Impartialist Ethics and Psychic Disintegration: A Talking Cure

Roman Nakia Briggs

University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd

Part of the Clinical Psychology Commons, and the Ethics and Political Philosophy Commons

Recommended Citation

http://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/1320

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by ScholarWorks@UARK. It has been accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks@UARK. For more information, please contact scholar@uark.edu, ccmiddle@uark.edu.
Impartialist Ethics and Psychic Disintegration: A Talking Cure

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment
of the requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in Philosophy

by

Roman Nakia Briggs
Henderson State University
Bachelor of Arts in Psychology, 2003
University of Arkansas
Master of Arts in Philosophy, 2005

December 2015
University of Arkansas

This dissertation is approved for recommendation to the Graduate Council.

____________________________________
Dr. Richard Lee
Dissertation Director

____________________________________
Dr. Eric Funkhouser
Dr. Edward Minar
Committee Member
Committee Member
Abstract

This dissertation deals with integrity understood as a state of the psyche. Its primary interlocutor is Professor Bernard Williams, and its point of departure is my interpretation of his *Objection from Integrity* to impartialist moral theories. Against Williams, I hope to show that the active adherent of impartialist ethical systems (e.g., act utilitarianism) may retain both moral integrity and integrity. In demonstrating this, I make use of a variant of Roy Schafer’s *action language* approach to psychoanalysis, and what I call *practical aestheticism*. 
Acknowledgements

The plan was to write up a detailed set of acknowledgements, thanking each of you in specifics. However, as I started the first mental draft of this project, it occurred to me that this would involve a dissertation-length manuscript all its own. For the sake of brevity (and expensive paper), please accept by most sincere and perhaps too concise Thanks!

Thanks, first and foremost, to my parents, Ronald and Mona Briggs – words always fail in describing my love for and gratefulness to you both; I couldn’t have done this without you has never been said with more sincerity. I love you and cherish you more than you know.

Thanks, too, to Ryder and Wyatt – I love you, boys!

And, of course, big thanks to my dissertation committee: the omnibenevolent and über-patient Richard Lee, Eric Funkhouser, and Ed Minar – you guys are the best!

And [in alphabetical order] big thank you shout-outs to: Celeste Atkins; Aaron Baker; Oliver Balson; David Barrett; Norm Bates; Tanya and AJ Biami; Chad Bogosian; The Briggs Brothers (and Sister); Bruce and Chico; Jeff Byrnes; Aaron and Kristin Champene; Stefanie Childers-Turner; Paul Cudney; Joshua and Jenna Daniel; Karen Davidson; Wakanda Davidson; Diana Dominguez; Kevin Durand; Adam and Christy Erwin; Alex Felton; Bob and Kara Fink; Reagan Funkhouser; John Gulley; Angela Hackstadt; Karly Hamilton-Scarborough; Zac Harmon; Dawna and Jake Hendricks; Chuck Hoyack; The Huffman family; Jim Lampinen; Steve Levine; Jack and Raina Lyons; Virginia Pfau-Thompson; Tetima Parnprome; Tatiana Patrone; Cameron Pershall; Jeff Perumal; Matt
and Christina Pianalto; James Pierce; Julie Pollock; Ray Porter; Jennifer Rowe; Sharon Seals; Tom and Georgia Senor; Jerry Sillavan; Lynne Spellman; Sherry Sparks; Barry Ward; Denise Wells; Jeremy and PJ Williams; Holly Wimer; Tony Woodside; and, Kathryn Zawisza.

And, in memoriam, infinite love and thanks to my sister, Heather Briggs Sillavan – you’re with me every moments of every day, sis. To my grandparents, John Jr. and Jesse Mae Briggs and Ray and Jane Davidson; and, to my dear friends, John Foster, Don Ledford, Cody Moore, and Jack and Kevin Walters – you are missed.

Special thanks to Christine Korsgaard for allowing me to view an advanced e-copy of her then-unpublished Self-Constitution: Agency, Identity, and Integrity (2009); and, to Darcia Narvaez for allowing me to view an advanced e-copy of her then-unpublished Character: Essays in Moral Psychology (2009). Special thanks, too, to the attendees of both the International Conference on Persons (BYU, August 2011), and Desire, Drive, Dissent (University of New Mexico, April 2012) for extremely helpful comments on earlier versions of portions of this dissertation.

For anyone that I managed to forget in name, please except my apologies.

Roman Briggs

August 31, 2015
Dedication

This dissertation is dedicated to my parents, Ronald and Mona Briggs – persons of integrity. And, it was completed in memory of my sister, Heather Briggs-Sillavan – a beautiful self.
Chapter 3

3.0: Introduction ................................................................. 196
3.1: Utilitarianism and Disintegration ..................................... 198
3.2: Disintegration and Moral Death ...................................... 216
3.3: Action and Reintegration ............................................. 235
3.4: Reintegration and Aesthetics ......................................... 254
3.5: Concluding Thoughts .................................................. 280

Notes ........................................................................... 286

Appendices

I: The Objection from Integrity ........................................ 318
II. Necessary Conditions of Personhood .............................. 319
III. Necessary Conditions of Selfhood ................................. 320
IV. Necessary Conditions of Moral Selfhood ......................... 321

Bibliography ................................................................. 322
Introduction

I'm an avid consumer of hardboiled fiction – the pulpier, the better. As an enthusiast of this genre, I especially enjoy Raymond Chandler's run of stories featuring the quintessential world-weary gumshoe, Philip Marlowe – *The Big Sleep*, in particular. The following is an interesting story about that story, which I hope will shed some light on my overall approach to this project, and what I had hoped to accomplish in completing it.

When *The Big Sleep* was being adapted to the silver screen for the first time (the 1946 MGM release, costarring Humphrey Bogart and Lauren Bacall), its trio of screenwriters pored over Chandler’s text in attempt to unravel one uncommonly elusive thread. Namely, they needed to establish who killed General Sternwood’s chauffeur, and what the murderer’s motive was. The novel informs us only that the General’s Buick was fished out of the Pacific, the driver’s body still draped around the steering column; that upon impact he had sustained a broken neck, determined by authorities to be the cause of death; that he had been struck across the temple with a blunt object just prior to this; and, finally, that the car’s throttle had been jammed, causing it to accelerate rapidly off of a wharf, and into the ocean.1 These facts certainly suggest that foul play was involved. But, assuming that this is so, who done it?

After unsuccessfullty trying to deduce this from more unambiguous plot points, the scriptists eventually relented, and decided to contact the author, himself. When asked who offed the driver and why, Chandler admitted, somewhat embarrassingly I imagine,
that he had no idea. Forced to take creative license, the screenwriters decided to simply divulge the facetious speculations of Chief Inspector Ohls, and to leave it at that: “Could be a drunk, or a suicide.” Pay no attention to the premortem bump on the head and the obviously tampered-with (in this version) Packard. For whatever reason, Bogie’s Marlowe seems to let this matter go, and the film, like its source material, closes without any resolution.

In the 1978 version of the film (distributed by United Artists, and starring Robert Mitchum), the chauffer’s death enjoys its own scene. Here, we see him seem to intentionally speed the General’s Bentley sedan off of a pier, into the choppy waters of the English Channel. Rather than providing ultimate explanation, though, this raises another, somewhat more involved question: Why did he do it? Perhaps he had succumbed to the effects of a broken heart. After all, we’re informed, the driver had fallen madly in love with the General’s insatiable daughter, Camilla (in the book and first film, Carmen). And, we all know well and good that that was never going to work out, given the severity of her issues.

By the time the Coen Brothers tipped their fedora to Chandler with their deliberately slack homage, The Big Lebowski, the chauffer had disappeared altogether – his few functionary roles being subsumed by other characters less dispensable with respect to pushing forward the narrative.

Here we have one sliver of the structural evolution of The Big Sleep. Was Chandler’s story improved by retellings which included such changes? In a strictly
formative sense, sure. Otherwise, not so much. The novel, in my mind, bests all film adaptations. The first film adaptation is superior to the second. And, the second, at least insofar as we're talking about instances of gritty and grisly dime fiction, per se, is preferable to the third. With each successive reworking, however, certain elements of the story – again, the how and why of the death of the chauffer – are ironed out, improving cohesion and overall flow. So, while none of the subsequent screenplays matches the punch of Chandler's prose, each does the often unheralded work of strategically resituating the characters within the storyline, and of clarifying their motivations. More than that, each interpretation provides us with an opportunity to reconsider the story from a fresh vantage point.

Similarly, while few of Bernard Williams's respondents rival his acuity in their analytical retellings of, and critical rejoinders to, his work on the relation between integrity and moral theory,5 many have played a part in further elucidating his overall position and his understanding of the concepts at issue.6 More than that, in some instances his interlocutors have drawn our attention towards innovative perspectives by which we might make better sense of the original 'story,' and so, to come to terms with, and to more successfully respond to, its upshot.

This is where I come in. The following is my take on the circumstances precipitating the chauffeur's demise – that is, what follows is my account of integrity, of selfhood, and of the relation between these; of how the moral agent may preserve
integrity while adhering to an impartialist ethics; and, of how she may do so in the face of Williams-styled objections, specifically.

So, one might ask, why not take a cue from Joel Coen, and simply write integrity out of the storyline that is Western ethics? Can’t we make sense of moral motivation, and gauge the tenability of particular moral theories, without including this historically inscrutable ‘character’ as a principal part of the intrigue? More than that, must we, in developing integrity as a significant player, also amplify the role played by the self – a concept which has, within the purview of modern moral theory, played a supporting part, at most?

It is my belief, for reasons which should become clear, that both integrity and selfhood lie near the center of a complete and compelling – moreover, healthy – moral discourse. And, painting with an extremely broad brush, the increasing neglect of these critical notions within modern ‘scripts’ is largely what Williams and kindred spirits have unfavorably gestured towards in formulating their objections to impartialist moralities. For these reasons, I hold that integrity, selfhood, and the nature of their connection, deserve a more thorough treatment than has recently been provided. To return to the analogy at hand, the time is ripe for a reboot of the story in which these concepts are among the *dramatis personae*. Here, I offer just such a treatment by providing critical discussion regarding, and therapeutic redescription\(^8\) of, these notions, as well as concentrated exploration of both their relation to one another and of their distinct commissions within practical reasoning.
Unlike those who first adapted Chandler, I don’t have the luxury of contacting Bernard Williams in order to elicit guidance. In offering my interpretation, then, I have relied upon a careful reading of the original texts – as well as of a range of responses to these which make up the literature – a generous pinch of philosophically-informed imagination, and liberal artistic license. Here’s hoping that what I have to say does justice to Williams and to his various interpreters, and that what is novel below complements the virtues of their accounts while excising a few of the more enfeebling deficiencies. I conclude this introduction by providing a précis of each chapter to come, which, taken together, may serve as an annotated table of contents.

In opening Chapter 1, I offer a detailed introduction to the problem of personal integration, generally, working loosely from a Freudian template. Next, I situate the topic within a specifically moral and moral-psychological context by introducing Bernard Williams’s *Objection from Integrity* – an argument advising against the acceptance of impartialist moralities, reliant upon an apparent incompatibility between adherence to such theories and the retention of integrity. Next, I make some preliminary points about the account of integrity which I advocate later, and introduce the concepts central to this. Most notably, I offer a glimpse at the account of selfhood fleshed out in Chapter 2, listing its constituent parts.

I go on to initiate discussion of the positions which I take, in tandem, to provide a solution to Williams’s objection. The first of these involves the adoption of an agent-based aesthetic outlook with respect to practical reasoning, in the place of the traditional
action-based, purely objective standpoint. This shift, I hope to show, may significantly personalize what otherwise tends to show up as essentially impersonal values and moral reasons, and so can help in staving off psychic disintegration. The second of these positions involves the resituating of a psychotherapeutic orientation known as *action language*. In utilizing action language in order to redescribe to oneself the nature and source of desires, values, valuations, and other mental events, I argue that the subject’s tendency to disintegrate can be, to a significant extent, forestalled.

I close the chapter by providing critical discussion of accounts of personal integration which I take to be both excessive and deficient. These are positions advanced by, respectively, the Apostle Paul (and others) and Jacques Lacan (and others). Working from Madhyamaka Buddhist intuitions, I argue that we must negotiate a middle understanding between these two unhealthy extremes in endorsing any acceptable understanding of selfhood – and so, of integrity.

In Chapter 2, I set the table for my own account of psychic integration by discussing in detail that which is to be consolidated: the oscillating network of mental events which I call the *self*. I begin by unpacking the conditions necessary for personhood, itself a prerequisite for selfhood. These conditions include: adequate enculturation; rationality and self-reflection, and the perceived unity of consciousness which accompanies these conditions; the capacity for autonomous agency within contemporary compatibilist parameters; the conception of oneself as being situated in time, and as being psychologically continuous; and, most importantly of all for our
purposes, one’s capacity for valuation, evaluation, and revaluation. I discuss the nature of each of these conditions, the relation in which each stands to the others, and provide reasons for which I take each to be an essential component of the self.

Again, particular attention will be paid to value. So, what is to be valued, and valued so highly? I suggest, piggybacking on the insights of Williams and others, that it is largely involvement with special projects which allows for the preservation of a relatively stable self. And, that those projects which are valued most highly, and so, which warrant an especially strong kind of devotion, are things to which we are committed. It is primarily in terms of commitment and accordant values – more specifically, identity-conferring commitment and values – that I define the self. And, closely related, I define the moral self principally in terms of specifically moral identity-conferring commitments and the moral values which bolster these.

In Chapter 3, I extend discussion of valuation, evaluation, commitment, and identity-conferring commitment, drawing special attention to how these can come into conflict. I make use of an autobiographical vignette provided by Richard Rorty that nicely demonstrates the tension which can come to exist between, first: personal and moral values, and personal and moral commitments – and so, which can cause variance between the self and the moral self. And second, between: competing moral values and commitments. Here, I reintroduce Williams’s *Objection from Integrity*, now playing its premises off of the account of selfhood introduced in Chapter 2 and embodied in Rorty’s sketch.
Next, I offer detailed discussion of the potential for personal disintegration given strict adherence to an impartialist ethics. Specifically, I consider the moral agent’s commitment to act utilitarianism, and explore the potential for dissolution of the self and accompanying feelings of intense estrangement and self-estrangement, given the stipulation that the agent also has, first, personal interests which do not jibe with his moral allegiance; and second, competing moral interests.

I go on to discuss the preservation of integrity against a particularly difficult backdrop for act utilitarianism. I raise the questions: May the person who takes part in acts of optimific terrorism retain integrity? May he retain moral integrity? Or, as some have forcefully argued, are there certain actions, such as those which take the shape of indiscriminant violence, which are simply off the table for sufficiently integrated selves? In answering, I explore the concepts moral death and moral monstrosity, ultimately arguing that the performance of such acts amid adherence to act utilitarianism does not necessarily lead to the agent’s falling into either of these.

Finally, I offer my own account of the process of personal reintegration by means of the joint adoption, again, of an aesthetic perspective in matters of practical reasoning, alongside the application of action language to internal dialogue – the dialogue being that indefinitely long, ideally serial, conversation which takes place between the agent as ‘analyst’ and the agent as ‘analysand.’ Here, I return to psychic disintegration and discuss this in the context of my two-pronged talking cure. This is accompanied by a brief discussion of beautiful selves as practical ideals. Specifically, I explain how attraction to
these ideals can significantly personalize what otherwise show up as objective, impersonal values. I close by offering summary and some final thoughts regarding the project.

Notes

1 Raymond Chandler, 1992, p.43-50

2 Tom Hiney and Frank McShane, 2002, p.105

3 Contrary to the source material, this version of the film takes place in 1970s England, even though it is a preceded by a version of Chandler’s *Farewell, My Lovely* (1975) faithfully set in seedy 1940s Los Angeles, also starring Mitchum as Marlowe and also produced by ITC Entertainment.

4 While the chauffer is nowhere to be found in this version, there might be a nod to him near the conclusion of the film. Upon returning to her husband’s estate from a mysterious leave of absence, trophy-wife Bunny Lebowski crashes her car into a large fountain just outside of the mansion’s foyer. Given the Coen Brothers’ attention to detail, this very well could be an allusion to the original story.

5 As discussed in detail in section 1.2, Bernard Williams provides what is typically taken to be the most influential integrity-centered indictment of impartialist moralities in general, and of act utilitarianism in particular. For this reason, there is no better place to initiate a monograph on integrity as it relates to modern moral thought than by considering Williams’s highly influential, “A Critique of Utilitarianism,” 1973. See p.99, p.114-115, and p.116-117.

The same certainly goes for interlocutors of Freud or of the Buddha – two veritable giants in the history of philosophy, each of whom more indirectly informs what follows.

I should point out from the get-go that the centrality of selfhood to my interpretation of Williams’s *Objection from Integrity* – and, of his consideration of integrity and its practical import, more generally – is not standard. I would like to thank Richard Lee for emphasizing this, and for pushing me to reconsider the prominent place which I have reserved for the self within my reading of Williams.

As noted in the side discussion which makes up Chapter 1, footnote 13, I use *redescription* as Richard Rorty uses this notion. Here, I hope to offer redescriptions of *integrity*, *selfhood*, and *psychic disintegration* and *reintegration* which are therapeutic in the sense that their renewed understanding leads to greater general wellbeing for the modern moral agent. The account which I offer does not pretend to get at the objective and complete truth of the matter regarding these topics, but, instead, is intended to provide a somewhat greater inner peace for the agent by way of the partial reconceptualization and restitution of certain notions central to more traditional conceptions of practical identity.

This *pilfer-then-strategically-resituate* approach to doing philosophy is perhaps best described by Nietzsche, who writes: “The philosopher believes that the value of his philosophy lies in the whole, in the building: posterity discovers it in the bricks in which he has built and which are then often used again for better buildings: in the fact, that is to say, that that building can be destroyed and nonetheless possess value as material (1996, p.261, emphasis is the author’s own).”

Historically, it has been somewhat common for philosophers to categorize integrity as a virtue. This is as good of a place as any to say a bit about why integrity is, in my mind, not best made sense of in this way. I frame this digression by cataloging some of the virtues historically championed by moral philosophers which we might more naturally associate with integrity.

Looking to the ancients, one might attempt to make sense of integrity as being a facet of the virtue σωφροσύνη – typically transliterated as sôphrosunê or sôphrosynê, and typically translated as *temperance* or *moderation*. However, this only gets us to the periphery of those characteristics most central to integrity as I understand it here – that is, as a sense of personal wholeness and harmony with respect to certain mental events. So, while the retention of integrity does assume the capacity for an especially stout self-constraint on the part of the integrated agent, moderation falls well short of capturing what I take integrity to be, overall.

One might also look to δικαιοσύνη as something approximating a Greek analogue – typically transliterated as dikaiosynê, and traditionally translated as *justice*. This, in my
opinion, is a better contender than sôphrosunê – at least as Plato presents it – as there are passages in the *Republic* which are extremely congenial to what I say about the integrated (and even the beautiful) self, below. For instance, in Book IV it is agreed by Socrates and friends that “virtue is the health and beauty and well-being of the soul, and vice [is its] disease and weakness and deformity.” Moreover, Plato ultimately describes the ideal state, and so the ideal self *writ large*, in terms of its constituent parts working together as a whole, with each performing its proper function and no other. But, whereas this component of justice involves the cohesion of the state (so, of the self), there is not sufficient overlap with other characteristics and capacities essential to persons of integrity to successfully argue that integrity, and only integrity, is what Plato has in mind. To provide one important point of divergence, I go on to suggest that persons of integrity must remain open to revaluation and change. This is not, given an orthodox reading, what Plato seems to have in mind by justice. It could be argued, in fact, that the kind of potential (and perpetual) innovation which I have in mind is in the antithesis of Plato’s conception of justice.

Finally, one might suggest that it is not any one virtue which Plato equates with integrity, but the unity of the virtues jointly cultivated by the truly arêteic person. Here, I certainly disagree. Aside from temperance, steadfastness, and intellectual honesty, I don’t take it that any of the other traditional Greek virtues are necessary for the acquisition of, or the retention of, integrity. On the account of integrity that I endorse, the integrated self needn’t be the courageous and prudent and temperate and [etc.] self. However, again, it might be the case that the integrated self must also be temperate. To suggest that, say, temperance is necessary for the retention of integrity, though, is not to suggest it is identical to or is in part integrity, itself. For these reasons, talk of integrity as a Platonistic virtue seems forced.

Similarly, integrity cannot be found in name or in essence among those virtues championed by either Aristotle (or his followers, historical or contemporary) or the medieval Christians (or their followers, historical or contemporary). Although, psychic cohesion is gestured to by all of the above as being of some importance to leading a morally good life. One could compelling argue that the person of integrity must possess the classical Christian virtue *industria* (diligence), as it is understood in some contexts. However, as we have already noted with regard to moderation, to say that this virtue is a necessary condition for attaining and sustaining integrity is certainly not to say it is also sufficient for achieving it. Nor is it to say that diligence is to be identified with or to be considered a part of integrity. More than that, there are definite ideas affixed to diligence as it is understood *qua* Judeo-Christian virtue, specifically (e.g., work ethic), which simply do not at all connote integrity as it is typically understood outside of that particular context, or as I unpack it below.

Setting aside the ancients, a number of contemporary philosophers have suggested that an *ad hoc* account of integrity in terms of virtue may be eked out. David Concepción (2002) and Paul Robinson (2009) have argued independently of one another that integrity...
may be best understood as the mean situated between *akrasia* and stubbornness. Damian Cox, Marguerite La Caze, and Michael Levine also seem to endorse something similar to this at times, suggesting that “the virtue of integrity involves handling self conflict well. It occupies a mean, for example, between holding true to commitments no matter what the cost to other values and changing one’s mind capriciously . . . The good at which integrity aims is a mean between, on the one hand, a disintegrated, utterly fragmented and capricious self and, on the other, a hollow, yet ruthlessly consistent self (2003, p.4-5).”

Like those attempts to place integrity within a context of ancient Greco-Roman virtue ethics, such construals don’t seem to get at what I have in mind, as those who advocate this view seem to be mistaking that which is to be integrated – the set of fluid psychic relations which I will refer to as the *self* – for those character traits which, in part, facilitate the semi-harmonious state of these mental events. In fact, given the second explanation of integrity in terms of mean, Cox, La Caze, and Levine seem to ostensibly admit just this. Still, I readily concede this much to the virtue proponent: it is entirely possible that we may best make sense of those characteristics naturally suited for attaining and preserving personal integrity as virtues.

Adding a point about motivation to this, Bernard Williams writes: “... one should perhaps say that integrity is not a virtue at all ... While it is an admirable human property, it is not related to motivation as the virtues are. It is not a disposition which itself yields motivations ... nor is it a virtue of that type, sometimes called ‘executive virtues,’ which do not yield a characteristic motive ... It is rather that one who displays integrity acts from those dispositions and motives which are more deeply his, and has also the virtues that enable him to do that. Integrity does not enable him to do it, nor is it what he acts from when he does so (1999f, p.49).”

