The Multiverse Argument for the Existence of God

Michael Dover
*University of Arkansas-Fayetteville*

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The Multiverse Argument for the Existence of God

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of the requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts in Philosophy

by

Michael Dover
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__________________________________
Thomas D. Senor, Ph.D.
Thesis Director

_______________________________  ____________________________
Eric M. Funkhouser   Barry M. Ward
Committee Member    Committee Member
Abstract

The Fine-Tuning Argument for the Existence of God is one of the most powerful arguments in favor of God’s existence. Perhaps the most common objection to this argument involves the Multiverse Theory, which posits an infinite or very large multiverse, adequately explaining the fine-tuning of the universe without positing an intelligent designer. Thus, the Multiverse Theory is often posited as a way of maintaining Atheism. In this paper, I argue that the Atheistic Multiverse View is untenable: if the multiverse exists, God or gods are highly likely to exist as well. Additionally, this paper explores topics like: the conceivability of nomological possibility, the attributes of God, and implications of the Multiverse Theory.
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The heavens tell of the glory of God; and their expanse declares the work of His hands.

—Psalm 19:1 (NASB)

1.0 Introduction to Fine Tuning and the Multiverse

The story presented in Genesis tells of an entity hovering over a chaotic primordial earth that is in a state of tohuw bohuw, or “formless and void.” Part by part, this being brings forth order from the chaos by separating, crafting, and speaking things into existence. With each creative act the earth becomes more primed for intelligent life. Light is separated from darkness to create day and night; the waters below are separated from the waters above to create an expanse between the heavens and earth; waters are separated from land; land yields vegetation; the cosmos are ordered as signs for seasons, days and years; fish, birds, and livestock are brought out of the creation—all culminating to the final act of creation: humankind. Bringing order from chaos—that is, fine-tuning the universe for life—has always been a central part of the Judeo-Christian creation story. Moreover, many theists have taken the apparent order of the observable universe to be evidence of God’s handiwork.¹

Most physicists and philosophers would agree that, at the very least, the universe appears to be well-ordered and fine-tuned for life; however, whether this appearance is evidence of a divine creator is controversial. In this paper, we will briefly examine Robin Collins’s “A Scientific Argument for the Existence of God,” and consider the Multiverse Theory (MT) as a response to his version of the Fine-Tuning Argument (FTA). While Collins lists many reasons for rejecting the “Many-Universes Hypothesis,” MT is beginning to gain some traction in physics and cosmology. There have been a variety of responses from FTA proponents which attempt to combat the MT response. Most responses center around casting doubt on the validity

¹ Psalm 19:1-6, Romans 1:20, Romans 10:18
of MT or, at the very least, casting doubt on subjectively making a cogent inference to belief in MT over theism. Still, all parties agree that if MT is true, the FTA is in serious trouble.

In this paper, I wish to mount an attack on the use of MT as a way of maintaining Atheism when confronted with the FTA. I will propose a new argument for the existence of God which takes MT as a given. Indeed, as I will show, if MT is true, Atheists have good reason to believe in the existence of a higher power as a result. I intend for my argument to create a two-horned dilemma for the Atheist: on the one horn is the FTA, which gives probable support for the existence of God; on the other horn is my Multiverse Argument for the Existence of God which gives probable support for the existence of God or gods. Given this, I will show that MT is no reasonable escape for the Atheist. Or, put another way, I will show that the Atheistic Multiverse View is untenable.

1.1 The Fine-Tuning Argument

The FTA is often seen as one of the most compelling arguments for the existence of God. In “A Scientific Argument for the Existence of God,” Robin Collins sets out to craft the strongest version of FTA possible and respond to the most common atheist objections to it.² His formulation of the argument is sufficient for our purposes, so I will simply aim to replicate it briefly here. He begins with listing some of the more convincing examples of fine-tuning in the universe (I have included his original citations in the footnotes):

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1. “If the initial explosion of the big bang had differed in strength by as little as one part in $10^{60}$, the universe would have either quickly collapsed back on itself, or expanded too rapidly for stars to form...”

2. Calculations indicate that if the strong nuclear force, the force that binds protons and neutrons together in an atom, had been stronger or weaker by as little as five percent, life would be impossible.

3. Calculations by Brandon Carter show that if gravity had been stronger or weaker by one part in $10^{40}$, then life-sustaining stars like the sun could not exist. This would most likely make life impossible.

4. If the neutron were not about 1.001 times the mass of the proton, all protons would have decayed into neutrons or all neutrons would have decayed into protons, and thus life would not be possible.

5. If the electromagnetic force were slightly stronger or weaker, life would be impossible for a variety of different reasons.

Each of these examples are meant to point us to how the universe is fine-tuned for life in a fairly miraculous way. Indeed, if the universe was even slightly different than it is, life would not be sustainable. Moreover, Collins takes the fine-tuning of the universe to be “beyond question” and uncontroversial—something that I will not take issue with here.

After listing some convincing evidence of the universe’s fine-tuning, Collins aims at a rigorous formulation of the fine tuning argument. For the purposes of this paper, I will include his “prime principle of confirmation” as a premise in the formulation (which he separates for pedantic reasons). Here is my version of his formulation:

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9 Ibid, 212.
1. “Whenever we are considering two competing hypotheses, an observation counts as evidence in favor of the hypothesis under which the observation has the highest probability (or is the least improbable).”\textsuperscript{10}

2. “The existence of the fine-tuning is not improbable under theism.”\textsuperscript{11}

3. “The existence of the fine-tuning is very improbable under the atheistic single-universe hypothesis.”\textsuperscript{12}

4. Therefore, (because of 1, 2, and 3) “it follows that the fine-tuning data provide strong evidence to favor the design hypothesis over the atheistic single-universe hypothesis.”\textsuperscript{13}

There are several points to note about the core version of the argument. First off, it is a valid and quite convincing argument. Collins spends ample time in his paper considering objections to and defending this argument. However, it is not a sufficient argument for the existence of God without addressing what he calls “The Atheistic Many-Universes Hypothesis.”\textsuperscript{14} To include for this possibility, the argument can be restructured as follows:

1. “Whenever we are considering two competing hypotheses, an observation counts as evidence in favor of the hypothesis under which the observation has the highest probability (or is the least improbable).”\textsuperscript{15}

2. “The existence of the fine-tuning is not improbable under theism.”\textsuperscript{16}

3. “The existence of the fine-tuning is very improbable under the atheistic single-universe hypothesis.”\textsuperscript{17}

4. The Atheistic Many-Universes Hypothesis ought not be preferred over arguments in favor of design.

5. Therefore, (because of 1, 2, 3, and 4) “it follows that the fine-tuning data provide strong evidence to favor the design hypothesis over the atheistic single-universe hypothesis” and an atheistic many-universes hypothesis.\textsuperscript{18}

\textsuperscript{10} Ibid, 213.
\textsuperscript{11} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{12} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{13} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{14} Ibid, 217.
\textsuperscript{15} Ibid, 213.
\textsuperscript{16} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{17} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{18} Ibid.
However, this formulation of the argument is far weaker than the prior version—especially in light of recent developments in MT. As defined by Collins, this theory postulates the existence of a very large or infinite number of universes each of which may have physical laws that vary from those we observe in our universe.\textsuperscript{19} Now the implications of the theory on his argument is quite clear. If MT (which I will take to be synonymous with the Multiple Universes Hypothesis) is preferable to arguments from design, and offers an explanation for fine-tuning outside of the existence of a designer, then his argument fails. This is because if MT is correct, then the existence of a fine-tuned universe is not all that surprising. Despite the improbability of a fine-tuned universe, amongst infinite universes it may simply be inevitable (or at least less improbable) that we find a universe that is fine-tuned for life. But crucially, if premise 4 cannot be supported, then the argument fails. Before we see what Collins has to say about MT, let us first explore the theory in its own right—is this a theory that we should take seriously?

\subsection*{1.2 The Controversy of the Multiverse Theory}

For the purpose of this paper, there is no need to deep-dive into the complex physics and mathematics surrounding MT. The formulation that Collins puts forth is a common way of quickly explaining the theory and will suffice for our exploration.\textsuperscript{20} What is more important to explore is whether or not the theory is substantiated. First, it is important to note that support for MT is quite divided. It seems to be stronger than what most apologists would like, but weaker than most physicists and cosmologists would like.

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, 217
In 2020, Neil A. Manson published a study in *Theology and Science* aimed at exploring support for MT among cosmologists.\(^{21}\) Motivated by skeptical statements from philosophers and theologians like William Lane Craig, William Dembski, and Rodney Holder, he surveyed cosmologists regarding three main claims: “(1) The multiverse hypothesis is unscientific and untestable. (2) The multiverse hypothesis was concocted in order to block the inference to the existence of a designer. (3) Even if true, the multiverse hypothesis does not explain why this universe is fine-tuned for life.”\(^{22}\) A quick note, I will not explicate (3) because I don’t find it to be helpful for our purposes.\(^{23}\) Concerning the first question, he asked cosmologists if the Multiverse hypothesis could be formulated with “rigor.” 39% said that it could be and usually is; 30% said that it could be but usually is not; 15% said that it could not be; and 17% said none of the above.\(^{24}\) He also asked about the “testability” of the theory: 17% said the theory is testable now; 20% said it is not testable now but will be in the future; 26% said it will never be testable; and 36% said “none of the above.” From these two data sets, Manson concludes that the claim “The multiverse hypothesis is unscientific and untestable” is unsubstantiated.\(^{25}\) However, that the most popular answer on testability was “none of the above” might signal a deficiency in the framing of the question.

When asked about whether the multiverse theory attracted the attention that it did intrinsically, or because of its ability to undercut fine-tuning, 24% said that it was “purely

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\(^{22}\) Ibid, 32.

\(^{23}\) I am referring here to Roger White’s argument, sometimes called the “this universe” objection found in “Fine-tuning and Multiple Universes,” in *God and Design*. Manson uses Questions on “Modal Dependence,” “Gravity in This Universe,” and “Particularity” to cast doubt on some of the assumptions of the argument. I did not wish to include it in this paper 1) because it is not an argument made by Robin Collins, and 2) I find the thesis to be untenable, regardless of what cosmologists think about it. Put simply, (and as Manson states it) it argues that even if we assume the multiverse theory to be true, we have no explanation for why this universe contains the life-sustaining properties.

\(^{24}\) Ibid, 33.

\(^{25}\) Ibid, 34.
intrinsic interest;” 19% said it was primarily intrinsic; 16% responded that it was equally both; 18% said it was primarily for undercutting Fine-Tuning; 1% said it was only for undercutting Fine-Tuning; 23% responded “none of the above.” Now, there are two ways that this data set can be construed: 1) the majority of cosmologists believe that interest in MT is generated mainly intrinsically, or 2) the majority of cosmologists believe that interest in MT is partly because of its ability to undercut the fine-tuning argument. Regardless of how we interpret the data, we might do well to be skeptical about what a surveyed belief about generated interest actually tells us about the general support for a theory.

