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# Multiculturalism, Colorblindness, and Prejudice: Examining How Diversity Ideologies Impact Intergroup Attitudes

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Multiculturalism, Colorblindness, and Prejudice: Examining How Diversity Ideologies Impact
Intergroup Attitudes


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**Abstract**

The present research examined an underlying psychological process of the effect of diversity ideologies on prejudice among Whites. In one study, I tested whether colorblindness vs. multiculturalism affected perceptions of similarity vs. difference, outgroup perspective taking, and, in turn, prejudice. Using an experimental design, 341 total White participants from both an undergraduate ($n = 151$) and non-student adult sample ($n = 190$) were randomly assigned to a standard colorblind or multicultural condition. Participants then completed various measures of perceived similarities vs. differences (visual, interpersonal), outgroup perspective taking (egocentrism, perspective-taking scenario), and prejudice (explicit racial bias, symbolic racism). Results suggest the diversity ideology manipulation only had a significant effect on the outgroup perspective-taking scenario, but the direction of this effect was contrary to hypotheses and previous findings. Compared to colorblindness, multiculturalism significantly reduced participants' likelihood of taking the perspective of a racial outgroup member, with additional mediation evidence suggesting this effect on reduced outgroup perspective taking, in turn, indirectly increased explicit racial bias and symbolic racism. Alternative explanations and additional research considerations are discussed.

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**Introduction**

In *Parents Involved v. Seattle Schools* (2007), a landmark legal case on the use of race in school integration policy, Chief Justice John Roberts declared, "the way to stop discriminating on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race." In this statement and many others across the history of the United States, race is deemed an arbitrary, meaningless social category that should be ignored. If recognizing race facilitates prejudice, discrimination, and unequal opportunity in society, ignoring it should increase equality among all individuals. This reasoning is consistent with the ideal of *colorblindness*, a diversity ideology that came to prominence in the 1950s and 1960s Civil Rights era. Colorblindness suggests the best way to achieve intergroup equality is by ignoring racial or ethnic group categories, instead treating everyone as an individual or recognizing the sameness among people (for reviews, see Apfelbaum, Norton, & Sommers, 2012; Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010).

The colorblind approach is largely consistent with years of social psychological theory (Park & Judd, 2005), including classic research showing the negative consequences of intergroup categorization (e.g., Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). Researchers have suggested *decategorization*—the process of de-emphasizing group categories—may yield more positive attitudes during interracial interactions because the experience can be more personalized and individuated, essentially reducing ingroup favoritism and enhancing differentiation among outgroups members (Brewer & Miller, 1984). Researchers of the *recategorization* approach suggest recognizing a common, overarching category (e.g., Americans) instead of distinct subgroups (e.g., Black-Americans, White-Americans) improves intergroup attitudes because groups previously perceived to be part of the outgroup are now part of the same ingroup (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Plaut (2002) referred to colorblindness as the *sameness model*, also

noting its relevance to early social psychological theory and research on group categorization.

At the same time colorblindness was advanced in the Civil Rights era of the United States, the notion of *multiculturalism* was gaining traction as frustration over the progress of colorblindness stalled. Multiculturalism suggests racial and ethnic group categories should not be ignored, but recognized and celebrated as important contributions to society (Berry, 1984; Takaki, 1993; for reviews, see Plaut, 2010; Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010). Like colorblindness, the multicultural approach to intergroup relations also stems from social psychological theory and research, including aspects of the mutual intergroup differentiation model (Brown & Hewstone, 2005) and the value-added model (Plaut, 2002; also see Park & Judd, 2005; Plaut, 2010).

Both colorblindness and multiculturalism are well-intentioned diversity ideologies because their ultimate goal is reducing inequality among groups. Some research supports this analysis. Colorblindness and multiculturalism were both found to be hierarchy-attenuating ideologies due to their negative association with social dominance orientation (Levin et al., 2012), a belief that "superior" and "inferior" groups should be unequally situated in society (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999). Despite the colorblind goal to promote a "post-racial society," ignoring race is perceptually difficult. Race is such a salient category that people perceive it within one-seventh of a second, among the fastest dimensions by which people categorize others (Ito & Urland, 2003; also see Norton, Sommers, Apfelbaum, Pura, & Ariely, 2006). What's more, some researchers have argued that although its intention is to improve intergroup relations, colorblindness may perpetuate intergroup bias and inequality (e.g., Bonilla-Silva, 2003; Knowles, Lowery, Hogan, & Chow, 2009).

Research seems to support this notion, showing that a colorblind ideology predicts modern racism and belief in a just world (Neville et al., 2000; cf. Levin et al., 2012). When colorblindness is manipulated among Whites (by having participants read essays on the intergroup benefits of colorblindness), explicit and implicit pro-White racial bias is greater compared to multiculturalism (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; but see Correll, Park, & Smith, 2008; Wolsko, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2000). Colorblindness also makes it difficult for people to recognize bias and discrimination when it occurs. In classroom settings, children who were told a story about the importance of recognizing similarities (compared to valuing differences) were less likely to recognize ambiguous and blatant displays of racial discrimination in school incidents (Apfelbaum, Pauker, Sommers, & Ambady, 2010). During intergroup interactions, taking a colorblind approach has negative consequences as well. Some majority group members (e.g., White-Americans) believe ignoring race in interracial interactions is an effective strategy for appearing less biased, but Black-Americans perceive this colorblind approach as an indication of *greater bias*—especially when that interaction is race-relevant. Whites' attempts to suppress the recognition of race in these interactions also leads to more unfriendly nonverbal behaviors because of reduced inhibitory control (Apfelbaum, Sommers, & Norton, 2008; also see Apfelbaum et al., 2006; Vorauer & Sasaki, 2010). Other work suggests colorblindness effectively suppresses bias momentarily, but the cognitive suppression eventually rebounds and bias increases (Correll, et al., 2008).

Those who endorse a multicultural ideology, however, are more likely to have positive attitudes toward racial and ethnic outgroups (Levin et al., 2012; Verkuyten, 2005; Wolsko, Park, & Judd, 2006). When multiculturalism is manipulated among majority groups (by having participants read essays about the intergroup benefits of multiculturalism), evaluations of

outgroups generally improve and ingroup bias weakens (e.g., compared to colorblindness, Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; compared to control or assimilation conditions, Correll et al., 2008; Verkuyten, 2005; Wolsko et al., 2000). In classroom settings, children who were told a story about the importance of valuing differences (compared to focusing on similarities) were more likely to recognize ambiguous and blatant displays of racial discrimination in school incidents (Apfelbaum et al., 2010). In intergroup interactions, Whites who acknowledge and recognize race are seen as less biased (Apfelbaum et al., 2008). Thus, this evidence suggests colorblindness and multiculturalism differentially impact intergroup attitudes and behavior: colorblindness generally perpetuates or worsens intergroup bias, whereas multiculturalism reduces it (for reviews, see Park & Judd, 2005; Plaut, 2010; Rattan & Ambady, 2013; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010).

In sum, many researchers over the last two decades have concluded multiculturalism is the more viable method for reducing prejudice and improving intergroup relations. As of yet, however, little research has addressed *how* colorblindness and multiculturalism affect prejudice, an important next step for understanding diversity ideologies and their impact on intergroup relations. This is the aim of the present work. To better understand the underlying psychological mechanisms that explain the effect of colorblindness and multiculturalism on prejudice, I begin by detailing how these ideologies have typically been operationalized across the experimental literature.

**Current Operationalizations of Colorblindness and Multiculturalism: What Are We Really Manipulating?**

The first manipulation of colorblindness and multiculturalism was proposed by Wolsko and colleagues (2000). Ever since, it has served as the standard for the majority of

operationalizations of colorblindness and multiculturalism in the literature (e.g., Correll et al., 2008; Morrison et al., 2010; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Todd & Galinsky, 2012; Vorauer et al., 2009; Vorauer & Sasaki, 2010, 2011; Wolsko et al., 2000), though not all researchers have employed this method (e.g., Apfelbaum et al., 2008, Apfelbaum et al. 2010; Kauff et al., 2013; Levin et al., 2012; Verkuyten, 2005). Participants read an essay suggesting prominent scholars believe the best way to achieve intergroup harmony is by adopting a colorblind or multicultural approach in life. As such, when examining the effect of colorblindness and multiculturalism on intergroup attitudes and behavior, it is important to understand what—exactly—this procedure is manipulating.

A close examination of the original materials of Wolsko and colleagues (2000) suggests a variety of diversity models are embedded within the colorblindness and multiculturalism essays. The colorblindness essay argues we must "see each person as an individual," paralleling the decategorization approach (Brewer & Miller, 1984). But it also includes phrases such as, "we are all citizens of the United States" that should be seen as "part of the larger group, 'Americans.'" This parallels the recategorization approach of the common ingroup identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). Thus, colorblindness has most often been operationalized as a combination of two separate approaches, decategorization and recategorization, to reducing intergroup bias (for reviews, see Park & Judd, 2005; Plaut, 2002).

Like colorblindness, the multiculturalism essay includes several diversity models embedded within it as well. Paralleling the mutual intergroup differentiation model, phrases such as "recognizing this diversity" and "we validate the identity of each group and recognize its existence" focus on the recognition of group differences (Brown & Hewstone, 2005). Moreover, phrases such as "each ethnic group within the United States can contribute in its own unique

way" and "each group has its own talents, as well as its own problems, and by acknowledging both these strengths and weaknesses, we validate the identity of each group" parallel the value-added and multimodal models of diversity (for reviews, see Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999; Park & Judd, 2005; Plaut, 2002). These focus on the value of distinct groups in society and their ability to contribute in unique, but inherently different, ways. Of particular importance is how the multiculturalism essay by Wolsko and colleagues (2000) ends, that is, "understanding both the similarities and differences among ethnic groups is an essential component of long-term social harmony in the United States." Given the majority of the multiculturalism essay focuses on recognizing difference and allowing distinct groups to contribute differently, this focus on both the similarities *and* difference is worth noting (see Park & Judd, 2005). It is not clear how individuals are responding to operationalizations of group difference alongside a focus on similarities. In some ways, it is reminiscent of the dual-identity approach to intergroup relations (e.g., Banfield & Dovidio, 2013; Gaertner, Dovidio, & Bachman, 1996; Glasford & Dovidio, 2011; also see Mummendey & Wenzel, 1999), a modest reformulation of the recategorization-based common ingroup identity model (Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000). The dual-identity model focuses on a common superordinate group (e.g., Americans) alongside distinct groups (e.g., White- and Black-Americans), wherein the former represents overarching similarity and the latter intergroup difference.

