The Finnish Line: Verbal Tactics of Small States in Immature Anarchy

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The Finnish Line:
Verbal Tactics of Small States in Immature Anarchy

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by

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Abstract

The rules-based international system which has steadily emerged over the last century is in decline. Realists fail to realize that the fundamental anarchy of the international system can mature into a rules-based system which constrains geopolitics. Liberals fail to realize that it can regress in the opposite direction, towards the self-help system described by the realists. Small states stand to lose the most in this regression and are least equipped to fight it by material means. Finland is an ideal example of such a small state, and its foreign policy is articulated by President Sauli Niinistö. This paper will analyze the text of the Finnish President’s speeches for verbal attempts to protect and promote the rules-based system in response to events which occurred during his presidency and regress the system from mature to immature anarchy.
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The Finnish Line

Verbal Tactics of Small States in Immature Anarchy

Introduction

As a small state between world powers, Finland perceives the erosion of the liberal international system towards a self-help system as a national threat. Finland thus has an interest in maintaining a rules-based international system. The burden of pursuing that interest falls on President Sauli Niinistö to reinforce the rules-based international system without provoking its further regression. Thus, the research question explored herein is: How does President Niinistö’s verbal support for the rules-based international system respond to events which undermine the international order?

Literature Review

Theories of International Relations

This analysis will demonstrate a view in international relations which has gotten little attention in recent decades but was discussed widely at the end of the Cold War (Bull, 1977; Hoffman, 1978; Buzan, 1983; Wendt, 1992). In this conception, the realist framework of a security competition among self-interested states in anarchy is one position along a spectrum. This position is characterized in the literature cited above as “immature anarchy”. The liberal system of a cooperative rules-based order is far towards the opposite end of that spectrum. This is characterized in that literature as “mature anarchy”. At a given point in time, the nature of the international system lays somewhere along that spectrum and can develop toward mature anarchy or regress toward immature anarchy. In order to understand this spectrum, a thorough examination of the opposing positions is in order.
**Immature Anarchy.** Realists claim that anarchy is a sufficient condition for a self-help international system to develop (Waltz, 1988; Mearsheimer, 1990). The international system exists in anarchy in its most literal sense; no one rules the world (Waltz, 1990; Mearsheimer, 1995). In this conception, because other states’ intentions are unknowable and because the potential stakes of an incorrect assessment are unbearably high, every state must compete for security (Waltz, 2000; Mearsheimer, 2014). States incapable of competing have at best a negative peace so long as more powerful states will allow it (Waltz, 1988; Mearsheimer, 1990). Thus small states have an interest in avoiding a self-help system if avoiding such a system is possible.

**Mature Anarchy.** The international system which has developed since the end of the Cold War was largely based on the work of Immanuel Kant. Kant argued that “perpetual peace” was contingent on non-interference in other states’ domestic affairs, the spread of democracy, economic interdependence, international law, and collective security (Kant, 1795). This analysis will refer to these institutions (democracy, free trade, international law, international organizations, and collective defense) as peace-making institutions (PMIs), a term that will reappear in the methods section. President Niinistö’s speeches will be analyzed for changes in the frequency and context in which these PMIs are mentioned.

After the Great War, President Woodrow Wilson attempted to implement Kant’s Perpetual Peace in the international system; he especially advocated the creation of a League of Nations which became the precursor to the modern United Nations. After the Second World War, organizations like the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the International Monetary Fund, and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development facilitated economic interdependence with the explicit mission of creating a more stable and peaceful world by
Kantian means. The PMIs prescribed by liberals aided in the construction of a liberal international system following both World Wars and especially after the Cold War (Mearsheimer, 1995). Empirical study of Kantian Peace began in earnest after the end of the Cold War.

Through many multivariate regressions, Russett and Oneal (2001) found that PMIs like democracy, economic interdependence, and international organizations each make the other more likely and each make peace more likely. Within the heading of international organizations, Russett and Oneal included international law and collective defense agreements. Their framework explicitly seeks to vindicate Kant’s *Articles of Perpetual Peace* (1795), and they identify the peace-making institutions therein as “republican constitutions … free trade … and international law and organizations” (Russet & Oneal, 2001, p. 271). Gelpi and Grieco (2008) found that democracy has a very large impact on the likelihood for conflict and that trade has an interaction with democracy to further decrease the likelihood of conflict. Contrarily, Anderson and Souva (2010) found that capitalism has no independent effect on conflict once democracy is controlled for; democracy, on the other hand, encourages prudent decisions regarding war and peace. Regressions ran by Lektzian and Souva (2009) indicate that democracies are less likely to fight and less likely to escalate conflict because they can more easily share and interpret credible information. Long (2003) finds that states engaged in a mutual defense pact trade more with each other than with states outside of the pact. Kupchan & Kupchan (1995) argue that Mearsheimer has set up a straw man, and that “[a]ny institution that is predicated upon the principles of regulated balancing and all against one” which they identify as institutions for collective security, create a more stable and positive peace than immature anarchy (p. 53). This movement from the “immature anarchy” of the realists towards the “mature anarchy” of the liberals
constitutes a development of the international system in the sense described by Hoffman (1978), but he also warned of the possibility of regression from that maturity.

