The Rise of Anti-immigration Populist Radical Right Parties: The Effect of the Syrian Conflict on Refugee Resettlement and Migration Policies in Germany and Austria

Sara Kouchehbagh
University of Arkansas, Fayetteville
The Rise of Anti-immigration Populist Radical Right Parties: The Effect of the Syrian Conflict on Refugee Resettlement and Migration Policies in Germany and Austria

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Science in Geography

by

Sara Kouchehbagh
University of Arkansas
Bachelor of Arts in International Relations, 2015

December 2019
University of Arkansas

This thesis is approved for recommendation to the Graduate Council.

Fiona Davidson, Ph.D.
Thesis Advisor

---

Edward C. Holland, Ph.D.
Committee Member

---

Thomas Paradise, Ph.D.
Committee Member
Abstract

The effects of Syrian migration in Europe have revolutionized refugee resettlement globally. Most immigration and refugee problems have historically been settled similarly post WWII, however, Syria is the largest refugee crisis since WWII. It is important to learn how to respond to future conflicts with displacement and resettlement affecting Western countries that are unprepared to respond to a conflict of such magnitude. This thesis will compare previous conflicts and the Syrian conflict, while highlighting the resilient political momentum of reactionary new political groups in European states, particularly Germany and Austria.

The research and results from this study will include data from government bodies, international organizations, and research institutions to depict how the Syrian conflict has directly caused popularization of anti-immigrant views amongst political parties in Germany and Austria. The results and recommendations will be useful for migration policy development and management of refugees after great conflicts.
**Table of Contents**

**Chapter One: Introduction**

**Chapter Two: Literature Review**

2.1 The response of EU states to preceding major refugee producing conflicts

2.1.1 Yugoslav Wars

2.1.2 Gulf War

2.1.3 Origins of the international refugee regime post-WWII

2.2 Background of the Syrian Conflict

2.3 Defining Migration Crises and Forced Migration

2.4 Perspectives on Migration Policy: How Migration Transforms Societies

2.5 Labor Markets and Migration: Comparison of Responses to the Syrian Refugee Crisis

2.6 European Response to Syrian Refugees

2.6.1 Non-European Countries that Host the Most and Least Syrian Refugees: Turkey and the United States

2.7 The Syrian Conflict’s Effect on PRR Groups

2.8 Who Votes for PRR and Why?

2.9 Germany’s PRR Group- Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)

2.9.1 AfD and Right-Wing Party Voter Distribution

2.10 Austria’s PRR Group- Austrian People’s Party (ÖVP)
Chapter Three: Methodology

3.1 Data Analysis of PRR Popularity in Germany and Austria through Maps .......... 34
3.2 Data Analysis and Result ......................................................................................... 37

Chapter Four: Analysis and Recommendations

4.1 Gastarbeiter (Guest Worker) Agreements Reapplied in the 21st Century ............. 38

4.1.1 Guest Worker Agreements and Migration Policy Recommendations:
Case of New Zealand .................................................................................................. 39

4.1.2 Skill Sensitive Recommendations for Future Migration Policies .............. 41

4.2 Private Funding of Refugee Resettlement: Case of Canada ......................... 43

Chapter Five: Conclusion ........................................................................................... 46

References Cited ......................................................................................................... 47
# List of Figures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2.1 Number of Syrian Displaced Persons and Durable Solutions</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.2 Displaced Syrians Globally according to the Pew Research Centre</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.3 Syrian Nationals Applying for Asylum in Europe by Year and Quarter</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.4 Constituency Seats Won by Party in the 2017 Election in Germany</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.5 AfD Share of Vote in the 2017 Election in Germany</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.6 The Ratio of Foreigners Relative to the Total Population of Germany</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.7 Map Representing the Unemployment Rate in Germany in 2013</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2.8 Percentage of Votes for the NPD Party in Germany in 2013</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.1 German General Election Results for the AfD Party</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3.2 Results of the Austrian General Election</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Chapter One:

Introduction

The Syrian conflict which began in March 2011 has created the largest number of displaced persons since World War II (UNHCR 2017). This displacement has created unprecedented difficulties for Syrians, neighboring countries, as well as Europe and the remaining Western hemisphere. It is therefore important to examine the effects that mass migration and refugee resettlement have on political movements and parties in host countries. The rise of anti-immigration rhetoric amongst political parties in European countries has steadily risen since the early years of the Syrian conflict. As of 2018, over 6.1 million Syrians have been internally displaced, and an additional 5-6 million are refugees. The European Union (EU) hosts about 1 million of the 5-6 million Syrian refugees, furthermore Germany is the EU member state that resettles the majority of Syrians living within the EU (Kumar, et. al 2018).

Prior to the Syrian conflict, Western and Central European countries, alongside the United States, hosted multiple waves of refugees and migrants throughout the 20th century. World War II resulted in the largest of these waves between the years 1945 and 1970, when immigrant families fled to host countries as a result of conflict. After a brief fall in migration due to economic issues in the 1970s that resulted in stricter migration policies, migration to Europe rose once in again in the 21st century as a result of conflicts in the Middle East (Kentmen-Cin, et. al 2017). Despite current migration, and prior migration that has resulted in first and second-generation immigrants now living in Europe and the United States, there is an unprecedented effect that migration from the Syrian conflict has had on politics and society in Europe, particularly regarding immigration and refugee policies. Political parties have gained momentum
on the basis that they are anti-immigration or closed-border policy parties, and the attitudes and rhetoric toward Syrians and other immigrants after the start of the Syrian conflict in 2011 are now regularly discussed in the news and in daily political debates.

Whether or not Syrian conflict related migration has a positive or negative impact on Germany and Austria’s society and development is rationalized through policy discussion, formation and enforcement. These policies attempt to regulate migration issues, such as monitoring remittances, and aim to curb negative impacts of migration. Furthermore, global policies that regulate training, education, resettlement funds, and especially migrant returns, can be difficult to enforce. In turn, funds for policies should focus on improving infrastructure and legal security of migrants, which would allow migrants to have access to similar institutions and rights as citizens. Preferably, this would deter the migrants from falling into the all-too familiar trap of vulnerable poverty and low-skill working jobs, and would instead alleviate pressure and stimulate development.