From this analysis, the majority of operationalizations of colorblindness and multiculturalism are not "pure" manipulations; they are "hybrid" combinations of various diversity models employed throughout the intergroup relations literature. While each diversity model discussed has independently been shown to have positive outcomes for intergroup relations (Banfield & Dovidio, 2013; Brewer & Miller, 1984; Brown & Hewstone, 2005;

Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000), it is not clear what psychological processes are being influenced and how they are affecting prejudice when multiple models are combined together. Below, I discuss various operationalizations of colorblindness and multiculturalism in more depth, with the aim of conceptualizing an overarching focus of colorblindness and multiculturalism. In other words, what focus is *most salient* in colorblind vs. multicultural ideals?

**Conceptualizing Colorblindness and Multiculturalism: A Focus on Similarities vs. Differences**

Arguably the most overarching component of colorblindness is a focus on the similarity or "sameness" among people and an avoidance of any intergroup distinctions such as race, ethnicity, or culture (Neville, Awad, Brooks, Flores, & Bluemel, 2013; also see Rosenthal & Levy, 2010; Plaut, 2010). The materials of Wolsko and colleagues (2000) state, "If we can recognize our 'sameness' we will be able to rechannel… resources to work on difficult and important other problems within our society [rather than interethnic conflict]." In other words, the apparent differences among people should be ignored in favor of their similarities. A somewhat distinct but related operationalization of colorblindness is a component of assimilation, such that any ethnic or cultural identities adopted by minority groups should be abandoned in favor of the dominant culture (e.g., Neville et al., 2000). Like the similarity component of colorblindness, assimilation argues for little to no distinctions among groups in society (Hahn, Banchefsky, Park, & Judd, 2015). In each case—and whatever the particular group distinction (e.g., race, ethnicity, culture)—both the similarity and assimilationist components can be subsumed under a broader "sameness" category, in which group differences are ignored in favor of similarity.

A third and final operationalization of colorblindness has focused on the individual as a unique person or human being (Rosenthal & Levy, 2010). This focus on individuality parallels the decategorization process, in which stripping people of their group membership in favor of individual qualities improves intergroup attitudes (Brewer & Miller, 1984). Most operationalizations of colorblindness have mixed the similarity and individuality components together, but when examining the materials of Wolsko and colleagues (2000) closely, it is clear the "uniqueness" component is subsumed by the broader component of similarity: "We must look beyond skin color and understand the person within, to see each person as an individual *who is part of the larger group*, 'Americans'" [emphasis added]. In other words, while people are unique individuals, ultimately there is some similar, overarching category binding them together (also see Plaut, 2002). As such, I conceptualize the ideology of colorblindness as possessing an overarching focus on *similarities*.

Like colorblindness, operationalizations of multiculturalism have focused on three components. The most overarching component of multiculturalism is a focus on the differences among people, particularly regarding group memberships such as race, ethnicity, or culture. These group differences are seen not as nuisance variables that should be ignored, but important distinctions in society that should be recognized (Plaut, 2002, 2010). Another operationalization of multiculturalism involves not only recognizing group differences, but appreciating and valuing the contributions various racial, ethnic, or cultural groups have made to society (Plaut, 2002; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010). Appreciation of group differences extends beyond merely recognizing those differences, and while recognition indicates at least some form of awareness, appreciation underscores the perceived value of intergroup diversity. A third operationalization of multiculturalism has focused on the right of minority groups to maintain their cultural

traditions and distinctiveness—even if doing so contrasts with the dominant or majority culture (Berry & Kalin, 1995; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010).

These operationalizations of multiculturalism are each evident in the original manipulation of Wolsko and colleagues (2000), including "recognizing diversity," allowing "each ethnic group" to "contribute in its own unique way," and acknowledging that "different cultural groups…provide a richness in food, dress, music, art…" Though relatively distinct, these various operationalizations of multiculturalism are all based on the desire to recognize the importance of racial, ethnic, or cultural differences. Without recognizing the importance of group differences, one cannot *appreciate* the contributions of different racial, ethnic, or cultural groups. Moreover, without recognizing group differences, one cannot believe in the right of groups to *maintain* their distinctiveness in society. As such, I conceptualize the ideology of multiculturalism as possessing an overarching focus on *differences* over similarities.

If colorblindness generally focuses on similarities and multiculturalism on differences, what downstream psychological processes might these orientations affect? In the following section, I discuss the influence of perceived similarities and differences on social comparison and perspective-taking processes.

**Similarities, Differences, and Perspective Taking**

When people make social judgments or evaluations, they typically do so in a comparative fashion (e.g., Festinger, 1954). Evaluations are not made in a vacuum; they are made in relation to other things, people, or contexts. The selective accessibility model (for a review, see Mussweiler, 2003) suggests such evaluations arise from a series of comparisons between a target (e.g., the self) and a standard (e.g., another person). Before this comparison can occur, however, an initial, focal assessment must be carried out: are the target and standard generally more

similar or dissimilar to one another? An overall assessment can be reached spontaneously based on several factors, including category membership, psychological closeness, or extremity, just to name a few. If the target and standard share the same category membership (e.g., gender, race), or if there is high psychological closeness between the target and standard, a series of similarity-oriented hypotheses are likely to be tested to confirm whether the target and standard are indeed similar. If the target and standard have extreme features, however, a series of difference-oriented hypotheses are likely to be tested to confirm their dissimilarity. An initial, holistic assessment of similarity or dissimilarity can also be experimentally manipulated by priming individuals to be in one mindset or another (for a review, see Corcoran & Mussweiler, 2009).

In either case, this holistic assessment of perceived similarity or dissimilarity engenders a series of comparisons that increase the accessibility of information consistent with the initial assessment. If the target and standard were initially judged to be similar, knowledge consistent with this judgment is selectively searched for and tested. If the target and standard were initially judged to be dissimilar, however, knowledge highlighting inconsistencies between the target and standard are selectively searched for and tested. All the while, this comparative process increases the accessibility of target-standard similarities or differences, and the accessibility of this information ultimately becomes integrated into an evaluation of the target (e.g., Mussweiler & Strack, 2000; Mussweiler, 2003). In one study, for example, participants read about a student (the standard) struggling or succeeding in their transition to college. Those who were experimentally primed to focus on similarities judged their own college transition as more successful in the "succeeding" compared to the "struggling" condition. Those primed to focus on differences, however, judged their own college transition as less successful in the "succeeding" condition compared to the "struggling" condition (Mussweiler, 2001b).

When people focus on similarities and test hypotheses consistent with this holistic assessment, subsequent evaluations of the target move closer to that of the standard. But when people focus on differences and test hypotheses consistent with this assessment, evaluations of the target move farther away from the standard. As such, this similarity effect has been termed *assimilation* and the difference effect *contrast* (Mussweiler, 2003). In general, initial judgments of similarity and subsequent evaluations of assimilation are typically the default assessment. This is partly because similarity-focused comparisons are faster and more efficient to process than difference-focused comparisons (Corcoran, Epstude, Damisch, & Mussweiler, 2011). Importantly, the underlying comparative processes outlined by the selective accessibility model have implications for a related social comparison process: psychological perspective taking.

Epley and colleagues (2004) suggest the process of perspective taking—intuiting the mind or imagining the viewpoint of another person—functions similarly to the anchoring and adjustment heuristic (Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Here, the perspective of the self is used as a cognitive anchor to estimate the perspective of another, and is in line with the finding that the self is often used as an initial point of comparison when evaluating another person (e.g., Dunning & Hayes, 1996). The self-generated anchor undergoes a series of adjustments to reflect the most plausible estimate of another's perspective; when this estimate falls within an implicit range of possible perspectives, adjustment stops (Epley & Gilovich, 2001, 2006). Because the most automatic and accessible source of information when judging another's perspective is the perspective of the self, estimates of another's perspective fall closer to the self-generated anchor. Thus, chronically underestimating the plausibility of another person's perspective is the rule rather than the exception (for a review, see Epley, 2008), suggesting egocentrism is our default cognitive process. In effect, we overestimate the perceived similarity between how we see the

world and how others see the world.

In one study by Epley and colleagues (2004), participants listened to a voicemail ostensibly left on an answering machine, in which the caller discussed his thoughts about the quality of a comedian they saw earlier in the week. The voicemail was otherwise ambiguous and could be interpreted as either sarcastic or sincere. Participants were given privileged information prior to hearing the voicemail that provided background knowledge to the caller's intentions. Participants recognized someone without this knowledge would be less certain about the intention of the caller, and therefore participants adjusted how a listener might perceive the call. The key finding of the study was that participants did not adjust far enough away from how the privileged information influenced their own perspective of the call. This insufficient adjustment, in turn, caused participants to judge the perceptions of an uninformed listener as closer to how they perceived the call themselves.