**Development and Regression.** Nicolaidis and Schaffer (2005) find that globalization drives the creation of international law in the form of Mutual Recognition Regimes. These require states to surrender some elements of control over borders and national law, thus eroding the sovereignty necessary for the realists’ immature anarchy. Sterling-Folker (2000) argues that the constructivist model and neoliberal institutionalism are effectively the same theory; however, she also admits that neoliberal institutionalism is normative rather than descriptive. Mearsheimer admits the blind spots in his theory, specifically that ideological components “occasionally dominate a state’s decision-making process” producing anomalies which the realists can not explain (Mearsheimer, 2014, p.11). It is precisely the liberal *ideology* and institutions which have allowed states to escape the realists’ self-help system of immature anarchy and develop it into a more mature anarchy, and the effects of ideology are exclusively explored in the constructivist framework (Wendt, 1992).

In contrast to the realist claim that anarchy is sufficient for a self-help system to emerge, constructivists claim that anarchy can only affect the system in the context of existing institutions. In this constructivist lens, anarchy is a necessary but insufficient condition for a self-help system; the system must also be constructed through a recursive process of action, interpretation, and reaction. Put more simply, “Anarchy is what states make of it” (Wendt, 1992). Insofar as actors in that anarchy have normalized their relations in a rules-based system, it can be said to have “matured” (Bull 1977, p. 68; Buzan, 1983, p. 96). The contrasting “immature anarchy” (Bull, 1977; Buzan, 1983; Wendt, 1992) is the self-help system described by the realists. Insofar as behaviors occur according to well-understood and agreed norms, each actor in
the system can more accurately interpret their meaning and respond appropriately (Kupchan & Kupchan, 1995).

Inversely, behaviors which can not be interpreted within the existing normative framework undermine its legitimacy. Ganesan (1995) found that a feedback loop occurs between the pursuit of realist goals and the dismantling of neoliberal institutions; as the institutions weaken, self-interested behavior increases and vice versa. This undoing of the rules brings the system a bit further from maturity and a bit closer to immaturity, a move which Hoffman (1978, p. 243) calls “regression”. On the next page, Hoffman (1978, p. 244) identifies two categories of regression:

1) Regression in economic interdependence, devolving from a system of free trade to a self-interested mercantilist system

2) Regression in the strategic-diplomatic realm including aggressive unilateral invasions and dismantling of security coalitions

Thus events which undermine the stability of free trade or violently challenge the currently understood rules can be seen as regressive events. Later in this document, it will be argued that Russia’s hostile annexation of the Crimean peninsula from Ukraine in March 2014 was just such an event. This invasion will provoke a change in the Finnish President’s advocacy for PMIs and a rules based system in general.

This paper takes the position that the anarchic system has the potential to evolve both ways: maturity and regression. In subsequent sections, it will demonstrate that Finland has a particular interest in the maturity of anarchy, that relevant regressive events are occurring, and that certain kinds of speech are Finland’s best hope of navigating this regressive anarchy. The
text analysis will demonstrate Finland’s attempts to protect and promote Kantian peace-making institutions and how those attempts change in response to regressive events.

Interests and Identities. Shared interests encourage the creation of shared identities and weaken the barrier between other and self. On a fundamental level, the difference between self and other is that the self can be moved for self-centered motivations (Hegel, 1807, p.111-112). Thus, when actors move with the same motivation, they approach an identification with each other as the same self. The formation of group identities occurs in a recursive process of cooperation and/or competition such that perceived cooperation encourages identification of the subject as self, and perceived competition encourages identification of the subject as other (Browning 2008, p.51-52). Thus the audience identifies the speaker as an extension of the self, a contradiction of the self, or somewhere in between (Wendt, 1994, p.386). In moving towards common goals, individuals or groups come to share an identity, and a shared identity encourages cooperation. An international system of regular cooperation then comes to see itself as a global community where self-interested action means actions for the good of humanity. Kupchan & Kupchan (1995) find that states “have interests in protecting an international order that they see as beneficial to their individual security” even when they are not directly threatened (p. 55). Russet and Oneal (2001) find that a security community can develop between a group of states which, “does not expect war to occur with other members of the community and so does not prepare for such an eventuality” (p. 75). Thus, as anarchy matures, regular cooperation encourages a larger conception of self-interest up to and including a global self-interest.

Well-embedded identities and interests can resist the emergence of their contradictions. This was recently demonstrated regarding China’s identity both as a peaceful rising power and a victim of western intervention (Liao, 2017), European unity versus national identity and
sovereignty (Miskimmon, 2017; Schmidt & Radaelli, 2004), as well as US-Russia cooperation after decades of existential threat (Roselle, 2017). When institutions destabilize through major historical events, norm entrepreneurs compete to persuade until their norms reach a tipping point and become institutionalized (Barnett, 1999; Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998). Browning (2008) suggests that foreign policy analysis should turn its focus to “political contests over the construction of identity and meaning” in order to “see how one discourse came to prevail over other representations of the self and to analyse the processes by which contending narratives were marginalised” (p.54).

The history of Finland, in particular, gives it a set of identities and interests which make it a good case study as a resistor of anarchic regression. Because it is a small state between great powers, a devolution towards immature anarchy would put Finland in the path of conflict between Russia and the West. For this reason, Finland has an obvious interest in avoiding this kind of system by whatever means are available. Finland also has a history of hard-won semi-sovereignty insofar as more powerful neighbors allow. This will be explored in the section labelled “The Case of Finland”.

