American Feminism and Social Democracy

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AMERICAN FEMINISM AND SOCIAL DEMOCRACY

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

By

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University of Arkansas, 1974

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"If a term has many diverging definitions, it is better to begin by assuming that it is full of meanings. For none of the main ideas of our civilization has a single meaning..."

"But in the great ideas there is some kind of central validity around which disagreements and a variety of meanings continue to revolve. Everyone of the great ideas is confusing, because it is too full of meaning to be defined simply. But if it were empty of meaning, it would have disappeared into the void..."¹

As Walter Lippmann notes, the great notions of our civilization are difficult to grasp due to the many interpretations they are given. This is as true for the concepts of political theory as for those of any other study, and we resign ourselves to this problem, that no important idea will have a single, simple meaning.

This observation is made by way of introduction to the two major ideas to be dealt with in this paper -- feminism and democracy. The cardinal rule of multiple meanings is most applicable to these two concepts. Many meanings, some even contradictory, attach to these words. Feminism is defined by some as a political notion, dealing with political and legal issues. Others see feminism as containing something else and as dealing with something other than, or in addition to, the political and the legal.

¹Walter Lippmann, The Public Philosophy, (New York, 1955) Mentor, p. 120.
The same variations are found concerning the concept of democracy. Some hold that democracy is a purely political notion, while others maintain that it contains something other than, or in addition to, the political.

What are these extended meanings in feminism and democracy? What is seen as composing the "something else"? For the term democracy, the something else can be a social and economic meaning in addition to the political. There are those who deny that social and economic definitions of democracy are legitimate. Yet we find that there is some notion that various people persist in calling social democracy. And in feminism, there is often included in its "something else" an element that looks a great deal like this notion of social democracy. It is the purpose of this thesis to examine the applicability of the concept of social democracy to this particular strand of feminist understanding. It is the thinking of Charlotte Perkins Gilman and Jane Addams, two turn-of-the-century feminist writers, which will be analyzed through the use of a concept of social democracy.

The concepts of both social democracy and feminism will be discussed in detail in the course of the thesis. By way of introduction, broad definitions for these concepts will be offered here. Before attempting these definitions, however, the "central validity" of which Lippmann speaks and around which the definitions revolve should be established. The core of both social democracy and feminism, as they are to be used here, is a particular understanding of the notion of equality. Jean Bethke Elshtain has done an excellent job of explaining
this perception of equality and I shall therefore restrict the explanation of this concept to a brief summary of her work.²

**Equality**

Elshtain begins by discussing four versions of equality proffered in political thought. They are as she lists them: (1) equality as a statement of fact or a description of the ways in which persons either do or do not share certain characteristics, (2) equality of rights or equality under the law, (3) equality of opportunity, and (4) equality of treatment and respect.³

This first version of equality is often used as a reinforcement for institutionalized inequity in social arrangements, Elshtain tells us, because it presumes that to be "equal to" is to be the "same as". Equality here means sameness.⁴ Since we are all obviously not the same, then this definition leads us to the conclusion that we are not equal. If we are not equal, then it is easier to argue that we should not be treated equally.

The second version of equality, that of equality of rights or equality under the law, is based on the understanding that we all share common qualities as persons (capacity to suffer, to feel pain, to experience joy, etc.) which override the other qualities which are not

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⁴Ibid, p. 455.
shared by all. This Elshtain terms the "naturalistic argument for equality" and she explains that this version of equality argues for equality of respect for all people for the reason of our all simply being human. It is this version of equality that falls under the rubric "equality of rights", "equality under the law", and "political equality", although each of these has a different meaning. Equal rights means the right of all to participate, whereas full political equality would mean the opportunity to participate equally. The fact that everyone has equal political rights by no means ensures that everyone is politically equal.

Elshtain notes that this concept of equality of rights feeds into a third understanding of equality, that of equality of opportunity. According to this model, all people have the freedom to compete equally for that which society offers to those who succeed. Equality of opportunity assumes equal rights and extends its emphasis to economic rights and freedom of life. Under this system of equality, the opportunity of each person to an education, job, and status commensurate with her or his own ability is what constitutes justice.

This third concept of equality, Elshtain notes, has several major conceptual flaws, the most obvious being: Where does the competition begin so that we can be assured that it is equal? At birth? At the beginning of schooling? Of employment? We can't easily say.

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5 Ibid., p. 462.
6 Ibid., p. 463.
7 Ibid., p. 464
8 Ibid., p. 468.
The final theory of equality Elshtain discusses is one which moves beyond the language of equal rights and equal opportunities and into the notion of an equality of respect and treatment.\(^9\) As Elshtain explains, this concept of equality is tied into the second of the two meanings of equality as description, which sees equality as being based on an understanding of the shared humanity of all people. Simply stated, if we share among all of us common and equal needs that arise from our shared quality of being human, then it can follow that we have an equal need for respect (including self-respect) and for the treatment at the hands of society which will lead to this respect.

What are the logical outgrowths of this last understanding of equality? Elshtain tells us that to presume this kind of equality would necessitate social institutions and arrangements which promote and ensure equality of respect and treatment. In order to ensure this equality, social institutions would be arranged in such a way that a baseline would be established below which no one could drop, regardless of the presumed merit of the individual. Additionally, if we presume equality of respect and treatment, the range of rewards between different social positions would be narrowed. Such things as status, income, work life, family, and education would be open to scrutiny.\(^10\)

 Obviously, this particular notion of equality, by rejecting the theory of equality as "sameness", would view any institution or practice based on "natural inequalities" as illegitimate. Furthermore, it also

\(^9\)Ibid., p. 475.

\(^{10}\)Ibid., p. 472-73.
rejects an acceptance of a system of equality of opportunity or competition. To compete would mean that some people would fail. To fail would be to lose respect and would lead to a difference in treatment of the failing member. As Elshtain notes, "...equality of opportunity and equality of treatment are ultimately incompatible". Instead of recognizing, for example, the right to compete on equal footing for a job or to receive equal pay for the work, this final version of equality sees the issue as being the right to equal work itself.

It is this last notion of equality which is the core, the "central validity", around which social democracy and feminism will be defined for the purposes of this thesis. As previously noted, it is a particular kind of feminism that is to be examined here, and the feminist thinking that will be examined, that of Gilman and Addams, will be found to adopt this notion of equal respect and treatment.

**Initial Definitions**

Having now defined what is meant by equality, we move on to an initial and brief definition of feminism and social democracy. Feminism is used in this thesis to mean a philosophy which advocates the establishment within society of political, social, and economic institutions and practices which assure each person the individual control of her/his own political, social, and economic existence. These institutions and practices, according to this definition of feminism, are established through the enactment and acceptance of a system of equality of respect.

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11Ibid., p. 473.
12Ibid., p. 476.
and treatment. Social democracy is defined as the establishment of these equal political, social, and economic institutions and practices. The practice of equality of respect and treatment is social democracy, for the purpose of this thesis.

**Method of Analysis**

Thus we are dealing with a particular notion of democracy and are seeking to discover how that concept can be used to analyze a particular notion of feminism. The method used to make this examination will be to compare and contrast chosen authors who deal with these two concepts.

A partial discussion of works by Dorothy Pickles, Henry Mayo, and C. B. Macpherson will help establish a model of social democracy. The purpose of using these particular authors is that in composite they form a spectrum of comparison for differing conceptions of social democracy. For example, Pickles can be placed conceptually on the democratic right, for she is one of those who, as was alluded to in the opening paragraphs of this thesis, does not accept the notion of social democracy as being legitimate. Rather, Pickles maintains that democracy is a purely political concept which is not applicable to social or economic areas.

Macpherson can be set conceptually on the left side of our scale, for he maintains that democracy is incomplete if it is not extended into social and economic areas. At a later stage, it will be shown that Macpherson's model of social democracy is the closest to the feminist understanding which is based on equality of respect and treatment. His
model provides a basis for understanding what it is that one particular
type of feminism is saying about democracy.

Finally, we find on our conceptual spectrum that Mayo is in the
center, for while he ultimately denies the legitimacy of a concept of
a social democracy, he provides us with a compromise model which
incorporates elements of both Pickles' and Macpherson's separate understandings of democracy.

Thus, we will be contrasting the views of these three authors
and establishing through this contrast a spectrum for the purpose of
comparison. It is by this method that the concept of social democracy
will be clarified, for it will allow us to explore a multitude of
opposing and supporting views of this notion. It is Macpherson's model
which will ultimately be accepted as the model for understanding the
feminist use of social democracy for purposes of this study.

After we have come to grips with the diverging perceptions of
social democracy and have ultimately established the model which is most
compatible with this study, we shall move to an examination and analysis
of feminist theory based on this model. The two theorists whose work
will be utilized for this purpose are Charlotte Perkins Stetson Gilman
and Jane Addams. They were chosen because they are among the first
American feminists to display the understanding of democracy which was
labeled in our initial definition as being feminist. They hold to an
understanding of feminism which includes the "something else" of a social
and economic aspect. They see more than a political content to feminism
and in addition they see more than a political content in democracy.
Social democracy can thereby be used as a model for analyzing what
it is that Gilman and Addams are saying about both feminism and democracy.

We note that we will be stuck here with the chicken-or-the-egg dilemma. It can not be ascertained which came first -- did their understanding of feminism lead Gilman and Addams to the advocacy of a system of social democracy? Or did their understanding of democracy to include social and economic institutions lead to their adoption of feminism? An educated guess can be forwarded (for Gilman it was the former; for Addams the latter) but it would remain that -- a guess. The fact we should keep in sight is that we can see one feeding into the other -- democracy and feminism. It is the examination and documentation of this relationship which is the purpose of this thesis.

A further introductory note to Gilman and Addams is to say that it must be understood that they were sociologists, not political scientists. They use the vocabulary of their own profession, and although they speak of democracy and use the term, we have no assurance that they realized the significance of their work to political theory. It is only recently that feminists have begun to speak of social democracy per se in reference to feminism. Gilman and Addams never used that term. It is only through establishing a model for social democracy that we can see that this is indeed what they intended, that they were advocating the joining of a particular brand of feminism to a concept of social democracy.
CHAPTER II
SOCIAL/ECONOMIC DEMOCRACY

In order to clarify the concepts of social and economic democracy so that we can later establish their roles in feminist theory, we will now undertake the formation of comparative spectrum as explained earlier. In order to simplify the process of definition, the related concepts of social and economic democracy will be examined separately here and will be rejoined later at the appropriate place of development.

Social Democracy

In beginning this examination of the concept of social democracy, it is best to start by discussing how the scope of democracy first came to include social concerns. Pickles states that this enlargement of focus is the result of the changing nature of national economics and of economic relations from the 1950's onward, and the subsequent change in the political roles of economists and sociologists. Pickles is making reference here to the rise of the welfare state and the interest of academicians in the analysis of class structures in society. As people became more aware of the divisions between them that arose from the class structure, it caused "...the desire for an equal and classless society", which Pickles terms 'social democracy', and which she says

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has become the most outstanding political objective of the late 1960's.14

One is uncomfortable with Pickles' explanation here for two reasons. First is the fact that she treats social democracy as though it were a product of modern politics, when in reality we are aware that this notion was under development in the early 19th century by people such as Robert Owen. One wonders why she chooses to ignore these earlier writers. Secondly, the realization of the import of the phrase 'equal and classless' begins to nag at us, for it would seem that Pickles is talking about 'sameness' here, and we have already discussed the inappropriateness of that perception of equality in relation to social democracy.

Macpherson, too, has ignored the work of earlier theorists in his explanation of the expanding scope of democracy. Just as Pickles names the modern welfare state as the impetus for expanding democracy, so does Macpherson find the catalyst in a modern phenomenon, that of East-West competition and hostility.

The liberal, capitalist ethos is meeting stiff ideological competition from the non-liberal, socialist ethos, Macpherson tells us.15 Additionally, the social and economic expectations of the Third World Nations are rising, and this has increased their discontent with the unequal distribution of human opportunities between rich and poor.