Much theory and research has long investigated the bi-directional effect of perspective taking and perceived similarity (e.g., Stotland, 1969), including studies showing perspective taking increases perceived closeness and self-other overlap (Davis, Conklin, Smith, & Luce, 1996; Galinsky, Ku, & Wang, 2005; Laurent & Myers, 2011). Other research, however, has suggested perceptions of difference and a focus on *the other* are integral parts of the perspective-taking process. For instance, cross-cultural research has suggested collectivist cultures, despite being more interdependent, are better at perspective taking than individualistic cultures (cf. Chopik, O'Brien, & Konrath, 2016). This is not because interdependent individuals see themselves as more similar to others, but because they are more *other*-oriented (Wu & Keysar, 2007).

Moreover, if the process of perspective taking uses the self's perspective as an anchor that is subsequently adjusted to represent another's perspective, sufficient adjustment should be less likely to occur when the perspective of the self and the perspective of another are already perceived to be similar (Epley, 2008). In other words, perceived similarity should thwart adjustment because the perspective of the self is a reasonable enough anchor at which to begin and end. Perceptions of difference, however, should extend this anchoring and adjustment process. As stated by Epley and colleagues (2004), "when others are known to be in different situations, from different backgrounds, or in possession of different knowledge, such naïve realism is untenable. In these cases, … it is clear from the outset that one's perspective is not shared and adjustment is required" (p. 337).

Based on this reasoning, perceived similarity should foster more egocentric perspective taking, whereas perceived difference should facilitate more other-oriented perspective taking. Indeed, Todd and colleagues (2011) argue a focus on self-other differences engenders more accurate, other-oriented perspective taking, whereas a focus on self-other similarities engenders egocentrism. Egocentrism, in essence, is assimilation of another person's perspective with the perspective of the self. Their research has shown a focus on differences increased the likelihood of taking the visual perspective of another person (Study 1) and decreased the likelihood of projecting privileged knowledge onto how an uninformed person would interpret an ambiguous email (Study 2). Even when a focus on differences is not explicitly manipulated, people are likely to spontaneously adopt a difference focus when exposed to ethnic outgroup members (Study 5) because they are salient points of comparison to the ingroup (also see Corcoran & Mussweiler, 2009; Mussweiler & Bodenhausen, 2002; Mussweiler, 2003). Together, these findings not only suggest a focus on similarities vs. differences has implications for the

efficaciousness of perspective-taking processes, but that merely recognizing the membership of different outgroups can be an antecedent to focusing on differences (and ultimately facilitating perspective taking).

**The Impact of Diversity Ideologies on Prejudice through Perspective Taking**

Given my conceptualization of colorblindness as similarity-focused and multiculturalism as difference-focused, I hypothesize colorblindness and multiculturalism should differentially impact perspective-taking processes through perceptions of similarity vs. difference, respectively. The colorblind notion that all individuals are essentially the same and racial/ethnic group differences are unimportant should thwart adjustments beyond the self-generated anchor, leading to egocentrism. In contrast, the multicultural notion that racial/ethnic group differences must be recognized and appreciated should facilitate greater adjustments beyond the self-generated anchor, leading to a more accurate perception of another's perspective. Previous research supports this line of thinking and comes from two different labs. Vorauer and colleagues (2009) showed multiculturalism (compared to a colorblind condition) engenders a more outward, other-oriented focus when interacting with a member of a different ethnic group (Vorauer, Gagnon, & Sasaki, 2009). Todd and Galinsky (2012) demonstrated that multiculturalism increases self-reported perspective taking (compared to colorblindness and control conditions, which did not differ; Study 1), increases tendencies to take the visual perspective of a Black man (compared to colorblindness; Study 2), and decreases egocentric responses when participants guessed how an outgroup member would interpret an ambiguous email from a co-worker, about which the participant received privileged information (Study 3; also see Sparkman, Eidelman, Dueweke, Marin, & Dominguez, in press).

Although such research tests the differential impact of colorblindness and

multiculturalism on perspective taking, it is unclear whether this effect occurs *through* a similarity vs. difference focus. Furthermore, it is unclear whether the long-studied effects of colorblindness and multiculturalism on prejudice are mediated through perspective taking. Perspective taking has been shown to be a powerful tool for prejudice reduction, not only predicting but causally leading to less prejudice (for a review, see Todd & Galinsky, 2014). Individual differences in perspective taking predict less prejudice (Sparkman & Blanchar, 2017; Sparkman & Eidelman, 2016), and directly taking the perspective of an outgroup target lessens prejudice toward the entire group (Batson, Polycarpou, et al., 1997; Dovidio et al., 2004; Vescio, Sechrist, Paolucci, 2003). In other areas of intergroup relations research, such as intergroup contact theory (Allport, 1954), perspective taking has been shown to be among the strongest mediators for prejudice reduction (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2008).

But for all we have learned about colorblindness and multiculturalism, we still know relatively little about *what* is happening inside the minds of individuals when considering colorblindness and multiculturalism, and *how* these diversity ideologies affect prejudice. The present research attempts to answer these questions.

## Overview of the Present Research

In one study, I examined whether colorblindness and multiculturalism affect prejudice through a serial mediation process involving (1) a focus on similarities vs. differences and (2) outgroup perspective taking. Using an experimental design, participants were randomly assigned to a colorblind or multicultural condition using the standard manipulation of Wolsko and colleagues (2000). I first examined the effect of colorblindness and multiculturalism on perception of similarities vs. differences, measured by both a visual and interpersonal judgment task. I also examined the effect of colorblindness and multiculturalism on the willingness to take

the perspective of a racial outgroup member, measured by both an egocentrism task and imagined perspective-taking scenario. I also examined the effect of colorblindness and multiculturalism on prejudice, operationalized as both explicit racial bias and symbolic racism. Together, I hypothesized that (compared to the colorblindness condition) multiculturalism would increase perceptions of difference (relative to similarities), increase outgroup perspective taking, and decrease prejudice. I also hypothesized that these effects should occur in a particular order and underlying process. Compared to colorblindness, the effect of multiculturalism on increased perceptions of difference should, in turn, facilitate greater outgroup perspective taking that, in turn, should reduce prejudice.

The current research makes three contributions to the literature. First, manipulating diversity ideologies and examining their effect on perceptions of similarity vs. difference may provide important information about what is *most salient* following typical social psychological manipulations of colorblindness and multiculturalism, most notably the hybrid approach used by Wolsko and colleagues (2000). Second, examining the effect of colorblindness and multiculturalism on perceptions of similarity vs. difference may uncover an underlying mechanism explaining previous effects of diversity ideologies on perspective taking (e.g., Todd & Galinsky, 2012). Third, examining whether colorblindness and multiculturalism impact perceptions of similarity vs. difference and, in turn, outgroup perspective taking may demonstrate an underlying psychological mechanism explaining the long-studied effects of diversity ideologies on prejudice.

**Method**

**Participants**. A priori 95% power analyses indicated a total sample of 210 participants would be needed to detect an estimated medium effect size of $d = 0.50$ at $p < .05$ for the effect of

diversity ideologies on perceptions of similarity vs. difference. Based on previous research, a prior 95% power analyses indicated (1) a total sample of 96 participants would be needed to detect the reported effect size of $d = 0.75$ at $p < .05$ for the effect of diversity ideologies on outgroup egocentrism (Study 4; Todd & Galinsky, 2012), (2) a total sample of 210 participants would be needed to detect the reported effect size of $d = 0.50$ at $p < .05$ for the effect of diversity ideologies on self-reported perspective taking (Study 1; Todd & Galinsky, 2012), and (3) a total sample of 196 participants would be needed to detect the reported effect size of $d = 0.52$ at $p < .05$ for the effect of diversity ideologies on explicit racial bias (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004). Given published effect sizes in the psychological literature are likely inflated (Szucs & Ioannidis, 2017) and high-powered replication attempts suggest published effects sizes are approximately twice the size as replication effect sizes (Open Science Collaboration, 2015), I decided to substantially increase (roughly double in size) the required sample estimated by a prior power analyses.

A desired sample size of 400 non-Hispanic White undergraduates was sought from the University of Arkansas' general psychology subject pool, and participation was compensated with partial fulfillment of a course requirement (see Appendix F for research compliance approval). At the end of the semester-long data collection attempt, however, only 176 of the 400 participants (55% female; 95% monoracial White; $M_{age} = 19.36$ years old, $SD = 1.61$) were recruited in the study. To supplement this sample size, 220 non-Hispanic White participants (58% female; 94% monoracial White; $M_{age} = 37.10$ years old, $SD = 12.33$) from Amazon Mechanical Turk (MTurk) were recruited and compensated $1.45 for their time. The undergraduate and MTurk samples were then combined, but also analyzed separately for potential differences. Twenty-two participants who did not identify as White, 14 participants

who failed an attention check ("This is an attention check. Please select 'strongly agree' for your answer."), and 19 participants who provided a response more than three standard deviations from the mean on any dependent measure were all excluded from the analysis. This left a final sample of 341 participants for analyses (50% female; 100% monoracial White; $M_{age} = 29.36$ years old, $SD = 12.85$).

**Procedure.** The study took approximately fifteen minutes and was advertised to be about how reading brief essays in the social sciences might be related to other thoughts and social attitudes. After providing informed consent, participants were randomly assigned to one of two essay conditions (colorblindness vs. multiculturalism), as done in Wolsko and colleagues (2000). Following this, participants responded to the primary dependent measures of perceived similarities vs. differences (visual, interpersonal), outgroup perspective taking (egocentrism task, perspective-taking scenario), and prejudice (explicit racial bias, symbolic racism). The items of each individual measure were randomized within-block, each type of measure was randomized within-block (e.g., the presentation of visual and interpersonal similarities vs. differences was randomized), and each category of measure was randomized between-block (i.e., the presentation of perceived similarities vs. differences, outgroup perspective taking, and prejudice were all randomized). Following the dependent measures, participants provided demographic information (political orientation, age, gender, and race/ethnicity) and were then thanked and compensated appropriately.