It is evident that in a globalizing world, migrants are key players in development related policies, as changes in policies can have a domino effect on two or more societies at a time. Germany and Austria’s current successes and failures should be examined through the lens of past policies and agreements involving mass migration, guest workers and refugee resettlement comprehensively in order for policies to improve in the future. In order for appropriate procedures to progress, data representing the impacts of past and current policies will be analyzed alongside the influence of Populist Radical Right (PRR) parties’ dogma to police Syrian migrants within Germany and Austria.
Some of the major actors amongst global political parties that have gained momentum since the start of the Syrian conflict include, the Alternative for Germany (AfD) in Germany, UK Independence Party (UKIP) in the UK, National Rally (National Front) in France, The Freedom Party (FPO) in Austria, Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz) in Hungary, and the Swiss People’s Party (SVP) in Switzerland. For the purpose of this research, I will focus on the AfD party in Germany and the FPO in Austria. Germany and Austria share similar experiences, language, culture, and history, and both countries also host more Syrian refugees than a majority of their EU counterparts (Connor 2018).

The AfD and the FPO are both parties heavily involved in anti-immigration, populist policies with their rise to power coinciding with the first waves of migrants arriving to Europe from Syria after the start of the 2011 conflict. In the political sense, the populist policies of the AfD and the FPO refer to their belief in the political impact of the “average” majority versus holding political power among few powerful persons. This position can be attractive to middle class, working class citizens, or those who may feel neglected by a small, powerful group of people making impactful decisions in their government (de Vreese 2018). In order to effectively understand how these parties have gained power we must define the difference between a economically motivated migration and forced migration, examine past conflicts that have created migration crises, explain how migration affects societies and how PRR parties rise to power, and ultimately provide criticism and recommendations for how the EU can respond to the large number of Syrian migrants that continue to settle in Europe.
Chapter Two:

Literature Review

Historical Conflicts that Have Created Migration Crises

2.1 The response of EU states to preceding major refugee producing conflicts

2.1.1. Yugoslav Wars

The crisis in the former Yugoslavia caused the largest wave of refugee resettlement in Europe in the 1980’s. At the time, national refugee determination procedures were heavily overburdened, and the elimination of internal borders within the EU meant that the policies of individual states were conditional and dependent on the border and migration policies of neighboring EU countries. Throughout the conflict, the EU did not admit many Yugoslav refugees, and countries such as Germany went as far as tightening their entry policies at the border. Countries that were closer in proximity to the conflict, such as Austria and Hungary, began adopting German style measures as well. The pattern of the rise and fall of lenient migration policies was repeated once again in 1993 during the Bosnia-Herzegovina conflict. Despite these varying policies, some of the countries with the strictest policies at times were also the countries that hosted most of the refugees among Europe States. Germany hosted the most refugees reaching roughly 300,000 persons, followed by Austria with nearly 75,000 persons (UNHCR 2017). These conflicts instigated a rise in aid and refugee assistance from international organizations, such as UNHCR, as the interest in migration and refugee flow became a serious priority for many countries. As a result of the migration concerns, an agenda promoting temporary resettlement by governments and international organizations began to emerge in political discourse and eventually trickle down into EU states’ migration dialogue, and
eventually policies. Ideally these measures meant that refugees would temporarily stay in EU states until the conflict in their home country had settled, in which then they would return.

As with the Syrian conflict, the mass wave of migration due to the Yugoslav wars resulted in temporary or abrupt amendments to migration policies, otherwise, refugee status may not have been decided within a reasonable time. The Yugoslav wars differ from the Syrian conflict in the sense that migration and refugee related issues and statuses were primarily handled or directed by UNHCR and similar agencies. However, since the start of the Syrian conflict we have seen a rise of willing participation and expression regarding these matters by political parties and government bodies.

2.1.2 Gulf War

The three million refugees fleeing the Persian Gulf during the 1991 Gulf War fought between Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq and their oil producing neighbor state, Kuwait, left a massive humanitarian crisis. The minority groups most severely impacted by Saddam Hussein’s invasion included about 1.85 million Kurds and thousands of Shiite Muslims, who were then forced into neighboring countries such as Iran and Turkey (Galbraith 2003). The migration and refugee strategies and lessons learned that are now relevant to post-war conflicts because of the Gulf War, such as the Syrian conflict, include the importance of sectarian conflict, weapons of mass destruction, and the willingness of neighbor and distant states in accepting refugees in any given conflict. For example, according to the Migration Policy Institute, the Kurdish minority was the largest displaced group as a result of the Gulf War, and a number of Kurdish migrants bypassed UNHCR procedures in order to resettle in European countries. Because the Kurds were
largely anti-Saddam protestors, they had the support of many groups and states who also supported the fall of Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq. With this support, many of these migrants acquired fake documents or had connections to ease the burden of the expensive and often stressful resettlement procedures in Europe.

2.1.3 Origins of the international refugee regime post-WWII

The first agencies managing cross-border migration on a global scale began after WWI. The International Labor Organization (ILO) was established in 1919 to protect the interests of workers outside their home countries, and two years later the High Commissioner for Refugees was established by the League of Nations (Redondo, 2018). The establishment of the Permanent Migration Committee came about after the ILO began paying more attention to providing resources for migrant persons. Although the Committee was originally intended to handle labor issues, the outbreak of WWI and other conflicts meant that the urgency of refugee response was steadily rising. Political tensions and governmental interests caused a delay in the establishment of a permanent body to handle refugee issues, and it was not until WWII that refugee issues became a top priority for states.

WWI and WWII resulted in different consequences throughout Europe, specifically, WWII resulted in a large movement of population within countries. Redondo states that the death count after WWII reached over 60 million, and the survivor count left anywhere between 30 to 60 million people displaced. The term ‘refugee’ was used by the Allies to describe victims that fled the Nazis, whereas other groups were excluded. During this time the term refugee started to be associated with discrimination and opposition issues, and the terms refugee and displaced
person were often used interchangeably and incorrectly. After the War, the US led the search for assistance for the millions of displaced Europeans, but it was Belgian who initially gave shelter to 50,000 refugees providing them jobs as well. As other countries followed Belgian’s example, the US and Latin American countries also implemented similar measures. It was only in the 1940’s that countries, including the US, began creating new agencies to safeguard and assist refugees worldwide. Agencies such as the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration were established, and the difference between refugees and displaced persons became significantly clearer. By 1951, the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees was created due to the difficulty of unifying the management of human migrations between different agencies with different priorities.