As a method of constructing identities and interests, presidential speeches have gained attention in recent literature. The next section will discuss that literature and what is known of this field so far.

**Presidential Speeches**

Content and/or text analysis of presidential speech has been used much more frequently in recent years to elucidate the intentions of the administration, especially in foreign policy. Presidents use strategic narratives to advocate foreign policy objectives (Esch, 2010; Hancock, 2011; Roselle, 2017; Widmaier, 2007; Zarefsky, 2004). Zarefsky (2004) discusses eight cases of
pensional rhetoric being used to redefine or reframe events to justify presidential policy goals. He finds both that presidents attempt to use rhetorical tactics like framing and analogy to justify their policy agendas and that these frames change the public conversation about these issues (Zarefsky, 2004, p. 618).

Widmaier (2007) searched and interpreted the speeches of Presidents Harry Truman and George W. Bush to redefine the international system for the Cold War and War on Terror respectively. He found that presidential rhetoric in both cases caused a shift in foreign policy encouraging the Republican Party to shift its stance from a neo-realist national interest platform to a “more-crusading internationalism” than the platform of Democratic Party (Widmaier, 2007). In the case of President Truman, the goal was the construction of systems for international trade and collective defense of democracy abroad (Widmaier, 2007). In the Bush case, the goal, at least in the rhetoric, was a protection of those same interests (Widmaier, 2007). This analysis will investigate the Finnish presidential construction, protection, and reconstruction of these same PMIs, among others.

Widmaier, Blythe, and Seabrooke (2007) investigated the Presidential narrative construction in response to regressive events. The events they use were “turning points when old orders ended and new ones began to emerge” (Widmaier, Blythe, & Seabrooke, 2007). They described regressive events like “wars and crises as moments where elite and mass public agents attempt to persuade each other over "who they are" and "what they want".” (Widmaier, Blythe, & Seabrooke, 2007). They found that policy constraints are socially-constructed and that agents interested in particular policy outcomes must therefore socially-construct the necessity for those policies to audiences capable of influencing those outcomes (Widmaier, Blythe, & Seabrooke,
2007). This can be said of Finland as an actor interested in mature anarchy and as President Niinistö speaking for Finland.

Joan Esch (2010) analyzed President George W. Bush’s official communications for certain myths and lexical triggers which Bush used to justify the Global War on Terror. Rather than searching for the entire myth in every instance, she searched for certain “lexical triggers” which indicated that a myth was being referred to (Esch, 2010). She found that myths of American Exceptionalism and the War on Terror as an example of Civilization vs. Barbarism were wielded by the US President and permeated the culture of the entire administration (Esch, 2010). These myths “drive our determination to act” and thus impact the implementation of international relations (Esch, 2010).

Hancock (2011) examined “over 230 post 9/11 speeches, policy documents, verbal statements, official texts, memos and public reports prepared by Bush Administration officials” for specific “internal linguistic consistencies or rules” weaving a narrative about human rights violations (p. 806). He found that advocacy for human rights in the documents of the Bush administration facilitated action in favor of justice, democracy, and freedom in US foreign policy (Hancock, 2011).

Roselle (2017) examined 15 speeches given by Presidents George W. Bush, George H. W. Bush, Vladimir I. Putin, and Boris Yeltsin regarding the Persian Gulf War, the war in Chechnya, and the Global War on Terror. In each case, she found particular narratives about the nature of the international system, national identity, and the role of that nation in the broader context (Roselle, 2017).

The analysis of presidential speeches and official documents is an increasingly common method in international relations literature. Presidents have used their platforms to advocate for
PMIs, give descriptive and normative accounts of the international system, and provoke action on key issues.

The Finnish president has a clear mandate to speak for Finland on matters of foreign policy; this mandate is based in the constitution, the Finnish political culture, and the support that President Niinistö in particular has earned from the Finnish public. The Finnish Constitution, Chapter 8, is titled “International Relations” and outlines the powers of various entities within the Finnish government to conduct foreign affairs. The first paragraph reads, “The foreign policy of Finland is directed by the President of the Republic in co-operation with the Government. ... The President decides on matters of war and peace, with the consent of the Parliament.” An official English translation of The Finnish Constitution can be found at finlex.fi/en. Browning (2008) finds that within Finnish politics “ideas of ‘consensus’ and ‘unity’” are “central values that legitimise giving up powers to the foreign policy elite” (p. 232). As a vote of confidence in President Niinistö’s ability to articulate Finnish foreign policy, an overwhelming majority (62.7%) of voting Finns returned him to office in January 2018; the next 3 most popular candidates received 12.4%, 6.9%, and 6.2% (OSF). Arguably, President Niinistö has a more clear mandate to speak for the Finnish people than US President Donald Trump has to speak for the American people, since President Trump was unable to secure even the largest minority of the popular vote. The analysis will follow a long trend of literature by analyzing the official English versions of speeches of Sauli Niinistö, President of the Republic of Finland.

The Case of Finland

As a small state situated between great powers with a history of rivalry, Finland has an obvious interest in maintaining the mature anarchy which has been established over the last century: that of free trade, democracy, international law and organizations, and collective
defense. President Niinistö indicated Finland’s awareness of this precarious position when discussing commonalities with Mexico thusly, “we both learned how to live next to a giant.” (Office of the President). This section will outline evidence to suggest that a return to geopolitics, especially between Russia and the West, is an existential threat to Finland, and that Finland has no choice but to talk its way out.