**Manipulating colorblindness vs. multiculturalism**. Participants in the colorblind condition read an essay suggesting, "Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that interethnic issues are a #1 concern for the United States," and that "in order to overcome interethnic conflict and fighting, we must remember that we are all first and

foremost human beings, and second, we are all citizens of the United States" (see Wolsko et al., 2000). The essay goes on to suggest intergroup conflict can be overcome by recognizing our "sameness" and seeing ourselves as "parts of a larger whole" (see Appendix A1). In the multiculturalism condition, participants read the same beginning essay indicating interethnic issues are a #1 concern for the United States, but then diverged from the colorblind essay to suggest that "recognizing this diversity would help build a sense of harmony and complementarity among the various ethnic groups" (see Appendix B1).

On the following page, participants were asked to reflect on the issue of interethnic relations (in order to make their views more accessible) by listing four reasons why "a unification among all ethnic groups could potentially strengthen the United States" (colorblindness: Appendix A2) or four reasons why "multiculturalism is a positive asset that could potentially strengthen the United States" (multiculturalism: Appendix B2). Finally, and in line with Wolsko and colleagues (2000), participants were given a list of 21 responses for this task—ostensibly written by other participants—and asked to select which ones sounded most like their own. Colorblindness responses included, for example, "A sense of patriotism when people are in one group," "Less violence," and "Better sense of national pride" (Appendix A3); whereas multiculturalism responses included, "Learn new cultures," "Minorities don't feel that they are unimportant," and "Enables the settling of future immigrants" (Appendix B3).

**Dependent variables**. To provide a rather broad measure of each dependent variable (perceptions of similarity vs. difference, outgroup perspective taking, prejudice), two operationalizations of each construct were used.

***Perceptions of similarity vs. difference.***

*Visual judgments*. A person's comparative focus—either on similarities or differences—can be surmised by providing a pair of pictures and asking whether they appear more similar to or different from one another. Previous research (Mussweiler, 2001; Mussweiler, Rüter, & Epstude, 2004) suggests that one's informational focus on similarities or differences extends to subsequent comparisons, even if such comparisons are directly unrelated (for a review, see Corcoran & Mussweiler, 2009). The picture pairs need only have a relatively equal number of similar and different qualities. Participants were told to take several minutes to carefully inspect and compare three pairs of pictures, one pair taken directly from Markman & Gentner (1996), one pair taken from email correspondence with T. Mussweiler (personal communication, August 21, 2014), and one from the internet. After inspecting each picture pair, participants rated them on the same 1 (*very similar*) to 9 (*very dissimilar*) scale. All responses were combined and averaged to provide an index of one's *visual similarity vs. difference* ($\alpha = .66$), with higher scores indicating more dissimilarity.

*Interpersonal judgments*. For the undergraduate sample only, participants also evaluated themselves relative to a college student, Christiane, who was adjusting well to her transition to the University of Arkansas (Appendix C).[1] Participants were instructed to read the passage attentively and form an impression of Christiane. After reading the passage, and in line with Mussweiler (2001b), participants were asked to compare themselves to Christiane and answer, "How difficult was it for you to make this comparison?" on a 1 (*very difficult*) to 9 (*very easy*) scale. Critically, they were asked two objective questions (rather than subjective questions; see Biernat, Manis, & Nelson, 1991; Mussweiler & Strack, 2000) assessing self-evaluations of their adjustment to college, "How often do you typically go out per month?" and "How many friends do you have in Fayetteville?" These self-evaluations were only weakly correlated, $r = .17$, $p =$

.04; and thus analyzed as separate interpersonal judgments. Self-evaluations that suggest going out more times per month and having more friends in Fayetteville indicate greater perceived similarity to Christiane's experience (i.e., assimilation), whereas going out fewer times per month and having fewer friends indicate greater perceived difference from Christiane (i.e., contrast).

*Correlations between measures.* The visual and interpersonal judgments were relatively independent measures of perceived similarity vs. difference: visual judgments were uncorrelated with "night out" interpersonal judgments, $r = .06$, $p = .47$; and "number of friend" interpersonal judgments, $r = .07$, $p = .40$.

### Outgroup perspective taking.

*Egocentrism task.* In a procedure used by Todd and colleagues (2011, 2012) that was originally based on work by Keysar (1994), participants read about an exchange between two presumably Black coworkers, Tyrone and DeShawn (Appendix D). In this exchange, Tyrone asks DeShawn for a new restaurant recommendation, which Tyrone eats at later in the evening. The participant is then provided privileged information suggesting Tyrone did not enjoy the restaurant. The following day, Tyrone sends an ambiguously worded email to DeShawn, "About the restaurant, it was marvelous, just marvelous." With no other information provided, participants were asked "How do you think DeShawn interpreted Tyrone's email?," with responses ranging on a 1 (*very sarcastic*) to 9 (*very sincere*) scale. For ease of interpretation, responses to this item were later reverse-scored.

This egocentrism task is an adult version of the traditional false belief, or "displacement," task used to assess theory of mind in young children (for a review, see Wellman, Cross, & Watson, 2001). Just as young children must withhold their privileged knowledge when

estimating the perspective of a naïve target, adult participants must prevent their privilege knowledge (that Tyrone did not enjoy the restaurant) from influencing their estimate of DeShawn's perspective. Judging DeShawn's interpretation of the email as more sarcastic suggests overreliance on one's privileged knowledge of Tyrone's dislike of the restaurant— which DeShawn could not possibly know. Judging DeShawn's interpretation as more sincere indicates a less egocentric perception of DeShawn's perspective. To create a more reliable measure, 3 additional questions were asked on similar 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 9 (*strongly agree*) scales, including "DeShawn could tell that Tyrone was upset about the restaurant, "DeShawn could tell that Tyrone did not enjoy the restaurant," and "DeShawn could tell that Tyrone was satisfied with the restaurant" (reverse-scored). All responses were combined and averaged to provide an index of *egocentrism* ($\alpha = .89$), with higher scores indicating more egocentrism.

*Perspective-taking scenario.* Previous research (Todd & Galinsky, 2012) suggests manipulating colorblindness vs. multiculturalism increased self-reported tendencies of perspective taking, as measured by the perspective-taking subscale of the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983). To build on this finding, participants were shown an image of a Black male target taken from the Chicago Face Database (Ma, Correll, & Wittenbrink, 2015). They were instructed to "imagine you are having a disagreement with the person in the photograph above. Imagine they are pretty upset and trying to explain where they are coming from. Take a few moments to put yourself in this situation. Really try to think about what this experience would be like and how you would respond." This page was presented for a total of 35 seconds, during which participants could not advance to the next page until an automatically generated arrow appeared on the screen. Following this prompt, participants completed the perspective-taking subscale of the IRI, with all 7 items reframed to be about what participants

would do in this situation (e.g., "I would find it difficult to see things from this person's perspective" [reverse-scored], "I would try to better understand this person by imagining how things look from their perspective;" see Appendix E). All items ranged on a 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 7 (*strongly agree*) scale, and responses were combined and averaged to provide an index of the *perspective-taking scenario* (α = .87). Higher scores indicate greater perspective taking of the Black target.

Correlations between measures. The egocentrism task and perspective-taking scenario were also relatively independent measures of outgroup perspective taking, though they were weakly and negatively correlated, $r = -.09$, $p = .10$.

### Prejudice.

*Explicit racial bias.* To measure explicit racial bias, participants self-reported their evaluations of four racial groups (Whites, Blacks/African-Americans, Asians, and Latinos) on a 0 (*very cold*) to 100 (*very warm*) feeling thermometer scale, a common technique for measuring explicit intergroup attitudes (e.g., see the American National Election Studies, General Social Survey, and World Values Survey). Difference scores were computed by taking the reported warmth toward Blacks, Asians, and Latinos and individually subtracting them from reported warmth toward Whites. These difference scores were then combined and averaged to provide an index of *explicit racial bias* (α = .88), with positive and larger values indicating more pro-White racial bias.

*Symbolic racism.* To capture a more nuanced form of prejudice, the symbolic racism scale (Henry and Sears, 2002) was used. Symbolic racism is argued to reflect a more subtle and abstract form of prejudice among Whites against Blacks, including beliefs that racial prejudice and discrimination are no longer issues, that Blacks are demanding too much from society and

may even be experiencing advantages from such demands, and that any disadvantages experienced by Blacks are a function of their own unwillingness to take responsibility for their lives. The scale includes eight items (e.g., "Irish, Italian, Jewish, and many other minorities overcame prejudice and worked their way up. Blacks should do the same," and "Over the past few years, Blacks have gotten less than they deserve" [reverse-scored]), each answered on various 1 (*strongly disagree*, *not pushed fast enough*, *not much at all*, *none at all*) to 7 (*strongly agree*, *pushed too fast*, *all of it*, *a lot*) scales, depending on question wording. Responses were combined and averaged to provide an index of *symbolic racism* ($\alpha = .90$), with higher scores indicating more symbolic racism.

  *Correlations between measures.* The explicit racial bias and symbolic racism measures were moderately and positively correlated, $r = .40$, $p < .001$.

