of any successful regional policy. Instability in the eastern Mediterranean basin had to be carefully managed, lest great power rivalries or the insidious threat of the communist monolith disrupt the fragile world order. As Loy Henderson, Director of the Office of Near Eastern and African Affairs, observed in a December 1945 memorandum:
At the present time the Near East, which for the purpose of this memorandum may be considered to include Turkey, the Aegean and Eastern Mediterranean Islands, Syria, Lebanon, Palestine, Transjordan, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Iran, the Persian Gulf area, and Afghanistan, is a breeding ground for international misunderstandings… The most important interest of the United States in the Near East is not based, as a fairly large section of the American public appears to believe, upon American participation in petroleum extraction or in profits to be derived from trade, but upon preventing developments from taking place… which might eventually give birth to a Third World War.  

Henderson also outlined the interest of the four great powers he saw playing the greatest role in the development of eastern Mediterranean affairs: Britain, whose main stakes in the region included keeping trade conduits with the rest of the Empire open and restraining Russian expansionism; France, whose “national pride” and “desire at least to appear to continue to play the role of a great empire” made it reluctant to withdraw from regional commitments; the Soviet Union, imbued with a desire to eliminate a “third barrier” to its southern expansion; and the United States, which sought to pursue a “policy of the open door” predicated upon support of independence movements, national self-determination, and giving “full consideration to the welfare of the people of these countries” with the goal of readying them “to play a role in world affairs appropriate to their number and talents.” Though Britain stood as the “great dam” restraining Soviet expansion, Moscow’s growing influence in the Near East made it “unjustifiable” for the United States to refuse to bolster its presence in what was now “a major political battlefield.”

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59 Ibid, pp. 2.
60 Chester W. Nimitz to James Forrestal, July 23, 1946, “Russia” folder, Box 15, Clifford Papers, Harry S. Truman Library.
In the eastern Mediterranean, as elsewhere, American anti-colonial rhetoric coexisted with but was frequently subordinated to the actions of beleaguered European empires, particularly when their problems involved the risk of newly independent nations tilting into the Soviet orbit. As tensions with Moscow worsened in the late 1940s and then burst into open hostility with the Korean War, official U.S. attitudes toward calls for Cypriot self-determination evinced a similar preference for the preservation of the status quo. They also reflected broader concerns about a new, but equally serious, threat to Washington’s global strategy – neutralism. As a July 1952 telegram from Dean Acheson to the embassy in Athens stated, American views on the Cyprus problem were

well known to [the] parties directly concerned. Restated briefly, they are that the US [is] not party to problem but does not believe it useful for the Greek government to press the matter… public restatement of our position at this time is unlikely to alter the approach of either the Greeks, Cypriots, or British to the problem. On the other hand, such reiteration Would probably provide additional propaganda material to those groups in ME (Middle East) and elsewhere which have belabored us for our approach to other problems involving aspirations of local groups in that area.61

Britain was only too happy to follow suit. Despite the vehemence of Cypriot calls for independence and their endorsement on the mainland by Greek politicians of all parties, dreams of enosis were repeatedly dashed by British authorities, whose lip service to Hellenic concerns foundered on the realities of imperial strategy. Amidst the suite of issues facing the Empire, from guerrilla wars in Malaya and Kenya to the aftermath of the Indian partition and the task of charting Britain’s role in the first stages of the European integration experiment, Cypriot and Greek concerns were a secondary – if still strategically vital – concern. Western control of the eastern Mediterranean, of which Britain’s Cypriot role formed a crucial pillar, was a non-

negotiable bulwark against instability on the Western alliance’s vulnerable southern flank. But it must be done at a minimum of cost, and certainly with none of the agonizing commitments now materializing, for London, Paris, and Washington alike, in Southeast Asia.

Policymakers in London made no secret of such views. It was thus a great insult when in 1953 British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden informed Greek prime minister Alexandros Papagos that the acknowledgement of Cypriot rights to self-determination was out of the question because the Cyprus issue, in the British government’s view, “did not exist.” As a shocked Papagos later recalled, Eden angrily demanded to know whether the Greek government intended to demand union of New York City’s sizable Greek population with the home country. Eden, like most British statesmen of the era, saw the writing on the wall: the Empire’s days were numbered, and the modus operandi of Britain’s foreign policy thus shifted to stopgap measures designed to ensure favorable regime transitions upon independence. But Cyprus was different. Located so close to the vital regions of the Middle East and North Africa, it was indispensable to the effective execution of British global policies in a way other territories were not – especially after the 1954 relocation to Cyprus of the War Office’s Middle East Headquarters for Land and Air Forces. For the time being, the importance of Cyprus as a strategic outpost made the prospect of its abandonment out of the question. As Henry Hopkinson, a junior minister at the colonial office in London, reported in July 1954:

> British administration in Cyprus, besides bringing much prosperity to the island and safeguarding the rights of all sections of the population, has maintained and still maintains stable conditions in this vital strategic area… the efficient administration on the island, in which a large number of Cypriots play a most effective part, has brought about vast improvements in

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62 Hyam, pp. 204.
health, agriculture, communications and many other fields… Her Majesty’s Government fully recognises that the Greek-speaking and Turkish-speaking parts of the population have close cultural links with Greece and Turkey. Without sacrifice of those traditions, Cypriots have before them the prospect of expanding opportunities in economic, social and constitutional development.  

Stakes became higher, however, when the Cyprus question came to international attention through the forum of the United Nations. As the psychological reconstruction of the Greek body politic made national prestige a major issue for both right and left, the plight of Greek Cypriots – bonded with the motherland in the Orthodox faith, Hellenic language, and a rich shared history – constituted a glaring example of Greek honor trampled upon by the exigencies of great power strategy. The Greeks thus opted for an expansion of the Cyprus question to the global community, raising the issue of Cypriot independence at the Ninth General Session of the United Nations, held between September 21 and December 17, 1954.  

Greece’s actions put the Western allies in a difficult situation. Britain, already tasked with the resolution of far-flung, increasingly violent insurgencies, sought simultaneously to preserve its standing on Cyprus and to prevent yet another colonial disturbance from causing embarrassment at the United Nations. The United States, while overwhelmingly concerned with the prospect of an internal threat to NATO cohesion in the form of Greco-Turkish conflict over Cyprus, could not countenance British failures to recognize Cypriot demands in so public a forum. The Anglo-American strategy thus became one of careful placation – keeping the Cyprus question localized and seeking its management through cooperation between the regional powers themselves. “We fully appreciate the distress and difficulties which any such discussion [of Cypriot independence] would create for you in the General Assembly, and we are ourselves not

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64 Quoted in Ibid, pp. 287.
unconcerned,” U.S. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles wrote to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill on September 21, 1954, the day the Ninth General Session convened. “However, the question as to how to vote on inclusion of this matter on the agenda poses an exceedingly difficult problem for us… because we have consistently and publicly adhered to the principle of the right of discussion in the General Assembly. We fought very hard for this at San Francisco [in 1945] in the face of Soviet opposition.” Still, Dulles went on, the United States would do everything within its power to make sure the issue never got off the ground in the first place. “If the item is included on the agenda,” he assured Churchill, “we shall actively oppose the passage of any resolution and will do all possible to keep any discussion to the absolute minimum.”

In the meantime, Washington and London sought to resolve regional tensions through efforts at multilateral negotiations among the involved nations. Between the spring of 1954 and the beginning of the Ninth General Assembly in September, the U.S. State Department repeatedly lobbied the Menderes government to take a more active role in the resolution of the Cyprus crisis, while cautioning Ankara that any settlement should take into account the reality that “Western unity is of paramount importance.” Turkish officials, “while making their position clear, should also show a desire to work for the mutually satisfactory solution of the problem so that it will not poison NATO relationships or jeopardize future Balkan alliances.” Neither the British nor the Americans informed Greece of their overtures to Turkey.

In addition to Greek support on the global stage, Cypriot pleas for self-determination found a powerful indigenous spokesman in the person of Michail Christodolou Mouskos, better known to history as Makarios III, the archbishop and primate of the autocephalous Cypriot

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Orthodox Church. A native of the island, Makarios had spent the Second World War studying theology under German occupation at the University of Athens, and in subsequent years received a scholarship to pursue further study at Boston University. Upon his return to ecclesiastical life in Cyprus in 1950, he had thus encountered the two most formative influences upon his later political endeavors: the experience of subservience to and occupation by foreign powers, and a close knowledge of the Western – and especially American – political and sociocultural systems. Both would prove indispensable in his international dealings.

Makarios’s return to Cyprus coincided with the beginning of the period of intensifying calls for enosis, and the archbishop deftly capitalized on the power of his position, his considerable diplomatic acumen, and the Greek world’s resurgent ethnic identities to stoke the fires of Cypriot nationalism. Upon his assumption of the archbishopric, he received the title of Ethnarch – the de facto leader of the Greek Cypriot community. This is essential in understanding the depths of Makarios’s phenomenal power over both Greek Cypriots and mainland Greeks. As head of church, state, and oppressed community, the archbishop came to embody the captivity of Hellenism, and the pathway to its salvation, in a way no leader, not even Venizelos, had done in modern times. His distance from formal politics and insistence on speaking in spiritual terms promoted a widely held perception of sanctity in a world of constant political turmoil. And Makarios wasted no time in cultivating this quasi-messianic image. As he later revealed to Italian journalist Oriana Fallaci,

In my world, [the joining of temporal and spiritual power] is fairly common… in my opinion, the Church should interest itself in all aspects of life – the Christian religion doesn’t confine itself to taking care of the moral progress of men, it’s also concerned with their social well-being… Besides, I don’t lean on a party. I’m not the leader of a political party who goes around asking people to elect him. I simply serve the people in the two capacities that they insistently and almost unanimously offered me… I’m strong because I’m weak. Because I have
neither a party nor an army nor a police force behind me. And because I
don’t even know the rules of politics. Because I follow certain principles
that are Christian principles and not games, tricks, political maneuvers.\textsuperscript{68}

For a man ignorant of the rules of politics, Makarios manipulated them skillfully. An
anti-imperialist through and through, the archbishop made no secret of his desires to see Cyprus
liberated from the British yoke. Although he stopped short of endorsing outright violence, he
vowed to adopt whatever means necessary to ensure the survival of the independent Cypriot state
that would follow Britain’s exit. Cyprus had to remain a sovereign state independent of foreign
interference in the deepening Cold War, and Makarios would shape the nature of its government.
Though his commitment to Orthodoxy precluded serious consideration of Soviet-style
communism, socialism, in his view, offered a tantalizing mixture of anti-colonialism and social
justice. It had, furthermore, demonstrated its credentials as the active motor of recent history,
having gained ground in some of the world’s most traditional religious societies, nations in Latin
America:

I can say I really have nothing against socialism. Among all social systems, it’s
the closest to Christianity, to a certain Christianity, or at least to what Christian
teaching should be… And let me add that, in my opinion, the Future belongs to
socialism. It will end by prevailing, through a kind of osmosis between the
communist countries and the capitalist ones. Spiritually it’s already happening.
The socialist, that is, egalitarian, spirit is permeating all human relationships… In
the last thirty years a great change has happened in the world. Thirty years ago
who would have imagined that colonialism would be over and that war would no
longer be accepted as a means for subjugating a country?\textsuperscript{69}

Makarios consciously tapped into the growing power of the global non-aligned
movement, as well as Anglo-American fears of its potential to disrupt regional stability, to attract
international attention. His efforts were not in vain. The archbishop’s conspicuous flirtation with

\textsuperscript{68} Quoted in Oriana Fallaci, \textit{Interview with History} (New York, 1977), pp. 319-320.
\textsuperscript{69} Ibid, pp. 327-328.
destabilizing movements and alliances quickly caused concern in Washington and London. Combined with his independent initiatives to bring the Cyprus issue before the U.N. Security Council, he alone constituted one of the greatest threats to alliance cohesion in the eastern Mediterranean basin. “The paladin of Greek nationalism,” as U.S. ambassador to Greece Charles Yost termed him, was a potentially dangerous rogue in a region and era when stability was essential. Particularly alarming was the possibility of Makarios’s Cyprus – already a central concern of Greek foreign policy – becoming the primary thespian in the passion play of Hellenic nationalism. “If Makarios goes ahead [with agitation at the United Nations],” Yost concluded, “he may publicly accuse [Greek prime minister] Papagos of the betrayal of Cypriots, which would have a most serious effect upon the position of the Papagos government in Greece…” Certainly there are few issues on which the opposition could cause more embarrassment to the government than that of the ‘betrayal of Cyprus.’”70

As Britain increasingly felt pressure on Cyprus from both Athens and Nicosia, top officials in Washington, echoing their earlier assessments of the situation, supported the Empire’s policy of status quo maintenance out of strategic considerations while publicly acknowledging the legitimacy of Cypriot demands. The failure of the General Assembly to pass a resolution in favor of Cypriot independence, according to Dulles, “gained some time” for the British “which should be used in [an] effort [to] avoid even more difficult situations” should the matter be raised again. “We intend to retain a reasonably flexible attitude regarding Cyprus so we will be free to exercise our influence usefully… in general, we are anxious to preserve harmony in NATO and are interested in seeing orderly and evolutionary development of the

political rights of the Cypriot people.” But such rights would have to be gained through “mature” discussion and negotiation, a category into which calls for enosis did not fall:

In examining problems, the U.S. must weigh heavily whether Cypriots are willing to adopt a constructive long-range attitude… it does not appear a sign of political maturity to ask that the British promise a plebiscite before holding discussions. This attitude will only restrict their opportunity to develop political experience and responsibility… Cypriots ask for the sympathy of the free world, but should remember that any increase in freedom requires an equal increase in responsibility and cooperation.  

Cyprus, in other words, would soon follow a road to independence and self-government – but its development would have to happen on the terms of a rapidly coalescing consensus on development in Washington that placed heavy emphasis upon capitalist development as an essential play in the grand geopolitical game with Soviet Russia. Even as the decisiveness of particular circumstances in the eastern Mediterranean joined cracks in the Soviet bloc as evidence for diversity within the ranks of international socialism, the U.S. and Great Britain continued constructing the monolith.

As 1954 came to a close, Anglo-American policymakers rested on their laurels, confident in the success of their gradualist approach to the Cyprus situation. The Greeks and Cypriots, by all indications, seemed willing to pursue a longer-term process toward a peaceful solution. Careful inclusion of Ankara in future talks would assure that all potential points of disagreement were covered, and that the destabilizing inertia of ethnic nationalism in the eastern Mediterranean would be contained. “Some of our people who have been traveling recently in Greece,” wrote Churchill to President Eisenhower in late September, “have come back and spread stories to the effect that Greece and Cyprus are quite ready to be reasonable and

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72 On the origins of development theory in the Cold War see especially David Milne, America’s Rasputin: Walt Rostow and the Vietnam War (New York, 2008).
conciliatory – of course I do not know how accurate are their observations and their reporting. But this kind of thing does serve to give you some idea of why I am interested in the other side of the story.”

Through careful management, policymakers in both London and Washington hoped that the unpredictable forces unleashed by a Cypriot uprising could be preempted. Their miscalculation proved disastrous.

On April 1, 1955, General George Grivas, a former Greek Army officer, led coordinated attacks on British military installations across Cyprus. In the key cities of Nicosia, Limassol, and Famagusta, police stations reported well organized, hit-and-run strikes on waypoints and barracks, all perpetrated by small bands of guerrillas armed with grenades and small arms. The outbreak of hostilities caught the British by surprise, but the island’s administration reacted swiftly. Four weeks after the first explosions, on April 27, 1955, the government formed the Cyprus Internal Security Committee, composed of the heads of the military and intelligence outfits stationed on the island. Unremitting harassment from EOKA pushed the committee by June to pursue a harder line toward the rebel movement, which culminated in the late summer with the execution of nineteen young insurgents in Limassol. In September, Her Majesty’s Government dispatched John Harding to the island as its first military governor, tasked with bringing the insurgency to an end. By November 26, the new governor had declared a state of emergency. Cyprus had joined the mounting list of insurgencies facing the crumbling British Empire.

At the heart of EOKA’s campaign stood a self-assigned mission to strike at the heart of imperialism – “by deeds of heroism and self-sacrifice, to draw the attention of international public opinion, especially among the allies of Greece.” But the organization’s credo revealed the

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73 Churchill to Eisenhower, Eisenhower Papers, Whitman file, Dwight D. Eisenhower Library.  
74 Grob-Fitzgibbon, pp. 297-298.
centrality of a historic ethnic identity as well. In leaflets distributed to EOKA fighters throughout April 1955, Grivas – operating under the nom de guerre Digenis, the name of a Byzantine general who had perished defending Constantinople against Ottoman assault – exhorted his fellow Cypriots to rise against British rule:

> With God’s help, with faith in the righteousness of our struggle, with the aid of all Hellenism, we hereby take on the struggle to rid us of the British yoke, with the sacred motto left upon us by our ancestors – EITHER WITH IT, OR ON IT… From the depths of the centuries we are watched by all those who shone upon Greek history to maintain our freedom, those who fought in Marathon, in Salamis, the 300 of Leonidas and those who more recently fought in the Albanian epoch. We are watched by the fighters of [18][21], who taught us that liberation from an occupier always comes through BLOOD. We are also watched by the rest of Hellenism with anticipation, but also with national pride.

> The declaration went on to castigate the British and their supporters for their collusion in the captivity of Hellenism: “GLOBAL ENVOYS: Take a look at your own actions. It is a disgrace in the 20th century for a nation to have to shed blood to gain its freedom, the holy gift for which we fought on your side and for which you yourself claim to have fought against Nazism and Fascism.”

> Greek public opinion, though similarly surprised, reacted favorably to the beginning of EOKA’s campaign and espoused its anti-imperialist agenda. Athens news stations closely and enthusiastically followed the exploits of Digenis and his followers. As the British novelist Lawrence Durrell, at the time visiting Cyprus to finish his Alexandria Quintet, recalled, “The moral pressure exercised by Athens radio, which went into raptures at every evidence of what is described as an open insurrection, was backed up by the local clergy whose public utterances

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75 Χρυσή Αυγή, October 2005, pp. 19; George Grivas, “First Declaration of EOKA.”
reached new heights of bloodcurdling ferocity… ‘Freedom is acquired on by blood!’ shrilled Athens radio.”

The initial high hopes did not last, however, for as early as May 1955, it had become clear to at least a few Greek officials that Washington had no intention of pushing Britain toward a favorable resolution of the Cyprus issue. Despite Dulles’s assurances to the contrary, the Greek ambassador George Melas had in a May 25 conversation expressed his concerns that the British forces on Cyprus “would not have acted as they did unless they had general U.S. support on the Cyprus question.” Greece understood the rules of the game in the eastern Mediterranean: Britain may have been hanging Cypriot rebels, but could not have done so without the backing, tacit or otherwise, of America.

As it turned out, London itself sought ways of bringing the conflict to a rapid conclusion. With negotiations on the Malayan Emergency just over the horizon, British policymakers rushed to find a multilateral solution to the Cyprus imbroglio, acting out of perennial concerns over broader exposure – and embarrassment – on the international stage. The Eisenhower administration, again eager to preserve the threatened status quo, followed suit. The Anglo-American solution – reaching out to Turkey in earnest in an attempt to bring both Athens and Ankara to the negotiating table – inflamed the situation even further. The outbreak of violence on the island had changed the terms of the dispute not only for the British and the Greeks, but also for Turkey, which reacted with alarm at the vulnerability of Cyprus’s Turkish community in the face of Grivas’s onslaught. And such concerns were soon validated by actions. By the summer of 1955, Turkish Cypriot casualites had begun to mount – no doubt due, in large part, to John

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Harding’s decision to expand the ranks of auxiliary police forces by recruiting heavily from the Turkish community.\textsuperscript{77}

The expansion of talks to include Turkey came at a time when the ethnic dimensions of the Cyprus conflict made any Greco-Turkish dialogue doomed to mutual intransigence. Public opinion in both countries throughout the first year of the Cypriot insurgency had resolutely condemned the other government’s position as untenable and unjustifiable at best, jingoistic and self-consciously aggressive at worst. Xenophobia spread rampantly throughout both Greece and Turkey, but especially in the latter, where Menderes’s government officially sponsored anti-Greek press campaigns after its 1954 election victory.\textsuperscript{78}

Britain was acutely aware of such developments and quickly moved to exploit them to her advantage. As 1955 wore on, British forces’ failure to find a favorable end to the Cyprus emergency steadily became clear. The difficulty of quelling a strategically competent and widely supported insurgency had taken its toll; also, the wider challenges of managing crises elsewhere in the empire and facing mounting domestic opposition to overseas ventures gave British officials incentives to extricate themselves from the eastern Mediterranean imbroglio. Turkey’s new interest in Cyprus provided a convenient opportunity to do just that. “Apart from restoring order in Cyprus, a need which this development [Greek and Cypriot calls for Cypriot self-determination at the UN] underlines,” pronounced the Foreign Office in the late spring of 1955, “we can only do our best to appease the Turks by giving them full information about our intentions, whilst continuing to make clear that we, not they, rule the island.”\textsuperscript{79}

\begin{flushleft}
\textsuperscript{78} Dogu Ergil, “Past as Present,” \textit{Turkish Daily News}, September 12, 2005.
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But British actions were often far more sinister in nature. To officials stationed in Ankara and Athens, the vitriolic exchanges between Greeks and Turks offered opportunities to do more than include Turkey in a British problem. Exploitation of xenophobic sentiment could transform the Cyprus issue into a Greco-Turkish affair altogether. As early as August 1954, Sir Charles Peake, the British ambassador to Greece, had suggested to Greek officials that “Greek-Turkish ties are anyway superficial… nothing would be lost if, for instance, something were to happen to Atatürk’s house in Thessaloniki.”

Much more blunt were statements from the Foreign Office – “a few [anti-Greek] riots in Ankara would do us nicely” – and from Labour politician John Strachey – “The Greek minority in Istanbul… could be for Turkey a trump card should Greece consider annexing an independent Cyprus.” Such incitements resonated with the Turkish government and public. Between 1954 and 1956, nationalist student organizations and irredentist publications railed against the alleged role of Istanbul’s Greek community and the Istanbul-based Ecumenical Patriarchate in exacerbating tensions over Cyprus and fomenting conspiracies to ensure its domination by Greece. Such voices frequently invoked history to condemn their targets, as evidenced in an article from leading nationalist newspaper Cumhuriyet:

Neither the Patriarchate nor the Rum [Greek] minority ever openly supported Turkish national interests when Turkey and Athens clashed over certain issues. In return, the great Turkish nation never raised its voice about this. But do the Phanar Patriarchate and our Rum citizens in Istanbul have special missions assigned by Greece in its plans to annex Cyprus? While Greece was crushing Turks in Western Thrace [in 1922-23] and was appropriating their property by force, our Rum Turkish citizens lived as free as we do, sometimes even more comfortably. We think that these Rums, who choose to remain silent in our struggle with Greece, are clever enough not to fall into the trap of four or five provocateurs… If the Greeks dare touch our brethren, then there are plenty of Greeks in Istanbul to retaliate upon.

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80 Quoted in Dick Güven, Yasam, September 7, 2005.
81 Quoted in Ibid.
82 Holland, Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, pp. 75-77.
83 Ömer Sami Cosar, Cumhuriyet, August 30, 1955.
It was in this context of insurgency, diplomatic deadlock and mutual hostility that Greco-Turkish relations, already strained by the outbreak of violence, took a turn for the worst. On September 6, 1955, Turkish news stations reported that the Turkish consulate in Thessaloniki – none other than the birthplace of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk in northern Greece – had been bombed by Greek nationalists the previous evening. As it turned out, no such bombing had actually taken place. An usher at the consulate, it was soon discovered, had planted a device in its basement and then informed superiors of its presence. Yet the fuse had been lit, and when it ran its course the explosion was catastrophic. News of the incident spread across Turkey on government news stations and official radio broadcasts. In Istanbul, municipal officials in all the city’s districts incited Turkish citizens to descend upon the city’s Greek minority. Over the night of September 6th and into the next morning, tens of thousands of Turks ransacked Greek businesses, pillaged households, and committed acts of violence, some resulting in deaths, on the community’s Greek Orthodox religious leaders. In little more than twelve hours, four thousand homes, one thousand businesses, 73 churches, 26 schools, and virtually all of the Greek community’s infrastructure had been irreversibly damaged or destroyed. Human costs included some 30 dead, several hundred injured, and, in the case of several priests, forcibly circumcised.  