Finland has enjoyed a tentative sovereignty throughout its existence and has occasionally had to fight to defend that sovereignty. Until the Swedish-Russian War of 1809, the land and people of modern Finland were Swedish (Rinehart, 2002). When the land was ceded to the Russian Empire, the Swedish-speaking elite constructed the Finnish identity from the peasants’ language to maintain their cultural distinction (Browning, 2008, p. 75-79). This constructed identity is elegantly described by early Finnish nationalist Adolf Arwidsson, “We are no longer Swedes. We do not want to become Russians. So let us be Finns.” (quoted by Niinistö on 10/7/2014). Finland won independence from the Russian Empire during the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917.

In the winter of 1939-1940, Finland narrowly defended its sovereignty against the Soviets, who intended to use it as a buffer against the Nazis (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 151). The Finns allied with the Nazis for the protection of their sovereignty; as that option became untenable, they struggled to maintain a position of neutrality between the Soviet bloc and the West (Rinehart, 2002). After Communist coups in Hungary and Romania, Finland signed the Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance with the Soviet Union in 1948 to avoid a similar fate (Krosby, 1960). Each move was a compromise with the intentions of larger neighbors to maintain Finland’s questionable sovereignty.
Today, Finland is a member of the European Union, and it cooperates but will not commit to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Finnish popular support for joining the EU rose sharply from less than half to over 60% after Russian nationalist politician Vladimir Zhirinovsky called for a reconquest of Finland (Browning, 2008, p. 240). In 2008, Ukraine and Georgia lobbied NATO for admission, to which NATO declared “that these countries will become members” of the organization (NATO). In light of this expansion, President Putin began to accuse NATO of a “broken promise” to stop expanding and used this narrative to legitimize an aggressive response (Rühle, 2015). Russia invaded Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 for precisely these reasons, to clarify to these western institutions that it would tolerate no further expansion into its periphery (Matsaberidze, 2015). This expansion prompted war games and posturing, raising the potential for lethal conflict in Eastern Europe including NATO military movements 90 miles from St. Petersburg (Zwack, 2016). Russia is clearly unwilling to allow further eastward expansion of western institutions like NATO and the European Union, a position which limits Finnish policy options.

**Russian Aggression**

The potential for aggressive Russian expansion in Eastern Europe remains. Since the fall of the Soviet Union, Russia has exhibited a pattern of aggressive behavior in Eastern Europe by stoking ethnic separatist tensions and then establishing a *de facto* protectorate relationship with those separatists (Mankoff, 2014). Survey data show a stark geographic divide preceding the invasion in Ukraine between pro-European, Ukrainian-speaking civic nationalists to the West and Russian Orthodox, ethnic nationalists to the east (Shulman, 2015). Belarusian identity has formed only in contrast to the Polish Catholics to their West and Russian Orthodox culture to their East between which the Belarusians largely identify merely as “locals” (Ioffe, 2003).
Romania has historically struggled with identifying and being identified as “oriental” (in this case, Russian), occidental, and Turkish in alternation (Spiridon, 2006). Russia is inhibited from invading Finland only by Finland’s reluctance to join NATO and the steep costs Russia would pay to take and hold the territory (Mearsheimer, 2014, p. 201). Finland has struggled to maintain neutrality, and it has only been able to develop an explicitly Western identity when the threat of Russian aggression was minimal (Browning, 2008).

Russia has sought access routes to the open ocean for centuries (Courtney, 1954). Access to the Black Sea and the protection of its fleet there were major factors motivating Russia’s invasion of the Crimean Peninsula (Mankoff, 2014). This has changed the balance of power, granting Russia more dominance in the Black Sea region (Studzinska, 2015). The Baltic Sea (which encompasses Finland’s south and west coasts) has been among Russia’s top interests in its pursuit of open sea access (Courtney, 1954). Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia has had less coastline with the Baltic Sea than it has had for centuries. The Nord Stream Pipeline, on which Finland depends for natural gas (Marshall, 2016, p. 33), runs under the Baltic Sea. It is owned by Gazprom, a corporation in which the Kremlin owns a majority of the shares (Stefanova, 2012). Finland and the Baltic States, which also border Russia, are entirely dependent on this Russian natural gas; Finland pays less for that gas than the Baltic States due to better Finno-Russian relations (Marshall, 2015, p. 33). In a system of immature anarchy, Russian aggression to annex Finland as it annexed the Crimean Peninsula is not a far-fetched notion.

Finland has a clear interest in preventing immature anarchy. If the international system proved unwilling or unable to protect Finland from Russian aggression, Finland could become the next Ukraine: either overrun by Russian forces or see a repeating the narrow and costly defense of its territory as in the Winter War of 1944-1945. Enabling and encouraging a mature,
rules-based system of mutual recognition is Finland’s alternative. It has no choice but to attempt to talk its way into a more stable and mature anarchy. As the next section will show, the Crimean Invasion was a particularly salient regressive event for Finland, prompting shifts in that conversation.

**Google Trends and the Salience of the Crimean Invasion**

As a regressive event, the Crimean Invasion was particularly salient to the Finnish people. This section will discuss the utility of Google Trends data (accessible at trends.google.com) and then use that data to demonstrate the salience of the Crimean Invasion to the Finnish people.