**Results**

  **Sample descriptives.** On a 1 (*very liberal*) to 7 (*very conservative*) scale—with 4 being the midpoint—the overall political orientation of the sample was slightly left-of-center ($M = 3.75$, $SD = 1.88$). However, the MTurk sample was significantly more liberal ($M = 3.53$, $SD = 1.94$) than the undergraduate sample, which was near the mid-point of the scale ($M = 4.04$, $SD = 1.77$), $t(339) = 2.52$, $p = .01$. Overall, participants saw the picture pairs as somewhat more similar than different ($M = 3.97$, $SD = 1.42$), perceptions that did not differ by sample, $t(339) = 1.03$, $p = .30$. Regarding interpersonal perceptions of similarity vs. difference, undergraduate participants reported going out approximately six nights per month ($M = 5.78$, $SD = 3.95$) and having approximately 30 friends ($M = 30.23$, $SD = 31.45$) in Fayetteville (data were not collected for the MTurk sample). Regarding outgroup perspective taking, participants overall reported relatively high levels of perspective taking toward the Black target ($M = 5.62$, $SD = 0.88$),

regardless of sample, $t(339) = 1.01$, $p = .31$, and displayed somewhat low levels of egocentrism ($M = 3.70$, $SD = 1.89$). However, the undergraduate sample displayed significantly more egocentrism ($M = 3.98$, $SD = 1.88$) than the MTurk sample ($M = 3.48$, $SD = 1.88$), $t(339) = 2.45$, $p = .02$. Regarding prejudice, participants overall reported slight disagreement with symbolically racist statements ($M = 3.35$, $SD = 1.30$), regardless of sample, $t(339) = –0.86$, $p = .39$; but a slight pro-White racial bias ($M = 6.01$, $SD = 14.79$). The undergraduate sample reported significantly more pro-White racial bias ($M = 8.09$, $SD = 13.68$) than the MTurk sample ($M = 4.35$, $SD = 15.46$), $t(338) = 2.33$, $p = .02$.

**Correlations among primary variables.** As shown in Table 1, perceiving greater differences among several pairs of pictures was uncorrelated with egocentrism but negatively correlated with taking the perspective of the Black target in the perspective-taking scenario. However, among the undergraduate sample, interpersonal judgments of a fellow college student were uncorrelated with both egocentrism and responses in the perspective-taking scenario. Perceiving greater differences among pairs of pictures and interpersonal judgments of going out more times per month were both positively correlated with explicit racial bias and symbolic racism (judgments of how many friends one has were uncorrelated with all measures). Finally, whereas egocentrism was uncorrelated with explicit racial bias and symbolic racism, taking the perspective of a Black target in the perspective-taking scenario was negatively correlated with explicit racial bias and symbolic racism.

**Primary hypotheses.** I hypothesize that, compared to the colorblindness condition, participants in the multiculturalism condition will perceive the picture pairs as more dissimilar than similar. Among the undergraduate sample, I hypothesize participants in the multiculturalism condition (compared to colorblindness) will contrast their own adjustment to college from

Christiane's, evidenced by self-evaluations of going out fewer times per month and having fewer friends in Fayetteville. I also hypothesize that, compared to the colorblindness condition, participants in the multiculturalism condition will judge DeShawn's interpretation of Tyrone's email as more sincere (suggesting less egocentrism) and report greater likelihood of taking the perspective of a Black target in a perspective-taking scenario. I also hypothesize that, compared to the colorblindness condition, participants in the multiculturalism condition will report less explicit racial bias and symbolic racism. Finally, I hypothesize that this effect of multiculturalism on reduced prejudice will be serially mediated by greater perceptions of difference (relative to similarity) and, in turn, greater outgroup perspective taking.

**Main effects.** First, to examine the overall effect of the diversity ideology manipulation on perceptions of similarity vs. difference, outgroup perspective taking, and prejudice, a series of independent samples $t$-tests were conducted on the primary dependent variables. For descriptive statistics and results of all $t$-tests, see Table 2 for the full sample, Table 3 for the undergraduate sample, and Table 4 for the MTurk sample.

*Perceptions of similarity vs. difference.* Results suggest the diversity ideology manipulation had no significant effect on the visual judgments, $t(339) = –0.92$, $p = .36$; and remained non-significant whether examining the undergraduate, $t(149) = –0.52$, $p = .60$; or MTurk sample, $t(188) = –0.78$, $p = .44$. The diversity ideology manipulation also did not interact with sample type on the visual judgments, $F(1, 337) = 0.04$, $\eta_p^2 < .001$, $p = .84$. Among the undergraduate sample, results suggest the diversity ideology manipulation also had no significant effect on the interpersonal judgments, number of nights out per month: $t(149) = –0.62$, $p = .54$; number of friends in Fayetteville: $t(149) = 0.66$, $p = .51$.

*Outgroup perspective taking*. The diversity ideology manipulation had no significant effect on the egocentrism task, $t(339) = -0.61$, $p = .54$; and remained non-significant whether examining the undergraduate, $t(149) = 0.60$, $p = .55$; or MTurk sample, $t(188) = -1.42$, $p = .16$. The diversity ideology manipulation also did not interact with sample type on egocentrism, $F(1, 337) = 1.94$, $\eta_p^2 = .01$, $p = .17$. There was an effect of the diversity ideology manipulation on the perspective-taking scenario, but in a direction contrary to hypotheses and previous findings. Compared to the colorblindness condition, participants in the multiculturalism condition were significantly less likely to take the perspective of the Black target in the scenario, $t(339) = 3.52$, $p < .001$. While the effect on responses in the perspective-taking scenario was significant for the MTurk sample, $t(188) = 3.24$, $p = .001$; and not the undergraduate sample, $t(149) = 1.57$, $p = .12$; the results were in similar directions and the interaction between condition and sample type was not significant, $F(1, 337) = 1.27$, $\eta_p^2 = .004$, $p = .26$.

*Prejudice*. The diversity ideology manipulation had no significant effect on explicit racial bias, $t(338) = -0.43$, $p = .67$; or symbolic racism, $t(339) = -0.93$, $p = .36$. These non-significant effects remained whether examining the undergraduate, explicit racial bias: $t(149) = -0.33$, $p = .74$; symbolic racism: $t(149) = 0.08$, $p = .94$; or MTurk sample, explicit racial bias: $t(187) = -0.34$, $p = .74$; symbolic racism: $t(188) = -1.11$, $p = .27$. The diversity ideology manipulation did not interact with sample type on either explicit racial bias, $F(1, 336) < 0.001$, $\eta_p^2 < .001$, $p > .99$; or symbolic racism, $F(1, 337) = 0.80$, $\eta_p^2 = .002$, $p = .37$.

**Mediation.** The only significant effect of the manipulation of colorblindness vs. multiculturalism was on the perspective-taking scenario. Because this measure represented one of the proposed mediators (i.e., outgroup perspective taking), I proceeded to test for evidence of an independent—rather than serial—indirect effect of diversity ideologies on prejudice *through*

outgroup perspective taking. In the past, statisticians have argued (via the *causal steps approach*; Baron & Kenny, 1986) that evidence of mediation can only be justified if the independent variable directly impacts the outcome variable. More recently, however, researchers and statisticians have demonstrated an independent variable need not have a direct impact on the outcome variable to establish mediation (Hayes, 2013; but see Fiedler, Schott, & Meiser, 2011). As such, while it is clear the manipulation of diversity ideologies had no direct impact on prejudice (either explicit racial bias or symbolic racism), it is still possible the effect of colorblindness vs. multiculturalism had an indirect impact on prejudice, carried only through outgroup perspective taking.

Hayes' (2013) PROCESS macro for SPSS was used to test for evidence of such mediation, and analyses were conducted with 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals based on 5000 bootstrap samples (variables were mean centered). As shown in Figure 1, the indirect effect of multiculturalism (compared to colorblindness) on explicit racial bias through responses in the perspective-taking scenario was positive and significant, $b = 1.95$, $SE = 0.69$, 95% CI [0.81, 3.60]. Thus, multiculturalism reduced participants' likelihood of taking the perspective of the Black target, and this reduction in perspective taking indirectly increased explicit racial bias. As shown in Figure 2, the indirect effect of multiculturalism (compared to colorblindness) on symbolic racism through responses in the perspective-taking scenario was also positive and significant, $b = 0.20$, $SE = 0.06$, 95% CI [0.08, 0.33]. Multiculturalism therefore reduced participants' likelihood of taking the perspective of the Black target, and this reduction in perspective taking indirectly increased symbolic racism. Because no other proposed mediators were significantly affected by the diversity ideology manipulation, no further mediation analyses were conducted.

**Discussion**

The aim of the present work was to examine an underlying psychological process of *how* the diversity ideologies of colorblindness and multiculturalism impact prejudice among Whites. I hypothesized that, compared to colorblindness, multiculturalism would decrease prejudice through a serial mediation process involving increased perceptions of difference (vs. similarity) and, in turn, greater outgroup perspective taking. To test this prediction, participants were randomly assigned to one of two essay conditions espousing the benefits of colorblindness or multiculturalism for improving interethnic relations in society. Participants then completed several dependent measures capturing perceptions of similarity vs. difference (using both visual and interpersonal judgments), outgroup perspective taking (in an egocentrism task and perspective-taking scenario), and prejudice (operationalized as explicit racial bias and symbolic racism). Results suggest that, contrary to hypotheses, the only significant effect of the colorblindness vs. multiculturalism manipulation was on reduced tendencies to take the perspective of a Black target in an imagined scenario. Moreover, results suggest that (compared to colorblindness) the effect of multiculturalism on reduced outgroup perspective taking, in turn, increased explicit racial bias and symbolic racism. To be clear, these effects on explicit racial bias and symbolic racism were not direct, but rather indirect and carried entirely through reduced tendencies to take the perspective of a Black target.

The present research failed to find evidence that colorblindness and multiculturalism facilitate a particular comparative focus—either on similarities or differences. This is rather interesting given strong conceptualizations of colorblindness as primarily similarity-oriented and multiculturalism as difference-oriented (Neville et al., 2013; Plaut, 2002, 2010; Rosenthal & Levy, 2010; cf. Park & Judd, 2005). It is difficult to conclude whether this means colorblindness

and multiculturalism—as ideologies—do not differ in their focus on similarity vs. difference, or if the operationalizations of perceived similarity vs. difference in the present work were not sensitive enough to capture the effect of diversity ideologies on comparative processes. The present research also failed to replicate several published findings, including the effect of multiculturalism (compared to colorblindness) on reduced egocentrism and increased outgroup perspective taking (Todd & Galinsky, 2012), as well as the effect of multiculturalism on reduced explicit racial bias (e.g., Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; but see Correll et al., 2008; Wolsko et al., 2000). The current findings suggest the opposite effect, that is, multiculturalism (compared to colorblindness) *decreased* the likelihood of taking the perspective of a Black target. Moreover, this reduced outgroup perspective taking, in turn, indirectly *increased* explicit racial bias and symbolic racism.