2.2 Background of the Syrian Conflict

According to the Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), the Syrian conflict’s inception in March of 2011 began with the Arab Spring protests that started in Tunisia and swept through much of the Arab region. Originally beginning as peaceful protests against Syrian leader, Bashar al-Assad, and the state descended into turmoil after protests became violent and it turned into an armed conflict. Syria has now become the largest refugee crisis since WWII, with the largest number of IDPs (Internally Displaced Person) worldwide and at least 40% of its entire population displaced internally. According to the IDMC, the remaining Syrian population seeking asylum or refuge includes about five million people throughout the Middle East, and roughly one million people in Europe.
The following include working definitions provided by UNHCR for IDPs, asylum seekers, and refugees: A refugee is defined as someone who is forced to leave their home country due to persecution, war or violence, leaving him or her with a fear for return because of racial, political, national, or religious social grouping. In contrast, an asylum seeker is strictly someone who flees their home country to seek sanctuary in another country (this is not necessarily due to ongoing war or violence). An internally displaced person is someone who has been forced to flee their home but have not entered another country by crossing a border (UNHCR 2019). Below are the IDMC’s figures for Syria displacement as of 2018:

![Figure 2.1: Number of Syrian Displaced Persons and Durable Solutions (Source: IDMC 2018)](image)

The IDMC holds government advances in Syria responsible for spikes in displacement figures for specific months between 2017 and 2018, such as in January, March, and June. However, it reports that as government advances increase overall there is a decrease in the number of displaced Syrians (IDMC 2018).
Alongside the IDMC, the Pew Research Center (PRC) also found that over six million Syrians were displaced within the state (PRC 2018). Below is the PRC’s estimated number of displaced Syrians globally in 2017.

![Map showing the most displaced Syrians globally](image)

**Figure 1.2: Displaced Syrians Globally according to the Pew Research Centre, 2017**
(Source: PRC 2018)

The Syrian conflict is a humanitarian crisis, meaning a situation in which a widespread threat to health, life, or safety beyond the coping capacity of societies (Weerasinghe, et. al 2014).
The Syrian conflict is also a humanitarian crisis that is specifically triggered by armed conflict, political instability and public tensions. Although these triggers are often what is associated with major conflicts, they are not lone actors and there are usually underlying structural dynamics at play that affect the magnitude and direction of these conflicts. The Syrian conflict is a human made disaster that has resulted in a humanitarian disaster because of the allegations of the use of chemical weapons by the Assad regime, which produced the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) Fact-Finding Mission (FFM) established in 2014. According to UN and OPCW FFM reports conducted on ground, in 2018 it was confirmed that there was use of sarin and chlorine in Syria in the spring of 2017 (OPCW 2017).

2.3 Defining Migration Crises and Forced Migration

Still, a “crisis migration” resulting from a humanitarian crisis is a term coined to cover the sometimes-gray area of what defines voluntary and forced migration. Although many violent conflicts produce refugees and asylum seekers, it cannot always be determined who is directly fleeing conflict and who is not directly being driven out by conflict but instead chooses to leave because of economic strife due to conflict.

International organizations have adopted clauses and terms based on their own definitions of migrants who voluntarily leave and those who are forced to leave due to conflict. For example, the 1951 UN Convention Status of Refugees defines refugees as persons who crossed international borders and are unable to return because of persecution or because they will have no protection in their home country and residence (UNHCR 1951 Refugee Convention). Other
organizations’ definitions extend the definition to include other reasons or groups of people, which is likely due to circumstances of regional relevance to an organization.

For refugees and asylum seekers, the dynamics differ. Because of human rights violations, religious or ethnic persecution, or violence, many have no choice but to rush to neighboring countries for initial asylum resettlement (United Nations 2017). Only a small minority of those resettled in neighboring countries has the financial means, connections, or good fortune, to resettle in a more prosperous and secure country outside of their region, such as in the EU. This second migration movement for migrants is typically attractive for the long-term economic and social benefits associated with living in a EU state. Subsequently, failure or shortcomings in migration policy crafting can easily occur when distinctions between forced and economically migrations are not made, thereby missing the target population.

2.4 Perspectives on Migration Policy: How Migration Transforms Societies

Migration can be a very dangerous undertaking and difficult process for victims of conflict who often leave family and livelihoods behind for potentially life-threatening reasons. It is not uncommon from host country citizens to place blame on immigrants when the country goes through economic hardship or internal conflict; however, some people and political parties do overlook the advantages of migration in these times of despair. The advantages and contributions of migrants and their communities, including fill of labor shortages, business and trade stimulation, and an overall economic boom, are discounted (International Labour Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, et. al 2015). As a result, xenophobia, racism, and sometimes violent behavior and riots begin to swell in communities, thus creating
platforms for anti-immigration parties and increasing their chance of succeeding in local and national elections.

It is critical for political parties to address how migration transforms societies in host countries economically and socially. It is unarguable that each conflict triggered migration wave throughout history has its own unique patterns; however, there is still space to make generalizations regarding social and economic impacts for host countries. The key in these generalizations is to distinguish post conflict migrations that are (1) economically motivated after conflict and (2) forced after conflict.

An economically motivated migrant would likely be younger in age, seeking resettlement in an economically thriving country, and are typically ‘target-earners’ who want to save money in higher-wage economies for future economic or cost-effective opportunities (i.e. buying land, buying a home, dowries, education costs, etc.). Unlike forced migration, economically motivated migration encourages policy makers to include temporary status or recognition of the willingness of migrants to return to their home country. However, it largely accounts for situations that include migrants who have intentions of returning home in order to be near family, a similar culture, and to live a more comfortable life financially. The other group of economically motivated migrants stays in a circular migration cycle, in which migrants will either leave and return, or attempt to have their spouses, family, or friends join them in the host country. Usually with childbirths and longer stays the latter group is generally more inclined to permanently settle.

The powerful and ever-changing dynamics of different migration processes can heavily affect policy makers’ resolutions as well as their pace of policy-based work. Initially, migrants
do not typically make a decision to migrate permanently or settle down for tens of years.
However, regardless of their legal status or original reason of migration; migrant communities eventually strengthen in number and become self-sustaining, which in turn makes it harder for governments to enforce new migration policies and encourage return. The idea that migration could potentially be turned on and off, like a switch, is not a realistic grasp of migration patterns historically. The anti-immigration parties in Europe that support the idea of a migration ‘kill switch’ are not considering the aforementioned points. Looking at the 20th and 21st century, there is a consistency that democratic countries with strong legal systems, such as those in Western and Central Europe, are unable to prevent temporary migration from turning into permanent settlements, and this needs to be addressed by future policy makers.

2.5 Labor markets and Migration: Comparison of Responses to the Syrian Refugee Crisis

According to the Pew Research Center (Figure 2), nearly six million Syrians are displaced within Syria (PRC 2018). Within Syria alone the International Displacement Monitoring Centre ranked it as the country with the highest number of IDPs worldwide in 2018 with at least 40% of its entire population displaced internally. The remaining Syrian population seeking asylum or refuge includes about five million people throughout the Middle East, and roughly one million people in Europe.