Google Trends provides time-series data for search volume of a given term. The user can enter multiple search terms, specific dates to limit the time-series, and specific countries and regions to limit the geographical scope of the analysis. Data are presented as a percentage of the maximum value for that term in the dataset. For this reason, the data will only consist of a 101-term ordinal scale of integers between 0 and 100. Much of the literature (examined below) uses a separate *Insights for Search* feature; this is now combined with Google Trends under the name of the latter.

The utility of Google Trends data to track salience has been studied since sufficient time-series data has existed. A wealth of literature indicates that disease outbreaks can be predicted by statistics on internet search patterns (Polgreen et al., 2008), especially those provided by Google Trends (Carneiro & Mylonakis, 2009; Ginsberg et al., 2009; Wilson & Brownstein, 2009). Google Trends has also been used in economics with great success to predict market demand.
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Figure 1.

(Kholodilin, Podstawski, & Siliverstovs, 2010; Schmidt & Vosen, 2009) and unemployment
claims (Askitas & Zimmermann, 2009; D’Amuri & Marcucci, 2010). In all of the above
documents, Google searches indicate the importance of an issue to the general public.

Google Trends was first used for political research by Reilly, Richey, and Taylor (2012)
who found that search volume for California ballot initiatives tracked voter participation per
issue. Where google searches of a particular ballot initiative or related terms were lower, more
voters chosen to leave that issue blank on their ballots (Reilly et al. 2012). Mellon (2013) found
that Google Trends accurately predicts survey responses for a wide range of issues including
economic, defense, and environmental issues in both the United Kingdom and Spain. As these
studies have used Google Trends data to examine the salience of political issues within defined
times and locations, this study examines search volume for relevant elements of Finnish foreign
policy to demonstrate the salience of the Crimean Invasion in March 2014.
Figure 2.

The chart above shows the proportion of searches of Russia, the European Union, China, the United Nations, and the United States of America in Finland from March 2014 to February 2018. In this data, searches of Russia averaged higher than any other term, 49.5% of the highest value on the chart. Russia is the most searched term in all but 4 months of the data, wherein it is exceeded by the United States. Of those 4 months, two are US presidential elections (November 2012 and November 2016), and one is the inauguration of US President Donald Trump (January 2017). In the other month (July 2012), a spike of searches of the United States coincided with a spike in searches of basketball after a US basketball victory in the Summer Olympics. Russia is both the most searched term on average and is the most searched term in each month of the dataset, except for those 4 months. This demonstrates the importance of Russia in the Finnish public consciousness.
A closer look at searches of Russia will indicate the causes for those searches. Searches of Russia within the relevant timeframe reach above 90% of the maximum value in 5 months: February 2014, March 2014, May 2014, May 2015, and May 2016. Searches of Russia increase sharply each May and return each June. Within each May, searches of Russia and Ice Hockey World Championships together increase dramatically and then decrease. This coincides with Ice Hockey World Championship tournaments. Thus, to examine salient regressive events involving Russia it will be necessary to overlook May of each year. Excluding Mays, searches reach above 90% of the maximum value in 2 months: February 2014 and March 2014. These months indicate the beginning of a trend discussed in the next paragraph.

Russia was more frequently searched in Finland in 2014 than during any other year from March 2012 to February 2018, the timeframe of the analysis. Google Trends’ “Rising” feature lists the most increasingly searched terms in conjunction with the given term in the given
frame compared to the previous time. Among the top five “Rising” terms in conjunction with Russia during 2014 were “Crimea - Topic”, “NATO - Topic”, “international sanctions - Topic”, and “fighter aircraft - Aircraft Type”. In the 6th and 10th places were “War in Donbass - Armed Conflict” and “Ukraine - Country in Europe”, respectively. The 1st through 6th topics were all labelled “Breakout”, indicating that each term’s search volume in conjunction with Russia increased well over ten-fold. This radical shift in search volume indicates the importance of the Russian invasion of the Crimean peninsula to the Finnish people.

For reasons described thoroughly above, The Crimean Invasion was both a regressive event and very important to the Finnish people. As Finland has an interest in preventing regression in the international system, it must use the means at its disposal to prevent that regression and reconstruct mature anarchy. The next section will investigate the means by which Finland will achieve that end.

Methods

This study will conduct a manual text analysis of the 148 speeches of President Niinistö from his inauguration in March 2012 to February 2018. The unit of analysis will be paragraphs within these speeches. These speeches are available on the official website of the Finnish President’s Office at https://www.presidentti.fi/en/speeches/. The results will be examined over time with specific attention to the Crimean Invasion of March 2014. Observations will be each paragraph of advocacy for the Peace-Making Institutions discussed on pages 4 & 5.

Definitions

For the purposes of this analysis, all 5 of the following are Peace-Making Institutions (PMIs) which will serve as lexical triggers:
1) International Trade - Economic activity and cooperation which is international in scope whether between public, private, or mixed entities

2) International Law - Rules, laws, and/or treaties requiring multilateral consent and cooperation, including the concept of a rules-based system itself

3) Democracy - political, civil, and human rights outside of Finland

4) Mutual Defense - international security cooperation between any number of willing participants

5) International Organizations - systems of international cooperation which have a stated mission and regular meetings, excluding organizations for mutual defense

**Operationalization of Definitions.** Advocacy includes both expressions of audience interests and calls to action. Appeals to audience interests require all of the following criteria:

1) A PMI is stated.