14Ibid., p. 90.
countries.\textsuperscript{16} Because of these two conditions, liberal Western society is examining its system of democracy very closely in an attempt to justify it to the world.\textsuperscript{17} Hence the increasing concern for social democracy.

Macpherson sees the need for a system of social democracy as a crucial element in international relations. The competition between liberal democratic values and non-liberal democratic values threatens to continually disrupt world peace, and Macpherson hints that this divergence is leading us down the path to nuclear war.\textsuperscript{18} The key to the power struggle at this point is to develop a moral advantage, to create political and economic systems that the world will "accept" because they are moral systems.\textsuperscript{19} To be moral, political and economic systems must satisfy the desires of all their people.\textsuperscript{20} Macpherson says the desire of people is to have equal access to the means of a decent life and to have equal human rights.\textsuperscript{21} Hence the West must begin to concern itself with the expansion of democracy into the social realm of people's lives.

Macpherson's use of the concept of "equal access" as opposed to Pickles' "equal and classless" concept leads us to believe that Macpherson has an understanding of equality very similar to the one

\textsuperscript{16} Ibid., p. 23-34.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid., p. 38.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid., p. 37.
\textsuperscript{19} Ibid., p. 66.
\textsuperscript{20} Ibid., p. 65.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., p. 65.
defined and accepted earlier as a system of equality of respect and
treatment. It is of significance that he does not limit his notion of
equality to equal opportunity for access but speaks of equal access
itself. This is consistent with the definition of equality which we
accepted as the basis for our definition of social democracy.

The point to be made here is that, for one reason or another,
the Western world began to express an interest in expanding democratic
values into the social arena. But how is social democracy expressed?
How is it achieved?

Pickles tells us that social democracy finds expression three
ways: (1) through participation, (2) through the "levelling influences"
of social services, and (3) by the establishment of a unified, uniform
national educational system. Pickles is not thorough in her discus­
sion of these systems. She doesn't explain what participation is, who
is participating, or what is to be participated in. She does give us
some insight as to the nature of the levelling influences of social
services, one of which is education. She speaks of the difficulty of
establishing "...the precise point at which all unnatural equalities,
such as wealth, status, educational and social opportunity, will have
been eliminated, leaving only the natural inequalities that cannot be
eliminated by political action." The social services, then, are to
level these unnatural inequalities.

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22 Pickles, p. 90.

23 Ibid., p. 91-92.
There are two objections to this perception of Pickles, both of which stem from our acceptance of Elshtain's theory of equality. First, we have already been forewarned about institutions which include consideration of "natural inequalities", for, as Elshtain has explained, we are of course not all the same and to dwell on our natural inequalities is to invite justification for unequal treatment. Secondly, under the system of equality that has been adopted for use in this paper, there is no assumption that we will end the unnatural inequalities of wealth status, and so forth as mentioned by Pickles. Elshtain speaks of establishing "...a baseline...below which none could fall..." She does not speak of "levelling".

Macpherson is more helpful than Pickles in dealing with the question of how social democracy is achieved. He tells us that under the present system of liberal capitalism, the only people who can participate fully are those who own the means of labor, which is defined as something to work on, land or material or other capital. Anyone not owning the means of labor cannot participate unless some of her/his powers are transferred to someone holding those means. By human powers, Macpherson means the strength and skills possessed by a person plus the ability to exercise those skills. In order to exercise human skills, one must have access to the means of labor. Without that access, a person is without full human powers and is therefore incapable of full participation in society.

24 Macpherson, Real World, p. 43.
25 Ibid., p. 41. Also Democratic Theory, p. 9.
Two quick notes need to be interjected here. First, by participation in society, Macpherson means the right to work in society. This is consistent with Elshtain's observation that under a system of equality of respect and treatment, the issue of employment becomes one of a right to equal work rather than a right to compete for work, equal or not. Now we notice that once again Macpherson is rejecting the concept of equality of opportunity. He does not say that human powers are skills plus the opportunity to exercise them. Opportunity implies something passive, transient, optional. Macpherson uses the term "ability", which implies a permanent state of being.

To summarize Macpherson, we find that only the owners of the means of labor are full participants in society. Only owners have access to full human powers because only they are assured of the ability of exercising their human powers. Everyone else must transfer some of their powers to these owners in order to participate, to work. They, therefore, do not have full human powers. In order to achieve social democracy, then, the transfer of powers must no longer be compulsive. All people must have equal access to the means of labor.

In order to end the transfer of powers from non-owners to owners, Macpherson tentatively advocates that all people become owners of the means of labor.26 This is essentially a socialist model and according to Macpherson, it is therefore basically unacceptable to the members of the market-oriented West.27 But Macpherson feels that once the harmful


27Ibid., p. 15-16.
effects of market society are fully understood, the liberal West would welcome the opportunity to trade the limited freedoms offered by capitalist society for the full freedoms afforded by a system of equal access.

It should be emphasized that Macpherson's system of equal access has no relation to Pickle's system of levelling through social services. Indeed, Macpherson disagrees that a welfare society has much of a levelling influence at all. For although the benefits of a welfare state do set up systems of transfer payments in the other direction, from owners to non-owners, these offsetting transfers can never equal the original and continuing transfer inherent in capitalism. If the welfare transfers were equal, there would be no profits. Without profits, the capitalist system would no longer exist. So social services cannot be considered as anything but a minor equalizing agent, if that, and have nothing to do with equality of access.\(^\text{28}\)

Up to this point we've seen how social democracy came to be considered and how it might be achieved. But we've still to answer the question: What is social democracy? For Pickles, social democracy is both the means and the end to a classless society. She equates social democracy and an equal, classless society, and she also tells us that social democracy is the way to achieve an equal society. She implies that in a system of social democracy everyone participates equally, everyone has the same level of material achievement, and everyone has the same level of education.

\(^{28}\text{Ibid.}, \text{ p. 12.}\)
For Pickles, this would be an appalling and illegitimate system of government, however. She doubts seriously that social democracy (or social equality, as she terms it) can be achieved through political means and she denies that a majority of citizens are interested in acquiring this equality. Pickles' purpose in equating social democracy with social equality seems evident. It is probably very true that pure social equality could never be achieved in any society; by saying that social democracy is essentially the same thing as social equality, she denies the possibility of establishing a socially democratic system. Note that this is the "sameness" perception of equality again, which we rejected in the initial definition of social democracy and feminism in the introduction.

The main reason Pickles objects to trying to establish any system of government that would forward the goal of social equality is that she thinks such a system would destroy political democracy.

"In one way, an unrelenting pursuit of social equality may prove more likely...to destroy democracy itself. For once egalitarians go beyond the attempt to eliminate real economic inequalities and seek to eliminate...feelings of inferiority, they are setting out on a road that seems likely to be endless...In the process of chopping away at one real or imagined privilege after another, the egalitarians could also eliminate much of the individual freedom that is an even more essential objective of democracy".30

For Pickles, freedom and equality are irreconcilable. Democracy to her is a political process, not a social goal. Social democracy is therefore an illegitimate concept. It is Pickles' understanding of

29Pickles, p. 91

30Ibid., p. 92.
equality as sameness which leads her to fear social democracy as a levelling process. She is afraid that people will lose the right to be different, and will be forced to be equal. Under our understanding of equality as a system of equal respect and treatment, this, it has been shown, would not be the case. Again we must refer to Elshtain’s "baseline". To set a floor past which no one is allowed to drop does not lead to or even imply levelling. To give everyone equal access to the means of labor is not to lose the right to be different. Within a system of social democracy as it has been defined for the purposes of this thesis, Pickles’ fears are ungrounded.

It is obvious that Macpherson will take issue with Pickles’ view of democracy. He would agree with her that social democracy is a means to an end, a type of process, but that is as far as the agreement would go. For Macpherson, social democracy is the process by which everyone achieves equal access to the means of labor. Under a system of social democracy, everyone would have the ability to achieve equal human rights. For Macpherson, a system of social democracy assures everyone an equal access to the means of exercising her/his full human powers. This is not the same thing at all as Pickles’ "equal and classless society", although Macpherson would probably approve of such a system. But with social democracy, there is still the possibility that some people, although they have equal access to the means of labor, might choose not to use this access. They may still choose to transfer their powers to others, for whatever reasons. People would not be forced to be equal, which is what Pickles implies.

Social democracy, then, is only a process by which people could be allowed equal access to the means of labor, if they want it. It is
also a process with a goal — that of ending all transfer of individual power. Macpherson would term this state an "economic democracy", the last step in achieving a genuine democracy. Equal access is social democracy for Macpherson; the end of the transfer of powers is economic democracy.

Macpherson, then, sees social democracy as a legitimate and necessary element of a politically democratic system. Macpherson fears that the liberal democratic ethos is in danger of being overcome by the non-liberal democratic element, as was discussed earlier. He feels that western liberal democracies must establish a system of social democracy in order to justify their values in the eyes of the world and therefore gain a moral advantage in the current world-wide power struggle of ideologies. For Macpherson, social democracy is the logical extension of democratic values.

The basic contention between Pickles and Macpherson is how the ultimate goal of democracy is viewed. Pickles would tell us that the purpose of democracy is to ensure individual freedoms above all. Any move to deal with societal problems as a whole is therefore suspect, because the interests of the public are then considered to take precedence over the interests of private individuals.

Macpherson would tell us that implied in Pickles' view of freedom as the realization of "natural inequalities" is a two-fold assumption: (1) that people have an unlimited natural desire for acquisition, that they consciously seek the means of establishing unnatural inequalities, such as wealth, status, etc., and (2) that people
have the right to acquire as many material possessions as possible. It is assumed that some will acquire more than others. This diversity would seem to be quite acceptable to Pickles, who would probably tell us that this inequality is a small price to pay for the advantages afforded by individual freedoms.

Macpherson would agree that one of the primary objectives of democracy is to protect individual freedoms and it is his respect for those freedoms which compels him to concern himself with the survival of Western liberal values. He does not agree that people have an unlimited and natural desire for individual appropriation. Rather, he contends that this assumption was cultivated in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries as a necessary element of the market mentality.31

It is this assumption, coupled with the belief in a scarcity of goods, that leads to the transfer of powers and the denial of equal access to the means of labor.

"Putting the logical chain in reverse order, and compressing it, we get: the acceptance, by the most active part of society, of the belief that unlimited desire is natural and rational leads to the establishment of the right of unlimited appropriation, which leads to the concentration of ownership of the material means of labor, which leads to the continual net transfer of powers."32

Belief in unlimited human desire and the ensuing inclusion in the definition of freedom of the right to unlimited acquisition are inimical to human development, therefore, because it allows some people

31Macpherson, Democratic Theory, p. 17.
32Ibid., p. 18.
to acquire the means of labor, causing others to forfeit their powers in order to get access to those means. Under a system of social democracy, therefore, this element of market freedom, that of unlimited acquisition, will be modified in order to achieve the larger freedoms afforded by equal access to the means of labor.

By contrasting the views of Pickles and Macpherson, we have arrived at a model of social democracy which will be used as a means for analyzing what it is that Gilman and Addams are saying about democracy. The elements of the model include: (1) It is based on an understanding of equality as a system of equal respect and treatment. As such, it rejects the notions of equality as sameness, or as exclusively political and dealing with rights, or as a system only of opportunity. (2) Based on this perception of equality, the model for social democracy postulates a baseline below which no one can drop regardless of her/his presumed merits. Further, this model, (3) advocates the establishment of social institutions, arrangements, and practices which preserve and promote equality of respect and treatment. (4) Such institutions and practices would include provisions for the equal participation of all people in society. To participate here means the same as to work as well as political participation. (5) In order to insure that all people can participate equally in society, the model of social democracy provides for equal access by each individual to the means of labor. (6) In order to provide equal access, all people will own the means of labor. (7) In order for these means of labor to be owned by all, social democracy denies the validity and
rationality of unlimited individual acquisition which is based on the false assumption that people have unlimited desire for personal appropriation.

Before moving on to an examination of feminism based on this model, we must deal with one more area. By way of introduction, we can ask the question: What is social and what is economic?