10 See Elizabeth Anscombe (1981b) and Alan Donagan (1978)

Chapter 1

1.0: Introduction

In section 1.1, I introduce the problem of psychic integration, generally, framed by Freudian insights. I liken the moral philosopher’s task to the psychoanalyst’s, suggesting that each endeavors to facilitate his own patient’s self-reconciliation – the philosopher’s patient, figuratively speaking, being the moral agent who suffers psychic disintegration stemming from the commitment to mutually exclusive values and commitments. I go on to provide initial discussion of my redescription of the sufficiently integrated self – given my understanding of this notion, the self of integrity – here, conceptualized primarily in terms of a relatively harmonious constellation of those values and commitments with which the agent literally identifies. Finally, I introduce the first of two tools which I later appropriate in reconciling impartialist ethics with integrity; namely, I briefly explain the aesthetic approach to practical reasoning, and say something about how I intend to use this for my own purposes.

In section 1.2, I narrow the parameters of my analysis of psychic integration to that which deals with moral psychology, specifically. Here, I formulate and discuss my interpretation of Bernard Williams’s Objection from Integrity – an argument purporting to demonstrate that, as impartialist moralities do not allow for integrity, they are to be rejected by the agent outright. Next, I elaborate on the intrinsic connection between active commitment and integrity – so, psychic integration – and, given my conception of integrity as an identity-conferring state of certain mental events, with selfhood.
In section 1.3, I talk about the conceptual roots of integrity, relating this notion to the self. I then go on to introduce the second of the tools which I later commandeer in responding to Williams; namely, I discuss the application of action language to psychoanalysis, and say something about how I intend to use a variation of this for my own purposes. In closing this section, I mention narrativity theories of identity, briefly explaining their affinity with action language, and alluding to the potential utility of these approaches in collectively aiding psychic reintegration.

I close the chapter by providing a critical look at excessive and deficient conceptions of psychic integration. Adherence to either of these extremes, I argue, serves as an impediment to the acceptance of healthier conceptions of selfhood. In section 1.4, I sketch a genealogical outline of what I refer to as psychic perfection, based on extracts from the autobiographical writings of the Apostle Paul and St. Augustine. This excursion is intended to furnish some familiarity with the conceptual ancestry of the present folk understandings of integrity and selfhood, and to shed light on why, both historically and contemporarily, the self's preservation in psychic perfection is felt by many to be of such importance.

Finally, in section 1.5, I argue against a pair of accounts which are radically antirealist about the self – advanced, in turn, by Jacques Lacan and María Lugones. Lacan holds that mental events cannot be integrated to any meaningful extent, even purely at the level of the conscious mind. Given this, the argument goes, self-talk is illusive, potentially harmful, and so, should be discarded. Lugones holds that those social roles
and values with which many individuals identify the most strongly are irreconcilable. Given this, she claims, it makes no sense to talk about such persons as being integrated selves. These and similar positions advance what I refer to as a doctrine of psychic disarray – a strict denial of the self in the mold of certain interpretations of ancient India’s anattā doctrine. I suggest that acceptance of psychic disarray – and, following from this, exclusion of the term self from psychological, philosophical, and lay discourse – is every bit as detrimental to a healthy conception of the person as adherence to psychic perfection is.

1.1: Selves Disintegrated

As Charles Taylor has pointed out, clinicians practicing in contemporary Western society are dealing progressively less with those hysterias, phobias, and fixations which seem to have permeated 1890s Vienna. Meanwhile, there has been a significant increase in the number of consultations concerning lack of self-cohesion and core – or, as Taylor puts it, “ego loss” – diminution of purpose, and a lingering sense of emptiness. Freud anticipated these trends, writing more than a century ago of a self that has become fragmented across all intelligible lines, and whose ego has been – in part, as a result of this – decentered. Never one to be concerned with the purely academic, Freud spent a great many trips to the inkwell speculating about why these conditions manifest in the peculiar ways that they sometimes do, and how these psychic states and their accompanying symptoms might be remedied.
Understanding that treatment begins with self-knowledge and self-reconciliation on the part of the patient; and, realizing that self-knowledge and self-reconciliation on the part of the patient can only result from effective analysis; Freud dedicated his life to restructuring both theory and therapy.\textsuperscript{17} Contrasting his own theoretical incendiary with its predecessors, he writes:

> Although . . . humbled in his external relations [by Copernicus and Darwin], man feels himself to be supreme within his own mind . . . [However,] this mind is not a simple thing . . . it is a hierarchy of superordinated and subordinated agencies, labyrinth of impulses striving independently of one another towards action, corresponding with a multiplicity of instincts and of relations with the external world, many of which are antagonistic to one another and compete.\textsuperscript{18}

Following previous decenterings,\textsuperscript{19} we, Westerners, eventually found ourselves able to carve out new spaces of meaning – chiefly by synthesizing novel worldviews with a reconceptualization of certain long-established concepts which, for one reason or another, remained necessary to making sense of our pooled identity.\textsuperscript{20} However, insofar as we conceive of ourselves as integrated selves, Freud describes a psychic reality so at odds with conventional thinking that, granting even his most basic assumptions, we are unseated from our very essence.

> It is one thing, after all, to be decentered with respect to the cosmos – or, for that matter, with regard to a hierarchy of living things. It is something else altogether for the subject to be decentered from the mind which she, in the most literal sense, identifies. Pulling no punches, Freud writes:
You behave like an absolute ruler who is content with the information supplied him by his highest officials and never goes among the people to hear their voice. Turn your eyes inward, look into your own depths, learn first to know yourself! . . . *The ego is not master in his own house.*

To call this a diagnosis deflates beyond recognition what Freud is attempting to impart. To put a sharper point on things, it is not the mentally abnormal that he is addressing, but the person, *simpliciter*. Fragmentation of the self and displacement of the ego are not the tandem culmination of some recherché disorder found only within the pages of the DSM-5. Here, Freud is describing the predicament of the socialized person, as such. I’m fragmented. You’re fragmented. All persons were, and will continue to be, fragmented psychically. Given this, the only questions which warrant asking are, *To what extent is the self divided in this way?* And, *How may we go about strengthening our egos and partially reintegrating our selves, so that we can recuperate a reasonable degree of control over our actions and some say over the trajectory of our lives?*

Although Freud generalizes in answering, his findings are based on the clinical evaluation of individual analysands, the theory construction which follows, and the introduction of curative practices based on these—most pertinently, psychoanalysis. While his analytical approach certainly matured over the years, Freud recognized very early on that therapeutic *talk* could bring about marked improvement in the conditions of his patients. I hope to demonstrate that a variation of this can also be used to
effectively treat the moral psychologist’s ‘patient’ – the disintegrating modern moral agent.

Here, I introduce a kind of Freudian talking cure\textsuperscript{23} by which the sometimes dissonant mental components of the moral agent may be sufficiently reintegrated. Rather than considering the aggregate psyche, my focus will remain on the disharmony between fully-acknowledged moral and personal values and commitments, and between fully-acknowledged competing moral values and commitments – and so, between what I refer to throughout as the self and the moral self. Along the way, I establish therapeutic redescriptions of these concepts, as well as redescriptions of psychic integration, disintegration, and reintegration – therapeutically redescribed, in the sense that these rehabilitated understandings are, in important ways, healthier than their parent concepts.\textsuperscript{24}

While I borrow from Freud throughout, when it comes to the consolidation of the consciously known with the actively repressed components of the mind, I defer to psychoanalytic and post-psychoanalytic convention, completely. I do so, first, and most obviously, because I lack the expertise to offer even the most rudimentary thoughts on bridging the conscious-unconscious divide. I do so, second, because my discussion of this global fragmentation is only intended to serve as an analogue to my focus: the integration, disintegration, and reintegration of the purely conscious mind as the subject engages in practical reasoning. For my purposes, then, I will simply assume the sufficient
integration of the conscious and unconscious when constructing and treating the mockup of the self considered in Chapters 2 and 3.

Some might object that in positing this, I have assumed the very integration at which psychoanalysis aims. And so, nothing more needs to be said as far as the mental wellbeing of the moral agent goes. I disagree. It is certainly possible for one to have suitably reconciled her conscious with her unconscious mind, but to continue to struggle with a form of fragmentation which involves fully-acknowledged mental events, exclusively.25 Here, I have in mind she who, on the one hand, is torn between known personal and moral values and commitments; and she who, on the other, is torn between known competing moral values and commitments, some of which have a very personal feel. It is these forms of psychic disintegration, specifically, to which I hope to offer a partial corrective in the pages to come.

To call this a diagnosis, once again, misses the point. It is not the abnormal moral agent, per se, that I am referring to, but all who are genuinely committed to a sufficiently impartialist ethics, on its terms. This particular fragmentation is not the result of obedience to some obscure moral theory whose adherents number a dozen. Nor is this the product of a misunderstanding on the part of the agent concerning what impartialist moralities actually demand. Here, I am describing the base condition of the modern moral agent insofar as she is pressed to perform some action by existing moral values and commitments, and simultaneously to perform an opposing action by existing personal
values and commitments; or, insofar as she is pressed to perform incompatible actions by competing moral values and commitments.\textsuperscript{26}

With psychic fragmentation understood in this restricted way, we are faced with a pair of questions which parallel those raised above: To what extent is the conscious self divided across the moral-personal line? And, in other instances, across the moral-moral line? And, How can those of us who are adversely affected by either go about partially mending these psychic splits and treating those debilitating feelings of self-estrangement which sometimes accompany them?

Given the practical importance of successfully answering these questions, it may be conceded that this project is worth pursuing, but then further objected that in focusing solely on the conscious self, we have moved decidedly beyond the neighborhood in which psychoanalytic theory and praxis lives and labors. Again, I disagree. While it is certainly the case that the principal objective of psychoanalysis is to bring to the surface those unconsciously-situated parts of the mind necessary for a partial reconciliation to take place, this is so because it is this fragmentation that is typically the greatest detriment to normal functioning. If this is not the case – stipulating, again, that these parts of the mind stand at relative peace – attention should be shifted towards mediating those known components at reciprocal variance. I ostensively argue in the pages to come that there are many psychoanalytic concepts and techniques that, once modified, can be of tremendous benefit in making sense of the relationship between integrity and commitment to impartialist moralities. It is my view, in fact, that Freud and
the moral philosopher are, at least in this case, working opposite sides of the same street. And so, a variation of Freud’s talking cure provides a serviceable prototype when it comes to treating the disintegrating moral agent.

Having defended my appropriation of certain psychoanalytic tools, I will now say something about the features of the account of psychic integration offered in the pages to come, the conceptions of integrity and selfhood endorsed there, and the various ways in which what I offer differs from its competitors.

I propose an account of psychic integration – so, on my conception of this, the creation of and the preservation of the integrity of the self – delineated primarily in terms of the fluid consolidation of certain values and commitments. As my understanding of these notions is entirely descriptive, they do rest upon a moral foundation. However, in exceptional instances, the sufficiently integrated person can possess a self and moral self which coextend. Again, this is not because I define integrity in terms of anything approaching extraordinary scrupulousness. One need not embody Susan Wolf’s moral sainthood, in other words, in order to be a person of integrity; she need not even be decent by most standards. Still, the personal, in principle, may overlap with the moral in toto because I discuss the push to moral action partially in terms of a kind of an aesthetics of the self.

Put another way, I describe the integration of the moral with the personal in terms of a consonance between motivating values, commitments, and reasons which flow out one’s aesthetic evaluation of what beautiful selfhood comes to. So, in cases where the
beautiful self is understood purely in terms of the saintly self, and where one becomes motivated exclusively by the desire to cultivate such a self in action, this mutual inclusion is possible.

Given what I have just said about the part played here by practical aestheticism, the theory that I am advancing may come off as viciously subjective to conservative readers. However, I hope to show that it may appease even those with strong moral realist intuitions, as the aesthetic perspective adopted in determining what kind of self a person wishes to create or sustain may be characterized as one which motivates the inculcation of, say, virtuous traits; or, as one which moves the agent to routinely use decision-making procedures that procure morally-required actions, exclusively.\(^3\) Conversely, for those with moral antirealist intuitions, this aesthetic outlook may be viewed as that which guides one towards internalizing qualities, or towards using practical calculi, that are merely instrumentally good – morally good, to rework the analogy for my own purposes, in the eye of the beholder.\(^3\)

There is nothing in the accounts which I offer of values, commitments, or integrity which precludes the existence of objective values. I provide no formal arguments against the realist’s position, and welcome those who hold to the belief that such values exist, and in the manner in question. At the same time, my account does not require the acceptance of even the most deflated forms of moral realism.\(^3\) I leave room for theories of value, on both objective and subjective understandings. And, I welcome theories which both emphasize the cultural inheritance of moral codes, and, conversely, which stress the
individual’s role in independently accepting or rejecting such sets of principles. Further, I assume that moderate versions of each of these takes on the acquisition of value have merit.

Having now suggested that I take seriously both the communal origin of values, and the individual’s ability to define herself in terms of a defiance of these very values, it may seem that the accounts of valuation and evaluation at work here perilously tread the fence which separates communitarian and liberal axiologies.\(^{33}\) While it is true that I appreciate each, what I have to say finds itself a bit more at home with a moderate conception of the latter, especially as far as the essential subjectivity of aesthetic values and subsequent commitments is concerned. While I wholeheartedly agree with the communitarian that the values with which the individual finds herself in childhood (and, in most instances, on into early adulthood) cannot originate from any source other than that of the community in which she was brought up, the aesthetic perspective and accompanying values she will embrace in evaluating these and other values – while also, certainly, initially originating from this same source – are best described as, in a strong sense, her own, once she has taken steps to make them so. And, I argue later, coming to legitimately own this deliberative process and its supporting values involves reflective endorsement on the part of the agent.

If, upon serious reflection, the agent finds herself clinging to values and commitments – so, to a self – with which she has misgivings, the burden is on her to work towards replacing these with others. In so doing, she has taken the foremost step in
cultivating a new, more beautiful self, and, more basic still, of becoming her own person.
On the other hand, if she unreflectively adheres to values, commitments, and practical ideals inherited from her parents, peers, etc., then these are in no significant sense hers. Being essentially undergirded by such things, she is in no sense her own person, and falls into a dangerous inauthenticity, which, to put things in the most relevant terms, disallows integrity – as, aside from everything else, integrity demands that the agent be, in the act of valuation, evaluation, commitment, and subsequent action, true to her true self in choosing her self.

In some sense, then, the act of aesthetically appreciating a certain self – even in cases where the practical ideal embraced is ultimately identical to that endorsed by one’s community – involves placing oneself at odds with others, such that she may autonomously choose to accept or to reject this ideal, these values, and the evaluative perspective which she has been deeded by these persons. Think of these action-guiding values as a particular set of Kant’s *counsels of prudence* – hypothetical imperatives, shorn of any appeals to universalization or patient-centered side-constraints, guided by one’s aesthetically-derived practical ideal. Here, the content of the rules that any agent self-legislates follow directly from the desire to construct and sustain what is best described, again, as a beautiful self.

This is all extremely abstract – but, given that this is intended to be a preliminary glance at the project, this probably cannot be helped. Please rest assured, though, that much more will be said of what practical aestheticism amounts to and how this fits in
with psychic reintegration in Chapter 3. For now, I will set aside the topics of value, valuation, evaluation, reasons, and the relationship between these, and move on to consider in some detail an outline of the argument central to all that follows, and the concept most salient to this – integrity.

1.2: The Objection from Integrity

To summarize, the fragmentation of the conscious self – given the agent’s acceptance of an uncompromisingly impartialist morality, whether intuitive, or religiously or philosophically derived – has become increasingly widespread. Not surprisingly, the symptoms associated with psychic disintegration are no longer being speculated about exclusively by psychoanalysts. Contemporary clinicians of moral agency – philosophers and moral psychologists – have more and more voiced their own worries about the modern moral agent’s tendency to disintegrate, specifically across the lines of the personal-moral and the moral-moral. Certain critics have even gone so far as to accuse otherwise revered moral theorists – Kant and Bentham, specifically – for advancing ethical systems which lead to this fragmentation; or, put into much more colorful language, of proliferating what Michael Stocker refers to as moral schizophrenia. Describing this condition, Stocker writes:

One mark of a good life is a harmony between one’s motives and one’s reasons, values, justifications. Not to be moved by what one values – what one believes good, nice, right, beautiful, and so on – bespeaks a malady of the spirit. Such a malady . . . can
properly be called *moral schizophrenia* – for [this involves] a split between one’s motives and one’s reasons.\(^{39}\)

Stocker’s point is that impartialist moralities tend to legislate precepts which necessarily stand at significant odds with the individual agent’s personal projects, values, commitments, moral codes, and with the personal point of view, generally speaking.\(^{40}\) Such theories demand that the moral agent performs actions which have been determined in a completely dispassionate way, by, say, adhering to the dictates of a hedonic calculus. Meanwhile, the agent’s personal values – more often than not bound up with the favoritism that she feels should be shown towards an intimate or a labor of love – dictate that she must *not* perform these same actions due to the neglect of such projects.\(^{41}\) This can lead to feelings of extreme alienation from the moral theory itself (and the Good insofar as it is understood as connected with the theory’s demands); from the agent’s desire to adhere to the theory (so, the desire to adhere to the Good); from the reasons which flow out of such desires, and – insofar as the agent’s rational capacities lead to understanding the Good as described by the theory – from reason, itself;\(^{42}\) from the agent’s moral projects and commitments; and finally, from the moral side of the agent’s very *personality*. That is, in extreme cases, this can lead to a figurative expulsion of the moral self from the self.

Siding with those commitments most important to her sense of existing identity, the individual comes to view the moral self as, in a strong sense, foreign. Here, the moral self becomes *persona non grata*, the *Other*, a *thing*. Describing this experience, Bernard
Mayo writes: “A [moral] rule necessarily restricts my freedom; so far from not being something representable as something alien, a rule cannot, at least initially, be represented as anything else. Unlike my character and my purposes, a rule is an it.” So too, the thoughts, desires, commitments, and other mental events which support morality in the face of personal commitment can show up within the individual’s deliberations as its as well. This colors each of the agent’s experiences. She may come to feel that a world which forces her to choose between the personal and the moral, and to always favor the latter, must be essentially unjust; or, reaching metaphysically, that there must be some omniscient counterweight which will right this intrinsically inequitable state of affairs somewhere down the line.

Considering the same occurrence from the opposing perspective, the facet of one’s personality which is beholden to morality finds itself alienated from desires regarding the completion of personal projects. This follows, by some estimations, from an “overvaluing” of moral values in the part of the agent. It is here that we find a splintering of the conscious self which reflects Freud’s tripartite conception of the psyche. And, as with Freud, each projection of the conscious self – the moral (a surface variant of the superego), the partial and hedonistic (a domesticated id) – means to act in accord with its own particular desires and interests irrespective of how this conflicts with its psychical opponents.

The feelings of self-estrangement associated with the fragmentation of the conscious self may be, in a way, worse for the sufferer than those of its unconscious
counterpart. Here, the disconnection from certain projects that one experiences when taking the impartial point of view (and vice versa) is immediately present before the mind. And here, the agent is well aware that she is being pulled apart by the segments which comprise her own personality. Front and center, she feels the unremitting tear of this. These components – due to their fixed incongruity with one another and oftentimes disagreement with the will of the agent – can show up as antagonistic, outlying forces, intensifying this sense of alienation. In extreme cases, the agent may come to view herself as little more than an unqualified and overly complaisant mediator (a weakened ego, to return to Freud) who must arbitrate between the most unreasonable of disputants.

In willing an action, the choice comes down to: either perform the action espoused by the moral theory, relinquishing what is personally important in the process; or, act in order to further what one values personally, and, in so doing, knowingly perform what the theory judges deems an immoral (or, at least, nonoptimific) action. Described in terms of practical identity: one may either preserve her commitment to morality (the commitment which, in part, makes up her moral self), or preserve her personal commitment (the commitment which, in part, makes up her self). With the performance of either action, the agent is torn. Psychic disintegration occurs. But, in inaction she is torn also – as, this ambivalence also constitutes an undesirable forced choice made. Once again, psychic disintegration occurs. So, what should the agent choose? The moral or the personal?
While the history of philosophy teems with those who affirm the overridingness of morality, there is a still-developing trend among contemporary ethicists to highlight the importance of personal commitments and the role that these play in matters of identity. Michael Stocker, one philosopher who has outspokenly advanced this position, has already been introduced. Another advocate of this point of view – and, a philosopher whose influence here is paramount – is Bernard Williams. Working from assumptions similar to Stocker’s, Williams has characterized the problem with impartialist ethics in terms of a failure to respect the moral agent’s integrity. While Williams makes significant use of this concept, he says very little about what integrity actually comes to. In taking the objection seriously, it is important, then, that we ask and answer the following: What is integrity? And, why, if it actually is, is integrity of such importance to us?

We may best approach answering these questions by asking and answering one which is immediately a bit more manageable: What do Williams’s concerns about the undermining of personal integrity have to do with Stocker's worries about moral schizophrenia? Let’s consider the ways in which the two accounts are similar: both Williams and Stocker speak of the evils of an extreme contrariety of personal and moral values, commitments, and reasons – and, to extrapolate, of a subsequent division of the self, whether described in terms of disintegration (Williams) or schizophrenia (Stocker). When it comes to taking sides with respect to values, commitments, and reasons, both endorse personal values and projects over their impersonal, moral counterparts. So much
the worse, it seems, for taking the objective point of view in practical life. I will formulate this argument as follows:

1. In order to preserve a sufficiently cohesive self – to be a self – one must preserve an adequate integration of certain mental events.

2. In order to preserve this degree of psychic integration, one must make some personal commitments with the intention of keeping these, even when doing so flies in the face of the demands of morality; as, this is, in large part, constitutive of sufficient psychic integration. Therefore, 3. In order to preserve a sufficiently cohesive self, one must make some personal commitments with the intention of keeping these, irrespective of all other considerations (from 1-2).

4. One must possess a sufficiently cohesive self (from intuition).

5. Therefore, one must make, with the intention of holding to, some personal commitments (from 3-4).

But, 6. Strict adherence to any impartialist moral theory at least potentially requires that the adherent break any or all of her personal commitments, at any time.

So, 7. Stipulating that the agent adheres to an impartialist ethics, her integrity is virtually compromised at each moment (from 2 and 6).