2) The audience can promote and/or protect the PMI by an implied method.

3) The speech implies the audience’s interest in promoting and/or protecting the PMI.

Calls to action require the following criteria:

1) A PMI is stated.

2) An action which would promote and/or protect that PMI is stated.

3) The audience is able to take that action.

4) A moral signifier (i.e. ought, should, must) is applied to that action.

**Results**

Figure 4 shows advocacy per peace-making institution over time. Advocacy is an aggregate of both calls to action and expressions of audience interest. Much of Niinistö’s speech in the first few months was dedicated to laying the groundwork for his agenda and to addressing
the fallout of the 2008-2009 Great Recession. Thus, advocacy for economic cooperation was especially altered in a way that distracted from the relevant trends (see appendix). For this reason, the first 6 months of President Niinistö’s term are not shown in figures 4-7.

The Crimean Invasion occurred in the Spring of 2014. Immediately thereafter, a noticeable chilling effect takes place. For a visualization of this effect, see the shift in Figure 4 between Winter and Summer of 2014. A moderate increase in advocacy for international law continues while advocacy for all other PMIs decreases sharply. Advocacy for defense cooperation responds more slowly to the chilling, with a more modest decrease lasting twice as long. Finland’s geographic position, size, and long history of Russian tensions necessitate this cautious approach. It is precisely for these reasons that Finland must appeal to the other institutions. Following a half-year chilling period, law, trade, and democracy sharply increase for the next year and maintain a higher average than the preceding period.

![Advocacy Over Time (By Institution)](image)

Figure 4.
A less noticeable chilling period occurs later in the data with the same impact: advocacy for law increases while all other institutions decrease including a year-long decrease for defense. This later chilling period occurs over early 2017 as US President Donald Trump takes office.

Recall the discussion of Google Trends data. Searches of the United States surpassed searches of Russia in only 4 months, two of which were the months of Donald Trump’s election and inauguration. Searches of the United States during November 2016 (during the Trump election) were higher than any other value in those data, more than 30% higher than searches of Russia during the Crimean Invasion. The coincidence of these google searches and similar presidential speech patterns following the two events suggests the similarity of these two events from the Finnish perspective. Both may represent a regression towards immature anarchy as threats to the liberal international order.

Trade and defense steadily increase together from Fall 2014 to Spring 2017 except for a short decrease over Fall of 2015. During that decrease, international law and organizations increase together and then decrease together. These movements are largely the result of meeting with different kinds of actors. As the President met with actors with whom he could reinforce defense and economic cooperation, such as individual states, he emphasized those institutions. As he spoke to the United Nations and other international organizations, he emphasized available methods for reinforcing international law and organizations. A critic may argue that since this variation is based on the available audiences it should not be analyzed as an intentional variation in advocacy. However, the President’s choice of his audience is as telling as his choice of what to speak about. Except in the case of the seasonal variation in organization advocacy which is due to the timing of UN General Assemblies, I would argue that the President can choose his
venue and that the variation is thus sufficiently within his control. However, even the winter spikes can be noteworthy.

Advocacy for international organizations undergoes seasonal changes, increasing with each UN General Assembly visit every winter and returning to a low point each summer. This is true for each winter in the dataset except the winter following the invasion. In that winter, Niinistö criticized the UN for its insufficient defense of international law. During that General Assembly meeting, Niinistö stated, “Unfortunately, the UN Security Council has not been able to uphold its responsibilities neither in Ukraine nor in Syria. We need to reform the Security Council. Finland supports the efforts to restrict the use of veto.” In the UN Security Council, any of the 5 permanent members (US, China, Russia, UK, & France) may veto any UN action. From October 2011 to the time of Niinistö’s criticism, Russia had used its veto 5 times to prevent UN action in Syria and Ukraine. Niinistö’s call for veto reform is a clear critique of Russia’s behavior in the Security Council. In that same speech, he told the UN General Assembly, “... the voice of this important body should have been even stronger, condemning Russia’s actions and charting a way towards ending violence and restoring peace.” The target and motivation of his criticism are no secret. He openly rebukes the United Nations for its failure to respond to the Crimean Invasion. This is the reason for the smaller spike in advocacy for international organizations in the Winter between 2014 and 2015 than in other winters.

Figure 5 shows the calls to action in favor of each PMI over the relevant timeframe. These are cases where President Niinistö has clearly stated an action which could be taken to promote a PMI and attached a normative mandate such as “ought” or “should”. The same chilling effect which was obvious in Figure 4 is more noticeable here. Calls to action sharply reduce for all PMIs in the wake of the invasion except for law, which shows a modest increase.
Figure 5.

The largest of the winter spikes for calls to action in favor of international organizations occurs in the winter before the Crimean Invasion. Talking to Sweden on January 12, 2014, Niinistö said, “We need to return to a path with Russia along which mutual security and trust are built.” Within that same paragraph, he listed international organizations with the potential to “take concrete steps, even small ones” including “the Council of Baltic Sea States (the CBSS), the Northern Dimension, Barents Cooperation and Arctic Cooperation.” This winter spike also included support for the International Red Cross and for environmental organizations involving Finland, Russia, and other neighbors. This advocacy demonstrated the indirect method President Niinistö took in using the liberal international system in general, rather than organization designed for specific purposes, to reinforce mature anarchy rather than to address a particular problem. It also demonstrated the growing awareness of problems between Russia and the West.
The next winter, calls to action decrease from the preceding summer, reversing the trend of increasing advocacy each winter. This is the only summer to winter decrease in calls to action regarding international organizations. This is due to the previously mentioned castigation of the United Nations for inaction on Ukraine. The next winter shows a modest spike and then a larger spike in the following summer. As Finland’s confidence in the United Nations (and other international organizations) is slowly restored, it attempts to strengthen these institutions again.