In modern corporate society, we recognize that it is often impossible to separate social services and exigencies from those which are economic. Therefore it is necessary that we discuss the concept of economic democracy.

This brings us to the point of considering the role of capitalism as an economic system which would be viable within a social democracy, for the philosophical base of competition and natural inequality on which capitalism is founded is seen to be in many ways incompatible with the concept of equal respect and treatment of a social democracy. This consideration will now be examined.

Economic Democracy

As it was necessary to examine the reasons why the concept of democracy came to include social matters, so it would be appropriate to formulate some idea as to why democracy came to be considered in economic terms. In this section, as in the section on "Social Democracy", we will contrast various authors in order to have the opportunity to examine disparate views and opinions which will aid in defining the concept of economic democracy.
The possibility of establishing a system of economic democracy is considered from time to time, Pickles tells us, in the interest of justice, stability, popularity, efficiency, or individual freedom. Although there are people who believe that the extension of democracy to the economic sector is necessary if democracy is to be genuine, Pickles maintains that this would be impossible.

No one can define the concept of economic democracy in political terms, says Pickles, and without such a definition, there is no way that a national government can operationalize such a system. Pickles does not explain what she means by this observation and one can only assume that she is puzzled at the prospect of applying political processes, such as majority rule and minority rights, to economic concerns on a national scale. For example, if everyone having an equal vote is a tenet of political democracy, what will it be that people will have "one equal of" in an economic democracy? As shall be discussed in a moment, it could be that it is again one equal vote that people have as part of an economic democracy, a system which is popularly termed "industrial participation". In passing, one can also note that there is no reason why the government has to operationalize the system nor why it would be done on a national scale.

Macpherson would be distraught to think that a belief in the impossibility of establishing an economic democracy would gain much

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33Pickles, p. 79-80.

34Ibid., p. 80.
credence, for he maintains that economic democracy is the end we must achieve in order that liberal democratic values be justified and thereby prevail. As was discussed earlier, Macpherson holds that in order to have Western liberal values "accepted" by the world and to end the escalation of hostilities between liberal democracies and non-liberal democracies, a moral advantage must be established by existing liberal democratic systems. In order to do so, a system of social democracy must be established in which everyone has equal access to the means of labor. This system of equal access, which for Macpherson is social democracy, will eventually lead us to a system of economic democracy, in which the transfer of individual powers has ceased. How then, can a system of economic democracy be established? What does it look like?

Pickles is helpful in that she discusses five types of systems of economic democracy. Her first example is that of an economically egalitarian system where the means of labor, to borrow Macpherson's term, are entirely in the hands of the State, and causes of economic inequality (inherited wealth, private property, etc.) are eliminated. This particular system is not acceptable to either Macpherson or Pickles. Macpherson, we recall, wants the means of labor to be owned by everyone, which is different from State ownership. Pickles, on the other hand, advocates the private ownership of capital.

Secondly, Pickles tells us that the term "economic democracy" can simply mean "an intelligent system of labour relations".  

35 Ibid., p. 80.
36 Ibid., p. 80.
Or it can be interpreted as meaning "participation", a system of industrial democracy under which workers are consulted regarding conditions of work and pay. Another form of industrial participation identified by Pickles is one in which the workers cooperate with management in the actual running of businesses and industry, and/or in the sharing of profits. Macpherson would most likely agree, but he would probably tell us that an economic democracy includes all these elements and would deny that they are separate concepts, as Pickles' catalogue seems to imply.

Finally, Pickles tells us that economic democracy is interpreted by some as being a system in which the economy is run by the workers. This last system, says Pickles, entails a complete reorganization of society, eliminating the State and the wage system altogether. The reason for this outcome, Pickles says, is that "...no conceivable society could be organized through the spontaneous action of separate working units, and...a central trade-union headquarters would either become a new State or leave its country without any economic or political direction or coordination..." Therefore, Pickles concludes, "...the logical implication of this doctrine is anarchism".

Although Pickles spells "anarchism" here with a small rather than large "a", one is still left with the impression that she sees anarchism

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37 Ibid., p. 81.
38 Ibid., p. 81
39 Ibid., p. 81.
40 Ibid., p. 81.
41 Ibid., p. 81.
as a sinister affair, synonymous with chaos, rather than as a valid (at least academically) societal alternative. We must conclude that this predicted outcome is an unsubstantiated value judgement on Pickles' part. Why is it not conceivable that society can remain organized if workers become managers also? When citizens were given control of politics, the result was not anarchy -- if citizens manage politics, why not economics? What is economy now if not "the spontaneous action of separate working units"? It does not follow that to allow people to manage their own work would cause chaos, which is what Pickles seems to mean. Her description of the system is useful. Her prediction that it will lead to the elimination of the State is questionable.

Macpherson would agree with Pickles that the practice of economic democracy includes such elements as wise labor relations, participation of workers in decisions regarding work and pay, and worker cooperation in the running of businesses. It is noted that while Pickles distinguished these elements as being separate systems, Macpherson probably would not. Under his system of social democracy, everyone has equal access to the means of labor. If every person is to maintain her/his equal access, we must assume that they will have equal participation in controlling the management of those means. That would ultimately constitute an economy run by workers, the fifth type of economic democracy that Pickles listed.

Pickles told us this type of system would eliminate the State by virtue of being anarchistic. For reasons discussed above, we reject that value judgement. Pickles also stated that this type of economic democracy would end the wage system, which she sees as being capitalism
itself. This perception seems to have a logical base. If all workers are owning and managing industry, they probably would not be involved in what has been traditionally termed "wage earning". They would probably share profits, and deficits in some manner, but they wouldn't receive "wages" as such. Capitalism as we have known it would no longer exist.

Questions to be addressed now are: How can divorcing democracy from capitalism be justified? Is not capitalism the economic system which is most compatible with the concept of democracy, since both of them sprang from the same liberal values? Obviously Macpherson won't think so.

As was briefly discussed earlier, Macpherson sees the acceptance of capitalism as being based on the following premises: (1) The essential human quality is that of striving for possession; people have unlimited desire for acquisition;42 (2) Human beings are averse to activity and therefore will not work except for material reward;43 (3) Human society is in a constant state of scarcity.

Consequently, in order to produce enough goods to meet the demands of unlimited desire in a world of scarcity, and in order to provide naturally inactive people with the incentive to produce more goods, a market economy is necessary. The qualifying democratic condition is that everyone must have an equal opportunity to compete in the market.

42 Macpherson, Democratic Theory, p. 17.

43 Macpherson, Real World, p. 38.
According to Macpherson, these premises and assumptions are fallacious. There is a strain of unlimited desire for possessions that can be detected in human nature, but the true human essence is activity with purpose. People are creative producers, not just consumers. Therefore the demise of the wage-reward system which serves as the basis of capitalism would not eliminate the incentive for people to produce the goods and services necessary to the survival of society. Additionally, human society is no longer faced with scarcity but instead, thanks to technology and automation, it is now approaching a state of abundant goods. Capitalism is no longer seen as necessary in the modern world by Macpherson.

The major flaw that is found in this line of reasoning is encountered when we consider Macpherson's perception of the modern world as having an abundance of goods. The problem stems from the issue of natural resources. Increasingly the need to conserve natural resources is becoming of concern to responsible peoples, for it is recognized that those resources are becoming more scarce, and, once depleted, can never be replaced in kind. Does this not mean that Macpherson's perception of abundance is false, or at least a temporary state?

Upon consideration of two factors, Macpherson's theory can be accepted. The first is that a major element in the problem of scarcity of natural resources is not that those resources are as of yet near depletion but rather that there is a problem in the distribution of

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44 Ibid., p. 4-5.
them. An obvious example is found in the oil situation, in which many countries have faced a scarcity of oil not because there is no oil to be had but because they cannot afford to buy it or have been denied the opportunity to buy it. The second consideration is that while logic tells us that it is inevitable that someday the natural resources will be depleted, we also recognize that technology can offer us substitutes for at least some of them. Solar energy as a replacement for oil and coal is one such example.

So it is with the reservation of the natural resource issue and the two ensuing considerations above that we can understand Macpherson's rejection of capitalism as a system still necessary for and compatible with democracy.

Henry Mayo is useful in dealing with this question of what economic system is most compatible with democracy. He encourages the consideration of an economic continuum, which has democratic capitalism on one end and democratic socialism on the other. A move too far toward laissez faire capitalism will threaten a democracy with social revolution while coming too close to total, enforced social egalitarianism will conflict with political liberties. Mayo seems to be rejecting both Pickles' insistence on a wage and market economy, and Macpherson's proposal of a particular type of socialist economy. In their place, Mayo is advocating a balance between both as the economic system most compatible with democracy. Mayo, as the centrist in this comparison, is offering a compromise.

Mayo agrees with Pickles that the concept of democracy is political and is that exclusively. But he does not agree with her that political democracy is totally unrelated to social and economic issues. For Mayo, the political system is paralleled by the social and the economic, a perception he shares with Macpherson. The political freedoms and safeguards that are guaranteed by democracy are reflected and mimicked in the socioeconomic system, and vice versa. As political democracy grows, it is paralleled by a similar growth in the social and economic systems.47

Mayo would disagree with Macpherson that it is the role of democratic government and political systems to assure the existence of social and economic democracy. Nor would Mayo agree that political democratization is a first step in a larger evolution toward an equal society. Political equality and freedom, when achieved, is a complete system of itself.

What Mayo tells us is that political democracy makes it more likely that the values of democracy will carry over into other spheres, that the development of political democracy will nurture the development of democratic values in the whole society. But democracy as a concept is complete when political self-government is achieved. Democracy remains for Mayo a political term, as it does for Pickles.

There is a special significance to this argument that is found in both Mayo and Pickles that democracy ultimately remains a political concept. Peter Bachrach, in his work, The Theory of Democratic Elitism, explains what that significance is.

First, says Bachrach, the contention that democracy is only a political term stops the consideration of expanding democracy to the economic sector. This in turn allows corporate elites to escape accountability to the general public, even though they make decisions directly affecting social values. Consequently, to limit democracy to political matters ends consideration of participation in the decision-making process of powerful industrial institutions by the society which they affect. Ultimately, to limit democracy to the political sector, Bachrach notes, is to discard the principle of "equality of power", which can be taken to mean what we have called "equality of respect and treatment". In its place is put the principle of equality of opportunity to compete.\textsuperscript{48} The competition would be to see who got to make the economic decisions.

Here then, we come to an understanding of the basic difference between the proponents of the concept of democracy as a political system and those who believe that in addition to the political, democracy is something else, that it has social and economic meaning. This difference is based on the way that equality is defined. Those who see equality as meaning equal opportunity in the quest to achieve something, who are trying to equalize the "starting lines" in the competition for individual social and economic rewards, consequently seem to view democracy as a legal/political process which can equalize this competition. Those who view equality as meaning equal respect and treatment in the quest to achieve something, who want equal access for all people to the means of achieving their individual social and economic goals, seem to view

democracy as a social/economic process, in addition to the political, which will insure that this access is equal. It is important to notice that this second interpretation of democracy foregoes competition entirely.

By reversing the order, we can say that Pickles and Mayo are viewing democracy as political because they define equality as being equal opportunity, while Macpherson sees democracy as being social and economic because he defines equality as meaning equal respect and treatment, without the competition aspect which is found in the concept of equal opportunity.

It is Macpherson's understanding of economic democracy that we are now going to include as the eighth and final element of our model for social democracy. This notion of economic democracy is defined broadly as a worker-management approach to industry and business which acts to end the transfer of powers. In this concept, all people, by virtue of owning the means of labor, participate in the management of those means and in the sharing of the benefits (profits) of production. This system is characterized by a lack of competition and would end the wage system as we have known it.

