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Who's the Safer Sex? Testing Barbara Burrell's Theory of Campaign Contributions in Arkansas State Legislative Elections

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Introduction

At the very heart of American politics and government is democracy. Debates abound about the nature of American democracy, and especially ways to improve symbolic representation, substantive representation and/or participation by groups typically considered in the political minority (Moss-Kanter 1977; Pipert-High and Corner 1988; Saint-Germaine 1989; Seldon 1997; Thomas 1997). One focus of this literature is on the outputs of bureaucratic agencies or legislative agendas. If advocates of representative democracy hope to create legislatures on both the state and the national levels that contain an adequate presence of female representatives in order to fully represent women, they must begin with an analysis of the campaign process. The campaign process is the first test for any future legislator, as it is the only mechanism candidates have to strive for office. Finally, the campaign process not only holds the answers to where possible electoral discrimination lies but also provides answers to solve discrimination.

The most obvious starting point of any look at the success of campaigns is money. Money "provides no guarantee of electoral success. Yet it is also true that having more money than your opponent is a distinct electoral advantage in congressional elections, second perhaps only to the incumbency advantage in terms of electoral impact." (Goidel, Gross, and Shields 1999: 41) Most research on money and electoral success (especially in regards to money and gender) has focused on the national level. The most extensive work on women's electoral bids for Congress, especially their effort to raise the capital to campaign, has been done by Barbara Burrell (1985, 1994, 1998). She found that starting on the national level in 1988, women began to raise as much money as men of similar

candidate status (i.e. incumbent, challenger, or open-seat). However, starting in 1992, women began to exceed men in their capabilities to raise funds for national office (Burrell 1994, 1998; Dolan 2001; Francia 2001; Green 1998).

My study tests whether Arkansas state legislative races mirror this trend. I hypothesize that women running for office in the Arkansas state legislature will be less successful than men of similar candidate status in raising campaign funds. While this hypothesis runs counter to the national trend, Arkansas does not always follow national trends in many areas of political life. Despite its typically strong presence of Democrats, Arkansas is a fairly conservative state. Most of these Democrats that have been able to hang onto their offices even as the days of the "Southern Democrat" are disappearing in the face of an increasingly popular state level Republican Party. In the past, women running for office have faired better nationally in the Democratic Party. As Kim Hoffman, Carrie Palmer, and Ronald Gaddie observe, "the prospect for descriptive female advancement—electing more women, regardless of ideology or party—is increasingly staked on Democratic Party success and failure" (2001: 51). As a result, women in Arkansas may begin to lose their ability to secure funds and elections in an increasingly Republican area.

Additionally, Arkansas has been defined in classifications of political culture and ideology as both a conservative and a traditionalistic state (Elazar 1964; Hill 1981; Hogan 2001). Women have faired poorly in their election rates in traditionalistic states. This is accredited to the general stigma against women's equality in traditional political cultures (Hill 1981; Hogan 2001). The poor reception of women in traditionalistic societies may be translated into the inability of female candidates to secure funding.

Topic Justification

Before considering the capability of women to raise the necessary funds to run for office, attention should be paid to why citizens should care whether women are elected to office at all. This starting point is key to understanding the importance of vigilant study of all aspects of the election process, including women's successes in both learning to navigate elections and culling success in being elected. M.M. Lee's 1976 study of the lack of women in public office concludes by acknowledging the graveness of this need. At the end of her study, she frames the importance of women holding public office by questioning the existence of democracy in America. For Lee, democracy means self-representation by groups whose concerns are unique. If women are not able to represent their concerns, how can America be considered a representative democracy? Lee's study has had implications for later studies by adding a grave normative question to the study of women's representation. Do women have unique concerns, separate from being a citizen generally? If so, Lee's normative question is valid and becomes a powerful tool in critiquing a system that does not come close to adequate representation of women by women.

Three overarching topics are considered in the literature that discusses the importance of having a significant, if not equal, number of women participating politically by holding a legislative office. I label these topics as substantive representation (i.e., "women know what women need"), participation issues ("women spurring female efficacy") and networking and power issues ("the Anita Hill phenomenon"). Though she is discussing the representation question in the context of the bureaucracy, Sally Coleman Selden (1997) argues that the level of representation of

traditional minority groups has these same divisions. She describes them as the ability to "provide genuine expertise, valid information, and more accurate reflections of group preferences" (substantive representation), as the path to "alleviate intimidation of minority groups in relation to program personnel while fostering cooperation" (participation issues), and as the phenomenon of "members of distinct groups becom[ing] public officials...[and] becom[ing] legitimate actors in the political process with the ability to shape public policy" (networking and power issues) (Seldon 1997: 6-7). Since these are issues present in multiple arenas of representation for the politically underrepresented, consideration should be made of how increased numbers of women in office could assuage these problem areas.

With respect to the first area, the enduring questions posed by scholars who look at legislative outcomes of women in politics is best framed by a 1988 study by the Center for the American Woman and Politics (CAWP),

> But do women in office really make a difference? Are they agents of change? Do they alter the course of public policy? Do they work to reform the political process? Or, once in office, do women lose interest in changing the system, accept the traditional ways of doing things and behave just like 'one of the boys'? (CAWP 1988: 2)

This study, in conjunction with several others financed by CAWP, concludes that women officials do have different policy priorities than their male colleagues at all stages of their career. Women officials are more focused upon women's rights and other traditional women's issue policies—i.e. health care, childcare, education, and gendered crimes (rape, abuse, etc.), than are male officials.

Findings of the 1998 CAWP study have been echoed by other studies. The result has been the evolution of a fairly concerted view classifying specific issues as women's issues. Generally, traditional women's issues are interests that have typically had a big

impact on women in the domestic sphere (Saint-Germain 1989). While scholars have varied in what topics are included as women's issues, they generally include the following: children nurturance, child care, welfare, reproduction, education, social welfare, women's rights, and family issues, social welfare, human services, and the protection of the environment. (Clark 1998; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Sapiro 1981) Not only has work been done to show that women are interested in working on the above issues, studies have demonstrated the difference to be one of degree as well. Specifically,

> Existing research also finds that a higher percentage of women than men spend time promoting passage of 'women's rights' bills and that women are more likely to list 'women's distinctive concerns'—for example, health care, welfare and education—when asked to name their top legislation priority.
> (Dolan and Ford 1998: 77)

Janet Clark (1998) affirmed these conclusions when she found that gender has an independent effect on how women vote in Congress. Generally, women vote more liberally than other members of their party, especially when issues compromise women's rights.

Women also impact the way debates are framed. Dena Levy, Charles Tien, and Rachelle Aved (2002) found that women impact how men in Congress view issues. In their study of the Hyde Amendment[1] debates, they found that as women have increased their numbers in Congress, men have changed how they argue for or against this pro-life amendment. They found that men have moved from debating morality and have joined women in debating the health and economic aspects of the abortion debate. If research continues to show that women affect the behavior of men in legislature in a way that

[1] This amendment to the Federal budget has been proposed in some form since 1974. It bans the use of Federal funds for abortions. The Hyde Amendment is not only controversial but also represents the active movement of the anti-abortion segment of Congress toward trying to cap the amount of abortions performed each year.

broadens statesmen's perspectives to include women's concerns, it becomes more pressing to try to understand low levels of women in legislatures.

In addition to the unique viewpoint women legislators bring to their job, another interesting line of argumentation concerns the impact women have on substantive representation through running for office. Richard Logan Fox (1997) posits that women running in competitive elections, despite a loss, may have implications for better substantive representation, even though it does not mean greater levels of symbolic representation. He argues at the end of his book that even if women are not elected, campaigns of women and the issues these campaigns interject into the political dialogue change the agenda of male candidates. Fox claims that male candidates change campaign messages in order to compete against female candidates, and that this in turn changes their substantive agenda as a legislator if they win. Perhaps, Fox concludes, even if women are discriminated against in the election process and are not winning races, women are being more substantively represented just by the phenomenon of women campaigning. Even if Fox's conclusions are true, women must be able to solicit the funds necessary to launch a campaign competitive enough to 1) increase awareness about a set of issues or a position that is not currently on the agenda and 2) actually get voters to make these issues a constituency preference.

