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Church, Country, Culture: How Three Aspects of Authoritarianism Predict Support for Donald Trump

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Church, Country, Culture: How Three Aspects of Authoritarianism
Predict Support for Donald Trump

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ABSTRACT

In the American bipartisan system, ideologies and beliefs create political views that sort voters between two groups. Political sorting increases polarization based on cultural preferences for an in-group that become ethnocentric views, which develop into ethnocentric cultural politics. I present an augmented concept of authoritarianism in America that encompasses sorting based on aspects of political belief, encapsulating sources of polarization and cultural attachments to political associations.

I develop the argument that authoritarianism is the result of political attachment to identities that feed off one another as individuals identify with an in-group, such as a party platform. My central theory is based around the political preferences for cultural "oneness and sameness", found to be a driving force of social sorting leading to polarization based on similar political preferences. I convey the maximum likelihood of authoritarian based sorting as a deciding factor for presidential vote, using by logit regression and frequency tables.

The findings reveal a higher likelihood that the Republican Party has become increasingly Authoritarian due to cultural sorting reliant on aspects of world view preferences. The findings particularly raise concern regarding what it means to be American between sorted groups. Applying an ethnocentric perspective to the theory of political sorting a culturally cohesive method of studying authoritarian behavior can be further developed.

Keywords: Authoritarianism, Authoritarian Dynamic, Polarization, Political Sorting, Ethnocentrism, Cultural Politics

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LITERATURE REVIEW

Vast research has explained the historical and sociological approaches to identifying authoritarianism in the United States. Multiple theories detail the extent that authoritarianism is involved in political behavior in varying ways. I approach authoritarianism as a collective of behavioral facets, as suggested by Karen Stenner in "Authoritarian Dynamic", however I apply nuance concerning cultural ties congregated within the bipartisan system through social sorting. Combining the insights from Hetherington and Weiler's "Authoritarianism and polarization in American politics", and the cultural concepts of Liliana Mason's "Uncivil Agreement", I convey how social sorting is the embodiment of polarization. Specifically, social sorting that is based on constituents' affinity for their own cultural norms, which I explain leads to higher likelihood of polarization to the design suggested by Abramowitz.

A synthesis of research that collectively conveys various conditions of polarization, the political environment necessary for authoritarianism to expand in the U.S. has been more prevalent in the past two decades than previously credited. Research has shown variables that reflect authoritarian disposition to be racial prejudice, a literal belief in the bible, negative stances on gay rights issues, and unfavorable views on immigration. Using this concept of authoritarianism, a frame in which the varying explanations and aspects of authoritarianism adjoin to drape across the political landscape, I build on a cultural concept of authoritarianism.

Plethora of research states authoritarianism is about maintenance of social order. Specifically, a social order that is structured by a confined world view. Regarding the behavior of voters, authoritarianism is about striving to maintain this order, while affirming worldviews at times when citizens are especially uncertain or fearful. When either party is seeking to maintain order, it leads to cultural division through the reciprocal processes of sorting between party platforms based on worldview preferences of constituents. If authoritarian voters pursue a

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political in-group that is morally akin to theirs, it is easy to see how Authoritarianism could be congregated by shared cultural sentiments. Additionally, authoritarian behavioral types are designated as social conformists, by Hetherington and Weiler as they identify "moral traditionalism" as a key division in American politics when discussing partisan differences "that run to their core" (P.27).

On page 32 Hetherington and Weiler explain that "the clustering of preferences" has produced "better sorted" constituencies. If authoritarians seek groups to impose their view of order on a disorderly world, regarding issues such as gay rights or abortion, constituencies will have more reason to divide due to opinion on social issues. Thus, research suggests the possibility that authoritarians could naturally gravitate to one partisan identity given the opportunity. I link this concept with the authoritarian dynamic to further develop the idea that culturally prejudice issue stances shaped social sorting in the early stages of an authoritarian political evolution in the United States.

Research collectively shows multiple points in history leading up to the 2000s that offered necessary context for sorting along racially derived lines to occur. On page 43 Hetherington and Weiler differentiate between "high and low authoritarian" types. People who are "high authoritarians" are indicated as holding a higher need for order with much more prejudice and those that are "low authoritarians" have a greater capacity for tolerance, which allows for a more nuanced approach to policy by low authoritarians producing a more inclusive platform particularly on the left. It appears lesser authoritarian individuals should be expected to more easily express and support abstract ideas of policy representation, which plays a pivotal role in an identity centered conceptualization of authoritarianism. If social issues drive

authoritarian disposition in the U.S., then the issue environment is fulfilling the conceptual parameters of "situationism", regarding political interaction with attachment to cultural morals.

Lilliana Mason's "Uncivil Agreement" succinctly makes the connection between polarization and cultural identities, and I use this work to convey the impact sorting has on the process of developing cultural facets into authoritarian predictors. Mason describes how "in-group vs out-group" preferences can amplify the extent that opposing groups are predisposed to engage in conflict. She offers a powerful example detailing the interactions that took place between two groups of boys at a social experiment posing as a summer camp, at the beginning of "Uncivil Agreement", where the two groups of boys begin to war with each other within a week of being made aware of the other groups existence.