Summary of Model

Before moving on to our discussion of feminism and its relationship to social democracy, the model that has assumed for this study should be summarized briefly and completely once more. Its elements are:
(1) It is founded on a notion of equality as a system of equal respect and treatment;
(2) Based on this perception, it postulates a baseline below which no one can drop;
(3) It advocates the establishment of social institutions and practices which preserve equality of respect and treatment;
(4) It provides that all people will participate (work) equally in society; therefore,
(5) It provides equal access for all people to the means of labor;
(6) In order to have equal access, all people own the means of labor; therefore,
(7) The model denies the acceptability of unlimited individual acquisition;
(8) The model includes a concept of economic democracy as a worker-management approach to industry and business which precludes competition and ends the traditional wage system.
CHAPTER III
CHARLOTTE PERKINS GILMAN, JANE ADDAMS, 
AND FEMINIST DISCONTENT

With our model for social democracy now established, we can use it to analyze and understand a particular type of feminism. As was previously mentioned, we will be using a partial listing of the works of Charlotte Perkins Stetson Gilman (1860-1935) and Jane Addams (1860-1935) for this purpose. The following is a brief summary of the works which are included.

In 1898, Gilman attempted to answer the question of how to achieve full equality for women in an industrial society. In Women and Economics, Gilman concludes that it is both morally and economically necessary that women work as men do. In an attempt to dispel the "domestic mythology" and "matriolatry" that pervaded her time and blocked any major change in women's societal roles, Gilman published The Home in 1903, an expose' of the harmful effect of sex-stereotypical home life on women, their families, and, consequently, on society itself. Gilman firmly believed in the redeeming qualities of work which is of benefit to society while fulfilling the individual, a belief she delineates in 1904, in the book, Human Work. Housework, in Gilman's view, does not always meet those requisites. The reason that women have been limited to the home is that they are socialized from birth to believe that this is all they can or should do, a theme that Gilman develops in The Man-Made World, published in 1911.
Jane Addams, like Gilman, was essentially an activist and much of her published work is compilations of the innumerable speeches and lectures she gave in the cause of her social work. For example, *Democracy and Social Ethics*, published in 1902, is a composite of 12 lectures that Addams delivered at various colleges and universities across the country. Here Addams contends that the concept of democracy has evolved into a system of, and commitment to, "social justice" and a particular type of lifestyle. In her 1912 publication, *The Spirit of Youth and the City Streets*, Addams uses the predicament of young, working class people caught up in the rapid changes of an industrializing society to illustrate the need to expand democratic values to industrial and social life. *Newer Ideals of Peace* (1927) is Addams' plea for recognition of the common human bond between all people and her statement of hope that this recognition, which validates the worth of each individual, will stop humanity from exploiting its own kind, particularly in war.

We will now begin to examine the assumptions Gilman and Addams make concerning the establishment of society. These assumptions serve as Gilman's and Addams' justifications for asserting that society has, through history, been naturally evolving toward a cooperative state.

**Establishment and Evolution of Society**

Both Gilman and Addams see society as progressing to a better stage, an ideal condition. They express belief in a good and perfectable human nature, and they are "environmentalists", believing that human character is shaped by the environment in which they live. As such, both authors express deep concern for organizing society in such a way
as to bring out the good in people. Both authors postulate the possibility of achieving such a society based on their assumptions about the beginnings of civilization.

Gilman and Addams both tell us that it was "natural" parental affection that was the first source of civilization. They view the development of society from the point of that affection onward differently, however.

Gilman postulates that at the very dawning of human consciousness, the need of mother and child for each other established the first form of cooperation. They were mutually dependent in the uncivilized state of society, therefore, they became unified by affection. This happened, however, "long before fatherhood was anything more than a momentary incident". 49 The male, at this point, did not contribute to the cooperation.

There was to come a time when man began to contribute. Gilman tells us that while women and children were learning affection, males were fighting each other for mating partners. This ended when males decided that it would be easier to fight the smaller female once and for all for mating privileges rather than have to win her in combat with other males.

"There seems to have come a time when it occurred to the dawning intelligence of this amiable savage that it was cheaper and easier to fight a little female, and have it done with, than to fight a big male every time. So he instituted the custom of enslaving the female; and she, losing freedom, could no longer get her own food nor that of her young." 50

50 Ibid., p. 60.
This in turn taught man to care for others, because, "...he must care for what he forbade to care for itself, else it died on his hands".  

This then expanded cooperative understanding.

"By this common interest, existing now not only between mother and child, but between father, mother, and child, grew up a wider common consciousness."  

In this way, men, who Gilman considers to be naturally destructive, were "tamed" by women, who Gilman sees as being naturally constructive. Women's subordination was necessary to achieve this end. Men had to learn to be civilized and to cooperate. They have done so now, and the socializing effect of the subordinate woman is no longer necessary to the evolution of society, Gilman concludes.

Gilman's assumptions about the establishment and evolution of society, which today seem at best picturesque, are useful in providing her with justifications for two principles. The first of these is the validation of a cooperative society based on "history". Gilman has written a story of history in which man learns to care for women and children, and thus discover this superior mode of interaction-cooperation. "History" teaches that cooperation is best, superior to other types of relations. "History" for Gilman shows that it is "natural" for this cooperation to expand to include all members of society.

The second principle that Gilman justifies through her assumptions concerning the beginning of society is that of the changing role and

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51 Ibid., p. 61.
52 Ibid., p. 125.
53 Ibid., p. 126-127.
54 Ibid., p. 136.
status of women. Gilman "proves" that it was once necessary for women to be subjugated to men in order to civilize them. Since men are now tame, there is no longer a need for women to be subordinate. It is now "safe" for the status of women to improve.

Addams, too, makes certain assumptions concerning the establishment of society. For Addams, the path to a cooperative society is different from Gilman's. Although she doesn't spend as much time on it as Gilman, Addams also accredits the establishment of civilization to parental affection and the creation of the family. She speaks of "man's motive power" as being found in "elemental appetites". It was this appetite that drove man "...to secure and protect a mate, developing into domestic life, widening into the building of homes and cities, into the cultivation of the arts and a care for beauty." 55 The unifying factor of the family, with its ensuing benefits, is affection for children.

"That wonderful devotion to the child seems at times, in the midst of our stupid social and industrial arrangements, all that keeps society human, the touch of nature which unites it, as it was that same devotion which first lifted it out of the swamp of bestiality...It is, of course, this tremendous force which makes possible the family, that bond which holds society together..." 56

Eventually, Addams tells us, man found cause to enter into tribal relationships. It was here that a wider social morality, i.e. cooperation, began to develop.


56Ibid., p. 33-34.
"...Primitive man, by the very necessities of his hard struggle for life, came at last to identify his own existence with that of his tribe. Tribal life then made room within itself for the development of that compassion which is the first step towards sensibility and higher moral sentiment."  

Unfortunately, tribal life established a double set of ethics, one for the relation with tribal members and one for relations with outsiders. As tribes have grown into nations, this double standard has remained. Consequently, we have never been assured of international peace.  

Addams finds a solution to this problem among the poorer members of the cosmopolitan city. Here she is referring to the immigrants who were flooding into American cities during the period in which she was writing. These immigrants, Addams notes, have different "tribal heritages" which they have given up on order to merge into a new culture. Because the immigrants of differing nationalities are so varied in their heritages, they are forced as a whole to meet on the only common ground remaining to them -- that of their shared humanity.

"Because of their differences in all external matters, in all of the non-essentials of life, the people in a cosmopolitan city are forced to found their community of interests upon the basic and essential likeness of their common human nature..."  

In this way the citizens of the American cities are laying the foundations for international peace, by learning through necessity to accept and cooperate with people of other nationalities.  

58 Ibid., p. 11.  
60 Ibid., p. 17.  
61 Ibid., p. 18.
It is through these assumptions that Addams claims justification for her belief in the inevitability of a system of cooperation between all people, not just those of this society. By assuming its inevitability, she can next argue that it is pointless to wait to actualize it. At the time she was writing this, Addams was deeply involved in the pacifist effort to avoid the European conflict that became World War II. Her assumptions about the evolution of society would obviously serve well as a buttress to this effort.

Another important observation here is that Addams, by emphasizing the common and essential humanity of people, has now laid the foundation for a notion of equality defined as equal respect and treatment. It will be recalled that in Chapter I Elshtain explains that both equal rights and equal respect and treatment are based on the understanding that all people share a common bond of humanity, thus all people should have equal rights and equal respect and treatment at this point. Addams has not yet totally committed to this notion of equal respect and treatment. We should note the groundwork for it as it exists here, however.

In summary, we find that through differing assumptions, Gilman and Addams conclude that society has the potential for cooperation and that it is natural for society to progress toward this goal. The concept of cooperation is still vague here, and thus we will soon move to a closer examination of what their notions of a cooperative ideal are. Before doing so, we are going to examine the reasons for which the cooperative ideal has failed to be realized and what it is that is blocking the path.
Another preface to a discussion of the notion of cooperation is the consideration of why cooperation is of importance to feminism and the model of social democracy that we are using to analyze feminism. Recall that the model requires an end to competition based on both its rejection of a notion of equality as equal opportunity and on the subsequent requirement for equal access. If people are not competing for social and economic rewards, and if they are not living in total isolation from one another, then how are they interacting? We seem to be left with the answer -- they are cooperating.

Here, then, we see this particular notion of feminism becoming more understandable in light of the model of social democracy. By postulating and advocating a cooperative society, Gilman and Addams seem to be rejecting competitive society, which, if true, would be consistent with social democracy. At this point, we are only noting the trend. A definition of the cooperative ideal itself will be necessary to confirm this tendency.

Problems Blocking the Cooperative Ideal

Gilman and Addams both postulate that society is naturally progressing to a cooperative ideal, although they use different assumptions to justify this shared belief. But is is evident that society has not yet reached the mark and much must be done before the ideal is realized. What is the problem? Why has a cooperative society not yet been attained?

In Gilman we are able to identify three broad areas of complaint -- "false" economic laws, the institution of the home, and the status and
role of women. Addams identifies the trouble as lying in social relations, industrial relations, and, finally, in what she terms "filial" relations. We shall discuss these areas separately, beginning with that of economic and industrial relations.

**Economic and Industrial Relations**

Gilman tells us that one of the major blocks to the formulation of a cooperative society is our acceptance of false economic concepts and the subsequent erroneous understanding we have about work.

The first and basic error we make about economics is what Gilman calls the Ego concept. This false assumption is that human beings are separate entities, when in truth, Gilman tells us, "the human consciousness is collective".\(^6^2\) Gilman's distinction here is between what she sees as being human characteristics and what are merely individual characteristics. "That we have a separate personal consciousness is not denied, but it is not humanity."\(^6^3\) Humanity is found in collectivity.

Our failure to see that humanity is collective has been buttressed by the error of what Gilman calls "the Pleasure-in-Impression" theory. The individual can be made to experience pleasure or pain by what is done to her/him. What we have failed to recognize, says Gilman, is that pleasure and pain are not exclusively reactionary. People also experience pleasure by action, and pain is avoided by acting. People act to gain pleasure, but we have failed to recognize that. People seem to only notice income, not output.\(^6^4\)


\(^{63}\)Ibid., p. 59.

\(^{64}\)Ibid., p. 61.
Humanity, being collective, also acts to gain collective pleasure. Gilman tells us that this collective social action is one of the greatest human delights, but it too has failed to be recognized. Humanity does not gain its greatest pleasure from impression, from what is done to it, Gilman says, but from what it does itself instead.

The Pleasure-in-Impression fallacy gives rise to the third erroneous economic concept, that of the Pay theory. Gilman tells us that if we assume it is only pleasure or pain incomes (in the broad sense) that makes people act, then we will conclude that people will not work unless they are rewarded for it, which means in modern society that people must be paid. Allied with this Pay theory is the Want theory, which wrongly assumes that people work only to gratify wants, and once those wants are supplied, they will no longer work. The Want theory also ties into the Ego concept by assuming that people only work to gratify individual wants, an assumption that Gilman terms the Self-Interest theory. This we know as the law of self-preservation, Gilman says, and we think it is the first law of nature. Wrong, says Gilman. The first law of nature is to preserve the species, the "race".