In some ways, Manson’s survey is a failed opportunity to survey the actual support for the multiverse theory among cosmologists; however, there are some conclusions that we can draw from it. Indeed, Manson’s target seems maimed, for now. Attitudes toward the multiverse theory aren’t quite as derisive as some philosophers and theologians would like for them to be. But this still doesn’t mean that cosmologists are flocking to support the theory. There may be good reasons to reject it.

George F. R. Ellis has been a long time skeptic of what he calls the “level 2” multiverse (which is the version we have been discussing). Concerning MT he writes:

“Similar claims have been made since antiquity by many cultures. What is new is the assertion that the multiverse is a scientific theory, with all that implies about being mathematically rigorous and experimentally testable. I am skeptical about this claim. I do not believe the existence of those other universes has been proved—or ever could be. Proponents of the multiverse, as well as greatly enlarging our conception of physical reality, are implicitly redefining what is meant by ‘science.'”

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26 George F.R. Ellis, “Does the Multiverse Really Exist?: Proof of parallel universes radically different from our own may still lie beyond the domain of science,” 38.
27 Ibid, 40.
Now, granting the Manson survey, this position does put him in agreement with a minority of cosmologists, but his position is well supported. He addresses “seven questionable arguments” made by the proponents of multiverse theories (level 1 and level 2) which he thinks runs them into trouble. Each of the arguments ultimately fall short along the lines that he laid out in the above quote. They are not experimentally testable, and may never be.

For example, he finds the claim that “known physics predicts other domains” to be dubious since the hypothesized fields are both unknown, and not yet proven to exist experimentally. “Crucially, physicists have not substantiated that the dynamics of these fields would cause different laws of physics to operate in different bubble universes.” Thus, the central way that the multiverse theory combats fine-tuning (through postulating the possibility of universes with different “laws”) is unsubstantiated and not reasonably deductible by the theorizing of it alone.

From what we have discussed so far, it seems that MT is far from being certain, but also not completely dismissable as a pseudo-science. It does not have full scientific force behind it, but it does have a reasonable degree of explanatory power for some theoretical physics. Moreover, it has conjured some level of support amongst cosmologists. At the very least, it is worth taking seriously—even if the theory may ultimately be false.

28 Ibid, 41.
29 Ibid, 42. Ellis mentions it’s ability to explain the Density of Dark Energy (something I will not pretend to understand fully). But he also mentions that in some cases it “assumes the desired outcome before it starts…” See also Raphael Bousso and Leonard Susskind, “Multiverse interpretation of quantum mechanics.” Physical Review D 85, no. 4 (2012): 1-46. Here, Bousso and Susskind argue that multiverse theory exclusively explains a particular mechanism in quantum physics, but they also seem to argue that level 1 and level 2 multiverse theory is equivalent. In short, it is unclear to me if this relates directly to fine-tuning.
1.3 Reasons for Rejecting the Multiverse

Collins has much to say about the Atheistic Many-Universes Hypothesis, but it is important to note that he wrote this piece in 1999, before the MT had become a serious postulation by physicists. At the time of his writing, this theory may have been better described as a speculative possibility, but now—as mentioned above—it may be something more serious than that. Recall the argument from above:

1. “Whenever we are considering two competing hypotheses, an observation counts as evidence in favor of the hypothesis under which the observation has the highest probability (or is the least improbable).”\(^{30}\)
2. “The existence of the fine-tuning is not improbable under theism.”\(^{31}\)
3. “The existence of the fine-tuning is very improbable under the atheistic single-universe hypothesis.”\(^{32}\)
4. The Atheistic Many-Universes Hypothesis ought not be preferred over arguments in favor of design.
5. Therefore, (because of 1, 2, 3, and 4) “it follows that the fine-tuning data provide strong evidence to favor the design hypothesis over the atheistic single-universe hypothesis” and an atheistic many-universes hypothesis.\(^{33}\)

What’s clear from this argument is that Premise 4 needs much defending. If the force of the FTA is going to remain in effect, MT needs to be unfavorable to say the least. Let us turn to the reasons that Collins rejects the MT.

**First Reason:** For his first reason, he argues a new principle or general rule: “everything else being equal, we should prefer hypotheses for which we have independent evidence or that are natural extrapolations from what we already know.”\(^{34}\) He then argues that FTA meets this criteria because everything that we observe that is as fine-tuned as the universe has a designer.\(^{35}\)

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\(^{30}\) Ibid, 213.
\(^{32}\) Ibid.
\(^{33}\) Ibid.
\(^{34}\) Ibid, 217.
\(^{35}\) Ibid, 218.
At the time of his writing, he took that the FTA met this standard while the MT did not. Since it is now the case that the MT has been supported through “natural extrapolations from what we already know,” MT seems to meet this latter criteria, while both MT and FT fail the “independent evidence” criteria.

Second Reason and the Third Reason: I will lump these together because in both of these objections, he makes an assumption that does not necessarily apply to MT. He assumes that in order for there to be multiple universes, there would need to be some sort of “universe generator.” He rejects this because: 1) If it exists, it seems like it would have needed to be designed, and 2) because it must not only select new laws and universe, but also create them.\(^{36}\) In MT there is no talk of an independent “universe generator” of the sort that Collins speaks of. It can be true that there exists multiple universes without there needing to be a “universe generator” (one might defer to the Cosmological Argument for the existence of God as a rebuttal, but I will not entertain that here).\(^ {37}\)

Fourth Reason: is simply that MT does not explain other parts of the universe that exhibit apparent design.\(^ {38}\) More formally, this is an attack aimed at explanatory power (although Collins does not formulate it as such). Because there are so many instances of apparent design in the universe that MT would not explain, it would be better to have a unified theory that explains the whole. MT would only explain fine-tuning, but would not explain other signs we observe of

\(^{36}\) Ibid, 218.


intelligent design. This argument shows some promise, but Collins does not offer specific examples of this apparent design. Moreover, the MT now has its own explanatory force.\(^\text{39}\)

_**Fifth Reason:**_ this reason really just reasserts the improbability that life exists even in an infinite universe. Because the universe is always trending toward disorder, we might expect to find a few universes that contain “pockets” of order, but this is far from confirming that intelligent life is necessary or even probable. Indeed, even if the MT is correct, we should still be surprised to find life. The fine-tuning that we observe would still be in spite of a universe tending toward disorder, and life existing—much less intelligent life—would remain improbable. What’s interesting about this reason for rejecting the MT is that it blatantly doesn’t; rather, like reason four, it seems to defer to a different argument altogether.

What I wish to draw from this section is that the force of FTA currently hangs in the balance. Given the increasing viability of MT, Collin’s argument seems to be in jeopardy. It primarily rests on whether or not MT is a viable theory and if it ought to be preferred over a single-universe theory. Since Robin Collins’s publication, there have been several other attempts from philosophers and apologists to salvage the FTA in a variety of ways. These boil down to a few different strategies: 1) discredit the validity of the Multiverse, 2) discredit the inference to the Multiverse, or 3) discredit the effect of the Multiverse Theory. We’ve already discussed (1) sufficiently. I’m not sure just how much sway philosophers and theologians have in weighing in on theoretical physics, other than evaluating what other physicists think of the theory. As I have shown above, the support is varied, so I don’t think (1) has too much going for it.

Another strategy to retain the power of FTA is to show that, in general, people are not justified in inferring MT from fine-tuning. It’s no doubt that if MT is true, we shouldn’t be

\(^{39}\) See footnote 29.
surprised to find a universe that is fine tuned, but that doesn’t mean we should assume that MT is true because we observe a finely tuned universe. Many argue that this amounts to “an inverse gambler’s fallacy”. The fallacy goes as follows: A gambler is asked if a pair of dice has been thrown before. Before he makes his judgment, he rolls the dice, and they land on double sixes. Because it’s so unlikely that the dice would land on double sixes on the very first roll, he concludes that there have been many rolls before. Several philosophers have posited that inferring to a multiverse from Fine-Tuning evidence lends itself to something of a gambler’s fallacy. Upon seeing the highly improbable nature of our finely-tuned universe, it is not correct to infer that there are likely many universes, or that there have been many universes prior to ours.

Though the literature is quite vast in this direction, it is relatively unpersuasive in my view. If this is the kind of inference being made by MT converts, then it is an obviously bad one, but I find it highly unlikely that this inference is common. The inference that I find far more likely goes something as follows. Confronted with an argument based on Inference to the Best Explanation (that is, the FTA), Theists, who hold a high degree of prior credence in the existence of God are likely to happily accept the argument. Atheists, who hold a low prior degree of credence in God take pause. When the MT response is offered, the Atheist is given an option between two Hypotheses that equally explain the evidence of Fine-Tuning. H\text{God}, they have a very low degree of credence in; however, H\text{MT} is likely to be one that is \textit{prima facie} more appealing: it does not posit the existence of God, it allows one to be unmoved by the FTA, and most appealingly, it’s a fully naturalistic theory from a well-respected discipline. It’s likely that

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the inference being made is not from Fine-Tuning to MT; rather, it’s an inference between hypotheses that explain some evidence. For an Atheist, the prior degree of credence in a naturalistic theory is almost certainly higher than the prior degree of credence in the existence of God; so, the Multiverse Theory is adopted, and the existence of God is rejected. This is simply based on subjective prior degrees of credence and an intuitive understanding of Inference to the Best Explanation. But even if there is something wrong with this sort of inference, it doesn’t really matter if there is independent evidence for MT.

   What is really needed in the FTA-MT literature is a response to the problem that supposes that MT is correct. So far, the only existing response along these lines is the “This Universe” response offered by Roger White, but this response has been heavily scrutinized, and I will not explore it in depth here.\(^{42}\) It is my hope that the argument I offer will help fill in the gap in the literature in defense of God’s existence.

2.0 The Multiverse Argument for the Existence of God

   Rather than attempting to reject MT outright, or even reject the inference to MT, my approach will be quite different. All that I wish to do here is show that MT is not a reasonable escape from becoming a Theist. Or, put another way, if one is motivated to believe in MT as a way of maintaining Atheism, I will show this to be a mistake. My strategy will be to propose a new argument for the existence of God which takes MT as a given. Indeed, as I will show, if MT is true, God (and/or gods) are likely to exist.

The argument goes like this:

1. If the Multiverse Theory is true, then there exists an infinite number of universes.
2. If there are an infinite number of universes, then there is an infinite subset of those universes in which nomological possibility reflects that of our own observable universe.
3. For any x that is nomologically possible, x is highly likely to be realized in an infinite series or set of universes.
4. The existence of God is a nomological possibility in this universe.
5. Therefore, if there is an infinite series of universes like ours, God is highly likely to exist.