Between 2011 and 2014 nearly 12 million Syrians were either internally displaced or fled Syria due to the violent conflict between Bashar al-Assad and Syrian based forces. This conflict has sparked a serious refugee crisis that has significantly affected the communities in many countries, primarily in the Middle East, and as far as the Western hemisphere. This section will
examine the financial cost and burdens placed on Syrian refugee hosting countries, and how their varying policies and actions in response to the conflict have created either effective or ineffective results within their borders.

The Journal on Migration and Human Security assessed the policies and results of the United Kingdom, the United States, Sweden and Germany in response to the Syrian refugee crisis. In comparison to the Middle East, the actions and steps taken by European nations and the Western counterparts are relatively trivial given the actions and policies taken by countries such as Turkey, Jordan, Iran and Lebanon. Ostrand puts forward recommendations that would lighten the burden for countries in the Middle East, however, for this paper I will focus on the second recommendation that concerns how European countries can make a greater impact in the process of refugee resettlement and why there should be an increase in refugee resettlement according to the understanding of UNHCR data from 2014 (Ostrand 2015). Ostrand examines the policies and actions of the United Kingdom, the United States, Sweden and Germany due to the high number of annual asylum seekers that are accepted by the aforementioned countries. Although UNHCR reported that the United States ranks among the top five asylum receiving countries in the world, it is imperative to note that this does not include Syrian refugees.

2.6 European Response to Syrian Refugees

The Migration Policy Centre at the European University Institute, Florence, focuses their research on how migration affects European states. They reported in 2014 what procedures and recommendations European states should undertake regarding the Syrian refugee crisis. The paper includes three major routes and modes of transport that Syrian refugees who are fleeing the
region into Europe usually take. This includes, (1) a land route to Bulgaria or Greece, (2) an air route to an EU state, (3) a sea route to a Mediterranean Sea bordering state (i.e. Italy, Greece, Spain, etc.). In all likeliness, those choosing the air route typically have family abroad and are exercising their right to obtain a tourist or visiting visa. It is migrants who have no European connections that typically take sea or land routes to the nearest European state. The Syrians living within Europe then belong to one of three categories of migrants: (1) asylum seekers, (2) visiting travelers, and (3) irregular migrants (Fargues, et. al 2012). Unfortunately, the EU has focused a majority of their statistical resources on the first group. UNHCR has reported that given the magnitude of the Syrian conflict, the numbers of reported asylum cases in the EU are remarkably low. Below is a graph depicting the rise in asylum requests after the start of the conflict between 2011 and 2012.

![Figure 2.3: Syrian Nationals Applying for Asylum in Europe by Year and Quarter, 2010-2012](https://example.com/image.png)

(Source: Fargues, et. al 2012)
According to the Centre, the handful of countries in Europe that have experienced the impact of Syrian refugees the most are Germany and Sweden, with the UK and Austria following far behind yet ahead of the remaining European states. As Germany and Sweden are two of the European states that have dealt with a majority of Syrian asylum request, the rise of PRR groups in these countries will be compared next to states such as the UK and Austria. For the purpose of this paper, the UK will still be included as part of the European Union as the withdrawal agreement has been extended until October 2019 (Wheeler, et. al 2019).

2.6.1. Non-European Countries that Host the Most and Least Syrian refugees: Turkey and the United States

As mentioned, countries in the Middle East, particularly Turkey, receive and accept one of the largest numbers of Syrian refugees across the globe. This migration wave has left Turkey with economic, political, and social consequences as the number of Syrian refugees in Turkey climbed to 1.7 million in 2015 and later 3.6 million in May 2019 according to the government of Turkey (UNHCR Operation Portal).

In comparison to Turkey, North America lags in accepting Syrian refugees or asylum seekers. It is estimated that only 1% of displaced Syrians have been resettled in the North American continent. However, countries such as Canada and the United States have had very different experiences accepting displaced Syrians since the start of the conflict. Whereas Canada has accepted nearly 52,000 displaced Syrians since 2012, the United States has only accepted less than half this amount at an estimated 21,000 persons according to the Pew Research Centre.
2.7 The Syrian Conflict’s Effect on PRR Groups

Despite migration numbers to the EU dropping after 2015, the rise of populist leaders gained momentum in EU states (HRW 2019). Many of the growing political parties that hold anti-immigration views encourage methods that include fear of violence and economic issues for host countries, as well as sparking patriotism or nationalism in communities. The rise of these populist leaders was originally perceived to publicly undermine EU standings and objectives without affecting policy, however, more recently these rising political groups have slowly won seats at local and national elections and their influence in policy making at the national and European level must now be deliberated.

In 2018, the Human Rights Watch World Report disclosed that anti-immigration parties in countries including Italy, Hungary, and Austria continue to dominate the migration debate despite a decline in overall migration. These disagreements on how to handle migration issues within the EU have resulted in the blocking of agreements on EU asylum reforms and laws. These disagreements have directly affected the distribution and processing procedures for migrants and asylum seekers who enter the EU. Instead of moving forward with agreements, the focus has shifted to methods of keeping migrants and asylum seekers out of the EU. Many proposals from these countries supporting anti-immigration plans for the EU have included unrealistic and impractical measures, including problematic offshore processing, migration partnerships with non-EU states that typically have fewer resources to offer, unclear human rights records, and the inability to process claims.
Mostly due to problematic migration coordination, the Human Rights Watch reported that roughly 65,000 fewer people arrived to the EU in 2018 when compared to the registered arrivals in 2017. Regardless, some EU countries such as Belgium have continued their development of family immigration detention centers for migrant families, and instances of racist or violent hate crimes continue in Bulgaria, Slovakia, Spain, France, Greece, Hungary, Germany, Italy and the UK.

Despite numbers of Syrian migrants migrating to the EU dropping after 2015, the rise of populist leaders gained momentum in EU states (HRW 2019). Many of the growing political parties that hold anti-immigration views encourage methods that include fear of migrant violence and new economic issues in host countries, as well as sparking renewed patriotism or nationalism within communities no longer content with the sitting government, such as Poland’s populist government prior to 2018 and Germany’s AfD party as stated in their manifesto.

The rise of these populist leaders was originally perceived to publicly undermine EU standings and objectives without effecting policy, however, more recently these rising political groups have slowly won seats in local and national elections and their influence in policy making at the national and European level must now be considered.