The second overarching argument found on the importance of electing women is the issue of political participation of women. Or put simply, do female public officials spur female political efficacy in the public? A gender gap has been documented to exist on almost all levels of political participation (Blee 1998; Clark and Clark 1986; Costain 1988; Jennings 1983; Kenski 1988; Mueller 1988; Owen and Dennis 1992; Schlozman,

Burns, and Verba 1994, 1997). In their 1994 study Schlozman, Burns, and Verba argue that even when the definition of political participation is expanded to include fairly broad parameters of what political participation is, gender differences not only persist but are more prevalent both substantively and statistically. And those who have found the gender gap decreasing argue that it is a result of weakening male participation more than an inherent increase of women's participation (Scnell and Bernotsky 1997). Scnell and Bernotsky's study focuses on voter turnout rates, and finds that women's efficacy scores are still very low.

Some studies have delved into understanding why the gap between men and women's level of political participation persisted. Two theories have developed in an attempt to answer these questions. One focuses on socialization and the level of political efficacy that women possess. The other explanation focuses upon structural and resource inequalities between men and women. One of the first socialization studies in regard to the gender gap was conducted by M. Kent Jennings (1983). He looked at several nations in order to assess the impact of parents politically socializing their children. Jennings found that the gender gap was most prevalent in nations such as the United States where fathers were the dominant disseminator of political information. Jennings warns that while his argument is not one of causality, it does demonstrate that socialization may be a critical factor in explaining the gender gap in political participation.

Cal and Janet Clark (1986) take Jennings' analysis one step further by directly comparing socialization variables, i.e. distinguishing between childhood (or Jennings' view of socialization) and adult socialization, and structural variables, to test their respective explanatory power. The primary difference in socialization and structural

variables is that socialization variables effect women's beliefs that they could and should try to affect politics. Conversely, structural variables affect the actual ability of women to engage in politics (e.g. educational status, income, etc.). Clark and Clark argue that the gender gap is a product partly of structural inequalities and mainly of low levels of efficacy as a result of adult socialization factors. Verba, Burns, and Schlozman (1997) found this to still be the case in their study of political participation in the early 1990s. They also found that material resources only partially explain the gender gap and that political engagement (information, efficacy, and interest)—affected by socialization—is the most important factor in understanding the difference between the participation rates of men and women. Only when they controlled for political engagement variables did the gender gap become statistically insignificant. The study raises a concern that the democratic process may be compromised if differences in participation rates are due to a socialization process that leads to an exclusion of women, rather than a preference or choice by women not to participate.

Why is understanding the nature of the gender gap in political participation so important for understanding the electoral process? More specifically, why is it so important as a reason to study campaign finance of women's campaigns? One possible way to combat lower participation rates of women could be in electing more women to office. Evidence exists that the lack of female political role models may hinder the political socialization process for girls (Owen and Dennis 1992). Boys display a stronger relationship between their level of politicization and their exposure to mass media (*ibid*). One plausible reason for this is the domination of male-centered political stories in the

news. If facets of information lead women to believe they are not important political actors, they will not feel empowered to participate.

For women to be successful in the political process they must become empowered. "Political empowerment is the extent to which a group has achieved significant representation and influence in political decision making" (Pippert-High and Corner 1998: 54). K.M. Blee (1998) recognizes a need for "space" to be made by female leaders for women to participate. She argues that radical women activists, who are acting against the mainstream, have an impact on women's political participation overall. Women who witness or are affected by radical women activists seem to become more politically aware, and though they may not become activists themselves, definitely experience a politicization process that creates an incentive to participate politically more often.

In this context, Blee speaks of radical female activists, but the analysis could be extended to women in any position to lead or be a role model in society. Political empowerment can have an attitudinal effect, which increases the group's political participation. When women citizens observe other women participating on a grand scale, such as being elected to office, these women citizens begin to believe in their own political efficacy. Cases of female representation have been shown to increase multiple measures of political participation by women. The most statistically significant differences between representation by a woman versus a man are not only levels of participation, but also of political efficacy and political competence. (Pippert-High and Corner 1998)

The final topic that highlights the importance of attention to women's legislative success deals with networking and power issues that exist within legislatures. Specifically, the topic considers how women find support after they get into office. A label for this topic could be the "Anita Hill phenomenon." The case of Anita Hill's treatment during the Clarence Thomas Supreme Court confirmation hearings is a commonly invoked example for the importance of women being present in the halls that conduct government business. If women are not present to support each other, overt sexism can more easily surface. Senator Barbara Boxer (1994) views Anita Hill's charge of sexual harassment during the Clarence Thomas Supreme Court nomination hearings as a pivotal moment. This ordeal shows the impact women working together as women in legislatures can have on society. Only with a display of unity were the women of the House able to bring salience to the problems of Anita Hill's treatment. The Anita Hill phenomenon is the tendency of women in Congress to stand up for one another when they see a woman being treated unfairly based upon her sex. In these instances, women legislators have been willing to stand up to the established male majority and let them know that their actions are inappropriate. In these instances, women are able to gain a voice and be empowered.

The Anita Hill phenomenon has been seen in other contexts. A second example deals with the rampant and unchecked sexual harassment of female congressional staffers has been a continual problem. The Capitol Hill Women's Political Caucus asserted itself on this issue in 1993-1994 and has worked to improve the conditions for women working on the Hill. Issues such as these demonstrate the importance of having women represent women in Congress (Foerstel and Foerstel 1996).

Women are not only working on such issues, but they are slowly beginning to gain power, and thus could offer assistance to each other in a more substantive way. Women legislators in the 1990s gained more access to more diverse committee assignments while maintaining a strong representation on traditional women's issues committees (Dolan and Ford 1997). This diversification of women's committee assignments has important implications for women to work on their policy priorities. For instance, committees such as the Rules Committee or Ways and Means have a huge impact on what kind of legislation is given real consideration in a manner that offers bills a chance of passage (Arnold 1990; Kingdon 1995). Women serving on these committees and being able to foster a favorable setting for women's issues bills consideration is important. Additionally, women legislators are gaining more access to leadership positions (Dolan and Ford 1997; Foerstel and Foerstel 1996). These leadership positions are not only on committees and subcommittees but also within the party leadership. Positions of leadership are creating an avenue for women to advocate for each other, as well as bring concerns and points of view previously unrecognized into the leadership. This is critical since the legislative leadership has been shown to be the agenda setters for what is considered by both committees and the chamber of Congress as a whole. (Arnold 1990; Kingdon 1995).

Anne Costain (1988) argues that if women are going to be successful in continuing their work of substantively representing women in the legislature, increasing participation, and gaining more legislative power, they must continue to closely identify with one another and work together. Costain argues that women can represent themselves in two ways. First, they can choose to be represented as a special interest. Or

second, they can choose not to be a special interest and try to work independently through mainstream channels. She claims the second path is ineffective and blames this method of working politically as being the reason for women's failure to gain steps toward equality including the failure to have their calls for social equity taken seriously (i.e. reproductive issues, equal pay, child care, etc.). Costain encourages women in leadership roles to represent themselves as a special interest and avoid allying fully with one party. She feels the gender gap presents an opportunity for women to channel their political participation in a more effective manner.

Women's presence in the halls of legislatures, both nationally and across the states, has been shown to be important to creating democratic and equal substantive representation, political participation, and power and networking opportunities. The primary step to working toward such a situation is found in the electoral process.

Why Campaign Finance?

Campaign funding is a critical subject in ensuring that we have a fair and competitive elections process. The importance of understanding women in relation to campaign finance is stated most eloquently by Carole Jean Uhlaner and Kay Lehman Schlozman:

> The puzzle for those who study political recruitment—and for those who care about the virtual exclusion of half the population from higher elected office—is to illuminate the processes of self-selection, misperception, and/or outright discrimination that are at work. In order to understand these processes more fully, we need to be able to make detailed comparisons between the experiences of women and men in politics—those who win, those who lose, and those who never run at all. (1986: 47)

Understanding the implications of current systems of campaign finance among all levels in the U.S. is increasingly important in this era that has been characterized by increasing

pressure for reforms. The national system has already undergone dramatic changes to campaign finance law, and states such as Arkansas have been involved in court battles over reforms without resolve. Only by understanding the inadequacies of old systems can individuals be able to evaluate whether 1) change is needed or 2) the change addresses the problems that existed in the old system.