Mason corroborates the impact of issue evolution over the 2000s, as the notion of identity based social sorting is derived from the development of an ideological identity. Identity-based sorting is the framework for my investigation of cultural attachment to politics and the progression of these attachments into authoritarianism. The concept that sorting exacerbates the potential for authoritarian congregation is strengthened by a quote from page 40 of "Uncivil Agreement" "subjective feelings of attachment are important indicators in the trend of social sorting", which I believe further supports the proposed increase of authoritarian priming in the U.S. Authoritarian dispositions are activated as individuals identify with an in-group, such as ethnic identity, which may work in congruence with political identity to amplify authoritarian movements.

Racially affiliated sorting has been shown to influence voters' behavior by (Kam and Kinder 2012) concerning ethnocentrism in the American Presidential Election of 2008, however I present that ethnocentrism was not simply a short-term force in 2008 but has been developing

into a forceful factor influencing 2016 voting as well. I do not insinuate that in the lowest rung of racially derived cueing in just the Obama vote did sorting take place, but rather racial sorting came to an impasse following Obama's primary victory in 2008 that shaped the nature of political sorting we are experiencing today. As sorting has taken place over the decades issue environments have made authoritarian social concerns more salient. Issue salience has brought about constant prompt for social sorting and the investigation of different authoritarian behaviors. In considering these behaviors Hetherington and Weiler found that in 2000 "Republicans who defected from Bush were 14 points less authoritarian" and then in 2004 "Democrats who defected to Bush were about 15 points higher authoritarians than Kerry Democrats". Additionally, Clinton supporters had previously shown higher authoritarian attitudes by favoring jailing and deporting practices regarding immigrants, as well as torture shown to already (P.175).

Combining these findings with inclusion of work by (Jackman and Vavreck 2008) used to show that prior to the 2008 primary Hillary Clinton supporters already harbored more racial resentment than Obama supporters, which is another calling card of authoritarian disposition. Continuing this concept, as racially derived sentiments more than played a role in support for either Hillary Clinton or lack of support for Barack Obama, as suggested by Hetherington and Weiler (P.188). Thus, with Obama winning the primary in 2008 the issues of race and immigration ignited the impulses of presumably higher authoritarian members to leave the Democratic party. This historical event created a realignment in social sorting, one that would lead to an even greater congregation of authoritarian predispositions.

Perhaps some of the previously leftist authoritarians would return to the Democratic Party when Hillary was the Democratic candidate in 2016, but it is likely most authoritarians that had

defected to the right stayed with the Republican party finding a more suitable political base. The specific authoritarians that split away from the democratic party would presumably have been majority higher authoritarian to respond so negatively to Obama's victory. If we assume a cultural identity-based attachment to salient issues touted by the Republican Party platform, it stands to reason that this was a more appealing "in-group" for authoritarians given the rigid parameters of belonging in American identity. The political action involved in cultural issue changes in political environment is credited with heightening polarization and expanding on the idea that cultural attachments to authoritarian dispositions act as a driver for social sorting leading to polarization. If high authoritarians and lower authoritarians that were previously leaners, are simultaneously wielding an identity aligned with party and American ancestry it stands to reason polarization would continue to increase.

Cultural differences incorporated into Mason's argument with the inclusion of 2012 TiVo analytics which found that there were zero show overlaps between the top 20 show list of Democrats compared to that of Republicans (P.43). In fact, it is found that Duck Dynasty viewing was a better predictor of presidential support for Trump as the nominee in 2016, while Family Guy viewing was a predictor for supporting Hillary Clinton. Cultural differences noted by mason can be summed up linearly thinking about the differences in "Red vs Blue states" using the example that partisans "come from and create different kinds of families". Democrats and Republicans sorting across many sectors of society rings true in multiple aspects of consumer culture, which naturally involve the implications of political attachment.

Mason pulls research from Marilynn Brewer which states, "when multiple identities align people are less tolerant, more biased, and feel angrier at people in their out groups" P. 61. Using this type of identity-based hierarchy of behavior brings to prominence identity driven prejudice.

Identity-based prejudice then catalyzes the potential for cohesion of authoritarian sentiments as "partisan identities fall into alignment with other social identities, stoking intolerance" P.63. Presenting a connection from the well sorted partisans and the cultural alignments that produce political environments that would be more likely to activate authoritarian dispositions. Using logit method, Mason proved to be directive in my research, with the development of a "social identity scale" on P.66. Moreover, Mason notes on page 85 that aligned identities exhibit more anger in political contexts, which alone serves as a flag for Authoritarian disposition.

Returning to "authoritarianism and polarization" on page 195, Hetherington suggest that ordinary Americans are better sorted and not authoritarians, but I take a different account. I assert that the observed sorting displays the priming of the authoritarian dispositions present in U.S. politics as higher and lower authoritarians congregate further. If threat activation is needed for the authoritarian dynamic to present, then cultural sorting creates a greater "in-group" identity alignment concerning political actions. Essentially, this synthesis of literature suggests that sorting has created polarization because of culturally based politics in a reciprocal cycle, which leads to an increased authoritarian disposition overlaying the American electorate.