The anti-Greek pogrom cast salt into pressurized, age-old ethnic wounds and greatly intensified the stakes of the ongoing Cyprus conflict. Greek Prime Minister Papagos addressed the nation on September 17 to decry a grievous affront to national honor: “It is with great emotion that I am addressing the Greek people today, mainly to extol the coolness, wisdom, and self-control with which they reacted as a civilized people, to blows affecting the Nation’s soul…

84 On the pogrom and its aftermath, the best English-language source is Speros Vryonis, *The Mechanism of Catastrophe: The Turkish Pogrom of September 6-7, 1955 and the Destruction of the Greek Community of Istanbul* (New York, 2005).
I deeply share the Greek peoples’ indignation on account of the tragic events in Turkey against our holy Orthodox Church and our brothers in Turkey.”

Foreign Minister Stefanos Stefanopoulos, in a note to the Turkish foreign ministry dated September 9, had been much more blunt, spelling out the significance of the pogrom for future Greco-Turkish cooperation on the Cyprus issue: “In the fact of this recently created situation, the Greek government cannot limit itself to a mere expression of stern protest, for it is, at the same time, obliged to call to the attention of the Turkish government the broader political consequences which will possibly be provoked by the anti-Greek manifestations.”

It was in this charged environment that the second and latter installment of the Cyprus drama unfolded. On December 3, 1957, the British government replaced John Harding as Governor of Cyprus with Sir Hugh Foot, previously the island’s colonial secretary from 1943 to 1945. Foot had been fingered by Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan as Harding’s replacement after the Cyprus Emergency had settled into a bloody stalemate. The outgoing governor grasped the reasons for the leadership transfer. His harsh handling of affairs on the island had done Britain more harm than good, and though Macmillan had assured him that no other official could have performed the task “with greater distinction… courage, fairness, and skill,” it was nonetheless time for the empire to dispense with violence and conclude this chapter of the decolonization saga through peaceful means. “I don’t know anything about Sir Hugh Foot,” Harding wrote to his son three weeks following his dismissal, “but I am sure there are definite advantages at this stage in having someone in the post who has no connection with the harsh

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86 Ibid, pp. 199.
measures I have had to adopt to hold and control the island, and has no military label attached to
him.”

Foot may have had no personal connection to the Cypriot counterinsurgency’s brutality, but he
certainly had to contend with its repercussions, the largest of which was the diplomatic
impasse that had precluded meaningful and conclusive discussions on Cyprus’s future. His job
was doubly complicated by the recent events in Istanbul, which made distrust among the island’s
Greek and Turkish communities an even greater obstacle. Only a period of respite, the governor
believed, could mend wounded sensibilities and pave the way for peace. Despite advice to the
contrary, upon his arrival to the island in early December, Foot delivered a speech to the Cypriot
people in which he eschewed the violent approach of his predecessor and extended hope for
future fruitful dialogues: “I earnestly ask everyone on the island to pause today to consider the
course we should follow. Cyprus cannot be doomed to a future of hate and fear. The people of
this lovely island must one day again work and live together in peace and respect and
happiness.”

The tangible expression of such sentiments was the eponymous Foot Plan, in which the
governor proposed a four-point program for the future of Cyprus predicated on the end of
violence, constitutional discussions leading to self-governance, and, finally, a conclusive
settlement agreed upon by both the Greek and Turkish governments. The plan, which hinged
upon the outcome of the all-important provision regarding Greco-Turkish talks, was short-lived.
Initially supported by both the British and the American, within a month of its promulgation in
January 1958 it had been flatly rejected by both Athens and Ankara, neither of which would
accept the prospect of communal reunification over a solution favorable to their respective

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87 Quoted in Grob-Fitzgibbon, 370-371.
88 Ibid, 372.
Ethnic politics, unsuccessfully managed by the United States and the United Kingdom and then actively promoted by the latter, had hijacked attempts at resolution of the Cyprus conflict.

Throughout 1958, Foot’s governance did little to forge a final solution on the island’s future. Though the incidence and intensity of violence decreased during his tenure, EOKA carried out several high-profile assassinations of British military officials and Greek and Turkish Cypriot commanders. Only in December of that year did progress come with joint Greek-Turkish talks, organized by Macmillan and held under the auspices of a NATO council, on Cyprus’s future. By February 1959, detailed plans for a conference between the three nations had been hammered out and announced in a communiqué, followed shortly thereafter by the announcement that Cyprus would become an independent republic the following year. Its goal of national liberation achieved, EOKA immediately ordered a ceasefire. The Cyprus Emergency was over.

In the wider context of postwar international relations, the Cyprus conflict was of limited significance. The United States and the Soviet Union each regarded the island’s troubles for what they were – disturbances on the periphery of their spheres of influence which, though capable of expanding into broader conflicts, were not likely to transcend regional boundaries. The docket of issues facing the superpowers was simply too long throughout the 1950s for Cypriot protests and British imperial decline to garner deep attention. Yet the same centrifugal forces the British and Americans sought to contain throughout the emergency had by its conclusion been unleashed. The source was neither the perfidious extension of Moscow’s monolithic influence, nor the

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89 Ibid, 373.
90 Ibid, 374-375.
operation of its global acolytes, but the tempestuous state of internal eastern Mediterranean politics and resurgent ethnic identities.

**Conclusion**

On August 16, 1960, Cyprus officially achieved its independence from Britain under the terms of the London-Zürich Agreements. Henceforth, the Republic of Cyprus would be governed by a constitutional arrangement that divided administrative and government positions between the Greek and Turkish communities, with the latter receiving a permanent veto in constitutional affairs and having rights to a minimum of 30% of the seats in parliament. Archbishop Makarios would serve as the republic’s first president. In addition, the three “mother states” – Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom – were, under the accompanying Treaty of Guarantee, granted international sanction to intervene on the island as guarantor powers in order to preserve the stability of the new Cypriot government. For all parties involved, the conclusion of the Cyprus dispute yielded mixed returns. The United Kingdom, now in the last stages of decolonization, had managed to extricate itself from a brutal counterinsurgency campaign and had even managed to retain control over two sovereign bases on the island. Turkey, which from the beginning had advocated taksim, or division of the island along ethnic lines, saw in the London agreements a sizable concession, but ultimately a workable arrangement that would allow Turkish Cypriots considerable influence in the new country’s governance. The United States, throughout the 1950s staunchly opposed to the formation of any centrifugal forces within NATO, had averted a serious Greco-Turkish confrontation, successfully assisted in the United Kingdom’s demarche, and now took its place, as it had done with Greece, as the dominant outside influence in Cypriot affairs. The challenges of the 1960s in the eastern Mediterranean, as elsewhere, now passed to the Americans.
For Greece, the outcome was far more questionable. Like Turkey, it had managed to avoid a hot war over Cyprus. But the war of words and incitement of identities the island’s dilemmas had provoked – between Greece and Turkey, between Greece and her Anglo-American allies, and, as would be seen in the early 1960s, within Greece itself – proved equally costly to the nation’s fractious political scene. The irresolution of the Cyprus dispute would come to be viewed by Greeks as the latest iteration of foreign policy disappointments plaguing the modern Hellenic ethnios. As with the Asia Minor catastrophe, it would soon take its place as a central pillar of indigenous debates over the proper course for the Greek nation.

The 1950s, moreover, witnessed the coalescence of two patterns that would shape the eastern Mediterranean for the rest of the Cold War: the resurgence and politicization of regional ethnic nationalisms, and the failure of great power hegemons to effectively respond to their challenges. In refusing to acknowledge Greek and Cypriot appeals for the expansion of the Cyprus issue to international forums, American policymakers sacrificed their eastern Mediterranean allies’ concerns upon the altar of Cold War grand strategy. Employing many of the same heuristics they used elsewhere to combat the threat of international communism, they hoped to contain the burgeoning crisis between Greece and Turkey before it could complicate other diplomatic efforts. In so doing, they stifled opportunities for allies to vent grievances, to take a hand in the development of their own foreign policy agendas, and, ultimately, to participate in the Western alliance framework so many in both Athens and Ankara had initially welcomed.

Even more seriously, the United Kingdom, by executing a protracted and brutal counterinsurgency campaign in Cyprus and by provoking – often deliberately – Greco-Turkish animosity, severed cultural ties that had long underpinned Anglo-Greek relations. At the same
time, Britain cemented itself as colonial oppressor nonpareil in the Greek political lexicon. If Greeks learned a hard lesson in the 1950s, it was that the dreams of supranational condominium and equality between nations in an open forum were just those: visions in the ether, rapidly dissipated when the exigencies of international relations came into focus. They and their Cypriot cousins – particularly the charismatic and ambitious Archbishop Makarios – would not soon forget. The great desiderata of British and American postwar policies in the region were predicated upon stability, ensuring that domestic political developments avoided treacherous turns to leftism and that dangerous international orientations like neutralism were defeated before they could mature and be manipulated by Moscow or Beijing.  

Ironically, the Anglo-American attempt to preserve the equilibrium in eastern Mediterranean affairs foundered on the rocks of age-old suspicions and animosities inflamed into modern hatreds over Cyprus. 

Yet the special relationship’s missteps and lost opportunities, while significant, should not be overstated. Despite the trials of the 1950s, a great crisis seemed to have been averted by decade’s end. The immediate threat to NATO’s southeastern flank was, for the time being, attenuated. The Greek and Turkish governments, despite lingering tensions and festering disputes, had settled into stable, if grudging, coexistence and even mutual cooperation under the terms of the London agreements. Britain, humiliated at Suez and forced to concede defeat to the EOKA rebels, relinquished its role as great power arbiter of eastern Mediterranean affairs to the United States. The latter, moreover, had the resources to help sustain the new republic and seemed committed, in the words of Eisenhower’s successor John F. Kennedy, to “whatever use of U.S. resources may be required” to hold the line and ensure the Cypriot state’s security. 

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91 On neutralism see Sandra Bolt, Jussi M. Hanhimaki et. al., eds., *Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the Blocs?* (Routledge, 2015).
Cyprus was independent. A constitutional framework had been established for its governance. If there was another explosion of tension on the horizon, it seemed to stem more from the task of managing the new state’s role in global bloc politics – a minor endeavor when compared to the dilemmas facing the Western alliance in Eastern Europe, Latin America, and Southeast Asia. Perhaps most importantly, the full force of Greek ethnic nationalism – which had historically destabilized the volatile region, and had threatened to do so again over Cyprus – had been dammed. Though written five years earlier, a 1955 American intelligence memorandum on the state of affairs in the eastern Mediterranean accurately summarized the prevailing view of U.S. foreign policy officials in 1960: “Regardless of internal political developments, Greece’s strongly pro-Western orientation is unlikely to change over the next few years… although the enosis issue is likely to be a continuing irritant in Greek relations with the UK, Turkey, and the US, it is unlikely that Greece’s alliances with these powers will be strained by this or any other issue.”

The coming years demonstrated the prematurity of such optimistic assessments. While the Cypriot constitution provided for the sharing of power between the island’s two communities, it failed to take into account the aspirations and machinations of the republic’s president. And though a geopolitical equilibrium prevailed on NATO’s southeastern flank for now, its persistence into a decade of increasing demand upon the Western alliance’s stretched resources was far from certain. The great error of British and American policies in the 1950s was their failure to adequately navigate and then reverse the tide of ethnic discontent for decades kept at bay, but now cascading through the eastern Mediterranean. When the dam finally burst in the

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coming years, the transforming dynamics of the Cold War gave regional identities their largest canvas yet.
IV. Cyprus and the Stalemated Sixties

The assassination of John F. Kennedy on November 22, 1963 sent shock waves throughout the United States and the world. U.S. embassies and consulates across the globe suspended normal communications duties as nervous and confused phone calls poured in. Governments on both sides of the Iron Curtain expressed sorrow and sympathy at the news. Washington-based CBS correspondent Roger Mudd eloquently captured the prevailing mood of pervasive mourning in his 2008 memoir: “It was a death that touched everyone instantly and directly; rare was the person who did not cry that long weekend. In our home, as my wife watched the television, her tears caused our five-year-old son, Daniel, to go quietly and switch off what he thought was the cause of his mother’s weeping.”

Attentions soon shifted to Kennedy’s vice president, Lyndon Baines Johnson, who now found himself thrust suddenly into the most powerful political position on the planet. Though by his own admission unprepared and unwilling to assume the responsibility before him – “I ask for your help – and God’s,” he told assembled officials as he exited the presidential airplane upon which he had been sworn into office – the new president had no intention of dramatically altering Kennedy’s policies. Domestically, LBJ pledged to carry forth the legacy of sweeping reform outlined by his predecessor’s administration – much of which he inherited – remarking that “no memorial oration or eulogy could more eloquently honor President Kennedy’s memory than the earliest possible passage of the Civil Rights Bill for which he fought so long.”

There were similar continuities in foreign policy. Johnson maintained both the diplomatic team and the foreign policy commitments of the previous administration – most notoriously the

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deteriorating stage of affairs in Southeast Asia, but also a deepening American role in the world at large, from the developing nations of Latin America and Africa to the processes of détente underway with the Soviet bloc. The Texan also agreed with Kennedy that “flexible response,” a full range of non-nuclear warfare that included the use of conventional forces as well as new mechanisms of psychological and cultural warfare, was the best way to confront communist influence in the Third World. But to familiar commitments and underlying beliefs LBJ brought a fresh ethos premised upon ideologically driven action that differed considerably from the Kennedy administration’s more pragmatic, social justice-based approaches. Whereas his predecessor had emphasized the need to promote democracy as a means to an end in the fight against Soviet imperialism, Johnson espoused an abiding belief in the primacy of American ideals themselves. The allegiance and partnership of global allies had to be won not out of strategic considerations, but genuine convictions. As White House Press Secretary George Reedy put it,

To a considerable extent, our foreign policy has failed because it has been based on the assumption that we must do things simply to counter the Soviets. We have advertised to the whole world that we are willing to help India because we don’t want India to go Communist. We have advertised to the world that we will help in the Middle East because we don’t want Western Europe to lose the oil resources of Iraq, Iran, and Saudi Arabia… this has, naturally, led to a great deal of skepticism among the uncommitted people.97

Scholarship on the Johnson administration’s foreign policy, inundated with accounts seeking to describe and explain the Vietnam debacle, have in recent years begun to consider the extent to which LBJ and his advisers responded to such international concerns – what H.W.

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96 On the Kennedy administration’s Third World entanglements, see especially Lawrence Freedman, *Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam* (Oxford, 2002).
Brands terms “the wages of globalism.” Historical reassessments illuminate important dimensions of the administration’s diplomatic activities, especially significant challenges, such as Charles de Gaulle’s 1966 withdrawal of French forces from NATO’s integrated military command, domestic turmoil in West Germany, and ongoing financial crises involving the British pound sterling, which all constituted trials of U.S. foreign policy. Such investigations have become something of a cottage industry within scholarship on Kennedy’s successor, reversing orthodox understandings of the Johnson years and attributing much of their successful handling to the skillful, but heretofore upbraided, official and personal diplomacy of the administration.

Yet the story of Johnson and the eastern Mediterranean has, with a few notable exceptions, been almost entirely neglected in this new historiography. Such omissions obscure the formative impact of the Johnson years on the development of eastern Mediterranean politics and identities and, ultimately, upon the course of the region through the international environment of the late twentieth century. From 1964 to 1968, two major events occupied the bulk of American attention in the region: the ongoing Greco-Turkish dispute over Cyprus, and the related domestic political instability within Greece that eventually led to the 1967 coup d’etat of right-wing military generals. Faced with the inheritance of a discredited imperial power and demonstrating little willingness to engage with more systemic problems in the Anglo-American approach or to learn from Britain’s mistakes, LBJ and his foreign policy team missed opportunities to defuse rapidly escalating tensions between Greece and Turkey. Opting for a policy of stability founded upon the erroneous assumption that international neutralism and not ethnic nationalism motivated key players in the eastern Mediterranean, they misinterpreted the

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winds of change blowing through the region, ultimately sacrificing grand visions of an effective foreign policy upon the altars of diplomatic expediency and international distractions.

The Cyprus Crisis of 1963-1964

The administration’s handling of the ongoing Cyprus crisis prompted its first major diplomatic initiative in the eastern Mediterranean, and proved itself the latest iteration in a predictable pattern of U.S. responses to regional problems. After the 1960 declaration of Cypriot independence, internecine violence escalated as the island’s communities jockeyed for influence in a new governmental arrangement. Bitterness that had until recently been directed against British rule now turned inward upon itself, and by the first year of the new decade Cyprus’s stability seemed threatened by the threat of renewed bloodshed.

The island’s troubles were only aggravated by Makarios’s presidency. As the figure most identified with Cyprus’s path to independence, as well as the man responsible for navigating the nation through treacherous waters of Cold War diplomacy, Makarios received at the time, and has ever since maintained, considerable attention. Contemporaries in the political and diplomatic realms vociferously debated the effectiveness of the archbishop’s role in eastern Mediterranean crises, some decrying his ironhanded, intransigent rule of Cyprus and others lauding his unwillingness to compromise national sovereignty in the face of withering pressure from the great powers. What is beyond doubt is the shrewdness with which Makarios manipulated Cyprus’s circumstances during the 1960s in order to capitalize upon both regional and international tensions, propelling himself and the Cypriot nation onto the global stage in ways perhaps not even he had foreseen.  

By January of 1964, it was clear that the situation on Cyprus had little hope of solution through the current diplomatic environment afforded by the 1960 agreements. David Ormsby-Gore, the British ambassador to the United States, noted to Johnson that recent talks between the three guarantor states in London looked “very black,” with both joint efforts at conflict resolution and reconciliation between the island’s feuding communities becoming more and more unlikely. The question now turned from defusing the situation to an exploration of possible means by which the inevitable conflict could be contained once it erupted, at least until a longer-term solution was achieved. And other global crises were fast shortening the timeline within which a successful solution to the Cyprus dilemma could be reached. The United Kingdom, ending a brutal counterinsurgency campaign in Malaya and beginning another in Kenya, pushed strongly for multilateral military intervention by way of a NATO peacekeeping force containing a contingent of American troops. Domestic support for foreign adventures was at an all-time low, and Whitehall could no longer shoulder the burden of the brewing Cypriot crisis alone.\footnote{FRUS, 1964-1968: Volume XVI, Doc. 1.}

Johnson rejected such proposals outright. In his view, the problem was a British one – borne from the decline of the empire’s imperial project, and its resolution therefore a British responsibility. In a January 25 telephone conversation with Under Secretary of State George Ball, the president all but washed his hands of U.S. obligations to participate in Cypriot peacekeeping affairs, pointedly remarking on London’s impotence: “I think that the British are getting to where they might as well not be British anymore if they can’t handle Cyprus.” At a conference later the same evening, administration officials – Ball chief among them – presented to Johnson a stark assessment of the Cyprus situation and suggested that before deciding to refuse the British request, more information be obtained regarding the composition and size of
the proposed force. But LBJ still resists advice. Asking “everyone to go slow on any plan to use
U.S. troops in Cyprus” and suggesting that Britain send more troops for the time being to
stabilize the situation, the president pointed out that “we have helped them [the British] in the
past and they must now continue to carry this burden in Cyprus.” With the coming American
elections representing a test for Johnson to win the highest office in the land in his own right, the
introduction of further military commitments anywhere else in the world was a measure to be
reserved “as a last resort.”

For now, the administration regarded troubles on Cyprus as another item on the plate of
global disturbances and opportunities in front of the United States. Washington had enough to
occupy its attentions with the worsening situation in Vietnam and the domestic ramifications of
Johnson’s first actions in building the Great Society. The prospect of a hot war in the eastern
Mediterranean, though a frightening prospect, could be averted through peaceful means. On
January 26, Johnson instructed Ball to form a special mission to the capitals of guarantor powers
Britain, Greece, and Turkey, as well as Cyprus, to forge a new settlement.

Yet the administration’s efforts to keep the struggle on Cyprus limited proved fruitless,
with Makarios again emerging as the flaw in the plan. Far from a feeble figure subject to foreign
manipulation, the archbishop thwarted American efforts to keep the issue confined to the region
by playing his strongest hand – appealing to the United Nations Security Council. By calling on
the UN to honor Cypriot sovereignty and throwing into broad exposure Anglo-American
consideration of a NATO peacekeeping force, Makarios in a single stroke deftly utilized
Cyprus’s political capital as a non-aligned state, thus safeguarding its opportunities for future

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101 Ibid, Doc. 3.
102 Ibid, Docs. 4-8.
economic and military support from the Soviet bloc and (so he thought) increasing his leverage with the West.\textsuperscript{103}

As it turned out, the archbishop struck at an ideal time. Makarios’s vehement protests ensured that the Greek nationalist version of the Cyprus drama – a passion play in which Cypriots were crucified upon the cross of Western imperialist diplomacy – would receive serious hearings in the communist world. Though the 1964 crisis took place at the beginning of détente, the proximity of Cyprus to both the strategically crucial Middle East-Africa nexus and to the Soviet Union itself made superpower confrontation a foregone conclusion. The showdown came with a February 7 note from Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev to President Johnson, in which the Soviet leader pledged his support for Cypriot self-determination and condemned Western proposals for NATO action. The island its struggles, Khrushchev insisted, were “being exploited as a pretext for unconcealed intervention in the internal affairs of the Republic of Cyprus… a sovereign, independent state, a member of the UN,” and such meddling, if continued, “could present a serious danger for real peace.” Noting the island’s closeness to the southern extreme of the USSR’s borders, Khrushchev warned that “the Soviet Union, although it does not border directly on the Republic of Cyprus, cannot remain indifferent to that situation which is developing in the area of the eastern Mediterranean.”\textsuperscript{104} Johnson’s reply asserted that Khrushchev had, in fact, based his objections on an erroneous assessment of the state of affairs; the United States, Johnson maintained, “has been cooperating with the governments concerned, including the Government of the Republic of Cyprus, for one purpose alone, that of assisting the

\textsuperscript{103} Ibid, Docs. 9-14.
Cypriots to restore a peaceful situation in Cyprus.”105 But the die was now cast. The island had attracted Soviet attention, and its issues were now problems whose international significance could be exploited in the developing global cold war with Washington – aided by the island’s president and his solidarity with the non-aligned movement. Makarios, with characteristic deftness, had tested the Cold War’s diplomatic waters and had the efficacy of his balance-of-power maneuvers confirmed. The Ball mission now shifted its charge from an acknowledgement of U.S. concerns for Cyprus’s problems to a race against time to resolve the crisis before it became a foreign policy disaster.