In this study, one aspect of possible inadequacies is considered. Are women discriminated against by the current campaign finance system? And if so, are there any proposals for reform that can address or equalize this discrimination? Unfortunately, women and campaign finance seem to have fallen out of vogue in current literature since researchers have found fairly conclusive answers to the money question on the national level. Even the Spring 2001 edition of *Women and Politics*, devoted to the topic of women in electoral politics, contained only one brief article that was directly concerned with campaign finance (Francia 2001). This is problematic for two reasons. First, the bulk of research that has been done on this subject focused upon 1992-1994 election cycles. This is only two data periods, and many of these studies make overarching conclusions that women are no longer facing discrimination in raising funds for campaigns (Burrell 1994, 1998; Plutzer and Zipp 1996). To make such a claim based upon two elections is premature, especially since women have not been as successful in gaining representation in Congress in subsequent elections (Dolan 2001). The problem is accentuated by the possibility that these elections were unique in that the press treated women more favorably than in other elections (Smith 1997). Continued study of women and campaign finance is necessary in order to validate these findings in addition to monitoring the development of new trends.

The second problem of not diligently pursing this topic deals with the sheer importance of campaign finance in being elected to office. The ability to raise, and subsequently spend, money has been shown to be a critical factor in getting elected in open seat elections or as a challenger. (Burrell 1994, 1998; Francia 2001; Goidel, Gross, and Shields 1999; Green 1998). But, in the realm of campaign finance, incumbency has been shown to be the dominant factor in candidates' ease of raising money. For any candidate to mount a competitive election, they must focus on fundraising.

Incumbency has been found to be one of the key factors in any candidate getting elected. Incumbents are reelected in more than ninety percent of the elections in which they run (Goidel, Gross, and Shields 1999). Incumbents are able to easily secure the resources needed to run for office through already established financial networks (Burrell 1985, 1994, 1998; Goidel, Gross and Shields 1999; Green 1998). In addition to being able to secure funds, incumbents enjoy established name recognition and privileges of office, such as franking. Burrell (1985, 1994, 1998) has demonstrated that the incumbency effect has been one of the biggest reasons women have not faired better in national elections or been able to secure funding levels comparable to those they run against.

Just because women are reaching contribution parity on the national level does not translate into the conclusion that all states are doing just as well on this score. The trend of increasing campaign finance parity must be met on the state level as well. Each state is unique, and if women are going to continue to make inroads electorally on the national level, competitiveness must exist at the state level as well, in every state. In

order to determine this, states must be studied to find if any discrimination exists that the rules of the game reinforce.

Who cares about states?

For die-hard national politics fans, the most compelling argument for studying campaign finance on the state level is that prior elective experience has been shown to be one of the critical factors for candidate success and viability on the national level. (Burrell 1994; Darcy, Welch, and Clark 1994; Dolan and Ford 1998; Duerst-Lahti 1998; Green 1998). Specifically,

> As women won an increasing number of seats during the 1970s, research confirmed the importance of state legislatures to women's representation in politics for several reasons. First, evidence shows that service in the state legislature functions as a key entry point to higher office; the rate of gains for women at the state level has an impact on the number of women serving in the national legislature and executive positions nationwide. Of the 47 women currently serving in the U.S. House of Representatives, 20 served in their state legislatures prior to being elected to Congress. (Ford and Dolan 1998: 74)

Greater state and local experience and multiple runs for Congress have generally been what has given women an edge over male competitors for national elective office (Palmer and Simon 2001; Uhlaner and Schlozman 1986). Prior elective experience has been shown to be a necessary condition for women to win national elections, but not for men (Hoffman, Palmer, and Gaddie 2001). If this trend continues, diligent focus in opening women's access to state offices is critical for their success on the national level.

A second reason for considering women's ability to be electorally successful on the state level is based in Lee's (1976) critique of American representative democracy. America cannot consider itself a representative democracy if the concerns of women, or any segment of society, are not represented.

Additionally, state level legislation has a powerful impact on women from a policy stance. Many issues that directly effect women are decided at the state level (Dolan and Ford 1998), indicating the necessity of women to be substantively represented at the state level.

Finally, states are the foundational level that the pyramid of US federalist democracy works. In order for the integrity of this democracy to be maintained, the health of state level democracies must be explored. Robert Hogan (2001) shows that type of political culture, using Daniel Elazar's scale of traditionalist, moralistic, or individualistic, makes a huge difference in the probability of faring well as a female candidate. Traditionalist societies show poorly in getting women elected to state legislatures, and moralistic societies have extremely high (in many cases reaching parity) in getting women elected to state legislatures. Having a traditionalist culture decreases the probability that women will win an election by six percentage points per district and twelve percentage points per state (Hogan 2001). Hogan looks generally at how variables such as political culture affect the ultimate ability of women to be elected at the state level. Hogan argues that the next step is to consider how these variables effect sub-points to being elected, such as campaign finance. I expect to find this phenomenon to be translated in the success or failure of women in a traditionalist culture, such as Arkansas, to be able to secure necessary and comparable funds to men for state legislative office.

Undoubtedly, women's representation in state legislatures is growing. Women in state legislatures have reached beyond the twenty percent mark nationally, and thus, they are beyond the critical mass level of fifteen percent that Elizabeth Moss-Kanter (1977) claims women must have to be effective in office (Dolan and Ford 1998; Thomas 1997).

If women are being represented at a level at which they can make an impact, the assumption is made that cause for concern is not noteworthy. Yet, the aggregation is problematic and deceptive, because this aggregate is the product of extremes on each end. States such as Washington have reached women's representation levels of 40-50 percent while states such as Alabama have had a range of 1 to 6 female legislators from 1964-1995 (Norrander and Wilcox 1998: 105). Hogan's finding that culture matters is affirmed in Barbara Norrander and Clyde Wilcox's (1998) study. In their study they find political culture to be a strong indicator of whether or not women run for state office. Culture may have a secondary effect of discouraging women to run for office by creating an atmosphere of discrimination toward the financing of women's campaigns. The only way to study this phenomenon is to begin collecting data over every traditionalist state to see if discrimination toward women in campaign finance exists. I begin with Arkansas.

When choosing a case for study several considerations were made. First and foremost was the availability of data. Though Arkansas has not been the subject of the few studies that exist on state legislative race funding and women, it does have available and accessible records over campaign contributions and expenditures of candidates. Unlike the Federal Elections Commission's (FEC) database, the data available for Arkansas is not formatted for easy manipulation by the social scientist. The scanned-in versions of campaign and expenditure reports are often hand written and sometimes poor fax copies, which makes coding time consuming. The Secretary of State does not provide any accumulative data, and sometimes totals provided by the candidate and individual reporting sheets do not show the same figures. Despite these problems, data was available online, which is a step some states have not yet taken.

Additionally, Arkansas is a perfect case to use for a preliminary study to see if political culture produces a different result in studying gender and campaign finance. Beyond being a traditionalistic state, Norrander and Wilcox (1998) find that though many states have moved around in their ranking of women on state legislatures, Arkansas has stayed firmly in the second to lowest category, just on the border of being in the lowest category. Even so, Arkansas has been slowly increasing the number of women that serve on their legislature, perhaps signaling better levels of campaign finance for women.

Methods and Data

This pilot study seeks to add to understanding the ability of women to compete at the state legislative level for campaign contributions in traditionalistic cultures. Despite previous research that claims women are as able as men to successfully compete for campaign funds, I expect to find in traditionalistic states, where the political culture often works against women in politics, that women are significantly less successful than men in raising campaign funds. This dimension was chosen for study in order to look into a new variable to be considered with campaign finance. I have chosen to look at Arkansas State Representative races for the lower chamber of the legislature for 1996, 1998, and 2000.[2] Data for this study were found on the Arkansas Secretary of State website under the elections department[3] (Arkansas Secretary of State 2002). Here, individuals are able to gain access to scanned copies of all contribution/expenditure forms filed by candidates.