Other works have highlighted increased party loyalty, such as "Peak Polarization" by Abramowitz, which suggests the rise of affective polarization has followed party system changes that mirror political attitudes. My concept of authoritarianism further develops the notion of "politics as warfare" offered by using abortion as the starting point for divisive politics in the 1980s. Abramowitz draws a similar conclusion as Liliana Mason when mentioning that partisan ideological consistency has increased from 1972 to 2020, marking a considerable decline in swing voters. He also notes that in recent years democrats moved sharply to the left and republicans have moved steadily to the right, which corroborates the conglomeration of research

on sorting. Disagreements across essentially every policy issue are designated as problematic reflections of polarization by multiple works on social sorting.

High levels of partisan polarization have increased the sense of threat and disagreement, with the acceptance of political information mainly favoring the perceived partisan source. Even among the least educated and least interested, partisanship has risen as the primary factor of political behavior, which shows an increased sentiment of partisan in-group association. Specifically, republicans have skewed further to the right than democrats have to the left, indicating it is even more likely that republicans harbor a denser congregation of higher authoritarian personality types within their ingroup. The findings in "Peak Polarization" corroborate the general concept that product of partisan ideological consistency as lead to the rise of affective polarization.

A point that when applied to the field of research on social sorting prompts concerns over the potential for authoritarianism to become more embodied in American politics.

HYPOTHESES

Hypothesis 1

Trump voters will have a higher likelihood to believe religion is an important part of life than Biden voters.

Hypothesis 2

Trump voters will have a higher likelihood for American identity to be an important part of life.

Hypothesis 3

Trump voters will exhibit higher likelihood to believe immigration raises crime.

METHODS

I framed my research question around the response variables cited by research as being associated with authoritarian responses. From the differences on abortion, gay marriage, racial opinions, and immigration there is a guide to dissecting the likelihood of authoritarianism by analyzing the ratio of responses regarding cultural issues that provoke intolerance. Using the guidebook of the ANES 2020 Time Series Survey, I looked over every question to decipher the type of investigation possible to develop a cultural concept of authoritarianism in the United States. I selected specific ANES 2020 questions based on religious importance, traditional family values, and world views on immigration because I believe these cultural parameters can be as predictive of presidential vote as party ID.

Approaching previous concepts of authoritarianism with a psychosocial lens, I coded the variables indicative of authoritarian traits into an index-based theme of authoritarian behavior. I placed presidential vote as my dependent variable to cast a wide net, capable of modeling various types of identity association present in voter behavior, to apply the potential cultural overlay of authoritarianism. Presidential vote was reduced to only the main party candidates (Trump and Biden) to meet the dichotomous standards of logit regression, shown in Appendix B.

I chose logit regression because identity-based affiliations do not act in singularity but rather, they are confounding variables existing in a swirl of cultural norms. I adapted the model Mason built to predict the spread of anger sentiments using logit regression into a model that would define the cultural rigidity of political attachments, or in-groups. Designs such as this can be adapted to create a predictive method of mapping political behavior across cultural attachments. I removed all feeling thermometer questions from my dataset to allow a more

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succinct method of recoding responses, in addition to the fact that feeling thermometer responses have been used in other research.

Adjusting to mostly post-election questions for the indexed variables in the logit regression, I preemptively alleviate some extraneous variables present due to drop out and uneven responses in some of the questions that may be relevant in future research. I ultimately chose my variables based on the number of responses accepted by the ANES staff. Some of the pre-election questions were derived from web only interviews and subjected to interviewer opinions of meaningful answers, leading to some questions having an abnormally small amount of responses.

The variables I focus on are:

(American Identity = *AMID*)

(American Customs=*AMCUST*)

(Speaking English = *ENGLISHIMP*)

(American Ancestry = *AMANCESTRY*)

(Rural vs urban = *RURBAN*)

(Strong leader in politics = *LEADER*)

(Political compromise is selling out ones principles = *PCOMP*)

(Minorities should adapt = *MINORADAPT*)

(Majority should rule = *MAJORITY*)

(Importance of religion to respondents identity = *RELIMP*)

(Literal belief the bible in the world of God = *BIBLE*)

(Religious identification = *RELID*)

(Immigration takes away jobs = *IMMJOB*)

(Illegal immigration increases the crime rate = *IMMCRIME*)

(Immigration harms culture = *IMMHARMCULT*)

(Blacks should work their way up = *BWORKUP*)

(Past discrimination and slavery have made it more difficult for black people = *PASTDISCRIM*)

(Black people would be better off if they tried harder = *BTRY*)

I made these variables dichotomous by collapsing the responses into more regression friendly 0/1 responses, shown in Appendix C. I based each index on aspects of authoritarianism noted by Hetherington and Stenner that cite the inclusion of issue preferences regarding immigration, racial, political, traditional family values, gay rights, religious, and cultural values.

Indexes

gen polauthism=leader+pcomp+minoradapt+majority

gen relindex=relimp+bible+relid

gen cultauthindex=amid+amcust+englishimp+amancestry+rurban

gen immthreat=immjob+immcrime+immharmcult

gen racialauthism=bworkup+pastdiscrim+btry

The indexes were then included in the final logit model with *EDUCATION, PARTYID,* and *RURBAN* serving as control variables. I regress the indexes with presidential vote. Each of these analyses and tables I include in Appendix A.

By applying cultural difference to choices between party platforms as reflected by presidential vote, assumptions can be made about cultural dynamics that are affiliated with Authoritarian world views.