Gilman refutes the Pay theory of work by pointing out again that people do not only gain pleasure by income but also by output. Further, as noted under the Pleasure-in-Impression discussion, the greatest pleasure comes from output, not input. Therefore the necessity of pay

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65 Ibid., p. 62.
66 Ibid., p. 62-64.
67 Ibid., p. 65-66.
is questionable. Gilman uses the same argument to refute the Want theory, saying that it is the desire to gain pleasure that makes people work. The greatest pleasure is in collective action, and that is the incentive to work, not the desire to gratify wants.

The sixth false economic assumption Gilman examines is the Pain theory, which holds that adversity and difficulty are good for us, because they make us rise to the occasion, thereby improving ourselves. That is idiocy, Gilman says. Many people are able to rise in spite of adversity, such as poverty, but many more are ruined because of it. Gilman says that the Pain theory is confusing coincidence with cause.68

It is interesting to note that not only does Gilman use poverty as an example of adversity here but also wealth, and she states that both poverty and wealth are illegitimate.69

Gilman tells us that the foregoing six errors regarding work lead us to consider work as contemptible. She credits Veblen for already having discussed this situation in his Theory of the Leisure Class, in which is discussed, "...how labour, being first performed by women and them by conquered opponents made slaves, was despised by the early mind, and how, further, the ability not to work, involving the power to make others work for you, soon became an ingrained principle of pride..." Gilman concludes her summary of Veblen by saying that "This accounts satisfactorily enough for a large share of the (unfavorable) popular feeling about work."70

68Ibid., p. 67-70.
69Ibid., p. 70.
70Ibid., p. 179.
Gilman's point in making this observation is to show that it is the employers who are contemptible, for they are doing nothing to maintain themselves but yet, she says, they call themselves independent and believe that they "support" those they employ. Gilman finds it paradoxical that the people who are employed also seems to believe this.71

Without one qualifying note, Gilman's assessment seems unfair. It is true that there are people who own the means of labor without working on those means. However, to own the means does not preclude working. Many owners also work with what they own. We must assume that it is the former type who elicit Gilman's disdain.

The last economic fallacy with which Gilman deals is the Law of Supply and Demand. Gilman tells us that this error is partly a derivative of the Want theory, partly based on "natural law", and partially attributable to what she terms our "artifical market". Gilman notes that this law states that where there is a demand, that is what is supplied and there are supplies to meet the demands for them; supply equals demand.

This obviously isn't true, says Gilman. Many people starve, freeze, and sicken for lack of necessary supplies. And many people waste supplies because they have more than they need. Gilman tells us that the law of supply and demand can be more accurately phrased as the law of the product of human industry and purchasing power. Here, then we have "production = purchasing power". This formula is false, also says Gilman, in that market economics warns against "overproduction".

71 Ibid., p. 73.
If the supply equals the demand then the demand will not be as great and will no longer equal the supply.  

Then is it demand that creates a supply? Not necessarily, Gilman answers.

"'Demand' is not a producing agent. It does not make them sell unless they want to...It does not make them work even, unless they are able and willing."  

For Gilman, what creates "supply" is the natural human desire to be productive.

It is the economic system that is derived from these false laws that impedes society's progress toward a cooperative ideal, for it allows ignorance, poverty, and crime to become part of the human condition. The economic structure as it presently stands allows for congestion of wealth in some sectors while engendering abject poverty in others. This indicates that there is something wrong with the "social organism."

Emerging from Gilman's conception of economics is a picture of what she believes to be the "right" kind of economic interaction. People should work collectively because they are collective by nature and because the work gives them pleasure. Because the nature of work is collective, human production should meet the needs of the total society, not just individual needs. No one should employ anyone to work, and no one should be externally employed. Supply and demand

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72 Ibid., p. 73-74.
73 Ibid., p. 75.
74 Ibid., p. 11.
75 Ibid., p. 13.
theory, in the sense of supply equaling demand, should be a reality once the market concern for "overproduction" is discarded. There should be no poverty or great accumulations of wealth.

The question of employment and, consequently, of ownership of the means of labor, remains unresolved. In Gilman's ideal, if no one is being employed per se, then what is the method of production? Who owns the means of labor? Will her ideal include a form of capitalism?

To allow private ownership of the means of labor is a misuse of the "social body", Gilman tells us. Machines should be used to meet society's needs, not to benefit private individuals.

"In our blind ignorance of the real social life and its laws, in our persistent maintenance of a rudimentary egoism, we have claimed private ownership of these exquisitely social products (i.e. machines), and have striven to restrict their mighty multiplication of wealth to private consumption." 76

Private ownership of the means of labor is wrong, according to Gilman. Although Gilman never specifically states in one place that it is the public who should own the means of labor, she strongly implies it many times. For example, when attacking private ownership of the means of labor, she says,

"On public land granted by the public, with rights and franchises granted by the public, with money subscribed by the public, and with elaborately coordinated labour performed by the public, this form of public service (i.e. production) is established. Then one man, or group of men, is allowed to "own" this great piece of social machinery, and proceeds to administer it, not with regard to the public advantage, but with regard to the advantage of this managing group and of that small minority of the public who furnished the money for the enterprise." 77

76 Ibid., p. 171.
77 Ibid., p. 211.
One can only conclude that Gilman feels that the public by right should own the means of labor.

So we find that private ownership is another economic structure that is blocking the path to a cooperative society.

By now we have a good understanding of what it is that Gilman thinks is wrong economically with the present system and what it is in economic relations that is stopping the formation of a cooperative ideal. Her proposals for correcting these faults and establishing a cooperative society will be discussed in the next chapter, "The Cooperative Ideal". We will now turn to Jane Addams and examine her perception of industrial relations.

Like Gilman, Addams sees the problems of society, and for Addams, also those of international relations, as stemming from industry and the economic structure. The societal ills which Addams is concerned with are also those of concern to Gilman -- poverty, crime, disease, and other signs that society is not adjusting well to industrialization.

Addams tells us that the base for all of society's problems is that people are just beginning to learn how to act in association. Because we are new at it, we are still trying to find the cooperative methods which work the best. One problem here is that we keep falling back on individual rather than collective effort to deal with social concerns. Yet it is cooperative, collective action that is wanted, for that is ultimately of more use to society.

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78Addams, Peace, p. 42.
"If, as is many times stated, we are passing from an age of individualism to one of association, there is no doubt that for decisive and effective action the individual still has the best of it. He will secure efficient results while committees are still deliberating upon the best method of making a beginning. And yet if the need of the times demand associated effort, it may easily be true that the action which appears ineffective, and yet is carried out upon the more highly developed line of associated effort, may represent a finer social quality and have a greater social value than the more effective individual action... Nowhere is this illustrated more clearly than in industrial relations."  

So Addams thinks that, difficult though it may be at first, society must begin to work in association, for associated effort has more "social value". By social value, Addams means that it is something which moves society toward cooperation. In particular, associated effort is needed in dealing with industry, Addams says. 

It is her discussion of participation in industry that we learn that Addams considers this associated effort to be democracy, or at least to be the democratic process.

"A growing conflict may be detected between the democratic ideal, which urges the workmen to demand representation in the administration of industry, and the accepted position, that the man who owns the capital and takes the risks has the exclusive right of management. It is in reality a clash between individual or aristocratic management, and corporate or democratic management."  

In summarizing what Addams is saying, we find that society must start acting in associated effort because that type of action has social value -- it leads to cooperation -- which is needed in industrial relations. In industry, Addams defines associated effort, or democracy, as

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80 Ibid., p. 139.
participation, which in turn means "representation in the administration of industry".

By saying that associated effort in general and industrial participation in particular is democracy, Addams brings the weight of strong public sentiment to her advantage. Generally in American society, and particularly in Addams time, democracy is equated with good. To say that a thing is democratic is to say that it is good, and that it is the "American way". If Addams seriously hoped to get workers participatory rights in industrial administration, she would benefit by implying that not to have it so would be undemocratic.

Let us recall now that we are in the process of discussing what it is that Addams sees as blocking the path to a cooperative society. Is non-participation in industry a block to this society, and if so, how?

If associated effort leads to cooperation, and is democratic, and if democracy is expressed in industry through worker participation, as Addams says it is, then it follows that the lack of participation will be a block to the cooperative society. But why?

Addams' major concern is that any action taken toward social advance that is not done through associated effort faces a strong possibility of failing. No matter how meritorious an undertaking of an individual to forward society, unless society feels committed to that undertaking, it will fade after the individual, for whatever reason, withdraws. The lack of associated effort, here meaning participation, is a block to cooperative society because no forward step taken
without it, no matter how well intentioned, is likely to survive.\textsuperscript{81}

Therefore society can't move ahead.

The flaw in this argument is that we also cannot be assured that, even though all people participate in making a certain decision or in initiating a given undertaking, it will not fail. Plans made by committees, to use Addams' earlier example, seem just as susceptible to failure as do plans made by individuals.

A major objection to Addams' overall theory that participation leads to cooperation is found in the observation that it is precisely when people begin to participate that they begin to argue and to present competing ideas. Thus it seems odd to postulate that participation breeds cooperation, unless one assumes Addams means that after a debate concludes and a decision is reached, society in general will cooperate in enacting it.

So we find that Addams discovers cooperative society blocked by the lack of associated effort -- participation -- in the functioning of social institutions, particularly that of industry. Next we should ask, how does the question of ownership fit into participation? If everyone is participating, does that mean that they are also owners of the means of labor?

Addams tells us that if machines would have been considered as "social possessions" from the outset of industrialization, then many of the evils of factory life, such as child labor, poor wages, and bad working conditions, might have been avoided. However, from the first, society regarded machinery as the property of the person who paid for it when it became a finished product, although, Addams says, it seems

\textsuperscript{81}Ibid., p. 153.
more logical to consider it the property of the many people who invented and developed it. Because society allowed private ownership of the means of labor, it was doomed to experience the maladjustment that it has.\textsuperscript{82}

Because of this assessment by Addams, we can assume that she would advocate public ownership of the means of labor, although she never specifically says that. It is clear that she thinks that private ownership is illegitimate.

Next we must make a comparison between Addams' and Gilman's views on the subject. Both Gilman and Addams see elements of the economic structure as being in the way of society's evolution to a cooperative state. Both picture society as being collective in nature. Gilman assumes that society has been this way for a great while. Addams sees societal collectivity as a recent development. Therefore Gilman attributes society's inability to see the error of the economic system to insensitivity and prejudice, while Addams feels that it is our unfamiliarity with democracy and associated effort generally which is slowing the recognition of collectivity.

Both women think that private ownership of the means of labor is illegitimate and they recognize the harmful effect that private ownership has had on society by allowing both poverty and the amassing great wealth to exist. Both Gilman and Addams want public ownership of the means of labor, although Gilman is more vocal on this point than Addams. Addams has begun here to lay groundwork for the acceptance

\textsuperscript{82}Addams, \textit{Peace}, p. 149.
of a system of industrial participation to fulfill the democratic ideal while Gilman speaks of people participating collectively because it is one way in which they gain pleasure. Gilman has not yet mentioned industrial participation specifically.

Now that we have an understanding of how the economic structure and industrial relations are blocking the path to cooperation we shall move to a discussion of the status of women and filial relations and how Gilman and Addams view their roles in the progression toward cooperation.