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[2] Special elections were not included.
I had originally intended to include the 2002 primary races. I was unable to do this because the Secretary of State did not have all the Contribution/Expenditure Reports posted for all districts.

[3] As noted above, problems with the data exist. Extra care was given when coding to isolate these problems. Reliability in coding was checked by recoding the first two districts after coding ten districts. The only variable that was not exactly matched was BIGPAC. In four districts the original PAC that had the most contributions came in second or third.

The site also includes lists of all election results since 1992, including the number of votes each candidate garnered.

Only districts that have had women run in at least one of the years considered were included in this data set. Women that ran in the primary, but did not make the general election were included. This arrangement allows more comparability between men and women as competitors in similar environments. This narrowing also allows for enough cases to be present for analysis since it whittles the set to 46 districts down from 100 districts present in Arkansas to be analyzed over three years. In most of these districts, women only ran in one or two of the three years, so both men versus women and men versus men races are included in this set.

While this study is problematic in that it deals with a single state, its central advantage is that it allows for the comparisons of results from several elections. Brian Werner (1997) argues that single election studies have had problematic validity in the past. Only after considering multiple elections in a state can trends begin to be detected. I felt that the trade off between looking at multiple states versus multiple elections was an easy choice. While my study does sacrifice generalizability, this problem can be compensated by considering other single and multiple state studies such as Werner (1997) and Burrell (1990) that compare multiple elections in other states. These other studies can be used to compare the results found in Arkansas to see if similar results are found. Choosing to compare multiple states over a single election sacrifices the validity of a study claiming either equity or inequity in fundraising. Such validity problems would be difficult to remedy, while generalizability problems have an easy remedy by supplementing previous research.

Each election cycle for Arkansas Representative races were coded for several variables.[4] The dependent variables are campaign contributions—total, type, and timing— and election results. The independent variable is candidate sex. Two control variables were also coded: party strength and candidate status. Both of these control variables have consistently shown that they have powerful influences on both contributions and election success (Goidel, Gross, and Shields 1999). Candidate status has consistently been shown to be the true explanatory variable in previous studies of women and campaign contributions (Burrell 1985, 1994, 1998; Uhlaner and Schlozman 1986).

I coded for contributions several ways in order to better understand variances, in men's and women's abilities to raise money. First, I consider the total amount of contributions. Second, I coded for amounts raised from different avenues of contributors. These avenues include individual contributions, political action committee (PAC) contributions, self-contributions[5], and party contributions. Two considerations should be made in regards to these categories. I list corporate donations as PAC donations, even though these groups are not registered with the state of Arkansas as PACs. These groups would include Tyson, Coca-Cola, Pepsi, Philip Morris, among others. I did this for two reasons. First, under Arkansas election law, individuals[6] and PACs have the same contribution limit of $1000 per candidate per election (Arkansas Ethics Commission

[4] See Appendix 1 for a full list of variable and coding schemes.
[5] Loans are included in self-contributions since the candidate is responsible for the loan or sacrifices the money in the event that funds are not raised to cover the amount. No candidate is guaranteed they will be able to raise funds enough to cover the loan.
[6] I assume corporations would be counted among individual's contributions in Arkansas. They are not specifically addressed as an entity. Corporate contributions are not excluded under the law per se. But, the guidelines to be recognized as a PAC are very clear. One of these requirements is to be registered with the state. Corporations, such as the above examples, are very active campaign donors, but are not listed among the Arkansas registered PACs as per the Secretary of State's website.

2002). Second, I am making the assumption that corporations have motivations that are more similar to PACs than to individual contributors. Theilmann and Wihlite (1991) argue that PACs consider five criteria in donating to candidates. They consider access to the candidate if elected, likelihood of concern being on the agenda, ability to collect political IOUs, level of support the candidate gives their issue of concern, and the committee assignment and voting record of the candidate if applicable.

The second consideration that should be given to the categories of contributions has to do with political parties. Under Arkansas electoral law, a differentiation exists between the state party and the local parties and subgroups within the party. The Arkansas state parties are allowed to contribute up to $2500 per candidate per election. All other party groups—such as the Benton County Republican Party or the Northwest Arkansas Democratic Women—have to register as PACs and are subject to the $1000 per candidate per election limit. Despite the distinguishing factors under the law, I code these together since financial support of local and subgroups in the party reflect party support of candidates as well as state party support.

In addition to considering contributions' sources, I also coded for the three distinct time periods of contributions during the election. Literature has documented the importance of early money for the success of legislative candidates, especially women (Burrell 1994, 1996; Francia 2001; Theilmann and Wilhite 1991). In order to see if women in Arkansas are able to secure early money for the general election, I calculated the amount raised during the off election year and through the primary season ending the early money period with May. The mid period is considered June through August, and

the late fundraising period is September through the November election. These late periods often help off set last minute costs.

Past scholarship has revealed two variables to be powerful contributors to the overestimation of discrimination against women in election returns as well as contributions. These two variables are party and candidate status (Burrell 1994; Francia 2001; Hoffman, Palmer, and Gaddie 2001; Theilmann and Wihlite 1991; Werner 1997). Party is controlled with a dichotomous variable denoting if the previous election was won by a Republican (0) or a Democrat (1). Candidate status was coded as incumbent, challenger, open seat, or unopposed. Finally, I will consider the independent variables being investigated. The most important of these is gender. Candidate gender was coded dichotomously for being female. Males were coded "0", and females coded "1."

I also decided to include the largest contributing PAC type as a variable. I coded all PAC donations as one of the following types: business[7], health[8], energy and utilities, transportation, construction, poultry[9], agriculture, social[10], women, and other[11]. Largest contributing PAC is an independent variable because I expect that when PACs have a lot

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[7] Business included any PAC that dealt with mass distribution of a product or service. Included in this group was banks and bankers PACs, insurance groups, real estate groups, corporations such as Coca- Cola, Phillip Morris, Pepsi, Anheiser-Busch Distribution, etc.

[8] Health included not only physician and clinical groups, but also hospitals, nurses' groups, pharmacists' groups, pharmaceutical companies, ophthalmologists' groups, and dental groups. Insurance was considered a business. With pushes for health care reform, insurance companies have been charged with not being focused on care. Additionally, this categorization circumvents problems of classifying companies and PACs that represent multiple types of insurance carriers.

[9] I classify poultry as distinct from agriculture. This is because of the enormous independent force of the poultry industry in Arkansas that does not necessarily have the same concerns as the rest of the agricultural industry. For instance, many crop farmers are concerned with watershed and pollution that poultry farms produce, which could possibly harm their product.

[10] The social type of PAC includes education, welfare, public safety types of groups, as well as ideological groups such as the Conservative Leaders of Arkansas PAC.

[11] If "other" was coded, I noted from where the money was donated. If the bulk of this donation was from one place or type of PAC I coded it in addition to "other". For example, IMPACT, the trial lawyers PAC, sometimes donated the full $1000 allotted, and thus had the potential to become the largest contributing PAC type in the category "other".

of financial resources and donate to a campaign, the amount contributed in general will be higher than if low resource PACs are the largest contributor, i.e. women or social types.

This variable serves several functions. First, it allows for observation of the strength of women's PACs in Arkansas. Is a women's PAC the largest contributor to any one candidate? Since women's PACs have been seen as one explanation for women's increased electoral success (Burrell 1994; Francia 2001), the presence, or lack of, could aid in understanding women's electoral politics in Arkansas. Additionally, I expect to see a difference in the type of PACs that is the largest contributor for each sex. I expect to see health and social PACs as the largest contributors for women, and possibly being a reason for lower campaign contributions. Conversely, the expected support bases for men's campaigns are poultry and business.