2.8 Who Votes for PRR and Why?

According to research, supporters and condoners of many PRR parties justify their stance based on open or closed borders and immigration issues. Many far-right supporters are self-defined nationalists potentially threatened by international competition or globalization (Rooduijn 2015). The Eurosceptic position embraces their nativist view and it is undeniable that
the social and political situation of a country either diminishes or escalates support for such parties. The success of these parties relies on the legitimization of them in the media, politics, and society. The conversation and debate over relevant topics such as immigration, social changes, and unemployment has legitimized their status through political involvement so that any democratic state would be unable to turn them away. PRR parties have been around decades prior to the rise of far-right leaders and conflicts such as the Syrian War, however their rise only began in the 1990s and their global significance occurred in the 21st century. In Europe, the significance of these parties occurred after the 2014 elections for European Parliament. According to Matthijs, during this year Europe saw an average of 25% of votes supporting far right parties in the EU.

Before delving into why the populist anti-immigration radical right parties are relevant to the anti-immigration politics of the EU, it is important to clarify what types of parties fall into this category. In the 1990s and early 2000s there was an unclear labeling and a ‘gray area’ of what classifies a supporter of a far right populist group, so in 2004 a Dutch political scientist named Cas Mudde coined the term, ‘populist radical right’ as a catch all for political parties that incorporate xenophobic, anti-immigration, and nationalist appeal (Mudde 2007). Since 2007, this term is the conventional description and distinction between populist far right groups and other political parties in the realm of migration policy and international migration discussions. Mudde describes these groups as inherently nativist, identified as, ‘an ideology, which holds that states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group (“the nation”) and that nonnative elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogeneous
nation-state’ (Mudde 2007, 19). Which in turn would mean that immigrant communities and waves of migration would threaten the beliefs of these right-wing political groups.

Secondly, PRR groups characteristically are also interested in continuing or establishing a strict and orderly society via an authoritarian leader. This means that there is a heavy emphasis on law, order, and penalties for violations. Lastly, populism is a third pillar of PRR groups. In this case, populism within PRR groups reflects the exploitation of good people by an ‘evil’ elite. Often the ‘evil’ elite shifts around according to current political issues, and there is rarely a clear structure to who falls in this category and who does not, so political, economic, and social elite may all find themselves in similar situations at one point or another.

Although these three pillars are central to many PRR groups, a fourth pillar, which is key to European politics and policies, is the criticism of European unification and open borders. The Eurosceptic viewpoint fits into the PRR rhetoric and appeals to citizens who are more concerned with migration issues in recent news, particularly after the previously mentioned spike in migration in 2014-2015 after the Syrian conflict. This pillar believes many of a state’s or EU’s failures lay at the hands of bureaucratic leaders who do not have the citizens’ best interests at heart, and instead respond to the needs of other elitists. There are always exceptions, such as the Vlaams Belang party in Belgium that does not criticize European unification, so it is not an absolute requirement for PRR groups to be Eurosceptic, however, a majority hold this belief.

Another common, but not necessary, characteristic of PRR groups is the shared commonality of ‘othering’ elitist or capitalist groups. Vieten describers the term ‘othering’ as a
way to blame out-groups and as an, “ideological maneuver that obfuscates the real causes of economic crisis that lie within the tendencies towards periodical crisis within the social relations of capital itself” (p. 534, Vieten, et. al 2016). He describes PRR groups, specifically right-wing nationalist groups with anti-immigration platforms, as scapegoating the Other instead of the true cause of a migration crisis that is affecting a migrant-hosting state. He goes as far as to compare the parties’ obsessions with migration after the inception of the Syrian conflict with German propaganda where non-Jewish Germans blamed German Jews during 1930s German Nazism. Prior to German Nazism, in the 1920s communists and socialists were targets for economic and social blame within Germany. The blame put on wealthy or middle-class intellectuals in the 20th century has also found its way to 21st century political discourse among PRR groups. It is a cycle that repeats itself.

Vieten makes an excellent point describing how conflict or tragedy, such as financial recessions or violent warfare, can drastically change the course of politics allowing for PRR groups to rise in popularity. These dramatic shifts in a society may influence citizens, who otherwise would not support a PRR group, to shift their thinking and begin to agree with some of their ideologies. It is difficult for many people in the 21st century to grasp the idea of how Adolf Hitler could have risen to power and how his far-right populist group could have gained political seats in Germany, but it must be considered that Germany was suffering tremendously economically and jobs were scare. The German people were in a highly vulnerable situation allowing for an excellent opportunity for an authoritarian leader to step in as an innovative frontrunner by appearance.
2.9 Germany’s PRR Group- Alternative für Deutschland (AfD)

Between 2011 and 2017 over 500,000 Syrians travelled to Germany to seek asylum status, ranking it as the country with the fifth largest displaced Syrian population in the world (PRC 2018). However, the economic and migration issues that plagued so many nations in the 21st century affected Germany to a far lesser extent. Still many Germans have since begun to show their support for a withdrawal from many Eurozone related issues and the idea of having closed borders and a more rigorous migration process for incoming refugees and migrants has gained momentum. The Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) is Germany’s first Eurosceptic party that has steadily gained a larger fan base due to its core skepticism toward economic and social integration in Europe. The party claims that this skepticism is not in fact new, and it is only due to recent events that the German people are finally coming around to the idea of addressing negative impacts of migration and integration. Grimm argues that the rise of the AfD is not only because of recent migration flow, but also due to the lack of alternate political choice in the 2017 elections. European financial issues paired with conflict and migration flow into European states created a panic amongst German nationals, which ultimately led to AfD’s success in the 2017 election.

After the global economic crisis in 2008, the German economy continued to grow despite serious financial setbacks for other countries. The 2008 financial crisis left countries such as Turkey, Greece and Spain with severe debt, unemployment rates and housing market concerns, whereas Germany experienced some of the lowest impacts due to money lent to them from the international market. Despite Germany’s relative success after 2008, Eurosceptic sentiment still began to rise in the local and national levels (Grimm 2015). Although in 2019 there began a large
anti-immigration sentiment by the AfD, in the initial 2013 general elections the AfD gained 4.7% of the vote on issues such as the inefficiency of the euro as a single currency, as well as other bailout policies. Following the 2013 elections, in 2014 the AfD continued to rise in the polls with a 7% hold in the European Parliament. This election win meant AfD would send seven party members of the European Parliament to France.