Ball’s mission commenced in mid-February 1964 amidst a tenser-than-ever situation on the ground. Relations between Greece and Turkey were at a nadir that called to mind the prelude and aftermath of the 1955 pogrom, with Athens charging that Ankara was planning an invasion of Cyprus and Turkey continuing to advocate partition of the island (rightly viewed by the Greeks as a violation of the Treaty of Guarantee). And Cyprus itself reeled in turmoil, its parliament’s Turkish minority having walked out just weeks before, the remaining members legislating only in the interest of the island’s Greek population and insisting that negotiations over the future of the Republic could take place only if Ankara relinquished its rights, under the recently concluded Treaty of Guarantee, to intervene in Cypriot affairs.106

Ball flew to Nicosia on February 13 and immediately launched into heated discussions with Makarios about the necessity of a Cyprus peacekeeping force. As the tentative armistice occasioned by the London conferences broke down across the island, which Ball called “a battlefield” marked by “a pervasive atmosphere of imminent crisis,” the Under Secretary and the

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archbishop waged their own series of battles. In the meetings, Makarios insisted that he would consider the issue of an international force at a later date; for the time being, his efforts would focus instead on procuring a U.N. Security Council resolution that would reaffirm “the territorial integrity and political independence of Cyprus.” Ball, who considered the proposed postponement “criminally foolhardy” in light of the escalating violence and resultant regional tension, “told off Makarios and his extremist ministers in a manner unfamiliar to diplomatic discourse.” Several hours of conversation resulted in a stalemate, and Ball left Cyprus convinced that the only way to effectively deal with the crisis was a negotiated settlement involving Athens and Ankara, but not Nicosia.107 In his view, Makarios was neither liberator nor crusader, but a dangerous, volatile power center in an already unpredictable situation. Neutralism had found a foothold in the eastern Mediterranean, and the memory of recent reversals at its hand convinced Ball that its advance had to be stopped decisively.108

LBJ agreed. The president had firsthand experience with Makarios from a visit to Cyprus he had taken as vice president in 1962, when the archbishop had first used Cypriot neutrality as a bargaining chip in relations with the West.109 By the conclusion of Ball’s mission, Johnson saw that the only hope for a peaceful end to the situation on the island was in weakening Makarios. To this end, on February 20 the president dispatched telegrams to Prime Ministers Ismet Inönü of Turkey and George Papandreou of Greece in which he emphasized the necessity of Greco-Turkish partnership in order to preserve the stability of NATO and save the worsening situation on Cyprus. In typical Johnson fashion – and signaling the dawn of personal presidential and cabinet diplomacy as a key element of American conduct abroad – the president urged Inönü and

107 Ibid, Doc. 11.
Papandreou to settle their differences in pursuit of an agreement to ensure lasting, decisive peace. He extended the message especially to Papandreou, whom he perceived, by virtue of the Greek leader’s recent electoral landslide and his ostensible mandate as a competing leader representing a more mainstream Hellenic identity, as the figure most capable of restraining Makarios.

Congratulating Papandreou on his political successes and reminding him that “the common need of Greece, Turkey, the US, and the UK to stick together is paramount,” LBJ expressed his hope that Papandreou’s election, which provided him “the necessary freedom of action,” would result in a more productive Greek-Turkish dialogue culminating in the neutralization of the Cyprus dilemma. Johnson handled the worsening diplomatic situation in the eastern Mediterranean by impelling leaders to see past old animosities and talk out current problems, but he had misjudged the depth and severity of a crisis well beyond conventional diplomacy. Regional political realities had progressed far past the stage of formal discourse, which, in any case, would no longer do any good in the face of rapidly mounting domestic discontents in both Greece and Turkey. By this point the prospect of conclusive bilateral talks between Athens and Ankara was little more than wishful thinking, as Papandreou’s primary goal – enosis – was wholly unpalatable to İnönü. And if the Greeks conceded to discussions with the Turks, the result would inevitably be an agreement by which either side used its current influence on Cyprus – which shifted rapidly as violence ebbed and flowed on a landmass scarcely the size of the Peloponnese – to construct a settlement. In the charged climate of 1964, anything short of an all-or-nothing resolution was unthinkable. Johnson’s administration had followed in the footsteps of Eden and Eisenhower, mistaking deeply rooted ethnic intransigence for a transient issue to be mutually resolved.

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Moreover, Johnson had taken for granted that Papandreou’s government could exercise leverage over Makarios and thereby tame the more radical Cypriot contributions to Greek ethnic nationalism. Yet the reality was quite different. By Mid-February 1964, Makarios was revered not only by Greek Cypriots, but a sizable portion of the mainland Greek public. Far from a pawn to be manipulated in the service of Athens politicians, the archbishop, to many, represented a powerful voice of Hellenic nationalism and therefore posed a potent political threat to Papandreou and his party. Any move against Makarios, political or otherwise, would constitute a significant gamble, and the stakes were increasingly the hearts and minds of the Greek people.

Yet Papandreou decided to play his hand. On one point, the American president was correct: the Greek prime minister’s landslide electoral victory gave him unprecedented control over the conduct of Greek foreign policy, and he assumed that now was the time to act on the Cyprus issue. On February 26, 1964, he sent a note to Makarios insisting that the ethnarch follow Greece’s lead with respect to the island’s affairs. The Greek government would soon negotiate a Cyprus settlement that would include enosis, and for his part, Makarios would be expected to accept these conditions. In no uncertain terms, Papandreou made it clear that his brand of enosis would be mainland-driven, its progress and ultimate direction monitored, even dictated, by the Athens government. Should Makarios accept the arrangement, the age of Cypriot diplomatic independence – as well as the archbishop’s unrestrained control over the conduct of that diplomacy – would be over.111

To Makarios, such an arrangement was preposterous. Any settlement on enosis concluded in Athens would necessarily involve the Turks, and by the early spring of 1964 the Cypriot president had invested far too much political capital in the exclusion of Turkey from the

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bargaining table. Turkish antagonism, as James Miller has demonstrated, formed a key element of Makarios’s foreign policy, and the leader had shrewdly observed that the main interest of the United States lay in safeguarding NATO cohesion in the eastern Mediterranean. By inflaming the passions of both Turkish Cypriots and the government in Ankara, Makarios forced Washington to tame Turkish aggression, thereby gaining support and psychological collateral in his quest to further the aims of Greek ethnic nationalism.  

By April, U.S. diplomats in the region had come to the conclusion that Papandreou’s plans for enosis constituted the most realistic and effective way to resolve the crisis, provided that Turkey was granted a significant territorial concession in exchange. Yet such a deal proved much too bitter for Papandreou, who, aside from having nothing substantial to offer the Turks in the first place, possessed such confidence in a favorable outcome for the Greeks that it bordered on hubris. And the prime minister was not alone on this score: by the late spring of 1964, Greek public opinion would accept nothing short of unconditional enosis. Throughout April and May, Greek Cypriot-led attacks on Turkish minority members escalated, and Ankara’s patience grew thinner by the day. It seemed that Makarios’s provocations could only go so far before the delicate diplomatic balance upon which his entire strategy hinged was finally disrupted.

Push came to shove in early June. The Turks, infuriated by the wanton harassment and slaughter of Turkish Cypriots, began preparing for an invasion of the island. Alarmed, President Johnson himself directed a letter to Inonu in which he reminded the Turkish leader that any unilateral action he took with Cyprus would be unsupported by NATO. Even worse, it might encourage Soviet reprisal – and this was to say nothing of the very real possibility that a Turkish invasion would result in vicious retaliation against the Turkish Cypriot community,

112 Miller, The United States and the Making of Modern Greece, pp. 98.
which would undoubtedly be seen as collaborationist. The planned intervention never occurred. Johnson’s harsh admonishment succeeded in restraining Ankara from taking direct military action, but it was not lost on the president that Makarios had once again used American power to keep Turkey on a leash. Convinced of his ability to bring Greek and Turkish leaders together under U.S. supervision and also of the necessity of a swift settlement, Johnson moved even more forcefully throughout the late spring of 1964 to bring both countries together for renewed talks.

Turkey eagerly jumped on board. Greece, per usual, was not as enthusiastic. Johnson’s June 11 meeting with Greek ambassador Alexander Matsas proved inconclusive, with the diplomatic avoiding the idea of direct Athens-Ankara discussions and insisting that cooperation with Makarios was necessary for the time being. The same unwillingness to settle manifested itself during George Papandreou’s visit to the United States later in the month. In meetings with American officials in Washington and New York, Papandreou repeatedly shot down the U.S. suggestion of employing veteran cold warrior Dean Acheson as mediator in Athens-Ankara talks. The Greek leader insisted that such discussions were useless; and in fact, he appears to have had no reason to pursue peace at the moment, exuding the same overconfidence and using his resistance to Washington as an opportunity to enhance his image with the Greek public. By the time he left the country, the prime minister conceded only that discussions – albeit under UN and not U.S. mediation – were a possibility.

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113 “Letter from President Johnson to Turkish Prime Minister İnönü,” June 5, 1964, reproduced in Monteagle Stearns, Entangled Allies: U.S. Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus (New York: Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1992), pp. 156-159. Though the topic falls beyond the scope of this article, Johnson’s letter to İnönü represents a critical point in the study of Turkish anti-Americanism, as its forceful language and reference to U.S. aid to Turkey was seen as an attempt to bully Turkish leaders into compliance with American wishes.


115 Ibid, Docs. 126-129.
Through the remainder of the summer, such a possibility became ever more appealing to Papandreou, who, especially after an abortive attempt to secure Charles de Gaulle’s support for his intransigent Cyprus policy, increasingly found himself without allies.\textsuperscript{116} In mid-July, the Greeks agreed to participate in U.N. talks in Geneva mediated by Acheson. Like Ball and Johnson, Acheson sought an agreement involving enosis coupled with a satisfactory concession to Turkey. In the face of the aforementioned Greek opposition to any such compromises, he reminded Papandreou’s government that at least a small Turkish base on Cyprus was necessary in order to ensure the safety of the island’s increasingly marginalized and vulnerable Turkish community. After much haggling, Papandreou suggested exchanging Kastellorizon, a small Greek island in the Dodecanese, for control of Cyprus. Turkish bases there, as well as the presence of Turkish forces on Cypriot soil (albeit a contingent under a NATO flag – what Papandreou termed “NATO with a fez”) to protect the minority populations, came to be seen as acceptable compromises in order to avoid a shooting war. On the Makarios issue, Papandreou promised the neutralization of the archbishop’s excesses and his backing of the enosis-based compromise solution. When asked how such control would be achieved, the prime minister replied simply that “a Greek flag would defeat Makarios.”\textsuperscript{117}

Toward the end of July, Acheson sent to the Greek and Turkish governments a memorandum outlining the positions of either side and suggesting points of further negotiation. In a remarkably shortsighted gesture, Papandreou delivered a copy of the memo to Makarios, who was visiting Athens at the time. Immediately Makarios condemned the proposals and rebuked what he regarded as a duplicitous attempt by Washington to betray the Greek people.

\textsuperscript{117} Quoted in Miller, pp. 104.
Furthermore, and to the intense embarrassment of Papandreou’s government, the archbishop had the document published and widely disseminated. To American diplomats stationed in Greece, the entire incident seemed to prove that, despite his arrogant promises to rein in Makarios, Papandreou, and not the archbishop, was the subordinate in the relationship. Perhaps even more significantly, Makarios’s overwhelming objection to the Acheson memorandum demonstrated that the Cypriot president was committed above all to the island’s continued independence, no matter how much he echoed Papandreou’s desire for Athens-driven enosis. Papandreou had had enough. His focus now turned to engineering a coup against Makarios, after which the Acheson provisions could be enacted.

But the firestorm created by Makarios proved uncontainable. Sensing Papandreou’s domestic weakness following the archbishop’s revelation of the Acheson memorandum, Turkey hardened its line on Cyprus, demanding greater concessions in exchange for enosis. Turkish hostility once again played into the hands of Makarios, who secured both a United Nations resolution reaffirming Cypriot independence and an assurance of Soviet support if the Turks invaded. And all the while Greek Cypriot soldiers began offensives against Turkish Cypriot-occupied areas to the north of the island, further darkening the prospects of a successful settlement and thus strengthening the archbishop’s hand. Following a series of Turkish air strikes on Greek Cypriot encampments, the White House again forced the Turks to back off, and Greek Cypriot forces abandoned their assault. Acheson, rightly fearing for the future of negotiations, scrambled to convince Papandreou to offer Turkey more concessions. But the damage had already been done. The two nations had come closer to agreement than ever before only to see their hopes dashed by drifting to the brink of war. Makarios was now appealing for Soviet aid,

and Papandreou maintained that the Greek people would never accept the Acheson plan as long as it contained any hint of concessions to Turkey. The American mediator frantically reworked his proposals to accommodate these considerations, but soon came to the conclusion that crucial momentum had been lost. On August 15, he lamented the failure of his mission.\textsuperscript{119} After Johnson’s victory in the November 1964 elections, assistant secretary of state for the Middle East Lucius Battle told the president that “the problem of Cyprus will be with us for some time to come,” but noted with optimism that “… for the moment, a Greek-Turkish war has been avoided.”\textsuperscript{120} Regional stability and NATO cohesion had been achieved; this, after all, was the real victory the administration had been fighting for in the first place. But while such diplomatic triumphs were very real, assessments of their lasting significance were much too sanguine. Johnson’s diplomacy had failed to bring about a conclusive Cyprus settlement, and tensions over the island remained as hot as ever as 1965 dawned. Cautious of further entanglements in eastern Mediterranean affairs – especially as the war in Vietnam continued to escalate – the Johnson administration celebrated its survival in what had been a very close call and, in what would prove to be a fateful decision, began diverting its attentions from the Greco-Turkish situation altogether. By failing to see the stalemate over Cyprus and the growing appeal of Makarios’s struggle for what it was – a deepening ethnic dimension to the eastern Mediterranean’s crises – LBJ and his advisors missed a crucial window of opportunity, in the process stoking the fires of Greek ethnic nationalism and giving its chief exponents new fuel for their diatribes. As Greece headed into the latter half of the 1960s and toward domestic disaster, it would be the ghosts of Cyprus and the lingering ramifications of failed American intervention that tipped the nation over the edge.

\textsuperscript{119} FRUS, 1964-1968: Volume XVI, Docs. 120-124.
\textsuperscript{120} Quoted in Brands, The Wages of Globalism, pp. 84.
Domestic Deadlock, Constitutional Crisis, and the Greek Coup of 1967

By the time he won the presidency in his own right in November 1964, Lyndon Johnson had already presided over a significant period of American involvement in the eastern Mediterranean by taking an active role in efforts to resolve the Cyprus crisis. U.S. mediation, however, had failed; and a period of relaxed American policy toward Greece followed in the wake of the 1964 humiliation. Most observers would never have expected Johnson to risk another entanglement in Greek affairs, and ironically, it was precisely this lack of interference that led to the most controversial (and best-documented) aspect of the administration’s Mediterranean policy – its diplomacy in the period leading up to the Greek coup d’état of 1967.

Since the end of the civil war, the specter of communism had haunted Greece, whose political system after 1949 was marked more by instability and suspicion than by any real progress toward amnesty and recovery. KKE was banned following its defeat, and the 1950s saw a period of conservative rule that included extensive persecution of former communists. During this time the government imprisoned, tortured, and executed hundreds of leftists in terror campaigns that dwarfed those of the 1920s and 30s. Thousands fled abroad to avoid such crackdowns. The political ascendancy of the right heralded disaster for the left, which suffered a catastrophic loss of prestige in addition to the immediate traumas of postwar harassment. Until 1974, the only legal leftist party in Greece was the Union of the Democratic Left, or EDA. Illegality, however, did not beget nonexistence, and much of the turmoil that plagued Greek politics in the years after 1949 can be attributed to rightist fears of a communist resurgence, and the widely held belief that EDA was simply a front for the outlawed KKE exacerbated the situation. With the rise of two conservative prime ministers in the 1950s – Alexander Papagos

and Constantine Karamanlis – stability seemed finally to have returned to the chaotic political arena.

Karamanlis especially appeared to many Greeks to be the leader of the future. Before becoming prime minister, he had served as minister of public works, in which capacity he set into motion wide-ranging modernization programs throughout the country. While in power he also managed to reduce the influence of IDEA (the Sacred Band of Greek Officers), a rabidly anticommunist organization that represented the Greek military’s preponderant influence in politics. And Karamanlis proved able to consolidate and balance support better than any of his successors, marginalizing EDA and forming strong ties with the military while maintaining his independence from it.122 Led by an anticommunist par excellence who also proved capable of holding a moderate line and checking the excesses of the extreme right, Greece seemed bound for normalcy and prosperity.

The political and economic stability of the Karamanlis years prompted a reduction in U.S. aid to Greece. Both the Eisenhower and Kennedy administrations viewed the current Greek state of affairs as evidence that American involvement since 1947 had worked its magic; and while this new Greek “independence,” was a double-edged sword, especially when it gave rise to irredentist policies toward Cyprus and associated antagonisms with Turkey, it at least indicated the Greek people had established a cohesive, noncommunist identity. Moreover, bulwarks had appeared in Greek politics that seemed certain to crush any communist threat should it arise. EDA was enormously weakened. Communism also appeared to have little appeal for the Greek body politic, who under a comparatively conservative regime were witnessing economic revival for the first time in decades. And at the very least, American observers noted, Greece possessed a

122 Ibid, pp. 244.
formidable military apparatus supported by the Western alliance. Even if democratic lines of defense failed, a prescient U.S. security report concluded, “IDEA would undoubtedly use its influence against the formation of a government in which communists had a dangerous degree of power.”

Reassured by an interlocking conservative safety net, the United States entered a period of noninvolvement in Greek affairs, actively cooperating and compromising with the Karamanlis government while simultaneously approaching Greece according to a decidedly hands-off policy.

The parliamentary elections of 1958 shattered this American complacency. To the chagrin of Karamanlis and his U.S. allies, EDA, through the newly instated system of proportional representation, won 78 seats in parliament, becoming the leading opposition party and severely weakening the center. The resulting political crisis triggered an extended period of Greek civil unrest that enhanced the political fortunes of the centrist party EK (Enothiki Kentro, or Center Union), led by George Papandreou, and culminated in Karamanlis’s decision to resign in 1963.

Karamanlis’s resignation propelled George Papandreou to the forefront of Greek politics. In this capacity, the Center Union’s leader was able to achieve a smashing electoral triumph in February of 1964, carving out a new space for the Left, which had exercised almost no political power since 1949. As demonstrated, he also catapulted the dormant Cyprus issue into the limelight of Greek and international attention. Yet for the purposes of analyzing the lead-up to the 1967 coup, George Papandreou’s rise to power was most significant because it paved the way for his son Andreas’s domination of the country’s political scene for the next four years.

Andreas initially exhibited little of the popularity that made his father such a formidable political figure. Educated in the United States, the younger Papandreou had witnessed from a distance the upheavals of the civil war and postwar years. He thus lacked the firsthand experiences and political savvy of his compatriots – a lethal combination in the chaotic environment of the early 1960s in Greece. But even had Andreas grasped the intricacies of domestic politics, he was guilty of an even greater crime for those voicing their discontents: association with America at a time when Greek ethnic nationalism railed against perceived attachment to and dependence on the United States.

Andreas may have been a pariah, but he was quite aware of his vulnerability. He, like Makarios, also acutely sensed that his greatest weakness, a keen and personal familiarity with the United States, could be turned into a political tool. He quickly set out crafting a new image at home as the face of contemporary Greek anti-Americanism. After a brief and fruitless flirtation with the idea of using his background in the U.S. to advance his father’s political interests, Andreas shifted to attacking Washington’s interventionist policies in earnest. To the younger Papandreou, America was responsible for the current economic and social stagnation of the Greek nation after the rebound of the late 1940s and 1950s. It was the driving force behind the current political chaos, inserting itself into regional affairs when appropriate and taking its leave as soon as its own gains had materialized. And the failure of Greek diplomacy to achieve long sought-after goals was also the fault of the United States, with the 1964 Cyprus debacle only lending weight to such polemics.124

In addition to his stridently anti-American discourse, Andreas sought to shift the Greek political momentum to the “center left” by strengthening labor and youth organizations within...

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the Center Union. Citing the example of similar movements in France, Andreas maintained that such a shift would prevent communism from gaining a foothold by presenting more moderate alternatives to the radical left. Yet for the time being, any opening to the left was political suicide. Political opponents, the monarchy, and even members of EK viewed Andreas’s maneuverings with suspicion, casting them at worst as an attempt to establish a popular front with EDA and at best a destabilizing force that would deliver votes into EDA’s hands.\(^{125}\)

The U.S. may have been able to tolerate either Andreas’s attacks or his political shuffling, but the combination raised warning flags, especially as Andreas was quickly gaining popular support and seemed poised to follow in his aging father’s political footsteps. The Greek constitutional crisis of 1965, however, ensured that he went from a nuisance to a hot-button priority. The Αποστασία (“Apostasy”) of 1965 resulted from a scandal in which ASPIDA, a group of centrist Greek army officers, allegedly sought to prevent rightist domination of the military by distributing posts and promotions to members. Such nepotistic arrangements were nothing new to Greece, and the ASPIDA incident probably would have made little impact had it not been for the purported role of Andreas Papandreou in the scheme.

The reaction was quick and overwhelming. Minister of Defense Petros Garoufalias proposed the formation of a committee to investigate ASPIDA and was quickly shouted down by both Papandreous; his subsequent resignation convinced George Papandreou to succeed him, thereby assuming personal control of the army and bringing the prime minister into open conflict with King Constantine. A heated exchange developed between the two during which the king repeatedly refused to accept the elder Papandreou’s self-appointment as defense minister. Eventually Constantine suggested that the prime minister choose another individual to fill the

\(^{125}\) Ibid, pp. 53.
position, a solution Papandreou vehemently rejected. After more abortive correspondence, the prime minister threatened his resignation if his self-appointment did not receive royal recognition. When Constantine remained unyielding, Papandreou resigned. Minutes afterwards the king swore in a new prime minister, Speaker of the Parliament Georgios Athanasiadis-Novas.126

But the former leader, who soon afterwards went into exile, was far from defeated. Largely because of the rapidity with which he was replaced, George Papandreou garnered a great deal of support from the Greek public, who now saw the monarchy as hostile to any party that pursued interests different from its own. From abroad he actively participated in the Center Union’s struggle for survival, ensuring that the party remained in tense conflict with the palace. Yet even as his popularity soared he began facing significant political challenges from the most unexpected source – his upstart son Andreas. The ASPIDA scandal and subsequent governmental crisis forced Andreas to learn the ropes of Greek politics, and learn them quickly. Despite his initial maladroitness he proved more than fit for the task, rallying enormous public support by his impassioned condemnations of the out-of-touch monarchy, its military apparatus, powerful Greek economic interests, and, above all, the entrenched power of the United States. Among his demands were economic modernization and industrialization that would allow for more equitable distribution of income. The special powers of the monarchy and top economic figures would be eliminated. In matters of foreign policy, Greece would no longer answer to the Western alliance, instead pursuing its own agenda over that of NATO.

Andreas’s calls were neither novel nor shocking to the Greek people. His calls for λαοκρατία, or “people power,” combined with diatribes against the privileges of the palace and

126 Papandreou, Democracy at Gunpoint, pp. 157-176.
nationalist lambasting of the elusive yet convincing specter of “foreign intervention,” had, at one time or another, formed integral parts of his father’s rhetorical arsenal, and resonated profoundly with enormous segments of the Greek populace eager to leave behind the troubled past. But what made such demands so venomous this time around was the unprecedented instability of the political arena, coupled with the absence of any sort of stabilizing figure following the departure of George Papandreou. In such a climate, Andreas was free to use his oratorical skills to harness and organize latent Greek xenophobia, including anti-Americanism in the wake of the Cyprus crisis, into a force with political significance – but also with a significant price.\footnote{Blantas, Ανδρέας Παπανδρέου, pp. 58-60.}

By late summer 1965, Greece was at a political impasse. The prospect of reform on the Andreas Papandreou model frightened conservatives, and the more startled they became, the more they suspected Andreas of communist sympathies. Moreover, while convenient when things were going well, U.S. reluctance to intervene in Greek affairs meant that the present crisis was a problem for Greece alone. This noninterventionist pose further polarized the country’s politics, adding to the frustrations of both the right and the left, which, despite the anti-American discourses of the latter, paradoxically both felt they had been cheated out of implicit promises of support made to them by the Americans.