The final variable I consider is women's contribution activity. I expect to find a positive relationship between increased women's contribution activity and overall contribution level and electoral outcomes. I operationalize women's contribution activity in three ways. Women's individual contributions are first. This is the total amount that women donated to a candidate's campaign. In order for the contribution to be counted as a women's individual contribution, it had to be listed under a recognizable female name. Choosing to risk underestimation rather than overestimation[12], all names of questionable gender were excluded. Also, husband and wife names listed together under one donation were not counted in this variable. Only in cases that could be reasonably assumed that the woman was making a choice to support a candidate was the contribution included.

[12] If a statistically significant relationship occurs with underestimation, at least the relationship can be definitively concluded to exist. With overestimation, the relationship may not exist at all.

Since Arkansas election law states that contributions must be made directly from the contributor to the candidate or individual authorized to act for the candidate (www.arkansasethics.com), contributions made with a women's name were counted.

The second measure of women's contributions activity deals with women's PACs. The variable "largest contributing PAC" may not capture the activity of women's PACs. In order to capture this activity, I dichotomously coded for the presence of a contribution by a women's PAC. Candidates received a "1" for a donation of any size and a "0" for no women's PAC contribution.

This dichotomous scheme was repeated for my final measure of women's contribution activity—party. This final category demonstrated the support of women specific subgroups within the parties. Examples of these groups would be the Washington County Republican Women or the Northwest Arkansas Democratic Women. Like women's PACs candidates were coded "1" if they received a contribution of any size and "0" if not.

So, Who is the Safer Sex?

I began with the argument that the ability of women to secure campaign funds in Arkansas will not follow the national trend of women being more successful than men in raising campaign money. Four hypotheses are tested in order to assess the nature of campaign finance for women in a traditionalistic political culture, in this case, Arkansas.

These four hypotheses are as follows:

1) Women in Arkansas will not raise as much money as men—in total campaign receipts, in any one time period, in individual or PAC contributions, and in party contributions.

2) Candidate status and party will not prove to be alternative explanations for the trend stated by hypothesis one.

3) Women in Arkansas will have a distinct advantage in contributions from women. Women in Arkansas will raise more money than men in contributions by women; they will have more instances than men of women's PAC or women's party contributions.

4) Women will have more success raising money from social, health, and women's PACs, than business or poultry, which men will have more success in securing.

Each of these hypotheses is developed under the assumption that sex discrimination is a more blatant problem in traditionalistic cultures. Hypotheses one and two are founded upon a consideration of women's roles in this type of culture. Specifically, even though many women have to work due to necessity, their roles are still confined to those that aid the family, such as health and education careers. (Thomas 1997) I do not expect women to get overwhelming financial support for their bids for office. Hypothesis three considers outlets where women may be able to secure support. While some literature has hinted at this relationship, few have tried to test it (Burrell 1994; Francia 2001). Finally, hypothesis four considers one possibility of PAC support that would fit traditionalistic perceptions of women (Thomas 1997).

In trying to determine the impact that sex has on women's abilities to raise campaign contributions, the first step is considering the variation within the variables. Table 1 reports the frequency distribution of candidate status, sex, and party. While distribution is not even within each of these variables, they are not completely skewed either. When a value contains a greater number of cases, it is rarely over double the other value.

Table 1 Frequency of the independent variables.

Total number of...	1996	1998	2000	ALL
Incum/Chall/Open	31/ 11/ 35	18/ 18/ 70	31/ 12/ 41	80/ 41/ 199
Males/ Females	50/ 27	67/ 39	58/ 25	175/ 91
Republican/Democrat	19/ 47	31/ 71	24/ 59	74/ 177

After making sure that variation existed in the independent variables, I looked to see which of my variables were correlated. After looking at the relationship between the candidate sex and different aspects of contributions, a regression considers the influence of candidate status and candidate party. Additionally, the t-tests are considered later to test for the significance for the differences in mean.

Appendix 2 bolds the variables that were found to be significantly correlated to candidate sex in each year with their Pearson's r and two-tailed significance scores. The most consistent relationship was between women's PAC contributions and gender, and even this relationship is only seen in two of the three election years. Generally, the unstable results demonstrate a lack of stability in the role that gender plays in campaign fundraising in Arkansas.

The differences in significant correlations suggest movement between election years. A first interesting difference between election years is the significance of a correlation between sex and campaign contributions. Specifically, being a woman candidate made a difference for campaign contributions in 1998, but not in 1996 or 2000. In 1998, early contributions and PAC contributions, as well as total contributions, were significantly correlated with sex. The level of explanation that sex offers was weak.

Also, the change in direction of the relationship of women's party contributions between 1998 and 2000 is contrary to the expectation that women's party organizations would be focused on aiding women candidates. In 1998, men are more likely to receive

contributions from women's party groups in a significant fashion. However, in 2000, the direction of the relationship is in the expected direction of being a woman candidate positively impacting the ability to secure campaign funds from women's party organizations. One very surprising result was that sex did not impact the amount of individual contributions from women in any of the election years. This is an interesting finding since the literature on women and campaign fundraising suggests that women are large contributors for women's campaigns (Burrell 1994). This lack of correlation would suggest that, in Arkansas, women equally contribute to men's and women's campaigns.

Finally, in 1996, winning or losing the race was the only variable correlated with sex. Interestingly, sex has a highly significant relationship to election outcomes in 1996, with a significance level of .001 and a Pearson's r score of .37. Despite this relationship in 1996, the correlation is not observed in 1998 or 2000. The lack of a consistent correlation would show Arkansas as not fitting Hogan's (2001) model of traditionalistic political cultures as creating a statistically significant barrier to women getting elected to office

After considering what variables were correlated with sex, I then looked at the t-tests of gender and the various dependent variables in order to test the four hypotheses. While the correlations seem to show that 1) the relationships that tested are not significant and 2) when they are significant, they are in the opposite direction than intended. I consider the t- tests because, "the t-test is used to determine whether the difference between the means of two groups or conditions is due to experimental manipulation or selection, or simply due to chance" (Rowland, Arkkelin, and Crisler 1991). I found that several variables had significant differences between male and female

means in some of the elections. Surprisingly, in 2000 not one variable was statistically significant, despite four dependent variables showing statistically significant differences in sex in 1998. These swings in significance show instability in relationships between the variables over years. In all variables except three, women raised more money than men, just not at a statistically significant level.

The t-test is critical for affirming hypothesis one, women in Arkansas will not raise as much campaign contributions as men. As is the pattern with many tests in this study, the results of the t-tests vary from year to year. Before considering differences that are statistically significant, some consideration should be made about the general differences between men and women. In 1996, women raised more money than men on all dependent variables that hypothesis one considers (total contributions, contributions by type, and contributions by time period) except for contributions made from June to August, contributions from individuals, and personal contributions. The only difference of mean found to be statistically significant for 1996 was contributions made from June to August, which had a two-tailed test of significance score of .065. This result demonstrates that although women are competitive with men in fundraising, women still have a slight disadvantage. The results of 1998 exhibit a different pattern, one in which women are not just competitive, but actually advantaged in comparison to men. In 1998, women's means for every variable of general campaign contributions were higher than men's means. Additionally, four variables had statistically significant mean differences. These variables, listed in Table 2, are early and late contributions, total contributions, and PAC contributions.[13]

[13] See Appendix 5 for full t-test tables for all years.

Table 2 Significant t-tests for 1998.

	EARLY	LATE	TOTAL	PAC
MEAN				
Men	4798.65	3045.64	9345.34	1894.76
Women	8439.57	4943.20	14434.58	3435.91
Difference	3640.92	1897.56	5089.24	1541.15
F- test	10.592	.294	4.187	6.271
Significance	.002	.589	.043	.014
t-test	-2.448	-1.799	-2.393	-2.508
(two-tailed)Sig.	.016	.076	.018	.014

The 2000 election did not maintain the same statistically significant difference in mean. As in 1996, men fared better than women in soliciting campaign contributions in three areas. Only one of the three areas matched the results from 1996: men contributed more personal money to their campaigns. Different than the results from 1996, men were able to raise more money in the early contributing period (pre-June), rather than in the middle June to August period in which they were significantly more successful than women in raising money in 1996. Finally, men were able to raise more money than women from PACs in 2000. After considering these trends by comparing the means of men and women, the t-tests for 2000 show that none of the differences between men and women are statistically significant.