The contrast between the recovery of calls to action for trade and calls to action for collective defense are telling. The first institution to rebound from the chilling effect is trade. This is because it is a relatively innocuous institution unlikely to be perceived as a threat to Moscow. Calls to action for collective defense, in contrast, never recover to the high point they reached before the invasion. This is for the opposite reason. A very outspoken rallying of the troops may provoke a direct military response from an already aggressive Russia. The contrast demonstrates a Finnish calculus regarding available avenues for establishing peace. These two variables seem to be the most clear indicators of small states’ outlook on the international system where advocacy for trade demonstrates a liberal confidence in mature anarchy and advocacy for military cooperation indicates a less confident view of the world. These two variables also correspond to the two kinds of regression identified by Hoffman (1978, p. 244). A future study may focus on these two variables and include discussions of national defense as a last resort.

The long and steady increase of calls to action for international law ended in early 2016. In the opening of the 2016 parliamentary session on February 3rd of that year, the President revealed the cause in these words, “Migration is a serious problem. Europe, Finland, the western way of thinking and our values have all been challenged by it.” In that message to Parliament, he spent 20 of the 37 paragraphs discussing this issue alone. In other speeches, he notes the failures
of international law to mitigate the problems of immigration and the legal quagmire that separates refugees from migrants. The absence of an international legal remedy for this issue decreases confidence in international law generally, especially in light of its other failures. This may have been the straw that broke the camel’s back, causing President Niinistö to lose faith in international law and reduce his support for it as a peace-making institution.

A decline in the President’s calls to action for trade in early 2015 coincides with economic problems in Finland. Speaking to Parliament on April 29, 2015, the President explains, “Our economy has shrunk. The needle has swung towards critical on the public debt and deficit indicator. The state has large guarantee commitments, and the national unemployment insurance fund has a considerable borrowing requirement.” These economic problems precede an interesting shift whereby President Niinistö continues to discuss trade in relatively the same quantity (see the blue line of Figure 4), but the calls to action on trade (Figure 5) diminish in favor of audience interests in trade (Figure 6). This more subtle approach may be a way to continue building trade as a peace-making institution without broadcasting Finland’s temporary weakness in that arena.

Figure 6 enumerates the paragraphs where President Niinistö expresses the audience’s interest in participating in a PMI. This chart demonstrates the most obvious responses to the Crimean Invasion itself. While the chilling period had an effect on calls to action, no such effect obviously takes place regarding expressions of audience interests. This may be hidden by the low volume of expressions of audience interests before the invasion. On the other hand, the slight decrease in trade and organizations may indicate the same chilling effect which was noticeable from the other charts. Half of a year after the Crimean Invasion, all variables except the audience’s interest in mutual defense increase together.
After the chilling period, audience interests in both trade and law show steady increase for an entire year. Relative to defense, which responds more slowly and modestly to the Crimean Invasion, these two are passive and non-provocative methods for reconstructing a mature anarchy. As noted above, more innocuous institutions seem to recover more quickly than potentially provocative ones. This is an effort to avoid sending the wrong signals to Moscow.

Expressions of the audience’s interests in international trade and international law covary until Winter of 2016/2017 when a second chilling effect seems to take place. As in the Spring of 2014, expressions of the audience’s interests in international law increase while all others decrease. This coincides with the months of the highest searches for the United States mentioned before: the election and inauguration of US President Donald Trump. The repetition of the exact same trends suggests similar assessments by the Niinistö administration of the Crimean Invasion and
Trump election: both regressive events requiring a pause for reflection followed by a reconstruction of the liberal system.

As with trade, advocacy for international organizations shifts from calls to action (figure 5) to expressions of audience interests (figure 6) without a major change in the total advocacy (figure 4). In other words, President Niniistö transitions from telling to selling, indicating a more passive role following the invasion. As was the case with trade, this may be a method for continuing to promote the institution of international organization without promoting action on behalf of its current form. This is consistent with President Niniistö’s calls to reform the UN Security Council as discussed above.

Expressions of audience interest in defense cooperation increase more modestly and on more of a delay. As discussed previously, this is due to the provocative and aggressive nature of military cooperation relative to the other peace-making institutions. The average amount of expressions of audience interest in defense clearly increases after the Crimean Invasion, only in a more subtle way than other variables. This demonstrates that it is an important peace-making institution which still must be strengthened, potential provocation notwithstanding.

Figure 7 is an aggregate of all 10 variables, demonstrating the total advocacy for peace-making institutions over the relevant timeframe. Notably, the advocacy rises constantly from Summer 2013 to the end of the dataset except for 2 periods: the Crimean Invasion and the inauguration of US President Donald Trump.

This analysis attempted to demonstrate that small states who benefit from the peace and stability of mature anarchy will attempt to reinforce that mature anarchy when it regresses. The analysis was performed with an awareness of the Crimean Invasion as the obvious example a
destabilizing event for countries on the Russian/European Union border. It has shown this to be true.