Despite such discontent, U.S. policymakers, remembering well their last venture into eastern Mediterranean affairs, vowed to let the problem remain a Greek one. As the political deadlock worsened throughout late 1965, the risk of a military coup increased, and on several occasions the CIA pushed for covert intervention in order to undermine Papandreou’s influence with cash before paranoid military factions destroyed it by force. Senior planners in Washington, national security adviser McGeorge Bundy chief among them, opposed such plans. Soon, Greek
politicians themselves began to request American mediation in what was fast becoming an unpredictable and uncontrollable environment. Both the palace and the Papandreous courted American officials in an attempt to use U.S. influence as leverage in negotiations between the monarchy and Center Union, with the king even going so far as to send a personal message to President Johnson. Yet the most significant exchange occurred between Andreas Papandreou and his American liaison, chargé d'affaires Norbert Anschuetz. In talks, the younger Papandreou tamed his anti-American rhetoric and assured the U.S. diplomat that any political changes made by another Center Union government would be moderate. Conceding that he may have been “imprudent,” Andreas sought to control the fires he had set and, in so doing, ensure American support for the calling of new elections.

Anschuetz proved a reluctant customer in what was, in any case, a tremendously hard sell. If the U.S. sanctioned new elections and the Center Union emerged victorious (for all intents and purposes a foregone conclusion by 1965-66), vital pro-American elements of Greek society would undoubtedly be alienated. Even these bottom-line consequences assumed Andreas would keep his word and pursue only moderate reforms. Following the Andreas-Anschuetz talks, George Papandreou hurried to reassure U.S. officials with promises that political reconciliation in Greece was possible and that conservative interests would not be endangered by a Center Union victory. By now, however, officials within the Johnson administration had made up their minds. With his leftist leanings and flagrant anti-American outbursts, Andreas was too much of a loose cannon to be protected, much less aided. From now on, “constructive influence,” not crisis resolution, would be the modus operandi of America’s Greek diplomacy.

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of perhaps the greatest threat to Greek democracy since the civil war, the Johnson administration’s chief policymakers ignored the advice of the domestic Greek forces best able to evaluate and respond to the current crises.

With the decision made to abandon both Andreas and the problems he had created, the template for complete disentanglement from the Greek political crisis seemed complete. But once again, the whirlwind pace of developments precluded such a tidy extrication. By the fall of 1966, the king had repeatedly approached U.S. ambassador Phillips Talbot to inform him of a plan, hatched by George Papandreou, to bring in an objective mediator and in the meantime install a temporary, nonpolitical government. Talbot equivocated. The scheme reeked of an attempt to draw the United States further into an impetuous political vortex in order to advance the interests of one side over the other. But further developments seemed to confirm that Greece was indeed ready for stability. On September 29, George and Andreas Papandreou, finally eschewing their characteristic equivocation, directly requested that American officials serve as mediators in discussions with Constantine. Again they vowed that the Center Union would avoid forming a coalition with EDA, upheld the promise of a nonpolitical interim government throughout the negotiation period, and pledged their support for NATO and Greece’s role within the alliance.131

For once, both sides’ commitment to cooperation seemed legitimate. Investigations into the ASPIDA scandal had all but cleared Andreas, and major political leaders on both the right and the left were ready to make concessions to avoid a military putsch. Yet at another crucial juncture, and in full view of a settlement process, the Americans backed and filled. Andreas’s exoneration, rather than clearing the ASPIDA issue from the political docket, had

131 Paraskevopoulos, Άνδρεας Παπανδρέου, pp. 42-44.
catapulted the younger Papandreou into hero status with his party. His popularity greater than ever before, the right feared that the sudden power shift in his favor would tempt the Center Union to abandon plans for negotiation, or even more likely spark a coup led by fearful rightists.\textsuperscript{132} Such concerns were well founded. The CIA continued to issue troubling reports indicating profound discontents in the military, noting that right-wing elements of the Center Union’s opposition were increasingly considering installing an “extra-parliamentary government.”\textsuperscript{133} Seeking to avoid calamity while maintaining a minimum of intervention, the United States pushed George Papandreou and the palace to reach an immediate deal on their own. The long-awaited arrangement came on December 18. With a plan for the establishment of an interim government under John Paraskevopoulos, a politician supported by both the Center Union and its opposition, and the calling of new elections after another election law had cleared the legislature, Greece appeared, at long last, to have averted political catastrophe.\textsuperscript{134}

With stability at hand, ambassador Talbot expressed his belief that the crisis was over and that American concerns could now be put to rest. And such would have been the case if not for the continued brazenness of Andreas Papandreou, who found himself shortchanged by a deal his father had brokered without consulting him. Andreas had simply invested too much in spirited opposition to the monarchy to let the issue die. His intensifying invective terrified the palace, which saw the younger Papandreou as both an obstacle to the recently concluded settlement and a rallying pole around which a shattering Center Union victory could be organized in the upcoming elections. Despite such concerns, American observers in-country believed a return to normalcy was around the corner, and consequently rejected increasingly radical palace appeals

\textsuperscript{132} Miller, 128.
\textsuperscript{134} Spyridon Markezinis, Συγκροτή Πολιτική Ιστορία Της Ελλάδας (Modern History of Greece; 3 volumes) (Athens, 1994), Volume 3, pp. 136-150.
for assistance. When asked if the U.S. would support extra-parliamentary measures in a January 28, 1967 meeting with Constantine’s political chief Dimitrios Bitsios, CIA station chief Jack Maury maintained that “U.S. reaction would be extremely unfavorable.”

Ambassador Talbot likewise sought to prevent a drastic turn of events. On February 11 he approved a CIA plan, to be sent to Washington for review, for a “limited covert political operation” that would entail providing “support for certain competitive elements” in order to reduce the gravity of the almost-certain Center Union electoral victory. The success of the plan would result in the strangulation of both the Center Union and Andreas Papandreou, forcing the party into a moderating coalition, injuring the politician’s image with his followers, and calming the passions of both sides in the crisis. In so doing, it would steer Greece back onto the track of stability rather than allowing its continued slide into a confrontation with despotism.

Washington proved unsympathetic. Particularly in light of the escalating hot war in Vietnam – a commitment fast consuming both America’s military and moral resources – a digression in Greece, as with anywhere else, was a prospect to be avoided. Greater European troubles, too, filled the docket of global disturbances: the aftermath of Charles de Gaulle’s 1966 withdrawal of French forces from NATO’s integrated command structure, as well as the tremendous effort required by Washington to stabilize global economic networks in the midst of Britain’s sterling crisis, drew critical attention away from the impending disaster for Greek democracy. Misgivings at the highest levels of policymaking, moreover, mirrored the vacillation of officials like Talbot. In meetings held by the National Security Council’s 303 committee on covert operations, chairman Walt Rostow expressed his doubts that the nature of Andreas’s threat merited such meddling in Greek politics, citing “other examples of leftists settling down

\[135 FRUS, 1964-1968: Volume XVI, Doc. 251.\]
\[136 Ibid, Doc. 255.\]
after an election.” Cyrus Vance and State Department representative Foy Kohler shared Rostow’s reservations. On March 14, Secretary of State Rusk rejected the CIA plan, supplying his belief that “the possible political gain is outweighed by security risks… if the dual-national Greek-Americans are concerned about the prospects and if $200-300,000 will make the difference, they should have no trouble raising that sum themselves without involving the United States.”137 The fate of democracy in Greece had been subordinated to official doubts and other international dilemmas.

Throughout the late winter and early spring of 1967, American officials stood back while Greek tensions moved further and further to the boiling point. On March 17 George Papandreou met with Talbot and voiced his concerns about a reactionary “junta” that was putting pressure on the king to suspend the constitution. The American ambassador confirmed that a conspiracy indeed existed, but took care to note that there existed “no evidence that [the] army leadership is actually plotting to create conditions leading to a deviation from [the] constitution.” The most important factor in the coming days, continued Talbot’s report to Washington, was “[the] attitude of [the] king,” who was frantically seeking a politician with whom he could draw up plans for the formation of a coalition government that would ensure a stable transition from the interim government under Paraskevopoulos. Such a man seemed to arrive in the figure of Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, who on April 3 achieved Constantine’s approval for a government in which he would serve as prime minister.138

But even as Kanellopoulos and the king sought to hold the line, forces beyond their control had decided to carry out plans of their own. Since 1964 the CIA station in Greece had known of a military conspiracy involving a group of Greek army officers led by Colonel George

137 Ibid, Doc. 261; Maury, “Greek Coup.”
138 Ibid, Doc. 264.
Papadopoulos. For three years the conspirators had held posts at various points in the country, and due to this geographic separation had been unable to coordinate their actions and seize power. By April 1967, however, they had all returned to posts in the capital, and from there surveyed the fragmented political scene. To the conspirators, the time for negotiations had long passed. Any elections would result in spontaneous violence leading to another civil war or in a victory for Andreas Papandreou and thus a communist takeover. After Kanellopoulos’s appointment on April 3, the die was cast. Papadopoulos and his collaborators settled on the early morning hours of April 21 – a day when several influential political figures, including the Papandreous, would be in Athens – to carry out their plans.139

Sensing the impending danger, Constantine held frantic conferences with Talbot on April 9. The young monarch reminded his interlocutor of Greece’s integral role in NATO and the damage Andreas Papandreou represented to the cohesion of that alliance. He also sought a straightforward profession of the American position, to no avail. Yet Constantine was scared, and Talbot knew it. Much too late, the U.S. ambassador realized the reality of the dire situation in Greece. “We share,” he wrote, “[the] king’s fear that events in Greece [are] approaching [the] climax,” but added “we have found little taste for compromise in any quarter.”140 But Talbot and the king were quite alone in their views. George and Andreas Papandreou habitually downplayed the danger of a coup, resting sure in their belief that even if such a drastic turn of events seemed to be on the horizon, U.S. intervention would prevent it.141 Washington, too, was reluctant to whip itself into hysterics over the possibly of a putsch. On April 20, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Lucius Battle ordered Talbot to present George Papandreou with an

140 Quoted in Miller, pp. 133.
141 Blantas, pp. 67.
American plan for final negotiations with Constantine; in the event of further complications, Talbot was to serve as a mediator.\textsuperscript{142} Obviously, policymakers in the states had finally reached the conclusion that some measure of overt U.S. involvement was merited, to calm the strained nerves of the palace if for no other purpose. Again, they believed diplomacy would do the trick. In a tragically ironic twist, the United States had opted to extend a hand to the preservation of Greek democracy just as the iron fist of an indigenous conspiracy moved to crush it.

In the early morning hours of April 21, 1967, Papadopoulos and his fellow officers carried out the long-expected coup. Tanks barricaded strategic areas of the capital, ensuring that no major resistance could be mounted. Politicians and military leaders suspected of harboring left-wing sympathies were arrested. The colonels even managed to convince the Commander-in-Chief of the Army, Gregorios Spandidakis, to activate a NATO contingency plan, formulated to be put into action in the event of a communist coup, allowing special forces units to seize control of the Greek Defense Ministry. Soon thereafter, the royal palaces, parliament building, and scores of communications stations fell to the coup leaders, and numerous political figures were arrested. By six in the morning, the country was under the control of a military dictatorship that would hold power for the next seven years.

During the early hours of April 22, following probably the most momentous day of his diplomatic career, Talbot lamented the events that had taken place: “So far as I perceive we have now completed reportage of the day of the rape of Greek democracy. I am certain that Greece will long rue this day’s events, whose long range effects are hard to foresee.”\textsuperscript{143} The ambassador could not have guessed how prophetic his remarks would prove to be in the coming decades. The

\textsuperscript{142} Miller, pp. 134.
\textsuperscript{143} Ibid, Doc. 277.
Johnson administration had in the Cyprus crisis of 1964 encountered the most open opportunity yet for the exercise of American power toward the goal of Greco-Turkish reconciliation. In a great and ultimately tragic irony, its actions – nominally driven by concerns of democracy promotion for democracy’s sake and by accurate perception of ideological problems – had failed to take account of the true nature of the problem, and contributed profoundly to the political deadlock that culminated in the end of Greek democracy altogether. The military junta represented the capstone of an extended period of Greek political strife that began with the resurgence of the center in 1963 and came to the forefront with the 1965 Αποστασία. It would forever alter the way Greeks discussed, analyzed, and even remembered their past. And, as we will see, it would become, by virtue of its powerful direct and indirect ties with U.S. Cold War diplomacy, a wellspring of anti-American sentiment that has yet to run dry, and that has taken its place alongside other historic discontents in the modern Greek xenophobic lexicon.

Richard Welch had long sought to unravel Greece’s complexities. As a Harvard undergraduate, his courses in classics exposed him to the nation’s rich history and linguistic traditions – and his proficiency at the latter attracted the attention of the U.S. government, who recruited him into the CIA following his graduation in 1951. It was only fitting that the gifted classicist’s first posts should be in Athens and Cyprus, where he distinguished himself as a deeply knowledgeable area specialist before moving to senior intelligence roles in Latin America. After the fall of the Greek junta, Welch’s expertise was sought to provide much-needed strategic perspective on events in Athens, and he reassumed his erstwhile post as station chief at the end of 1974. Yet his second post in Greece was to be tragically short. Two days before Christmas 1975, a group of armed men, sympathetic to anti-American Marxist terrorist organization Revolutionary Organization 17 November, followed Welch and his wife home in a stolen Simca. As one restrained Welch’s wife, another fired a fatal shot at the station chief from a close-range .45 caliber pistol. “It was a symbolic assassination,” in the words of a post-incident report by Laurence Stern, himself a classicist, historian, and keen observer of contemporary Greece. “It could have been anyone in the American establishment.”

The Welch assassination – the first of a CIA agent – caused severe disruption and internecine strife within the agency. William Colby, its director, broke character in stridently condemning security lapses within the organization and publicly mourning the loss of a senior officer. But the killing also cast into high relief the changing international currents of the 1970s. While terrorism and politically inspired murder would each emerge as especially jarring evidence of globalization’s disruptive potential, they joined a litany of other global disturbances

that illuminated the new interconnections – often unwillingly forged – between modern states. The Seventies would see erstwhile empires and superpowers alike challenged from within by restive minority groups and from without by former colonies, who now used their global voices, natural resource reserves, and non-aligned status to disrupt great power grand strategy. Heretofore-underdeveloped nations or areas recently defeated in wartime would recover their economic dynamism and exert newfound influence over the comings and goings of international finance. And the decade would witness the rise of non-state actors – especially dissident and reformist voices, carrying messages of liberation often forged through global linkages – that had unprecedented impacts upon international relations. In the 1970s, a full picture of the global arena could no longer be painted with the traditional palette of statecraft. Decades-old understandings of the world’s diplomacy were, for the first time, being tested as new power centers emerged. Human rights, environmentalism and – as 1968 had powerfully shown – domestic protest respected few nation-state boundaries, and had the potential to transcend altogether the crumbling bipolar order the superpowers had created.145

Such developments affected the shape of grand strategy across the globe, and nowhere was this truer than in the eastern Mediterranean, where traditional Cold War paradigms and assumptions were challenged and often abandoned altogether. The period of the Greek junta coincided with a time of transition within U.S. foreign policy circles, as the superpower faced new challenges in Latin America, the Middle East, and Africa alongside its ongoing crisis in Vietnam. Faced with competing strategic priorities that spanned the globe, Washington could no longer spend its increasingly stretched energies on disputes it regarded as tangential – and distracting – to the overriding pursuit of NATO stability. Domestic turmoil, too, reoriented

145 The best account of the 1970s remains Niall Ferguson, Charles S. Maier, Erez Manela et. al., eds., *The Shock of the Global: The 1970s in Perspective* (Belknap, 2011), from which this chapter’s title derives its name.
American strategy, as a beleaguered Nixon administration struggled to manage crises abroad while its legitimacy at home crumbled. The result was a failure of diplomacy in the eastern Mediterranean that resulted in the rupture of the long-standing Cyprus dispute. In the face of the greatest threat to regional stability since the Suez Crisis, American policymakers proved unwilling to intervene decisively and forestall Turkish aggression. In the aftermath of Ankara’s 1974 invasion of Cyprus, Washington watched with growing alarm as events in the Persian Gulf, the Middle East, and Africa threatened its regional supremacy – while remaining largely ignorant of the profound sociological and psychological changes occurring nearby in eastern Mediterranean societies. Nixon’s successors, though more willing to take an active role in the region’s affairs, likewise faced too many items on the global docket to exercise true leadership. For its part, the Soviet Union expressed little interest in the eastern Mediterranean, preoccupied instead by internal dissent, the return of competition with the United States and, by the end of the 1970s, a costly war in Afghanistan that would put on full display the limits of superpower adventurism.146

But while the superpowers’ strategic shifts furnished the international environment in which the eastern Mediterranean navigated the 1970s, deep changes, long brewing in the region’s societies, had the greatest impact upon the cadences of everyday Greek, Turkish, and Cypriot life. Domestically, the eastern Mediterranean Seventies were a period of sociocultural ferment driven from above by regime change and globalization, but also, and profoundly, by the actions of indigenous populations and their quest for new identities. Emerging from dictatorial rule, Greeks embraced newly reinstated political organizations, took opportunities provided by

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146 The best monograph on the “global Cold War,” especially the conflict’s globalization throughout the 1970s, is Odd Arne Westad, *The Global Cold War: Third World Interventions and the Making of Our Times* (Cambridge, 2006).
institutional support for social mobility and individual economic dynamism, and participated in a newly open sphere for public discourse. The reinstatement of democracy allowed political voices demanding a critical rereading of the past, and in such an environment, pre-junta cultural institutions came under intense scrutiny. Greek civic culture also became highly critical of the paths that had brought Hellenic civilization to its current position, and popular sentiment, articulated and supported by the new establishment, turned toward mass politicization. By the end of the decade, most Greeks had begun to question legitimacy claims long held by key institutions of Greek life, opting instead for new readings of the national past – and visions of the national future – that returned to the traditional emphasis upon the uniqueness of Greece’s civilization and provided new avenues for its course through the future.

Turks throughout the 1970s likewise sought new national direction in the wake of turmoil. But stability was not so easy for Greece’s eastern neighbor to achieve after a 1971 military coup d’etat, and interim governments – formed by coup leaders acutely aware of the Greek junta’s domestic crises across the Aegean, and careful to heed their lessons – dominated Turkish politics until the middle of the decade. But the provisional governments were ultimately succeeded not by a single leader capable of mobilizing broad popular support for reconstruction and reconciliation, in the mold of Greece’s Karamanlis, but rather by a coalition of rightist forces that only intensified left-right conflicts. With partisan strife frequently boiling into the realms of widespread riots, assassinations, and targeted terrorist activity, the military – ever-present guardians of Atatürk’s reformist legacy – concluded that only decisive intervention in the political sphere could safeguard Turkey’s future. The resulting effects on Turkish culture and society would set the stage for the country’s path through the 1980s.
Both the Greek and Turkish nations during the 1970s therefore dealt with the many changes of regime transition. And both societies had to learn the “grammar of a system of competing power blocs,” to use the phrase of Henry Kissinger, as globalization coexisted with and often overrode the processes of European integration and the protection of Atlantic alliance cohesion as the key shapers of the region’s foreign policy. Ultimately, the societies of the eastern Mediterranean proved to be adept students. The 1970s, in the words of Daniel Sargent, “opened dilemmas that would define a post-Cold War era, dilemmas whose persistence into the twenty-first century made manifest the failures of decision-makers during the 1970s to remake the international order in order to master the dilemmas of their own – and our own – times.” As U.S. presidents and Soviet statesmen alike confronted a changing geopolitical arena in which old directives of Cold War strategy were no longer relevant, their responses to such dilemmas yielded mixed results. The promise of détente wilted by the end of the decade with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan – proving in no uncertain terms that neither Washington nor Moscow was any longer the arbiter of global politics. America’s will to extend its influence across the globe, though soon to be reborn under Reagan, similarly suffered grave defeats with the rise of terrorism and the Iranian Revolution of 1979. But while both Western and communist bloc policymakers responded to the shock of the global in fits and starts, the eastern Mediterranean, like societies elsewhere now emerging from long acquiescence to great power demands, harnessed the power of changes in the international order, using them as springboards for cultural self-assertion and for the coalescence of new identities as old regimes – and rituals of nationhood – faded into history.

The Strategic Turns of the Seventies

All states had to adapt to the rapid changes of the 1970s. But it was the superpowers that faced the greatest trials in navigating the changed global arena. This was the case particularly for Washington, where Richard Nixon’s accession to the U.S. presidency in January 1969 came at a time of great national turmoil. American involvement in Vietnam was entering its fourth year, and had reached peak costliness, with more than three hundred servicemen dying per week. The domestic economic and sociocultural ramifications of the war combined with civil rights issues and an active student movement threatened to tear the nation apart, as widespread protests and political disturbances underpinned a pervasive sense of malaise. The years of Lyndon Johnson had opened up rifts in the body politic; it was incumbent upon his successors to take on the monumental tasks of resolving and then healing those divisions. “In these difficult years,” the new president reflected in his inauguration speech, “America has suffered from a fever of words; from inflated rhetoric that promises more than it can deliver; from angry rhetoric that fans discontents into hatreds; from bombastic rhetoric that postures instead of persuading. We cannot learn from one another until we stop shouting at one another, until we speak quietly enough so that our words can be heard as well as our voices.”

In foreign policy, Nixon likewise promised changes in American conduct, especially regarding the increasingly divisive Vietnam War. Pledging to deliver “peace with honor,” he and his diplomatic team embarked upon new policies premised upon classic balance-of-power considerations and careful triangulation of interests between great powers, all calculated to bring Hanoi – and any other geopolitical opponents – to the negotiating table on terms favorable to Washington. The administration’s approach to foreign policy bore no resemblance to its

148 UPI, 1969 in Review.
aspirations for domestic bridge building. Instead, the president and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger pioneered a new style of policymaking in which executive prerogative and personal management served as the primary levers of statecraft. By keeping the conduct of diplomacy lean, and often secretive, the Nixon-Kissinger team could confront the new challenges of globalization just as they emerged: swiftly, nimbly, and flexibly. Such a policy, in the view of its chief architect, was simply a dictate of changing international realities. As Kissinger argued, the United States could no longer operate on the same principles of existential threat vis-à-vis the communist world that had driven earlier policies. It now had to respond to a world drastically changed, one in which “the hallmark, today, of relations among states, even among continents, is interdependence rather than independence.”

In practice, the Nixon-Kissinger relationship hinged largely upon the deeds of the latter, and Kissingerian diplomacy fully embraced the new opportunities of flexibility and strategic versatility. The secretary of state adeptly grasped the changed drivers of global politics in the form of popular discontents, shifting poles of economic power, and the rise of transnational forces, his official communications rich with multifaceted analysis of the interconnections between seemingly disparate global events. And, despite his many critics, Henry Kissinger’s diplomatic achievements as national security advisor, then secretary of state reflected both a powerful understanding of traditional balance-of-power statecraft and a preternatural sense for their application to a changed world. In East and Southeast Asia, Kissinger worked assiduously to effect a settlement to the long-running Vietnam conflict, playing the delicate dynamics of Sino-Soviet rivalry in pursuit of an end to the war. The NSA, controversially, demonstrated the

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150 For the best biography on Kissinger, see Walter Isaacson, Kissinger: A Biography (Simon & Schuster, 2005); Kissinger’s own memoirs, White House Years, also offer invaluable insight into the diplomat’s worldview and decision-making.
value of a tacit Sino-American alliance by supporting Pakistan, a key ally of the People’s Republic of China, during the Bangladesh Liberation War of 1971.\footnote{151}

For Moscow, the rise of discontents within the communist bloc and the maturation of a Sino-American thaw in the late 1960s and early 1970s signaled new threats, many of which required new responses and global engagements to circumvent. And international pressure on the Soviet Union had in any event rarely been higher than in the early years of the Seventies. The suppression of the Prague Spring in 1968 shocked observers on both the left and the right who had placed hope in the promise of détente, and Leonid Brezhnev’s eponymous doctrine claiming Soviet rights of interference to prevent the endangerment of socialist regimes foreshadowed an era of increased involvement in protecting and expanding the domains of international socialism. Much of this involvement naturally originated in the Third World. Under the ambit of Andrei Gromyko, Minister of Foreign Affairs for nearly three decades, from 1957 to 1985, the Soviet state actively pursued aid and training initiatives in developing nations, with the prominent example of Cuba often overshadowing equally influential involvements in regions as far-flung as southern Africa, the Persian Gulf, and the Indian subcontinent.\footnote{152}

And, just as with Kissinger, much of Gromyko’s diplomacy unfolded according to personal predilections, which in turn reflected earlier convictions gained during his first years in Soviet diplomatic realms, neither misguided nor incorrect, that the United States actively sought containment and circumscription of the Soviet Union’s sovereign conduct of foreign policy. But though his views of American motivations may have been premised on outdated perceptions, Gromyko’s sensitivity to emergent arenas of superpower competition in the 1960s and 1970s had


\footnote{152}{The best source on Gromyko’s foreign policies remain his \textit{Memoirs} (Doubleday, 1990).}
much to do with the same sets of concerns facing Washington – new power centers, power alignments, and transnational forces across the globe.