A few preliminaries should be discussed. First, premise (1) confines this argument to the Infinite Multiverse Theory. While most formulations of MT posit an infinite Multiverse, there are some formulations that posit a very large, non-infinite number of universes. I will discuss this possibility later in the paper, but I will show that an objection to the argument on these grounds does not salvage the Atheistic Multiverse View—as I will show, it simply knocks it back a step. Second, I take premise (2) to be relatively intuitive given premise (1). Insofar as MT offers a response to FTA, it does so by showing that in an infinite series, a life-sustaining universe is not surprising. I take it this is because if the probability of some x is 1/1000, then in 1000 cycles we should expect x to appear one time; in 2000 cycles we should expect x to appear two times; and for an infinite series we should expect x to appear an infinite number of times. Thus, if MT is true, and there is an infinite number of universes, we would also expect an infinite number of universes with the same physical laws that we have (ones that permit life).

Premise 3 also has quite a lot of intuitive force behind it. There is a common adage that says “anything that can happen will happen.” In an infinite series, this adage becomes even more
tempting, but there is good reason to qualify premise (3) in the way that I have. Imagine you have someone rolling a die. It’s possible for any number 1-6 to show up. How long would you have to roll the die to land on the number 6? Well, it’s hard to say. It’s likely that in six throws you’ll land on it once, given a ⅙ odds of landing on it. However, it’s certainly possible that you roll 20 times and never land on a six—possible, but highly improbable. Indeed, it’s possible that, in an infinite series of rolls, the dice never lands on 6—but again, it’s highly improbable. The overwhelming likelihood is that, in an infinite series, you’ll not only strike six, but you’ll strike six an infinite number of times. For this reason, all things considered, the claim “anything that can happen will happen,” is worth qualifying to “anything that can happen is highly likely to happen in an infinite set,” simply because it’s not certain that it will.

I’ve also taken the liberty to specify what exactly is meant by “can happen”. In a manner of speaking, it could happen that on my morning walk tomorrow, gravity gives out and I float away into the sun. That is, it’s not a logical contradiction that such a thing could happen. However, given what we know about the laws of the universe, most people would agree that this is not nomologically possible. Nomological possibility is concerned with what is possible given the laws of nature. Because we’re considering an infinite number of universes like ours, we can restrict our scope to nomological possibility. So, while it’s not nomologically possible that I float off into the sun tomorrow, it is nomologically possible that I come across $100. And if the multiverse exists, anything that is possible, given the laws of nature, is highly likely to happen in an infinite series. So in some universe, tomorrow, I’ll find $100 on my walk tomorrow. There may be some concerns on the gap between possibility and probability—I will address this in more depth later on. For now, it’s worth taking it for granted that for nomological possibility, the gap is quite small.
2.1 In Defense of Premise 4:

So far so good. We have a valid argument with three relatively uncontentious and plausible premises. However, premise (4) is sure to stir up much debate. In order to defend this premise I will employ two main strategies. My first argument will be “The Nomological Omni-Conception of God Argument.” I will build a case that a relatively orthodox conception of God is nomologically possible. I will admit, many aspects of a orthodox conception of God are prima facie incompatible with nomological possibility; however, I will show that the three major attributes of God, Omnipotence, Omnibenevolence, and Omniscience are compatible.

The second strategy that I will employ will take on a form of reasoning similar to that of Perfect Being Theology (PBT). I will call it, “The Argument for a Nomologically Possible Perfect Being.” Building from the prior argument, I will show that a nomological variation on PBT produces a conception of God which is satisfying enough to warrant the description “god”, if not the description “God” as well. This strategy takes what is nomologically possible and works forward from there. In offering these two arguments, I will show that premise 4 is more tenable than it first appears. Indeed, I will show it to be rather well-supported.

2.2 On Nomological Possibility:

First, it is important to first lay a groundwork for nomological possibility. We need to examine two questions: 1) What exactly “counts” as a nomological possibility, and 2) how do we come to know or theorize nomological possibilities? In other words, we need to address the ontological framework of nomological possibility, and the epistemic framework of nomological possibility. To answer these questions, let’s begin by exploring a series of distinctions in how possibility is conceived, and the link between conceivability and possibility.
From the start, we should clarify between what is a nomological possibility and how we conceive of a nomological possibility. Ontologically speaking, there exists some set of nomologically possible states of affairs. Given the laws of the universe—whatever they may be—some things are possible and some things are impossible once all things are factored in. That is, from an “ideal” ontological perspective, there are some things that are truly nomologically possible, but from an epistemic standpoint, it’s not always easy to discern this matter.

In “Does Conceivability Entail Possibility?” David J. Chalmers offers a series of distinctions that will serve us quite well. The first, hinted at above, is between prima facie conceivability and “ideal” conceivability. Some P is prima facie conceivable simply when it seems possible on first appearances. P is ideally conceivable when it is placed under “ideal rational reflection”.\textsuperscript{43} Of course, because ideal rational reflection is often very difficult, and prima facie conceivability is an imperfect guide to possibility, often, the best we can do to narrow the gap between conceivability and possibility is reach what he calls “secunda facie conceivability” which is where a prima facie conceivability judgment survives reasonable reflection and scrutiny.\textsuperscript{44}

But just how do we go about such scrutiny? There’s no doubt that some cases are clear nomological possibilities. A die landing on 6 is a clear nomological possibility. We know for sure that it is fully consistent with the laws of the universe because it happens quite often—most of us have observed a die landing on 6. But other cases are far less clear. Consider the claim: “It’s possible that I was born with green spots.” I personally have never known anyone born with green spots. But from what I know of the laws of nature, I see nothing which precludes such a

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid, 160.
possibility. The claim seems prima facie possible, but what needs to happen for us to scrutinize such a claim? I might posit the following epistemic principle:

*The Restrictive View*: S is justified in believing that x is nomologically possible if and only if we know that x follows from the laws of nature.\(^{45}\)

This means that nomological possibility is limited to our knowledge of what is possible given either what we have observed, or what can be entailed directly given natural laws or physical processes. On this view, I should not accept that it is nomologically possible that I was born with green spots. This is because I have not observed anyone born with green spots, and I do not know of any genetic processes that would allow for someone to be born with green spots. The restrictive view restricts nomological possibility to a very small subset of possibilities. Consider the claim, “It’s possible that humans colonize Mars”. On the restrictive view, we cannot consider this a nomological possibility. Because we have not observed this, and because we do not currently know the physical processes by which it would take place, we cannot say it is nomologically possible.

Insofar as nomological possibility is a helpful tool for navigating possibility in this universe the restrictive view is entirely unhelpful. This is because it is reliably inaccurate when it comes to what is possible. Consider the proposition: “It’s possible that a man can stand on the moon.” At our current point in time, we know that this is a nomological possibility on the restrictive view. We’ve observed humans standing on the surface of the moon, and we know exactly what physical processes play into making this event happen. However, prior to the moon landing, the restrictive view would not allow this possibility within the scope of nomological

possibility. Likewise, this entails that any scientific discovery or advancement is not a nomological possibility before it happens. Thus, the restrictive view, while tempting at the onset, does not allow us to accurately conceive of nomological possibility. For this reason, let’s look at how nomological possibility is generally construed:

The Liberal View: S is justified in believing that x is nomologically possible if
and only if it is consistently conceivable with the laws of nature.

Alyssa Ney posits it this way, “If the laws of nature don’t rule out that a certain proposition p is the case, then p is nomologically possible.” On this view it is nomologically possible that I was born with green spots. As long as we cannot point to any particular law or physical process that rules out some proposition, then it is possible. This view seems to map on quite well to how we think about possibility. We often consider various options as possibilities until they are ruled out rather than needing a highly specific account of something before we consider it a possibility. Still, the range of what we’re willing to consider might vary depending on how far the claim departs from our regular experience.

Consider again the claim mentioned above, “It’s possible that I was born with green spots.” I take this to be a rather wild claim—it’s odd to picture myself (or anyone) with green spots. I might be tempted to take up the restrictive view and say that this is not nomologically possible because it’s not something that I’ve ever observed. Indeed, I do not know of any physical processes that would produce a baby with green spots. But the liberal view would encourage that unless we have some reason to exclude the possibility, we should leave it open. As it turns out, to my surprise, babies are sometimes born with green spots. It is a true nomological possibility.

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But how far do we extend our conception? Some things are easy to rule out: It’s not nomologically possible for a human to stand on the surface of the sun naked; it’s not nomologically possible that a unicorn kidnap me on my way to work tomorrow. But is it nomologically possible that single-horned-horses (unicorns) could exist if evolutionary processes had advanced differently? Is it nomologically possible that humans eventually evolve to have wings? I think the liberal view would answer affirmatively—we can’t point to any natural law which prohibits these things—but I’m not convinced that this offers a satisfying account of possibility. Though we cannot point to any laws which preclude these possibilities, when it comes to more extreme claims—claims that depart wildly from our normal experience—we need something more than an “innocent until proven guilty approach.”

Here, Chalmers offers another helpful distinction: positive and negative conceivability. Negative conceivability is similar to the “liberal view” that I mentioned above. P is conceivable when it is not ruled out by reason or reflection. We can consider a claim to be prima facie negatively conceivable if there is no apparent contradiction, or secunda facie negatively conceivable if there is no contradiction after we’ve given it reasonable scrutiny. Positive conceivability offers us much more than negative conceivability, positive conceivability requires that we are able to generate a “positive conception of a situation” in which P obtains. This generally requires that we are able to imagine some situation or state of affairs in which it is possible that P.

For example, I can offer a negative nomological conception as follows: “it’s possible that my laptop breaks today.” The negative conception points out that there’s no physical law or process which prohibits this, so it is a possibility. The positive nomological conception requires

49 Ibid, 150.
that we imagine a full scenario in which this obtains. It would go something as follows. It’s nomologically possible that I go to the library today and set my bag down on the floor. Just as I set down my bag, a very large man comes and steps on it such that I hear a “crunch”. As I open my bag, I see that his weight on my bag caused the plastic protecting my laptop to break, the screen to be shattered, and the laptop to be inoperable. This is an example of a positive account. We’ve generated something more than a statement that is consistent with the known natural laws; we’ve offered a story about how that possibility could obtain. Moreover, because each component of the story—each detail—is nomologically possible, we can see that the statement itself is nomologically possible.

At face value, it seems like we can positively conceive of these states of affairs and many more. But we might want more. We might want to know the weight of the man, how much weight my laptop is able to support, and at what distributions it can sustain that weight. We might want an “ideal” conception. For an ideal positive nomological conception, Chalmers offers the following guidelines:

“When S is ideally positively conceivable, it must be possible in principle to flesh out any missing details of an imagined situation that verifies S, such that the details are imagined clearly and distinctly, and such that no contradiction is revealed. It must also be the case that rational reflection on the imagined situation will not undermine the interpretation of the imagined situation as one in which S is the case.”