**Status of Women and Filial Relations**

Gilman finds another hindrance to cooperation to be the dependent economic position of women within society. She calls to our attention that it is only in humans that we find the female of the species dependent on the male for food, a condition Gilman considers to be a result of man's early enslavement of woman for mating privileges. Gilman tells us that in no other species does the female permanently depend on the male for economic survival, by which Gilman means food and shelter.83

Gilman tells us that when this economic factor was introduced to the sex-relation, it caused the development of "over-sexing" in women. Because a woman now needed to attract a man to support her in order to survive, as well as to mate, her sex-distinction became excessive. Women became hyper-feminine.84


84 Ibid., p. 30-34.
had been economically independent, they needed each other only for mating. Man was attracted to woman because of her sex. As she became dependent on him economically, her sex-distinction became more and more exaggerated, because it is that distinction which draws men to women. In modern society we are at the stage whereby women's economic profit comes through her power of sex-attraction. 85

We recall from the discussion of Gilman's assumptions regarding the establishment of society that she explained woman's subordination to man as a condition necessary to the preservation of the race, for it was in this way that man became civilized and learned to cooperate with others for their mutual survival. That, however, was a primitive condition, and should have been just one more step in the progress of civilization, Gilman says. Yet, somehow, while men were building industry and art and science, women got stuck in this primitive stage and have yet to progress, she notes. Gilman tells us that the continuance of the practice of keeping women economically dependent on men has importance in regard to modern problems. Woman gains her livelihood through her sex relation with man and not through any sort of industrial or productive relation with society as a whole. Therefore society has lost the skills and gifts that women have to offer. Furthermore, Gilman says, because woman can receive only that which is given her rather than earning it herself, and because she does not know the difficulty of obtaining these goods first-hand, woman has a tremendous appetite for consumption. It is this excessive consumption that is at the root of the failure for people to cooperate, Gilman concludes, for

85 Ibid., p. 62-63.
men must constantly compete in order to achieve the means for gaining excessive wealth. ⁸⁶

For Gilman, then, the status of women within society adds to the economic problems which stop cooperation. Addams also views the position of women as a stumbling-block in the road of progress but Addams sees it as being a question of values, not necessarily economics.

Addams tells us that women, particularly daughters, have been viewed as family possessions. When women are viewed thus, it is difficult for society in general and the family in particular to accept the idea that women are also part of the "social order" and that they too have something to offer the state and society. ⁸⁷ Thus, if a woman wishes to marry, the family accepts and welcomes it, for the woman, as a family possession, remains such, and only enlarges the family itself. If, however, the woman attempts to fulfill what Addams calls the "social or democratic claim" — if the woman attempts to participate in society outside the family, then she is considered to be threatening the family claim. ⁸⁸

Addams feels that modern education is teaching women that they do have an obligation to serve society, yet the family claim to women is repressing this social claim. Because women are close to the family and love it, they will usually give up social work in order to please the family. The result is both an unhappy woman and a loss of skill to society. ⁸⁹

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⁸⁶Ibid., p. 118-119.
⁸⁷Addams, Democracy, p. 82.
⁸⁸Ibid., p. 74-75.
⁸⁹Ibid., p. 85-86.
Addams, like Gilman, alludes to the fact that while women are in the home, they are trained only to accumulate goods and, as a result, learn to distrust their "finer impulses", those leading her to a wider social commitment. Addams does not examine this in depth but merely alludes to it.

Social cooperation is thwarted, then, Addams says, because individuals, most particularly women, are honoring the claims made on them by the family, but the family is not allowing them to honor the claims made by society.

While examining this issue of the status of women and the role of filial relations as a block to cooperation, Gilman and Addams both seem to leave a major issue unresolved: Why is it that women have a special gift to give society? What is the Gift? Why is it that Gilman and Addams believe that women's participation in society will change society? Could it not be that society will change women and merely include them in the institutions of mankind rather than women humanizing those institutions? Addams tells us that modern education has begun to teach women a sense of social obligation -- has it not taught that obligation to men? Gilman says men are competitive in order to support women and the accumulations of the home. If women begin to participate in society, why does she think that people will accumulate less, since there would now be two adults to contribute to the amassing of wealth. Because both Gilman and Addams fail to address these questions, one assumes that they are adopting the "angel-in-disguise" view of female character which postulates that women are inherently virtuous and are

90Ibid., p. 89-90.
on a higher moral plane than men. This view would allow them to argue that because women are virtuous, they will bring that virtue with them to society if they are allowed to participate.

In comparing Gilman and Addams, we find that both women view the status of women as a hindrance to the realization of a cooperative society. Gilman sees the economic relation between men and women as an incentive to compete, both in that women compete between themselves in an attempt to attract man to support them and that men compete in order to get the excessive goods needed to support the women. Addams views the values of family life as an obstacle because the family demands primary allegiance from women, thus denying them the right to participate and make contributions to society. Both Gilman and Addams consider women to have excessive appetites for wealth due to their subordinate position in society. Both see society as losing valuable talents due to the exclusion of participation by women.

This discussion of the status of women leads us to an analysis of the home as a negative factor in society and to a general discussion of the traditional female "nurturing" occupations, such as housekeeping and charity work.

The Home and Social Relations

We have already discussed Gilman's view of the position of women as a negative element of social life. Gilman also sees the role of women in the home as negative, an issue we will examine here.

Gilman's major objection to the home is that it is wasteful. First, there is an enormous waste of labor. The fact that this labor is usually unpaid does not make it any less so, says Gilman. Half of
society's population stays home to cook and care for the other half, Gilman notes, and that reduces the work force substantially. She illustrates this point by examples, showing that if half the members of a ship's crew, lumber camp, or company of soldiers were employed solely to wait on a one-to-one basis on the other half, we would see the waste of labor as obvious. This is one type of waste we find in the home.91

The second major kind of waste Gilman detects in the institution of the home is that of the repetition of the "plant", the home factory. In every home there is the repetition of utilities and machines -- kitchen, pantry, laundry, servants quarters, etc. All people have to pay separately for their own home plant, all sitting side-by-side down every street -- twenty kitchens where Gilman says one would do.92

Gilman therefore concludes that, "...the domestic system of feeding, clothing, and cleaning humanity costs more time, more strength, and more money that it could cost in any other way except absolute individual isolation."93

Another objection that Gilman has to the home as we know it is what it does to the people in them. Gilman portrays the modern household as a stifling environment which weakens people physically and morally. Gilman tells us that the preparation of food is the main business of housekeeping, taking the most labor and is the main expense. But for all the time and money we put into home cooking, what are the

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92Ibid., p. 118.
93Ibid., p. 52.
results? Are we well-nourished, strong people because of it? No, says Gilman. "...No other animal is so depraved in its feeding habits as man; no other animal has so many diseases of the alimentary system. The dog ranks next to us in diseases, and shares our home-cooking."

Gilman believes that home-cooking, one of the major responsibilities of the housewife, causes physically weak, fat, under-nourished people.

The effect of women in the home on children is even more destructive, in Gilman's view. Women are expected to live day in and day out with small children who have very special needs. Society expects women to know instinctively how to meet those needs when in truth, Gilman says, many women do not have the temperament, talents, and skills necessary for child care. We expect mothers to educate the children, even if they have no talent as teachers. The result is unhappy, hysterical women and neurotic, poorly educated children.

Finally, the home has a poor effect on the men who live in them. We have already noted Gilman's view that the home places an unfair financial burden on the man, making him responsible for securing enough excess wealth to support this isolated and complete domestic factory. Additionally, Gilman tells us, men are subjected to the belittling effect of having to live with a person of limited experience and understanding of the world. He not only assumes a financial burden for the woman but also a mental burden, for he must care for her and look out for her interests as well as his own rather than being able to share

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94 Ibid., p. 129.

that responsibility with her, Gilman notes. The belief that a man enjoys this limitation of a domesticated woman is "...one of the roaring jokes of history", according to Gilman.

It is obvious from Gilman's discussion that her view of the house is primarily middle and upper class. Lower class women, although also responsible for cooking and child care, do share the man's "worldly burdens" of financial and mental concerns as a rule for they must work outside the home in order for the family to survive financially. Furthermore, while most lower class homes would most probably include the expense of maintaining their own kitchens, it is doubtful that they also would be burdened with the expense of a pantry, laundry, and servants quarters.

To summarize, Gilman tells us that the home is a burden to society because it is wasteful of labor and supplies, it forces women into roles for which they are not necessarily suited, such as cooks and teachers, and it doubly burdens men, financially and mentally. Jane Addams also shares many of these perceptions of the home with Gilman.

We have already seen how Addams considers the family to be an element preventing cooperation in society by vetoing social claims in favor of family claims. This familial tendency is further compounded by the confused perception of the family that for women to fulfill family obligations, they must perform domestic service, Addams tells us.

96 Gilman, Home, p. 275-279.
97 Ibid., p. 280.
98 Addams, Democracy, p. 106.
To exemplify this, Addams also uses the example of home-cooking. For some reason, Addams says, we feel that a woman is not serving her family unless she cooks for them. We have allowed all other industries to become specialized and assumed by modern industrial life, such as weaving and the making of clothes, Addams notes, but we insist that women serve society by serving the family, and what women are expected to serve is food.

If women would abandon this misconception, then Addams believes that we would come to see that the woman who served her family best was one who made it part of the community life.

"Were she in line ethically, (woman) would have to believe that the sacredness and beauty of family life do not consist in the processes of the separate preparation of food, but in sharing the corporate life of the community, and in making the family the unit of that life."99

So for Addams, it is both the overall expectation of the family that stipulates that women should serve the family and the specific value of the family that says this service is achieved through domestic work that makes the home inimical to cooperation.

Housework is a traditional domain for women and Addams concerns herself with explaining how the values which reinforce this tradition are harmful to the progress of society. A larger field of traditional work for women is what Addams called "charity" work. Here, too, the values on which the occupation is based are viewed as wrong by Addams, and because they are wrong values, they block society's understanding of cooperation.

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99 Ibid., p. 110.
Addams' first observation is that we really have no justification for considering the alleviation of social ills as charity. For Addams, democracy implies equality. If we were truly democratic, we would not need what we call charity, for people would be equal. Because we do have "charity", it is a sign that we are not yet democratic, Addams says. 100

This is Addams' strongest definition of equality so far and indicates that she views equality as meaning equal respect and treatment. Once again we recall that the doctrine of equal opportunity only allows for equality of competition. If there is a competition, then someone loses. If we have "losers" in society, then it would seem that there would always be a need for charity. Addams says that in a democracy, there is no such need. That would indicate that she feels that all people deserve at least a minimum equal respect and treatment, not just equal opportunity.

Addams continues by telling us that democracy, by providing all people with the ability to live without charity, which we take to mean the right to equal respect and treatment, has worked to make us change our attitudes regarding charity. Instead of seeing it as a favor to the "deserving poor", we realize that in actuality amelioration for social ills is theirs as due payment for the work they do for society. Inherent in this is the recognition of the social value of all work. 101

Addams tells us that society is beginning to learn it needs the special

100 Ibid., p. 14.
101 Ibid., p. 16.
contribution of each and every person. 102 This means that, "theoretically, we would all admit that the man at the bottom, who performs the meanest and humblest work, so long as the work is necessary, performs a useful function..." 103 Addams tells us that our problem is that we do not follow through on that theory, that unless the worker is ill, we hold him in contempt and deny him the full benefits of social and industrial life. 104 What little we do give to the poor we still consider charity, which is contrary to what we abstractly know to be the nature of democracy.

A major contributor to this skewed view of social amelioration is the government, Addams claims. If the government would realize that social concerns are germane to its functions, then it would be easier for society to recognize a new civil consciousness or life. 105 By a "new civil life" Addams means a cooperative, public life.

So we find that Addams sees the values of the family and the values of both society and government regarding social concerns as being obstacles in the way of achieving social cooperation. She believes with Gilman that the home as it is traditionally structured also interferes with cooperation, for it embodies the belief that women serve best who serve the limited family rather than serving society as a whole. In addition, Gilman believes that the home is ruining the physical and mental health of its members, for it requires a non-specialized

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102 Ibid., p. 178.
103 Ibid., p. 195.
104 Ibid., p. 195.
105 Addams, Peace, p. 51.
worker -- the woman -- to do many specialized tasks for which she is not equipped. Both women see the home life of women teaching them to be over-consumers. Additionally, Gilman sees the home itself as wasteful of both labor and goods. We find that Addams will accept the home and the role of women in family life if it is geared to serving society while Gilman believes that the traditional home is largely unacceptable to cooperative society and that women must leave the role of housewife if cooperation is to be realized.