The aggregate effect of all such influences upon American and Soviet policy was what I will term distraction by attention – the tendency to overlook traditional strategic theaters through increased, sustained, and often obsessive attention to emergent ones. It was a variation on strategic patterns that had characterized the Cold War confrontation from its very beginning, when American and British strategy fixated on the notion of a communist monolith as the expense of accurately diagnosing ethnic and nationalist movements bearing no allegiance to the international communist bloc. But the emergence of new international concerns did not spell a turn away from old perceptions of major threats and opportunities. As Niall Ferguson has demonstrated, Soviet-American rivalry, despite the initial promises of détente, remained the central focus of both superpowers’ global policies during the 1970s. Both powers’ turn outward to new global commitments represented departures from prior areas of focus – but this did not translate to paradigm shifts in overarching priorities. The United States still sought to contain the Soviet monolith wherever it emerged – and developing states’ flirtations with Marxist developmental models to many represented a dramatic surge in Moscow’s international influence. Likewise, the Soviet Union continued holding out moral, economic, and military support to regimes in the developing world whose path into modernity intersected with opportunities for the extension of Marxism. Perhaps nowhere were such distractions clearer than in the eastern Mediterranean, stalemated by the strictures of dictatorship and by the intransigence of regional powers.

The Globalization of Greco-Turkish Disputes

In the eastern Mediterranean, superpower distraction ultimately ended the Greco-Turkish stalemate over Cyprus, but not by way of the long-sought settlement favorable to regional stability. Instead, the last years of the Athens junta saw the issue dramatically escalated, as it emerged from tense stagnation with the explosive actions of Greek militant nationalism on the island. When Turkey invoked the Treaty of Guarantee to forcibly bring about a solution, the United States chose to restrain its hand, with Washington’s strategic focus on the Middle East and its crucial relationship with Ankara demanding a light response. But these were not the only forces in play during the decade. Indeed, the enduring developments of the eastern Mediterranean Seventies stemmed in large degree from a confluence of domestic political rebirth and changing international circumstances.

The Johnson administration’s diplomatic efforts had done nothing to prevent either the suspension of democracy in Greece or the escalation of Greco-Turkish tensions over Cyprus. With the failure of a second American attempt at mediation on the island in 1967, the issue entered a new period of stagnation. The accession of the Athens junta in April of that year contributed to a lessening of tensions in the immediate term, as the new dictator made it clear, despite the regime’s virulent nationalist rhetoric, that peace with Turkey would be his modus operandi toward Cyprus. Yet peace, though welcome for the island’s beleaguered inhabitants, led no closer to a definitive solution, and as Cypriots neared their first full decade of independence, their ethnic divisions – as well as the determination of each community to see through a satisfactory settlement – had grown more conspicuous than ever before. “Even my brief visit to Cyprus was depressing with respect to the Turkish Cypriot predicament,” reported Robert Komer, the U.S. ambassador to Turkey, in a May 1969 memorandum.
The Greek sector’s economy is booming, while the Turk Cypriots stagnate barricaded in their enclaves. The growing economic disparity between the two communities is even more visible. Despite this, I see little give among the Turkish community in Cyprus or their backers in Ankara… indeed… the greater the economic disparity the more determinedly the Turk Cypriots would insist on the full measure of their rights.  

Intercommunal intransigence, however, belied powerful intracommunal rivalries. Terroristic violence on both sides had posed problems since the days of EOKA’s counterinsurgency campaigns, but by the beginning of the 1970s its tempo had increased markedly, with more than two hundred assassinations in 1970 alone. The Turkish minority, frustrated by a lack of concrete achievements on Cyprus, had already broken with Ankara over numerous issues, a trend accelerated with the appointment of Rauf Denktash as leader of the Turkish Cypriot community in 1973. Concerned over the likely ramifications of intensified violence toward the island’s Turks, Denktash throughout the year increasingly pushed for autonomous control over Turkish forces on Cyprus, further straining relations with Ankara.

Frictions within the Greek Cypriot community proved even more divisive. Archbishop Makarios had sensed the unviability of enosis in the wake of Turkey’s increased involvement in the island’s affairs throughout the 1960s. By the end of the decade, he had abandoned any dreams of union with Greece in favor of a more “attainable” solution that could accommodate the indisputable reality of Turkish influence on Cyprus, as well as safeguard Cypriot sovereignty against the machinations of either Athens or Ankara – not to mention Washington or London. But Makarios’s views were at odds with influential figures in the Greek Cypriot community, who rose to protest – often violently – what they saw as an insufferable affront to the cause of Hellenism. Chief among these was EOKA’s former leader, George Grivas. Recalled from  

Cyprus by Athens in 1967, Grivas had spent the intervening years watching with growing contempt as Makarios tempered and ultimately jettisoned his once-radical support for enosis. By 1971, Grivas had become convinced that the archbishop represented not only a step backward for Hellenism, but a roadblock to Greece achieving its future destiny. Under cover, and with the tacit support of Athens, Grivas returned to Cyprus in late 1971 to form EOKA-B, a successor organization to the guerrilla outfit he had formed sixteen years earlier.156

EOKA-B never enjoyed the broad support of its predecessor. The absence of a visible colonial aggressor in the mold of the British, exhaustion from a full decade of intercommunal conflict, and the quite accurate perception of Grivas as an agent of the Athens colonels all contributed to apathy on the part of Greek Cypriots. Lack of widespread backing, however, did not prevent sudden and violent action by EOKA-B or its sympathizers. As early as March 1970, the terroristic inclinations of enosis hardliners went on full display when Makarios narrowly escaped death after his helicopter was shot down over Nicosia. Pro-enosis and anti-Makarios sentiment also came from the Greek Orthodox Church itself, where three of the island’s bishops in March 1972 openly broke with the archbishop by calling for his resignation as President of the Republic at the Holy Synod. Embattled, Makarios took fateful steps to cement his wavering legitimacy, bolstering the strength of his personal militia in the months following the Cypriot Church’s “ecclesiastical coup.”157 But for all its potential to explode again into violence, the Cyprus crisis, by the dawn of 1974, had stalled, mired in the inertia of intercommunal tension. It would take George Grivas’s death in January of that year, as well as a series of dramatic actions by the junta leadership in Athens, for it to emerge again as a flashpoint of hot conflict.

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156 James Ker-Lindsay, *The Cyprus Problem*, pp. 49-53.
157 Ibid.
The Crisis Explodes: The Long Summer of 1974

After Grivas’s death, control of EOKA-B shifted to the regime in Athens, which was facing its own formidable challenges of legitimacy. Attempts at liberalization throughout 1973 by junta leader Papadopoulos had backfired tremendously, culminating in the disastrous uprising of November 17, 1973, in which military forces slaughtered 24 students and civilians following staged anti-dictatorship demonstrations at Athens Polytechnic University. The uprising galvanized Greek public opinion, already turning against the junta, into active resistance. It also led Dimitris Ioannidis, head of the military police and a former junta hardliner, to stage his own successful coup against Papadopoulos on November 25 to stave off an outright regime collapse.

Ioannidis’s foreign policy differed drastically from that of his predecessor. The new leader eschewed caution on the Cyprus issue, vociferously denouncing the “communistic” machinations of Makarios (whom he termed “the Red Priest”) and placing assertive movements toward enosis at the top of Greek diplomatic priorities. U.S. ambassador Henry Tasca, sensing that Ioannidis’s regime sought to engage in dangerous and destabilizing adventurism, issued repeated warnings to Washington about the likely actions of the new Athens leadership, suggesting an immediate drop in military aid levels and the adoption of a public pro-democracy and pro-Karamanlis stance. Kissinger rebuffed such requests. “All elements of the mission should stay out of the domestic maneuverings now going on in Greece,” the secretary of state counseled. “The mission should monitor developments, not participate in them.”

But developments on the ground, as Tasca well knew, were moving so quickly and with such intensity that non-involvement was a virtual impossibility. Keenly aware of the regime’s weakness and fearing for their personal futures, hundreds of Greek army officers in the early

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158 Quoted in Miller, The United States and the Making of Modern Greece, pp. 173.
months of 1974 scrambled to secure economic and political safety in the event of Ioannidis’s ouster, with many fleeing abroad. The increasing politicization of the officer corps and the hemorrhaging of the dictator’s core support group, warned the British ambassador, boded ill for the regime’s stability, which was in any case severely jeopardized by growing expressions of popular discontent. Concerned by rumors that the CIA had supported the coup against Papadopoulos – in all likelihood, concocted by Ioannidis to cement his tenuous rule – Tasca continued to plead for direct American involvement to forestall another calamitous turn of events in the eastern Mediterranean. On March 20, 1974, in a meeting with Kissinger and senior State Department officials in Washington, the ambassador made his case for a U.S.-supported return to democratic governance, arguing that only active promotion of the dictatorship’s fall could preserve vital American interests in the region from being shattered by a Greco-Turkish war. Again, Kissinger was unmoved. The question of democracy in Greece, in the secretary’s view, was unrelated to the potential ramifications in foreign policy: “With all respect, this issue is being put in a hopelessly abstract manner because the issue isn’t between democracy and non-democracy. We conduct foreign policy here, not domestic policy. We don’t muck around with other countries. Now before we change course, I want to hear overpowering reasons why we should.” Compatibility with the interests of American realpolitik, not concern over future crises, would continue to dictate the United States’s policies toward the Athens regime. “We work,” Kissinger concluded, “with whoever is in power as long as they are not anti-American.”

While such anti-Americanism had always been a concern for Washington, it was even more pressing in the changing environments of the 1970s, when the transatlantic superpower faced significant challenges that called into question its role as leader of the free world. The

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159 Quoted in Miller, 175.
recent oil crisis of 1973 had demonstrated the limits of American power when faced with resistance by strategically important, often non-aligned oil-rich nations determined to protect their interests in international arenas.\textsuperscript{160} The Middle East had again emerged as a key point of American focus with the Yom Kippur War, which demonstrated the growing power of Arab states – and questioned traditional assumptions about the stability of Israel’s as a Middle Eastern security bulwark – following the disastrous Six-Day War six years earlier. And all global issues – much less Cyprus, an island American administrations had heretofore considered only as an element of broader regional strategies – were lower priorities than usual for Nixon and Kissinger in the early summer of 1974.

By June of the year, the series of prolonged court battles over the Watergate scandal had boiled over into near-certain prospects for Nixon’s impeachment and conviction. Soon the controversy was tearing the administration apart. Between March and April, the president had been labeled an “unindicted co-conspirator” in the illegal plot, and by May the timing and circumstances of his exit from office, not the fact of the departure itself, was in question. Kissinger was by no means immune to the fallout. Already under popular and congressional scrutiny for his role in the overthrow of Chile’s Salvador Allende in September 1973 and under withering attack on all sides for his policies on Vietnam and détente, the secretary of state sought to extricate himself from a political spiral, especially as it seemed likely that Nixon’s successor, Gerald Ford, might opt for a less controversial replacement.\textsuperscript{161}

American distraction, then, played an essential part in the Cyprus drama that was to follow. But so did the diplomatic moves of Makarios, which displayed none of the sensitivity to


\textsuperscript{161} Ibid, 177. For more context on Kissinger’s thoughts during the presidential transition, see also Isaacson, \textit{Kissinger: A Biography}.
great powers’ international and domestic concerns they had exhibited the previous decade. Seemingly unaware of Watergate’s magnitude, the archbishop, beleaguered by ongoing opposition from pro-enosis members of the Greek Cypriot community and by the threat of military action from Athens, issued a letter to Greek president Phaedon Gizikis in which he angrily accused the Ioannidis government of recent plots against his life. Demanding the immediate removal of Greek army officers from Cyprus, Makarios stressed the profound damage that aggressive attempts on his life and leadership had wrought on the entire Hellenic community:

I am sorry to say, Mr. President, that the root of the evil is very deep, reaching as far as Athens… the national interest dictates harmonious and close co-operation between Athens and Nicosia… I do not desire [the] interruption of my co-operation with [the] Greek Government. But it should be borne in mind that I am not an appointed perfected or locum tenens of the Greek Government in Cyprus, but an elected leader of a large section of Hellenism and I demand an appropriate conduct by the National Guard towards me.\textsuperscript{162}

The archbishop had no illusions about the reaction from Athens, which he rightly anticipated would be swift and incandescent. But, as he had come to expect from years of skillful diplomatic maneuvering, the United States would intervene to prevent its clients from taking violent actions to disturb the regional status quo. He sorely miscalculated.

On the morning of July 15, Makarios returned to Nicosia from meetings in the Troodos Mountains. Shortly after arriving at the presidential palace, his guards sounded the alarm as tanks and infantry, supplied and transported by the Athens government, surrounded the complex and demanded the president’s surrender. As his bodyguard delayed the attack, Makarios fled by automobile to a nearby British sovereign base at Akrotiri, from which British forces airlifted him.

to London and safety. Ioannidis’s agents on Cyprus quickly installed Nikos Sampson, an ex-EOKA fighter and staunch supporter of enosis, as the archbishop’s successor.163

As Makarios had sensed, the only major player with the power to bring about a settlement of the situation was the United States. Yet he had not anticipated the lukewarm reaction of Henry Kissinger, whose primary concerns lay in the implications of the Cypriot coup for Soviet plans, not on Greco-Turkish relations. Fresh from shuttle diplomacy in the greater Middle East and acutely sensing the potential ramifications of a prolonged Cyprus dilemma for future Soviet influence in the area, Kissinger by May 1974 had washed his hands of any efforts to bring the Cypriot problem to a universally acceptable resolution. “Having heard Kissinger’s explanation of the U.S. position,” recalled Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, “I asked him point blank, ‘Does the U.S. government support the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, or not?’ He was evasive, but his answer boiled down to the admission that Washington would basically be happy to see the division of the island into two parts… Once again Washington was showing its indifference to the principle of non-interference in the affairs of other states, which meant nothing when set against the economic and strategic interests of the USA and NATO.”164 A division of the island, while preserving the tensions between its communities, would quarantine any further violence behind internationally sanctioned partition lines. Kissinger saw in division a way to halt any further unraveling of the Cyprus imbroglio. He would not have to wait long.

In the early hours of July 20, 1974, Turkish battalions under the command of Brigadier General Gen Tuncer came ashore on the northern tip of Cyprus, several kilometers west of the port town of Kyrenia. Greek Cypriot resistance, though substantial as Turkish forces moved inland, had by the late afternoon dissipated as word of the invasion swept the island. By

nightfall, Tuncer’s forces had gained control of over one-third of Cypriot territory, and more than 3,000 Greek Cypriot households had been abandoned. Fourteen years after the Treaty of Guarantee codified its right to do so, the Turkish government had intervened decisively to advance its national goals vis-à-vis Cyprus.\textsuperscript{165}

**Domestic Fallout in Greece: The Fall of the Junta and the Return of Karamanlis**

The invasion of Cyprus delivered a fatal blow to the already grievously injured Athens dictatorship. Within two days of the Turkish invasion, President Gizikis called an emergency meeting of old guard politicians, including Panagiotis Kanellopoulos, Spyros Markezinis, and Evangelos Averoff, to appoint a national unity government while Greece made the transition to democracy. The new provisional government contacted former Prime Minister Karamanlis, since 1963 in exile in Paris, to invite his return to power. Flying to Athens on July 24, Karamanlis assumed his erstwhile role amidst broad, nationwide television and radio coverage and cheering crowds at the international airport where he arrived. The days of the junta were over.\textsuperscript{166}

With the fall of the dictatorship, years of great domestic trial for the Greek people came to an end. Yet even the restoration of democracy, long sought after by exile politicians such as Karamanlis himself, placed problems on the horizon. The Turkish invasion had quite clearly and dramatically brought the era of American primacy in eastern Mediterranean diplomacy to an end. Washington had failed to forestall the rupture of the Cyprus crisis – and, worse, it had signaled its tolerance for decisive, violent unilateral action by the region’s actors. Disillusioned with the

\textsuperscript{165} There are no comprehensive historical accounts devoted solely to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, but among the most intriguing is Brendan O’Malley and Ian Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion* (I.B Tauris, 2001), which expertly narrates the invasion from the perspectives of Ankara and Washington and suggests – perhaps brazenly – that Kissinger and his Turkish counterparts planned the invasion years in advance of July 1974.

United States’s demonstrated unwillingness to intervene on her behalf, Greece turned inward throughout the 1970s and 1980s, convinced that the only way forward was to rely on national self-sufficiency rather than risk a future in the hands of the great powers.

Moreover, Ankara’s aggression and the lukewarm American reaction shifted long-held strategic paradigms in Athens, driving home the reality that the major threat to Greek national security was not the communist bloc, but the traditional foe to the east. National protection in this changed strategic environment emerged as a key priority of post-junta governments, and the means for achieving it were twofold. On the one hand, Greeks should exert concerted effort on the diplomatic stage to defend and advance their national interests, even if this meant running afoul of traditional alliances. Thus did Karamanlis lay the groundwork for expanded ties with the communist states of Eastern Europe, antagonizing Washington, and – as we will see – did Andreas Papandreou consciously position Greek interests as antithetical to those of the Western alliance.
On the other hand, new narratives of nationhood and national honor had to be crafted – or resurrected altogether – to guard against further foreign exploitation as Greece entered a period of post-junta reconstruction. The task required little effort. Powerful antecedents for the rebirth of ethnic nationalism already existed, stretching back to the days of the *Megali Idea* and the Asia Minor catastrophe, and the Turkish invasion gave Greeks the firmest evidence yet of a hostile outside world characterized by persistent threat to the Hellenic people and by perfidy on the part of Greece’s “allies.”

For its part, the United States, though sensitive to the gravity of such changes in the Greek political landscape, had few concerns as to the long-term status of Greece within the Western alliance. America’s failure to forestall the Turkish invasion may have been a disappointment to the Hellenic community, but as Ambassador Tasca assured the State Department in August of 1974, the damage was by no means grievous:

> During the crisis, it [the Greek body politic] has felt let down by its NATO allies which it felt could have compelled Turkey to observe its cease-fire. On the other hand, I believe when the dust settles the basic elements tying Greece to the United States and its NATO allies will be given their appropriate weight. They are a small country surrounded by hostile and potentially hostile forces. Geographically, they clearly need friends. With democracy in the process of being restored, many friends will be apparent… Our traditionally close ties with this country, and particularly its people, will prove to be strong and I believe can be decisive.\(^\text{167}\)

While Tasca had accurately identified many of the essential perceptions that would drive Greek policies in the coming period, he grossly overestimated the country’s psychological ties to the Western alliance. Under Konstantine Karamanlis and his successor Andreas Papandreou, Greek domestic and international politics entered an era of self-examination and reassertion that would set the country on new trajectories. The remainder of the 1970s would see Greece’s

\(^{167}\) *FRUS 1969-1976, XXX, pp. 80-81*
strategic direction turn outward: to Europe and the promises of supranationalism, to solidarity with regional allies who likewise sought an alternative to superpower dominion, and – most important for its subsequent history – to broader ethno-historical affinities with the Orthodox world.

**Changes in Greek Society: Metapolitefsi**

News of Karamanlis’s homecoming following a decade of self-imposed exile swept through Greece, and thousands of Athenians lined the runways and tarmacs of the airport to greet him as he arrived. In cities across the country, crowds gathered to chant in unison: “Ἐρχεται, ἕρχεται!” – “He is coming! He is coming!” The fanfare of Karamanlis’s return symbolized the momentous domestic transformations ushered in by the fall of the military dictatorship. The readiness of the Greek people, even after the trials of the junta period, to enthusiastically welcome the leadership of one of Greece’s most famous conservative elder statesmen underscored the country’s need, by the mid-1970s, to set aside decades of political strife in pursuit of national unity. Karamanlis’s promises to rehabilitate prisoners and exiles across the political spectrum, to seek economic reconstruction for the Greek nation, and to prosecute the leaders of the junta indicated the desire for a new direction forward. Far from temporary measures delivered as stopgap initiatives to forestall the outright collapse of the Greek nation, they presaged a new national zeitgeist, a reformist spirit that would come to dominate domestic Greek sociopolitical agendas throughout the post-dictatorship period. Metapolitefsi – “beyond the political,” a term observers applied to the years following the colonels’ ouster – would serve

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as a backdrop against which Greeks embarked upon the formidable tasks of reconstruction, rehabilitation, and reformation.$^{169}$

The institutional changes of metapolitefsi constituted the most dramatic restructuring of Greek society in decades. Though Karamanlis’s government would not go so far as Andreas Papandreou’s in changing the fundamental ethos of Greek society, as we will see in the next chapter, it nonetheless introduced sweeping changes in the conduct of everyday Greek life. Throughout the Karamanlis era, concerted efforts at political rehabilitation resulted in a civic sphere permitted to debate openly and widely, and official pronouncements re-legalizing leftist parties – including, crucially, the communists, outlawed since the civil war period – served as the tangible markers of this new political permissiveness. Obstacles to openness that had long pervaded Greek civil society likewise lost much of their weight during metapolitefsi – largely as a result of widespread skepticism around the long-unexamined role of the Church, the military, and even the family in modern Greek life. It was, in many senses, a precursor to the Eighties under Papandreou, when more wholesale transformations would be witnessed.