RESULTS

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Iteration 0:    log likelihood =  -3940.786
Iteration 1:    log likelihood = -2305.0829
Iteration 2:    log likelihood = -2238.2134
Iteration 3:    log likelihood = -2237.4203
Iteration 4:    log likelihood = -2237.4202

Logistic regression                        Number of obs    =       5,791
                                           LR chi2(8)       =     3406.73
                                           Prob > chi2      =      0.0000
Log likelihood = -2237.4202                Pseudo R2        =      0.4322
```

presvote	Coef.	Std. Err.	z	P>|z|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
polauthism	.3369999	.0362524	9.30	0.000	.2659466	.4080533
cultauthindex	.1745528	.0381346	4.58	0.000	.0998104	.2492953
relindex	.1971372	.0256423	7.69	0.000	.1468791	.2473953
immthreat	1.43939	.0531483	27.08	0.000	1.335221	1.543559
racialauthism	.5090983	.050576	10.07	0.000	.4099711	.6082254
partyid	.6653628	.0445261	14.94	0.000	.5780933	.7526324
education	.0016793	.0036523	0.46	0.646	-.0054791	.0088376
rurban	.3816899	.0867757	4.40	0.000	.2116127	.5517671
_cons	-6.112042	.1883702	-32.45	0.000	-6.481241	-5.742843

The results suggest that the maximum likelihood of authoritarianism to account for

presidential vote was strikingly high in 2020. Furthermore, a higher likelihood for authoritarian

dispositions to reside in the Republican Party, as shown by frequency tables for responses

associated with authoritarian behaviors. Everything is statistically significant except for

education, which I suggest simply implies the amount of change in access to education across

demographics and the cultural effect of sorting rather than education serving as a heavy

predictor. It is prudent to mention that education no longer serves as definite of a predictor of

presidential vote as it has in the past, presumably with so many changes in college attendance

and informational access among voters. Table A9: Frequency distribution of education level

sorted by PRESVOTE

In analyzing these results, the first thing that shows a highly predictive value for

authoritarianism is the religious index allowing the acceptance of hypothesis 1. The identity

authoritarian index coefficients support hypothesis 2 and the immigration index supports

hypothesis 3. Reiterating that the likelihood of dispositional authoritarianism in favor of Trump voters in every index is displayed in the voter distribution in each frequency table shown in APPENDIX A.

The higher ratio of Trump Voters that believe religion is an important part of life lends itself to the argument that the religion of the in-group would be the one that is most important, which is playing out in current political climate with abortion. Reflecting the likelihood of a Trump supporter identifying with religion as an important part of life is "Table A1: Frequency of *RELIGIMPOR* by *PRESVOTE*". The opinion preferences for gay rights services shown in Appendix A by the Frequency table "Table A2: Frequency of *SERVSSCOUPL* by *PRESVOTE*" where liberals are more politically authoritarian when seeking to require service of a business concerning gay rights. This is representative of a leftist cultural authoritarian action in the belief to require services by Biden supporters. Simultaneously showing that Trump Voters are more Authoritarian in a traditional sense with traditional family/religion values in mind. In conjunction with "Table A5" measuring frequency of traditional family values responses and "Table A4" measuring frequency of respect over independence as a child trait shows a traditional authoritarian anchor from previous research in the 20th century.

Another support for Authoritarianism is shown in table "Table A3" as the belief that immigration will increase the crime rate is classically authoritarian by Stenner and, Hetherington and Weiler supports the out-group functioning of cultural politics. The low tolerance of difference decreases the acceptance of immigration statuses and produces more reason to gravitate toward an ingroup for support in this stance. An additional support for authoritarian behavior intertwined with culture relating to childrearing studies shown in "Table A4" and taken from a portion of the research that Stenner based her investigations around.

There is a higher ratio of trump voters agreeing that American Identity is an important part of life which shows alignment of cultural influences that are deemed American, frequency table "Table A6". American ancestry "Table A12" is important to show the ethnographic acceptance in this alignment and becomes concerning when considering the alignment of identities with the response to threat about the party.

Even at a more even split than other distributions, this displays that nearly one third of Trump supporters believe that the will of the majority should overrule the will of the minority, as opposed to one sixth of Biden supporters. The political authoritarian index was probably driven largely by this factor shown in frequency table "Table A7", which is likely confounded by "Table A6" addressing the frequency of belief that it being American is important to identity with a ratio strongly leaning to Trump voters.

Attachments to American identity and traditional family values are predominantly congregated within Trump supporters and the Republican party, as shown by the frequency distributions in Appendix A. As such these results show Trump voters, to a higher ceiling than Biden supporters, harbor an authoritarian disposition. However, there are still varied proportions of authoritarian responses among Biden voters. Specifically interesting are aspects of leftist authoritarianism, which seems to be driven by their preference for political change on worldviews. In other words, "leftist authoritarians" appear to be more concerned with absolute political change regarding their worldview preferences concerning minority rights. A view of this nature would likely lead to additional identity threat as democrats seek to make vast changes to gender norms and other traditionally harbored cultural aspects. As aspects that are more heavily tied to the politics of the right leaning "higher authoritarians" become more salient the authoritarian dispositions from both left and right ingroups likely become more activated.

Control Variables

Party ID serves as the simplest control variable to relate to the concept of sorting since it is the identification parameter that cultural sorting is aligned. Meaning that party ID could be expected to outperform models of authoritarian dispositions due to the increase in straight ticket voting noted by many, including Burge. However, party ID would encompass aspects of political affiliation derived from implicit notions of the in-group.

Education is no longer the predictor it once was, as many aspects of policy and academic progression has increased collegiate attendance. Furthermore, I believe the sheer expansion of degree programs that intermingle students from different backgrounds could have a suppressing effect on educations predictive validity. Perhaps a deeper analysis of types of degrees incurred would serve as a better predictor than education level alone. Additionally education level could be combined with other variables that are solely demographic based, such as gender and income, to reconsider the methodology around democratic backsliding for use in future research.