We now have viewed three major conditions that Gilman and Addams consider to be obstructing the cooperative ideal for society. They are: (1) Economic and Industrial Relations, (2) The Status of Women and Filial Relations, and (3) Home Life and Social Relations. Of particular importance in economic and industrial relations are Gilman's and Addams' objections to private ownership and to the lack of participation by workers in the administration of industry and other social activities. This later concern is particularly of importance to Addams and she refers to it as the need for "associated effort".

In regard to the status of women and filial relations, we note that both writers see the position of women as engendering competition, including competition between women, between men, and between the family unit and society. Ultimately, Gilman and Addams see the position of women as representing a loss of skill to society.

The traditional home is seen by both women as a unit inimical to cooperative society for it teaches the wrong values, such as isolation and over-consumption. The values of social relations are also seen as faulty for they persist in declaring legitimate and unnecessary social
amelioration as charity rather than recognizing the value of all work and the consequent acceptance of democracy as a system of equal respect and treatment.

Based on our understanding of what Gilman and Addams see as being the faults of society as it exists, we can proceed to a discussion of what their cooperative ideal looks like and an analysis of it based on the model for social democracy.
CHAPTER IV

THE COOPERATIVE IDEAL:
SOCIAL DEMOCRACY AND FEMINISM

Since we are now familiar with the elements of modern society which Gilman and Addams want to remedy, we can move on to what that remedy consists of for both of them, i.e. a cooperative ideal. We will compare the elements of Gilman's and Addams' cooperative ideal with the model of social democracy in order to discern similarities and disparities between the two. In this manner it will be possible to conclude whether the "something else" of a particular notion of feminism is the same as the "something else" of a particular notion of democracy; in other words, if feminism, as used here, can use a concept of social democracy to explain its recommendations for society.

It would be best to begin by verifying the concept of equality that Gilman and Addams hold. The model for social democracy tells us that equality means equal respect and treatment. This concept, we recall, is based on the common quality of being human, which is shared by all people and which justifies equalizing the respect and treatment which each person receives. Is there any evidence that Gilman and Addams accept this particular notion of equality?

As noted in the section, "Establishment and Evolution of Society", in Chapter 3, Addams bases her hope for a peaceful world on her observation that the many-national occupants of the cities had shed their "tribal"
loyalties and had begun to build communitites based on the only similarity that Addams could see them sharing, that of "the basic and essential likenesses of their common human nature". Gilman based her theory that people are natural producers who work collectively for society on the premise that there is a collective "human consciousness", a shared humanity, which she distinguishes from "separate personal consciousness", or individual characteristics, which are not humanity. Both Gilman and Addams see a common human bond as uniting people, and thus they accept the foundation of equality of respect and treatment.

Thus arguing that the equality of people is found in shared humanity, Gilman and Addams, as is the case of the model, simultaneously reject the notion of equality of sameness, the concept used by Pickles to equate social democracy with an "equal and classless society". We find that by Addams' discussion of "tribal" differences and Gilman's recognition of "separate personal consciousness", both authors accept differences between people and do not see equality as meaning "sameness". What they confirm is that all people share one characteristic which justifies treating them equally, that of shared humanity.

The model for social democracy also dictates that, on the basis of equality of respect and treatment, no one shall compete for respect or for a higher standard of treatment -- people share these equally. Therefore, equality of opportunity is rejected, for it merely equalizes the competition, not the outcome. Again we refer to Chapter 3 and recall that both Gilman and Addams assume that cooperation is the zenith of

106 Addams, Peace, p. 17.
civilization and that civilization has been progressing toward it ever since people began to discard competition for the sake of caring for their offspring. Furthermore, in the discussion of "Home Life and Social Relations", Addams has told us that in a full democracy there is no need for charity, for there is no one who needs it. Working backwards, we assume that if no one needs charity then no one has "lost" in a competition to secure goods and services. If there are no "losers" then everyone must have "won", and the lack of a class of "losers" and "winners" leads us to conclude that there was no competition in the first place. The concept of equality of opportunity, as in the model of social democracy, is also rejected.

In summary, we find that both Gilman and Addams have accepted the perception of a shared quality of humanity in all people which justifies treating all people equally. They reject equality assameness, which serves as Pickles' definition, and they also reject equality of opportunity, or competition, which produces a class of "losers" and "winners". Both Gilman and Addams have assumed cooperation to be a natural state for society and they maintain that the correction of certain societal misperceptions and ill-formed institutions will allow that cooperation to be realized. Without using the words, what Gilman and Addams are using here is a notion of equality as equal respect and treatment.

After assuming equality of respect and treatment, our model of social democracy leads us to consider the attitudes, arrangements, and institutions that will promote and preserve this equality. Elshtain, in Chapter 1, notes that these institutions will provide for two things:
(1) a baseline below which no one can drop regardless of her/his perceived personal merit, and (2) it will narrow the range of social and economic "rewards" between people.

In a very superficial manner, the subjects of a baseline and of narrowing the range of rewards have already been touched upon. Addams discussed the need for "social amelioration", or charity, as a legitimate right for people who have been denied the equality that comes in a true democracy (Chapter 3, "Home Life and Social Relations"). Gilman discusses the illegitimacy of both poverty and wealth, and postulates that both conditions arise from the false economic laws of our "artificial market" (Chapter 3, "Economics and Industrial Relations"). The broader issue inherent here is that of "equal access to the means of labor", as our model quotes Macpherson, for it is this equal access that the model uses to establish both the baseline and the range of rewards. Therefore we shall look to see if Addams and Gilman include equal access to the means of labor in their cooperative ideal.

The very first element of equal access, according to the model, is individual and public ownership of the means of labor. We recall that this concept rejects both private ownership and State ownership of the means, for its purpose is to allow each person to control her/his own social and economic life. We need to know, then, if Gilman and Addams advocate the control of the means of labor by the public.

As was discussed in "Economics and Industrial Relations", Chapter 3, both Gilman and Addams see private ownership of the means of labor as illegitimate. We recall that Addams tells us that if the means of labor -- the machines -- had been considered "social possessions" from
the first, the evils of industrial life, such as poverty, child exploitation, etc. could possibly have been avoided in the interests of the whole of society. It was because of private ownership that these social ills arose. Gilman tells us that it was the public all along that had the right to own the machines, the means of labor, because it was the public that produced and staffed them. It was our ignorance of true economic and social life and laws that made us think that some people could own the machines or the means of labor privately.

So we see Gilman and Addams rejecting private ownership of the means of labor, and Gilman advocating public ownership of these means. So far their perceptions of ownership are explained by the model. But how do Gilman and Addams view State ownership, which the model also rejects. What is Addams' stand, and what does Gilman mean by "public"? Could "public" mean State ownership?

Addams seems to equivocate on the issue of State ownership of the means of labor. She discusses the fact that the real issues of life are settled by industrial and commercial interests, and she alludes to the German arrangement of an "alliance" between government and industry which provides social services for workers. One gets the impression that she advocates a sizeable amount of governmental control

108 Addams, Peace, p. 149.
109 Gilman, Work, p. 211.
110 Ibid., p. 171.
111 Addams, Peace, p. 42.
112 Ibid., p. 88-89.
of industry, then. However, she then discusses the need for local autonomy in the governing of urban life, and strongly advocates local control of government by the people, rather than by transferring more power and duties to governmental administrators. For Addams, government is to control industry, and local citizens, rather than administrators, are to control the government. Addams rejects private ownership and advocates government control of industry and local, public participation and autonomy in controlling the government. But who owns the industry? The State or the public? Or could it be the public owning it through the State? Addams never becomes clear at this point. It is here that Addams' cooperative ideal seems to part company momentarily with the model of social democracy.

Gilman's rejection of State ownership is more easily mapped, for it is tied to her understanding of production and legitimate private property. As we recall from Chapter 3, Gilman sees all people as being natural producers because the major way people gain pleasure is through producing, acting, doing. This is the "true" economic law that Gilman sees as being hidden by the false belief in "Pleasure-as-Impression". Furthermore, Gilman sees all work as a collective endeavor by humanity, for humanity by definition is collective for Gilman. If all work is collective, then the product of the collective work belongs to all members of the collective, or humanity, Gilman tells us. No one

113 Ibid., p. 34-35.
114 Gilman, Work, p. 61.
116 Ibid., p. 292-93.
individual really owns the products of work, just as no one individual can legitimately own the means of production. Everyone owns both.

"The social goods belong to Society, are made by Society, for Society; and should be distributed to Society as widely, swiftly, and freely as possible; so adding to the social good."\(^{117}\)

Couldn't this social production and distribution still be State-owned? No, says Gilman, but very quickly, and in passing. Some might see this system as meaning "a wallowing sea of communism",\(^ {118}\) says Gilman, but that is because they do not understand what private property really is. Legitimate private property includes all goods and services that an individual needs to consume in order to produce -- food, clothing, education, tools, etc. What the individual needs to consume is her/his legitimate property, and what is produced belongs to Society as a whole. Other individuals take from that production what they need to consume in order to produce, and in turn their products go into the common pot.\(^ {119}\)

This, then, is Gilman's overall concept of consumption and production in a cooperative ideal, and by seeing the entire picture, it is easier to conclude that Gilman means individual public ownership of the means of labor rather than any sort of State ownership of those means. Her rejection of the concept of communism as an alternative, if only in passing, shows us that she has no plans for any sort of governmental ownership. Thus, regarding the public means of production, as opposed to both private or State ownership, we see that both Gilman and Addams can be explained by

\(^{117}\)Ibid., p. 331.

\(^{118}\)Ibid., p. 331.

\(^{119}\)Ibid., p. 331-332.
the model for social democracy. There is some reservation as to whether Addams rejects the notion of State ownership entirely, however. If she is advocating such a system, it is with the stipulation that the State's actions be controlled by a system of local autonomous participation by the citizenry and not by government officials.

Equal access to the means of production has now been examined from the aspect of ownership. The model for social democracy also includes a particular system of management for those means, a system which was defined as worker participation in administration. We have seen how Addams and Gilman view ownership -- what about management?

Again referring to "Economics and Industrial Relations", Chapter 3, we recall that Addams states that, if we are to pass from "an age of individualism to one of association", then we must come to rely on "associated effort" in place of individual effort, even if at first individual effort seems more efficient. The reason for this, Addams tells us, is that associated effort has more "social value", which we take to mean that it teaches society to act in cooperation.\(^\text{120}\) It is particularly important that actions taken to forward society be a product of associated effort, Addams tells us, for if not, once the individual who has controlled the action retires, the program or service will probably be lost because no one else has any background or personal commitment to it.\(^\text{121}\)

"Participation" is the common name given to a system such as Addams' "associated effort". Addams advocates a system of participation

\(^{120}\)Addams, Democracy, p. 137-138.

\(^{121}\)Ibid., p. 153.
but we are concerned here with how extensive a system that will be. It was previously noted that Pickles' system of "wise labour relations" or the consultation with workers on matters of pay and conditions would be included in our particular model of social democracy but that in itself would not be enough. Our model includes a system of worker participation in management of industry. It is for this element that we now examine Gilman and Addams.

Addams has already been noted as saying that the democratic ideal demands that workers be represented in the administration of industry.\textsuperscript{122} This is because large industry has ceased to be private and has become involved with the public interest, she says.\textsuperscript{123} Due to the exigencies of business, the individual aim of any employer prevents her/him from seeing the social issues inherent in the industrial situation.\textsuperscript{124} For this reason, Addams says a certain segment of society is coming to believe that industry must be managed through "deliberate corporate effort", and Addams clearly is a part of that segment. She agrees with those who propose that this "corporate effort" come through state regulation and control.\textsuperscript{125}

Here again, then, is a disparity between social democracy as we understand it, and Addams' concept of the role of government. Addams notes that it is the trade unions and not the government which teach

\textsuperscript{122}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 139.

\textsuperscript{123}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 142-143.

\textsuperscript{124}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 154.

\textsuperscript{125}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 166.
the immigrants self-governance, for it is the unions which deal with
the issues which are of primary importance to workers. 126 Because it
is the unions which deal with the workers' needs and not the government,
Addams says that people are choosing to participate in the unions and
to abandon their "civic duty", which Addams sees as threatening the
existence of democratic government. 127 It seems to be for this reason
that Addams is trying to involve government in industrial relations, for
she then expects people to participate in government in order to control
the industrial issues that are so important to them.