But not all changes were institutional, nor as visible. The same centrifugal international forces that had driven Soviet and American policymakers to reconsider traditional strategic paradigms during the late 1960s and 1970s likewise reshaped global societies from below, and in Greece, as elsewhere, groups skeptical of existing power arrangements turned inward to form new social organizations with growing domestic power. During metapolitefsi the conspicuous shifts in Greek life associated with Karamanlis’s reforms were accompanied by a shift toward a power social formation focused on reformation, an invisible association of everyday Greeks who

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$^{169}$ No monograph exists on the metapolitefsi period, but several edited collections have shed light on the post-junta era through synthesis of social, cultural, political and economic history. Among the best is Frederic P. Miller, Agnes F. Vandome, and John McBrewster, eds., Metapolitefsi (New York: VDM Publishing, 2009).
participated in what Dimitris Kitis has called an “anti-authoritarian chóros (space, milieu).” Within the chóros, citizens from all segments of society signaled their intentions to collectively resist the institutional trappings that had long held Greeks in a state of conservative bondage. And while previous anti-authoritarian sentiments had been articulated and channeled through party lines, the chóros of metapolitefsi effectively shifted leftist agitations and discontents from conventional settings, like the factory floor and university hall, into the streets and restaurants of mainstream Greek life.¹⁷⁰

Perhaps nowhere was this anti-authoritarian examination stronger than among youths of the extra-parliamentary left, who had lost allegiance to the Communist Party as a result of the latter’s perceived service to traditional bourgeois values. Once the primary conduit for leftist political consciousness among Greek youths, the youth wing of ΚΚΕ (Κομμουνιστική Νεολαία Ελλάδας, hereafter KNE) had throughout the dictatorship period stressed the importance of adhering to traditional Greek social values in the pursuit of a communist society, alienating those who viewed with disdain its overtures and accommodations to conservative bastions in Greek life. As a result, young Greeks increasingly adopted movements like anarchism, environmentalism, and feminism, which in turn tied leftist youth communities to global networks of new identity politics. The shared tastes, cultural artifacts, and experiences of young Greeks during metapolitefsi forged powerful community bonds within which older ideas found expression through new avenues of creation and consumption. And the post-junta Greek youth experience paralleled, materially and spiritually, paradigms seen elsewhere, especially in West

Germany and the United Kingdom. Punk rock, to take one example, served as a particularly influential pathway for political activation in Greece, with leading artists stressing the importance of preserving Greek lyrics and Greek themes as essential to conveying its proletarian roots.\textsuperscript{171}

Interrogations of traditional Greek culture extended far beyond the realm of politicized youth revolt. The legitimacy of systems that had long governed the rhythms of everyday life in Greece also came into doubt, with religious and communal practice the most notable examples. Church attendance in three villages in the Peloponnese more than halved from 1972 to 1980, a pattern paralleled in major urban areas with even greater intensity. And kinship ties, a bastion of Greek communities, lost much of their weight as new generations adopted values contrary to the conservative mores that had predominated prior to and during the dictatorship years. A survey of Athens families for the 1984 census revealed striking figures on the changing composition of family units: whereas the last census of 1978 had placed the average household size at 5.3 individuals, reflecting the prominence of extended families under a single roof, by six years later the average had fallen considerably, hovering just above 3.6. The figures were even more pronounced among younger generations, who were more than three times more likely than middle-aged Greeks to live alone or in pairs.\textsuperscript{172}

The cumulative sociological effects of such transformations are hard to quantify. But what is obvious is that throughout the 1970s Greece underwent a qualitative shift in conceptions of the self, as well as the self-within-nation, that lacked a unifying political expression but nonetheless exercised considerable influence upon the course of post-dictatorship politics.

\textsuperscript{171} Ibid, pp. 25-27.
Disparate communities of Greeks who had formerly identified with political parties across the spectrum now proved incapable of finding a single political voice. But they were part of national and international networks of shared experience. They would not have to wait long for a charismatic figure capable of uniting the anti-authoritarian amalgam into a cohesive party.

**The Turkish Seventies: Paralysis**

While Greece had felt the worst shocks of governmental deadlock and domestic discontent during the 1960s, it would be the fate of Turkey to experience such shocks the next decade. The roots of the crisis of the Seventies stretched far back, all the way to the 1950 election, which ostensibly offered the Turkish people the first democratic process in the nation’s modern history. But deeper institutional elements also contributed to the stalemate of the 1970s. Though the political tensions following the 1950 election provided the proximate cause of later disturbances, Turkish society had never been able to throw off the trappings of authoritarian rule acquired under over six centuries of Ottoman dominion. The rise of a “loyal opposition” to the ruling class, so integral a part in the rise of other successful democratic systems, never occurred in Turkey; and so the tradition of a strongman garnering enough support for effectively one-party rule, while simultaneously allowing the semblance of parliamentary democracy through the tolerance of even re-legalization of nominally opposition parties, matured. Once in power, the strongman’s party could also rely upon some general instability – ethnic disturbances on the border, a brewing regional crisis, or urban discontent – to consolidate control and purge opponents. By the end of the 1960s, the situation had produced deeply rooted intransigence on the part of Turkey’s political entities and impenetrable deadlock in the nation’s parliament. Military rule, since the founding of the Republic supported by a large segment of Turkish society
as a means to assuage such woes, had after the 1960 coup begun losing much of its luster as a solution.

But the stakes of inaction and paralysis had never been higher than in the early years of the 1970s, with groups such as the Grey Wolves engaging in numerous high-profile arsons, kidnappings, and assassinations throughout the decade. Officially named the Idealist Educational and Cultural Foundation, the Grey Wolves rose to prominence during the late 1960s by espousing radical nationalist agendas of pan-Turkic unification and anti-leftism. Though never achieving an official political expression, the Wolves’ widespread grassroots support – particularly among destitute Sunni Turks in the poorer neighborhoods of Turkey’s major cities and disgruntled students at major universities – meant its influence rose incommensurately with its representation at the polls.

Within years, the government’s tolerance of the Grey Wolves backfired as the organization grew to encompass nearly fifty thousand members. Turkey experts widely agreed that the group’s power had rapidly grown beyond the control of the state and that if left unchecked could unravel the already fragile democratic transition following the 1971 coup. Its terroristic activities, once carried out stealthily and usually targeting minor provincial officials or academics, likewise escalated as “death squads” engaged in pitched gun battles and street skirmishes with leftist militia. By 1976, the official death toll of Grey Wolves victims had risen to more than five thousand. As the strength of the left grew in response to such neo-fascist excesses, observers drew parallels with the first half of the 1960s in Greece, when deadlock had given way to dictatorship.

The strife of the Seventies represented the culmination of political conflicts between left and right that had punctuated Turkish politics for decades. But it also had much to do with the promulgation of a “threat narrative” within Turkish society, a powerful historical story of suspicion, internal betrayal, and external pressure that mirrored and coexisted with similar currents in contemporaneous Greece.\(^\text{174}\) When the breadth and intensity of the civil war reached critical levels at the end of the decade, it would fall to the military, Turkey’s oldest guardian of the Kemalist tradition, to prevent a headlong slide into chaos.

**Conclusion**

The 1970s witnessed the growth of the global as a primary driver of international politics. Few would argue that global dynamics made their first appearance in the Seventies – research in global history has demonstrated definitively that globalization can be understood as a process stretching back centuries, if not millennia.\(^\text{175}\) But in world-systems terms the decade witnessed unprecedented changes in global poles of power, as well as the depth and richness of interconnection between nations. Diplomacy and economics were now unmistakably transnational in nature, forcing accommodations and reassessments in traditional great power assumptions. And developments on the global stage had ripple effects in domestic politics across the world, as societies adapted to the shock of the global by forging new communities and identities across national boundaries.

For the eastern Mediterranean, the international shifts of the Seventies effected changes in superpower strategy that dovetailed with reconfigurations of internal political and social


\(^\text{175}\) For an early articulation of precisely this point see Alfred W. Crosby, *Ecological Imperialism: The Biological Expansion of Europe, 900-1900 (Studies in Environment and History)* (Cambridge, 1982).
organization. The United States, having seen its intervention in Greek affairs climax with the establishment of the Athens junta, elected to draw back its role in Greece – both tacitly allowing and, at times, directly choosing to let regional events run their course. While the Nixon administration had been preoccupied by the fallout of Watergate and could thus devote little attention to the unraveling of eastern Mediterranean diplomacy, its successors, by virtue of their avowed commitments to human rights and to new international dialogues, could be expected to take a more active role in deepening Washington’s involvement in a resolution of lingering problems in Greece, in Turkey, and especially in a now-divided Cyprus. Yet such was not to be the case. The United States had found itself increasingly forced to adapt to global crises and commitments, dealing with a shock of the global that proved all too acute. Its attentions were now on the Middle East, Latin America, Africa, and Asia, areas where new threats on the horizon – often bearing little resemblance to the traditional bogeyman of international communism – required more resources and attention.

But, as ever, the dual processes of synthesis and consolidation remained crucial shapers of the eastern Mediterranean’s domestic experiences during the Seventies. Post-dictatorship reforms in both Greece and Turkey furnished new avenues for political groups across the spectrum to debate recent events and contest visions of the national future. They also paved the way for the emergence of new voices entirely, often those of social groups who coalesced around shared experiences, environments, and material cultures. As such groups synthesized influences from abroad, they consolidated new identities – and articulated new readings of the national past.

Andreas Papandreou proved the master of both processes, deftly synthesizing his brand of democratic socialism with popular attitudes toward the recent past while simultaneously consolidating Greek political identity around a narrative of national independence. For a while, it
seemed as though Greece would pursue a national path at long last unencumbered by the old
ghosts of ethnic nationalism and instead oriented toward supranational condominium. Yet as the
1980s were to show, such hopes were premature.
VI. The Papandreou Turn and the End of the Cold War, 1981-1989

If the 1970s closed with the eastern Mediterranean buffeted by the often-tumultuous currents of globalization, the 1980s began with the region asserting its control over a changed world, embracing new opportunities accorded by regime transition and international power shifts. As Andreas Papandreou and PASOK took the reins of power in 1981, they marshaled widespread popular support for their vision not only of a Greece rehabilitated from the horrors of dictatorship, but a Hellas recast as a dynamic, integral contributor to European and world culture, just as at the dawn of Western civilization. Boardroom imperialists or politicians unaccountable to the people, influenced first and foremost by imperial grand strategies or foreign influence, had long governed Greece. Now it was time to reverse the tide, to explore the possibilities inherent in the Greek “appointment with history.” And the left – long discredited and persecuted – would be at the forefront of the national transformation. Throughout Greece, in the weeks prior to and following PASOK’s historic victory, a rhyming phrase echoed at rallies and speeches: “Ο λαός δεν ξεχνά τι σημαίνει η δεξια – The people do not forget what it means to be governed by the Right.” 176

As it turned out, PASOK would not have to wait long to see many of its dearest wishes come to fruition. Greece entered the European Community on New Years’ Day 1981, a decisive break with the nationalist past, and was followed not long thereafter by Portugal and Spain, the other two southern European democracies emerging from dictatorial rule. Throughout the decade, Greek participation in regional and global economic networks, as well as its willingness to make its voice heard in international arenas, blossomed. And tourism numbers, the perennial

176 The phrase has achieved such currency in Greek culture that it was employed repeatedly by political party SYRIZA to condemn the far-right Golden Dawn in the run-up to the country’s 2014 elections.
quantitative gauge of Greece’s cultural clout, improved dramatically during the 1980s, generating revenues not seen in more than three decades.\textsuperscript{177}

But while Greece’s global connections deepened throughout the Eighties, they coexisted with domestic transformations in the body politic, where the openings of metapolitefsi gave broad amplification to voices suppressed for decades. As with the compromesso storico in Italy, Greece during the 1980s witnessed unprecedented accommodation between left and right, both of which found common ground in articulating influential visions of the nation’s future. And just as Italian Communist leader Enrico Berlinguer had looked to events in Chile for inspiration, Andreas Papandreou found in the struggles and political positions of those in the developing world a model for a particularly Greek brand of centre-left socialism.\textsuperscript{178} Domestically, the result was an unprecedented expansion of the Greek welfare state, a movement that attracted the attention and allegiance of Greeks throughout society. Throughout the 1980s, Papandreou’s governments – which held power for two terms from 1981 to 1989 – generated numerous changes in the purview of the state, including the establishment of a nationalized healthcare system, a meritocratic government personnel system, and sweeping improvements in workers’ rights through new laws safeguarding the rights of strikers and unions. Though, as we will see, its successes were mixed, and marred by scandals in the latter part of the decade, they were nonetheless a radical – and welcome – departure from decades of dominion during which Greeks faced the humiliation of foreign control.

Papandreou also cast new stones in foreign policy, where he substantially increased the reach and intensity of Greek power projection. The prime minister caused controversy by

\textsuperscript{178} On Eurocommunism’s ties to Latin American socialist movements, see especially Frédéric Heurtebize, \textit{Le peril rouge. Washington face a l’eurocommunisme} (Puf, 2014) and Brogi, \textit{Confronting America}. 
laying claim to contentious areas of the Aegean Sea to directly challenge Turkish regional supremacy, and he attracted the ire of fellow Western powers by building new economic and strategic bridges with the communist world throughout his tenure. At the same time, Papandreou gained rich dividends at home for pursuing Greek national interests even when they ran afoul of the United States. The nation finally had a modern champion in the form of the maverick politician, former economics professor, and strident critic of American policy. His was a particular brand of Greek passion, a reconciliation between global, anti-imperialist struggle and Hellenic ethnic nationalism that Archbishop Makarios had perfected in previous decades, and the new prime minister now employed it deftly to articulate a new vision of redemption and international prominence for the Hellenic Republic.

The Papandreou era represented the greatest period of national consolidation in modern Greek history. By the end of the 1980s, Greece would again be a dynamic actor in eastern Mediterranean affairs, neither crippled by domestic turmoil nor restrained in its responses to international provocations. It would proudly assert its will regionally and globally, and its people, after long decades of division, could begin to articulate a new identity as members of a strong, unified modern Hellenic Republic. Rediscovering old hallmarks – the concerted pursuit of Hellenic honor, regional self-assertion, and solidarity with Orthodox civilization – was part and parcel of a transformed Greek nation. Greece was hardly alone in its concerted pursuit of a new national direction – its nearby socialist neighbors in France, Spain, and Italy likewise charted the frontiers fashioned by the breakdown of existing domestic and foreign policy paradigms in the 1970s and 1980s. But the coalescence of a new Greek identity carried with it the much darker currents of ethnic nationalism that would resurface with the end of the Soviet
The Papandreou Shifts

The 1981 elections in Greece made history in a number of ways. The first landmark, and the most obvious, was the electoral victory of a socialist government for the first time in Greek history. And the victory was not just clear; it was decisive. The Panhellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) nearly traded its parliamentary standing with New Democracy, gaining 79 seats and almost half of the Hellenic Parliament. The Communist Party, too, performed well – reentering the government with 13 seats and a promise to pursue coalitions with PASOK should progressive causes come under threat. For the first time in the nation’s modern history, leftists held the reins of power in Athens. Their agenda to transform Greek life was obvious to observers both foreign and domestic. “The vote,” the New York Times reported the day of PASOK’s victory, “was not really a protest action since even Socialist militants acknowledge that living standards have improved substantially under the long conservative rule. It was above all a desire for change.”

More important still was the deeper significance of PASOK’s victory, which represented a break with ideological strategies Greek politicians and political parties had used since the Civil War. While the ghosts of 1944-1949 had haunted the Greek psyche since the communist defeat at Mt. Grammos, old guard centrist politicians such as Karamanlis had until now been firmly in control of the prevailing narrative – one that stressed the necessity of firm, experienced governmental intervention to preempt a tragic seizure of power by forces on the left who wanted to see Greece’s territorial and cultural sovereignty subsumed under the banner of international communism. But after his win, Andreas Papandreou tapped the power of more recent horrors.

perpetrated by those on the right, reversing decades of popular knowledge of Greece’s modern history. In this narrative, the junta and its American supporters, not communists, had caused the greatest tragedy in the long-running Hellenic passion play. It was now time for the Greeks to reconstruct the shattered nation by joining together in defense of its national honor and in support of its long-beleaguered people. The story was not at all unparalleled. Across the globe – especially in the developing world, and particularly in nations emerging from years of dictatorship – messages of national rejuvenation found articulation from all manner of political voices, usually under conditions of new liberality and openness similar to the ones in Greece. Papandreou’s socialism bore more in common with Latin American than other European socialist movements. It blended a missionary, quasi-sacred ethos of mass politicization with secular efforts at social justice and welfare. And it spoke in a language of unity that appealed to common Greeks exhausted from years of division. It bears noting that Greeks were actively discussing political alternatives to conservative rule, and that they were all too happy to embrace Papandreou’s vision as the best option. In surveys collected across southern Europe shortly before PASOK’s victory, Greeks were 30 percent more likely than Italians, Spaniards, and Portuguese to reject the statement “all political parties are the same,” and were more likely than all three nationalities to read newspapers’ politics sections daily.180

But the prime minister’s domestic agenda, while representing a decisive break with past political culture in Greece, found key parallels in foreign policy, where Papandreou made concerted efforts to expand Greece’s influence in Eastern Europe, the Balkans, and the Middle East. One of his first major diplomatic overtures came in December 1981, when Greece granted diplomatic status to the Palestinian Liberation Organization. Though creating a diplomatic

mission rather than an embassy – a crucial distinction – Papandreou’s gesture nonetheless indicated a willingness to challenge the United States head-on in one of its key areas of strategic concern. It also reflected a new solidarity with developing states, one that signaled a decisive turn away from Western strategic concerns and toward an embrace of Greece’s own path. Given the contrarian Greek stance on a number of other Arab-Israeli issues, including recognition of Israel (Greece remained in 1981 the only member of the Common Market not to have ambassadors stationed there), observers could not have been terribly surprised by Papandreou’s actions. But it was the intensity of his rhetoric that was so notable, as few Greek statesmen since 1947 had so stridently condemned America and its allies.

Subsequent years would witness even more examples of Papandreou’s unilateralism. Toward the European Union, the prime minister obstinately resisted attempts to trim Greece’s budget deficits through entitlement cuts as preconditions for financial aid and subsidies. The new Greek government also veered into policy actions unambiguously antagonistic to the United States. In May of 1983 Papandreou condemned American grand strategy in the eastern Mediterranean and Middle East, which he accused of being driven by designs of “expansionism and domination”; the same year, Greece freed a Jordanian terrorist U.S. intelligence claimed had planned to bomb an international flight from Athens to Tel Aviv. Before the end of the year, Papandreou would further test the strained Greek-American relationship by refusing to prevent striking workers from blocking the entrances to U.S. bases. The incident sparked a long-running dispute during which an American threat to divert arms shipments from Greece to Turkey provoked an incensed response from a member of the Greek parliament, which was subsequently disseminated broadly by a *New York Times* article. And following international condemnation of the downing of Korean Airlines Flight 007 by the Soviet Union in 1983, Papandreou dismissed
the backlash, asserting that the airliner “was in fact performing a CIA spy mission.” The prime minister would have no sympathy for the losses of an America that even in the aftermath of Vietnam and the decade of globalization arrogantly extended its power abroad, with disregard for the potential ramifications. “We were the only ones who did not become hysterical over the issue,” he concluded on KL-007, exhibiting the coldness that had become emblematic of his administration’s views toward Washington.¹⁸¹

Papandreou’s statements were targeted manipulations of a wounded Greek psyche, maimed by long decades of foreign domination that had resulted in the self-flagellation of the military junta. By stymying the United States when and where he was able, the prime minister demonstrated the resolve of a new Greece that would refuse, in unequivocal terms, attempts to subvert her national honor. “In no other country of Europe,” wrote a reporter covering the region toward the end of Papandreou’s first term, “is there such a chasm between magnificent past and mundane present. The Greeks not only notice it; it wounds them. Out of that pain grows a special Greek sense of pride hurt, of honor injured. It is so much a national characteristic that there is a special word for it – ‘filotimo,’ or love of honor – and it helps give Greek politics its special passion and turbulence.”¹⁸²

All such regional developments transpired against the backdrop of a radically changed Cold War system. As the 1980s dawned, it seemed that the pendulum of Cold War attitudes had swung back to the system of confrontation that dominated the international environment after the Second World War. In marked contrast to the recent successes of détente in promoting arms reductions and the expansion of human rights agendas, the last years of the Seventies and first

years of the Eighties witnessed renewed tension between Washington and Moscow over geopolitical issues. The Carter administration’s responses to both the Iranian Revolution and the 1979 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan represented a conspicuous shift away from reconciliation and back toward condemnation in the form of economic sanctions, public outcries and threats of force should America’s vital strategic interests be jeopardized. And Reagan’s ascent only promised to continue this slide into confrontation, as the candidate had made no secret of his repulsion to Soviet communism on the campaign trail. The Soviet system, to the new president, was a corruption of natural politics that would ultimately find itself in the dustbin of history. “When a disease like communism hangs on as it has for half a century or more,” he had written in 1975, “it’s good now and then, to be reminded of just how vicious it really is… Communism is neither an economic or a political system – it is a form of insanity – a temporary aberration which will one day disappear from the earth because it is contrary to human nature.”

The new president’s actions confirmed his words. Reagan’s administration increased U.S. troop levels in Europe, modernized NATO weaponry, and took unilateral actions to ensure the strategic superiority of the United States – including a controversial decision in the spring of 1983 to unveil the Strategic Defense Initiative, a missile shield defense system whose deployment was news to the Europeans, and could jeopardize ongoing efforts at arms limitation talks with the Soviets. Such actions often drew the disapproval of allies accustomed to more say in the deployment of weaponry. Despite such protests, the transatlantic relationship during the Reagan years was quite warm. France, long the greatest check on American hegemony in Atlantic affairs, took its greatest role yet in the Atlantic alliance when in 1981 Socialist candidate Francois Mitterrand won a sweeping victory in the presidential election against Giscard

183 Quoted in Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind*, pp. 339.
d’Estaing. Initially wary of the new French president’s agenda (especially after his decision to include communists in the government, a choice Reagan outwardly condemned), Washington was pleasantly surprised when Mitterrand publicly supported American weapons deployment in Europe, even going so far as to personally pressure the German Bundestag to embrace U.S. missiles. And this is to say nothing of the legendary friendship between Reagan and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, who shared the American president’s views on domestic politics as well as statecraft.\footnote{On Reagan and Thatcher, see especially Nicholas Wapshott, Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher: A Political Marriage (Sentinel, 2007) or, for a revisionist take on the legendary partnership, Richard Aldous, Reagan and Thatcher: The Difficult Relationship (W.W. Norton, 2012).}

The new administration in Washington did well when it could reassume the mantle of American leadership in Europe, a mutually approved relationship with a template laid over the course of four prior decades. But its relations with the developing world proved much more complicated. To Reagan, unrest in the Third World had one source: perfidious Soviet designs on global expansion. The eastern Mediterranean proved to be no exception. In contrast to the conventional strategic imperatives that drove U.S. relations with Western Europe, NATO’s southeastern flank had over the course of the prior two decades been caught in the vortex of vacillating American policies that all too often abandoned regional stability in the interest of broader grand strategies or other pressing crises. Ever since the Johnson administration’s disastrous mishandling of the Cyprus crisis and the subsequent Greek domestic political turmoil, U.S. administrations had largely moved with caution in the region – Kissinger’s failure to intervene in the 1974 Turkish invasion notwithstanding. For Reagan, such a low-touch approach was not an option. Key events in the late 1970s and early 1980s made the Middle East, North Africa and, by extension, the eastern Mediterranean a key focus of U.S. foreign policy decisions.
When in the early years of the Reagan administration Muammar Qaddafi’s Libyan regime – the likely sponsors of the later 1988 Lockerbie airliner attack – hurled death threats and promises of increased terrorist bombings at Washington and its allies, Reagan opted to showcase American leadership in the region. Throughout 1981, military confrontation between U.S. and Libyan aircraft in the Gulf of Sidra demonstrated in no uncertain terms the extent of Washington’s commitment to regional stability.\textsuperscript{185}

In the eastern Mediterranean, Turkey, rather than Greece, occupied the bulk of the Reagan administration’s attentions as it kept its eye on the restive Middle East. While Greece had felt the sting of internecine conflict leading to authoritarian dictatorship two decades past, it was the fate of Turkey during the 1980s to repeat the same lessons. The intense terroristic and left-right conflicts in Turkey during the 1970s erupted on September 12, 1980, when a military junta under Kenan Evren, Chief of the General Staff, seized power. The third seizure of power by Turkey’s military in twenty years caught few by surprise. Evren had even commissioned a report, six months prior to the coup, enlisting the aid of members of the Turkish bureaucracy to determine whether military intervention was necessary again in the first place.\textsuperscript{186} Washington likewise registered little surprise. The hand of the United States in Evren’s coup, largely invisible as the colonels seized power in Greece in 1967, was now on full display. Ankara station chief Paul Henze, upon news of the coup, hastily cabled Washington with a single message: “Our boys [in Ankara] did it.”\textsuperscript{187}


\textsuperscript{186} İbrahim Doğan, “Evren, darbe için iki rapor hazırlatmış,” archived December 12, 2008.