This indirect effect on prejudice, however, should be interpreted with caution. Some researchers and statisticians (e.g., Hayes, 2013) would agree these results provide enough statistical evidence to suggest multiculturalism indirectly increased prejudice through reduced outgroup perspective taking. However, other researchers and statisticians have articulated compelling arguments that would question such an interpretation. A plausible alternative explanation is that the significant indirect effect of multiculturalism on greater prejudice through reduced outgroup perspective taking is simply due to the strong correlation between responses for the perspective-taking scenario and the measures of explicit racial bias and symbolic racism (for an in-depth explanation, see Fiedler et al., 2011). More unbiased tests of mediation involve experimentally manipulating the independent variable and measuring its effect on the proposed mediator, and then manipulating the proposed mediator and measuring its effect on the dependent variable (e.g., Bullock, Green, & Ha, 2010; Spencer, Zanna, & Fong, 2005).

If one were to take this potential limitation seriously, the present work is left with only one unexpected (albeit significant) finding: the effect of multiculturalism (compared to colorblindness) on reduced tendencies to take the perspective of a Black target. This effect was robust, small-to-medium in size, and appeared somewhat stronger in the MTurk sample compared to the undergraduate sample. However, there was no significant interaction between condition and sample on outgroup perspective taking, suggesting the effect was independent of sample type. What is it about multiculturalism (compared to colorblindness) that reduced participants' likelihood of outgroup perspective taking? If perceived similarities are what facilitate perspective taking and the overarching focus of multiculturalism is on intergroup differences, it would be reasonable to assume the difference-focus of multiculturalism is what reduced the likelihood of outgroup perspective taking. Yet, this conclusion is difficult to reach given there was no evidence the diversity ideology manipulation affected perceived similarity vs. difference—at least as it was operationalized in the current research.

**Examining Alternative Explanations: Open-ended Responses and Stereotype Activation**

Given the only significant result in the present work was the effect of diversity ideologies on outgroup perspective taking, it may be beneficial to understand (or at least further speculate) why multiculturalism reduced the likelihood of perspective taking in the imagined scenario. The standard manipulation of diversity ideologies (see Wolsko et al., 2000) used here and in previous research requires participants to write out several benefits of colorblindness vs. multiculturalism, but rarely have these open-ended responses been examined. What follows is not an exhaustive list based on formal text analysis, but a general overview of the themes that appeared (at least several times) among participants' responses in the colorblind and multicultural conditions.

Participants generally mentioned colorblindness would (1) promote unification within the

United States and create an image of strength to the outside world, (2) reduce fighting, riots, and violence both within the United States and abroad (e.g., lessening the frequency of terrorist attacks); (3) strongly reduce bias against minority groups, including prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination; (4) reduce racial tension and anxiety about race more generally, (5) promote equality and greater opportunities for all, (6) increase openness to different viewpoints, perspectives, and diversity; (7) benefit companies and save money for the economy, (8) allow people to focus on more pressing problems at the societal level (e.g., healthcare, the elderly, the poor, the opiod crisis), and (9) generally improve the happiness of people.

In the multicultural condition, participants generally mentioned multiculturalism would (1) promote unity, belongingness, and shared goals that would both strengthen the United States and promote harmonious relationships with other countries; (2) promote cultural and genetic diversity and allow people to recognize the strengths, weaknesses, and commonalities of different groups; (3) understand and accept different viewpoints and perspectives (particularly those of racial/ethnic minorities and immigrants) and become more tolerant, empathic, open-minded, "worldly," and adaptive to change; (4) reduce protests and conflict; (5) end racial tension, racism, ethnocentrism, and White dominance/nationalism; (6) create opportunities for new jobs and innovation, diversify the economy (including new food, art, and clothes), and increase trade with other cultures; and (7) generally improve happiness and trust among people.

A cursory examination of the open-ended responses indicates the themes participants discussed were relatively similar between conditions, despite colorblindness and multiculturalism being conceptualized as rather different approaches to diversity. Interestingly, although participants in both conditions mentioned colorblindness and multiculturalism would be beneficial in reducing intergroup bias, such beliefs appeared far more frequent in the colorblind

condition. It should also be noted that in addition to providing open-ended responses, participants were asked to select responses—presumably written by other participants—that were similar to their own. One option in the multiculturalism condition seemed particularly relevant to the significant effect on the perspective-taking scenario. Here, approximately 43% of participants picked the statement, "Multiculturalism helps groups with communication. Differing viewpoints can be hard to grasp and explaining these logically can be beneficial to all groups." If a considerable portion of those in the multiculturalism condition believed the perspectives of other groups are "hard to grasp," it may suggest participants' reduced likelihood of taking the perspective of the Black target was merely because his perspective was unable to be truly understood.

Even if multiculturalism reduced the likelihood of perspective taking in the imagined scenario, why did it have no effect on the egocentrism task—when both measures included targets from racial outgroups? An answer to this question may be found in research suggesting colorblindness and multiculturalism also differentially affect stereotyping. Multiculturalism emphasizes the importance of intergroup differences and relying on group categories, whereas colorblindness de-emphasizes intergroup differences altogether (e.g., Plaut, 2002, 2010). As such, research has shown that multiculturalism generally increases stereotyping and the liking of stereotypical (vs. counterstereotypical) minority group members, whereas colorblindness generally decreases stereotyping and increases the liking of counterstereotypical (vs. stereotypical) minority group members (Gutierrez & Unzuetta, 2010; Wolsko et al., 2000; but see Ryan, Hunt, Weible, Peterson, & Casas, 2007; for a review, see Rattan & Ambady, 2013).

If participants in the multiculturalism condition were primed to rely on intergroup categories, it is possible they relied rather strongly on stereotypical information activated in the

perspective-taking scenario. Here, participants are told to imagine they "are having a disagreement" with a somewhat unhappy-looking Black target. To the extent that this scenario activated stereotypical knowledge about the hostility or aggression of Blacks (e.g., Devine, 1989), the resulting threat or anxiety among participants may have thwarted desires to take the perspective of the target (Todd, Forstmann, Burgmer, Brooks, & Galinsky, 2015). Other work suggests that when attempting to estimate the perspective of another, group stereotypes are often salient and highly accessible pieces of information that people consider (for a review, see Epley & Caruso, 2009). Participants in the colorblind condition, however, were likely relying less on intergroup categories and therefore experienced less stereotype activation during the perspective-taking scenario. This may also explain why the effect of multiculturalism (compared to colorblindness) on reduced outgroup perspective taking was not significant for the egocentrism measure. Because the egocentrism task involved two presumably Black co-workers discussing dinner recommendations, it was unlikely that any threatening stereotypes were activated among those in the multiculturalism condition. Thus, the effect of multiculturalism on reduced outgroup perspective taking in the perspective-taking scenario may have been a function of the way the measure was operationalized, rather than any true effect of multiculturalism on perspective taking more broadly.

**(Re-)Considering Similarities, Differences, and Perspective Taking**

Over the years, research has made important distinctions regarding perspective taking—not only among the various forms of perspective taking (i.e., cognitive, affective, and visuospatial; e.g., see Batson, 2017; Davis, 1983; Erle & Topolinski, 2017; Ford, 1979; Stephan & Finlay, 1999)—but also regarding the psychological antecedents of perspective taking. Traditionally, research has suggested similarity, including perceiving closeness, a bond, and

"we-feeling" (Batson & Shaw, 1991; Stotland, 1969), is what primarily facilitates greater perspective taking. Indeed, in classic work on the empathy-altruism hypothesis (e.g., Batson, Duncan, Ackerman, Buckley, & Birch, 1981), researchers experimentally manipulated affective perspective taking (i.e., empathy) by highlighting similarities between the participant and a distressed target. Other researchers, however, have suggested that although perceived similarity facilitates greater perspective taking, a focus on similarity ultimately generates a more biased, inaccurate, and egocentric perspective of another. In an impressive program of research, multiple studies have shown that perceived differences are indeed necessary to adjust beyond one's own perspective and more accurately reflect the perspective of another (Epley, 2008; Epley & Caruso, 2009; Todd et al., 2011).

What remains unclear in this literature is under what conditions perceived similarity facilitates greater perspective taking, and under what conditions perceived difference does. As of yet, current research does not have a clear answer to this question, and more work is needed to understand potential moderating factors. One possibility is the role of anxiety or perceived threat on the effect of similarities vs. differences and perspective taking. Research suggests that when people are feeling anxious, uncertainty appraisals cause them to make fewer adjustments to their own perspective and adopt a more egocentric view of the other (Todd et al., 2015). When anxiety or threat is high, people should also be less likely to expend the cognitive energy necessary to differentiate their own perspective from that of a dissimilar other. In other words, perceived differences are likely to engender the cognitive adjustment necessary for accurate perspective taking, but only when anxiety or threat are minimal.

Epley and colleagues (2008, 2009) do not outline moderating factors of the effect of perceived similarity vs. difference on perspective taking, but instead delineate a general process

of perspective taking. First, the perspective-taking process must be activated, that is, the

individual must determine if they will even attempt to take the perspective of another. If the

individual has decided to take the perspective of another, they must then expend the cognitive

resources and energy necessary to adjust beyond their own perspective to more accurately reflect

the other (e.g., Epley & Gilovich, 2006). Finally, if the individual has decided to take the

perspective of another and also expend the resources necessary to adjust beyond their own

perspective, they must then use the *right* information to reach an accurate reflection of another's

perspective.