The changing t-test scores, as well as the changing difference of means, suggest two implications. First, gender does not play an important role overall in determining a candidate's ability to raise campaign funds in Arkansas. This finding is surprisingly considering the traditionalistic nature of Arkansas' political culture. The second implication from the results is that another variable could account for differences in variable significance. One possible variable is salience campaign issues. Perhaps women in years such as 1998 are able to campaign on issues, which are considered women's

issues, such as health or education. Further research would have to look into this consideration.

The alternative explanation for differences in significance could be found in controlling for candidate status or party. The lack of relationship between contributions and candidate sex before controlling for these aspects is a testament to the strength of women as candidates in Arkansas. In other studies (Burrell 1985, 1994; Werner 1997), women have had statistically significant smaller means of campaign contributions than men before controlling for candidate status or party. Hypothesis two considers whether controlling for candidate status and party will make a difference in the relationship between men and women candidates in Arkansas being able to raise money. I ran a means comparison for each election over total contributions to test this. The results were very similar to what was observed in the hypothesis one without the two control variables. Only one year, 1998, yielded a significant relationship in the ANOVA tests for total campaign contributions and sex controlling for candidate status and party.[14] In 1998, women fared better than fellow party members of similar candidate status except for incumbent Republicans. Even this number was subject to an extremely small "n" since only one male, Republican and one female, Republican incumbent ran in that election.[15]

While the relationship between sex and total campaign contributions remained statistically insignificant, women maintained higher means than men of similar party and candidate status on several counts. For 1996, women out matched men in soliciting campaign contributions as Democratic incumbents, Republican challengers, and

[14] The significance score was .035

[15] See Appendix 6 for full means comparisons of total campaign contributions by sex controlling for candidate status and party.

Democratic open seat candidates. The only similar group found in 2000 was Democratic, women incumbents raisin more money than males. Additionally, Republican incumbent and Democratic challenger women had higher contribution means than their counter parts. Women of both parties had a weaker showing than their open seat race counter parts.

Regression analysis confirms the inability of a model including candidate status and party in addition to candidate sex to flush out more interesting implications. Appendix 3 lists the regression output all of the spending variables using these three independent variables. The adjusted R-squared scores are extremely low, suggesting that this model does not explain very much of the variance in campaign contributions in Arkansas. For total campaign contributions, the adjusted R-squared never even broke .10. The election of 1998 was the only one to show candidate sex as a top variable in the model by having the top Beta score. This was the same year that has shown itself in several tests to have lots of relationships between the various measures of spending and sex as a predictor. No one predictor shows itself as being clearly more important than the others when looking at the various measures of campaign contributions. For explanatory variable shows itself to be important in different context in different elections.

In addition to campaign contributions, I tested how much women candidates appeal to and rely on support from other women. The increasing participation of female citizens by giving to political organizations has been theorized as being important for the rise in female candidates' abilities to run for office competitively (Burrell 1994; Foerstel and Foerstel 1996). Measurement of women's support was developed by three different dependent variables: individual contributions by women, a dichotomous variable

denoting support from a women's PAC, and a dichotomous variable denoting support from a women's party organization.

Women's financial contributions as individuals, one of the more powerful explanatory variables in the literature, prove to be an insignificant variable as an unique source of contributions for women.[16] Additionally, the t-tests for women's individual contributions are not statistically significant, though female candidates' means are greater in every election year. Table 3 shows the differences in mean for each year and lists the F-test, t-test, and corresponding significance scores for candidate sex and women's individual contributions.

Table 3 T-test for women's individual contributions and sex.

	1996	1998	2000
MEAN			
Men	323.67	1015.46	910.76
Women	383.48	1332.17	1579.64
Difference	59.80	316.70	668.88
F- test	.032	.002	.884
Significance	.859	.964	.350
t-test	-.366	-.741	-1.287
(two-tailed)Sig.	.715	.460	.205

Two other aspects of women's contribution activity that were considered were contributions made by women's PACs and women's party organizations. These two subgroups act as intermediaries between female candidates and female contributors. As evidenced by the correlations depicted in Table 4, each of these variables proves to be significant in 1998 and 2000, though they are not significant in 1996. Women's PACs are strongly correlated with men and women in raising campaign contributions. Not

[16] See appendices 3 and 4.

only is the relationship significant, it is one of the few relationships that is consistent in 1998 and 2000.

Table 4 Correlations of sex, women's PACs, and women's party.

	Women's PAC		Women's Party	
	Pearson's r	Significance	Pearson's r	Significance
1996	-.049	.670	.104	.373
1998	.292	.002 **	-.193	.047**
2000	.295	.007**	.306	.005**

While contributions from women's PACs and candidate sex are consistently correlated, contributions from women's party organizations and candidate sex are not. While the 1998 score has very low level explanatory power, it is in the opposite direction than expected. Male candidates of 1998 seem to have had a better chance of receiving money from women's party organizations than women candidates. In 2000, women are once again the benefactors of women's party contributions at a statistically significant level.

Finally, hypothesis four is tested. Hypothesis four argues that women will have more success in raising money from social, health, and women's PACs, while men will have more success at securing business and poultry PAC money. The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that social and health issues are usually allied with women's issues and interests, while business and poultry farming would be considered domains of men in a traditionalistic culture. The implication of this is that normally business groups give more money than any other group. To test this hypothesis, cross-tabulations of gender and biggest contributing PAC type are utilized with a report of the chi-square of this test. Surprisingly, the women and men were extremely similar in the type of PAC that was the biggest campaign contributor. In 1998 and 2000, business was the number one PAC

money contributor for both men and women. In 1996, business was the first for men and second for women. Women's number one PAC contributor in 1996 was health.[17]

Conclusion

The findings of this study confirmed the results found in other state studies and the national trend of women's ability to raise campaign contributions. This disconfirms my expectation that women running for Arkansas legislative office would not be able to raise comparative levels of campaign contributions.[18] These results showed that not only were women able to raise more money than men of similar candidate status, but they were able to raise more money than men in the aggregate. This is a phenomenon that has not surfaced on the national level in studies conducted throughout the 1990s.

This pilot study suggests two possibilities for political culture as an important variable in understanding the nature of campaign finance as it applies to women in state level elections. First, culture may not be a key explanatory variable when considering women's ability to solicit campaign contributions. Hogan (2001) beseeches political scientists to consider culture as an important variable in studying different aspects of campaigns and candidate sex. While culture seems to have an effect on women's ability to be elected to office (Hill 1981; Hogan 2001), if Arkansas is a true reflection of traditionalistic political culture, culture does not impact women's ability to raise campaign contributions. The second possibility is that Arkansas is not representative of traditionalistic political culture. Elazar's (1964) classification of states into political cultures is almost forty years old. Culture is not static, and these findings could be a function of Arkansas moving away from a traditionalistic culture. The only way to

[17] For the full cross-tabulation table see Appendix 7.1 through 7.3.
[18] See Appendix 2.

determine this would be an extensive revisitation of Elazar's study. The importance of considering both possible implications is that both address the dogmatic nature of the literature on political culture. The first implication addresses the limits of political culture, while the second address the assumptions of staticness.

Could it be that democracy is functioning well? The findings of this study suggest so. Not only are women competitive in their ability to secure campaign contributions, the sources of these contributions are similar to those received by men. The next research step would be testing to see if the equal levels of contributions from individual women are also found in other states and on the national level. Continual testing of this kind of parity is important not only in understanding the picture of electoral politics in Arkansas, but also to guard and expand the limits of our democracy.

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Appendix 1- Variable descriptions

Independent variables-

SEX- sex of candidate-

Male=0

Female=1

STATUS- type of candidate-

Incumbent=1

Challenger=2

Open seat=3

PARTY- party affiliation of the candidate-

Republican=0

Democrat=1

Independent/Reform= coded as missing "." (These are the only missing values for party- only three exist)

Dependent variables-

Election results

WIN- Did the candidate lose or win the race?