It is important to note that regardless of the global or continental circumstances that contribute to the rise of anti-immigration rhetoric and parties, in Germany this was also a result of the decline in popularity for other mainstream political groups. The AfD successfully marketed their group as proof of a democratic deficit in Germany, and when other center or leftist groups criticized AfD policies and stances, the AfD used the conversation to shed light on the stigmatization of the radical right in a democratic Germany post-World War II. This concept that it is “them versus us” or the “big man versus the little man” naturally appealed to many people who felt neglected by German politicians in office and by established political parties. A 2009 representative survey in Germany found that over 75% of respondents were proud of the German heritage and were no longer plagued with guilt over their past history (Identity Foundation 2009). This survey represents what potential impact the return of national pride amongst German nationals can contribute to, including patriotism and nationalism. The AfD consistently uses words such as bravery and courage to promote party values, again appealing to Germans who feel neglected, unrepresented, and disempowered in German and European politics. Overall, the combination of a new sense of pride and patriotism alongside and dissatisfaction with German politics and the lack of options in elections created a strong platform for the AfD.
Since 2014, the AfD expanded its reach and established an updated manifesto written in both English and German. Many points are mentioned in the 2016 manifesto published online by the AfD party under Chapter nine entitled, “Immigration, Integration, and Asylum.” The AfD introduced the migration subject by initially mentioning that asylum and immigration in Germany are too based in political correctness and that negative developments in the field are not properly addressed (and instead covered up by ruling political parties). The AfD demands that freedom of speech to voice a controversial opinion be respected, and for Germany to begin concluding its global image as an immigrant safe haven. The AfD demands a tighter grip in Germany regarding the number of asylum seekers, free movement within the EU, labor related immigration, as well as overall immigrant integration (Alternative for Germany 2016). Although the AfD does not directly mention the Syrian conflict, they do make a point to highlight “a target of mass migration as seen in 2015,” referring to the wave of Syrian migrants in Germany. The AfD states that the current German and European asylum and refugee policies are unsuitable and unprepared to handle the mass migration that will continue from the African and Middle East region. Regarding asylum immigration, the AfD believes that if there is not an ongoing war in the country of origin, the migrant must leave Germany as their protected status will be terminated and they will receive no protection from Germany. Regarding migration policies, the AfD recommends that regional centers and shelters (i.e. neighboring countries) take care of migrants under UN and EU mandates.

If executed successfully, the AfD’s measures effecting migration policy and refugee resettlement includes stricter German border control whilst assisting in the development of regional centers and shelters for migrants fleeing conflict, verifying identities of migrants and
preventing political influence of quotas, to distinctly separate highly skilled immigrants with asylum seekers in the migration process.

The relationship between AfD’s proposed measures in the manifesto and organizations, such as the UN, who handle global migration issues now intersect on multiple levels. The AfD has proposed that the UN be reformed in its manifesto.

2.9.1. AfD and Right-Wing Party Voter Distribution

The figures that follow depict the (a) constituency seats won by party, followed by (b) the AfD share of vote, for the 2019 EU parliament election in Germany.
Figure 2.4: Constituency Seats Won by Party in the 2017 Election in Germany
(Source: The Federal Returning Officer 2019)
There is a well-defined relationship between the election results and the long-term effects of an East and West Germany despite reunification. Post-socialist conditions in east German states and the issues after reunification were not properly addressed thus creating the foundation
for AfD to thrive in the 2010s (Stenning, et al 2008). The severe unemployment rates at the time of reunification were never dealt with properly, and major companies to this day are not headquartered in the east German states. As population numbers have dwindled in the east, this is not the case in the west where the population is growing steadily. East German states that continue to rely on pre-reunification period jobs in a post socialist era, such as coal mining, have seen the highest numbers of AfD support. Unaddressed economic troubles paired with no established alternative for Germans in the eastern states have led to high numbers of AfD support.
The figures below depict the polarizing effect of an East and West Germany despite nearly thirty years passing since its reunification, and the contributing factors to the rise of the AfD in East Germany.

Figure 2.6: The Ratio of Foreigners Relative to the Total Population of Germany in 2011. (Source: Navigation und Service 2019), map by Rick Noack)
The low unemployment rate and fear of migration and foreign-born population in East Germany is a deeply rooted issue tracing back to the lasting effects of denazification and the fall of the Berlin wall. The aforementioned AfD manifesto addresses these specific issues that concern much of East Germany, including migration and economic recession, and are therefore able to attract voters and gain momentum. Ultimately, the results of these divides can be seen in the election results as depicted in the figure below, where NPD, a right-wing party, has gained more votes in East Germany than in West Germany.
2.10 Austria’s PRR Group- Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ)

As an EU member state, Austria has experienced many changes in its political landscape since 2015. In Austria, a new government coalition combined the values of two existing parties, namely the conservative Austrian People's Party (ÖVP) and the far-right Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ) (Kostic 2018). This new coalition primarily prides itself on addressing and solving the European refugee crisis stemming from Middle East conflicts throughout the 21st century. As a country weakened by conflict and still recovering from Nazi rule in the mid 20th century, the Austrian political party FPO began to rise in popularity in the 1980s (Betz 1993). Prior to this, the traditional political parties only included OVP and the Social-Democrats (SPÖ). It is due to
years of economic, political, and social changes that caused these two parties to fall from popularity. Between the 1960s and 1990s, polling of Austrian political allegiances and party support showed a continual decline in either support for peoples’ original parties, or many chose to answer that they did not support any party. By the 1990s, both parties had lost nearly one third of their supporters as confidence in elected officials began to end (Ulrike, et. al 2016).

Unlike Germany and Austria’s other European counterparts who have seen a rise in PRR groups, the FPO held positions of power prior to 21st century migration and conflict issues that sparked the popularity of these groups. The FPO controlled office in 2000-2007, and only resigned to the opposing moderate leaders after pressure from mild sanctions the party produced that had affected FPO’s popularity in Austria. It is important to include here that neither Germany nor other European countries such as the UK experienced a PRR group rise to power and hold office soon after World War II, so Austria is unique in the sense that PRR groups are not a new concept to state and society.

Similar to other European states, the rise of PRR groups is largely due to distrust and dissatisfaction of the current political establishment and response to issues, and in this case, the 1990s showed to be the opportune moment for a PRR group to rise to power.

The FPO rebranded itself and appealed to time sensitive and current issues in order to gain support and notice. At first, the FPO presented itself as a “youthful” and modern choice to the already established “old” parties. Countries such as Austria that have deep-rooted history and affiliation with the Nazi regime have typically tried to maintain a neutral status after 1955. However, after Austria joined the EU things began to shift, and the political establishment no
longer worried about the image of Austria within Europe. Despite EU warnings, Austria did not condemn or discipline far right FPO activities and eventually they gained votes and ministerial posts. In the late 1980s, Jorg Haider replaced Norbert Steger as FPO Chairman. It was not until Haider’s takeover of the FPO that foreigners in Austria became a central topic of discussion.