8. Since adherence to impartialist moral theories is incompatible with making personal commitments with the intention of keeping them sans
phrase; and, since adhering to such theories is incompatible with an agent’s retaining her integrity (6-7); such theories are to be rejected as viable moralities.\textsuperscript{53}

Call this argument \textit{IO}.\textsuperscript{54}

Regardless of what an impartialist ethics dictates, the individual must make with the intention of keeping at least some personal commitments. Otherwise, she will cease to possess (or to be) a self. And, selfhood as such, it is reasonably assumed, trumps moral selfhood in cases of conflict, since selfhood is directly tied to autonomous action. If one does not hold to certain identified-with values and commitments unwaveringly, then she cannot produce the friction necessarily to \textit{freely} choose to perform one action rather than another.

Central to IO is integrity – on my interpretation, the state of the sufficiently integrated self. Below, I offer a detailed account of the nature of this mental state which is, I hope, compelling to a diverse range of readers, and strong enough to denote the proper degree of cohesiveness necessary for the health and proper functioning of the moral agent; but, an account which also takes seriously the fragility of practical identity, and which keeps in mind the fact that any attempt at characterizing selfhood in terms of absolute cohesion and transparency is not an option. Alongside my discussion of the nature of integrity, I offer a detailed account of the process of personal integration insofar as the moral self and self are concerned.
I will now say a bit more about my take on integrity in order to provide something of the lay of the land, and to introduce briefly what I will argue we may use in addition to practical aestheticism in order to treat the disintegrating moral agent – Roy Schafer’s action language.

1.3: Selves Reintegrated

Many times it is best to begin conceptual analysis by referencing the original lexical instantiations of the idea in question. Since I hope to offer an account of integrity which is, in some sense, true to its contemporary usage, and since the contemporary usage in important respects harkens back to its original meaning, I take this to be just such a case.

Etymologically, integrity derives from the Latin integri, a root which it shares with integer: meaning whole, sound, or untouched. Since my concern is with the integrity of the self – and so, the integration of the moral self with the self – something must be said about just what it is at the component level that we are to make whole in this particular context. I suggest that integrity involves the partial harmonization of values, desires, resultant commitments, and – flowing out of each of these – reasons for action, and actions. Given that we all have values, desires, commitments, and reasons which conflict with one another to some extent (and, of course, the divergent components may be mixed and matched, e.g., one value may conflict with another value, or one value may conflict with a desire, and so on), full integration, even if it were desirable, is impossible. To what extent, then, should we seek psychic wholeness?
First, I argue, we should make certain that what are referred to in the literature as identity-conferring commitments accord with one another, as well as with other potential motivators of action; and, that we come to hold these commitments in the correct way. This is essential, as – no surprise here, given the way in which they are characterized – these commitments lie at the very center of who we are as individual selves.

Second, as much as circumstances allow, we must see to it that those projects and commitments more peripheral to our self-conception accord with our identity-conferring commitments, with other motivators, and with each other. Note that we need not square all such projects and commitments, just as we need not square all values, desires, and reasons. To do so, again, would be impossible. As our identity-conferring commitments take precedence over other projects and commitments insofar as the preservation of any particular self goes, we may use the former to evaluate the relative worth of the latter. For this reason, our identity-conferring commitments and corresponding values do the yeoman work of all of: situating who we are; motivating action; enabling us to evaluate secondary commitments and projects; and, setting limits on what we may do, and what we certainly must not do, given the self we wish to create or sustain.

In using our identity-conferring commitments in their evaluative capacity, we can, from time to time, reconsider the prudence of remaining committed to less important plans and projects. In cases where a project stands at odds with an identity-conferring commitment, integrity is best preserved by distancing ourselves from such things.
altogether. This is because involvement with such a project, even in the absence of our actively working towards its fruition, may erode our will to the identity-conferring commitment which it counters, and eventually lead to an outright self-betrayal. Sliding down this slope, in turn, may lead to the disintegration of, and so the death of the self in question.

Notice that I have qualified my appraisal of whether or not we must remain committed to any particular identity-conferring commitment. Again, an identity-conferring commitment should take precedence over competing projects and commitments only insofar as we are interested in preserving personal integrity – that is, only insofar as we wish to sustain our present self. I do not intend to say anything stronger than this for the following reasons: There may come a time when a person judges her self – as defined, again, largely in terms of her identity-conferring commitments and supporting values – to be unworthy of preservation. A time when she consciously chooses to disintegrate this self, so that a superior, still developing self may emerge to take its place. Such a change of heart may take place gradually, or, in rare instances quite suddenly.58

In cases such as these, the agent’s willed disintegration may be a praiseworthy endeavor. This points to another glaring dissimilarity between the account of integrity I offer, and more traditional accounts which hold that integrity, itself, is an intrinsic good. I argue that the value we place on the integrated state of a particular self supervenes on the value we place on the self in question. Put another way, the sustained integration of a
particular self is valuable only insofar as the self in question is that which is deemed valuable by the aesthetic values mentioned above. The sustained integration and subsistence of any particular self, then, is not an inherently desirable state of affairs, and may serve as an impediment to positive growth in cases where the self in question is essentially flawed, but held together by inherited commitments not reflected upon or bad habits which it continues to hold to but from which it stands alienated, as opposed to reflectively-endorsed commitments which prop up an ideal self.59

To go much further with this would be to take us too far beyond what a preparatory treatment will allow for. Again, much more will be said about psychic integration, disintegration, and reintegration – and the role of practical aestheticism in all of this – in the sections to come. Before closing this section, I would like to add three points, each of which is pertinent to this particular topic and to the dissertation as a whole.

First, since the upholders of IO have targeted impartialist modern moral theories almost exclusively – again, pitting personal integrity against its moral counterpart, and championing the former – what I later discuss in terms of values standing opposed to personal identity-conferring commitments will be moral in nature. And, since it is generally agreed that the most egregious moral violator of personal integrity is act utilitarianism,60 what I have to say in defense of an agent’s adhering to the dictates of an impartialist ethics will be discussed with this theory in mind, specifically. However, what follows throughout Chapter 3 may be said mutatis mutandis in defense of other
impartialist moral theories, as well – specifically, again, rule utilitarianism, Kantianism, standard versions of contractarianism, and (I make this claim with lesser confidence) both unrestricted and restricted divine command systems of ethics.

My second closing point: in treating the disintegrating self, I recommend that we make use of a modification of a clinical methodology formulated by the post-Freudian psychoanalyst, Roy Schafer: *action language*. And, by using an approach to analysis which is analogous to that described by Schafer here:

> Psychoanalysts may be described as people who listen to the narrations of analysands and help them to transform these narrations into others that are more complete, coherent, convincing, and adaptively useful than those they have been accustomed to constructing.

Here, psychoanalysts are recast as “retellers of narrations,” and encouraged to shelve classical Freudian metapsychological terminology with its talk of independently acting drives in favor of a vocabulary which emphasizes agency, autonomy, and personal responsibility on the part of the person. Elsewhere, describing the clinical implementation of action language, Schafer writes:

> We shall regard each psychological process, event, experience, or behavior as some kind of activity, henceforth to be called an action, and shall designate each action by an active verb stating its nature and by an adverb (or adverbal locution), when applicable, stating the mode of this action . . . We must understand the word action to include all private psychological activity that can be made public through gesture and speech, such
as dreaming and the unspoken thinking of everyday life, as well as all initially public activity, such as ordinary speech and motoric behavior that has some goal directed or symbolic properties.\textsuperscript{64}

While Schafer has crafted this methodology in order to treat the more traditional analysand – in order to help reintegrate the mind of the patient by means of using ownership and control of mental events as a kind of psychic cement – I argue that this may also be used to resolve those conflicts which threaten to pull apart the self specifically amid commitments to impartialist moral theories and the personal values which conflict with these. In other words, I claim that by learning how to redescribe certain mental events in terms of controlled actions, we can move towards reestablishing a lost sense of agency and identification. This restoration may, in turn, help in preserving psychic integration in instances where this is desirable.

Mental events – including desire, valuation, evaluation, and commitment – will be construed as proper actions. In redescribing the source and nature of these, we construct a narrative which not only allows us to reclaim previously shirked or even repudiated mental events as our own – and so, to move towards reintegrating the self – but, in sharing our own story, even if only inwardly, we are also providing for ourselves a lost sense of continuity essential to the institution and future retention of a state of integrity. Here, I make reserved use of the work of narrativity theorists of personal identity.\textsuperscript{65} Now that I have said something about both the state of the disintegrating and self-alienated agent, and the method by which we will treat him, I should now mention one
chief area in which the analogy between his care and that of the psychoanalyst’s patient breaks down – one, however, which seems to stand in favor of the moral agent’s prognosis so far as the likelihood for long term mental health goes. I am referring to the potential for what analysts refer to as “self analysis.” Or, the ability for the analysand to work through matters largely on his own, assuming knowledge of a suitable therapeutic methodology, a hardy self-awareness, and sufficient objectivity.66

Although the moral agent treated in Chapter 3 is fictitious, it is also the case that each of us, as actual individuals, takes part in moral agency. And so, each of us just is an embodied instantiation of this moral agent when considering ourselves and our actions as they pertain to moral values and reasons. Although the clinician discussed there is a facet of this merely imagined agent’s psyche, it is also the case that each of us can claim his place through introspection and the process of self-analysis. Insofar as the integration of desires, values, commitments, and reasons – so, the integration of the self – goes, I will argue that by way of a therapeutic redescription of psychic life seen through the lens of practical aestheticism and tempered with the adoption of action language, those in need can take great strides toward initiating a continually-renewing self-restoration and personal fortification.

To briefly return to the analogy, in putting the model into practice, actual moral agents play two roles: that of analysand and that of analyst. And, insofar as the treatment I have in mind makes qualified use of narrativity theory, I will also be describing the potential coauthorship of the moral agent with the moral agent.67 Here, one facet of the
agent provides a raw account of the feelings associated with conflicting desires, values, commitments, reasons, and other potential motivators, and the other – playing the part of moral clinician as a kind of analytical ghostwriter – translates this into something like Schafer’s action language, reorienting himself through a consideration of what he takes a beautiful self to be.

In taking part in this ongoing self-analysis, the moral agent may bring about a partial reintegration of those parts of the conscious self which tend to split due to the pressure of what are conceived to be vastly different sources of motivational power: objective, moral reasons and subjective, personal reasons. Note, again, that the ideal here is the establishment and preservation of a partial self-integration. Once more, even if it were preferable – and, I would argue that it is not – we cannot hope for a complete and lasting personal integration of the person, at any level of the mind.

The bare fact that we cannot ever fully and finally integrate as one is distressing to many. But, assuming, via a partial self-integration, that any incapacitating symptoms have subsided, why should this be so? Where does this yearning for complete psychic integration come from? In section 1.4, I look to consider these questions from within an historical context. Here, I offer some tentative answers by drawing attention to the notion of holiness (a close conceptual relative of integrity, it turns out). I close the section by arguing that we would do well to move beyond this conception of the self for reasons which will become apparent.
Before introducing this discussion, I will close this section by advancing my third, and final, point: Although I am discussing integrity in terms of the self, and so, hold that continued use of this concept is desirable, I in no way want this to be mistaken for my advancing anything like a traditional realist account. On the other hand, although what follows owes much more to Hume than to Husserl – to the Bodhisattva than to the Brahmin – I also do not want what is said to be mistaken for advancing a hard antirealism about the self. Truth be told, I want to avoid metaphysical debate altogether, and shift the focus towards introducing an instance of what has been referred to by some pragmatists as an *edifying discourse*.

Considered within the context of contemporary Anglo-American philosophy, this approach likely comes off as both pejoratively postmodern and fringe; from other perspectives, however, it appears as neither. There is, in fact, a celebrated precedent for approaching discussion of the self in just this way – a response to a line of ontological questioning purportedly offered by the Buddha, himself.

According to the Pāli suttas, Gautama was once approached by Vaccha (sometimes Vacchagotta), a wandering ascetic, who inundated him with philosophical enquiry.⁶⁹ Among the questions asked was, *is there a self or is there not a self?*⁷⁰ It is said that, even when pushed, the Buddha refused to answer this question. This, of course, raises another: Why the stonewalling?

Archie Bahm has argued that among the reasons are that fixating on such questions can only lead to personal discontent. Bahm writes: “The important issue in life
is how to be happy. If you have a [self] you merely make yourself unhappy by wanting not
to have one. If you have no [self], you cause yourself unhappiness by wanting one.\textsuperscript{71} The
wise thing to do, then, is to let this questioning go and allay what the Buddha refers to an
irrational “greed for views.”\textsuperscript{72} T. R. V. Murti elaborates on this, developing the situational
nature of prescriptive, curative philosophy; and so, casts the Buddha’s approach to
discussion of selfhood as the epitome of the approach I look to take in the chapters to
come. Murti writes:

[The] Buddha’s teaching is adjusted to the need of the taught as the medicine of
the skilled physician is to the malady of the patient. He does not blindly . . . prescribe the
remedy to all and sundry. He corrects those with a nihilistic tendency by affirming the
self . . . To those addicted to the dogmatic belief in a changeless substantial \textit{ātman} and
who cling to it, he teaches the “no-self doctrine” as an antidote: his ultimate teaching is
that there is neither self nor not-self as these are subjective devices.\textsuperscript{73}

I hope to prescribe a way of talking about the self and its integration which is both
intuitive to and restorative to the modern moral agent. Given that the patient in question
is, in problematic ways, given to excesses in its stalwart belief in a substantial self, as well
as to anxieties about its possible nonexistence, my redescription negotiates between
realist and antirealist understandings, without settling in either. This, of course, owes
much to the Buddha, too – as, a great deal of what I have to say is congenial to
Nāgārjuna’s Middle Way approach to selfhood. I now turn to discussion of, and argument
against, two immoderate and extremely unhealthy positions which diverge from this path.

1.4: Selves Perfected

This project centers on, once again, a therapeutic redescriptions of selfhood, integrity, and the process of psychic integration from an aesthetic standpoint. And so, it assumes much about the harmful retention of more traditional understandings of these notions. Namely, that these are partly to blame for the prevalence of some of those more pronounced feelings of incompleteness discussed in the opening paragraphs of section 1.1; and, further, that the continued acceptance of these understandings may greatly impede our efforts in successfully transitioning to healthier self-understandings.

Since it is the self and its internal coherence that are at issue, we are basically talking about problems associated with humanity’s attempt to hold to an obsolete (and, in some ways, heteronomous) conception of what it is – or of, by the standards imposed by many strictly adhered to religious traditions, of what the human self must be. I open this section with a quote from Nietzsche, who tacitly accuses orthodox Christianity, specifically, of introducing just such problematic understandings of the self – conceptions to which we, Westerners, are still fettered today, whether these are couched in traditional religious ideology or in terms of secularized but loaded descendants.

Nietzsche writes: “It was Christianity which first painted the Devil on the world’s wall; it was Christianity which first brought sin into the world. Belief in the cure which it offered has now been shaken to its deepest roots: but belief in the sickness which it taught
and propagated continues to exist." It does not take too much in the way of imagination to interpret the apparent spiritual sickness to which Nietzsche is referring as one that involves a perceived disintegration of a once momentarily integrated soul resulting from what has traditionally been taken to be an intrinsically immoral human nature and the actions which follow from this. The texts central to Christianity are littered with passages which bolster this connection, as such disintegration is typically tied to sin and its deserved wages. Let’s initiate discussion of this by considering psychic disintegration’s opposite: the Christian conception of holiness.

Our contemporary understanding of the state of being holy is a conceptual descendent of the Old English notion denoted by hālig; in Middle English, holi, and earlier, hali. A close relative of hali is hāl (also Old English), meaning whole or healthy, and whose later English derivation, hale, signifies wholeness, completeness, soundness, and once again, health. Considering this concept from within a traditional Christian framework, Philip Sheldrake writes:

The New Testament assumes the holiness of God and is concerned with showing the equal holiness of Jesus who sanctifies others, making them hagios . . . The Spirit too sanctifies. By baptism and ‘renewal’ and ‘rebirth’ through the Spirit, the Christian is made part of the church, which is called ‘a chosen race, a royal priesthood, a holy nation’ (1 Peter 2:9).

To suggest that some entity or institution is holy, then, is to confer to it a kind of wholeness. This speaks to our understanding of the rebirth noted by Sheldrake, as this is
often cashed out in terms of the person in question being made whole by the Hand of God. And, additionally, of our conference of sainthood to this reborn person – as saint (also sanctification) is derived from the Latin sanctus, which also means holy, and so, of a whole. It for this reason, Jung has argued, that Christ, the “Adam secundus,” perfectly identifies the notion of what it means to have or be a self. As Christ, God incarnate, displays and can display no internal division whatsoever.

Contrast this evaluation of wholeness with the psychic fragmentation attributed to those most unholy, and so ungodly, things found throughout the Bible. The story of Legion comes to mind. Jesus’ exorcism of Legion – both whose name and amplified atrocity derive directly from its being an association of multiple, so divided, wicked spirits – is described three distinct times in the New Testament: Mark, Chapter 5; Luke, Chapter 8; and, Matthew, Chapter 8. This particular example set aside, the spiritual foulness associated with demonic possession, more generally, is often emphasized in terms of its involvement of the evil spirit or spirits intermingling with the soul of the possessed, so causing an abominable spiritual duality (or plurality) within one shared body. There is a litany of other subtler instances in the Bible where lack of spiritual integration is meant to indicate a kind of corruption only remediable by God – the Whole of wholes. “If a house is divided against itself, it cannot stand (Mark 3:25).”

Although examples of demonic possession designate cases where God is, in some sense, radically absent, once some person has come to God, an additional psychic fragmentation comes to the forefront. This takes the form of a conflict between the
converted’s recently renewed spirit and her inbuilt human, so innately sinful, nature. With this consciously-experienced inner variance we are provided with an example of the kind of witnessed self-fragmentation and self-alienation described more abstractly in sections 1.1 and 1.2. Here, however, the agent is not being pulled apart merely by consciously-known moral values and reasons and contradictory consciously-known subjective values and reasons – although, that is also the case – but by religious obligations which go to the center of who she now takes herself to be, and self-alienating animalistic cravings which she cannot seem to overcome. The latter, given orthodox Christianity, is a result of the agent’s fallen nature and the accompanying *akrasia*. In his Letter to the Romans, Paul describes just this kind of self-fragmentation and the inner-strife involved:

> I do not understand what I do. For what I want to do I do not do, but what I hate I do. And if I do what I do not want to do, I agree that the law is good. As it is, it is no longer I myself who do it, but it is sin living in me. I know that nothing good lives in me, that is, in my sinful nature. For I have the desire to do what is good, but I do not carry it out. For what I do is not the good I want to do; no, the evil I do not want to do – this I keep doing. Now if I do what I do not want to do, it is no longer I who do it, but it is sin living in me that does it.86

And, later in the same letter: “I myself in my mind am a slave to God’s law, but in the sinful nature a slave to the law of sin.”87 The mind – that part of the person which is imbued with reason – values the will of God and, so, desires to do His will at all times. The flesh – the part constituted by instinct, appetite, and the passions – values those very things forbidden by God, and, on some neo-Platonist readings, *because* these things are divinely prohibited. Despite having wholeheartedly committed himself, Paul
acknowledges that, being human, there is a sense in which he can never shake the attraction to sin. And so, he can never approximate becoming a true, lasting whole, drawn exclusively to God and to the Good. Let’s call this longed-for ever-lasting integration psychic perfection.\textsuperscript{88}

Linking up Paul’s take on the sinful nature of humanity and its results with the very kind of psychic disintegration and self-alienation at issue here, Augustine writes to God: “You gather me from my own scatterings, after I have torn myself from your unity and fallen apart into multiplicity . . . I was decomposing before your eyes while in men’s eyes I was pleasing myself and trying to please them.”\textsuperscript{89} And, later in the same work, emphasizing the thoroughgoing wickedness which he associates with human limitation: “I was in love with my loss, with my own lack, and not because I loved the lack itself. My soul was perverse, was disarticulated out of its basis in you, not seeking another thing by shameful means but seeking shame itself.”\textsuperscript{90}

So, the person is “gathered” by God, and shaped into what is a transient whole – an entity, for at least one moment, made in the image of God insofar as participation in His wholeness goes. But, as the person’s nature is unreservedly sinful, he immediately falls back into a collection of “scatterings” – he “decomposes,” giving in to mammon desire as opposed to standing firm in his religious commitment. The whole that Augustine momentarily is, as integrated by the graceful touch of God, can never last despite his best intentions and all of the will that he can muster. He is necessarily disobedient, and so, given to disintegration. After all, he is human. On the other hand, as he is born again in
devotion to God, he wills to do what is right. This paints the convert as being cursed to a kind of essential Janus-headedness. He both wants to obey God, and to disobey God – and, at the same time.\textsuperscript{91} Moreover, he cannot do otherwise.

In making sense of this, it will be helpful to refresh ourselves on the concept of Original Sin. Stephen Mulhall describes this as holding that:

\[\ldots\text{human nature as such is tragically flawed, perverse in its very structure or constitution. Human beings are not only naturally capable of acting -- even perhaps disposed to act -- sinfully, but are always already turned against themselves, against the true and against the good, by virtue of their very condition as human. Hence, that sinful orientation will distort and ultimately invalidate any efforts they might make by themselves to alter that orientation; the only possible solution lies in their attaining a certain kind of orientation to the divine}\ldots\text{[Original Sin] entails that our very ability to orientate ourselves toward the good is dependent upon transcendental spiritual sources, and asserts the direct opposite of the liberal understanding of human beings as self-originating sources of moral value. For the Christian, we are, if anything, the self-originating source of sin; hence, our only hope of regaining any contact with goodness is by dying to ourselves.}\textsuperscript{92}

\textit{Again, it is in virtue of being human that one sins and that one must sin. Or, to put it into a more pertinent phraseology, because some person is human she is not now, nor will she ever be for any extended time, psychically perfect. In a person’s requesting that God enter her heart, He takes the reins, and in so doing integrates her spiritually, purging those ungodly sources of internal dissention.}\textsuperscript{93} \textit{From the perspective of the believer, of course, it is God, Himself, who is healing the divided soul. She simply, as graciously as she can, accepts this gift.}\textsuperscript{94}

\textit{Ironically, the preparation for this integration has at times been described as God’s “breaking” of us, His “battering” of our hearts – His “burning,” and “striking” of us with...}
“blows.” The idea being that we cannot freely choose salvation, so God must — thankfully — step in and force our hand, but only at our request. Once God performs these actions, then the restoration of the self takes place. The moment that God relinquishes control, though, the person restored immediately turns from Him, falls, and disintegrates. At best, then, she can come to be in sometime communion with God, so to know, in however limited a way, His wholeness. In order to achieve this, the person must — as Mulhall puts it, echoing what Paul says in Colossians — *die to herself*. So, we are talking about death and rebirth again. But, here’s the rub — even after being spiritually reborn, the person retains her predilection for sin, and so the necessity of personal disintegration.