Interestingly, every variable which was affected by the aftermath of the Crimean Invasion was impacted in the same way by the election and inauguration of US President Donald Trump. In both cases, all advocacy variables decreased for half of a year except for international law which modestly increased. Also in both cases trade began to increase immediately after the chilling effect. Further study might expand the time scale to examine more recent speeches and determine the effects of the Trump presidency on the liberal international system.

**Discussion**

As a small state in regressive anarchy, Finland’s interests in maintaining the previously mature anarchy are manifest. President Niinistö’s speeches clearly shifted in favor of certain
peace-making institutions in the wake of the Crimean Invasion. Other events both domestic and international impacted these speech patterns in less noticeable ways.

This process was both delayed and subtle. The shift occurred much more strongly for innocuous peace-making institutions like free trade and international law than for the others. It also lagged months behind the regressive event, suggesting a chilling period for pragmatic calculation. This same chilling period occurred in the wake of Donald Trump’s inauguration, suggesting the similarities between these events. These similarities warrant further study. Financial troubles and an immigration crisis caused chilling periods for specific variables. Each of these chilling issues represents an erosion of the liberal international order.

The small states’ reaction to protect the liberal international system rather than national interests indicates a few features of this system. First, it indicates a trust in the peace-making institutions to protect the interests of the people. A state which did not trust the mutually reinforcing nature of PMIs (as examined by Russet & Oneal, 2001), would resort to military spending for the protection of its physical sovereignty rather than promoting the synergy of these institutions. This would happen both as regards institutions, pursuing the military dimension over economic interdependence or international law, and as regards the scope of cooperation, favoring unilateral action over bilateral action and bilateral action over multilateral action.

It is, perhaps, the case that small states have no other options. That would not undermine the quality of the reinforcement. The performance of an action suggests to observers that that action ought to be taken in those circumstances. By advocating for and participating in the liberal order, Finland indicates to other actors that advocating for and participating in the liberal order is a worthwhile action to take.
Secondly, it demonstrates subscription by those small states to a larger collective identity. Regular interaction in pursuit of common goals weakens the perceived barriers between self and other and thus develops a collective identity. Collective identity suggests the potential for further cooperation. As this recursive process continues, geographic and ideological borders which distinguish self from other lose meaning. The perception of self-as-species facilitates the ability to address global problems with global solutions. The contrasting self-as-nation/state facilitates more competitive and nation/state-oriented solutions. Responding to protect an identity that is threatened suggests an identification with that identity.

Thirdly, it indicates that that system is under threat. The reaction itself suggests a cause to react to. If an engineer responded to an earthquake by reinforcing a dam, we would suspect that the engineer feels the earthquake was a threat to the stability of the dam. Likewise, a small state’s reaction to reinforce mature anarchy by advocating peace-making institutions in response to regressive events suggests that the leadership of that small state feels the regressive events were threats to the stability of the liberal international system. Other states which benefit from free trade, multilateral defense, and international promotion of democracy and human rights may want to take note and respond to the same apparent threats accordingly.

**Future Research Opportunities**

Future research might expand the timeframe forward, examine a similar case like Mexico, or examine the shifts in advocacy for different institutions in the speeches. Each of these would independently contribute evidence to the arguments stated herein.

A look beyond early 2018 to examine the shifts during the administration of US President Donald Trump and during the Brexit process would begin to build more evidence. The evidence gathered in this paper suggests that that election was a regressive event since it seemed to be
followed by a chilling period similar to the one after the Crimean Invasion. The theory used in this paper suggests that Brexit would be an important regressive event within the European Union. If similar shifts occur in the years following that election and that divorce, the data would contribute to a potential quantification of regressive events generally.

Future research might examine similar data from Mexico. As President Niinistö said to a Mexican audience during a state visit, “We have both learned how to live next to giants”. This precarious position relative to Russia and the West made Finland a good case for this analysis. Given that Mexico is in a similar position relative to the United States, similar observations would build evidence for the arguments made in this paper. Specifically salient events might include the Trump Election, the process of renegotiating NAFTA to USMCA, and the political turmoil surrounding the construction of the border wall and reports of children in cages.

Future research may compare advocacy for multilateral trade, bilateral trade, collective defense, and national defense as these represent various levels of confidence in the maturity of anarchy. First, advocacy for defense rather than trade would indicate a more competitive and less cooperative international system. Second, scaling down ambitions from multilateral to bilateral and from bilateral to unilateral action would show decreasing trust in the intentions of other actors in the system. Both of these trends, if research confirmed them, would represent a regression from mature to immature anarchy as well as a sort of grasping-at-straws to preserve whatever might ensure security.

These suggestions need not be mutually exclusive. Any or all of them could be mixed and matched to develop a larger thesis. This body of knowledge has not gotten much attention in recent decades, but given current events, it may be time to examine these systemic theories in a new light.
Limitations

As an exploratory essay, this paper fits the bill. Generalizations from single case studies should be made with caution. Not all small states have the same identities and interests as Finland. Presidential systems do not always have the same legal mandates and normative legitimacy as the Finnish President to direct foreign policy. This study shows that President Sauli Niinistö, who has a legal and normative mandate to speak for the Finnish people on foreign policy matters, perceives such a risk in the international system and has responded in this way. Generalizations beyond this warrant further study.
Resources


# Appendix

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