Prior to Haider, the “immigrant issue” was not a concern for FPO supporters (Pelinka 2017). Haider’s takeover of the FPO made way for one of the first examples of what is now common practice in PRR speech making. When referring to Austria’s Nazi past, Haider neither clearly condemned nor condoned it, and often made remarks that left much to the imagination with unclear intention or meaning. According to Pelinka, this method of ‘tiptoe’ speaking to address topics such as racial, religious, or migration issues allows for leaders to present their PRR group as a brand-new party to market, instead of an extension of an older, nationalistic political party, while not making clear offenses.
Chapter Three:

Methodology

3.1. Data Analysis of PRR Popularity in Germany and Austria through Maps

The methods used in this research study are conventional to geography, and consist of cartographic work, collection of government data, and an analysis of the result (Woolstencroft 1980). The maps used display basic geographic knowledge of the German and Austrian region and how the Syrian conflict has impacted the political landscape of these regions and their provinces through election results.

A total of four maps were used. One depicts AfD support in Germany prior to 2015, and the second depicts AfD support after 2015. Pre and post-2015 was chosen as the year that Germany experienced the largest migration wave of Syrians to date. The third map depicts FPO support in Austria prior to 2015, and the second depicts FPO support after 2015. Again, pre and post-2015 was chosen as the year that Austria experienced the largest migration wave of Syrians to date.

The following maps include data provided from the governments of Germany and Austria regarding their leading PRR parties and their percentage of support in each of their provinces prior to the 2015 Syrian migration wave, as well as after the 2015 migration wave.
Figure 3.1: German General Election Results for the AfD Party in 2013 (left) and 2017 (right) (Data sources: Govdata - Das Datenportal für Deutschland and Bundeswahlleiter 2017)
Figure 3.2: Results of the Austrian General Election in 2013 showing FPO Support (top) and 2017 (bottom)
(Source: Austrian Ministry of the Interior 2013 and 2017)
3.2 Data Analysis and Results

The clear differences pre and post-2015 display a spike in support of PRR groups, coming at time after mass migration of Syrians, and the rise of anti-immigration rhetoric. In both Austria and Germany, provinces lacking a national capital or a major, populous city were typically more supportive of PRR groups, whereas more urban cities or capital areas, including Berlin and Vienna, the support for PRR groups were at the lowest before and after 2015.

The said causes that have contributed to the rise of PRR groups in Germany and Austria are economic and historical divisions and events that have shaped regional support and influenced voters. They Syrian conflict did not create these divisions in Germany and Austria. The effects of the Syrian conflict on migration related debates and political discourse exists because of past tensions and divisions since the fall of Nazi Germany (including Austria), followed by the reunification of East and West Germany. These contributing factors have led to the current political state in both countries, where the AfD has gained significant support since 2013, and the FPO and OVP have also gained support in the 2017 election in Austria.
Chapter Four:
Analysis and Recommendations

4.1 Gastarbeiter (Guest Worker) Agreements Reapplied in the 21st Century

Germany and Austria have both previously experienced a wave of economically motivated migration, primarily the post-war "Gastarbeiter" Agreements (guest worker agreements) of the 1960s, which allowed low-skilled migrants from Eastern Europe and the Middle East to temporarily relocate to Germany, and some in Austria, to in turn help support the development of the economy (Schmid 1983). Although an economic crisis abruptly ended these bi-lateral agreements between Germany and guest worker supplying countries, the ongoing wave of migration in the 21st century in Germany has been re-initiated due to another external crisis.

A common debate circling countries experiencing mass migration flows, such as Germany, is whether migration encourages development for migrant receiving countries or, contrariwise, impedes such development. Furthermore, this argument has more or less created a bi-lateral debate between those who believe that migration eventually brings ‘brain gain’, growth, and prosperity to host countries, and those who believe that migration causes a ‘brain drain’ and destabilizes development by wearing human and financial resources in the host country. The policies of development economists in the 1950s and 1960s stressed that labor migration was not only integral, but also a positive part of modernization. Governments, like Germany, have considered migration as a key instrument that fosters economic development; therefore, they have previously signed agreements, such as the guest worker migration agreement.
It was not until the Oil Crisis of 1973 that a new wave of migration sentiments began to predominantly assert that migration undermined local economic prospects for successful development, and can instead lead to potential stagnation and dependency due to the burden of incoming migrants (Castles, et. al 2014). More or less, the current bilateral debate surrounding global politics has roots in past historical involvements, such as positive impacts of guest worker agreements and negative impacts of economic crises. These agreements can be modified and reinstated to support the influx of Syrian refugees in both Austria and Germany.

4.1.1 Guest Worker Agreements and Migration Policy Recommendations: Case of New Zealand

Labor markets play a central role in migration, and the impacts of economically motivated migration are felt in destination and origin countries alike. Employers and organized labor, alongside international actors and states, profoundly shape migration policies, particularly for temporary migrant worker programs, such as seasonal worker programs or guest worker agreements. Seasonal worker programs are increasingly playing a greater role in migration and development policies, and nearly all OECD countries have comparable working programs. Seasonal working programs are extremely unique because they inherently allow low-skilled workers to benefit from working temporarily in high-income countries. Countries with guest worker programs have included the United Kingdom, the Republic of Korea, Italy, and Canada; however, New Zealand’s Recognized Seasonal Employer (RSE) program was one of the first of these programs specifically designed with an economically progressive perspective.
The World Bank Development Research Group produced research regarding New Zealand’s approach to policy facilitation as conducted by aid agencies and the government throughout the RSE program. Similar to many working agreements in other OECD countries, the RSE program was created to meet New Zealand’s labor needs while simultaneously boosting economic development in the Pacific region. The data exhibits a high grade of complexity in worker movements with little displacement of New Zealand workers. The migrant workers were shown to be more productive than local workers, and additionally the migrant workers were shown to gain productivity after returning for the following seasons.

The RSE program is an exceptional example in calculating migration policy development and economic impact of workers agreements for this research, and the ILO has stated that the RSE program in New Zealand “could service as a model for other [migrant] destination countries.” (p.4). The rapid growth of horticulture and viticulture industries in New Zealand created the demand for migrant workers during a time when unemployment was relatively low in the country.