As far as the United States was concerned, events in Ankara, much like events in Athens in 1967, ensured the survival of a stable ally in one of the most important domains of American grand strategy. The Reagan administration clung to this belief particularly strongly, and events elsewhere in the world seemed only to confirm that the correct course of action was preservation of the Turkish status quo. The administration’s policy toward Turkey was perhaps best encapsulated in the words of UN ambassador Jeanne Kirkpatrick, who defended American support for authoritarian regimes by contrasting them with the inherently inflexible totalitarianism of leftist movements:

> Although there is no instance of a revolutionary “socialist” or Communist society being democratized, right-wing autocracies do sometimes evolve into democracies – given time, propitious economic, social, and political circumstances, talented leaders, and a strong indigenous demand for representative government… The conceivable contexts [for U.S.-backed regime change] turn out to be mainly those in which non-Communist autocracies are under pressure from revolutionary guerrillas. Since Moscow is the aggressive, expansionist power today, it is more often than not insurgents, encouraged and armed by the Soviet Union, who challenge the status quo. The American commitment to ‘change’ in the abstract ends up by aligning us tacitly with Soviet clients and irresponsible extremists like the Ayatollah Khomeini or, in the end, Yasir Arafat.»

The junta would remain in power for nearly two years before a June 1982 referendum overwhelmingly approved a new constitution and one-party rule under Turgut Özal’s Motherland Party. Özal oversaw the implementation of numerous neoliberal reforms in the Turkish economy, which will be discussed below, as well as a conspicuous turn toward the European Community – a project that often clashed with the government’s simultaneous emphasis upon traditional conservative values. But it seemed that the overall tide had finally turned in favor of Turkey’s integration into the global system, an adoption of liberal democracy and peaceful transition over

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188 Quoted in Westad, *The Global Cold War*, pp. 358.
chronic instability. Throughout the 1980s, billions of dollars in economic aid flowed to Turkey through the OECD to support and further such stability, mirrored by massive increases in arms shipments through the expansion of existing agreements. Direct American military involvement likewise expanded through joint Turkish-American drills and Turkish cooperation with the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, a military unit developed under the Carter administration to rapidly respond to events in the Persian Gulf region. In comparison to many areas of U.S. intervention throughout the 1980s—particularly in Latin America and Africa, where American actions or economic restrictions resulted in widespread poverty and social unrest—Turkey emerged from the decade quite well, its coffers full of American money to be used for infrastructural reform and increased national defense expenditures.189

Andreas Papandreou watched all such developments eagerly. Intimately knowledgeable of U.S. politics and thus of the domestic pressures under which Reagan made decisions, the Greek leader wasted no time exploiting America’s regional activities for domestic gain. When in February 1983 the White House announced an aid agreement with Turkey that would nearly double U.S. military contributions to Ankara while keeping aid to Athens constant, Papandreou sent a stern missive to Reagan condemning the imbalance and warning that such actions would “diminish the chances of reaching agreement on the status of United States bases in Greece.”190 For his part, Reagan regarded Papandreou as a minor concern, further inflaming both the Greek prime minister and Greek citizens.

Official documentation of the Reagan administration’s eastern Mediterranean policies is, as of this writing, under declassification review. But available sources indicate that Washington’s

strategic priorities in the region throughout the 1980s ultimately had little to do with the eastern Mediterranean itself. In tackling the new challenges of the global Cold War, Reagan and his foreign policy apparatus regarded the eastern Mediterranean as a traditional Western European nation. They failed to sense that the Papandreou movement channeled something much deeper – a solidarity with the developing world premised upon a vigorously articulated notion of recent history that placed American perfidy at the center of national humiliation. Reagan’s actions, like those of leaders before him, thus played into the very narratives of national betrayal Papandreou sought to promulgate.

**Changing Economies and Societies in the Eastern Mediterranean**

Though globalization, Washington’s strategic shifts, and the neoliberal turn of the Eighties all shifted the rhythms of eastern Mediterranean life, radical diplomatic realignments unfolded in neither Greece nor Turkey, both of which remained firmly in the Western security camp. The same could not be said for either nation’s domestic spheres, which continued the dramatic transformations begun in the 1970s as each emerged from military dictatorship. The Papandreou era witnessed wide-ranging economic and political reforms in Greek society, all designed to bring Greece into modernity faster than the first metapolitefsi governments. Some were unmistakably pragmatic, even essential for Greece’s socioeconomic survival: agrarian reform along cooperative lines – largely to ensure non-disruption to the nation’s lucrative agricultural exports – and reform of healthcare laws to create a sustainable medical system and introduce more rigorous vetting of drugs and pharmaceuticals. But the prime minister went further in introducing reconciliation measures, such as the modernization of the police forces, the
reinstitution of dismissed police personnel, and the simultaneous recognition of the wartime resistance and abolition of Metaxas-era legislation.\(^{191}\)

From 1981 to 1985 Papandreou also engaged in what historian Philemon Bantimaroudis aptly calls “experimentation,” in this case testing the limits of state intervention via his new, “third way” form of Greek socialism. He oversaw an enormous boom in the number of state employees and entitlements, increasing pensions for the elderly and lavishing farmers with subsidies and direct monetary compensation – often as a direct political technique to ensure continued support at the polls.\(^ {192}\) But such investments came at considerable cost to other sectors, such as technology, that were cementing the economic viability of other Western European states as Greece increasingly fell behind. In the words of political scientist and Balkan scholar Judith Kleinman,

> By increasing direct government intervention in the economy, the socialist government of Andreas Papandreou precipitated a further deterioration in the business climate. Promises of investment incentives and five-year development strategy have given way to nationalizations and increasing government involvement in private-sector business decisions, including the establish of workers’ councils to sit on the board of firms. Conflicting signals and inconsistent policies deterred domestic entrepreneurs from expanding capacity and foreign investors from seeking investment opportunities in Greece.\(^ {193}\)

Relative economic decline, however, did not prevent PASOK from winning another term in office from 1985 to 1989, although with slimmer electoral majorities. But PASOK’s second term was blighted by the plagues of its own making, as swelling state budget deficits precipitated a fiscal crisis only exacerbated by market downturns in 1987 and 1988. Notably absent amidst all

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such financial crises, however, was widespread condemnation of PASOK and its policies among everyday Greeks. Despite the obvious problems inherent in the Greek welfare state’s expansion, broad consensus endured between the Greek state and the nation’s citizens as to the necessity of expanding popular access to state resources in the wake of the dictatorship years. By combining near-universal social entitlements with the rhetoric of national self-sufficiency and a “third path” distinct from the Western alliance, Papandreou painted a portrait of a Greece homogeneous in national direction and character if not in social or cultural organization. It was a testament to the prime minister’s success as a rhetorician and storyteller that he managed to minimize the impact of social cleavages and competing internal and external factions within Greek society, even as such forces reshaped the international environment within which Greece itself operated.

Profound social changes also characterized Turkey during the 1980s, although their mechanisms proved different from those in Greece. Whereas Greeks had embraced the promise of democratic populism in response to decades of bitter internal division, Turks following the 1980 coup still searched deeply for unification and national direction. The nation’s leaders found the answer in looking outward, first to membership in the European community and then in the increasingly complex system of neoliberal economics that took hold across the globe throughout the decade. During the Eighties, Turkish governments passed sweeping economic legislation that transformed Turkey’s primarily import-substitution economy into a powerful export-driven engine. Unprecedented economic growth followed. Between 1983 and 1988, the nation’s GDP rose more than thirty percent. Foreign infrastructural aid, already lavished on Ankara by the Reagan administration, also expanded substantially in lockstep with economic reforms through institutions like the International Monetary Fund.\footnote{Ekavi Athanassopoulou, \textit{Strategic Relations Between the US and Turkey, 1979-2000: Sleeping with a Tiger} (Routledge, 2014), especially pp. 85-95.}
But, as elsewhere, neoliberalism brought mixed blessings. Export-oriented economic policies clearly ran afoul of labor interests, which had come to play an integral role in Turkish politics as a moderating influence on extremist excesses. And following the 1980-1983 dictatorship, the government no longer sought to placate restive citizens, instead opting for decisive – and often harsh – regulations meant to forcibly usher Turkey into the global era. The post-junta government under Özal’s Motherland Party enacted fundamental changes to the political and judicial systems that, while on the surface representing a break with the period of military rule, in practice enshrined the junta’s aims in legislation. Laws stipulating the composition and permissible activities of the judiciary, police forces, university faculty, professional organizations, and trade unions carried the veneer of attempts to restructure society toward greater preparation for new production models and economic dynamism; but in actuality they served to circumscribe those elements of Turkish civil society that had long checked authoritarian tendencies.  

The many contradictions of neoliberalism presented a crisis of legitimacy for the Turkish state that would persist into the 1990s. This crisis, though bearing little resemblance to the violence of the 1970s, nonetheless set the stage for a repolarization of Turkish politics between various oppositional groups – rich and poor, reformist and traditionalist, globalist and insular, and as always left and right. Just as with Greece, the next decade would see proximate circumstances and specific events ignite these incipient discontents.

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Conclusion

Historian Geir Lundestad, in describing transatlantic relations during the 1980s, paints the decade as one of ambiguity during which the United States asserted itself more strongly on the European stage than it had in decades while simultaneously dealing with the independent actions of European states who sought the role of intermediary or “third actor” between Washington and Moscow. After the vicissitudes of the Seventies, which saw the Atlantic alliance challenged by the growing economic and strategic prominence of East Asia, by the resurgence of Soviet international involvement, and by the disastrous failure of the Carter administration to bridge divides through “trilateralism” along the Washington-Tokyo-Berlin axis, hopes were high at the start of the 1980s that new leaders could restore transatlantic harmony. Yet this was not to be the case. Throughout the decade, Europeans would resist Washington’s wishes and forge the future on their own terms, often taking actions directly contrary to the wishes of the United States. Ultimately, though, the West’s momentous victory at the end of the 1980s overshadowed any such animosities. The decade ended with the fall of the Soviet bloc, and the solidarity of the U.S.-led Western alliance has thus often been held to be a key contributor to the fall of communism. The reality, however, is that U.S.-European relations during the last decade of the Cold War reflected the dynamics inherent in a transformed superpower’s negotiations with allies who had found their own national directions – often those at odds with Washington’s wishes. And even as the Berlin Wall fell and the West celebrated the end of the Cold War, it began facing the challenges of the post-Cold War era, when resurgent states and new identities would begin reshaping the world the superpowers had created.

For the eastern Mediterranean, many of the same patterns dictated developments in the 1980s, with shifts in the nature of superpower influence painting a new strategic picture. The dominance of PASOK throughout the decade saw Greece’s old allegiances with the United States challenged for the first time at the highest levels of government – and unilateral actions on the part of the Greek government signaled a sea change in Washington’s ability to effectively manage regional developments. But while Greece presented new challenges for the United States, its relationship with Turkey – emerging from its third period of military rule and embracing the opportunities of neoliberal globalization – proved more stable in the 1980s than at any other time in the Cold War period.

Yet the new global environments of the 1980s coexisted with more fundamental changes in each nation’s societies. The national traumas of the junta period had found expression in Greek political culture of the Seventies, where numerous attempts at national reconciliation had taken place, but they also found a place within the long-running story of national subservience to and betrayal by the great Western powers, articulated with renewed vigor by the governments of Andreas Papandreou. Among radical segments of society, such ideas had an even deeper impact, as had been the case for decades. Revolutionary nationalist and terrorist groups had long embraced anti-Americanism and xenophobia as key narratives explaining the current crisis of Hellenism. But Papandreou’s positions gave them potent fuel to inflame future political passions, as the much-loved politician gained widespread popular support for his polemics against U.S. “imperial” influence.

Turkey, in marked contrast to Greece, courted the favor of the United States throughout the 1980s by virtue of its proximity to the hotbeds of the Middle East and Persian Gulf. Its position as a key ally proved lucrative, as economic reforms brought increased revenues into
state coffers and opened the door for much-needed foreign aid. But on the domestic front, Turks adjusted unevenly, and frequently unwillingly, to the shifts occasioned by neoliberal economics, as profits and privileges trickled through society irregularly. Despite their different national circumstances, Greece and Turkey would both enter the last decade of the twentieth century with societies dramatically transformed from within by a synthesis of external and internal pressures.
VII. The End of the Cold War Era: Ethnic Nationalism Returns to the Eastern Mediterranean, 1989-2003

The speed and peaceful nature of the Soviet Union’s collapse caught most analysts by surprise. It had long been clear that Moscow’s problems were formidable, even terminally damaging to the Soviet regime. But when Mikhail Gorbachev decided in the last years of the 1980s to make openings to democracy in Eastern Europe, the resulting ripple effect – the growth of a region-wide democratic momentum that culminated in the November 1989 dismantling of the Berlin Wall – shocked even the most perceptive of observers. In the aftermath of the Soviet bloc’s implosion, crucial questions begged to be answered. What would come of more than four decades of superpower competition now that history, in the infamous words of political scientist Francis Fukuyama, had ended with the decisive victory of liberal democracy? How would the United States – the lone “hyperpower” after the demise of the Soviet Union – respond to its newfound circumstances, and how would it wield its unparalleled power?

Despite the optimism of Fukuyama and others, the end of the Cold War fell far short of ending historical conflict altogether. On the contrary, the post-Cold War period saw the global resurgence of age-old national and ethnic conflicts – the latter of which would explode with particular ferocity in the Balkans. The eastern Mediterranean, having recovered from the traumas of dictatorship and regional conflict during the 1970s and 1980s, emerged into the post-Cold War arena with new identities crafted in the crucible of national tribulation. With new geopolitical circumstances replacing the Cold War system of superpower competition and clientelism, Greece and Turkey each found new global canvases for their expression.

By the decade’s end, Greeks and Turks alike had decisively asserted these identities in response to external events, ultimately emerging as deft manipulators of the globalization processes that had caused such powerful tumult and reexamination of traditional assumptions
over the past three decades. But in both nations the 1990s also built from powerful foundations laid in earlier decades in sowing the seeds for the eastern Mediterranean’s 21st-century travails.

**Greece in the Early 1990s: The Overstretch of Social Welfare**

Papandreou’s ambitious social welfare provisioning finally found its limit in the first years of the Nineties, when Greece’s budget deficits prompted dramatic cuts in public-sector pensions and unemployment benefits. Particularly taxing was the establishment of the Social Insurance Organization (IKA) early in PASOK’s first government, which through political pressure was forced to extend coverage to non-contributing public employees. Within a year the program’s finances had become overstretched and the number of pensioners dangerously high, but Papandreou’s government refused to reassess allocations.¹⁹⁷

By the early 1990s, the situation had grown so dire that the European Economic Community specifically cited fiscal reform of the Greek national insurance system as a precondition for agricultural and infrastructural loans. The conservative New Democracy government that came into power in the nation’s 1990 elections promised to rein in state expenses, but insurance and pensions by this point had become so prominent an issue among the Greek population that serious reversals on social entitlements were politically impossible. New Democracy, in any case, proved incapable of meeting the demands of Greek voters, whose appetites for expanding welfare provisions and extension of Greek national sovereignty had been whetted by nearly a decade of Papandreou’s leadership.

Frustrated, Greek voters chose to reinstall Papandreou and PASOK in 1993. But a return to the socialist experiment of the 1980s, hoped for by millions of Greeks, was not to occur. Throughout 1994 and 1995, Papandreou struggled with health issues and the fallout of a scandal

which found him accused of lavishing government gifts on a high-profile young mistress. After a three-month period of hospitalization in January of 1996, the leader retired from politics; that summer, he died at his home in Athens. Amidst a period of national mourning, Costas Simitis, the leader of PASOK’s pro-modernization and pro-Europe flank, won leadership of the party in an internal vote against Akis Tsochatzopoulos, one of Papandreou’s close friends and political advisors.  

Simitis was to have no time for adjustment. One day after he assumed the role of prime minister, widely read Greek magazine Gramma headlined a story covering dramatic events brewing in the region. At the end of 1995, the Turkish cargo carrier Figen Akat had run aground on the Imia islets in the Aegean, jurisdiction over which had been vaguely defined and divided between Greece and Turkey, with resulting confusion over the limits and responsibilities of Turkish salvage rights. The issue soon attracted broader audiences within the Greek and Turkish governments, each of whom regarded their counterparts’ geographical and legalistic understandings as erroneous. Though the incident had until mid-January 1996 seemed minor, capable of resolution through high-level talks between the governments’ ministers, the release of the Gramma article escalated the issue into a full-blown crisis over national sovereignty. Within days, public opinion had mobilized against suggestions of Turkey’s ownership, buffeted along by exploits such as the raising of a Greek flag over the disputed region on January 26.

Key institutions, embattled in the past decades by reformist currents, seized upon the opportunity to galvanize public opinion with great success. An increasingly radicalized Orthodox Church, suffering from declining membership and attendance and seeking avenues for continued

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199 The Figen Akat incident is covered most comprehensively in Theodore C. Kariotis, Greece and the Law of the Sea (Springer, 1997).
relevance, played the leading role. While Orthodox religious leaders had influenced the course of eastern Mediterranean diplomacy throughout the Cold War, their pronouncements had always been measured, strategic, and designed with the intent either of playing the great powers’ hand or of leveraging non-alignment for global political visibility. The Imia dispute, by contrast, provoked wholly visceral and confrontational responses from the clergy. Christodoulos, soon to be promoted to chief cleric in 1998, viewed Turkey’s provocations as nothing short of an act of war, one which would see the Greek people respond decisively, as was their historical destiny: “The choice we are confronted with is peace or freedom, peace or national humiliation. And when confronted with this dilemma the correct historical choice cannot be peace.” Nor were the future archbishop’s words a product of acute tensions, aberrations unrepresentative of his more measured political stances. Two years after the Imia crisis, Christodoulos advocated publicly for the military “recapture” of Constantinople from Turkey, lobbying unsuccessfully to endorse the support of key church dignitaries.\(^{200}\)

But Orthodox leaders’ condemnation of the Turkish enemy underpinned a much more pervasive sense of ethnic nationalist identity within the Greek nation. As the locus of Greek social power in the post-dictatorship era had shifted from key institutions to grassroots sociocultural formations, so, too, had the primary seat of xenophobic narratives shifted from official pronouncements to a broader diffusion throughout the Hellenic ethnos. Crises in the Balkans throughout the 1990s would put such transformations on full and dramatic display.

**The Balkan Wars: Ethnic Nationalism Reborn**

The Imia and other Aegean disputes demonstrated the changed foreign policy behavior of

\(^{200}\) Quoted in Takis Michas, *Unholy Alliance: Greece and Milosevic’s Serbia* (College Station, TX: Texas A&M University Press, 2002), pp. 111.
the Greek state following a decade of self-notification under Papandreou, and highlighted the
degree to which ethnic nationalism could coexist with new understandings of the self and
political community. But few diplomatic incidents of the 1990s were as conspicuous or as
significant as Greece’s stance during the Yugoslav conflicts that rocked Europe in the first half
of the decade. The conflicts grew out of the interplay between the fall of the Soviet Union, which
destabilized Eastern Europe, and the resurgence of ethnic nationalism throughout the Balkans,
which threw into question decades-long systems of religious and ethnic coexistence. As
Yugoslavia disintegrated throughout the late 1980s and early 1990s, however, the answer
emerged with bloody clarity. Key ethnic groups – particularly Croatian Serbs – strove for
independence and national sovereignty, both of which seemed finally possible after centuries of
rule under hegemonic powers. In response, the Serbian community under Slobodan Milosevic
increasingly invoked violent nationalist rhetoric – accompanied by violent ethnic cleansing – to
seek the establishment of an ethnically homogeneous “Greater Serbia.”

In form Greece proved loyal to its NATO commitments, allowing troops and supplies to
pass through its ports en route to their military operations. But among everyday Greeks, NATO’s
activities in the Balkans cast salt into old wounds and betrayed a perfidious double standard. The
United States, in particular, seemed all too ready to intervene to save Balkan Muslims after
having watched with indifference as its Greek allies had engaged in protracted crises with
Turkey. “Why, they ask,” began one article covering the domestic Greek response to the conflict,
“is NATO bombing the Serbs when no one has lifted a finger against the Turks who have done
similar things to Greeks, they claim, on the disputed island of Cyprus?”

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201 The best account of the Yugoslav dissolution and resulting conflicts is by journalist and historian Misha Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia: The Third Balkan War* (Penguin, 1996).
Even more shocking to outside observers was the extent of Greece’s identity chasm with the West. The greatest indications of support for Serbia occurred not among those with vested interests in the conflict – arms merchants, diplomats, or Greek leaders expressing public pronouncements of solidarity with Orthodox brethren – but among the everyday members of the body politic. Journalists, academics, and pundits alike trumpeted the existential necessity of supporting Orthodoxy against all attackers, especially as it came under assault from a West seeking its destruction. At the popular level, widespread pro-Serb and anti-Western demonstrations reflected a transformed national identity that conveyed old currents of ethnic nationalism within the new languages of anti-Americanism and xenophobia.

And the perceived role of the United States in perpetrating a war on Orthodoxy was the single greatest unifying characteristic of Greek xenophobia in the 1990s. When U.S. President Bill Clinton visited Athens in October 1999 shortly after NATO’s air strikes against Belgrade, he expressed excitement at “experiencing that wonderful quality of Greek hospitality.” His hosts had something quite different in mind as they lined the streets of the capital city during the days of his visit, breaking windows, vandalizing storefronts, and clashing with armed police. The Greek media also joined in the fray. A litany of scorn characterized the U.S. president in the editorial columns of one prominent Athens newspaper: “criminal, pervert, murderer, impostor, bloodthirsty, gangster, slayer, butcher, stupid, killer, foolish, unscrupulous, dishonest, disgraceful, and rascal,” among others. The paper was not alone, and the world took notice: in the last months of the twentieth century, several European news outlets remarked, with evident surprise, that Athens and not Paris or London had become the most anti-American capital in Europe, and arguably in the world.203

203 Michas, pp. 78-79.
But such sentiments did not stop at anti-Americanism. Even more alarming were expressions of solidarity with Orthodox civilization, often cast as outright endorsements of the violence Milosevic and his allies were perpetrating against those perceived as culturally impure. In the aftermath of the Serbs’ seizure of the town of Foca, during which they staged some of the worst anti-Muslim ethnic cleansing of the war, Greek media steadfastly refused to cover the atrocities, focusing instead on the exploits of Greek volunteer contingents and the sundry sufferings of Serbs caught in the crossfire. Gross violations of human rights and sweeping acts of genocide had no place alongside the story of Greek-Serb connection via a shared Orthodoxy.

Takis Michas, a journalist traveling through the former Muslim part of Sarajevo in late 1997, recalls the reaction of a Serb policeman whose attitude changed dramatically when he discovered Michas’s Greek ancestry: “A smile lit up his face and he said, ‘Greeks and Serbs are brothers!’ He then embraced me and began pulling me toward the café where he had been sitting to offer me a drink. ‘Together we will fuck the Muslims!’ he said gleefully.”

It was within the context of the Yugoslav Wars that Golden Dawn, a far-rightist political organization established in 1980 just prior to PASOK’s first electoral victory, saw the first surge in a level of popular support that would rise to new heights in the next two decades. Originally a fringe pro-junta party advocating a return to military dictatorship during the Papandreou era, in the first years of the Nineties Golden Dawn expanded its popular appeal through active engagement in the nation’s major foreign policy concerns. A naming dispute with Macedonia in 1991-1992 gave the group increased coverage in mainstream media, but its true apotheosis came with the Balkan conflicts, when Golden Dawn mercenaries joined the Greek Volunteer Guard – a few members of which participated in the July 1995 Srebrenica massacre.