Rural vs Urban dwelling is also not the sign of authoritarianism that it once was, but it is still predictive of authoritarianism. Rural life and urban life differ on many levels, much to tune of policy disagreements between partisans, as environment constructs cultural parameters. While location impacts issue environment differently as population grows and media adopts salient issues, it would seem logical for areas that were once rural to remain with more of a rural cultural affiliation, even with a growth shift to a more urban environment. The respondent distribution among rural and nonrural shown in "Table A10" is more even than expected regarding presidential vote, but this shows the changing norms and environment of cultural attachments to changing issue differences. As I argue that cultural attachments are becoming blurred in some of the more traditional research assumptions pertaining to authoritarianism.

Nonetheless this still sides with a traditional expectation of authoritarian distributions with more than half of Trump supporters coming from rural areas, while 60 percent of Biden supporters are either suburban or city dwellers.

It appears the potential of cultural attachment to politics may exacerbate situational threats to identity, as shown by overlapping or stacking of cultural "norms" shown by the frequency tables. The frequency of responses on American identity and American ancestry displays the priming power of cultural cohesion, due to sorting. The main concern over this style of investigation and analysis is that the model may be sorely overfit. There could be far too many confounding variables that are raising the likelihood of Authoritarian congregation and the predictability of the model. However, I believe that this can be alleviated by further research that seeks to understand the diffusion of political belief. Cultural attachments and in-group relations may serve as the pathways for information diffusion, which may detect the level of belief in political threat.

DISCUSSION

My research indicates that the way constituent congregations respond to issue preferences confirms the situational environment needed for authoritarian political surges in the name of protecting cultural identity. The cultural affiliations to traditional family values, minority rights of every kind, and American identity responses are all points of political turmoil in American politics resulting in an aggravated political climate. It appears the assumptions and insinuations about who participates in "American culture" has generated a conformist alliance in Trump supporters that also happen to share increasingly Authoritarian values, due to sorting over the previous two decades. However, I acknowledge this is not an exact illustration of what will always beget authoritarian embodiment, instead a result of "in-group vs out-group" sentiments that result in increased polarization in American politics.

The implication that each political side needs to vanquish the other side perpetuates the belief that culture wars must be rectified instead of lived with in political environments. It is of utmost importance to continue to decode the interaction between political identity and cultural heuristics to continue to develop policy plans that will better understand how individuals can be persuaded in the contemporary media market. Authoritarianism does not act in individuality, nor does polarization, but political sorting confined within bipartisan representation does produce a more authoritarian congregation on one side, as higher authoritarians choose one partisan group over the other. However, it is still poignant to note that 2016 and 2020 are potentially harbingers of future election years, as the GOP seems on course to continue harboring authoritarian dispositions at a higher rate than other political groups.

From institutional ethnography to social media the harnessing of a new Authoritarian concept could serve a groundbreaking role in understanding the behavioral interactions of

cultural heuristics and political beliefs. Perhaps the political justification of division points to the bipartisan system under the responsible party model for increased sorting, as cultural worldviews become uniformly detached from one another. Essentially, many differences make up each person, yet we align voters tightly in the bipartisan system simplifying self-sorting. Issue preferences formed around race, gender, safety, and security illustrate the difference between symbolically laden political stances and the programmatic realities of social turmoil.

Ultimately, American bipartisanship may be uniformly creating authoritarian political behaviors that are responsible for violent responses derived from attachment to political associations that beget character attributions. A point which calls to future research to investigate the covariation of negative partisanship and authoritarian predispositions. In the frame of "Follow the Leader" by Gabriel Lenz the contextual suggestion that leaders simultaneously signify cultural inclusion and virtue coding, in conjunction with issue stance, by appealing to the constituents concerns to collect votes.

In such a manner the affiliation of Trumpism and a true American identity would compound the affective response of authoritarian predisposition on the political right. Furthermore, I believe that the sorting and authoritarian cuing from elites mixed with the attachment to the identity of "being more American" than "others" could predict violent or aggressive behaviors by antagonizing the perception that the in-group needs to be protected. My research collectively suggests application of behavioral action of a constituency more predisposed for authoritarianism forms a post hoc prediction for the January 6th.

When we consider the interplay of elites and the representation of threat in times of emotional amplitude, polarizing beliefs may trigger other polarizing beliefs. Issue clusters adopted by polarized constituents leads to a conjoined politic regardless of policy stance, as a

group grows from similar virtues. As I mentioned previously, research states authoritarians are norm maintainers, or in other words cultural boundary maintainers. So, sorting based on authoritarian traits would in-of-itself lead to a party of "oneness and sameness" within the ultimate "in-group", such as a political party.

Applying the general concept of democratic backsliding to this research provokes some interesting questions regarding future research. To what degree does social norms impact the belief that threat is prevalent? Do political groups appropriately apply the will of citizens, or do they overreach creating a warring mentality, volleying rigid policy demands from side to side? Collectively applying conceptual arguments in the theorization of authoritarianism, I suggest future research considers how the diffusion of cultural politics in a highly sorted manner could lead to specific political beliefs of negative partisanship and nationalism, as these are the next steps from authoritarianism.

Qualitative research offers the methods needed to find explanations for the dissemination of information and belief. Potential for qualitative analysis to explain the surge in the diffusion of belief that democrats are anti-American could prove monumental in predictive modeling of violent behaviors. Cultural identity and the formulation of American values that highlight characteristics of industrial prowess, warring influences, religious pervasiveness, and the need for national unity create a worrying framework for political environment. My research suggests an imperative need to develop a more complete understanding of authoritarianism in contemporary America, as society presumably seeks peace and progress, free from prejudicial behaviors.

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APPENDIX A: FREQUENCY TABLES AND REGRESSION RESULTS