These requirements are similar for a good thought experiment, which generally starts with some prima facie positive possibility. Relevant details are then filled in, but fine details are left unspecified. Theoretically, the fine details can be filled in arbitrarily without significantly undermining the thought experiment. However, when we’re talking about nomological

50 Ibid, 153.
51 Ibid, 154)
possibility, until we attain all knowledge about the laws of the universe and the physical processes thereof, ideal positive nomological conception is very difficult in certain theorizations. In many theorizations, we are unable to fill in all relevant details about some claim. The best we have is to work from what we do know and theorize accordingly. We cannot fill in all the details about the laptop—we don’t know exactly how these physical processes would transpire. But one benefit of limiting our domain to nomological possibility is that we have some facts about possibility at our disposal. Whatever is observed to happen in this world, in most cases, is a sure-fire example of “ideal” nomological possibility. Because it happens, we know that it is possible to occur. However, we may not always know the exact circumstances or processes that bring it about.

But we can still generate a reasonable process for advancing such nomological possibilities. I take examples of ideal nomological conception to be relatively rare—at least for me. I strongly believe that it’s a nomological possibility that my phone screen shatters if I drop it, but it’s not because I fully understand the physical process behind it. I’m sure someone in the physical sciences can explain it in depth, but it’s not generally how I (or most people) produce accurate conceptions of possibility. Still, if we can produce a possibility based on some kind of ideal conception, it’s a sure bet for nomological possibility.

What I take to be far more common is what I’ll call an observed nomological possibility. We are most confident in possibilities that have transpired before. For example, I know that it’s nomologically possible for me to drop my keys because I have done it before. I can produce an observed positive nomological conception of me dropping my keys on this basis. In doing so, I’m simply abstracting the action and conjoining it with some undescribed time and place. I can use this method of conjoining to theorize a variety of nomological possibilities that hold a high
degree of credence. It’s nomologically possible for these keys of mine to be green—here I’m just conjoining the concept of “green” which I know to be nomologically possible with the concept of “my keys” which I know to be nomologically possible.

But notice what’s actually happening in these examples. In each case, I’m moving from an observed nomological possibility to an unobserved nomological possibility. In the first example, I’m moving from instances where I’ve observed myself dropping my keys to an instance where I haven’t. In the second case, I’m moving from observed particulars to an unobserved conjunction of the two. What makes these inferences justified? Primarily the assumption that all other relevant factors remain at some constant.

Given the above discussion, we can now develop a reasonable way of evaluating in what way we might claim that “the existence of God is a nomological possibility”. First, I wish to say that negative nomological conceivability is a good start, but certainly imperfect. Negative nomological conceivability is the default understanding of nomological possibility, but of course, just because we can’t find some law or physical process that precludes the possibility of something doesn’t mean that it’s a true possibility. For example, the claim, “it’s possible for my son to be born with green hair” seems prima facie negatively nomologically possible; however, holding the physical process of genetics as a constant, it’s not actually nomologically possible. Still, accepting the “liberal view” is still better than the “restrictive view” for the reasons I demonstrate above.

The methodology that I will employ is as follows: First, I will consider the claims as negative nomological conceptions so we can know that they are not ruled out. From there, I’ll use possibilities from our observed universe and build from there to unobserved positive nomological conceptions. We will then scrutinize these positive nomological conceptions to
ensure there are no easily identifiable defeaters to reach a secunda positive nomological conception (SPNC). A SPNC is about as reliable a conception of nomological possibility as we can hope for without full entailment; so, if I can create a SPNC of God, then we’ll have good enough reason to suppose that premise 4 is the case. It will not be an impervious account—it may still be defeasible. But it will be the best sort of account we are able to attain. Now that we have established some methodology, let’s turn to an account of the existence of God which follows suit.

2.3 The Nomological Omni-Conception of God Argument:

In this section I will build a case for the nomological possibility of God. On a prima facie negative nomological account, the claim “The existence of God is a nomological possibility” is true as long as we cannot point to any physical laws that preclude God’s existence. But as I’ve shown above, we want to go further than that. We want to build a SPNC of God. It will be helpful to examine what exactly we mean by “God” in this context. I will begin with a relatively uncontroversial account of God. Most Theists and philosophers have historically maintained that God is Omnibenevolent, or totally morally good, Omniscient, or all-knowing, and Omnipotent, or all-powerful. Our considerations can begin with this account of God with the underlying assumption: If I can show that it is nomologically possible for a being to exist that is Omnibenevolent, Omniscient, and Omnipotent, then I’ve shown that it is nomologically possible for God to exist. Still, there are many other qualities of God that Theists may wish to maintain. I will consider a few other attributes on the peripheral; though, I take these three to be the core worth considering.
2.3.1 Omnibenevolence:

Is it nomologically possible for a being to be omnibenevolent? Prima facie there seems to be no physical laws which prohibit this possibility, so it’s off to a good start. On a smaller scale, we know that it is nomologically possible that beings act benevolently, because beings that we observe sometimes act benevolently. Moreover, insofar as we observe right action, we know that it is nomologically possible for beings to act in a way that is good. From this we can draw the following: For any action that a being performs, it’s nomologically possible that they act in a way that is good (or at least, in a way that is not wrong). Now consider some being, Yeshua, who always acts in a way that is good. In every interaction, in every decision, in every volition, they always bring about a good state of affairs. This possibility is not difficult to positively conceive. If anyone has trouble with this conception, take the following interactive thought experiment: Consider your own life, and take a tally of every wrong thing (sin, if you will) that you have done. Now conceive of yourself in every instance of sin, having acted differently—having done good instead. Now also consider yourself never sinning in any future state of affairs. You have just formed a positive account of nomologically consistent omnibenevolence.

The account I have given is not only prima facie plausible, but stands to scrutiny quite well. It’s rather difficult to think of any law or physical process that would prevent me from acting rightly in a situation where I sinned. Moreover, I see no reason to suppose that I couldn’t have acted rightly in every situation possible. A skeptic to this nomological omnipotence would need to explain some physical process or find some law of nature that shows that omnibenevolence is impossible—but this would be quite strained, and I am unable to come up with any convincing skeptical account. Thus, it seems that we have reached a SPNC account of omnibenevolence. We can say that it’s nomologically possible for a being to be omnibenevolent.
2.3.2 Omniscience

Omniscience too seems to be prima facie negatively conceivable. There are a few possible issues upon further scrutiny, however. There’s a lot to be known in the universe, and it’s not entirely clear that 1) the physical processes that are familiar to us allow us to build a positive conception of omniscience, and 2) that all facts in the universe are knowable. I will show each of these are not serious worries for our conception of nomological omniscience.

For our purposes, we can represent the sum total of all facts in the universe as Ω. For humans, we might point to some physical processes that make it such that we cannot know Ω—namely, brain capacity. But, given our brain capacity, we do know some fraction of Ω—which we can arbitrarily set at \( n/\Omega \) where \( n \) is the number of facts we were able to know given our brain capacity. Now, there are two ways that I can positively conceive of omniscience starting from possibilities that we already know. The more lose account simply posits that we can conceive of a brain capacity that is expanded such that \( n^x = \Omega \)—that is, such that the brain capacity of that being is able to accommodate Ω. We can conceive of this simply by taking all the relevant factors that play into our own brain capacity—whatever they be—and increasing them until \( n^x = \Omega \).

Of course, one might object that this positive account isn’t full enough. Many relevant factors may have to be explored in more depth, and I am no neurologist, so I am unable to offer a fully nuanced account to maintain that a brain can have the capacity to store Ω. But what I can offer is a few plausible conceptions that I take to be quite promising. First, suppose that brain capacity is in some way limited by brain size. If this is the case, we can conceive of a human brain that is exceedingly large—large enough to contain Ω. The process by which this sort of brain might be produced is another story. At some level, one can always ask for a more full
account outside of ideal nomological conception. Perhaps it was produced through mad scientists altering human brains using stem cells and CRISPR. Perhaps it developed naturally through evolution in a world much different than ours, but such that it could support rather large-brained intelligent life. In either case, as long as we can reasonably conceive of such a scenario, it should add some credence to our case.

Still, perhaps we need something more grounded to theorize this kind of large-brain. Suppose I take a large sum of human individuals and have them each study a unique subset of Ω. Some study the laws of physics, others study human history, and so on. At some number of humans, the collective brain capacity would be such that \( n^x = \Omega \). On this positive account, we’ve shown that it’s nomologically possible for Ω to be contained in human brain tissue. If it’s possible for that brain tissue to be part of one collective brain—and I don’t think that’s too much of a jump—then I think we have a positive account of nomological omniscience. But even if it is too much of a jump, there’s still a reasonable account of omniscience available to us.

Imagine the aforementioned scenario except that in the place of human brains, there are advanced and highly powered computers which contain Ω and are able to retrieve any component of Ω in a moment’s notice. I take it that this is relatively easy to conceive given that our current computers give us something very similar, except with a fraction of Ω. Now suppose, wielding this supercomputer is a being, Eλ, who is an expert navigator of this computer. If nomologically possible (I will not argue that it is here), perhaps Eλ even has some kind of neural connection to this supercomputer. Whatever the case, Eλ is able to locate any component of Ω in seconds anytime that Eλ desires. On this, Eλ is, at least, effectively omniscient. But I think there is good reason to think that Eλ is more than just effectively omnipotent.
In “The Extended Mind,” Andy Clark and David Chalmers argue that the mind does not stop at the boundaries of the head, but rather extends into our environment when our environment is heavily involved in our cognitive processing. This view is called *active externalism.* Clark and Chalmers look at several examples of how cognitive processing sometimes extends into one’s environment “in a two-way interaction, creating a *coupled system* that can be seen as a cognitive system in its own right.” The most compelling example that they give is the thought experiment of Inga and Otto. Inga represents a neurotypical brain recalling a memory of some fact. She hears about an exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art and starts walking to it. As she tries to remember where the museum is, she consults her memory and finds that it is on 53rd Street. Clark and Chalmers note that she believed this prior to consulting her memory, but it was not previously *occurrent.* It was in her memory, “waiting to be accessed.”

Compare this example to Otto, who suffers from Alzheimer’s disease. Otto relies on environmental information in order to structure his life; he carries around a notebook everywhere he goes. When Otto learns new information he writes it down, and to retrieve old information, he consults his notebook. Otto also hears about the exhibition at the Museum of Modern Art and decides to go see it. He consults his notebook and finds that the Museum of Modern Art is on 53rd Street, and proceeds to walk there.

Clark and Chalmers use these examples to argue that both Otto and Inga engaged in a similar cognitive process.

“...just as Inga had her belief even before she consulted her memory, it seems reasonable to say that Otto believed the museum was on 53rd Street even before consulting his notebook. For in relevant respects the cases are entirely analogous: the notebook plays for Otto the same role that memory plays for Inga. The information in the notebook functions just like the information constituting an

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53 Ibid, 8.
54 Ibid, 12.
ordinary non-occurrent belief; it just happens that this information lies beyond the skin.”

The point of this example is to show that our consciousness—our very mind—can (and does) actually extend into our environment. Just as Otto consults his notebook to recall facts, I consult the speedometer of my car while I am driving to gauge my speed—most often without consciously thinking about it! Even as I am typing, I’m engaging in this kind of coupled system where I type, think, delete, restate… I’m using the words as they appear on my screen as part of my conscious process of thinking.