To return to Nietzsche’s critical remarks — it is definitely worth asking whether, in introducing this conception of holiness as spiritual wholeness, so, as psychic perfection, certain religious traditions have not established a standard which is injurious to the collective self-conception of humanity. Is it the case that, in introducing the belief that the psychically imperfect self is essentially flawed, Christianity has guaranteed that its devotees are tormented in this conviction? Moreover, is it the case that, in introducing the belief that the psychically perfect self is essentially good, Christianity has assured that its faithful will incessantly dwell upon and, perhaps only subconsciously, covet this impossible state of the self? And, as result, eschew any understandings of self-integration which make sense of suitable, realistic personal integration in terms of an only partial cohesion.
Now, speaking in his own defense, he who adheres to the belief in the holy psychic perfection of God will state that this cannot be the case. As, *In considering the wholeness of selves, it is always clearly stipulated that no limited, finite being, by definition, can attain a lasting integration.* And, so, *it is not as if an impossible standard has been introduced which anyone – God certainly included – expects the human person to live up to.* Those who do make attempts to achieve a state approximating psychic perfection do so out of the very arrogance and prideful nature which exemplifies humanity’s Fallenness. They, like Lucifer, desire to become God. Given this view, we are saved by the grace of God, not by our becoming psychically perfect, like Him. In recognition of this we enter into a state of ever-renewing thankfulness to God for His unending love and patience, even in the face of our abhorrent nature. We come to acknowledge His perfect grace, and are appropriately humbled in the process.

But – to speak for Nietzsche – that is exactly, in part, why the introduction of the notion of psychic perfection is objectionable. In introducing the conception of a perfected personal integration as had by God, we have set ourselves up for millennia of self-ridicule and the collective low self-esteem problems which go along with it. We are told that we will always fall short, and on the surface we accept this. But simultaneously, we believe deep down – perhaps only subconsciously – that we must achieve this level of perfect personal integration. Or, that we must maintain earnest attempts to do so, at the very least.
We fail, and fail again, of course. And, again and again, God picks us up and dusts us off, metaphorically speaking. The fact that we do not deserve, in the strongest sense of the term, this perfect grace only makes matters worse as far as our collective self-concept goes. The idealization of psychic perfection alongside the persistent attempt to achieve this state, also alongside our understanding of ourselves as being forgiven by God in light of perpetual failure, constitutes a vicious cycle that, in extreme cases, can lead to the most excessive degrees of self-loathing, and – when projected onto the entire species – an ill-founded misanthropy. Here, God’s perfect love devolves into a perfect and just hatred, and deliverance from our deserved damnation becomes capricious on His part:

The God that holds you over the pit of hell . . . abhors you, and is dreadfully provoked; his wrath towards you burns like fire; he looks upon you as worthy of nothing else, but to be cast into the fire; he is of purer eyes than to bear to have you in his sight; you are ten thousand times more abominable in his eyes, than the most hateful venomous serpent is in ours. You have offended him infinitely more than ever a stubborn rebel did his prince; and yet it is nothing but his hand that holds you from falling into the fire every moment . . . And there is no other reason to be given, why you have not dropped into hell . . . but that God’s hand has held you up. There is no other reason to be given why you have not gone to hell, since you have sat here in the house of God, provoking his pure eyes by your sinful wicked manner of attending his solemn worship. Yea, there is nothing else that is to be given as a reason why you do not this very moment drop down into hell.100

This is an extreme take offered by an extremist. However, I want to suggest that there is a little Jonathan Edwards within most of us, who takes us to task over, for believers, our radically flawed nature – psychically, and otherwise – or, for nonbelievers, our inkling that we are fragmented and incomplete in a way with which we are not at peace. This – the implicit striving for psychic perfection, and unspoken but often
excruciating disappointment upon continued failure – is the sickness; not the lack of complete integration, itself. Understanding oneself as, above all else, an incorrigible sinner, as woefully incomplete and essentially lost, is the sickness, Nietzsche wants to argue; not our ‘sinful,’ psychically imperfect nature.

I leave it up to the reader to decide whether Nietzsche’s overall criticism is a persuasive one. And, I will simply say that irrespective of the potentially damaging psychological baggage that goes along with the idealization of psychic perfection, the continued presence of this understanding of personal integration, and the implied striving to attain it, only promises to keep humanity from accepting more sensible conceptions of the self. Furthermore, in marking the worldview which supports this account of integrity as objectively true and sacrosanct, its more fanatical adherents have made any transitioning to healthier self-understandings extremely difficult and slow-going. That the idealization of a unified soul is mirrored in our contemporary secular conception of selfhood doesn’t help. But, as these cultural artifacts are so closely related, how could it be otherwise?

I have gone to some lengths here to offer consideration of the conceptual ancestors of the integrated self, understood in this context as those which denote psychic perfection. And, provided its connection with certain ingrained religious traditions, I hope it is now better understood why the acknowledgement of any degree of self-fragmentation continues to be accompanied with anxiety and discomfort by many. However, assuming that this striving was not originally initiated by such belief systems –
that, in other words, such traditions have an historically-situated source as well – nothing has been said about the actual origins of the common infatuation with psychic perfection, itself. I think that a couple of such theories are worth mentioning in passing, and will provide a nice segue into discussion regarding the proponents of what I call psychic disarray, below.

I will now briefly provide an account which I find both cogent and illustrative of the same type of collective self-alienation that, according to some critiques, accompanies the Western religious conception of perfect integration. The account – advanced in its most compelling form by Jacques Lacan – goes something like this: The infant’s experiences of itself are initially those of being radically fragmented and not at all in control of its own actions. This is the result of having underdeveloped cognitive ability, a still-developing capacity for self-reflection and understanding, and extremely limited motor functioning. At some point, typically between the ages of six to eighteen months, the child first experiences a visual reflection of itself in, say, a mirror. Predictably, the child identifies with this. As opposed to each of its previous subjective ‘self’ experiences, the form in the mirror appears to be an integrated whole. It is one. At some level, the child idealizes this, and throughout the duration of her life desires her inner world, however essentially chaotic, to resemble this apparently perfect unification.

While widely accepted in some circles, it should be noted that this account is not accepted as the Gospel truth even among Lacanians. Some analysts, in fact, have argued that the disintegration of the self – while, as Lacan suggests, is the default condition of
the infant’s subjectivity – is actually willfully sustained in some way by the infant. This is so because the infant purposively disallows the integration of those parts of its self to which it stands alienated due to an unwillingness to identify with them. Melanie Klein has endorsed such a view. She writes:

The early ego lacks cohesion, and a tendency towards integration alternates with a tendency towards disintegration, a falling into bits . . . The result of splitting is a dispersal of the destructive impulse which is felt as the source of danger . . . Since the destructive and hated part of the self which is split off and projected is felt as a danger to the love object [e.g., a parent] and therefore gives rise to guilt, this process in projection in some ways also implies a deflection of guilt from the self to the other person.¹⁰⁴

This intentional maintaining of a degree of psychic disintegration continues, on Klein’s account, throughout our lives, though we experience the effects of this intentional splitting in an often negative way, also. Later in the same article Klein writes about a dream reported to her by one her patients. It involves the unsuccessful attempts to dissuade a child from murdering an unknown innocent person. When it becomes clear that the child will not listen to reason, the patient dreamed that she strung up the child on a rope suspended from a tree’s branch, and awoke just before she hanged her. Offering an interpretation of these events, Klein writes:

In the dream the patient’s personality was split into two parts: the wicked and uncontrollable child on the one hand, and on the other hand the person who tried to
influence and control her . . . Killing the child – to which the patient had to resort – represented an annihilation of one part of her personality.\textsuperscript{105}

The patient cannot, of course, actually \textit{do in} this part of her self. So, in effect, she disowns it, sustaining a felt degree of disintegration in the process.\textsuperscript{106} While this feeling of disunity brings about significant discomfort, the subconscious mind constantly acts to preserve this separation in order to keep the greater threat at bay. I find this particular take on the motivation to sustain a degree of disunity extremely plausible, but also somewhat troubling given its psychical byproduct.

Setting aside those accounts in which one willfully, if subconsciously, acts to integrate or disintegrate the self, some theorists have argued that the disintegration felt first in childhood most often results from a disconnection from someone, typically a parent, with whom a child identifies prior to the full formation of their own self. Ernest Wolf writes: “Withdrawing the needed selfobject experiences before the child has irreversibly and cohesively established the evoked self results in a deficient structure or sometimes in fragmentation of the self . . . We often hear [such] people complain that they feel like they are ‘falling apart.’”\textsuperscript{107} Wolf goes on to argue that even into adulthood persons must sustain certain intimate relationships and the frequent and focused interaction central to these in order to remain integrated:

Human beings universally and continually need selfobject experiences in order to maintain the integrity of their selves. From birth to death we need to be embedded in a matrix of relationships supportive of our selves . . . Slight fragmentations manifest
themselves as relatively minor psychological discomfort, perhaps some mild depression or anxiety, and they usually quickly heal when one is provided with appropriate selfobject experiences. Massive fragmentation is associated with major mental illness and even loss of self to an extent equivalent to psychosis.\textsuperscript{108}

Having now discussed a handful of attempts to explain the source of the need to integrate (or to partially disintegrate), I now return my full attention to Lacan. As I have stated, the attempt to introduce redescriptions of the integrated self and the process which brings this about is very much a two-front battle. Setting aside those who would have us retain an understanding of integrity in terms of psychic perfection, the potential success of my efforts here hinges upon the ability of the subject to overcome what those with opposing intuitions have characterized as a mental reality which, even at the purely conscious level, cannot be integrated to \textit{any} considerable extent.\textsuperscript{109}

Before initiating any account of a redescribed integration of the self, then, I should also have something to say to the proponent of essential psychic disintegration who holds that selfhood, as a concept, is a potentially oppressive relic that we would do better to jettison, along with talk of things like sprites, monads, and homunculi.\textsuperscript{110} In the final section of this chapter, I consider a pair of understandings of what this commitment to necessary and complete personal disintegration might look like – accounts provided by Lacan and María Lugones, in turn. After discussing the more salient points of each, I offer criticism.
1.5: Selves Abandoned

Some theorists – Lacan, most prominently – have argued that the self cannot be integrated to virtually any extent, and so, we should discontinue its use as a concept. Let’s call the position advanced by such persons *psychic disarray*. Against the Lacanian, I hold that a significant degree of self-reconciliation, even at the more problematic level of the conscious and unconscious, is entirely possible. And, I believe that that analysts and analysands – especially those working from within Kohutian, Jungian, and more traditional Freudian paradigms – achieve this end in their cooperative work every day. There is ample anecdotal evidence which supports this point.

The Lacanian will likely lodge something like the following complaint, in return: *We have no way of knowing that the self has, in fact, been to any degree integrated in such instances, or even what that kind of talk might even mean. A feeling of greater psychic wholeness on the part of the patient, and an accompanying inner peace, does not guarantee that anything approximating true and lasting psychic integration has taken place, and may just as well be accounted for in other ways, provided that the analyst is working from within a theoretical framework which correctly does not suppose that there is something like a self to be assembled or reassembled, whichever the case may be.*

In response to this, I would say that we may reach a correct conclusion about what best accounts for the therapeutic results mentioned above by considering these outcomes from different psychoanalytic (and psychological, more generally) perspectives. I am of the – admittedly amateur – opinion that those frameworks which assume the possibility
of some degree of self-reconciliation and personal integration seem to better explain this alteration and the subjective experiences of the patient than those do which assert from their inception that the psychical components in question cannot be reconciled at any level. And, I find accounts which make sense of therapeutic progress in these terms to be extremely compelling for this reason.

Here, the Lacanian might concede that methodological frameworks which center on the self and its reconciliation do have seductive explanatory power, but further object that since talk of the self is potentially oppressive to the subject – partly in that it introduces with the concept, selfhood, an unattainable ideal along the lines of something like psychic perfection – those conceptual structures which make use of it are detrimental to the long-term betterment of the patient. Put another way, as there can be no metaphysically 'real' self to create or restore, talk of one, and the implicit goal-setting and negligent idealization linked to this, set up the analysand for falling prey to inevitable feelings of failure and despair. More than that, such talk feeds into the ego’s already deeply embedded tendency to duplicitous self-ossification in the name of finding an essence and center within the subject. In Buddhist traditions, the term associated with this deleterious longing is upādāna – literally, the fuel which powers all suffering.\textsuperscript{111} Regarding unhealthy attachment to the idea of substantial selfhood, specifically, Nāgārjuna writes: “Clinging is to insist on being someone – / Not to cling is to be free to be no one.”\textsuperscript{112}
Following Nāgārjuna, I take Lacan’s worries to be valid. We do tend toward this clinging. But, aside from those reasons discussed in the previous section, why? Simone de Beauvoir puts it this way:

Along with the ethical urge of each individual to affirm his subjective existence, there is also the temptation to forgo liberty and become a thing. This is an inauspicious road, for he who takes it – passive, lost, ruined – becomes henceforth the creature of another’s will, frustrated in his transcendence and deprived of every value. But it is an easy road; on it one avoids the strain involved in undertaking an authentic existence.113

Rather than face, with courage, the anxiety associated with the subject’s contingency and nonessentiality, the ego deceives the individual into believing that she has (or should have) an actual substantial self. And, of course, for reasons which are probably fairly obvious, the patient is more than willing to play the role of the dupe. Here, the person allows herself to become the creation of the ego’s will, and gives in to the fantasy of self-substantiality. Coming to form the belief that one is a self qua substance, while easing the analysand’s distress, betrays a kind of bad faith on her part; as, so the story goes, to view oneself in this way is to reify one’s subjectivity in a self-deceived and essentially inauthentic way. To use Sartrean terminology, to claim to be a substantial self is to view oneself as an in-itself.114 And, kowtowing to the will of another – even if this other is a part of one’s own mental make-up – is to allow oneself to be an in-itself strictly for that other.

Again, I take these to be compelling worries, but believe that there are adequate responses: First, I grant that talk of the self – where this term is taken to denote the completely integrated and transparent mind-stuff of Western lore – could very well lead
the analysand to form unrealistic expectations regarding the degree of personal
integration achievable, so strengthening her propensity for upādāna. For this reason, I
want to suggest that selfhood be fundamentally redescribed, along the lines of what I
endorse in sections 2.3-2.5, and with just those limitations in mind which have been
accentuated by Lacan’s critique of various humanistic psychologies.

So, while I disagree with Lacan in regards to the disutility of self-talk, generally, I
do feel as though he is owed a debt of gratitude in drawing renewed attention towards the
extent to which vocabularies making use of the term may be detrimental, given a lack of
sufficient pragmatistic irony and historicism. To draw from what was said earlier on,
rather than getting bogged down in metaphysical parley about the self, I hope to shift the
focus to distinguishing between better and worse ways of talking about the self a la the
Buddha.

Second – and, following from this, given the forthcoming redescription of selfhood
in terms of a fluid series of relations of mental events – there is little cause for justifiable
concern that the analysand’s expectations will outgrow her potential for partial
integration, given acceptance of such an understanding. Keeping this redescription fresh
in the mind of the analysand may hinder the ego in its plans to initiate any kind of covert
self-reificatory action, and so, to prevent the conscious subject from falling prey to the
fallacy of misplaced concreteness. In a sense, then, routine talk of the self, provided that
the analysand buys into its redescription, may prevent her from falling into the very
kinds of misunderstandings which the Lacanian is worried about.
Speaking about the self redescribed, the patient may work with the analyst in establishing some degree of cohesion by bringing certain components of her psyche into accord – values, projects, commitments, and so on. But, in continuously acknowledging her lack of essence, and the impossibility of coming to sustain the self as a thing, she may simultaneously understand and come to terms with the necessity of a degree of psychic heteronomy and flux. The former – the partial integration of psychic components which constitute a self, and the sense of security that this offers – may help the analysand to better face her overall lack of given essence and the more distressing psychic effects that follow from the acknowledgement of this – most notably, existential angst.

In addition to keeping these fresh understandings in mind by means of internal dialogue, there are practices found within various Buddhist traditions which can aid in the periodic unintegration of the self; and so, to provide routine reminders about how the concept should and should not be used. Here, I am talking about meditating on one’s essential sunyata – often translated as emptiness or voidness. “Emptiness,” Mark Epstein writes, “describes the lack of just those qualities of independence and individual identity that we so instinctually impute.” Embracing one’s sunyata amounts to coming to terms with the fact that there is no persistent self which desires, values, commits, and so on, but that the self largely is that open-ended stream of desiring, valuing, and committing. Once one shifts from the view that these activities are, in some strong sense hers rather than her she has achieved unintegration, and witnesses directly the true contingency and nonessentiality of self.
There are numerous ways of attempting to unintegrate by way of meditation. I will briefly describe two. These are: first, by internally searching for one’s substantial self, and, in virtue of discovery its absence, laying bare one’s sunyata; and second, by meditating on the content of the mind without making judgments about or taking direct ownership of these things. This indirect approach allows the self to melt away of its own accord. Of the first of these types of meditation, Geshe Ngawang Dhargyey writes:

If we meditate with the four keys [, i.e., (1) coming to recognize “how we view the ‘I’ as inherently existent, as if it were independent of the aggregates of body and mind”; (2) coming to see that “the inherently existing ‘I’ must exist as either one with the body and mind . . . or separate from them”; (3) “ascertaining the absence of true sameness of the ‘I’ and the five aggregates”; (4) “ascertaining any true difference between the self and the aggregates”] to search for the self in our body . . . and our aggregates of mind as well, we won’t find anything . . . It’s like looking for a cow in a certain field. We walk all around: up the hills, down the valleys, through the trees, everywhere. Having searched the entire area we found nothing, we arrive at the certainty that the cow simply isn’t there . . . This is the understanding of emptiness.119

Much like Hume, the practitioner of this meditation takes stock of that for which she is searching – a substantial self – looks inward exhaustively in order to locate this, fails to find even a trace, and surmises that her belief in such a self has no experiential basis.120

Of the second approach, Mark Epstein writes:

[In meditation,] the self-representations and self-feelings are observed instead of identified with, conflicts are noted without attempts having to be made to solve them. But this holding is not what we usually imagine it to be – it is not a holding on, but more like a juggling. Keeping a number of balls in the air, we hold all of them and none of them. In so doing, the experience of self is opened up, deepened, made more transparent, and transformed.121
Here, what is taken to be the unsubstantiated belief in a unified self is bracketed—as, implicitly, is belief in no-self. The meditator allows herself to experience all present mental events, but in so doing does not discriminately color these with convictions of ownership, and so, as if it were up to her to appraise them. This detachment from all mental content dissuades any personalization of these experiences, and allows the subject’s sense of self to dissolve.

While each of these meditations leads one to abandon, for a time at least, what the Buddhist takes to be an unhealthy sense of self, it is important to note that this does not necessarily, and should not, lead to an acceptance of anything like a Lacanian strong antirealism about the self. None other than His Holiness the Dalai Lama, writes: Buddhism asserts selflessness; is it not that the self is non-existent? If Buddhists did assert that there are no persons and that selves are non-existent, there would not be anybody to meditate on selflessness, and there would be no one with respect to whom one could cultivate compassion. Hence, our own experience establishes that there are persons, selves. \(^\text{122}\)

So, in affirming \textit{anattā}, what conception of the self is the Buddhist denying? Walpola Rahula describes it as “a permanent, everlasting and absolute entity, which is the unchanging substance behind the changing phenomenal world . . . the thinker of thoughts, feeler of sensations, and receiver of rewards and punishments for all its actions good and bad.” \(^\text{123}\) Of course, I want to deny the existence of such a self also. As for the Buddha, doing so does not preclude me from holding to belief in the self, described in
fundamentally different terms. And, it certainly does not commit me to rejecting talk of the self altogether. I am not sure how a vocabulary devoid of such a crucial piece would even function when the time came to describe the human experience. This brings me to my final complaint against Lacan.

I hold that the subject must come to understand herself *qua* self under some, however deflated, description – even if, in taking part in Lacanian analysis, she is not using this particular term to denote the concept.124 Said another way, even when the analyst is making use of those vocabularies which intentionally disallow expressions such as *self*, etc., I would argue that the analysand has worked out her own way of making sense of being a self in those terms which are allowed. The concept is simply too vital to the subject’s making sense of subjective life for it to be otherwise. John Barresi makes the point this way:

> From a phenomenological perspective, it does not matter whether this self that we attribute identity to through time is metaphysically real or mere psychological fiction, what matters is that it is essential to our phenomenology of self, and without it, we scarcely could consider ourselves as persons, with a past, present, and future.125

To travel a bit further down this same road, I take it that some degree of acknowledged integration of the conscious components of the mind, and discussion of this, is necessary for the attribution of personal responsibility to the subject; and, certainly for her ability to self-identify as an autonomous moral agent.126 Here, though, the Lacanian might just accuse me of assuming much too much: namely, that
Responsibility itself is a concept which we should continue to take seriously and use in analytic discourse. At this point, we reach an impasse. Richard Rorty writes:

It is one thing to say, falsely, that there is nothing [of lasting philosophical substance to refer to] to choose between us [liberals] and the Nazis. It is another thing to say, correctly, that there is no neutral common ground to which an experienced Nazi philosopher and I can repair in order to argue out the differences. That Nazi and I will always strike one another as begging all the crucial questions, arguing in circles.

Similarly, it might turn out to be the case that there are simply not enough common (in our respective minds) axiomatic starting points for the Lacanian and I to make any additional headway as far as the disagreement goes. That being the case, there is not much else to do other than congenially duke it out in Mill’s Marketplace of Ideas, and see who is left standing at the end of the day – hopefully each keeping an open mind with respect to the other’s position in the process.