Lose=0

Win=1

DVOTE= number of votes garnered for the candidate throughout the district

Monetary Contributions

TOTAL= total dollar amount of monetary contributions

EARLY= total dollar amount of contributions pre-June of the election year

MID= total dollar amount of contributions from June to August

LATE= total dollar amount of contributions from September to December

IND= total dollar amount of individual contributions

PAC= total dollar amount of PAC and business contributions

BIGPAC= biggest contributing PAC type

None=0	Agriculture=3	Poultry=6	Women=9
Energy=1	Construction=4	Social=7	Other=10
Business=2	Transportation=5	Health=8	

PERSONAL- total dollar amount of personal contributions and loans

PARTYMON- total dollar amount of party contributions

WMIND- total dollar amount of contributions given by individual women

WMPAC- Did a women's PAC contribute to the campaign?

No=0

Yes=1

WMPARTY- Did a women's party organization contribute to the campaign?

No=0

Yes=1

Appendix 2- Hypothesis Outline

Considering that Arkansas is a traditionalistic state, the ability of women to secure campaign funds in Arkansas will not follow the national trend. Specifically,

1) Women in Arkansas will not raise as much money as men...
    a. in total campaign receipts
    b. in early contributions, which are seen as crucial in running a competitive campaign.
    c. in late contributions, which can help in close races.
    d. in total individual contributions, PAC contributions, or party contributions.
2) Candidate status and party will not prove to be alternative explanations for this trend.
3) Women will have a distinct advantage in contributions from women. Women in Arkansas...
    a. will raise more money than men in contributions given by women
    b. will have more instances of donation by women's PACs
    c. will have more instances of donation by women's party groups.
4) Women will have more success raising money from social, health, and possibly women's PAC's, than business or poultry which men will have more success at securing.

    The reasoning behind this hypothesis is that social and health issues are usually allied with women's issues and interests, while business and poultry farming are still considered domains of men in traditional culture. The implication of this is that business and poultry groups typically give more money than other groups.

Appendix 3- Correlations

		1996 candidate sex	1998 candidate sex	2000 candidate sex
Candidate status	Pearson Correlation	-.218	-.182	-.135
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.057	.062	.225
	N	77	106	83
Candidate sex	Pearson Correlation	1	1	1
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.	.	.
	N	77	106	83
Party of candidate	Pearson Correlation	.185	.037	.135
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.134	.709	.227
	N	67	102	82
No. district votes	Pearson Correlation	.076	.071	.153
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.510	.472	.167
	N	77	105	83
Win/ lose race	Pearson Correlation	**.379**	.171	-.008
	Sig. (2-tailed)	**.001**	.082	.941
	N	**77**	105	83
Early Contributions	Pearson Correlation	.156	**.233**	-.094
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.175	**.016**	.400
	N	77	**106**	83
Mid Contributions	Pearson Correlation	-.165	.090	.078
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.152	.360	.483
	N	77	106	83
Late Contributions	Pearson Correlation	.083	.178	.081
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.474	.068	.464
	N	77	106	83
Total Contributions	Pearson Correlation	.062	**.228**	.006
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.594	**.018**	.958
	N	77	**106**	83
Individuals' Contributions	Pearson Correlation	-.046	.064	.044
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.690	.515	.694
	N	77	106	83
PAC Contributions	Pearson Correlation	.056	**.239**	-.059
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.627	**.014**	.596
	N	77	**106**	83
Loans and Self Contributions	Pearson Correlation	-.017	.121	-.057
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.885	.218	.609
	N	77	106	83
Party Contributions	Pearson Correlation	.081	.049	.045
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.488	.618	.686
	N	76	106	83
Women's Contributions	Pearson Correlation	.039	.067	.145
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.735	.493	.190
	N	76	106	83
Received women's PAC contributions	Pearson Correlation	-.049	**.292**	**.295**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.670	**.002**	**.007**
	N	77	**106**	**83**
Received women's Party contributions	Pearson Correlation	.104	**-.193**	**.306**
	Sig. (2-tailed)	.373	**.047**	**.005**
	N	76	**106**	**83**

Appendix 4- Regressions

1996

	EARLY	MID	LATE	TOTAL	IND	PAC	PERSON	PARTY	WMNIND
Sex									
Beta	.224	-.203	.106	.098	.029	-.034	.066	.167	.103
Sig.	.067	.109	.397	.422	.807	.781	.601	.140	.382
Status									
Beta	.344	.144	.186	.365	.312	.095	.210	.285	.241
Sig.	.008	.269	.155	.005	.014	.459	.112	.016	.052
Party									
Beta	.123	.019	-.149	-.010	-.176	.343	-.086	-.383	-.294
Sig.	.327	.881	.251	.937	.158	.009	.509	.001	.018
R	.370	.265	.269	.362	.397	.323	.244	.527	.423
Adj.R^2	.096	.026	.028	.089	.118	.061	.015	.243	.140

1998

	EARLY	MID	LATE	TOTAL	IND	PAC	PERSON	PARTY	WMNIND
Sex									
Beta	.243	-.227	-.188	.017	.014	.194	.010	-.535	.030
Sig.	.013	.022	.060	.862	.887	.045	.921	.000	.765
Status									
Beta	.137	.133	.047	.202	.176	-.156	.194	.052	.166
Sig.	.162	.184	.643	.044	.087	.112	.058	.551	.108
Party									
Beta	.235	.110	.175	.244	.078	.186	.145	.058	.083
Sig.	.017	.266	.080	.015	.440	.056	.149	.499	.415
R	.341	.288	.255	.288	.179	.344	.220	.545	.171
Adj.R^2	.090	.055	.037	.055	.002	.091	.019	.275	-.001

2000

	EARLY	MID	LATE	TOTAL	IND	PAC	PERSON	PARTY	WMNIND
Sex									
Beta	-.092	.093	.112	.028	.076	-.111	-.039	.105	.168
Sig.	.416	.417	.301	.808	.501	.316	.720	.303	.141
Status									
Beta	.168	-.002	-.083	.074	.175	-.292	.320	-.020	.096
Sig.	.136	.988	.440	.514	.122	.009	.004	.845	.397
Party									
Beta	.104	-.140	-.346	-.152	-.100	.030	.137	-.489	-.100
Sig.	.352	.219	.002	.181	.373	.786	.204	.000	.375
R	.221	.157	.361	.167	.203	.299	.352	.487	.197
Adj.R^2	.012	-.013	.097	-.009	.004	.054	.090	.208	.002

Appendix 5- Hypothesis 1 t-tests

Bold are significant differences.

1996

	Early	mid	late	total	ind	pac	Person.	party	wmind
Mean									
of men	3868.62	**2093.24**	2827.32	8789.16	2301.46	2840.04	1283.80	1029.08	323.67
of wmn	5599.22	**978.93**	3687.74	9946.93	2004.07	3323.15	1194.63	1335.56	383.48
	1730.60	**1114.31**	860.42	1157.77	297.39	483.11	89.17	306.47	59.81
F –test	.511	**10.062**	.155	.001	2.021	.706	.077	1.448	.032
Sig.	.477	**.002**	.695	.970	.159	.403	.783	.233	.859
t-test	-1.368	**1.880**	-.720	-.536	.401	-.488	.145	-.697	-.339
Sig.	.175	**.065**	.474	.594	.690	.627	.885	.488	.735

1998

	Early	mid	late	total	ind	pac	Person.	party	wmind
Mean									
of men	**4798.65**	1501.04	**3045.64**	**9345.34**	3443.10	**1894.76**	1921.39	907.66	1015.46
of wmn	**8439.57**	1949.30	**4943.20**	**14434.5**	4172.03	**3435.91**	3251.88	1047.29	1332.17
	3640.92	448.25	**1897.56**	**8**	729.92	**1541.15**	1330.48	139.63	316.70
				5089.24					
F –test	**10.592**	.557	**.294**	**4.187**	.001	**6.271**	5.532	.043	.002
Sig	**.002**	.457	**.589**	**.043**	.979	**.014**	.021	.836	.964
t-test	**-2.448**	-.842	**-1.799**	**-2.393**	-.642	**-2.508**	-1.239	-.499	-.741
Sig	**.016**	.403	**.076**	**.018**	.523	**.014**	.218	.619	.460