      With this perspective-taking process in mind, it is possible that each measure of outgroup

perspective taking in the present research captured different stages of this process. In the

perspective-taking scenario, participants were essentially asked whether they would *activate*

their perspective-taking ability and consider the target's perspective (if they ever found

themselves in such a situation, of course). Compared to the colorblind condition, participants in

the multiculturalism condition were less likely to activate their perspective-taking ability and

consider the viewpoint of the target. The egocentrism task, however, measured participants'

willingness to expend the cognitive energy necessary to adjust their own perspective from that of

another. The non-significant effect of the manipulation on the egocentrism task, then, may

merely reflect the fact that participants in the present research did not make it far enough to this

adjustment stage of the perspective-taking process (cf. Todd & Galinsky, 2012).

**Strengths and Limitations**

      While most of the hypothesized effects were non-significant and the only significant

effect was in a direction contrary to hypotheses and published findings, there are several

methodological strengths to the present work that provide some confidence in the results. First

and foremost, the present research—to my knowledge—is the most high-powered experiment conducted to date on the psychological effects of diversity ideologies, employing over 340 participants from both undergraduate and non-student adult samples. Second, the manipulation of colorblindness vs. multiculturalism in the present work used the original materials and procedure of Wolsko and colleagues (2000), the standard manipulation across multiple studies in this area (e.g., Correll et al., 2008; Morrison et al., 2010; Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Todd & Galinsky, 2012; Vorauer et al., 2009; Vorauer & Sasaki, 2010, 2011; Wolsko et al., 2000). Finally, many of the dependent measures used in the present work were taken from published research or directly from the researchers themselves (when possible), including the visual picture pairs (Markman & Gentner, 1996; T. Mussweiler, personal communication, August 21, 2014) and interpersonal judgments (Mussweiler, 2001b), each measuring perceived similarity vs. differences; the outgroup egocentrism task and perspective-taking subscale (Todd & Galinsky, 2012) used in the perspective-taking scenario, each measuring outgroup perspective taking; and the explicit racial bias items (e.g., Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Wolsko et al., 2000) measuring prejudice (symbolic racism was added). Moreover, because there were two operationalizations of each primary dependent variable, it ensured all constructs were captured rather broadly.

The strengths of the present research, however, must also be considered alongside its notable limitations. As in some experiments involving diversity ideology manipulations, the present work does not include a control or baseline condition. This makes it difficult to determine—when compared against a control—if colorblindness and multiculturalism both reduce prejudice but do not significantly differ from one another, a pattern of results that has been supported by other research (e.g., Correll et al., 2008; Wolsko et al., 2000). Regarding perspective taking in the present work, it is not clear whether colorblindness and multicultural

both increase outgroup perspective taking, but colorblindness simply increases it more than multiculturalism. It should also be noted that, although the perspective-taking scenario used the same scale as past research (Study 1; Todd & Galinsky, 2012), it was contextualized as part of an "imagined" or hypothetical situation. This likely made the measure more situationally realistic, but also substantially changed it from its original use as an individual difference measure. Finally, given the samples used in the present work are from the United States, the findings should be interpreted contextually rather than as applicable to all countries and cultures, which each have their own unique socio-cultural histories and status relations among groups.

In brief, one study on its own is likely insufficient to draw strong conclusions about the overall effect of diversity ideologies on intergroup processes, most notably the outcomes of intergroup perspective taking and prejudice discussed here. Future research should again attempt to replicate these findings using both the original measures and additional ones, and appropriate meta-analyses should be conducted to examine the overall effect of such published and unpublished findings across the literature. If replication attempts and meta-analytic findings reveal a different pattern of results, our understanding of social psychological theory and the research that supports it should be reconsidered.

**Conclusion**

The aim of the present work was to examine—for the first time—an underlying psychological mechanism of the effect of colorblindness and multiculturalism on prejudice (among Whites, in particular). Results suggest that, compared to colorblindness, multiculturalism significantly reduced the likelihood of outgroup perspective taking in an imagined scenario, and this reduction in perspective taking may have indirectly increased explicit racial bias and

symbolic racism. While the present work is an important step in this research, clearly more is necessary.

Across the many studies examining diversity ideologies and their impact on intergroup relations, the ultimate goal of social psychological theory and research has been to determine the most effective method for promoting a fair, equitable, and harmonious society. However, too often this examination takes a rather simplistic or mutually exclusive approach to answering the question. Is it colorblindness or multiculturalism? Decategorization or recategorization? A common ingroup or dual identities? Focusing too much on the benefits of one approach while ignoring the benefits of others may indicate we are missing the opportunity to approach diversity and intergroup relations in a nuanced way. Decades of research have shown that colorblindness, multiculturalism, and the like each benefit some facet of intergroup relations, whether that be reducing prejudice, stereotyping, or discrimination among majority group members, or making minority groups feel more engaged or valued members of society. Acknowledging our uniqueness as individuals does not necessarily mean our diversity as group members is unimportant or problematic—just as acknowledging our intergroup differences does not necessarily mean we are incapable of being unified under a common identity, goal, or shared fate. Thus, the most effective approach for promoting a fair, equitable, and harmonious society will likely require a solution as complex as the problem itself. Doing so requires a critical and simultaneous evaluation of our *individuality*, *intergroup diversity*, and *unity* as human beings.

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**Footnotes**

[1]     Given the original materials of Mussweiler (2001b) describe a fellow student's transition to college, there did not appear to be a similar alternative for the non-student adult sample on Amazon Mechanical Turk (e.g., not all participants have attended college). For this reason and additional concerns of study time and monetary compensation, the interpersonal judgments were not measured in the MTurk sample.

**Appendix – Tables**

Table 1

*Bivariate Correlations Among Dependent Variables (Full Sample)*

| Variable | 1 | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1. Visual sim./diff. | -- | | | | | |
| 2. Interpers. sim./diff. – N | .06 | -- | | | | |
| 3. Interpers. sim./diff. - F | .07 | .17* | -- | | | |
| 4. Egocentrism | .08 | .11 | −.11 | -- | | |
| 5. Perspective-taking | −.17** | −.04 | .01 | −.09$^\dagger$ | -- | |
| 6. Explicit racial bias | .19** | .15$^\dagger$ | .10 | .05 | −.35*** | -- |
| 7. Symbolic racism | .10$^\dagger$ | .17* | −.02 | .06 | −.40*** | .40*** |

*Note.* ***$p < .001$, **$p < .01$, *$p < .05$, $^\dagger p < .10$. Sim./diff. = similarity vs. difference, interpers. sim./diff. – N = interpersonal "nights out" judgment, interpers. sim./diff. – F = interpersonal "friends in town" judgment.

Table 2

*Descriptive Statistics and Results of t-tests Among Dependent Variables (Full Sample)*

| Variable | Colorblind Condition M (SD) | Multicultural Condition M (SD) | t | d | 95% CI Lower | 95% CI Upper |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Visual sim./diff. | 3.90 (1.38) | 4.04 (1.46) | −0.92 | 0.10 | −0.44 | 0.16 |
| Interpers. sim./diff. – N | 5.59 (3.63) | 5.99 (4.28) | −0.62 | 0.10 | −1.67 | 0.88 |
| Interpers. sim./diff. – F | 31.87 (29.27) | 28.48 (33.74) | 0.66 | 0.11 | −6.75 | 13.53 |
| Egocentrism | 3.64 (1.84) | 3.77 (1.96) | −0.61 | 0.07 | −0.53 | 0.28 |
| Perspective-taking | 5.78 (0.83) | 5.45 (0.89) | 3.52* | 0.38 | 0.15 | 0.51 |
| Explicit racial bias | 5.66 (12.16) | 6.37 (17.13) | −0.43 | 0.05 | –3.88 | 2.48 |
| Symbolic racism | 3.28 (1.34) | 3.41 (1.25) | −0.93 | 0.10 | −0.41 | 0.15 |

*Note.* *$p < .001$. Colorblind condition, $n = 173$ for all analyses except interpersonal sim./diff. variables ($n = 78$; undergraduate sample only). Multicultural condition, $n = 168$ for all analyses except interpers. sim./diff. variables ($n = 73$; undergraduate sample only) and explicit racial bias ($n = 167$). Sim./diff. = similarity vs. difference, interpers. sim./diff. – N = interpersonal "nights out" judgment, interpers. sim./diff. – F = interpersonal "friends in town" judgment.

Table 3

*Descriptive Statistics and Results of t-tests Among Dependent Variables (Undergraduate Sample)*

| Variable | Colorblind Condition | Multicultural Condition | | | 95% CI | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *M* (*SD*) | *M* (*SD*) | *t* | *d* | Lower | Upper |
| Visual sim./diff. | 4.00 (1.28) | 4.11 (1.29) | −0.52 | 0.09 | −0.52 | 0.30 |
| Interpers. sim./diff. – N | 5.59 (3.63) | 5.99 (4.28) | −0.62 | 0.10 | −1.67 | 0.88 |
| Interpers. sim./diff. – F | 31.87 (29.27) | 28.48 (33.74) | 0.66 | 0.11 | −6.75 | 13.53 |
| Egocentrism | 4.07 (1.88) | 3.89 (1.88) | 0.60 | 0.10 | −0.42 | 0.79 |
| Perspective taking | 5.78 (0.80) | 5.57 (0.83) | 1.57 | 0.26 | −0.05 | 0.47 |
| Explicit racial bias | 7.73 (11.22) | 8.47 (15.98) | −0.33 | 0.05 | –5.16 | 3.67 |
| Symbolic racism | 3.29 (1.06) | 3.28 (0.91) | 0.08 | 0.01 | −0.31 | 0.33 |

*Note.* Colorblind condition, $n = 78$ for all analyses. Multicultural condition, $n = 73$ for all analyses. Sim./diff. = similarity vs. difference, interpers. sim./diff. – N = interpersonal "nights out" judgment, interpers. sim./diff. – F = interpersonal "friends in town" judgment.