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204 Ibid, pp. 28.
205 “Για τη Λευκή Φυλή και την Ορθοδοξία”, Ιός, June 29, 2005.
Golden Dawn gained immediate infamy for its avowedly anti-immigrant, racist, and hyper-nationalist views. When during a particularly contentious 1999 soccer match between Greece and Albania an Albanian supporter burnt the Greek flag, Greek news reacted angrily to the cultural affront. But whereas most popular anger diffused quickly, Pantelis Kazakos, a longtime Golden Dawn member, took more drastic steps. On the night of October 22, 1999, Kazakos confronted a group of immigrants on a street in central Athens, shooting and killing two of their group and seriously wounding seven others. The individual shooter’s actions were widely condemned throughout the national media, but Golden Dawn itself capitalized upon the incident, forming a hooligan organization called *Galazia Stratia* (Blue Army) describing itself as a “fan club of the Greek national teams” charged with the sacred duty of “defending Greek national pride inside the stadiums.”

### The PASOK Implosion

In the last years of the 1990s, a series of events conspired to greatly weaken PASOK’s appeal among its core constituents of lower- and middle-class Greeks. Perhaps the earliest and most damaging were a series of corruption scandals in 1997, during which seven PASOK ministers were found to have diverted public funds into personal retirement and vacation accounts over the course of nine years. The incident and the subsequent highly televised legal proceedings drove a wedge between the historical legacy of PASOK as a progressive party representative of everyday Greeks and the conduct of its senior members. Membership dropped throughout the late 1990s.

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207 Kaklamanaki, *Andreas Papandreou*, pp. 95.
The foreign factor – long a key plank in the initial platform that drove Papandreou and PASOK to power – also emerged as a key element contributing to the party’s demise. While Greece had in 1997 won the honor of hosting 2004’s Summer Olympics in Athens, international concerns soon turned to the elevated rates of terrorism that had recently plagued the country in the form of targeted assassinations by 17 November. Seeking assurances of safety for their athletes and spectators, fellow European nations and the United States placed considerable pressure upon Simitis’s second government to allow international aid for terrorist monitoring and detention in the run-up to the games. The government’s acquiescence provoked a strong reaction among the Greek public, which railed against perceived intrusion in Greek sovereign matters by outside powers.208

But PASOK’s final blows did not come until the elections of 2004 and 2007, each of which demonstrated the party’s deep problems in resonating with a once-supportive public. In both elections New Democracy emerged triumphant, in the former case placing PASOK into opposition for the first time in over a decade and in the latter election inflicting the greatest loss yet for Papandreou’s party. By the time of the first austerity measures imposed upon Greece during the financial crisis of 2008-2009, PASOK had ceased to be a leading force in Greek domestic politics. PASOK’s implosion eliminated the progressive center from Greek political life, and in its place arose the extremes – communists, fascists, and extreme entities across the rest of the political spectrum. Centrist consolidation would not occur again until 2012 with the emergence of SYRIZA – an acronym for the Greek Συναπσπισμός Ριζοσπαστικής Αριστεράς, the Coalition of the Radical left – which harnessed the combined power of heretofore scattered

208 Ibid.
and largely impotent leftist groups.²⁰⁹

**Cyprus and Irredentism Resurface: The Rise of Golden Dawn**

A host of financial developments in the late 1990s and early 2000s, from the general movement toward globalized finance to the encouragement of high-risk borrowing patterns brought about by easy credit conditions in the 2001-2008 environment, by the end of the first decade of the twenty-first century had created a fragile economic situation in the Eurozone. With the onset of the global recession in 2008, the bubble burst, with ten European Union states simultaneously requesting bailout funding to save themselves from the worst excesses of a combined banking, competitiveness, and government debt crisis.²¹⁰

Greece was by far the worst hit of the debtor nations. Hundreds of billions of Euros in debt (of which France owned some 10%, sparking widespread terror at the prospect of default), it found itself in the humiliating situation of accepting enormous bailout packages from the European Union member states – France and Germany chief among them – in order to stay afloat. Domestically, the Greek situation fared little better. Forced to enact stringent economic austerity measures to eliminate wasteful spending programs and closely ration available revenues, the Greek government rapidly encountered the sociocultural fallout of decades of poor fiscal management. In major cities throughout the nation, protests erupted over the length and breadth of budget cuts. Outrage at the economic situation soon blended into expressions of disgust at the state of Greek politics, where corruption and mismanagement had destroyed the nation’s solvency and set it on a course toward crisis and humiliation. Especially among the youth, disillusionment and depression

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ran rampant. By late 2010, some 30% of Greek youth aged 18-29 were unemployed; by 2012, the number had climbed to over 55%.

Most disturbing of all, however, were the virulent (and often violent) expressions of hatred directed at foreigners, from the Eurozone members now debating the amount of money to lend the beleaguered Greek government to the illegal immigrants flooding the nation’s port cities. Xenophobia, to be sure, was nothing new to the modern Greek political scene. Views of the outside world had always vacillated between respect and admiration, as with the assistance of the European Philhellenes during the War of Independence, to ethnocentric invective, largely directed against the traditional Turkish foe. Yet the protests that erupted in the wake of the debt crisis revealed the extent to which the Greek body politic had come to internalize their struggles – economic, social, political, and demographic – as the product of victimization at the hands of outsiders. The xenophobia of these protests grew out of contemporary discontents, yet drew most of its inspiration from the country’s historical experience. The role of foreign powers in betraying Greek interests on Cyprus featured prominently.

Among the most visible of xenophobic groups was the far-rightist anti-immigrant party Golden Dawn. Founded in 1985 during Andreas Papandreou’s first term as prime minister, Golden Dawn existed on the fringes of Greek politics until the eruption of the Macedonian naming dispute in 1992 when its leader, Nikolaos Michaloliakos, coordinated a massive attack on foreign students at the Athens University of Economics and Business. From the beginning, Golden Dawn’s rhetoric blended old-style Greek ethnocentric irredentism with narratives of national victimization similar to Andreas Papandreou’s polemics. But whereas the leader of PASOK had sought to forge

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211 Ibid, 93.
an independent Greek foreign policy while preserving economic and political ties with other areas of the world, particularly the West, Golden Dawn espoused an agenda of violent rebellion against any who had conspired – in recent times or historically – against Mother Greece and her interests.213

Cyprus, the island whose affairs had for decades been inseparably connected with the objectives of outside powers, formed a key weapon in the group’s rhetorical arsenal. As early as April 2005, with the economic crisis just over the horizon, Golden Dawn devoted its semicentennial issue to coverage of the Cyprus Emergency, highlighting Britain’s perfidy toward its erstwhile allies: “The struggle was a slap in the face of the notorious British imperialists, proving that all Greeks would fight until their last breaths for their curtailed rights and natural dignity… if the despot, taking refuge behind false promises and cowardly international diplomacy, would not extend freedom to the brave Cypriot soul, it would be taken with blood!” The article went on to link Cyprus’s historical betrayal with the island’s contemporary state of affairs, which represented nothing more than the ongoing captivity of Hellenism: “Our brave Cypriot brothers… still languish under the foreign yoke. On a divided island they stand for honor, for Greece eternal, in the memory of their predecessors – Freedom or Death!”214

For Golden Dawn and similar organizations, the past is a fertile ground for stirring present agitations. Tapping into the sundry disillusionments of contemporary Greeks by pointing to historical disappointments, they effectively connect the Cyprus issue to age-old concerns over the captivity of Hellenism, and with Greece’s modern troubles vis-à-vis the European Union. By internalizing betrayal, they rationalize a stridently xenophobic platform predicated upon the same firm ethnic identification that first facilitated the island’s division.

The Turkish Nineties

As we have seen, the Turkish Eighties were punctuated by the challenges of globalization and neoliberalism. And while the 1980s had brought much-needed stability to the Turkish Republic after the widespread tensions and violence of the Seventies, the nation’s political scene proved far from inactive. In 1987, restive Kurdish groups on the southeastern borders of Turkey waged an insurrection and threatened to secede from Ankara. When the central government issued emergency legislation effectively placing the region under martial law, the specter of a return to dictatorship pervaded Turkish politics. It was thus in an atmosphere of considerable political tension that Turkey entered the 1990s, and not a few spectators awaited the National Assembly elections of October 1991 with expectations of another military intervention should the parliament emerge fractured.215

But by and large, the politics of Turkey in the 1990s avoided the feared instabilities. The 1991 election swept the True Path Party – immediate predecessor to Turkey’s modern-day center-right Democratic Party – into power, and elections in 1995 tended more conservative with the victory of the Islamic Welfare Party. While the Welfare Party’s religious agenda prompted a brief crisis in 1997 when the military issued a memorandum that effectively outlawed the organization (thus presenting the existing government with a fait accompli resignation), transitions to coalition governments proved peaceful, and the internecine violence that had marred the 1970s made a far more limited appearance.

But, as ever, the greatest transformations could be found in the social arena, where the shockwaves of globalization and shifting modes of economic development were felt most acutely. Turkey had failed to find workable solutions for the domestic discontent surrounding the

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215 Alev Scott, *Turkish Awakening: A Personal Discovery of Modern Turkey* (Faber & Faber, 2014), pp. 81-82.
adoption of neoliberal economic models in the 1980s. Its government had also gone further, deliberately blocking attempts by unions and other labor organizations to influence policy direction. By the end of the Eighties, the Turkish working class had responded to this marginalization through nation-wide collective organizing in pursuit of higher wages, better working conditions, but above all democratization of the labor legislation process. And the Turkish government found opposition from new sources altogether as the 1980s faded into the 1990s. Public servants, long loyal to the state, had as a result of shrinking state budgets found their career trajectories and earning potential weakened. In 1992 they organized their own labor union for the first time since 1971.216

Economic woes would soon add to the strained sociopolitical situation. In early 1994, American credit agencies lowered Turkey’s credit rating in response to expanding Turkish deficits in foreign trade. The consequent run on the Turkish lira precipitated a financial crisis that prompted Ankara to accept harsh austerity measures and aid agreements with extensive structural adjustment provisions. Center-right politicians and social democrats were held largely responsible for the financial catastrophe, largely because their platforms had promised new socioeconomic arrangements to stanch the worst wounds of neoliberalism. As popular opinion sought a scapegoat for turmoil, the Islamic Welfare Party gained increasing support, culminating in its 1995 electoral victory. As discussed earlier, the Welfare Party’s time in office was cut short by the threat of intervention by the military, which watched the party’s tolerance of fundamentalist Islam, drift toward desecularization, and flirtations with other Islamic powers with alarm.217

216 Ibid, pp. 102.
Socially, such developments were mirrored by broadening discontents over the uneven distributions of neoliberalism’s benefits. Particularly in urban areas, skyrocketing rates of poverty, declining salaries for public workers, continued difficulties in negotiating the democratization of labor policy formation, and the elimination of many public entitlements had eroded the political base of many of Turkey’s mainstream parties, and tensions akin to those of the 1970s began to rebuild as extremism gained a foothold in the major cities of Istanbul and Ankara.\textsuperscript{218}

In response, the Justice and Development Party (\textit{Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi}, hereafter AKP) – a coalition of conservative parties – emerged in 2001. AKP enjoyed immediate and consistent electoral success, achieving pluralities in the 2002, 2007, 2011, and 2015 legislative elections. The party’s founder, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, quickly emerged as its key leader and cultural figurehead, and would step down from official party leadership to assume the role of Turkish president in 2014. AKP – a pro-Western, pro-European Union liberal democratic party committed to building broad consensus – seemed the long-awaited remedy to Turkey’s political woes. But as the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis approached in 2008, unsettling antidemocratic acts – including the growth of unilateral actions by Erdogan – suggested to many that the threat of authoritarianism was returning to Turkish politics. Or perhaps Erdoganism was simply the latest defense of Kemalism, promulgated by AKP’s leader to weather the current crisis and preserve Atatürk’s republic.

\textsuperscript{218} Scott, \textit{Turkish Awakening}, pp. 110.
Conclusion

As the twentieth century gave way to the twenty-first, the eastern Mediterranean could reflect on a range of experiences in recent decades that had radically changed the nature and limits of nation, society, and identity. Over the course of sixty years, Greeks and Turks had endured the tumults of world war and subsequent global division along ideological and geographical lines. They had each, by virtue of their crucial strategic positions, fallen into a much grander game of grand strategy unfolding between superpowers who sought to gain influence — and, in the case of the Soviet Union, security — as older powers lost their grip on the region. And both Greece and Turkey had felt the full domestic ramifications of deep involvement in superpower strategy, as entrenched conservatives institutions in both nations, supported tacitly if not often explicitly by the United States, subjected their countries to dictatorship in the face of political turmoil.

Against the backdrop of the Cold War, Greek and Turkish societies had also transformed from within. From the time of its independence, Greece had drawn from the classical tradition in regarding itself as a unique civilizational strand with a sacred history, a Hellenic community bound by ethno-historical honor and by irredentist readings of the past. Turkey, entering the brotherhood of modern nation-states a century after its Greek counterpart, likewise tapped the reservoir of its deep history and shared cultural experiences in crafting a modern state and modern citizens. Institutionally, identities manifested in distinct ways: for Greece, a deep populist ethnic nationalism awakened in moments of national crisis or by the rhetoric of a skilled orator, and for Turks, a diverse but conservative body politic, influenced by the traditions of Islam and agrarianism, that coexisted with military guardianship of the modern secular democracy. The Cold War period did not supplant such identities, readings of history, and
institutional arrangements, but instead gave them new regional and international canvases upon which to be expressed. And when the international environment furnished by Soviet-American rivalry gave way to less familiar global circumstances at the end of the twentieth century, it was such transformed identities that shaped Greek and Turkish responses to the outside world. The situation was not unique to the two major powers of the eastern Mediterranean. But as nascent national entities with long histories and deep cultural roots to ages past – antiquity, religious animosity, and centuries of imperial rule – new views of the nation and its place in history were bound to have a particularly strong impact.

Still, there were no conspicuous signs of crisis on the horizon at the beginning of the twenty-first century. Indeed, it seemed that the worst times for both Greece and Turkey had already passed. While the 1960s and 1970s had witnessed profound instability across the eastern Mediterranean, the last two decades of the twentieth century were marked by concerted – and largely successful – attempts by both governments to consolidate control and social harmony in the wake of military dictatorships and potential conflicts on the foreign policy stage. In place of intransigence and mutual suspicion had arisen cooperation in the wake of mutual suffering and a willingness to pursue the benefits of transnationalism over the selfish gains of nationalism.

Yet as coming years would show, the brief period of stability, global accommodation, and diplomatic goodwill belied deeper and darker currents. The eastern Mediterranean had responded to the global unevenly, but constantly, throughout the second half of the twentieth century, and its path into the next bore the scars of its ordeal. Moreover, as they recovered from national traumas in the thirty years between the 1970s and the turn of the next century, Greeks and Turks had been given opportunities to synthesize international influences and indigenous cultures in the pursuit of consolidating identities – and such identities needed only another major
crisis to emerge with their full force. When proximate causes arrived in the form of the global recession of 2008-2009, the resulting explosion of popular discontents in the eastern Mediterranean represented not an acute response to temporary circumstances, but the apotheosis of recent national experiences conditioned by suffering, suspicion, and the adoption of new narratives that stressed the many betrayals of globalization.
Reflections on the Eastern Mediterranean’s “Imagined Communities:” Greece and Turkey at the Crossroads of Globalization

The Cold War cast a long shadow over interstate relations in the second half of the twentieth century. But its impacts stretched far beyond diplomacy and statecraft, as the strategic landscapes sculpted by the superpowers accelerated the transformation of cultures, societies, economies, and identities across the globe. In the eastern Mediterranean, as elsewhere, superpower competition cast into high relief struggles that had long unfolded between (and among) segments of society offering alternative visions of the future. Under the auspices of Soviet-American rivalry, Greeks, Turks, and Cypriots contended with the manifold challenges of modern nationhood, reconciling age-old animosities with the new realities of twentieth-century geopolitics. And, as this thesis has argued, the region’s Cold War experiences were conditioned throughout by a consistent and powerful synthesis of foreign influence alongside consolidation of domestic roles, power dynamics, and identities. The tangible intrusion of superpower action marked high points in the region’s involvement in global politics. But indigenous factors were always the primary drivers of developments as each society sought to answer penetrating questions about identity in the modern era.

Such questions, though, had arisen long before the Cold War, when the nascent Greek and Turkish nation-states expended copious blood and energy to cement cohesive national identities. For Greek politicians like Yiannis Makryiannis, Ioannis Kolettis, and, later, Eleftherios Venizelos, the contemporary world, wrought by Great Power competition, gave Greece a chance to fulfill its ancient destiny as chief exponent and defender of Hellenic civilization. Across the Aegean, Turkey – emerging from over nine hundred years of Ottoman rule – similarly sought to reconcile its glorious past with the political fragmentation and existential inertia of the present. For both Greeks and Turks, the period of national consolidation
moved in fits and starts. It involved a careful negotiation of new and deep foreign influences – immigration, communism, the growing presence of the British and the Americans – with long-running currents of ethnic identity, instilling a struggle between synthesis and consolidation that would last throughout the century. And as the foreign factor emerged with greater prominence with the coming of the Second World War, the eastern Mediterranean often had no choice but to participate in rapid synthesis. In the aftermath of great national traumas – war, forced migration, occupation, genocide, and internecine violence – Greeks and Turks had to align themselves in an increasingly polarized world whose superpower leaders frequently trivialized, and rarely recognized, the peculiarities of national and regional experiences. In a sense, the eastern Mediterranean had entered the Cold War long before superpower competition began in earnest, its people already weighing competing visions of a modern society.

But the Cold War proper, when it came forcibly to the eastern Mediterranean in the aftermath of Hitler’s defeat, accelerated the tempo and raised the stakes of internal debates. As integral powers on the southeastern flank of the Western alliance, both Greece and Turkey benefited from Marshall Plan aid, rhetorical support, and the steadfast protection of the United States should conservative agendas come under threat. But for NATO’s leaders, the Cold War would present regional challenges with far deeper roots than Soviet-American rivalry. While the eastern Mediterranean remained strategically aligned to Anglo-American interests, neither Washington nor London could control the insidious undercurrents of ethnic nationalism seething within both Greek and Turkish politics throughout the immediate postwar decades. The 1950s saw tensions over Cyprus inflame regional passions more significantly than at any point since the Greco-Turkish War, and the 1960s, a great time of tumult elsewhere in the Western world, witnessed the intensification of domestic conflict in both of the eastern Mediterranean’s NATO
members. When dictatorships threatened the democratic process in both nations, the United States – now the chief arbiter of eastern Mediterranean affairs – misread and misdiagnosed the eastern Mediterranean’s messages, ultimately failing to intervene decisively to forestall the dismantling of democracy in its birthplace. Still weary from wars spanning two generations, the Greek and Turkish people braced for more years of darkness.

The following decade, however, would witness a rebirth of civic dialogue alongside the suspension of democracy. The 1970s changed the world order, rearranging poles of international influence and proving the limits of superpower reach, and the eastern Mediterranean proved no stranger to their transformative power. In the aftermath of dictatorship, Greece chose the road of political reconciliation, moving “beyond politics” to chart a new course for the maimed Greek nation. Politicians, for decades exponents of bourgeois values and closely tied to the conservative factions that had led Greece into catastrophe, now embraced the language of democratic socialism to salve wounds and rebuild rapport, and key institutions of Greek life for the first time lost their power as an organizing force for the ethnos. Though Karamanlis stopped short of the dramatic transformations his successor Papandreou would enact, his leadership of metapolitefsi Greece made clear the nation’s decisive break with the past. At the same time, Turkey faced the rise of political polarization, social inequality, and even terrorism while growth and development caused the familiar shockwaves of economic expansion and contraction. For both Greece and Turkey, the Seventies represented a period of accommodation with the global that, though punctuated with turmoil and domestic violence, suggested the enduring supremacy of international interconnection. Looking abroad for economic development, supranational condominium, and cross-cultural influence, both nations, after decades of strife, seemed to have placed the ghosts of myopic ethnic nationalism squarely in the past.
Ultimately, however, the new identities expressed and consolidated during the 1970s held deep national significance, as the rhetoric of reconstruction and reconciliation served to rejuvenate and solidify the power of the ethnos. When Karamanlis handed the political reins to Andreas Papandreou and PASOK in 1981, he symbolically passed power to a modern-day Venizelos, a figure with broad popular appeal and grand visions of reviving the lost glories of Hellenism. But Papandreou had taken to heart the lessons of his predecessors’ ill-fated attempts at national rehabilitation. In their place, he synthesized his intimate knowledge of American politics, international relations, and the Greek domestic realm to vigorously assert Greece’s role on the foreign policy stage. In Turkey, the economic and diplomatic trends of the 1970s and 1980s – most notably deepening commitments of American aid and increasing commercial connection with the outside world – exposed rifts in society between those who had benefited and lost in the first phases of globalization. Marginalized Turks began to find their voice and articulated political visions hearkening back to the days of Islam, an attempt to shield the nation from the worst excesses of deepening global systems. The particularly observant among students of the region might have seen developments for what they were – a reckoning between deeply rooted notions of eastern Mediterranean identity and the vicissitudes of a changed international sphere, the continuation of synthesis versus consolidation.

Few observers, however, would have expected the dramatic turn of events in the Balkans at the beginning of the 1990s. Though the decomposition of the Soviet Union had long been recognized for its potential as a geopolitical domino, the sheer savagery of resulting shifts in southeastern Europe left even experts stunned. While the former Yugoslavia descended into war and genocide, the nations of the West rose in unison to condemn the internecine violence. But Greece had emerged as a nation concerned, as ever, with national and civilizational identity, its
capacity for self-assertion honed by the PASOK years and now directed outward with particular vitriol. Turkey, too, struggled with the ghosts of its authoritarian past throughout the last decade of the twentieth century, as the growth of membership in Islamist parties demonstrated. The dawn of the post-Cold War world highlighted what Greeks and Turks had long known: great power politics, while furnishing the environment in which each society acted, were far from the primary drivers of Greco-Turkish behavior. At the center of developments had always been the character of each nation’s people, shaped by the constant interplay of domestic politics and the challenge of consolidation amidst ever-changing influences from outside the nation. It was this legacy they now carried into a new century.

Some months ago I discovered a rare book on the Greek community of Istanbul. It had been loaned to me by a professor at the University of Thessaloniki, an expert on Greek Cypriots, who I had the pleasure of meeting, entirely by chance, through a mutual instructor acquaintance. In my best mixture of Greek and English I drafted an email letting him know I still had the book, and soliciting updated contact info for a return shipment. But a quick moment later, I received the ding of an auto-reply. Professor Markezinis, it said, was on research leave for another two months. He’d gone to northern Cyprus to work with a Turkish colleague on an oral history of the 1974 invasion. The process of traveling north was an arduous one, requiring express permission from both the Turkish and Greek governments and usually reserved for medical professionals or researchers (and even then, only a few academics were lucky enough to gain access, even for truly novel research). But, as Prof. Markezinis had told me during our last conversation, things were getting easier nowadays. The soldiers at the border weren’t so heavily armed. They smiled and told jokes and even brought candy for the Greek Cypriot children on the other side of the
fence. And there was real progress, he thought, on the longed-after territorial settlement, now
that a new generation of young Cypriots was gaining political conscience and demanding greater
inclusivity. Maybe, I thought, as I reshelved the book on Greco-Turkish relations, there was hope
for the twenty-first century. I remembered the lyrics to an old song by the Greek folk singer,
George Dalaras:

On the straits of the Bosporus,
Yiannis weeps at sunset.
And Mehmet, by his side,
Drinks and sings to him.
A Turk, I am, and you are Greek
I belong to a people, and you to a people too.
You, Christ, and I, Allah
But we both sigh “Aaah,” and “Vaaah.”
With a little love and wine,
I drink, and you drink too.
Drink a little from my cup,
I, your brother, and you, my brother too.  

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**Articles (Contemporary News and Current Events)**


**Articles (Scholarly)**