```
RECODE of
      pres
(PRE-POST:    RECODE of religimpor
   SUMMARY:    (PRE: Is religion
      2020     important part of R
Presidenti      life [revised])
  al vote) | Not Impor  Important |    Total
-----------+----------------------+---------
     Biden |    1,598      1,934  |    3,532
     Trump |      483      2,094  |    2,577
-----------+----------------------+---------
     Total |    2,081      4,028  |    6,109
```

Table A1: Frequency of RELIGIMPOR sorted by PRESVOTE

```
RECODE of
      pres
(PRE-POST:
   SUMMARY:    RECODE of servsscoupl
      2020      (PRE: Services to
Presidenti     same sex couples)
  al vote) |   Refuse     Require |    Total
-----------+----------------------+---------
     Biden |    1,037      2,462  |    3,499
     Trump |    2,025        534  |    2,559
-----------+----------------------+---------
     Total |    3,062      2,996  |    6,058
```

Table A2: Frequency of SERVSSCOUPL sorted by PRESVOTE

```
RECODE of
      pres
(PRE-POST:    immigrationcrime
   SUMMARY:    RECODE of
      2020     (POST: Effect of
Presidenti    illegal immigration
  al vote) |  on crime rate)
           | Decrease   Increase |    Total
-----------+----------------------+---------
     Biden |    2,578        889  |    3,467
     Trump |      252      2,291  |    2,543
-----------+----------------------+---------
     Total |    2,830      3,180  |    6,010
```

Table A3: Frequency of *IMMCRIME* sorted by *PRESVOTE*

```
RECODE of   |
       pres |
(PRE-POST:  |    RECODE of
SUMMARY:    | traitindresp (POST:
   2020     |   Which child trait
Presidenti  |    more important:
al vote)    |   independence or
            | Respect   Independe |   Total
_____|_____|_____
   Biden    |   1,968      1,497  |   3,465
   Trump    |   2,148        381  |   2,529
_____|_____|_____
   Total    |   4,116      1,878  |   5,994
```

Table A4: Frequency of child trait importance sorted by PRESVOTE

```
RECODE of   |
       pres |
(PRE-POST:  | RECODE of tradfamval
SUMMARY:    | (POST: Fewer problems
   2020     |   if there was more
Presidenti  |  emphasis on traditi
al vote)    | Disagree     Agree  |   Total
_____|_____|_____
   Biden    |   2,057      1,427  |   3,484
   Trump    |     395      2,155  |   2,550
_____|_____|_____
   Total    |   2,452      3,582  |   6,034
```

Table A5: Frequency of traditional family values belief sorted by PRESVOTE

```
RECODE of   |
       pres |
(PRE-POST:  | RECODE of amidentity
SUMMARY:    | (POST: How important
   2020     | is being American to
Presidenti  |     R's identity)
al vote)    | DisNeithe    Agree  |   Total
_____|_____|_____
   Biden    |   1,598      1,864  |   3,462
   Trump    |     482      2,047  |   2,529
_____|_____|_____
   Total    |   2,080      3,911  |   5,991
```

Table A6: Frequency of belief that being American is important to Identity sorted by

PRESVOTE

```
RECODE of
     pres
(PRE-POST:         RECODE of felonvote
 SUMMARY:     (PRE: Favor or oppose
     2020       allowing felons to
Presidenti           vote)
 al vote)      Favor      Oppose         Total
─────────────────────────────────────────────────
    Biden      2,578         953         3,531
    Trump      1,028       1,548         2,576
─────────────────────────────────────────────────
    Total      3,606       2,501         6,107
```

Table A8: Frequency of belief that felons should be able to vote sorted by PRESVOTE

```
RECODE of
     pres
(PRE-POST:
 SUMMARY:
     2020           RECODE of education (PRE:
Presidenti      Highest level of Education)
 al vote)    graduated  not gradu      95        Total
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    Biden       1,973      1,516        42        3,531
    Trump       1,020      1,520        34        2,574
─────────────────────────────────────────────────────────
    Total       2,993      3,036        76        6,105
```

Table A9: Frequency distribution of education level sorted by PRESVOTE