Parting company with Lacan for now, there is another noteworthy interpretation of what consented-to essential disintegration looks like, and why we should embrace it as a legitimate and healthy state of being. This take on the fragmentation of identity, marginally associated with certain flavors of feminism and other philosophies of liberation, suggests that as we are all, at bottom, a conjunction of identities and roles – and that, since some of these identities and the value systems in terms of which they are defined may oppose others of ours and their accompanying values in an irremediable way, we should simply accept ourselves as this conflicted
multiplicity and surrender the mission to locate or create anything like a self. María Lugones has argued for this position; she writes:

I am giving up the claim that the subject is unified. Instead I am understanding each person as many. In giving up the unified self, I am guided by the experiences of bicultural people who are also victims of ethnocentric racism in a society that has one of those cultures as subordinate and the other as dominant. These cases provide me with examples of people who are very familiar with experiencing themselves as more than one: having desires, character, and personality traits that are different in one reality than in the other, and acting, enacting, animating their bodies, having thoughts, feeling the emotions, etc., in ways that are different in one reality than in the other.129

And, elsewhere, speaking of her own experiences:

One of the possibilities of myself as unitary but lacking, is myself as a cultural participant in Nuevo Mejico: en los pueblitos norteños, working to keep the culture alive, working to undermine the de-moralization that keeps people from embracing the aliveness of the culture and from strengthening it through critical and creative participation. In [Sarah] Hoagland’s use of ‘autokeenous,’ this work can only be accomplished by an autokeenous self, a self in community and this self can only be well if the community becomes actively engaged in its own well-being . . . I, whom this community of place grounds by making it possible for me to be an autokeenous Hispana, and Nuevomejicana lesbians for whom this is their community of place, will not be heard as real participants in this rejection of anglo domination if openly lesbian. These communities do not recognize us as fully their own if lesbian . . . The other possibility of my self is in the lesbian community, in separation from heterosexism: both from racist, imperialists, capitalist, anglo relationships, conceptual and social frameworks and from Hispano heterosexism, steeped in poverty and ravaged by anglo racism and colonialism. I come to lesbian community with ‘my culture on my back,’ but this is not where I can struggle for the survival of Hispana culture and life. Thus my autokeenous self is lacking in lesbian community . . . It is only through participation in each community that I nourish each autokeenous self. But the autokeenous creation in each community cannot walk as autokeenous in the other.130
I take Lugones's point to be this: She is a Latina who happens to also be a lesbian. So, we are tempted to say that Lugones self-identifies, or could, as a lesbian Latina. But, she cannot. She can self-identify as neither a lesbian Latina nor a lesbian Latina, because there is an inbuilt incongruity, albeit a contingent one, which stands to oppose the one self-conception against the other. In order to fully take part in the Latino community – so, to wholly affirm her Latino identity – she must, to some significant degree, accept the values which are endemic to that community, and to act from them as they “are constituted within Hispanic culture.” But, among these values is an extremely rigid and ensconced heterosexism. So, insofar far as Lugones self-identifies as a Latina, she cannot simultaneously self-identify as a lesbian; as her lesbian identity stands at odds with her Latina identity. As a result, she stands alienated from that component of her personality at particular times.

Conversely, insofar as Lugones self-identifies as a lesbian, she cannot significantly take part in Latino culture, because, in self-identifying as a lesbian under some description of who she is, some of the time, she stands firmly against the heterosexism which permeates this community and its values, and in a personal way. Because of the prevalence of such practical incoherencies, Lugones finds it best to define herself in terms of an essentially disintegrated multiplicity, sometimes living in full accord with these values, sometimes those values. Lugones is sometimes a Latina, other times a lesbian, and routinely travels between these two distinct “worlds” without toting the luggage of either across the borderline.
There is a temptation to interpret Lugones as offering a wholly figurative account of the way in which she, a woman being in some sense pulled apart by conflicting facets of her identity, attempts to navigate her social world – and, on this reading, principally as a critique of the evils of a world that would unjustly divide her and others in this way. So far as this goes, I think the “world-traveling” vocabulary she introduces has a lot going for it. However, this does not seem to be her full intention. And, in as much as we are to take her description of this state of essential selflessness to heart, I think this talk should be replaced with that involving something along the lines of Owen Flanagan’s conception of the multiplex self:133

For Flanagan, the multiplex self is a self understood as comprised of sometimes mutually exclusive value systems and resultant projects and commitments, where the agent personifies one incorporation of these within one community with which she relates, and others for another. Here, there is sometimes the potential for the interaction between these otherwise compartmentalized facets of the self. But, typically the individual cannot emphasize more than one of her practical identities at a time – and so, more than one of these projects or commitments at a time. Let’s further consider Flanagan’s multiplex self by way of an example: the Log Cabin Republican.

The Log Cabin Republican finds himself, in important respects, in the same boat as Lugones. As one whose self-identificatory roles seem at odds in some very important ways; yet, as one who cannot, for whatever reason, continue to make sense of himself in breaking with either. This conflict is so pronounced that critics have accused Log Cabin-
Republicanism as verging on the oxymoronic. (Still harsher detractors tend to leave off the prefix, here.)

While there is without doubt potential conflict between the values which undergird the Log Cabin Republican’s various self-identifications, I do not think that the best way to make sense of the variance of these is by suggesting that he simply does not have a self. He may affirm his conservatism among Republicans, and his homosexuality among those in the LGBT community and its allies. And, of course, he may affirm both among friends, family members, a significant other, and to himself.

More than that, though, I would argue that he may, in fact, affirm his homosexuality among Republicans, refusing to accept the heterosexism of the GOP, and the homophobic special interest groups to which it tends to truckle. And, he may affirm his Republicanism among those in the gay and lesbian community, refusing to accept certain values typically adhered to within it, and the fiscally liberal special interest groups to which it bows and scrapes. The very fact that he self-identifies as a, specifically, Log Cabin Republican makes it plain that he can cope with this tension, despite being constantly stereotyped and harangued by those standing to his immediate Right and Left. And, stipulating that a commitment to each of these ways of life is identity-conferring for him, he must do so in order to preserve integrity – in order to sustain his self.

He understands that the largest number of the group with which he identifies politically disapproves of his sexual orientation and the lifestyle choices that go along with it. And, he accepts this, to an extent, while in no way endorsing the positon or
internalizing this criticism. He acknowledges, too, that the largest number of the group with which he identifies with respect to sexual orientation disapproves of his political affiliation. And, he accepts that, to an extent, and, again, without giving in to pressures to forfeit his most preciously held political ideals. Provided these things, I do not see that there is any reason to assert that the Log Cabin Republican cannot make sense of himself in terms of being a self. In fact, given what I have just said about his unwillingness to compromise with respect to either set of his identity-conferring values, one could conceive of him as the picture of integrity.

He is both a Log Cabin Republican and a Log Cabin Republican; he is a Log Cabin Republican. He can self-identify as each role separately, emphasizing one side of his person over others, as well as the conjunction of the roles simultaneously. And, he can do so while inhabiting either of his “worlds.” Similarly – and, I definitely do not want to come off as flippant, here, as I do understand that there is a tremendous strain to be overcome, and pressures which I couldn’t even begin to fully appreciate – I do not see why Lugones cannot make sense of herself as a lesbian Latina. She seemingly can keep one foot planted in either “world,” while taking part in both.

Finally, to briefly return to Lugones’s own autobiographical example: In quietly accepting that participation in the Latino community necessarily involves the tacit approval of heterosexism, we give way to a troubling kind of cultural fetishism. Groups expressly created for the purpose of the exclusion of others notwithstanding, our various associations – whether collectives based on race, gender, sexual orientation, class, social
and political issues, or whatever the case may be – are not ideologically fixed such that we may have no say in the evolutionary trace of their values and projects. The fact, then, that contemporary Latino culture is homophobic is a historical contingency, and does not guarantee – thankfully – that this particular ideological peculiarity will remain in its various future instantiations. Not to be patronizing, at all, but I would argue, too, that María Lugones the Latina lesbian could likely serve better in bringing about a positive change with regard to the Latino community’s heterosexist posture than could either María Lugones the Latina or María Lugones the lesbian.

In the preceding two sections, I have discussed and argued against what I take to be viciously excessive and deficient understandings of the integrated self. In the coming chapter I look to describe what I take to be the proper mean understanding. Here, I break ground on the construction of the self as moral agent – first discussing the necessary conditions of personhood, then of selfhood, then of moral selfhood. Following this, in Chapter 3, I reintroduce the Objection from Integrity in order to prepare my own account of personal integration. I close this chapter with a quote from Owen Flanagan, who writes:

There are many people who have come to grips with the contingency of their selves, with their fallibility, and with their naturalness, in ways that do not throw them into existential turmoil when they experience their frameworks as lacking transcendental grounding. There is no incoherence in the idea of persons . . . operating effectively and happily within frameworks that they simply do not see or experience as final or foundational.¹³⁴
In endorsing this, I imagine I am, to some extent, preaching to the choir. However, there are those—family, friends, neighbors—who, in holding to the idealization of something like psychic perfection, are not so receptive to coming to understand the self as extremely fragile; much less of embracing its inbuilt tendency to disintegrate. On the other side of the aisle, there are the intuitive strong antirealists who hold, again, that mental events are necessarily at loggerheads; who hold that self-talk is a deceptive vocabulary which may only hinder those who uses it; and so, who are just as suspicious of any use of the term self, however deflated.

It is my hope that the following account of personal integration and complementary redescriptions of the self sufficiently integrated may make baby steps towards acclimating the moral agent within a contemporary framework, whatever her intuitions on the state of the self may presently be. Throughout, I ask that we keep in mind the need to straddle the fence which cordons off competing theories of self substantiality. Or, to appeal to Nāgārjuna once more, I ask that we make a strong attempt to “Let go of ‘I am.’ / Let go of ‘I am not’” and “. . . [to] relinquish being and nothingness.”

Notes


13 Charles Taylor, 1989, p.19. Robert Fulton has argued that such disorders, and the methods by which they are treated, are peculiar to the Western world largely because of its collective belief in the existence of a radically independent, subsistent, and
autonomous self. He writes: “. . . many [mental disorders] reflect the unique cultural stresses of their host society and are properly considered culture-bound syndromes . . . Unlike most non-Western societies, which hold less extreme notions of the separateness of self, we [Westerners] have an entire clinical language to describe disorders of the self: narcissistic personality disorder, fragmentation of the self, lack of self-cohesion, and the ubiquitous complaint of poor self-esteem (2010, p.59).”

Still, some cultural anthropologists – Douglas Hollan, to name one – have argued that the East-West divide regarding understandings of the self has been exaggerated due to the prevalence of social scientists positing discrete cultural models and working too fixedly within the constraints of these vis-à-vis more routinely considering the personal reports of individuals living in different cultures piecemeal. In one study, Hollan compares and contrasts interviews given by American undergraduates who had recently lost a loved one, and by members of the Sa’dan Toraja community, a tribal people indigenous to the interior mountains of South Sulawesi, Indonesia. Hollan writes: “. . . one can find evidence, in some contexts, of an independent autonomous self among the ‘sociocentric’ Toraja of Indonesia and of an interdependent, relational self among ‘egocentric’ Americans in the United States (1992, p.302, emphasis is the author’s own).” It might turn out that cultures from the two hemispheres have much more in common than was once thought regarding their conceptions of selfhood; as, the selves which Easterners enjoy are perhaps not experienced as, as has generally been proliferated, entirely relational, and as the selves which Westerners enjoy are perhaps not experienced as, as has generally been proliferated, entirely independent. For additional discussion of folk understandings of selfhood across cultures, see Clifford Geertz (1985) and Melford Spiro (1993).

14 By fragmentation of the self, I mean a significant and potentially debilitating disconnection between the constituent parts and events which make up the mind. This can be a separation of the elements which comprise the purely unconscious mind, of those which comprise both the unconscious and the conscious mind, or of those which comprise the conscious mind. Fragmentation is a scalar notion, with an extreme, on the one hand, of near (but never realized) cohesion and uniformity, and on the other, of disintegration accompanied by feelings of pronounced estrangement and self-estrangement, lack of identity and autonomy, and dissociation.

15 By decentering of the self, I mean one’s realization that the ego is neither always at the helm of the person, nor even always in the know about which psychic components or events are at any given moment. Compare the decentering of the individual self its disorienting effects with the collective decenterings which human beings have experienced following the Copernican and Darwinian revolutions and their disorienting effects. What was taken to be the proper divinely-ordained ‘place’ of human beings has
been usurped in each case. See John Smith (1992, esp. p.45) and Joel Whitebook (1992, esp. p.105).


It is worth noting that Freud is far from the first to offer an account of the self in terms of sometimes-warring parts; or, for that matter, the first to offer a specifically tripartite conception of the self in terms of sometimes-warring parts. In the *Phaedrus*, Plato (1997c) famously writes of a charioteer working to control a pair of winged horses. Here, the charioteer represents reason, with the first horse, “of noble breed,” representing the desire or impulse to perform rational action, and the second representing the desire or impulse to perform the irrational action. It is up to the charioteer to goad the horses into working as a team, in order to guide them in the desired direction. However, as the horses are given to opposite instincts, each wants to pull itself, and so the chariot, in the direction in which it desires, and only in this direction. If neither horse is controlled, this could lead to the dismemberment of the soul (or self) in question. Freud says similar things of the id and the superego, although there are distinct differences between his ego and Plato’s charioteer. I discuss Freud’s account of the psyche further, specifically as this relates to integrity, in section 1.2. See also Jonathan Lear, 2003, esp. p.7.

It is also worth noting that Freud is not the first to voice concerns about the influence of unconscious – or, at least, not fully acknowledged – motivation. Describing his own doubts about the extent to which a person can truly know himself, Kant writes: “A human being cannot see into the depths of his own heart so as to be quite certain, in even a *single* action, of the purity of his moral intention and the sincerity of his disposition, even when he has no doubt about the legality of his action . . . In the case of any deed it remains hidden from the agent himself how much pure moral content there has been in his disposition (1999, p.523, emphasis is the author’s own).” And, later in the same work: “The depths of the human heart are unfathomable. Who knows himself well enough to say, when he feels the incentive to fulfill his duty, whether it proceeds entirely from the representation of the law or whether there are not many other sensible impulses contributing to it that look to one’s advantage (or to avoiding what is detrimental) and that, in other circumstances, could just as well serve vice? (1999, p.567).” See also Harry Frankfurt, 2004, p.72.
Passages such as these should remind us that Kant’s moral philosophy is largely an attempt to establish those conditions which are necessary for morally correct actions to be performed if, not necessarily when, such actions are performed.

In a seemingly more optimistic mood, Kant writes: “This [first command of all duties to oneself] is to ‘know (scrutinize, fathom) yourself’ . . . That is, know your heart – whether it is good or evil, whether the source of your actions is pure or impure, and what can be imputed to you as belonging originally to the substance of a human being or as derived (acquired or developed) and belonging to your moral condition. Moral cognition of oneself, which seeks to penetrate into the depths (the abyss) of one’s heart which are quite difficult to fathom, is the beginning of all human wisdom. For in the case of the human being, the ultimate wisdom, which consists in the harmony of a being’s will with its final end, requires him first to remove the obstacle within (an evil will actually present within him) and then to develop the original pre-disposition to a good will within him, which can never be lost. Only the descent into the hell of self-cognition can pave the way to godliness (1999, p.562, emphasis is the author’s own).” That last sentence, spoken figuratively, could have been written by Freud, himself.

Elsewhere, Kant writes: “Man has a general duty to himself, of so disposing himself that he may be capable of observing all moral duties, and hence that he should establish moral purity and principles in himself, and endeavor to act accordingly. This, then, is the primary duty to oneself. Now this entails self-testing and self-examination, as to whether the dispositions also have moral purity. The sources of those dispositions must be examined, to see whether they lie in honour or delusion, in superstition or pure morality. If people were to inquire what lies at the bottom of their religion and conduct, the majority would discover that there is far more honour, compassion, prudence, and habit in it, than there is morality. This self-examination must be constantly pursued. It is, to be sure, a special act, which cannot always be carried on, but we should pay constant attention to ourselves. In regard to our actions a certain watchfulness is in order, and this is the vigilantia moralis. This watchfulness should be directed to the purity of our dispositions, and to the punctiliousness of our actions (2001, p.128).” Compare this passage with Kant, 2006, p.195, and a bit further into Kant, 2001, p.137-138.

It is interesting to note that after more or less suggesting that persons cannot hope to ever successfully perform such self-analysis, Kant goes on to assert that this very kind of internal critique is morally imperative on the part of the agent; and, is described as our primary perfect duty, at that. I do not, for a second, want to suggest that Kant is being inconsistent – I think that the principle of charity requires that we look at these passages as a true genius trying to work through a philosophical issue that is among the most difficult of all.

17 It is not uncontroversial to suggest that Freud’s ultimate aim in the psychoanalytic endeavor is to aid the analysand in partially healing her psyche by means of reconciling and reintegrating its constituent parts. In fact, many Freudian and post-Freudian
theoreticians and clinicians hold that this is absolutely antithetical to the best interpretation of the psychoanalytic worldview. Others hold that psychoanalysis can, at best, better prepare the patient for facing such challenging work, themselves. As Jonathan Lear reminds us: “The English word ‘analysis’ comes directly from the Greek analusis, which means to resolve or break something down into its constituent parts. . . The reverse process, synthesis, is the stepwise process of construction from simple elements that we are familiar with from Euclid’s geometry. . . We [psychoanalysts] are not in the business of psyche-synthesis. At best, we try to facilitate a process in which analysands can engage in psyche-synthesis themselves (2003, p.59-61).”

I will not argue for my own interpretation of psychoanalytic theory here, but simply assume this in referencing Freud throughout. In passing, though, I will cite a pair of renowned orthodox psychoanalytic theorists who read Freud in just this way. Nancy Chodorow writes: “Freud . . . wanted to resolve the paradox he created, to use the scrutiny of the individual and self not to celebrate fragmentation but to restore wholeness . . . All analysts probably want to restore a certain wholeness and agency to the self (1991, p.155).” And, Robert Caper writes: “[The purpose of psychoanalysis is] to assist the patient to integrate repressed or split-off parts of his personality. This has long lineage, going back to Freud’s ‘Wo Es war, werde Ich sein’ [typically translated as, Where id was, there ego shall be] and beyond . . (2003, p.340).”

If my interpretation rubs some readers the wrong way, please feel free to read references to ‘Freudian’ as, instead, ‘Jungian’ or ‘analytical.’ As, there is certainly sufficient reason to regard psychic integration as the goal of Jungian analysis. See C. G. Jung (1978) and Warren Colman (2006).


19 “In the early stages of his researches, man believed at first that his dwelling-place, the earth, was the stationary centre of the universe, with the sun, moon and planets circling around it. . . [until] Copernicus . . In the course of the development of civilization man acquired a dominating position over his fellow-creatures in the animal kingdom. Not content with this supremacy, however, he began to place a gulf between his nature and theirs . . . [until] Darwin (1955a, p. 139-141).”

20 After some time, for instance, we came to accept that we are not, in even the most local of respects, the center of the universe – and, that this is perfectly okay, since our forebears mistakenly correlated physical place with divine place. Similarly, we seem well on our way to working through the idea that despite the fact that we possess superior cognitive ability, we are not different in kind from other animals.

21 Sigmund Freud, 1955, p.143, emphasis is the author’s own
In attempting to achieve reflective equilibrium, Freud also makes use of inverse of this process.

I am using the term talking cure in a general way to refer to that tradition of dialogical psychotherapies which stretches back at least to Joseph Breuer’s treatment of Anna O. (Bertha Pappenheim) in the 1880s (Sigmund Freud, 1999, p.3-17; Stanley Jackson, 1999, esp. p.98).

While the term only pops up a handful of times throughout the dissertation, pragmatic redescription will do much work here – and, so I want to say something about this before moving on. I borrow this concept from Richard Rorty, as I think that – better than anything else – it captures the sense in which I hope to rehabilitate and resituate our understanding of the state of the properly integrated self, the process which leads to this, and the attempts at the preservation of the integrated self which typically follow. In redescribing, we are taking a well-worn concept which, for one reason or another, no longer successfully meshes with our present worldview, and reinterpreting it in order that it may do the work that we need to be done, given our present needs and the proper context. Here, again, the concept in question is the integrated self. Long gone are the days in which we may think of the self in terms of a wholly integrated, completely transparent mental substance, under any compelling understanding of what this might come to. Still, the notions of selfhood and integrity are essential to our making sense of – to unapologetically use the concept at issue – ourselves. So, I will be offering an account which tries to resituate the integrated self, again redescribed, within a framework which is congenial to the contemporary situation, while remaining somewhat loyal to its conceptual roots and its everyday usage; and, again, likewise for the processes of psychic disintegration and reintegration, and integrity and its preservation.

To say a bit more about what pragmatic redescription involves, it is perhaps best to go straight to the horse’s mouth. In explanation of the practice, Rorty writes: “Interesting philosophy is rarely an examination of the pros and cons of a thesis. Usually it is, implicitly or explicitly, a contest between an entrenched vocabulary which has become a nuisance and a half-formed new vocabulary which vaguely promises great things. The latter method of philosophy [is to] redescribe lots and lots of things in new ways, until you have created a pattern of linguistic behavior which will tempt the rising generation to adopt it, thereby causing them to look for appropriate new forms of nonlinguistic behavior . . . I am going to try to make the vocabulary I favor look attractive by showing how it may be used (1999c, p.9).” For more, see Richard Rorty (1982a, esp. p.xiv; 1982b; 1982c; 1999d, esp. p.155; 2003), Ruth Anna Putnam (1993, esp. p.63-66), Owen Flanagan (2003, esp. p.53-54), and John Dewey (2008, esp. p.323-324).

It might seem that Rorty is being overly flippant in his casual assertion that we may replace longstanding, if antiquated, vocabularies with new ones simply because the latter are, in some sense, more useful. And, in some respects, he definitely is. But, this nonchalant approach is a direct outgrowth of his pragmatistic worldview. He writes of
this elsewhere: “Pragmatists . . . do not believe that there is a way things really are. So they replace the appearance-reality distinction by that between descriptions of the world and of ourselves which are less useful and those which are more useful. When the question ‘useful for what?’ is pressed, they have nothing to say except ‘useful to create a better future.’ When they are asked, ‘Better by what criterion?’, they have no detailed answer, any more than the first mammals could specify in what ways they were better than the dying dinosaurs (1999e, p.27).” For more on pragmatism’s relation to metaphysical antirealism, see Richard Rorty (1999c, esp. p.5) and Alexander Kremer (2009, esp. p.192-193).

So, for Rorty, there is no correct description of the way that the world is, per se – because, as he states, there is no way that the world is. Given this, there are simply better and worse vocabularies that we may use, the evaluation of which hinges upon the desire to bring about some state of affairs. If we ask him why this state of affairs and not some other, as stated, there is not much that he can say. He may reply, in a Wittgensteinian mood, “Our spade is turned . . . we have exhausted our argumentative resources (1999e, p.84).” At this point, from the perspective of Rorty, we are asking what Derek Parfit calls “empty questions,” and should simply “change the subject” (1987, p.213-214). Compare this with Peter Winch (1972, p.190), H. R. Hare (1973, p.69), Kai Nielsen (1989, p.200-201), Stanley Fish (1999, p.293-295), Richard Rorty (1999c, p.xv; 1999m, p.10-15), Michael Ridge (2001, p.238), and John Dewey (2008b, esp. p.323-324).

Some readers will want to assert that Rorty has given up much too fast here. But, for Rorty, it is sufficient to note that we all must offer just this response at some point – there is no Kantian “unconditioned premise” on which any argument may rely. So, all inferences beg some question if we travel far enough down the road. See Christine Korsgaard, 2007, p.33, 94.

We need not buy completely into Rorty’s metaphysical antirealism in order to appreciate what he is saying about the utility of redescription. And, of course, I am well aware that the intended audience of this paper will likely not be intuitively drawn to his approach to philosophy, generally. I will continue to use Rorty’s notion of redescription throughout the balance of this treatment, without, though, making any meatier assumptions with him. One note about this: rather than pragmatic redescription I will refer to my approach to redescribing and resituating the integrated self as a kind of therapeutic redescription, as this seems a bit more topic-specific. I using am “therapeutic” in the same sense as Jonathan Lear when he defines “therapeutic action” as “[both] the process, whatever it is, by which the patient [in our case, the moral agent] gets better . . . [and, as] all of our actions insofar as we are facilitating a therapeutic process (2003, p.31, emphasis is the author’s own).”