The connection of active externalism to El is not difficult to see. What El does to retrieve information is not much different from Inga and Otto. So long as El is engaging in a reflective coupled cognitive system, Clarke and Chalmers would likely say that the supercomputer is actually part of El’s mind—and the more coupled it is, the more clear this becomes. If something like a neurological connection to the supercomputer is possible, then it’s not difficult to see how it would function in a very similar way that semantic memory functions. El would have all knowledge of the universe contained in his mind; so El would be Omniscient.

There is one other worry that we ought to address before fully concluding that Omniscience is a nomological possibility. One might object that not all facts in the universe are knowable. This could mean two things: 1) one could be arguing that there might be all kinds of things that human brains are incapable of knowing, and most of my examples begin with human brains, or 2) there may be some facts that are nomologically impossible to know—that is, there’s no way of finding them out.

Point (1) is rather easily dismissed. If there were facts about the universe that humans are unable to know, we wouldn’t know what they are. I take this claim to be an assertion of a

55 Ibid, 13
nomological possibility, but if my objector wishes to maintain the same standard I have set for myself here, they must build a positive account of such facts; however, since these facts are unknowable, this task is impossible. Therefore, I have no reason to believe that there are facts that are wholly unable to us.

Point (2) is more of a concern about information gathering than an objection to knowing—which is exactly what creates the problem. If we can positively conceive of examples where we are certain that some fact (F) exists, but it is nomologically impossible to acquire knowledge about F, then this may be an issue assuming that omniscience requires that a being must know all facts about the universe. For example, one might wonder about all kinds of particulars about the universe that preceded their own existence. One might wonder if it rained on the spot occupied by the White House 1,000,000 years ago exactly. There is presumably some fact of the matter—it did or didn’t rain. But insofar as I know there is no way of acquiring this fact. If there are other facts of the universe like this, and they apply to our conceived being, El, then this problematizes our conception of omniscience.

There are three responses that can be made toward this objection. First, we can conceive that El and the supercomputer exist quite early in the universe, such that they are able to gather most knowledge about the universe that is to come, and such that there is enough evidence left from the prior state of the universe that unattainable knowledge is difficult to find. For this response, El observes the course of the universe as we know it, and has enough information from the early universe to bridge any gaps in knowledge from a time that precedes El. Of course, a skeptic might wonder if early conditions would allow for an intelligent observer like El. And I cannot create a full positive account that would satisfy this skeptic, so we will explore the next possible response.
Another response can appeal to the true limits of knowledge, given El’s vast resources. Suppose we begin by limiting El’s supercomputer (or big brain) to all knowledge that is nomologically attainable for El. This knowledge might turn out to bridge the kind of gaps that we are worried about. Suppose that someone knows the full and complete intricacies of weather patterns on earth. They know and are able to factor in all relevant details to predict the weather perfectly. Moreover, they attain all knowledge about the geological history of the earth and solar system surrounding earth. They know when weather patterns changed on earth and why. They know the causal connections that lead up to the current weather patterns. Is it too far-fetched to say that they would be able to figure out if it rained on the lot of the White House 1,000,000 years ago? It seems rather plausible, though I am still not able to complete a full account thereof.

For any objectors still withholding I have one final response. We might question the notion of omniscience in the first place. Perhaps omniscience is not the knowledge of all facts in the universe; but rather refers to the knowledge of all attainable, knowable facts of the universe. Think about it this way, if we have a being who knows anything that it is nomologically possible to know—they have access to everything that anyone could ever hope to know—doesn’t that being have “all” knowledge? The central claim here is simply that a fact that cannot be known or attained is not rightly included in the description of omniscience. If we have a being of the sort I describe, they have all knowledge that is nomologically conceivable—and I think that’s good enough.

2.3.3 Omnipotence:

A nomological account of omnipotence is, admittedly, prima facie contradictory. If omnipotence is construed as requiring limitless power, then it is not nomologically possible for a
being to be omnipotent, since nomological constraint provides all kinds of limitation. Luckily this is not how omnipotence is generally construed by Theists—and for good reason. Indeed, omnipotence is one of the more tricky attributes of God to conceive of in the first place. While many Theists maintain that God is “all-powerful,” they, at the same time, maintain that there are all sorts of things that God cannot do. God cannot sin, for example. So just what is omnipotence, and how should it be construed?

The most natural answer actually turns out to be the most often rejected among philosophical theists. Consider the claim:

O₁: Omnipotence means that God can do all things.

Early Christian philosophers like Anselm and Aquinas rejected this formulation of omnipotence, and their rejection has remained quite prevalent. This is because O₁ carries great difficulty—especially when paired with other divine attributes. Aquinas, in *Summa Theologica*, lists a litany of problems with this formulation of omnipotence. The most notable is the problem of Omnipotence and Necessary Goodness: to sin is to do something, but God cannot sin; therefore, God cannot be omnipotent.⁵⁶ Aquinas’ response can be summarized in this passage:

“Everyone commonly confesses that God is omnipotent. But it seems difficult to formulate an account of omnipotence, since there can be doubts about what is included under the distribution of ‘all’ when one says that God is capable of all things… However, if one considers the matter correctly, then since power is said in relation to possible things, it follows that when God is said to be capable of all things, the right way to understand this is that God is capable of all possible things and that this is why He is called omnipotent.”

Aquinas resolves the problem here by redefining omnipotence to exclude things which are impossible. Since “God sins” is a logical contradiction, it is an impossibility—which means it is not included in “omnipotence.” From this and many other problems that arise with O₁, we can

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see why many people in the philosophical tradition have opted for other definitions of omnipotence.

There are two main formulations that are widely defended today. I will not take time to defend these views or raise objections to them. Here, I wish only to show that at least some conception of each of these views has a viable nomological counterpart. The first is Aquinas' formulation, which has developed many different versions. I’ll offer a simple formulation as:

\[ O_2: \text{A being is omnipotent iff they have the power to bring about all possible states of affairs.} \]

“Possible” here generally refers to logical possibility such that God can bring about all logically possible states of affairs. On \( O_2 \) it’s generally seen that God can bring about anything that is not a contradiction. So God can make it such that a pig has wings, but cannot make it such that \( 2+2=5 \). The second formulation that is generally defended as follows:

\[ O_3: \text{A being is omnipotent iff there is no possible being with more power than their power.} \]

This principle generally refers to conceivable beings, also in terms of logical or metaphysical possibility. Whatever “all-power” is referring to, on \( O_3 \), as long as we cannot conceive of a being that is more powerful than our omnipotent being, then we have correctly identified maximal power.

At this point I will admit that our hopes of finding a nomological account of omnipotence still seems dull. Each of these views, in their own right, conceives omnipotence as referring to power in regard to some logical or metaphysical possibility, which is far larger than the scope of

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nomological possibility. There is an apparent, fundamental tension. However, insofar as the scope of this paper is concerned, I think there is still hope.

What $O_2$ and $O_3$ have in common is the conviction that omnipotence requires a being to have all power that it is possible to have. The investigation that I have engaged in thus far has taken up naturalistic assumptions. I have attempted to define the attributes of God within the parameters of nomological possibility because it most nearly and convincingly reflects actual possibility. I’ll use “actual possibility” here simply to refer to possibilities that we think can obtain in the world. For the Theist and non-Theist alike, we are likely concerned primarily with what is actually possible, not just what can be coherently conceived. Just because I can coherently conceive of a God that can bring about all logically coherent states of affairs, does not mean this God can or does actually exist. Here, I’d like to focus on a question which I expect will expose differing underlying assumptions between the average Theist and the Naturalist in order to resolve the tension.

Consider: can a being exist that can bring about states of affairs that are not nomologically possible?

If we answer “no” to this question, then our assumptions about $O_2$ and $O_3$ assuredly change. For a naturalist, “all power that is possible to have” is restricted to nomological possibility at the onset. So, a being that is $O_2$, is restricted to an interpretation of “possible” that is confined to nomological possibility. Moreover, a being with maximal power is likewise restricted to power within the natural limits—or nomologically possible power. Note that the definitions of omnipotence do not change for the naturalist, but the conception of what is within the scope of “possible” does. Thus the interpretation of omnipotence changes given the naturalistic assumption.
If, on the other hand, we answer “yes” to this question, it entails that we think it is *actually possible* for a being to exist that can bring about states of affairs that are not nomologically possible. This means that we either think that the laws of nature are such that they can be broken—they are not laws at all—or we think that a being which can bring about such states of affairs, a being that can bring about logically possible states of affairs, fits within the laws of nature.

Perhaps I should explain it another way. Recall that in our investigation of nomological possibility, I noted that possibilities that *actually happen* are sure-fire nomological possibilities. This is because we know that whatever happens in the natural world fits within whatever laws are governing the world. So, if it “can happen” that a being brings about a state of affairs that we formerly classified as only logically possible, we ought to reclassify this possibility as a nomological possibility. Likewise, if there exists some being who is able to bring about things that we formerly classified as only logically possible, we ought to see that we were wrong about the scope of nomological possibility—the laws of nature weren’t what we had them out to be.

Put more formally my claims are as follows:

1. The laws of nature, whatever they are, preclude what is and is not able to actually obtain in a world like ours.
2. So, if a being is able to bring about some state of affairs, E, E is within the laws of nature.
3. O₂ entails that a being is able to bring about all possible states of affairs.
4. If O₂ is able to obtain, it is nomologically possible for O₂ to obtain.
5. O₃ entails that a being is maximally powerful.
6. If O₃ is able to obtain, it is nomologically possible for O₃ to obtain.
7. Therefore, Omnipotence, on either definition, is nomologically possible.
What I really hope to show in this argument is that, the scope of what “can be done,” the scope of what power actually refers to, is always going to fall within the scope of nomological possibility—even if we conceptualize or talk about it differently. There is no doubt that logical and nomological possibilities differ for a reason. Being able to find modal consistencies and contradictions is quite useful in philosophy—even if the subjects of the claims cannot actually obtain. But insofar as we talk about God, and God’s power, it only matters insofar as it refers to things which can obtain.

Now, so far I have only shown that omnipotence is a negative nomological possibility—that is, we now have a conception of omnipotence that does not contradict nomological possibility. Like with all the other cases, I do not anticipate that this is enough to be convincing. We must also generate a positive conception of nomological omnipotence. I’ll make two arguments, the first of which assumes O₂.

On O₂ omnipotence, we need to conceive of a being, call him El Shaddai, that is able to bring about any nomologically possible state of affairs. We know that it is possible for beings to bring about all kinds of nomologically possible things—we do it all the time. Of course, for us there are great limits in what we are able to bring about. We cannot, for example, create a sun, though we know the creation of a sun is nomologically possible. Insofar as I can tell, there are two main reasons we cannot bring about a sun, and these reasons extend to all nomological possibilities that we are unable to bring about. The first reason is a problem of knowledge: we do not know how to make a sun. The second reason is one of supporting powers: we do not have the resources, energy, technology, etc. required to make a sun—even if we knew how to.