```
RECODE of
     pres
(PRE-POST:    RECODE of ruralurban
 SUMMARY:        (POST: Does R
     2020     currently live in a
Presidenti   rural or urban area)
 al vote)      SubCity      rural         Total
─────────────────────────────────────────────────
    Biden      2,432       1,054         3,486
    Trump      1,223       1,319         2,542
─────────────────────────────────────────────────
    Total      3,655       2,373         6,028
```

Table A10: Frequency distribution of rural vs urban sorted by PRESVOTE

```
RECODE of
     pres              RECODE of
(PRE-POST:    willofmajority (POST:
 SUMMARY:     CSES5-Q05b: Out-group
     2020      attitudes: will of
Presidenti          majorit
 al vote)    DisNeithe      Agree         Total
─────────────────────────────────────────────────
    Biden      2,959         510         3,469
    Trump      1,757         771         2,528
─────────────────────────────────────────────────
    Total      4,716       1,281         5,997
```

Table A11: Frequency of belief that will of majority should rule sorted by PRESVOTE

| RECODE of pres (PRE-POST: SUMMARY: 2020 Presidential vote) | RECODE of ancestry (POST: CSES5-Q06b: National identity: how important to have A | | |
	Not	Agree	Total
Biden	2,737	735	3,472
Trump	1,474	1,065	2,539
Total	4,211	1,800	6,011

Table A12: Frequency of belief that it is important to have American ancestry sorted by

PRESVOTE

| RECODE of pres (PRE-POST: SUMMARY: 2020 Presidential vote) | RECODE of blacktry (POST: Agree/disagree: if blacks tried harder they'd be as we | | |
	Disagree	Agree or	Total
Biden	2,645	841	3,486
Trump	532	2,003	2,535
Total	3,177	2,844	6,021

Table A13: Frequency of belief that if black people tried harder, they would be more well off

sorted by PRESVOTE

| RECODE of pres (PRE-POST: SUMMARY: 2020 Presidential vote) | RECODE of blkworkway (POST: Agree/disagree: blacks should work their way up with | | |
	Disagree	Agree or	Total
Biden	2,185	1,300	3,485
Trump	243	2,297	2,540
Total	2,428	3,597	6,025

Table A14: Frequency of belief that black people should work their way up sorted by

PRESVOTE

```
RECODE of
     pres        RECODE of
(PRE-POST:   pastslavdiscr (POST:
 SUMMARY:    Agree/disagree: past
   2020         slavery &
Presidenti   discrimination mak
 al vote) |  Disagree  Agree or  |   Total
----------+------------------------+----------
    Biden |      443      3,048   |   3,491
    Trump |    1,603        939   |   2,542
----------+------------------------+----------
    Total |    2,046      3,987   |   6,033
```

Table A15: Frequency of belief that past slavery and discrimination makes it more difficult for

black people sorted by PRESVOTE

```
. regress presvote relindex

      Source |       SS           df       MS            Number of obs   =      6,109
-------------+----------------------------------         F(1, 6107)      =     145.03
       Model |  34.5618798         1   34.5618798        Prob > F        =     0.0000
    Residual |  1455.36511     6,107   .238310973        R-squared       =     0.0232
-------------+----------------------------------         Adj R-squared   =     0.0230
       Total |  1489.92699     6,108   .243930418        Root MSE        =     .48817

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
    presvote |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
-------------+----------------------------------------------------------------
    relindex |   .0357316   .0029671    12.04   0.000     .0299151    .041548
       _cons |   .3719797   .0074933    49.64   0.000     .3572902    .3866692
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

```
. regress presvote cultauthindex

      Source |       SS           df       MS            Number of obs   =      5,970
-------------+----------------------------------         F(1, 5968)      =    1479.46
       Model |   289.26386        1    289.26386         Prob > F        =     0.0000
    Residual |   1166.8616    5,968   .195519705         R-squared       =     0.1987
-------------+----------------------------------         Adj R-squared   =     0.1985
       Total |  1456.12546    5,969   .243947975         Root MSE        =     .44218

------------------------------------------------------------------------------
     presvote |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval]
--------------+---------------------------------------------------------------
cultauthindex |   .1547415    .004023    38.46   0.000     .1468549    .1626281
        _cons |  -.0095188   .0125928    -0.76   0.450    -.0342053    .0151677
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
```

. regress presvote immthreat

Source	SS	df	MS		Number of obs	=	5,969
					F(1, 5967)	=	3910.10
Model	576.557959	1	576.557959		Prob > F	=	0.0000
Residual	879.855846	5,967	.147453636		R-squared	=	0.3959
					Adj R-squared	=	0.3958
Total	1456.4138	5,968	.244037166		Root MSE	=	.384

presvote	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
immthreat	.314717	.005033	62.53	0.000	.3048505	.3245835
_cons	.022068	.0081065	2.72	0.007	.0061765	.0379596