To return briefly to the broader topic, and provide one pertinent historical example: There is no better illustration of pragmatic redescription that I can think of than Freud’s introduction of his alternative vocabulary regarding the mind which, introducing new concepts alongside a redescription of those already in use, introduced major
innovation in the ways in which we think about the self and its sometime dysfunction; moreover, in the ways in which we treat such dysfunction. Freud recognized that the traditional psychological frameworks which held sway in his day were inadequate and out of step with science, generally, which prompted him to redescribe many of the notions which were fundamental to that framework. In this context, redescription and the introduction of new vocabularies may be compared with constructing “alternative tools” which help us to better get around in the world (Richard Rorty, 1999c, p.11). I will be using many of the tools introduced by Freud throughout.

We need not assume that Freud viewed his ‘discoveries’ from the same deflated perspective as the pragmatist in order to explain his third ‘Copernican revolution’ in these terms. However, according to Rorty, there is good reason to do so, as, on his reading, “[Freud was] as much of a pragmatist as James and as much of a perspectivalist as Nietzsche (1999c, p.30).”

25 I am using alienation (and interchangeably, estrangement) in the standard way, to denote one’s feeling of hostility towards something with which she typically finds a positive connection or even an experience of oneness; and, those negative feelings, such as emptiness (Peter Railton, 1984, p.137), which typically follow from this. One may be alienated from her own self, a state described by Timothy Schroeder and Nomy Arpaly as “the unpleasant experience of oneself as being other than one takes oneself to be (1999, p.381-382).” One may be alienated from particular mental events with which she does not identify, e.g., desires or values (Lee Baer, 2002). One may also be alienated from other persons, their actions, their values, and the list goes on and on.

Like other mental phenomena, alienation may be experienced to a variety of degrees, from the person’s feeling slightly at odds with the, say, alienated desire, to feeling a willful antipathy towards it. Harry Frankfurt writes: “What a person finds in himself may not just seem oddly disconnected from him. It may be dangerously antithetical to his intentions and to his conception of himself. Some of the psychic raw material that we confront may be so objectionable to us that we cannot permit it to determine our attitudes or our behavior. We cannot help having that dark side. However, we are resolved to keep it from producing any direct effect upon the design and conduct of our lives . . . [These desires, etc., are] intruders . . . We externalize them . . . They are outlawed and disenfranchised . . . [They have] no legitimate authority (2006b, p. 10).” Compare this with Sigmund Freud, 1959b.

Note that, for Frankfurt, the alienating desire (etc.) is not only perceived as having a foreign source, but the person goes on to actively disown it. Against Frankfurt, David Velleman (2007a) has argued that, given free rein, this defense mechanism can be extremely unhealthy in the long run, as the disownment constitutes a kind of repression and compartmentalization which leads to a further disintegration on the part of the person. This can manifest in all sorts of incapacitating ways.
While feelings of strong moral compulsion are certainly normal, I should note that it is equally normal – and, both studies and anecdotes suggest, more typical – that all persons simply do not, at all times, feel a disturbing sting of conscience following the performance of immoral or nonoptimific actions. Mordecai Nisan cites empirical evidence which supports this. He writes: “[Persons typically] allow themselves a measure of what they consider immoral behavior. The leverage to do this stems from the perspective of personal identity. This perspective grants an unavoidable right to assign special status to one’s personal projects (1990, p.283).” See also Mordecai Nisan, 1993, esp. p.256.

For these persons, the feeling of self-alienation that we are talking about, most times at least, shows up as a relatively minor and passing discomfort, if it shows up at all. And so, such persons are generally not in need of the self-reconciliatory work that I detail as the dissertation goes on. These persons allow themselves to, here and there, ‘play hooky,’ morally speaking, and do not rap themselves across the knuckles with a ruler for doing so. As they are able to negotiate the transition between moral and personal space so seamlessly, they do not feel the inner-tension between personal and moral reasons that one who is more committed to an allegiance to both parts of her practical life does. It is the mental life of the somewhat more devoted person that I am interested in discussing here, and in the pages to come.

There is a fine line between being committed in this way and being something of a prisoner to morality. While I take the former to be completely normal and (potentially) psychologically healthy, the latter – a slave, to some degree, of her superego – suffers dysfunction in mental and outward action as a result of the level of her commitment to moral goodness, and the punishment she inflicts upon herself as a result of failure. Those who are strongly committed, as opposed to the persons who give themselves an occasional free pass, are particularly susceptible to sliding into this type of dysfunction.

Regarding such persons, Nietzsche writes: “Everything he does now is upright and orderly – and still he has a bad conscience. For the extraordinary is his task (2001, p.139).” Making a similar point, Freud has this to say: “For the more virtuous a man is, the more severe and distrustful is [the super-ego’s] behavior, so that ultimately it is precisely those people who have carried saintliness furthest who reproach themselves with the worst sinfulness (1989b, p.87).” This dysfunction, typically referred to by contemporary clinicians as scrupulosity, often manifests in those suffering from certain instantiations of obsessive-compulsive anxiety disorder, and is embodied in symptoms which include debilitating internal or external checking behaviors (Joseph Ciarrochi, 1995 and Lee Baer, 2002).

It is worth noting early on that the account of integrity that I offer differs greatly from those which define the concept as necessarily involving the consistent performance of what are, according to commonsense or philosophically-sophisticated moral theories,


30 Here, I part company with Foucault to some extent.

31 Aside from wanting to alienate neither moral realists nor antirealists, I believe that little of practical import actually rests upon the outcome of this debate. R. M. Hare has argued compellingly that even in a world wholly devoid of ontologically “real” values, their subjective counterparts would (do?) continue to provide reasons for action. He suggests that it is simply an “empirical fact” that the human person is a “valuing creature” (1972a, p.39). So much so, in fact, that the worry of something like a global nihilism resulting from a sudden shift towards antirealism is nothing more than a “pretentious bogey (1972a, p.47).”

Hare writes: “Think of one world into whose fabric values are objectively built; and think of another in which those values have been annihilated . . . In both worlds the people go on being concerned about the same things – there is no difference in the ‘subjective’ concern which people have for things, only in their ‘objective’ value. Now I ask, What is the difference between the states of affairs in these worlds? Can any other answer be given except ‘None whatever’? (1972a, p.47).” Compare this with Kai Nielsen (1989, esp. p.196-198).

Shaun Nichols has accumulated empirical data which seems to support Hare’s intuitions: “Participants who treat canonical moral violations as nonobjective also treat such violations in typical ways on the standard measure of moral judgment. They treated moral violations as more serious than conventional violations . . . Further, they offered standard welfare-based justifications for why the moral violations were wrong, but they offered standard social-conventional explanations for why the conventional violations were wrong (2004, p.24).”
Here, I specifically have in mind theories like \textit{procedural realism}, “the view that there are answers to moral questions; that is, that there are right and wrong ways to answer them (Christine Korsgaard, 2007, p.35),” as opposed to \textit{substantive} or \textit{strong moral realism}, “the view that there are answers to moral questions because there are moral facts or truths, which those questions ask about (Ibid., p.35, emphasis is mine).” See also Harry Frankfurt (2006a, p.33).

As David Wong (2009) points out, it has been a pet project of communitarians – Charles Taylor (1989; 2003) and Michael Sandel (1982), to name two – to demonstrate the flaws in liberal intuitions regarding individual “radical choice” situations sometimes associated with autonomy. Namely, that choices made devoid of any community context and adjoining system of values are essentially arbitrary. Moreover, since the individual may only come to have language through community participation, and since language is a necessary component of any evaluative framework, then this kind of radical individuation with respect to values is impossible (Taylor, 1985a, p.274).

I agree. So, while I offer an account of values and evaluation which centers on the individual’s, again, stepping back from community-endorsed values and reasons in order to reevaluate these according to her own second-order desires (which, in turn, are informed by her own existing set of evaluative criteria), I do concede to the communitarian that there can be no stepping outside of one’s own skin, so to speak, in such instances. Evaluators are not born \textit{ex nihilio}.

Taylor provides a compelling description of the kind of communal givenness and situatedness at issue, especially with respect to evaluation being essentially a linguistic enterprise. Here, he also makes mention of the ways in which the individual may step back and gain a kind of freedom from the community voice: “I can learn what anger, love, anxiety, the aspiration to wholeness, etc., are through my and others’ experience of these things being objections for us, in some common space . . . Later, I may innovate. I may develop an original way of understanding myself and the human life, at least one which is in sharp disagreement with my family and background. But the innovation can only take place from the base in our common language. Even as the most independent adult, there are moments when I cannot clarify what I feel until I can talk about it with certain special partner(s), who know me, or with whom I have an affinity (1989, p.36).”

For further discussion, see Joel Feinberg (1986, esp. p.33-34), Larry May (1996, esp. p.130), Jane O’Dea (1997, esp. p.270, p.276), Daniel Hart (2005a, esp. p.260), John Martin Fischer (2006), and Phillippe Rochat (2008, esp. p.247). Much more will be said about the nature of value, its origins within one’s community, and how the agent may act autonomously in the face of this, in sections 2.3 and 2.4.

I am using \textit{authenticity} in the sense in which David Dilworth and Hugh Silverman attribute it to Heidegger – as the quality of a person remaining true to “that which is most one’s own (\textit{Eigenlichkeit}) (1978, p.91, emphasis is the authors’ own).” Compare this with

35 It is worth emphasizing that we should be careful not to throw the proverbial baby out with the bathwater – some person might inherit or naturally come by a system of values, etc., from which she has no desire, upon reflection, to deviate at all. This, of course, is completely fine, given that she reflectively endorses these values, etc. Persons should not deviate for deviation’s sake. Francis Dunlop puts the point this way: “As is well known, Sartre puts all the weight on self-fashioning, and denied that we might with integrity accept that our characters are also made for us by others, and by nature. This seems to me a very serious error (1982, p.13, emphasis is the author’s own).”


37 This position descends from Elizabeth Anscombe’s seminal paper, “Modern Moral Philosophy (1958).” Among its most vocal contemporary exponents is Michael Stocker. While Anscombe calls each of these philosophers out by name, Stocker refrains from doing so, but clearly has the usual suspects in mind. Early on he suggests that the “theories prominent in the English-speaking philosophical world” are those which are antagonistic to harmony between values and reasons (1976, p.455). Later in the same paper, he argues that act-utilitarianism, rule-utilitarianism, and Kantian deontological ethical systems can all lead to this kind of psychic disintegration and resulting feelings of self-estrangement (1976, p.459).

While it is clear that the various forms of utilitarianism widen the divide between reasons and values, it is somewhat controversial to say this of Kantianism. It may be argued – and, I owe this point to Richard Lee – that, as reasons and moral values flow from rationality for Kant, and as rationality and the self in its reflecting back on itself are identical, the Kantian, by definition, cannot reasonably come to view morality and its prescriptions as in any way alien. So, insofar as one is engaging in orthodox Kantian practical deliberation, there seemingly can be no divide between reasons and values, and so no feelings of alienation which accompany this.

Despite Kantianism’s autolegislative structure, it still seems so as though its adherents might come to view moral reasons and values as sourced from without when they stand at odds with more deeply held, and emotively-charged, non-moral values and commitments. In other words, while the Kantian moral agent gives moral rules to herself, she may still feel as if these same rules are restrictions placed upon her from an apparently outside source – and so, to become alienated from them. Barbara Herman writes: “[Bernard] Williams sees Kantian theory as impinging on integrity in two main ways: (1) it leads to estrangement from and devaluation of our emotions, especially in the rejection of emotions as morally valued motives; and (2) it insists on dominion over even
our most basic moral projects and intimate commitments, demanding a degree of attachment to morality that alienates us from ourselves and what we value (1983, p.233).” See also Peter Railton (1984), David Brink (1986, esp. p.435), Henning Jensen (1989, esp. p.193), Martin Hollis (1995, esp. p.172), and Bernard Williams (1999), the article to which Herman is largely responding.

To make the point another way, consider the following textbook example, modified for our own purposes. Imagine a person with Kantian intuitions, Sabine, who lives in Nazi Germany. Sabine, though a protestant German national, has no love for Hitler, and in fact, as any Kantian would, finds Nazism and its practices morally repugnant. She finds the Final Solution especially heinous, and because of this has taken up the practice of helping the resistance effort in any way that she can. This includes hiding both German Jews in a secret room parallel to her basement. Otto, her neighbor, and a devout nationalist and fascist, learns of Sabine’s activities and informs the authorities. Soon after, Sabine finds the Gestapo at her door asking whether or not she is hiding anyone in her home. Imagine that her hidey-hole is so well designed that if she were to deny that any such thing is going on, the hidden parties would never be found. And, ignore any further problems about how they might get out of the house if, as a result of Otto’s report, Sabine were now to be put under around-the-clock surveillance, etc.

Should she tell the Nazi officers the truth? Kant will say that she should. But, this is somewhat beside the point. What is really at issue is whether Sabine experiences the same division of reasons and values – and, following from this, feelings of intense alienation from morality – as the utilitarian often does in other instances. Assuming that Sabine’s commitment to protect the innocents from the Nazis is a strong one – what I later refer to as an identity-conferring commitment – then it seems surely to be the case that she will experience a strong sense of alienation from the moral (Kantian) side of her personality and its demands. And, even though Sabine understands well and good that she, in deliberating, has given herself the moral law vis-à-vis having been given orders from without, this does little to assuage her feelings of self-division, hostility towards, and radical separation from, morality at this moment.

Kantianism threatens her personal integrity, because the categorical imperative pulls her in a direction opposite to that of her personal values, emotions, and corresponding identity-conferring commitments. Moreover, it demands that, at any given time, she forego those projects most central to who she is, and does so from the get-go. Given this, there are any number of things which she cannot commit herself to with the intention of always following through, since reason (and so, morality) might dictate, given a particular set of circumstances, that she break that commitment.

Shifting gears a bit, I would argue that divine command theory, too, should be listed among those theories which routinely lead to self-alienation in just this way, as we may certainly imagine the dictates of God being experienced as alienating in similar respects regardless of one’s religious beliefs and subsequent commitments. Consider the story of Abraham and Isaac, for one example.

Michael Stocker, 1976, p.453-454. Compare this, with the experiences which Peter Railton attributes to the fictitious moral agents, John and Helen: “John and Helen [acting for utilitarian and Kantian reasons, respectively] both show alienation: there would seem to be an estrangement between their affections and their rational deliberative selves; an abstract and universalizing point of view mediates their responses to others and their own sentiments . . . It is as if the world were for them a fabric of obligations and permissions in which personal considerations deserve recognition only to the extent that, and in the way that, such considerations find a place in this fabric (1984, p.137).” See also William Wilcox (1987, esp. p.79) Michael Pritchard (1991, esp. p.205), and Michael Stocker (2003, esp. p.173).

David Brink, 1986, p.423

Setting aside the disagreement between moral and the personal reasons for action, it is also sometimes the case that moral reasons, themselves, come into conflict with one another. Reinhold Niebuhr describes such cases this way: “[The moral agent’s] conscience may become ‘divided’ because it is at different times informed by contrasting sets of loyalties and operates in different contexts of moral claims (1955, p.16).” While the primary focus of my discussion of disintegration and self-estrangement pertains to conflicting subjective (or, personal) and objective (in this case, moral) values and desires, I say much more about this in Chapter 3.


Regarding alienation from reason, itself, Kant writes: “The more a cultivated reason purposely occupies itself with the enjoyment of life and with happiness, so much the further does one get away from true satisfaction; and from this there arises in many, and indeed in those who have experimented most with this use of reason, if only they are candid enough to admit it, a certain degree of misology, that is, hatred of reason; for, after calculating all the advantages they draw . . . they find that they have in fact only brought more trouble upon themselves instead of gaining in happiness; and because of this they finally envy rather than despise the more common run of people, who are closer to the guidance of mere natural instinct and do not allow their reason much influence on their behavior (2006, p.9, emphasis is the author’s own).”
And, later in the same work: “The human being feels within himself a powerful counterweight to all the commands of duty, which reason represents to him as so deserving of the highest respect – the counterweight of his needs and inclinations, the entire satisfaction of which he sums up under the name happiness. Now reason issues its precepts unremittingly, without thereby promising anything to the inclinations, and so, as it were, with disregard and contempt for those claims, which are impetuous and besides so apparently equitable (and refuse to be neutralized by command). But from this arises a natural dialectic, that is, a propensity to rationalize against those strict laws of duty and to cast doubt upon their validity, or at least upon their purity and strictness, and, where possible, to make them better suited to our wishes and inclinations, that is, to corrupt them at their basis and destroy all their dignity – something that even common practical reason cannot, in the end, call good (2006, p.17-18, emphasis is the author’s own).”

One could argue that, for Kant, the very self-alienation we are looking to alleviate here provides, in a way, the greatest evidence that one actually is performing the morally right action; assuming, of course, that the person in question is also acting in accordance with the categorical imperative. Standing in conscious alienation from an objective reason for action, e.g., a moral reason, would seem to almost guarantee that in acting on it, the moral agent is acting from duty and not merely in accordance with duty.


Bernard Mayo, 1978, p.50. Compare this sense of alienation and subsequent disownment with Freud’s description of unconsciously motivated impulses: “Impulses appear which seem like those of a stranger, so the ego disowns them . . . We speak thus to the ego:– ‘Nothing has entered you from without; a part of the activity of your own mind has been withdrawn from your knowledge and from the command of your will. That, too, is why you are so weak in your defense; you are using one part of your force to fight the other part and you cannot concentrate on the whole of your force as you would against an external enemy (1955, p.142).” Again, Freud is talking about the secretive actions of the systems which inhabit the unconscious mind. However, in addition to sometimes showing up as “alien guests” (1955, p.141) there is another important sense in which the conscious mental events of which we are speaking are similar to their unconscious counterparts. Namely, both present themselves as, in some sense, overpowering to the person, as things over which she has no control. Part of the incentive of making use of Schafer’s action language, introduced in some detail shortly, is to nullify the perceived power and independence of mental events.
Some have based arguments for (or arguments supplementing arguments for) the existence of God on these very intuitions – C. Stephen Layman, to name one. Layman suggests that since we always have the most reason to do what is morally right; and, since doing what is morally right often involves a sacrifice to the agent acting – i.e., according to Layman’s account, the permanent of loss of something of significant value to the agent – then suggesting that we always have the most reason to do what is morally right, demands that there be an omnipotent and just God who can and will recompense the morally good for those sacrifices which she has made in the name of moral uprightness.

In Layman’s own words: “In every actual case, one has most reason to do what is morally required . . . If there is no God and no life after death, then there are cases in which morality requires that one make a great sacrifice that confers relatively modest benefits (or prevents relatively modest harms) . . . If in any given case one must make a great sacrifice in order to do what is morally required, but the sacrifice confers relatively modest benefits (or prevents relatively modest harms), then one does not have the most reason to do what is morally required . . . If there is no God and no life after death, then in some cases one does not have the most reason to do what is morally required . . . [So,] ‘There is no God and no life after death’ is false, i.e., either God exists or there is life after death, or both (2002).”

I would argue, against this position, that Layman and others are reducing morality to prudence, which is to lose our moral footing completely. F H. Bradley (1988) writes: “[Morality is] an end to be desired for her own sake, and not as a mere means to something beyond. Degrade her, and she disappears; and to keep her, we must love and not merely use her.” Even if Layman is guilty of this, it does not negate the original point about what motivates such accounts.

George Harris writes: “. . . it is simply mistaken that there is no [significant] cost to violating the demands of consequentialist moral theory. The cost is alienation. To the extent that a person of moral conscience does what he or she thinks is right and to the extent to which moral guilt is a form of self-alienation resulting from knowingly violating one’s moral values, a person accepting a consequentialist theory will be alienated from him/herself to the extent to which he or she is committed to the kinds of personal promises and personal relations that I claim are part and parcel of any plausible conception of personal integrity (1989b, p.452).”

Michael Stocker, 1990, p.41-42

Here, the moral agent may suffer feelings of guilt; or in more extreme cases, shame, which Freud describes as resulting from “the tension between the demands of conscience and the actual performance of the ego (1989d, p.33).” Or, put in terms congenial to talk of the self, coming to understand that “we have failed to be the kind of person we thought we were or should be (Michael Pritchard, 1991a, p.82).” See also Sigmund Freud (1989b,

48 Compare with Richard Sorabji, 2006, p.30

49 Perhaps the most celebrated member of this fraternity is Harry Frankfurt. Against the overridingness principle, Frankfurt writes: “The importance of morality in directing our lives tends to be exaggerated. Morality is less pertinent to the shaping of our preferences and the guiding of our conduct – it tells us less of what we need to know about what we should value and how we should live – than is commonly presumed. Even when it does have something relevant to say, it does not necessarily have the last word . . . Morality can provide us with at most only a severely limited and insufficient answer to the question of how a person should live . . . [It is neither] preemptive [nor] overriding (2004, p.6-7).”

Elsewhere, Frankfurt writes: “Morality . . . fails to get down to the bottom of things. The basic concern of morality is with how to conduct ourselves in our relations with other people. Now why should that be, always and in all circumstances, the most important thing in our lives? . . . There is no convincing argument that it must invariably override everything else. Even if it were entirely clear what the moral law commands, it would remain an open question how important it is for us to obey those commands. We should still have to decide how much we care about morality (2006, p.28, emphasis is the author’s own).”

And, still elsewhere: “Someone who takes morality seriously, and who believes that one of his alternatives is in fact morally preferable to others, may nonetheless regard the importance of this fact as less categorically preemptive . . . [Some projects may be] more important to him than meeting the demands of moral rectitude. It seems to me . . . that [such] subordination of moral considerations to others might be justified (2007, p.81).”

For those with intuitions similar to Frankfurt’s, much of what I have to say throughout this dissertation may seem somewhat superfluous. However, for those with, say, strong utilitarian or strong Kantian intuitions (or strong folk-divine command intuitions, etc.), Frankfurt might seem as though he is begging the question. As utilitarianism and Kantianism (etc.) imply that morality is overriding, positions such as Frankfurt’s simply do not resonate with the wide-eyed followers of such theories. The same may be said of intuitive consequentialists and intuitive deontologists (divine command adherents, etc.) outside of academia. Given this, while I certainly appreciate Frankfurt’s position, much more needs to be said to persons whose intuitions and firsthand experiences counter his own.