I’ve already shown that the problem of knowledge can be overcome through arguing for nomological omniscience. Moreover, it’s quite easy to conceive of a being gathering the required
knowledge on how suns are created and how to reproduce this phenomenon. I don’t take the first problem to be a major hurdle. The second problem does not produce a serious worry either. Whatever the required causal powers are, it’s not difficult to imagine that a being can gain them through some means. As a template, I can consider some nomological possibility that I am unable to bring about: building an exact replica of the Empire State Building. Supposing I know how to construct such a structure, I do not currently have the power. But I have an idea of how I could get the power. I would need to hire a construction company, buy the resources, equipment, and expect the project to advance over a period of time. Theoretically, I could conceive of myself taking on the entirety of the project, without hiring labor, but it might take thousands of years to complete. I do not expect the creation of a sun to be much different in nature from the story I have described.

But suppose there is some difficulty, I know not what, call it D, that makes it such that for some nomologically possible state of affairs, E, it is impossible for any being to bring about E. For example, suppose that, for unknown reasons, suns are such that they can form in the universe, but no conceivable being is able to reproduce them. This would raise problems with our conception of O₂ nomological omnipotence.

There are four viable responses to this problem. First, there is an issue of conceivability. Suppose I’m not convinced that any such D exists. For this objection to be tenable, by the standards I have set out, an objector would need to produce a positive account of D—with great difficulty, I anticipate. Second, I might appeal to the last part of the above statement as a kind of law—a law such that: for E, it is impossible that any being bring about E. If there is some law which governs our universe such that for E, it is impossible that any being bring about E, then a
being bringing about E is not a nomological possibility, and so it should not be supposed in our conception of omnipotence.

The third response is worth camping on for a moment. I think that there is a strong inductive argument against D as a skeptical response when the rest of nomological omnipotence is granted. There is a good test-case for this argument revealed in basic intuitions about the scope of the power of humans. When we say something like, “It’s possible that humans someday colonize Mars,” most of us have a strong intuition that this is a genuine possibility, such that, given enough time, and enough resources, humans will someday colonize Mars. But why do we find this intuitively appealing? Arguably we are making an inductive inference based on our prior experience about the vast capabilities of humans. The scope of what humans are able to bring about is vast and surprising—seemingly limitless. Thousands of years ago if you had asked someone if it’s possible that we grow flowers in the desert the answer likely would have been “no,” but today we know such a thing is possible. This is because humans are surprisingly good at figuring out how to reproduce circumstances that naturally occur in order to reproduce events that naturally occur. With this story in mind, we have good reason to reject some D—even when it only refers to human capability. Indeed, I think it’s genuinely possible that humans will someday be able to create a sun and colonize Mars. Take this same argument and suppose we do have a being that is able to do all things that we know is possible for a being to do. Like with humans, their capabilities seem limitless—especially in regard to naturally occurring events. It seems like there is good reason to then infer that no such D is likely. With this in mind, for anything that we know to be a nomological possibility, which especially include things that naturally occur in our universe, we ought to also believe that it’s a nomological possibility that some being is able to bring it about.
Though I find the above rather convincing, there could still be resistors, so I’ll offer one final option to lead us into a discussion of $O_3$ omnipotence. The fourth option is to admit $O_2$ to be untenable, but appeal to $O_3$ which does not have this problem. This is because if $E$ is such that no being can bring it about, then we cannot conceive that it is part of maximal power. A nomological positive conception of $O_3$ is also not difficult to postulate. Whatever the laws are that govern the power of beings, there is some nomologically conceivable being that has the most amount of power. This is not only possible but a necessary claim, I take it. Even if this ends up being a relatively small amount of power compared to logical omnipotence, there is some true nomological possibility regarding the power of beings. And whatever that maximal power is, that is our nomological conception of omnipotence.

2.3.4 Yeshua, El, and El Shaddai

Now that we have formed a SPNC account of the three major attributes of God, there is one piece left in order to complete our account that this “God” is nomologically possible. We must be able to conceive of one single being holding all of these attributes. I will note that there is a vast literature which attempts to argue that the three attributes of God that I have listed are not compossible, and there is a vast literature which defends the compossibility of these attributes. I will not survey those arguments here. Instead, I wish only to produce a positive account that should be easily conceivable given the ground we have covered so far.

In the above accounts I mentioned three beings—Yeshua, El, and El Shaddai—and I offered positive accounts of their conceivability. Now consider that Yeshua, El, and El Shaddai are actually all the same being by different names—a being named Yahweh. In the same way that the evening star is the morning star, Yeshua is El, and El is El Shaddai. Now, we can
conceive of each of these positive accounts with Yahweh as the subject inhabiting the thought-experiments. If the prior accounts held up on their own, placing Yahweh as the subject in each case should not jeopardize our endeavor. As long as no contradictions arise between the attributes I have defended, there should be no issue with conceivability; thus, no issue with maintaining the nomological possibility of this Yahweh—God.

2.4 The Argument for a Nomologically Possible Perfect Being

In this section, I wish to offer both a supplemental defense to what has been argued above, as well as a defense in its own right. I will assume the SPNC Omni account that I mentioned above, but I also see this section as plugging various holes left over from the above argument. Some may still be skeptical of my above defense of premise 4—primarily because I have only offered a partial conception of God. While it is true that there is good reason to think that the Omni-God above is nomologically possible, there are all kinds of other attributes generally attributed to God that are, admittedly, quite difficult to create a nomological account of. While one might concede that I have established the nomological possibility of a being that has all of the omni-attributes, they may be hesitant to call this being “God”. I will endorse this move and address it in more detail toward the end of my paper. But it is important to note that this will not salvage the Atheistic Multiverse View that I am attacking. Even if one is not convinced that the Judeo-Christian God exists, given my argument, so far I have argued for something that, at the very least, looks a lot like a [g]od. In this section, I will argue that, call it whatever you will, there is some nomologically possible maximally perfect being that we can conceive of. Whatever this being is, and whatever you want to call them, make them the subject
of Premise 4 in my argument and it should run forward just fine. To put my argument down clearly in comparison to my prior argument, it goes as follows:

The Nomological Omni-Conception of God Argument

1) God is conceivable as a being that is Omnipotent, Omnibenevolent, and Omniscient

2) The existence of an Omnipotent, Omnibenevolent, and Omniscient being is nomologically possible

3) Therefore, the existence of God is nomologically possible.

The Argument for a Nomologically Possible Perfect Being:

1) There is some conceivable being with the greatest nomologically possible array of nomologically compossible great-making properties.

2) This being looks a lot like the Judeo-Christian God; or minimally, reflects what we would rightly call a god.

3) Therefore, the existence of some being that closely reflects God or gods is nomologically possible.

The prior argument simply assumed a specific, partial conception of God (premise 1) then spent most of the time defending the second premise. This new argument is much more modest. I take premise 1 to be nearly undeniable—we will unpack it by looking at Perfect Being Theology (PBT), and developing a nomological version of PBT. The second premise offers a strong and weak version. In my mind, the Nomologically Perfect Being that we will discuss resembles God adequately enough for most to be convinced, but for witholders, I open up the option of “god”
since perhaps the nomological variation cannot carry every attribute that God is traditionally said to have. Still, on this note, I will point out that both of my arguments have crafted a similarity beyond what most arguments for the existence of God can claim. The fine-tuning argument, for example, only really defends a single attribute attributed to God: that He is the Creator. My accounts extend much further than this, so I take it, on either case, if we find any arguments for God’s existence compelling, mine ought to be as well. With all of that out of the way, let’s examine the first premise in this new argument.

First, let’s consider the God that is posited by Perfect Being Theology. In accordance with the Anselmian tradition many maintain that God is “that than which no greater can be conceived.” 58 Thomans Morris formulates this statement more rigorously as follows:

“(G) God is a being with the greatest possible array of compossible great-making properties.” 59

He defines a great-making property as any intrinsically good property, attribute, or characteristic. For example, if we take anything that is intrinsically good property, say being morally righteous, then God has this property insofar as it is compatible with his other properties. So, God is morally righteous insofar as moral righteousness is intrinsically good, and insofar as God’s moral righteousness is able to coexist with, say, his power and knowledge.

But how do we know which properties ought to be included in our list of compossible great-making properties? Moreover, how do we know which properties ought to take precedence over others? Ultimately, as Morris states, our judgements rely on our value-intuitions about intrinsically good things and great-making properties. 60 Morris recognizes the hesitation that one might have at this, but argues that intuition is more central to our belief structure than many may

58 Ibid, 16, Quote of Anselm
59 Ibid, 17.
60 Ibid, 18.
realize. We know that the propositions “Triangles have 3 sides” and “2+2=4” are true, and we ultimately rely on our intuition as guides in justifying their validity. Granted, some of our intuitions are stronger than others. One might be more inclined to intuitively accept that there cannot be a round square than they will be to accept that having foreknowledge about future actions is better than experiencing pleasant surprise at someone’s faithfulness. Still, this sort of intuitionist grounding is central to PBT. Morris writes:

“Most practitioners of Perfect Being Theology take our intuitions about matters of value, as they do most other intuitions, to be innocent until proven guilty, or reliable until proven deceptive. The alternative is a form of skepticism with few attractions.”

Thus, for Morris, when it comes to our intuitions about God as the greatest possible being, what things are intrinsically good, and what properties of God, when in conflict, ought to be thrown out, we ought to trust what we intuitively think until we find some reason for abandoning our position.

So, when we employ this process of intuition consulting, the sort of God that Morris thinks we will yield is as follows in this order:

(1) We will find that God is conscious, for to have the property of consciousness is better than to lack it.

(2) God will not only be conscious, but free—that is, He has the property of free will, since to be able to act is surely better than to be a passive conscious perceiver of the world.

(3) He will be thoroughly benevolent, since it is better for God’s free action to be good than evil.

(4) He will have significant knowledge, since to have knowledge is better than to lack it.

(5) He will have significant power, since it is better than lacking power.

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61 Ibid, 19.
(6) He will have *unlimited knowledge and power*, since it is better to have no limits in these areas than to have limits in these areas.

(7) He will be the creative source of all things, that is, ontologically independent, since it would be better for a being to be the source of all rather than one independently existing being among many others.

(8) He will be necessarily existent, since it is better to exist than not to exist.\textsuperscript{62}

The PBT conception of God gives us a start for our conception of God, but it is not fully consistent with a nomological account of God. First off, I do not think some of these claims are prima facie nomologically compatible and or tenable within a multiverse context. Points (6), (7), and (8) may be troubled on a nomological account—we will circle back to this. But I think there is a good case for the rest. Let’s start with the uncontentious points and build up from there.

That a being can be conscious is a sure nomological possibility. Whatever consciousness is, we observe it to some degree, so we know it is possible for a being to have consciousness. Free will may be slightly more tricky. I won’t go into a full discussion of it here, but there are certain ways in which we observe freedom even if we are not ultimately free. In Morris’s terms, I think he seeks only to establish that God is an agent—he acts in the world like you or I. We know this to be a nomological possibility, so there are no problems there. The next three qualities have already been argued for in their own right—they reflect the Omni-attributes that I develop above.