Table 4

*Descriptive Statistics and Results of t-tests Among Dependent Variables (MTurk Sample)*

| Variable | Colorblind Condition | Multicultural Condition | | | 95% CI | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| | *M* (*SD*) | *M* (*SD*) | *t* | *d* | Lower | Upper |
| Visual sim./diff. | 3.81 (1.46) | 3.98 (1.58) | −0.78 | 0.11 | −0.61 | 0.26 |
| Egocentrism | 3.29 (1.72) | 3.67 (2.02) | −1.42 | 0.20 | −0.92 | 0.15 |
| Perspective taking | 5.79 (0.86) | 5.37 (0.93) | 3.24* | 0.47 | 0.16 | 0.68 |
| Explicit racial bias | 3.97 (12.68) | 4.73 (17.89) | −0.34 | 0.05 | –5.22 | 3.70 |
| Symbolic racism | 3.28 (1.54) | 3.52 (1.46) | −1.11 | 0.16 | −0.67 | 0.19 |

*Note.* *p < .001. Colorblind condition, $n = 95$ for all analyses. Multicultural condition, $n = 95$ for all analyses except explicit racial bias ($n = 94$). Interpersonal similarity vs. difference judgments were not measured in this sample.

**Appendix – Figures**



*Figure 1.* Mediation model depicting the effect of diversity ideologies on explicit racial bias through self-reported likelihood of taking the perspective of a Black target. All path coefficients are unstandardized.



*Figure 2.* Mediation model depicting the effect of diversity ideologies on symbolic racism through self-reported likelihood of taking the perspective of a Black target. All path coefficients are unstandardized.

**Appendix A1**

Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that interethnic issues are a #1 concern for the United States. At the present time, we are experiencing a great deal of conflict among various ethnic groups. Social scientists note that it is extremely important to heed our creed in the Declaration of Independence that "all men (and women) are created equal." That is, in order to overcome interethnic conflict and fighting, we must remember that we are all first and foremost human beings, and second, we are all citizens of the United States. In order to make the U.S. as strong and successful as possible, we must think of ourselves not as a collection of independent factions, but instead as parts of a larger whole. We must look beyond skin color and understand the person within, to see each person as an individual who is part of the larger group, "Americans." Currently, we are spending a great many resources on conflict between ethnic groups. If we can recognize our "sameness" we will be able to rechannel those resources to work on difficult and important other problems within our society such as poverty, caring for the elderly, and medical reform. Thus, social scientists encourage us to see the larger picture, to appreciate that at our core, we really are all the same.

**Appendix A2**

We have found that it helps to reflect on this issue of interethnic relations in order to make your views more accessible. In the space below, please list four reasons that a unification among all ethnic groups could potentially strengthen the United States. That is, by treating the members of all ethnic groups similarly, how might this benefit the U.S?

1.


2.


3.


4.

**Appendix A3**

The following are responses to the previous question written by other participants. This is simply a collection of the reasons other participants listed for how a unification among all ethnic groups could potentially strengthen the United States.

*Please select the items that sound like your own responses (you may choose more than one).*

1. More productive in business when people work well together.

2. A sense of patriotism when people are in one group.

3. Diminishes a barrier between races that blocks good communication.

4. Would solve many of the social problems and injustices that hurt us today.

5. There would be fewer hate crimes.

6. Less time and money used towards lawsuits due to racial issues.

7. When at war everyone would fight for everyone equally. For example, a white guy would defend a black man as much as another white guy.

8. Would not need to spend as much government money on groups that help enforce a unified USA.

9. We might become a more prosperous country with everyone working together.

10. More cooperation with other countries if they see that we are one not different races.

11. Less violence.

12. We will finally do what our constitution says, "all men are created equal."

13. Better sense of National Pride.

14. Free flow of ideas between races resulting in faster technological advances.

15. No more racial tensions would result in a happier and more productive society.

16. We would be stronger as a nation if U.S. citizens got along instead of turning things into racial issues.

17. Not having to focus on ethnic issues frees up resources to focus on other issues.

18. Equal access to work/other positions or facilities --wouldn't have to produce extra facilities for separate but equal type policies.

19. People would be nicer to one another.

20. There would be less fighting between races.

21. Simplify politics.

**Appendix B1**

Sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists all agree that interethnic issues are a #1 concern for the United States. We are in the unique position of having many different cultural groups living within our borders. This could potentially be a great asset. Different cultural groups bring different perspectives to life, providing a richness in food, dress, music, art, styles of interaction, and problem solving strategies. Each ethnic group within the United States can contribute in its own unique way. Recognizing this diversity would help build a sense of harmony and complementarity among the various ethnic groups. Each group has its own talents, as well as its own problems, and by acknowledging both these strengths and weaknesses, we validate the identity of each group and we recognize its existence and its importance to the social fabric. We can allow each group to utilize its assets, to be aware of its own particular problems or difficulties, and overall to live up to its potential. Thus, social scientists argue that understanding both the similarities and differences among ethnic groups is an essential component of long-term social harmony in the United States.

**Appendix B2**

We have found that it helps to reflect on this issue of interethnic relations in order to make your views more accessible. In the space below, please list four reasons why multiculturalism is a positive asset that could potentially strengthen the United States.


1.



2.



3.



4.

**Appendix B3**

The following are responses to the previous question written by other participants. This is simply a collection of the reasons other participants listed why multiculturalism is a positive asset that could potentially strengthen the United States.

*Please select the items that sound like your own responses (you may choose more than one).*

1. Work together better.

2. Understand each other.

3. Less fighting.

4. Learn new cultures.

5. By interacting with people from different ethnic backgrounds we are more able to understand stereotypes associated with other countries.

6. Exposed to new goods, clothing, music, traditions, etc.

7. Minorities don't feel that they are unimportant.

8. Helps with international negotiations.

9. Make society less boring.

10. Educate people in the US of other ethnic groups.

11. Might help cut down on crime.

12. Increase awareness of how certain groups are treated.

13. Multiculturalism brings to light different viewpoints and methods of dealing with issues. One situation might be explained or dealt with in two separate ways by two different groups. This enhances our pool of ideas.

14. Multiculturalism gives way to diverse activities that one would not experience otherwise.

15. Multiculturalism helps groups with communication. Differing viewpoints can be hard to grasp and explaining these logically can be beneficial to all groups.

16. It refines people's sense of what being human is all about.

17. With all the knowledge present in our multicultural nation we could have a government which accommodates the needs of a larger spectrum of the population.

18. Provides diversity in social climate for future generations.

19. Gives people an open mind, that their culture isn't always the best or only culture.

20. Encourages bilingual communities.

21. Enables the settling of future immigrants.

**Appendix C**

Christiane is a second-year college student at the University of Arkansas. Moving to a new city in Fayetteville has been easy for her because she often moved during her childhood. Christiane never had problems getting used to a new environment and saw moving as a challenge. At the beginning of her studies she still went home regularly on weekends, but now that she has found many new friends on campus and in Fayetteville, she typically spends her weekends here. Christiane also likes her studies very much and has had few problems with exams.

**Appendix D**

*Below is a scenario depicting an interaction between two co-workers. Please read the following text thoroughly, and then answer the questions that follow.*

Tyrone and DeShawn are officemates at work. Tyrone asked DeShawn if he could recommend a restaurant; his parents were in town and he wanted to take them to a good place.

DeShawn said, "You should go to this new Italian place, called Venezia. I just had dinner there last night and it was awesome. Let me know how you all enjoy it!"

That evening, Tyrone and his parents ate there. Tyrone thought the food was unimpressive and the service was mediocre. The next morning when Tyrone got to work, he sent this email to DeShawn:

| Venezia Restaurant | _ ⤢ × |
|---|---|
| deshawnjs@gmail.com | |
| Venezia Restaurant | |

DeShawn,

About the restaurant, it was marvelous, just marvelous.

-Tyrone

Sans Serif ⁃ | ₸ ⁃ | B  *I*  U  A ⁃ | ≡ ⁃ | ≣ ≡ ≡ ≡ 99 | *I*ₓ

Send   A   ⫶   ⛅   $   🖼   ∞   ☺                                      Saved  🗑  | ⁃

**Appendix E**

I would find it difficult to see things from this person's perspective. (reverse-scored)

I would try to imagine "a day in the life" of this person.

I would try to better understand this person by imagining how things look from their perspective.

I probably wouldn't waste much time listening to this person. (reverse-scored)

I would try to look at their side of the argument to understand things better.

I would try to "put myself in their shoes" for a while.

Before immediately criticizing this person, I would try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place.

**Appendix F**

UNIVERSITY OF
ARKANSAS

Office of Research Compliance
Institutional Review Board

August 25, 2017

MEMORANDUM

TO: David Sparkman
Scott Eidelman

FROM: Ro Windwalker
IRB Coordinator

RE: EXEMPT PROJECT CONTINUATION

IRB Protocol #: 16-09-063

Protocol Title: *Diversity Ideologies, Perspective Taking, and Openness - Closure*

Review Type: ☒ EXEMPT

New Approval Date: 08/25/2017

Your request to extend the referenced protocol has been approved by the IRB. We will no longer be requiring continuing reviews for exempt protocols.

If you wish to make any modifications in the approved protocol that may affect the level of risk to your participants, you must seek approval *prior to* implementing those changes. All modifications should be requested in writing (email is acceptable) and must provide sufficient detail to assess the impact of the change.

If you have questions or need any assistance from the IRB, please contact me at 109 MLKG Building, 5-2208, or irb@uark.edu.