50 The locus classicus of the Objection from Integrity is Bernard Williams’s “A Critique of Utilitarianism (1973).” See also Williams 1999c and 1999e. The literature on this argument in regard to interpretation, criticism, and support is expansive. See Spencer Carr (1976,

Easily the two most frequently cited thought experiments which appear in the body of work on the objection are Bernard Williams’s vignettes involving George the chemist and Jim the botanist. Each is intended to demonstrate that faithfulness to act utilitarianism, in particular, is in a strong sense detrimental to personal integrity. At risk of oversimplifying what Williams is trying to say, this is shown in each case by pointing to the fact that adherence to act utilitarianism is incompatible with one, in principle, making, with the intention of holding to, nonoptimific commitments. Why is doing so, so important? As I argue later on, commitments (be they optimific or nonoptimific), and the values which charge them, are integral parts of the person’s self and self-concept. As reference to the George and Jim examples is so prevalent within the secondary literature regarding William’s position, I include portions of the accounts from Williams’s original text which offer the most salient points of each here.

Williams writes: “George, who has just taken his Ph.D. in chemistry, finds it extremely difficult to get a job . . . An older chemist, who knows about this situation, says that he can get George a decently paid job in a certain laboratory, which pursues research into chemical and biological warfare. George says that he cannot accept this, since he is opposed to chemical and biological warfare. The older man replies that he is not too keen on it himself, come to that, but after all George’s refusal is not going to make the job or the laboratory go away; what is more . . . if George refuses the job, it will certainly go to a contemporary of George’s who is not inhibited by any such scruples and is likely if appointed to push along the research with greater zeal than George would (1973, p.97-98).”

A commitment to act utilitarianism, of course, requires that George take the position and, as much as possible, pump the brakes when it comes to furthering the research. But, the question naturally arises, may he retain integrity if he does so? Given his commitment to never take part in research in chemical and biological weaponry, it would seem that he cannot, as doing so would amount to the intentional undermining of one of his strongest commitments – a central part of who he is.

The second vignette goes like this: “Jim finds himself in the central square of a small South American town. Tied up against the wall are a row of twenty Indians . . . [The village official responsible for their detainment] explains that the Indians are a random
group of the [nearby indigenous] inhabitants who, after recent acts of protest against the government, are just about to be killed to remind other possible protesters of the advantages of not protesting. However, since Jim is an honored visitor from another land, the captain is happy to offer him a guest’s privilege of killing one of the Indians himself. If Jim accepts, then as a special mark of the occasion, the other Indians will be let off . . . The men against the wall, and the other villagers, understand the situation, and are obviously begging him to accept (1973, p.98-99).”

Again, a commitment to act utilitarianism requires that Jim shoot one person in order to spare the lives of the remaining nineteen. But, the question arises, may he retain his integrity if he does so? Given an unspoken commitment to never intentionally kill an innocent person, it would seem that he cannot – this, again, is central to who he is.

Williams is typically portrayed as championing the right of individuals to remain committed to their personal values and projects. Otherwise, one might argue, Williams is begging the question against act utilitarianism with respect to what the morally right thing to do is in either situation. However, both the projects and commitments at issue in each example are conspicuously moral in flavor. I will not argue for which, between moral and non-moral projects, Williams likely had in mind here; as, in Chapter 3, I provide argument for how the aesthetic and action-oriented approach that I endorse may help the utilitarian moral agent retain integrity in either case, and in cases, such as those involving Jim and George, where commitments tend to show shades of both the personal and the moral. With nothing hinging on this, then, I interpret Williams as offering examples of moral commitments which the agents are personally connected to – so, in a way, a kind of hybrid. I discuss this notion of commitments a bit more in section 3.2, offering an additional example of my own there.

51 This raises some important questions about the nature of integrity that neither Williams nor Stocker speaks to in any great detail. I believe, though, that integrity is best made sense of just in these terms, and I provide support for these intuitions in sections 2.4-2.5, and in sections 3.1-3.3.

52 While I assert that (4) is so by appeal to intuition, many readers will likely find this dubitable if not straightforwardly false. Why must (or should) one possess a cohesive self? Moreover, given what we now know about the mind, is integrating mental events to any significant extent even within the realm of possibility? In raising these questions, something must be said in favor of (4) before we go any further.

I believe that the best first defense for suggesting that the integration of the self is both possible and of value is that autonomous action is in a direct way linked to its presence and (in some shape or another) its preservation. This will be explained in detail in Chapter 2.

Speaking practically, again, it also should be noted that most clinicians continue to speak of the self in theory and in practice. Dovetailing with this, the average Westerner
seems to best make sense of herself by reference to having or being a self, also. Hooking these up: the fact that clinicians have reported analysands by the drove seeking therapy in order to receive help in unifying (or reunifying) what they refer to as a self speaks to the concept’s practical importance under some healthy description.

Finally, I believe that even strong antirealists about the self will agree with the importance which I place on (what I talk about in terms of) the self’s constituent parts – most centrally, values and commitments – even if they would prefer to talk about these within the context of a different theoretical vocabulary. So, negative initial reaction to the importance placed on the self in IO might be remedied by the reader coming to a better understanding of what I have in mind in talking about the self. For these reasons, I ask that my reader humor me for the time being, and later reassess the utility of holding onto talk of the self following the redescription and resituation of this concept offered in the chapters to come.

Williams goes so far as to suggest that the demandingness of act utilitarianism is straightforwardly ridiculous on these grounds. He writes: “It is absurd to demand of [a moral agent], when the sums comes in from the utility network which the projects of other have in part determined, that he should just step aside from his own projects and decision and acknowledge the decision which the utilitarian calculation requires. It is to alienate him in a real sense from his actions and the sources of his action in his own convictions. It is to make him into a channel between the input of everyone’s projects, including his own, and an output of optimific decision; but this is to neglect the extent to which his actions and his decisions have to be seen as the actions and decisions which flow from the projects and attitudes with which he is most closely identified. It is thus, in the most literal sense, an attack on his integrity (1973, p.116-117, emphasis is the author’s own).”

Sarah Conly has accused Williams of sparring with a straw man. She writes: “Williams seems to think that utilitarian agents must always be concerned about utility, and never about their more personal achievements . . . This is, however, a view of what only a very unsophisticated utilitarian could think. Generally, we recognize that to promote happiness we must promote those activities which produce happiness, and that this requires having agents who have personal concerns . . . Simply, the best way to maximize happiness is not to pursue happiness alone, but to value people, achievements, and activities to themselves (1983, p.303, emphasis is the author’s own).” To defend Williams, what Conly says here may be true, but makes a negligible difference to the point he wants to make, overall. If one commits to act utilitarianism on its terms, then, given its demandingness, this commitment colors every other project which she takes part in.

Later in the same article, Conly comes close to admitting as much for Williams: “A more sophisticated notion of utility will not satisfy Williams, however, for it appears that it is not just that I calculate but that I calculate that renders my individuality nothing . . .
It is the calculation process itself . . . that depersonalizes (Ibid., p.303, emphasis is the author’s own).” This seems right, but leads to an impasse between Conly and Williams: “Williams’s argument is that one should decline to be influenced by external circumstances insofar as these circumstances are constituted by other peoples’ projects, since these forced the person to decide on the basis of external factors that impinge on his existence only coincidentally. This seems to the unsympathetic eye not so much maintenance of integrity as affectation of blindness (Ibid., p.305).” Mark Halfon makes a similar point: “The underlying difficulty with Williams’s position is his failure to recognize . . . that persons of integrity can suspend or step aside from their projects without being guilty of self-betrayal or suffering a loss of integrity (1989, p.83-84).”


54 As some of those who have offered variants of IO tend to place the stress on agency, the argument might be reformulated by adding the initial premise (1) In order to possess the capacity for autonomous agency, one must possess a (somewhat) cohesive self, and shifting the other premises down, such that the penultimate premise becomes In order to possess the capacity for autonomous agency, one must, make with the intention of holding to, and hold to certain of her personal commitments; where, (5) becomes One must possess agency; and, where the ultimate conclusion remains the same as that of IO. Call this IO*.

The disagreement about what is more important – agency or selfhood – so, whether we should talk about Williams’s objection in terms of IO or IO*, is of no major importance to my primary arguments about the nature and significance of integrity. This is because both formulations make sense of integrity in terms of the sufficiently integrated self, and both attack impartialist accounts of ethics in roughly the same way. Given this, little of interest here hinges on determining which of IO or IO* is the better version of the objection. However, I personally tend to favor IO, and stick with this formulation throughout the duration of the dissertation.

It is worth noting that there are interpretations of Williams’s objection which hinge upon related, but disparate psychological and motivational factors. To site one example, Kenneth Rogerson (1983) reads Williams as arguing that impartialist moral theories are incoherent on their face, because qua impartialist accounts they simply cannot motivate action. Of this, Rogerson writes: “My commitments provide my reasons or motives for acting. However, at least in some cases, impartial ethics require us to act contrary to our commitments. The requirement is unreasonable since we are obliged to
act and yet denied a necessary condition of human action, namely a motive. If human action requires us to have some motive for our actions, and if these motives derive from personal commitments, then impartiality threatens the very conditions of agency. That is to say, in those cases where an agent’s commitments conflict with what he regards as his impartial duty, acting from duty is ‘absurd’ since it would be stripped of all motivation (1983, p.467, p.471, emphasis is the author’s own).” This, while closer in personality to IO* than to IO, reads more as an objection from lack of motivating reasons, generally.

Rogerson’s objection is similar to certain standard critiques of Kantianism about moral motivation, as – so the arguments goes – in relegating motivational power within the moral realm to respect for duty alone, Kant leaves desire (here cashed out in terms of commitment) out of the motivational equation. The inclusion of such “empirical” motivators and their subsequent reasons leads, in part, Kant argues, to morality being nothing more than “a bastard patched up from limbs of quite diverse ancestry (2006b, p.35).” Even if it were true that Kantianism leads to this problem, it is certainly not the case that most forms of utilitarianism do. While the preeminence of pleasure and the avoidance of pain may be found out by reason, utilitarianism does not stop there. And, if we are to be good Millians, we must note that among the most qualitatively superior pleasures that rational entities can experience is the happiness (which, of course, has direct links to individual desire and desire-fulfillment) that follows from doing the morally right thing.

For broad discussion of this debate, see Thomas Nagel (1978, esp. p.7-15), Francis Dunlop (1982, esp. p.5-6), Christine Korsgaard (1986, esp. p.8-9; 2007), and Adina Roskies (2003); for a look at Kant’s own account of moral motivation, see Immanuel Kant (2006b, esp. p.22-23).

For ease of reference, I am including IO as Appendix I, p.318.

Some have argued – James Gutmann, to list one – that anything approximating complete integration demonstrates an absence of sufficient diversity and richness on the part of the values and projects held to by a person. Gutmann writes: “Lack of [some degree of inner tension among values and projects] may suggest that the unity of inner harmony which is evident has been attained too easily, that the pattern of its structure was too readily established to give a fully satisfying sense of diverse elements brought into a significant relationship (1945, p.213-214).”


Catriona Mackenzie describes the events which typically lead to sea changes in self this way: “[Self-transformative decisions] are preceded and precipitated by conflicts within the self. Conflicts within the self can arise when a person’s desires are inconsistent or contradictory, or when a person has conflicting desires that cannot be, or are highly unlikely to be, conjointly satisfied . . . The kinds of conflict that are a precursor to self-transformative decisions . . . arise at the level of one’s practical identity or normative self-conception, where the conflict concerns what one values what kind of a person one wants to be or thinks one should be. (2008a, p.129)” Of course, it need not be desires, per se, which precipitate such changes – but values, projects, commitments, and realizations about these and the relation in which they stand to other mental events, and one’s ego-ideal. Compare Mackenzie’s take with Jan Bransen (2000), who refers to similar conflicts as prodding one to choose between differing “alternatives of oneself.”


The primary reason for this is that since act utilitarianism confers value to states of affairs rather than to actions; and, since it disallows agent-centered side constraints; and, an empirical point, since the world is presently filled with such a great amount of pain and suffering to be combated; then, its commitment to negative responsibility – described by Nancy Davis as suggesting that “we are as much responsible for things that we allow or fail to prevent as for things that we bring about (1980, p.16)” – places an almost unbearable weight on the shoulders of the moral agent. At any given moment it is, for all intents and purposes, a certainty that utility will be maximized by doing something other than what that we are personally committed to or invested in, save the commitment to act utilitarianism, itself. But, of course, this last exception is significant, and I return to discussion of the possibility of the commitment to act utilitarianism being among one’s (or being her one) identity-conferring commitments in sections 3.2-3.4.


62 Roy Schafer, 1980a, p.63. We might be tempted to look upon a language reorientation with suspicion when it comes to significant change regarding the state of the integrated self – but, as Louis Kirshner reminds us, “words – signifiers – will mediate all [of the agent’s] exchanges with the world, and it is in these exchanges that the subject will attempt to construct himself as whole being (1991, p.181).” A change of perspective can be a powerful thing; and, all analytical changes of perspective take place within language.

63 Roy Schafer, 1980a, p.64

64 Roy Schafer, 1976c, p.9-10. We should note that in replacing classical Freudian metapsychology (talk of drives, psychic determinism, etc.) with action language, Schafer is not necessarily making any metaphysical commitments. Of this instrumentalist facet of his work, Louis Sass writes: “Schafer often backs off from an explicit claim that his [action language] approach has more objective truth than does metapsychology; at these times, he often retreats to a more pragmatic justification, arguing that, if not more ‘true,’ action language is at least ‘healthier’ . . . Schafer seems to hold that action language is to be employed only insofar as it is therapeutic in a given situation (1988, p.572).” Compare this with the general pragmatism of Richard Rorty, and with the approach attributed to the Buddha in sections 1.4 and 1.5. It is in this same instrumentalist spirit that I employ an analogue to Schafer’s approach and to integrity and selfhood, and to these concepts themselves, in looking to treat the disintegrating moral agent in Chapter 3.

65 Mark Tappan provides a nice concise description of how the narrativity theory of the self may come into play here; he writes: “The moral self is situated neither psychologically nor socially, but dialogically – as a function of the linguistically mediated exchanges between persons and the social world that are the hallmark of all lived experiences . . . the ‘authorship’ of the narratives one tells about one’s life is always a function of both self and other (1999, p.18).” As stated, I suggest in Chapter 3 that the agent may play the role of both analyst and analysand in terms of redescribing mental events as actions (so,
reclaiming agency and taking responsibly for mental action), and coming to add psychic coherence to one’s own mental life (so, cohesion to one’s own self) through the narrative process. While I hold that the self is more than just the autobiographical true story which we implicitly tell ourselves, and tell others about ourselves, I do believe that such storytelling can make tangible its makeup and further fortify the self. Moreover, this process can help one come to understand herself better.


Some might object that in lending credence to self-analyses we have certainly left Freud behind. However, if actions speak louder than words, this might not be the case. Karen Horney writes: “Freud, in his book on the interpretation of dreams, at least implicitly recognized that some degree of self-analysis is possible, for here he did analyze his own dreams. This is particularly interesting in view of the fact that his whole philosophy denied the possibility of self-analysis (1942, p.23-24).” Either way, as the mental events at issue here are those which we stipulate as consciously known, I do not believe that the most damning traditional worries regarding self-analysis are warranted. One could compellingly argue, in fact, that it is with the analysis of just such acknowledged beliefs and desires that self-analysis may be trusted as an effective method of treatment.

Schafer uses this very analogy: “People going through psychoanalysis . . . tell the analyst about themselves and others in the past and present. In making interpretations, the analyst retells these stories. In retelling, certain features are accentuated while others are placed in parentheses; certain features are related to others in new ways or for the first time; some features are developed further, perhaps at great length . . . The end product of this interweaving of texts is a radically new, jointly authored work or way of working. One might say that in the course of analysis, there develops a cluster of more or less coordinated new narrations, each corresponding to periods of intense analytic work on certain leading questions (1980c, p.36, emphasis is mine).”

Melanie Klein describes the psychic distress associated with this as a kind of loneliness: “The inner sense of loneliness [involves] the sense of being alone regardless of external circumstances, of feeling lonely even when among friends or receiving love. This state of eternal loneliness . . . is the result of a ubiquitous yearning for an unattainable perfect internal state (1975b, p.300, emphasis is mine).”

70 Here, self is sometimes translated as soul.

71 Archie Bahm, 2013, p.136. While the Buddha balks at answering Vaccha’s question for the reasons noted, he has long been associated with the anattā doctrine discussed in section 1.5. This is shown in his earliest depictions and in the manner in which he referred to himself. Stephen Bachelor writes: “In the fragments of stone friezes that survived [from the times of early Buddhism], he is represented as an empty seat, a pair of footprints, or the wheel of Dharma that he set turning. While alive, he referred to himself as the Tathagata, the ‘One Thus Gone.’ It was not until Greek settlers in India converted to Buddhism . . . that Gautama was first personified, in the form of the god Apollo. (2000, p.7).”

72 Archie Bahm, 2013, p.136. It is interesting to note that, despite the fact that this series of passages is a standard part of the canon, at least three major schools of Buddhism hold to positive, but contrary views about the self, with each curiously attributing its views to the Buddha; these are Theravāda (थिवरवाद) – the oldest living Buddhist denomination, Yogācāra (योगाचार), and Japan’s Jōdo Shinshū, or Shin, or Zen (浄土真宗). Bahm writes: “Theravāda Buddhism denies existence and continuity to a self through its basic doctrines of anattā (no-soul) and anicca (impermanence). Yogācāra Buddhism merges individual and cosmic consciousness (vijñāna) which, in effect, is an eternal world-soul perpetually preoccupied with transient appearances. Shin Buddhism believes that each individual soul will dwell eternally in the blissful company of Amidā Buddha in a Pure Land from which none will remain excluded. Thus, the history of Buddhist doctrines of self, expressed by persons attributing their views to Gautama, has consisted largely of a series of repudiations of Gautama’s refusal to answer the questions: ‘Is there a soul or is there not a soul?’ (2013, p.138).” It is also worth noting that, like the Buddha in this series of passages, Nāgārjuna does not explicitly come down on either side of the argument (Stephen Batchelor, 2000, p.64-68).

73 Quoted in Julia Ching, 1984, p.41. Compare with what Ankur Barua says here: “. . . while the Buddha may not have explicitly stated that ‘there is no self’, it is clear that the early Buddhist texts also deny that there is an inner controller, foundation or establishment for the psycho-physical components (skhandas) into which the human person is deconstructed. Given the pragmatic thrust of Buddhist teaching, one might therefore view anattā not so much as a doctrinal standpoint, but as a ‘soteriological strategy’ for reinforcing in the aspirant for liberation appreciation for the lack of permanence in all empirical phenomena . . . In place of a substantial self that is ontologically distinct from its properties such as thoughts and feelings, [one comes to hold that] there are simply interrelated processes of cognitions and feelings, and no ‘I’ that possesses or comprehends these events as ‘mine’ (2012, p.223-224).”
Compare both Murti’s and Barua’s take with Jay Garfield’s equally instrumentalist reading of Nāgārjuna. The latter writes: “That there is a self has been taught. / And the doctrine of no-self, / By the buddhas, as well as the / Doctrine of neither self nor self (1995).” Commenting on this passage, Garfield writes: “There are many discussions of the way to think about the self in the Buddhist canon. For those who are nihilistic about the self (such as contemporary eliminative materialists or classical Indian Cārvākas), it is important to explain the conventional reality of the self. For those who tend to reify the self, the doctrine of no-self is taught, that is, the doctrine of the emptiness of the self . . . Both the terms ‘self’ and ‘no-self’ . . . , Nāgārjuna claims, are conventional designations. They may each be soteriologically and analytically useful antidotes to extreme metaphysical views and to the disturbances those views occasion. But to neither corresponds an entity – neither a thing that we could ever find on analysis and identify with the self, nor a thing or state that we could identify with no-self . . . To say neither self nor no-self is, from this perspective, not to shrug one’s shoulders in indecision but to recognize that while each of these is a useful characterization of the situation for some purposes, neither can be understood as correctly ascribing a property to an independently existing entity (Ibid., 1995).”

Finally, compare each of these accounts with the exchange between the Buddhist sage, Bodhidharma, and his would-be disciple Hui-k’o; Stephen Batchelor recounts: “Bodhidharma went to Mount Sung . . . During this time he attracted students who were as intent on attaining enlightenment . . . One winter a monk called Hui-k’o approached the cave [in which Bodhidharma had sequestered himself], stood outside in the snow, cut his arm off as an act of devotion and cried: ‘Your disciple’s mind is not yet at peace! I beg you, Master, give it rest!’ Bodhidharma said: ‘Bring your mind to me and I will put it to rest.’ Hui-k’o replied: ‘I have searched for the mind but have never been able to find it.’ ‘There,’ said Bodhidharma, ‘I have put it to rest for you.’ Hui-k’o’s inquiry into the nature of mind led him neither to a metaphysical essence nor to a blank nothingness . . . The story illustrates a therapeutic strategy of questions that aims at freeing one from the fixation of ‘things’ and ‘nothings.’ Rather than encouraging his disciple to realize ‘emptiness,’ which could all too easily have been construed as either something sacred or simply nothing at all, Bodhidharma asks him to investigate the nature of his own immediate experience. This led to an easing of Hui-k’o’s vision, in which the constrictive hold of fixation was, for a moment at least, relaxed (2000, p.26-27; see Ibid., p.67-68 for Batchelor’s discussion of Nāgārjuna’s pragmatic bend).”


\[\text{\footnotesize Here, I make no distinction between the self and the soul. My reason for not doing so is primarily that the folk traditionally have not done so, and what I have to say here follows from a folk understanding of selfhood (or possession of or identification with a soul) and}\]
psychic integration, and the collective harm that goes along with this. It is worth noting, though, that while more sophisticated conceptions of the soul do not suggest that it is one and the same as the self (or, if you prefer, the mind), most do claim a perfect integrity or wholeness for the soul. See Thomas Reid (1983). I also make no distinction between (what are likely) different understandings of the self termed disparately in ancient Western and middle-Eastern religious texts. For example, I say nothing about the distinction between the *nephesh* (נֶפֶש) of the Old Testament, and the *psyche* (ψυχή or *psûkhē*) of the New Testament. My reason is the same for cases such as these.

C. G. Jung has argued that the conception of wholeness at issue is, in fact, an archetype, i.e., an idea which flows from the collective unconscious of all persons and in all historical ages. He writes: “Unity and totality stand at the highest point on the scale of objective values because their symbols can long be distinguished from the *imago Dei* (1978, p.31).” See also Warren Colman (2006).

If this is the case, then I am boxing with – at risk of making a Jungian pun – the shadow of the true adversary. In other words, if it is true that we all have an innate propensity to idealize the whole and fully integrated irrespective of the day in which we were raised, or the religious traditions to which we were exposed, etc., then these very traditions are merely external manifestations of something which lives deep within ourselves – something, moreover, which is actually a (largely unacknowledged) part of ourselves. To critique religion on this matter, then, would be to critique the superstructure vis-à-vis the substructure. As I am not completely sold on Jung’s position, I will continue with my critique.