It is premise 6 that generates some issue by employing the term “limitless”. For a nomological PBT account we can reformulate this as simply “nomologically maximal”—that is, all power and knowledge that it is nomologically possible for a being to have.

\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
Claim 7 is where we run into some pretty serious concern. Not because it is nomologically impossible for a being to be the source of all that there is. In fact, it’s plausibly conceivable. The problem is that this particular paper—my main argument—assumes that the multiverse exists, and, because the multiverse exists, God exists. The underlying assumption with this that I have yet to lay out is that this entails that God is in some way generated from the multiverse. Insofar as my argument is concerned, the God that I’m positing cannot be ontologically independent. With that said, I wish to note a few things. First, just because God is not ontologically independent does not mean that God is not a creator, or even the creator of this universe (insofar as it is nomologically possible). Indeed, we might reformulate (7) to say “God is a Creator, since it is better to create than not to create.” With this, we can retain a central attribute about God, at least partially. Second, I wish to note here that I will expound upon this point in my defense section—God being ontologically independent might only mean that he is ontologically independent in reference to us.

The last point that I will mention here is 8, that God is necessarily existent. This proposition is strange even within the confines of PBT. I’m not sure how important it is to our conception that God be necessarily existent. That said, I will at least note that it is nomologically plausible—many naturalists argue for necessarily existent things like numbers, moral truths, and so forth. If these are nomological possibilities, perhaps there is a way forward for this view, but I do not care to defend it in depth here.

What I hope the discussion in this section has done is offer a joint defense of Premise 1 and Premise 2 of the Nomological Omni-Conception of God Argument above. Premise 1 takes the form of a widely defended tradition, except that I placed the tradition within the scope of nomological possibility. Given the discussion leading up to this section, I take this first premise
to be well-defended at the start, but given an even more full positive account here. Premise 2 I implicitly defended by placing my formulation within the context of traditional PBT and showing that very few, quite minor alterations are needed for the nomological account of a perfect being.

2.5 Concluding the Defense of Premise 4:

Overall, my aim in this section has been to defend the claim that “The existence of God is a nomological possibility.” I offered two arguments. The first posited a conception of God, then attempted to show that this conception is nomologically possible. The second argument took an approach which mimicked Perfect Being Theology by arguing for a perfect being that fits within nomological parameters. I find both of these arguments to be rather convincing. They each contain a relatively normal conception of God and take care not to overstep what is considered to be a nomological possibility. My defense should be rather convincing. Still, I’ve offered several “outs” along the way. I’ve mentioned that those not convinced by my conception of God—in either case—might wish to opt for a [g]od adaptation of my argument. I’ve also admitted that my account is not indefeasible—SPNC nomological possibility is always open to review. Still, however my defense may be received, the ways out that I have offered do not escape some form of Theism that reasonably resembles Judeo-Christian theism. So, if premise 4 of my Multiversal God Argument holds up, I anticipate quite a problem for the Atheistic Multiversal View.

2.6 Conclusion of my argument:

It may be good at this point to review my Multiversal Argument for the Existence of God, since we have taken a long departure from the core argument at hand. I have argued that:
1. If the Multiverse Theory is true, then there exists an infinite number of universes.

2. If there are an infinite number of universes, then there is an infinite subset of those universes in which nomological possibility reflects that of our own observable universe.

3. For any x that is nomologically possible, x is highly likely to be realized in an infinite series or set of universes.

4. The existence of God is a nomological possibility in this universe.

5. Therefore, if there is an infinite series of universes like ours, God is highly likely to exist.

I argued that Premises 1-3 are relatively uncontentious, then turned mostly to a defense of Premise 4. So long as my defense of Premise 4 holds up, I take it that this should be a compelling argument for the existence of God (or, at least, Multiversal gods). Therefore, I have produced an argument which ultimately shows that if the multiverse exists, God/gods likely exist as well. Furthermore, this shows that the Atheistic Multiversal View is untenable, and therefore, inadequate as a response to the FTA.

3.0 Objections and Replies:

In this section I wish to explore the various objections that one might make at this stage in the argument. Some are rather serious, like the “Atheistic ‘This Universe’ Objection,” others are rather isolated by their specificity. Ultimately, though, I do not think that any objections below offer a sure escape for the Atheistic Multiversal View. Though there are many responses one could have to my argument, I will focus on three main reactions which will help clarify and defend my main argument.
3.1 Some Theological Objections

Here I wish to quickly address some theological objections that may be raised to my argument. This is not because I think that they offer any serious worries to my argument, but they are worth addressing and clarifying. While I take it that my argument has presented a Multiversal God that is rather similar to the Judeo-Christian God, there are many ways in which this conception departs from the traditional Judeo-Christian view of God—even beyond what is mentioned above. I wish to take a look at some of these ways before moving forward.

First, as I’ve mentioned above, the Multiversal conception of God is not ontologically independent. For my argument to function, this god must be produced by the multiverse in some way. This will likely be a hard pill for the average Theist to swallow, but I’m not asking Theists to swallow it. I’m not advocating in this paper that Theists ought to adopt the kind of Theism I’ve argued for here—I’m simply arguing that if the Multiverse Theory is true, this entails the existence of God or gods. This response does not refute my argument, it just shows it to be incompatible with particular theological conceptions and commitments.

Still, Just because the Multiversal God is not ontologically independent does not mean that this God is not a creator. Indeed, we might expect this God to be a creative-generative source in itself. We know that it is nomologically possible that universes are generated. Given the great power and knowledge of the multiversal god, it does not seem too far-fetched to posit that this god is able to create universes. It is, at the very least, negatively nomologically conceivable. A positive nomological conception is a bit more difficult for the same reason it is difficult to produce a positive conception that a being is able to create suns—we don’t know exactly what it would take to create a sun. However, I have a strong intuition that an omnipotent, omniscient God would be capable of creatively-generating universes—and I expect that many
will share this intuition. If we assume this point, we can see that the kind of God I posit can be, at least, relatively ontologically independent. That is to say, they can be ontologically independent of “this” universe; they can be the Creator of “this” universe.

A second worry is that, if other things that I’ve said hold true, it is not just the case that this Multiversal God exists, but it is also the case that there is an infinite subset of universes that contain a Multiversal god of the sort that I describe. Therefore, what my argument actually produces is a kind of Polytheism. This too is only a concern for particular conceptions of Theism, but it does not undermine my argument. The Atheistic Multiversal View is still untenable—even if it is untenable because the Multiverse entails the existence of an infinite number of Multiversal gods. Still, in fashion with what I mention above, it is compatible with a relative Monotheism—insofar as “this” universe is concerned, there may be only one God which inhabits it, or one God that is above all creation.

I should clarify again that I’m not asking Theists to subscribe to these statements. I imagine that most Theists would adopt a single-universe view in the first place, or posit that if a Multiverse exists, God created it. What I’m doing here is simply arguing against the Atheistic Multiversal View. All things considered, I do not take any theological qualms with my argument to be undermining it as long as they don’t radically undermine the conception of “God/gods” that I’ve presented here.

### 3.2 The Atheistic “This Universe” objection

The most serious objection to my argument would go as follows: Perhaps there are Multiversal gods out there, but there’s no reason to suppose that this universe contains a Multiversal god. Here, an Atheistic objector might wish to retain their Atheism by altering the
definition of Atheism slightly—Atheism is no longer the position that gods do not exist, or that there is no evidence to suppose that they do, it is the position that no gods exist in this universe.

There are many things to say about this objection, but I would like to begin by pointing out that it is a rather specific position that errs toward being ad hoc. The this universe objector admits that God/gods exist. They affirm that they are an ontological component of reality, but opt for a relativised position in relation to these gods. It is similar to saying that pandas don’t exist because there are none present in my city. Still, I will admit, Theism is important to us insofar as God or gods actually interact with us and our world. When a Theist claims that God exists, they assert something more than an ontological claim. They wish to say that this God that exists means something about our existence. This ontological fact corresponds to experiential reality and the meaningfulness of what it is to be a human in this world. So, while this objection does not deny the existence of God/gods, it does jeopardize the meaningfulness of the sort of Theism that would result from my argument.

I will offer two responses here that I take to be quite compelling; yet, each requires some degree of reasonable speculation. The first response is simple, though it is the far weaker of the two arguments. If it is nomologically possible that a Multiversal god can go from one universe to another, then the existence of a god in one universe entails the existence and meaningfulness of a god in all universes in the multiverse. If this follows, the Atheistic this universe response holds no merit.

But is there reason to postulate that it’s nomologically possible for a Multiversal god to be transmultiversal? Well, first off, it is negatively conceivable at the very least. We cannot point to any natural law which precludes this possibility primarily because it is speculative. And
though a negative conception is not solid ground to stand on, I’ve argued here that it ought to be at least slightly favored.

Another bit of added support for the transmultiversal god is that the potential physical evidence for the multiverse points to the assumption that, at the very least, one universe can have some kind of effect on the other. It has been theorized that, if the multiverse exists, there might be evidence that early universes collided with one another causing detectable “distortions in the cosmic microwave background… [or] strange galaxy properties in the direction of the collision.”\textsuperscript{63} Moreover, theorists like Heling Deng have reported that “special kinds of black holes… could be artifacts of pieces of our universe that separated into their own universe via a process called quantum tunneling.”\textsuperscript{64} Each of these possibilities seem to show that one universe can have an effect on another. This perhaps also adds some slight support to the idea that a multiversal god could be transmultiversal by establishing that there is some causal connection between universes that could be exploited by an all-knowing, exceedingly powerful entity. Of course, this is far from conclusive and only adds some slight support for the meaningfulness of this Multiversal Theism.

The next argument I will present, however, I find to be far more compelling. I’d like to begin by reconsidering a claim that I made earlier about omnipotence: I argued that for anything we know to be a nomological possibility, we ought to also believe that it’s a nomological possibility that a being with enough power and knowledge is able to bring it about. I take this claim to be well justified. Additionally, note that the “this universe” objection concedes that these multiversal gods that I describe are out there in the multiverse. From here I can make a new


\textsuperscript{64} Ibid.
argument that will be rather convincing, and will actually fill out my account quite well. It goes as follows:

**The Multiversal Creator Argument:**

1. It’s nomologically possible that the multiverse contains an infinite subset of multiversal gods.
2. It’s nomological possible that a Multiversal god produces an infinite multiverse. (I.e it’s possible that a Multiverse god is a multiverse generator.)
3. If (1) and (2), then, for any given universe, it’s far more likely that the universe is one that is generated by a Multiversal god.
4. Therefore, it’s far more likely that our universe is one that has a Creator.

The first premise should be a given if my argument holds up so far. It’s an admittedly odd implication of my argument that likely makes the average Theist uncomfortable, but it is a necessary step in filling out this argument. Given what I stated above, the second premise should also have some reasonable justification. Assuming that the multiverse exists, we know that it’s nomologically possible that a multiverse naturally occurs. And if a multiverse is a naturally occurring event, we have good reason to infer that an omnipotent being could reproduce this naturally occurring event.