For Addams, then, industrial participation takes the shape of
participation through the government. Here we must remember that in
discussing her view of ownership, Addams tells us that local autonomy
needs to be established and that the administration of industry through
government should be by the citizens themselves, not government
officials. Add to this her statement that "If the method of public
agitation could find...expression in legislative enactment, and if labor
measures could be submitted to the examination and judgement of the whole...
(then) we should have the ideal development of the democratic state
(emphasis mine)." 128 Addams makes this statement in a peripheral way
while discussing the need for public agitation as a method of securing
state support for workers' concerns. The impact of the statement remains
regardless. If Addams plans to establish a form of citizen administration
of government at the local level which includes the submission of

126 Addams, Peace, p. 95.
127 Ibid., p. 112-113.
128 Addams, Democracy, p. 171.
legislation to the approval of the whole, she has not only changed industrial arrangements of management, but she has also restructured government, making it a locally autonomous, direct participatory democracy.

In all fairness to Addams, it is doubtful that she means to imply this. She never speaks of referring any issue other than labor measures to the public as a whole, and it always seems to be her intent that labor be represented in industrial decision-making and administration, not that it participate directly 'en masse', just as she hopes that the government will begin to concern itself with labor issues and thereby become politically representative of labor. She does want industry controlled at the local level in order that workers in a particular factory may have a voice in how that particular factory is run, and what she seems to mean when she speaks of government control is a set of legislative guidelines regarding minimum standards for working conditions and labor protection.

Addams' main problem seems to be that she rejects the notion of private ownership of the means of labor without knowing what to put in its place. She seems to want stronger unions yet fears what the consequences of that would be for government. So she speaks of local participation via the government without thinking of what that would mean to government structure, for she is focusing on corrections for industry. Meanwhile she works herself back into a quasi-private ownership system of industry which is strongly influenced by the opinions of its workers regarding pay and conditions, and is controlled by minimum government standards.
If Addams had had the term "social democracy" at her disposal, and had understood its content, then perhaps she would have used it as a solution to the private ownership of the means of labor and the worker participation issues. She does not like private ownership and she does want workers to be able to control the pay and working conditions of their production. Her understanding of both ownership and management runs closely parallel to the model for social democracy, and certain elements of both are similar. A difference occurs when Addams proposes State intervention as a solution rather than trusting the mechanism of "associated effort" which she advocates so strongly. It is only here that Addams is doubly inconsistent, both with the model of social democracy and with her own philosophy.

Gilman's understanding of participation is more readily explained by the model for social democracy than is Addams'. As noted in the discussion regarding the ownership of the means of labor, Gilman sees individual consumption as a necessary prerequisite for production. If one is barred from consuming then, according to Gilman, one is also barred from producing. This argument is quite similar to that of Macpherson's in Chapter 2, who told us that those who had access to the means of labor were able to exercise their full human powers and participate in society. To be denied access to the means of labor is to be denied participation. For Gilman, consumption is the means to labor and production is the exercise of full human powers. It would seem that, according to the model, Gilman, like Macpherson, sees participation as meaning the right to work.
Here we can ask: Does the right to work merely mean the right to have employment, to earn a living? Does it mean something more?

We recall that Macpherson defines human powers as the skills and talents an individual has plus the access to the means of exercising those skills. Gilman and Macpherson agree as to what access and participation are -- does Gilman also agree that part of our human power is the ability to work with our own talents as we individually define them? Would any type of work fulfill Gilman's requirements for participation?

Again Gilman agrees with Macpherson, saying that participation is genuine only when an individual exercises her/his special talents which are the ones that bring them the most pleasure to use.

"Social exercise is but the use of our best and highest faculties to the largest end. A Gladstone confined to directing envelopes would not be exercising his social faculties to their full extent. Napoleon as a chauffeur might have killed quite a number of people, but would not have been really satisfied. Exercise is life's first law, and full exercise is required for full development."129

So Gilman defines participation like Macpherson does, as the ability to work, which means the exercise of special talents. One question remains: What if the products of an individual are not marketable? More to the point, what if the talents of an individual are not "in demand"? Could everyone "earn a living"?

Gilman answers,

"To work is to give, not to beg. Every worker adds to the world's wealth, increases everyone's share...As to the immediate facts that may be alleged, 'overcrowded labour market', 'over-production', and such bugaboos,

129Gilman, Work., p. 110.
these are only facts as watered stock and stolen franchises are facts; not economic laws, but criminal practices. A temporary superficial error in economic conduct need not blind us to permanent basic truth, and the truth which concerns us here is that a human creature must work for the health and power and pleasure of it; and that all good work enriches the world."130

According to Gilman, then, under an economic system based on "true" economic laws rather than the "false" ones of Ego, Want, Pleasure-Through-Impression, etc., all work is valuable and contributes to the world's supply, therefore all people are capable of earning a living through their own work.

Before summarizing Gilman's and Addams' perception of the cooperative ideal in relation to the model's requirement for participation, one last concern remains. The cooperative ideals set forth by these two authors will change, in varied degrees, the wage system as we now know it. Gilman will destroy it and Addams plans to modify it through industrial participation. It was discussed in Chapter 2 that to disassociate the wage system, or capitalism, from democracy will cause productivity to decrease, for it is believed that wages give people the incentive to work. This theory of people as consumers rather than producers also postulates that people have an unlimited desire for acquisition, which also serves as an incentive to work, for it is through working to earn a wage that people are able to get the means with which to acquire goods. Do Addams and Gilman also see human nature as acquisitive? How do they deal with this issue?

130Gilman, Home, p. 262.
In "The Status of Women and Filial Relations", Chapter 3, we recall that both Gilman and Addams see the status of women in the home as the condition which leads to what these two authors consider an unnatural desire for over-consumption. Both authors postulate that women are trained by society to be acquisitive, and Gilman argues that women, by not ever having the responsibility of earning the means by which to obtain goods, can not understand their worth, and so merely continue to demand more and more goods.

Also discussed in Chapter 3 was the argument by Gilman and Addams that the home itself as an institution is excessively expensive and this also creates the unnatural tendency toward over-consumption. Gilman notes that the home, as an inefficient factory, wastes both labor and goods, while Addams sees the home as a source of false values which require women to do jobs better suited for specialized industry, such as cooking, while also wrongly teaching that family concerns take precedence over social concerns.

According to Gilman and Addams, the cooperative ideal would remedy this unnatural desire by modifying both the position of women and the institution of the home. In order to do so, both authors initially advocate a new emphasis in education. Addams would have education teach each person her/his worth in the total production system, thus committing each person through social awareness to cooperation in the producing of goods. Addams also seems to assume that this social awareness will simultaneously cause a decrease in the competition for goods. Gilman

131 Addams, Democracy, p. 178-179.
sees much the same type of education as necessary and foresees the same outcome.  

Both Gilman and Addams also plan to restructure the functions of the home. Addams plans to have more of the household functions, such as cooking, relegated to businesses outside of the home.\textsuperscript{133} Not only will this help end the practice of using household servants, which Addams sees as abusive, but it will also help the family realize, once its needs are met by this alternative, that women have a duty to society outside the home.\textsuperscript{134}

Gilman's restructuring of the home is more comprehensive than Addams'. This is how Gilman would reform urban living: Different families would live together in houses or groups of houses which contain separate living units for each family. The units would be without kitchens. In place of separate and economically wasteful kitchens would be one communal kitchen belonging to the whole house. The commune would hire a trained cook to prepare meals and the families could meet together in a common dining room. The communes would have their own hired cleaning staffs, and each would contain a day nursery and a kindergarten where the children would be cared for by professional nurses and teachers. Gilman does not expect the individuals to manage the commune, but rather it is her plan that these houses be established businesses, run by business managers.\textsuperscript{135}


\textsuperscript{133}Addams, \textit{Democracy}, p. 134.

\textsuperscript{134}Ibid., p. 110.

\textsuperscript{135}Gilman, \textit{Economics}, p. 242-247.
By such an arrangement, women could be freed of their major responsibilities of cooking, cleaning, and child care, and could then take their places in the outside industrial world. They would no longer be dependent on men for economic survival. Men, now freed of their obligation to be the sole support of their families, could work more in the service of all humankind. Women, now liberated from the crude, primitive economic processes of home tending, could contribute to the economic processes of the whole society. Society would advance once again along the proper lines, and the cooperative state would thus be reached.\footnote{136}

Thus would Gilman and Addams resolve the problem of unlimited human desire for acquisition, by removing what they see as its cause -- the dependent status of women and the excessive need for goods by the isolated home.

We may now summarize Gilman's and Addams' notions of participation. Addams sees participation as an "associated effort" between workers, trade unions, industry, and the government to bring about changes in the pay and working conditions of labor. After some confusion, Addams seems to come to an understanding of worker participation as a system of representation of workers in the decision-making and administration of industry which is supported by minimum governmental standards. This is not exactly the worker-management industrial system which is used in the model of social democracy but the provision for worker-participation does fulfil one of the requirements of a social democracy.

\footnote{136}{For a modern version of Gilman's communal home model, see Gabrielle Burton's \textit{I'm Running Away from Home but I'm Not Allowed to Cross the Street} (Pittsburgh, 1972), p. 65-67. Burton proposes much the same sort of thing as a solution to the waste of time, labor, and money caused by the nuclear family.}
Gilman sees participation as the right to work, which includes for her the exercise of individual talents in work that is rewarding to the individual and of value to society. Participation is seen as modifying the wage system, and in order not to be overwhelmed by the demand for goods that would come from workers having freer access to consumption, both Addams and Gilman resolve to remove the cause of the unlimited human desire for consumption, which both authors see as being an unnatural trait developing out of the status of women and the structure of the traditional home. In order to remove that cause, Gilman and Addams would have education raise the social awareness of people by impressing upon them their importance in the production of goods and the maintenance of society. Additionally, both theorists advocate moving many of the traditional duties of women out of the home in order to free women to work for society, and to make the home less dependent on excessive consumption of goods.
CHAPTER V
SUMMARY

In comparing the model for social democracy with the cooperative ideals set forth by Gilman and Addams, we find the following similarities and disparities:

(1) Both the model for social democracy and the cooperative ideals of Gilman and Addams accept a definition of equality as equal respect and treatment, and so doing, both reject the notions of equality as sameness and equality of opportunity, or competition.

(2) On the basis of this definition of equality, both the model and the ideals postulate (a) a baseline of existence below which no one may drop, regardless of personal merit, and (b) the narrowing of the range between social rewards. The latter entails the elimination of both poverty and great wealth, which is required by both the feminist cooperative ideal and the model for social democracy.

(3) Both the model and the ideals require that there be equal access to the means of labor for all people. This element has two parts: (a) Ownership -- The model for social democracy states that ownership will be public, thus excluding both private and State ownership of the means of labor. Gilman also rejects both these alternatives and adopts public ownership. Addams partially rejects private ownership, modifying it to a limited extent by public ownership through the State.
(b) Participation -- The model stipulates that public ownership be complemented and guaranteed by public management. Gilman provides for this public participation while Addams limits public participation to "associated effort", a system of worker representation in industrial administration which is bolstered by State supports and standards.

(4) In order to allow public ownership and management, the model for social democracy rejects the traditional wage system of capitalism, which is made possible by a rejection of the notion of an unlimited human desire for acquisition. Both the cooperative ideals of Gilman and Addams also reject the notion of unlimited desire. Gilman rejects the wage system, and Addams modifies the traditional wage system by providing for worker participation in managerial decisions.

From this summary and thesis, we can see that the cooperative ideal of the kind of feminism represented by Gilman and Addams bears a great similarity to a popular definition of social democracy. It is my conclusion, therefore, that in American feminist theory, there appears a school of thought that has incorporated the notion of social democracy into its recommendations for change in society. In this way, feminism and democracy are approaching the same goals by the same process. And at this junction, feminism and democracy are inseparable.


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