The negative impact of such programs included in the report included an annual loss of NZ$ 180-300 million due to lack of training and poor quality labor. An important factor in measuring cost of temporary workers programs must include policies that address these losses. The New Zealand government addressed this issue in 2004 by allowing temporary seasonal work permits for the 2005-2006 year, and by developing a hierarchy of countries, including a “New Zealanders first” standard (Gibson, et. al 2014).
If countries such as Germany and Austria responded to refugee and mass migration related economic concerns in similar ways, including guideline of past guest worker programs, then the placement of Syrians within EU states would be a win-win situation for both EU member state citizens, as well as Syrians. Although the guest worker model may be difficult to implement in a conflict situation instead of an economically motivated migration wave, this does not mean that elements of the guest worker model cannot be included in future policies. Germany and Austria would benefit from creating policies that allow Syrians to obtain visas for apprenticeship-like programs that will provide intensive training in areas including tourism, manufacturing, education, and more. Although it would be difficult to apply this model as a long-term solution, this would help Syrian migrants settle in Europe and provide them with a livable wage in the short term.

4.1.2 Skill Sensitive Recommendations for Future Migration Policies

The Rand corporation conducted a study researching mutually beneficial opportunities for Syrians in labor markets. The study is funded by the Qatar Fund for Development and was built on previous data provided by the UN, and the governments of Turkey, Jordan and Lebanon. Using interviews, surveys, and focus groups, the research has determined the existing skill sets of Syrian refugees and how to effectively incorporate them in the resettlement process while overcoming the burdens and limitations of some policies.

The study found that the biggest obstacles Syrians face in the job seeking and hiring process after resettlement are the reluctances of companies to pay the extra fees for sponsoring a foreign national. This causes major issues for Syrians, because those with higher skillsets end up
working illegally at lower skill jobs for lower wages, thus creating the poverty cycle associated with refugees displaced abroad (Kumar, et. al 2018). Therefore, of the biggest problems with EU and UN policies alike, are that they focus too much on short-term humanitarian aid and assistance, and not enough on long-term resettlement and job opportunities for Syrians. For example, in Turkey although efforts to start vocational programs to transition Syrian refugees into the workforce have begun, as of 2018 only 200,000 of the 3.6 million registered refugees have taken part in such programs. This means in Turkey only about 5% of Syrian refugees have successfully completed a vocational program, leaving the remainder 95% without marketable skills or job opportunities.

According to the Rand corporation, Syrian refugees abroad mainly work low skill, low wage jobs, and a majority of them are not using their professional skills after resettlement abroad. Discrimination, legal status, language barriers, alongside other hitches complicates job opportunities for refugees, and migration programs provided by EU member states and the UN must address professional roadblocks after resettlement. In future policy development, it is vital that policy makers prioritize Syrian skill sets and provide adequate programs that will ease them into German and Austrian societies. Policies should include apprenticeships or accelerated training programs in areas such as medicine, education, business, and tourism that would benefit refugees seeking a stable wage in a known career, while they provide marketable skills in both countries.
4.2 Private Funding of Refugee Resettlement: Case of Canada

While the rise of right-wing populist parties that espouse anti-immigration and populist views is the cause of multiple events, there rise during the peak of the European migration crisis fundamentally altered the way in which refugee resettlement can be approached.

For example, during the conflict in Bosnia in 1991 and 1992, many European countries handled the events quite differently, with the mainstream public discourse sympathizing with the large number of refugees coming in a short period of time. The current crisis has diverged far from being viewed as a national, but solvable crisis. Instead the Syrian conflict overlapped with civil strife across the Middle East, North Africa, West Africa, and Sub-Saharan Africa. Civil wars, insurgencies, and economic problems led many to head to Europe for stability and security. This altered the conversation that was being held about refugees, as they were considered a small part of a larger wave of “economic migrants.” Specific events that occurred throughout Western Europe around 2015 drove public opinion against refugees and migrants. Coupled with some European countries refusing to allow many refugees, and building fences to divert the traditional flow through the Balkans and into Western Europe, some nations like Canada altered their methods to a far more proactive refugee resettlement method.

Privately sponsored refugee programs appear to be the best viable option for both refugees and policy makers. The model was first developed in the 1970s in Canada following the Indochina refugee crisis, which left approximately 1,000,000 people displaced. Between the years 1969 and 1970, Canada resettled approximately 60,000 people, with around half of which being sponsored privately by Canadians. Since its inception, the program has resettled
approximately 280,000 people. Canada requires individuals or sponsorship groups to register as privately sponsored refugees (PSR). These PSR’s provide refugees with helping them find a place to live, provide financial support, provide emotional support, and give food and clothing (Government of Canada 2018).

The PSR method has also stayed relatively popular amongst Canadians despite there being relatively negative discussions of refugee and migrant groups in the Canadian media, alongside international media. PSR appears to be more successful in integrating refugees better than Government Assisted Refugees numbers wise. Additionally, it has been successful at unifying families. When accepting families, the Canadian government recognizes only a nuclear family with, “up to two adults and their non-adult children.” Privately sponsored refugees can work to provide resettlement to other refugee family members that might have not been resettled otherwise (Hyndman, et. al 2017).

While some have argued that private refugee sponsorship removes the responsibility of governments to assist in refugee aid and resettlement, countries in Europe have shown that relying on the goodwill of these governments is a slow and risky process.

Parties who espouse PRR ideologies have won many seats in European national governments, the EU Parliament, heads of national governments, and ran candidates who have come close to victory for offices of President or Prime Minister. Therefore, privately sponsored refugees can lessen the false burden many anti-immigrant and anti-refugee parties espouse, primarily the economic burden and their arguments against integration of refugees. The victory
of anti-immigrants and anti-refugee parties in Europe tend to be unpredictable, therefore the international community must temporarily not rely on the good will of opposing PRR groups as it has done in the past. By being conscious of the negative reactions amongst the populace of these host countries, international organizations and NGOs can help resettle and help integrate refugees in larger numbers more successfully.
Chapter Five:

Conclusion

The research and analysis of previous and current migration issues that have directly affected Germany and Austria in the 20th and 21st century were taken into account, alongside methods of geographical study to determine if PRR groups are a result of mass migration after major conflicts, and how their political influence can be contended with the recommendations provided in this paper. The results from this paper show a distinct rise of PRR support in both Germany and Austria, as well as other European states, after the start of the Syrian crisis and directly after migration peaked in both countries.

The results of this research can assist international organizations, primarily including the UN, as well as government bodies, NGOs, and private organizations, to contribute to the refugee crisis to combat the rise of ineffective PRR migration rhetoric and policies. For future policy and academic research, it would be advisable to invest time and capital in developing long-term, economic goals that are viable for Syrian refugees who have resettled abroad, instead of solely focusing on short-term, humanitarian efforts.

Although there has been significant progress in assisting refugees, asylum seekers, and all other migrants fleeing conflict, we hope to learn from the impact and consequences of previous conflicts and policies, particularly in Germany and Austria, so that past policies and practices do not repeat themselves.
References Cited