Premise 3 might seem unclear at the start, but it is an even stronger premise than the other two. If the first two premises hold up, this means that there is an infinite set of universes which contain what I will call *Generative Multiversal gods*. These are Multiversal gods which then create multiverses. What this means is that, coming from the infinite multiverse, there is an
infinite set of infinite multiverses which have a creator. I will use the illustration below to demonstrate my point:

Suppose that $S_1$ is the multiverse that we’ve assumed for the sake of this argument—the one that serves as a response to the FTA. It is the infinite set of universes that occur randomly. We are unsure of how $S_1$ came about, but we do know that it produces an infinite subset of life-producing universes. If my multiversal god argument holds up, we know that the infinite subset of life producing universes contains an infinite subset of universes which contain a multiversal god, and we have good reason to think that this subset contains an infinite subset of generative multiversal gods. In the illustration above each integer can represent some arbitrarily high number of universes, but for the sake of simplicity, we’ll say that each integer represents a single universe. The arrows represent an infinite progression. While $S_1$ represents the original multiverse, $S_2$-$S_6$ each represent an infinite set of universes that was created by a generative multiversal god. Moreover, the number of sets created by generative multiversal gods progress
infinitely as well. The numbers which proceed from each set vertically represent the infinite progression of universes that is produced correspondingly.

Now, let’s examine the following question: In the illustration above, how likely is it that any given universe is in the set $S_1$? This question is important because it is the only set of universes that has no creator (at least not that we know of). Suppose we scale the illustration to only include $S_1$ and $S_2$ and we know that our universe is in either $S_1$ or $S_2$. We can suppose that, all things equal, the probability that our universe is in $S_1$ is .5. Now suppose that we scale the illustration to include $S_3$ and $S_4$ also. Now the probability that our universe is in $S_1$ is .25.

Suppose that we continue this process infinitely such that:

$$P = \frac{S_1}{S_2, S_3, S_4, \ldots}$$

Where:

- $P$ = Probability that our universe is within set $S_1$
- $S_1$ = The infinite set of universes we suppose in the multiverse theory
- $S_2, S_3, S_4, \ldots$ = The infinite progression of infinite sets that are created by generative multiversal gods.

How likely is it that our universe is in $S_1$? Infinitesimally small. Or in other words, how likely is it that this universe is one that is not created by a generative multiversal God?

Infinitesimally small. Therefore, it is far more likely that this universe was created by some being with the nomological powers to create it; thus, the this universe objection ultimately fails.

If the multiverse exists, and my other arguments hold up, we have very strong reason to suppose that this universe is one that is created by a Creator.
3.3 The Atheistic Non-Infinite Many-Universes Objection

Though the infinite multiversal models seem to be the most widely advocated models, there are also non-infinite many-universe models that are posited in the multiversal literature. An objection from these grounds would go as follows: The argument that you’ve posited requires a rather great improbability to be actualized. In an infinite universe, the existence of a Multiversal god is nearly inevitable, even if it is highly improbable. But perhaps the multiverse is not infinite. Perhaps it is quite large, but not large enough to assume that anything that is nomologically possible will exist. Sure, a life-sustaining universe is highly improbable, but we are able to assume that it exists in the multiverse because we observe it. However, we observe no Multiversal gods.

I think this is a good reply, but let’s examine what is really being said. Suppose that there is a non-infinite number of universes that exist on the Multiverse Theory. For the Fine-Tuning Argument to be unconvincing, the number of universes that exist must be exceedingly large. For example, if our universe is one of only a handful, I think the FTA still holds quite a lot of force. However, given the Multiversal gods argument, the number of universes that exist cannot be too large, or it will produce the Multiversal God/gods that I have posited. Therefore, what this response is actually positing is what I will call the “Atheistic Sweetspot”: there exists a number of universes so numerous that the FTA is unconvincing, but not enough that the Multiversal Gods argument is convincing. But how likely is it that the number of universes that exist lie within the Atheistic Sweetspot? Is there any reason we should suppose that there is some specific number of universes over any other specific number?

The non-infinite many-universes response hints at an answer, but I find it uncompelling. We do observe the existence of this universe, but that doesn’t tell us anything about how many
universes exist in the multiverse. Recall the inverse gambler’s fallacy that I mentioned in an earlier section. Just because some improbable possibility is observed does not permit an inference that there must have been a great number of trials prior to the observation (or that there exists a great number of trials). Or, put more plainly, just because we observe this universe as life-sustaining, which is highly improbable, does not mean that we can reasonably infer that there are many other universes. Our observation doesn’t give us any information about the number of universes that exist.

Insofar as I can tell, there’s no reason to suppose that one number of universes ought to be thought to exist over any other number of universes, even supposing a finite number of universes. Any specific number of universes is just as likely as any other specific number of universes. It’s just as probable that 2 universes exist on this view as it is that 2 billion universes exist. Still, we can determine that a larger range of universes is more proportionally likely than a smaller range. For instance, the likelihood that there are somewhere between 2 and 104 universes is twice as likely as the likelihood that there are between 2 and 52 universes.

From here we can see why the Atheistic Sweetspot is highly improbable. Suppose we give every possible number of universes an equal probability. Though we know that the number of universes that exist are finite, the number of possible universes is infinite. So, the probability of any given number of universes should be set at 1/\infty. The same can be done with a range of proposed universes. To evaluate the likelihood of some range of universes, we need only to take the number of universes occupying that range and divide it by infinity. So, to evaluate the likelihood of the Atheistic Sweetspot, we can arbitrarily represent the number of universes occupying this range as $n$, which represents some finite number. The likelihood that the number of universes lies within the Atheistic Sweetspot is $n/\infty$. Regardless of the value of $n$, the
probability that the number of universes lies within the Atheistic Sweetspot is infinitesimally small.

Compare this to the probability that a Multiversal god exists. The value for this range would actually be an infinite set higher than n. Here, my knowledge of how to mathematically represent this value runs dry; however, at face value, the infinite range of numbers higher than n is more than the range of numbers in n by definition. Therefore, the likelihood that a Multiversal god exists is necessarily higher than the likelihood that the number of universes that exist lie within the Atheistic Sweetspot. Thus, I take the non-infinite many-universes response to also be a dead end in preserving the Atheistic Multiverse View.

4.0 Conclusion

The aim of my project has been rather simple. I sought only to show that the Atheistic Multiverse View is untenable, particularly because if the Multiverse exists, there is good reason to think that Multiversal God/gods exist as well. In providing this argument, my aim has been to indirectly bolster the Fine-Tuning Argument for the Existence of God by countering one of its most promising responses. I have done this not by showing that the Multiverse Theory is untenable, as some have tried to do; rather, what I have done here is shown that Atheism is untenable if one accepts the Multiverse Theory. In doing this, the Multiverse reply to Fine-Tuning loses its fangs. If the Multiverse Theory is true, there’s good reason to think God/gods exist; if the Multiverse Theory is false, there’s good reason to suppose that the universe has a Creator.

In order to show this, I’ve presented a flurry of arguments, which primarily center around my Multiversal Argument for the Existence of God. I take this argument to be quite compelling
given that the first three premises are rather strong, and defending the fourth premise has been a central focus of this paper. In order to defend the fourth premise, I offered two main arguments which I call the Nomological Omni-conception of God Argument, and the Argument for a Nomologically Possible Perfect Being. Each of these arguments are sufficiently strong on their own, but garner added support when taken together. I then evaluated three main reactions to my argument in order to further clarify and develop my argument.

A note to Theists: as mentioned above, it is not the aim of this paper to convince Theists that Multiversal gods exist, or that they should adopt any kind of Multiversal View. I take it that most Theists will be persuaded by a single-universe hypothesis. However, even if a Theist is inclined to accept the Multiverse Theory, I anticipate that they will be inclined to maintain that a Creator is the origin of the Multiverse. As a Theist myself, I certainly favor a Traditional conception of God under a single-universe view. Indeed, I am inclined to reject both MT and the existence of Multiversal gods like those that I have described. However, I do think that if the Multiverse exists, then these Multiversal god arguments that I have posited ought to be compelling.

My hope in this paper is that the arguments I have presented will ultimately garner added support toward Theism more broadly. My aim is that the average person engaging with the Fine-Tuning/Multiversal arguments will be persuaded to recognize that the Atheistic Multiversal View is untenable; thus, offers no refuge as a response to Fine-Tuning. The inference that I take to be common, described above, ought to be updated with the recognition that the Multiverse Theory entails a high probability that Multiversal gods exist. Overall, I take this to be bolstering a Theistic Single-Universe hypothesis, though I will not argue for that directly here.
There are, of course, many people who may accept the Multiverse Theory for independent reasons. For those people, my hope is that they might consider this sort of Multiversal Theism to be compelling. However, it is not my hope that they remain at that status of belief. My argument is designed to arrive at a God that is similar to traditional Judeo-Christian God. With this in mind, I take my argument to be one that ought to boost credence in the claims of Judeo-Christian Theism. Any argument for the existence of God is incomplete left on its own. The FTA only argues for the existence of a Creator, which is intended to bolster the inference to God more broadly defined. In the same way, if one is compelled to believe in the Multiversal God/gods that I have posited here, perhaps they should also thoughtfully consider the God of the Bible and the claims presented within.

Indeed, I find it beautifully and wonderfully compelling that this vast universe of ours was lovingly and thoughtfully designed by a Creator. One who carefully fashioned humanity in His Image and endowed them with meaning and purpose. Perhaps through my arguments, one might more readily and thoughtfully reflect on the Psalm that I began my paper with:

Psalm 19 (NASB)

1 The heavens tell of the glory of God; And their expanse declares the work of His hands.
2 Day to day pours forth speech, And night to night reveals knowledge.
3 There is no speech, nor are there words; Their voice is not heard.
4 Their line has gone out into all the earth, And their words to the end of the world. In them He has placed a tent for the sun,
5 Which is like a groom coming out of his chamber; It rejoices like a strong person to run his course.
6 Its rising is from one end of the heavens, And its circuit to the other end of them; And there is nothing hidden from its heat.
7 The Law of the Lord is perfect, restoring the soul; The testimony of the Lord is sure, making wise the simple.
8 The precepts of the Lord are right, rejoicing the heart; The commandment of the Lord is pure, enlightening the eyes.
9 The fear of the Lord is clean, enduring forever; The judgments of the Lord are true; they
are righteous altogether.
10 They are more desirable than gold, yes, than much pure gold; Sweeter also than honey and
drippings of the honeycomb.
11 Moreover, Your servant is warned by them; In keeping them there is great reward.
12 Who can discern his errors? Acquit me of hidden faults.
13 Also keep Your servant back from presumptuous sins; Let them not rule over me; Then I
will be innocent, And I will be blameless of great wrongdoing.
14 May the words of my mouth and the meditation of my heart Be acceptable in Your sight,
   Lord, my rock and my Redeemer.
References