. regress presvote polauthism

Source	SS	df	MS		Number of obs	=	5,980
					F(1, 5978)	=	1345.45
Model	267.930275	1	267.930275		Prob > F	=	0.0000
Residual	1190.44364	5,978	.199137444		R-squared	=	0.1837
					Adj R-squared	=	0.1836
Total	1458.37391	5,979	.243916025		Root MSE	=	.44625

presvote	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
polauthism	.1810026	.0049346	36.68	0.000	.171329	.1906762
_cons	.1801097	.0087575	20.57	0.000	.1629418	.1972777

. regress presvote racialauthism

Source	SS	df	MS		Number of obs	=	6,013
					F(1, 6011)	=	941.27
Model	198.455433	1	198.455433		Prob > F	=	0.0000
Residual	1267.35065	6,011	.210838572		R-squared	=	0.1354
					Adj R-squared	=	0.1352
Total	1465.80609	6,012	.243813388		Root MSE	=	.45917

presvote	Coef.	Std. Err.	t	P>|t|	[95% Conf. Interval]	
racialauthism	.2345797	.007646	30.68	0.000	.2195908	.2495686
_cons	.0152058	.0144942	1.05	0.294	-.0132081	.0436197

APPENDIX B: DICHOTOMOUS RECODING OF RENAMED VARIABLES

V201406 - Renamed servsscoupl. Then recoded servsscoupl (1=0 "Refuse") (2/3=1 "Require") (-9/-8=.), gen(sscoupls)

V201360 - Renamed felvote. Then recoded: felonvote (1=0 "Favor") (2/3=1 "Oppose") (-9/-8=.), gen(felvote)

V202110x – Renamed pres. Then recoded: pres (1=0 "Biden") (2=1 "Trump") (3/5=.) (-1=.) (-8=.) (-9=.), gen(presvote)

V201510v – Renamed education. Then recoded: education (6/9=0 "graduated college") (1/5=1 "not gradute") (-9/-8=.), gen(edu)

V201462 – Renamed religid. Then recoded: religid (2/5=1 "Traditional") (6/13=0 "mainline or not religious") (-9/-8=.), gen(relid)

V201433 – Renamed religimpor. Then recoded: religimpor (1/3=1 "Important") (4/5=0 "Not Important") (-9/-8=.), gen(relimp)

V201434 -Renamed bibleword. Then recoded: bibleword (1=1 "actual word") (2/3=0 "word but not literal") (-9/-8=.), gen(bible)

V201231x – Renamed partyid. Then recoded partyid (1=0 "Democrat") (2=1 "Republican") (3=.) (4=.), gen(party2)

V201227 – Renamed partycontrol. Then recoded: partycontrol (1=0 "Control") (2=1 "Split") (3=.) (-9/-8=.), gen(parcon)

V202237 – Renamed immigrationcrime. Then recoded: immigrationcrime (1=1 "Increase") (2/3=0 "Decrease") (-9/-5=.), gen(immcrime)

V202233 – Renamed immtakejobs. Then recoded: immtakejobs (1/3=1 "Likely") (4=0 "Not") (-9/-5=.), gen(immjob)

V202265 – Renamed tradfamval. Then recoded tradfamval (1/2=1 "Agree") (3/5=0 "Disagree") (-9/-5=.), gen(trafamval)

V202266 – Renamed traitindresp. Then recoded: traitindresp (1=1 "Independence") (2=0 "Respect") (3=.) (-7/-5=.) (-9=.), gen(childtrait)

V202355 – Renamed ruralurban. Then recoded: ruralurban (1/2=1 "rural") (3/4=0 "SubCity") (-9/-5=.), gen(rurban)

V202409 – Renamed polcomp. Then recoded: polcomp (1/2=1 "Agree") (3/5=0 "DisNeither") (-9/-5=.), gen(pcomp)

V202413 – Renamed strongleader. Then recoded: strongleader (1/2=1 "Agree") (3/5=0 "DisNeither") (-9/-5=.), gen(leader)

V202416 – Renamed minadapt. Then recoded: minadapt (1/2=1 "Agree") (3/5=0 "DisNeither") (-9/-5=.), gen(minoradapt)

V202417 – Renamed willofmajority. Then recoded: willofmajority (1/2=1 "Agree") (3/5=0 "DisNeither") (-9/-5=.), gen(majority)

V202419 – Renamed cultureharm. Then recoded: cultureharm (1/2=1 "Agree") (3/5=0 "DisNeither") (-9/-5=.), gen(immharmcult)

V202422 – Renamed ancestry. Then recoded: ancestry (1/2=1 "Agree") (3/4=0 "Not") (-9/-5=.), gen(amancestry)

V202424 – Renamed customs. Then recoded: customs (1/2=1 "Agree") (3/4=0 "Not") (-9/-5=.), gen(amcust)

V202301 – Renamed pastslavdiscr. Then recoded: pastslavdiscr (1/3=1 "Agree or Neither") (4/5=0 "Disagree") (-9/-5=.), gen(pastdiscrim)

V202300 – Renamed blkworkway. Then recoded: blkworkway (1/3=1 "Agree or Neither") (4/5=0 "Disagree") (-9/-5=.), gen(bworkup)

V202303 – Renamed blacktry. Then recoded: blacktry (1/3=1 "Agree or Neither") (4/5=0 "Disagree") (-9/-5=.), gen(btry)

V202504 – Renamed amidentity. Then recoded: amidentity (1/2=1 "Agree") (3/5=0 "DisNeither") (-9/-5=.), gen(amid)