2000

	Early	mid	late	total	ind	pac	Person.	party	wmind
Mean									
of men	9539.07	1941.90	4327.74	15841.51	5112.25	5898.55	2201.08	1283.58	910.76
of wmn	7402.22	2583.60	5579.26	16021.91	5833.52	5148.20	1882.56	1552.48	1579.64
	2136.85	641.70	1251.51	180.40	721.27	750.35	318.52	268.89	668.88
F –test	.610	.381	.018	1.192	.104	.013	1.638	.078	.884
Sig	.437	.539	.894	.278	.748	.908	.204	.781	.350
t-test	.948	-.618	-.761	-.056	-.448	.553	.581	-.448	-1.287
Sig	.347	.541	.451	.956	.655	.583	.563	.656	.205

Appendix 6- T-test for total contributions by sex controlling for candidate status and party

1996

			MEN	WOMEN
Incumbent				
	Republican	mean	3000	2250
		Std. Dev.	141.42	.
		N	2	1
	Democrat	mean	6807.75	7570.13
		Std. Dev.	7941.04	7522.75
		N	12	15
Challenger				
	Republican	mean	10951.20	12730
		Std. Dev.	11684.06	.
		N	5	1
	Democrat	mean	3437.50	0
		Std. Dev.	3416.90	.
		N	4	0
Open-seat candidates				
	Republican	mean	14313.103	11973.33
		Std. Dev.	8505.67	538.67
		N	8	3
	Democrat	mean	12376.70	16324.50
		Std. Dev.	12389.38	11341.21
		N	10	6

1998

			MEN	WOMEN
Incumbent				
	Republican	mean	6050	1175
		Std. Dev.	.	.
		N	1	1
	Democrat	mean	9802.80	10616.84
		Std. Dev.	7936.12910	5807.83238
		N	5	11
Challenger				
	Republican	mean	10370.5550	15150.50
		Std. Dev.	8157.79058	.
		N	6	1
	Democrat	mean	4184.1913	10863.9900
		Std. Dev.	3386.97484	90.52381
		N	8	2
Open-seat candidates				
	Republican	mean	12324.2146	12766.6978
		Std. Dev.	10391.49516	7203.24284
		N	13	9
	Democrat	mean	10197.2313	19547.3033
		Std. Dev.	9050.29794	19151.61644
		N	30	15

2000

		MEN	WOMEN
Incumbent			
Republican	mean	19751.05	29594.23
	Std. Dev.	6764.84	21603.89
	N	6	3
Democrat	mean	10479.14	15198.06
	Std. Dev.	8628.86	13698.22
	N	14	8
Challenger			
Republican	mean	18304	0
	Std. Dev.	17320.94	.
	N	3	0
Democrat	mean	7064.81	13965.60
	Std. Dev.	8046.82	7196.03
	N	3	5
Open-seat candidates			
Republican	mean	17978.85	11361.50
	Std. Dev.	18955.66	10509.73
	N	10	2
Democrat	mean	18907.03	13947.09
	Std. Dev.	16085.81	11551.88
	N	21	7

Appendix 7.1 - Cross-tabulation for sex and bigPAC

1996

			biggest contributing pac type									Total
			none	energy	business	construction	poultry	social	health	women	other	
gender of candidate	male	Count	18	6	13	1	1	4	6		1	50
		% within gender of candidate	36.0%	12.0%	26.0%	2.0%	2.0%	8.0%	12.0%		2.0%	100.0%
		% within biggest contributing pac type	90.0%	75.0%	65.0%	50.0%	100.0%	50.0%	42.9%		33.3%	64.9%
		% of Total	23.4%	7.8%	16.9%	1.3%	1.3%	5.2%	7.8%		1.3%	64.9%
	female	Count	2	2	7	1		4	8	1	2	27
		% within gender of candidate	7.4%	7.4%	25.9%	3.7%		14.8%	29.6%	3.7%	7.4%	100.0%
		% within biggest contributing pac type	10.0%	25.0%	35.0%	50.0%		50.0%	57.1%	100.0%	66.7%	35.1%
		% of Total	2.6%	2.6%	9.1%	1.3%		5.2%	10.4%	1.3%	2.6%	35.1%
Total		Count	20	8	20	2	1	8	14	1	3	77
		% within gender of candidate	26.0%	10.4%	26.0%	2.6%	1.3%	10.4%	18.2%	1.3%	3.9%	100.0%
		% within biggest contributing pac type	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	26.0%	10.4%	26.0%	2.6%	1.3%	10.4%	18.2%	1.3%	3.9%	100.0%

Pearson's Chi-Square- 13.559
Significance (2-sided)- .094

Appendix 7.2 – Cross-tabulation for sex and bigPAC

1998

			biggest contributing pac type										
			energy	business	agriculture	construction	transportation	poultry	social	health	women	other	Total
gender of candidate	0	Count	4	16	1	3	2	4	10	7		4	51
		% within gender of candidate	7.8%	31.4%	2.0%	5.9%	3.9%	7.8%	19.6%	13.7%		7.8%	100.0%
		% within biggest contributing pac type	57.1%	53.3%	100.0%	60.0%	100.0%	80.0%	58.8%	58.3%		80.0%	59.3%
		% of Total	4.7%	18.6%	1.2%	3.5%	2.3%	4.7%	11.6%	8.1%		4.7%	59.3%
	1	Count	3	14		2		1	7	5	2	1	35
		% within gender of candidate	8.6%	40.0%		5.7%		2.9%	20.0%	14.3%	5.7%	2.9%	100.0%
		% within biggest contributing pac type	42.9%	46.7%		40.0%		20.0%	41.2%	41.7%	100.0%	20.0%	40.7%
		% of Total	3.5%	16.3%		2.3%		1.2%	8.1%	5.8%	2.3%	1.2%	40.7%
Total		Count	7	30	1	5	2	5	17	12	2	5	86
		% within gender of candidate	8.1%	34.9%	1.2%	5.8%	2.3%	5.8%	19.8%	14.0%	2.3%	5.8%	100.0%
		% within biggest contributing pac type	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	8.1%	34.9%	1.2%	5.8%	2.3%	5.8%	19.8%	14.0%	2.3%	5.8%	100.0%

Pearson's Chi-Square- 7.212
Significance (2-sided)- .615

Appendix 7.3 - Cross-tabulation for sex and bigPAC
2000

			biggest contributing pac type								
			energy	business	agriculture	construction	transportation	social	health	other	Total
gender of candidate	0	Count	6	23		6	1	8	5	1	50
		% within gender of candidate	12.0%	46.0%		12.0%	2.0%	16.0%	10.0%	2.0%	100.0%
		% within biggest contributing pac type	75.0%	69.7%		85.7%	100.0%	66.7%	50.0%	50.0%	67.6%
		% of Total	8.1%	31.1%		8.1%	1.4%	10.8%	6.8%	1.4%	67.6%
	1	Count	2	10	1	1		4	5	1	24
		% within gender of candidate	8.3%	41.7%	4.2%	4.2%		16.7%	20.8%	4.2%	100.0%
		% within biggest contributing pac type	25.0%	30.3%	100.0%	14.3%		33.3%	50.0%	50.0%	32.4%
		% of Total	2.7%	13.5%	1.4%	1.4%		5.4%	6.8%	1.4%	32.4%
Total		Count	8	33	1	7	1	12	10	2	74
		% within gender of candidate	10.8%	44.6%	1.4%	9.5%	1.4%	16.2%	13.5%	2.7%	100.0%
		% within biggest contributing pac type	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%	100.0%
		% of Total	10.8%	44.6%	1.4%	9.5%	1.4%	16.2%	13.5%	2.7%	100.0%

Pearson's Chi-Square- 5.580
Significance (2-sided)- .590