Friedrich Nietzsche, 1996, p.329, emphasis is the author's own

This is also consistent with Nietzsche’s conception of the self as hopelessly disintegrated to a significant extent. Alexander Nehamas writes: “Nietzsche believes that we are not warranted in assuming *a priori* the unity of every thinking subject: unity in general is an idea of which he is deeply suspicious . . . Our thoughts contradict one another and contrast with our desires, which are themselves inconsistent and are belied, in return, by our actions (1983, p.396-398).”

I am concentrating on Christianity primarily for the sake of familiarity and relative convenience, and because Nietzsche names it, specifically. However, it is important to note that the linkage between the holy and the whole, and the high value placed on holiness and wholeness, is peculiar to neither Judaism nor Christianity. To cite just one additional example of a religious tradition which is fixated on wholeness as synonymous with God and the Good, consider the Sufism of the 15th century shaykh, Jāmī. W. C. Chittick writes of his beliefs: “The key term which is ascribed to man as the manifestation of the Name ‘Allāh’ is the Arabic word ‘jāmī’, meaning, ‘all-embracing, all-
comprehending,’ that which brings all things into a unified whole (p.146).” More generally, it is widely known that Muslims, historically and ecumenically within their Islam, have so valued wholeness that they accuse Christians of practicing closet polytheism due to the Church’s doctrine of the Trinity and its habit of praying to any number of saints, rather to the one God, Himself.

79 Eric Partridge, 1958, p.292. The English holi, hali, and hālig are akin to the Old Frisian helich, the Old Saxon helag, the Old High German heilag, the Middle High German heilec, and the German heilig; also, the Middle Dutch heilich and helich, the Dutch heilig, the Gothic heilags, and the Old Norse heilagr.

80 Eric Partridge, 1958, p.292

81 Philip Sheldrake, 2005, p.341

82 There is a multitude of instances in the Bible where something like rebirth is mentioned (Titus 2:5). This is a recurring theme in the New Testament, especially in the book of Colossians: “For you died, and your life is now hidden with Christ in God (Colossians 3:3); “Put to death . . . everything that belongs to your earthly nature (Colossians 3:5); “Do not lie to each other since you have taken off your old self with its practices and have put on the new self, which is being renewed in knowledge in the image of its creator (Colossians 3:9-10).” There are also many references to the sinfulness of being double-minded throughout the Bible (James 1:7), a concept which is akin to the state of disintegration and its accompanying experience of self-alienation.

83 Eric Partridge, 1958, p.579

84 C. G. Jung, 1978, p.37. Jung goes on to point out that while the Christ of the New Testament is almost universally exalted for this reason by Christians, their conception of perfect wholeness is flawed in that it does not allow for the shadow element of the person to remain, much less to thrive. He writes: “There can be no doubt that the original Christian conception of the imago Dei embodied in Christ meant all-embracing totality . . . Nevertheless the Christ-symbol lacks wholeness in the modern psychological sense, since its foes now include the dark side of things but specifically excludes it in the form of a Luciferian opponent (Ibid., p.41, emphasis is the author’s own).” Given that persons share in both the, in this sense, Christian and Luciferian, but equate division with this, a feeling of alienation is both strengthened and perpetuated.

85 It is worth noting that even the idea of sin, itself – within a Thomistic framework – is talked about in terms of being a lack. Or, put another way, failing to be a whole necessarily involves the absence of God.
Romans 7:15-20. See also Ton van den Beld, 2002, p.66. Compare Paul’s self-analysis with Kierkegaard’s, who writes: “What is despairing other than to have two wills? For whether the weakling despairs over not being able to wrench himself away from the bad, or whether the brazen one despairs over not being able to tear himself completely away from the Good – they are both double-minded, they both have two wills (1946, p.266).” Of course, there is no shortage of pagan precursors to Paul’s stance on this issue – antecedents, moreover, that he would have been familiar with at least indirectly. The most celebrated of these (or, depending on the axe one has to grind, the most reviled) is Plato, himself. See Plato’s *Timaeus* and *Republic*, and for further discussion, p.6-19 of Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliaferro (2011).

Romans 7:25

I borrow this term from Lewis Kirshner, 1991, p.164.

St. Augustine, 2006, p.27, emphasis is mine. Compare the self-analyses of Augustine and Paul with William James’s third person take: “There are persons whose existence is little more than a series of zig-zags, as now one tendency and now another gets the upperhand. Their spirit wars with their flesh, they wish for incompatibles, wayward impulses interrupt their most deliberate plans, and their lives are one long drama of repentance and of effort to repair misdemeanors and mistakes (1990, p.157).”

St. Augustine, 2006, p.32. We may contrast this critical take on the fallen soul (or self) with the purely structural conception of the soul as indivisible substance. The latter, not surprising, borrows significantly from Plato’s position regarding the essential divisibility of corporeal bodies as opposed to the essential indivisibility of spiritual bodies. See also St. Augustine, 1978.

Compare Augustine’s account with the experiences of Jonathan Edwards during his first efforts to convert: “[Edwards’s] sinful life, he thought, had brought him to the verge of death. He therefore tried to renounce his former ways and obey the Lord’s word. Shortly after [recovering from his illness], however, he ‘fell again’ into his ‘old ways of sin,’ which led him to suffer many ‘great and violent inward struggles’ in his soul. Time and time again he tried to renounce his errant ways, but he constantly fell short of his promises and expectations. Thus, as he wrote, ‘after many conflicts with wicked inclinations, repeated resolutions, and bonds that I laid myself under by a kind of vows [sic.] to God, I was brought wholly to break off all former wicked ways and all ways of known outward sin; and to apply myself to seek salvation, and practice my religious duties’ (Avihu Zakai, 1998, p.129).”
Thomas Altizer makes the point more eloquently: “So it is that in the life of faith we are the Lord’s, none of us either lives or dies to himself (Romans 14:7), for in the life of the Spirit we are not our own (1 Corinthians 6:19). Here, we are not our own because what is my own is sin and death, at most I can wish or desire to serve the Law of the God within my mind, but actual obedience is closed to me so long as I live according to the flesh, and I live in bondage to the flesh so long insofar as I live as my own. (1980, p.360)”

And, Williams James, linking up God’s grace specifically with the healing of internal division, puts it this way: “To be converted, to be regenerated, to receive grace, to experience religion . . . are so many phrases which denote the process . . . by which a self hitherto divided, and consciously wrong inferior and unhappy, becomes unified and consciously right superior and happy, in consequence of its firmer hold upon religious realities (1990, p.177).”

John Donne, Holy Sonnet XIV

Ton van den Beld, 2002, p.67-70

Analogues to the Christian equation of wholeness with perfection go at least as far back as Platonistic readings of Parmenides. By the time we reach Plotinus, the One has been thoroughly deified.

Once more, it is not fair to lay this at the door of religion and only religion, as, just as there were secular precursors to the notion that the self (or soul) may be divided and that this division is a great evil, there were also those which spoke of the self (or soul) as being (ideally) a whole. Again, Plato’s Socrates seems to hold such views at various points in the dialogues, and argues in detail for the view in the Phaedo. By extension, it has been argued that Plato, too, held the view that selves were essentially wholes. See also Stewart Goetz and Charles Taliferro, 2011, p.6-19.

Compare this with what Kant says of morality, generally: “Virtue is always in progress and yet always starts from the beginning – it is always in progress because, considered objectively, it is an ideal and unattainable, while yet constant approximation to its duty (1999b, p.537, emphasis is the author’s own).” And, later in the same work: “This duty to oneself [to increase his moral perfection] is narrow and perfect one in terms of quality; but it is wide and imperfect in terms of its degree, because of the frailty (fragilitas) of human nature. It is human being’s duty to strive for this perfection, but not to reach it (in this life), and his compliance with this duty can, accordingly, consist only in continual progress. Hence while this duty is indeed narrow and perfect with regard to its object (the
idea that one should make it one’s end to realize) with regard to the subject it is only a wide and imperfect duty to himself (1999b, p.567, emphasis is the author’s own).”

100 Jonathan Edwards, 1999, p.57-58


102 In other cases, it might not be the infant’s own reflection it sees which leads to this idealization, but the integration which it attributes to some other person – the mother, for example. Hereafter the child forms the belief that its self, like its material shadow, must also be an integrated whole. See John Muller and William Richardson (1982, esp. p.29-30), Louis Sass (1988, p.599), Jennifer Church (1991, esp. p.213-218), and Mark Epstein (1998, p.9-10).

For Lacan, it is also important that the ‘realization’ that the self is unified originates from an ‘outside’ source. Nick Mansfield writes: “The image of the self [attained in the mirror-stage] has not been something that the subject has developed for itself, from within . . . The self’s new understanding of itself has come to it from the outside, in an image it has seen in the external world . . . [This] comes from, and remains a part of, otherness itself . . . The subject does not define itself. Instead, it is defined by something other than itself. Put in Lacanian terms, the subject is the discourse of the other (2000, p.43, emphasis is the author’s own).”

103 For a religious analogue to this account which ties it to the critique of psychic perfection offered in section 1.4, see Ludwig Feuerbach (2004, 2011) and Karl Marx (1967, 1978).

104 Melanie Klein, 1975a, p.5-12

105 Melanie Klein, 1975a, p.20. Elsewhere, Klein writes: “[Psychic integration] involves facing one’s destructive impulses and hated parts of the self, which at times appear uncontrollable and therefore which endanger the good object. With integration and a growing sense of reality, omnipotence is bound to be lessened, and this . . . contributes to the pain of integration, for it means a diminished capacity for hope (1975b, p.304).”


107 Ernest Wolf, 1993, p.60

Lewis Kirshner writes: “The mind is irrevocably divided for Freud by the pleasure versus reality principles, by the opposition of conscious and unconscious, and finally by conflicting claims of instinctual forces. This is the heart of Freud’s third Copernican revolution, dethroning man from his central position in the universe as not even the master in his own house (1991, p.166).” While these are certainly extremely important, I respectfully disagree with Kirshner’s ultimate point, holding instead that the capstone of Freud’s legacy is the facilitation of a partial reconciliation between once warring parts of the self by means of an increased self-knowledge and a strengthening of the ego, in order to establish a greater sense of wholeness and autonomy on the part of the patient. While stopping short of any mention of reconciliation per se, Joel Whitebrook describes the strengthening of the ego in Kantian terms: “Freud’s dictum, ‘Where id was, there ego shall become,’ can be taken as a programmatic statement of the move from heteronomy to autonomy in the Kantian sense. The formation of the ego structure not only frees the individual from the heteronomous determination of the id, which is to say, of inner nature, but also distances him from the ego’s other internal foreign territory, i.e., the super ego – which, it should be stressed, can be every bit as primitive and unreflective as the id – it also frees him from the nature-like compulsions of society as well (1992, p.100).” See also Karen Horney (1942, esp. p.21-22) Béla Szabados (1982), Patrick Hutton (1988, esp. p.121-124), Sigmund Freud (1989a), and Marcia Cavell (2008a; 2008b).

Jacques Lacan has argued that there can be no significant unification of mental components. Subjectivities are, on his view, essentially disintegrated, and radically so. Lacan holds that the felt need to do something about this disintegration is symptomatic of humanity’s lack of courage in accepting that the human person is essentially a manqué (or, lack of something substantial). On this view, there is no cohesive self to restore, nor should we ever hope to construct one. Moreover, forcing the conception of an integrated self onto one’s own subjectivity is a kind of auto-oppression. Joel Whitebrook describes the position this way: “[For many post-Freudians] the ego, far from being an agency of truth and emancipation is in fact a defensive structure, a submissive salve, sycophant, opportunist, and liar – a ‘symptom’ as Lacan puts it – that narcissistically seeks to protect the individual from otherness, and, in so doing, ultimately violates the otherness of the Other. Or, stronger yet, it may be the case that the very idea of emancipation is itself simply one of the grandiose illusions of modernity which seeks to deny our finitude, that is, our inescapable embeddedness in nature, language and tradition through omnipotent mastery. According to this account, the ego . . . [and] the desire for center in general, is a product of anxiety (1992, p.101, emphasis is the author’s own).” See also Jacques Lacan (1954; 1977), Louis Sass (1988, esp. p.592), Fred Alford (1990, esp. p. 152), Joel Whitebook (1992, p.100-103), and Jeffrey Rubin (1998, esp. p.109).

While the Lacanian School is the most notorious proponent of this line of thinking, more conventional approaches echo Lacan’s thoughts on the matter to a greater or lesser extent. Lewis Kirshner writes: “In contrast [to the self-psychology of Kohut],
analysts working in the more traditional mode of ego psychology do not endorse the existence of a guiding integrative self, but assume that what one hears in analytic work is the expression of many purposes and demands. Behind the subject account of experience, this analyst listens for contradictions, inconsistencies, word slips, and metaphors suggesting multiple agendas, including pressing bodily urges and emotional wishes, attempts to adapt to a perceived interpersonal milieu, and powerful moral and self-punitive tendencies. This analyst believes he or she is witness to an effort to harmonize these agendas by a portion of the mental structure controlling speech and activity, much of which is unconscious and has constructed compromises to achieve this state of harmony and security . . . The analyst observes in the treatment situation that each of the separate mental agencies seems to want to exploit him as an ally, source of gratification, or whipping boy (1991, p.160).”

111 In Sanskrit, उपादान

112 Nāgārjuna, 2000, p.131

113 Simone de Beauvoir, 1997, p.16-17

114 Jean-Paul Sartre, 1992

115 I borrow the concept unintegration – a notion whose affinity with Buddhism has been remarked upon extensively by Mark Epstein (2007) – from W. D. Winnicott. Unpacking this notion in brief, Adam Phillips writes: “Unintegration means being able to entrust oneself to an environment in which one can safely and easily be in bits and pieces without the feeling of falling apart (1989, p.80).” The stock example of this is the completely relaxed infant in its mother’s trusted arms. But, as stated before, sitting meditation can facilitate this experience as well.


117 Mark Epstein, 1995, p.100

118 Nietzsche puts it similarly: “. . . just as common people separate the lightning from its flash and take the latter as a doing, as an effect of a subject called lightning, so popular morality also separates strength from the expression of strength as if there were behind the strong an indifferent substratum that is free to exercise strength – or not to. But there is no substratum; there is no ‘being’ behind the doing, effecting, becoming; ‘the doer’ is simply fabricated into the doing – the doing is everything (1998, p.25, emphasis is the author’s own).
The five aggregates (literally *heaps*, from the Sanskrit स्कन्ध, or *skhanda*) mentioned are “body, sensation, conceptualization, volition, and consciousness (Gerhard Faden, 2011, p.42).” Julie Ching writes, “. . . the Five Skhandas are not merely philosophical analysis, but the corollary of the religious insight into the meaning of life. For life means suffering (*dukkha*), and suffering comes from attachment to the Five Skhandas. Indeed, according to Nikaya [the sutta Pitaka], the Five Skhandas themselves are *dukkha*. A denial of a Self giving substantial unity and permanent identity to the Five Skhandas is therefore regarded as the ‘right view’ (*sammādiṭṭhi*) (1984, p.37, emphasis is the author’s own).” Others view the clinging to (*upādāna*) the skhandas as the source of suffering, or as suffering, itself; still others regard thirst or desire (*tṛṣṇā*, in Sanskrit, त्रोण) as the source of suffering, or as suffering, itself.

I am playing fast and loose here, but believe that the comparison is overall a good one to make at least insofar as each thinker’s initial approach to the problem goes. However, some interpret the two as ultimately arguing for different positons. See, for example, James Giles (1993), who suggests that while Hume is a reductionist about the self, the Buddha is an eliminativist about the self. See also Louis Kirshner, 1991.

Mark Epstein, 2007, p.221


Walpola Rahula, 1974, p.51. Compare with Richard Taylor, who the bad conception denied as “an inner enduring self, having an identity through time and presumably being, therefore, capable of existence independent of the body and the world, even after death (1969, p.359).”

The same could be said against eliminativism about the self advanced by, for example, the Churchlands (1981).


W. D. Winnicott writes of his experiences with a patient who struggles with understanding herself in terms of just this type of psychic disarray: “[My patient] had not been able to find anything to react to . . . She was agitated, frightened of the state of affairs produced by there being nothing to which she could react . . . [The patient’s restored sense of] happiness was due to the fact that some things had [now] been happening to her but that she was the same underneath. I interpreted that if nothing was
happening for her to react to then she came to the center of herself where she knows there is nothing . . . There is a dissociative self which is nothing; it is nothing but a void; it is only emptiness and when this emptiness comes alive [i.e., is acknowledged] she is nothing but one huge hunger (1992, p.49-50).”

The Lacanian will argue that the thing to do here is to help the analysand come to terms with this state of personal disintegration. I disagree, and, once again, take some conception of the self on the part of the analysand to be essential to her making sense of her own subjectivity. If not an understanding of the psyche that is closer to fact, the self-understanding involving the self is – to borrow again from Sass, who attributes this perspective to Roy Schafer – “healthier” (1988, p.572).

127 Not only do I hold that individuals are responsible, in a strong sense, for their mental events and, certainly, for their actions, but for the state of their selves as well. Andrea Westlund describes what I have in mind here nicely: “. . . I take responsibility for self to be a matter of holding oneself accountable, for one’s endorsements, to external critical perspectives. To be self-responsible is to be willing to be engaged in a form of potentially open-ended dialogue about one’s action-guiding commitments . . . To be held responsible for one’s conduct is to be faced with a challenge that normally calls for some form of discursive response – a justification, exculpating explanation, or acknowledgement of the wrong done (2003, p.495-496, emphasis is the author’s own).” Of course, the discourse that I have in mind is primarily internal.

128 Richard Rorty, 1999m, p.15


130 María Lugones, 1990a, p.141-142

131 Cheshire Calhoun, 1995, p.239

132 Compare with Kristin Carter-Sanborn, 1994, esp. p.580-583

133 Flanagan writes: “[A multiplex self is a self whose] plans, projects, and desires are multifarious – and they are, to a certain extent, in tension with one another both synchronically and diachronically . . . Normal selves are multiplex. When a single individual experiences herself or expresses her being with different narrators who cannot grasp the connection between or among the narratives or narrative segments, the individual is a multiple . . . Multiplex selves in complex environments display different parts of their narrative to different audiences. Different selves – my philosopher self, my
baseball-coach self, [etc.] – are played for different audiences . . . I draw my selves together through the force of narrative gravity, and I comprehend myself in terms of a single, centered narrative in which they all fit together (but not without tension, various confusions, and much second-guessing) . . . Multiplex selves live lives that are continuous, connected, functionally coherent, and qualitatively more or less homogenous. Multiplex selves are integrated (1996b, p.66-74).” Compare this with David Wong’s conception of the “morally bilingual” self (2009, esp. p.101-104).

134 Owen Flanagan, 1996, p.160

135 Nāgārjuna, 2000, p.97

136 Nāgārjuna, 2000, p.107
Chapter 2

2.0: Introduction

In the closing sections of the previous chapter, I argued against a pair of positions regarding the degree to which the self can be integrated – the first, excessive, the second, deficient. Here, I construct a mockup of the person as self from the foundation up. In so doing, I provide a detailed account of the degree to which we, as selves, may hope to be psychically integrated, which negotiates an intermediate approach between the extremes criticized in sections 1.4 and 1.5.

In section 2.1, I provide discussion of the necessary conditions most fundamental to the conference of personhood: the capacity for rational thought and for rational self-reflection, the perception of unity of one’s consciousness, and the facility for autonomous agency. The latter of these is discussed in terms of reflective endorsement and the ability to perform free actions following from what Harry Frankfurt has termed second-order volitions. In section 2.2, I add to these the requirements that all persons be situated in time, that they be psychologically continuous in time, and that they be sometimes attentive to this relative psychological sameness. I go on to argue that necessary for the attainment of these conditions is the person’s capacity for valuation and evaluation.

In section 2.3, I extend discussion of the role that valuation and evaluation play in the lives of persons, introducing the primary objects of, and products of, personal values: projects, commitments, and identity-conferring commitments. In section 2.4, I discuss the overlap of persons and their unique selves and offer additional elaboration on the
distinction between different kinds of commitment. I suggest that the self is best understood as the fluid concurrence of identity-conferring commitments, the values which inform one’s allegiance to these, the evaluation of potential actions which follow from them, and the consciously-sustained and looping reevaluation of held-to values – and so, of held-to projects and commitments.

Finally, in section 2.5, I discuss the oftentimes precarious relationship between the self and the moral self – the moral self being that part of one’s mental life made up of her most strongly held-to, and so, identity-conferring, moral values and commitments. In concluding the chapter, I will have provided a sketch of the fully-selved moral agent which, with the help of an account provided by Richard Rorty, will be further fleshed out, scrutinized in the face of Williams’s Objection from Integrity (in section 3.1), and then “treated” (in sections 3.3 and 3.4) by way of the faux-psychotherapeutic procedures introduced above. Before turning to detailed discussion of these conditions, I will now briefly discuss one most basic requirement which antecedes all others with respect to both order of attainment and preeminence: the social component of personhood.

I am using social in a fairly broad, but standard sense, to denote the capacity for an individual to communicate with other persons; and, following from this, the consummation of an adequate enculturation on the part of the individual which includes, but is not necessarily limited to, the acquisition and use of some formal language, the learning of significant folkways, and the acceptance of some core values. The germ of all
that is social is the nascent person’s initial interaction with, and subsequent
differentiation from, others. Freud writes:

Normally there is nothing of which we are more certain than the feeling of
our self, of our own ego. This ego appears to us as something autonomous
and unitary, marked off distinctly from everything else . . . Further
reflection tells us that the adult’s ego-feeling [i.e., sense of self] . . . must
have gone through the process of development, which cannot, of course, be
demonstrated but which admits of being constructed with a fair degree of
probability. An infant at the breast does not as yet distinguish his ego from
the external world as the source of sensations flowing in upon him. He
gradually learns to do so, in response to various promptings. He must be
very strongly impressed by the fact that some sources of excitation, which
he will later recognize as his own bodily organs, can provide him with
sensations at any moment, whereas other sources evade him from time to
time – among them, what he desires most of all, his mother’s breast – and
only reappear as a result of his screaming for help. In this way there is for
the first time set over against the ego an ‘object’, in the form of something
which exists ‘outside’ and which is only forced to appear by a special
action.

At first, this seems to be little more than a gloss on Freud’s psychosexual theory of
development. The infant achieves libidinal gratification orally, and – as neither the ego
nor the superego is yet fully developed – is prompted to act almost exclusively by the id,
which, itself, is beholden to the pleasure principle. All that we can come to know about
the infant qua subjectivity here is that it is merely in the process of gelling, and that its
ego tendency is in no sense on footing comparable to that enjoyed by the id as far as
either controlled action or motivational power goes. Intuitively, then, we have some
reason to believe that the infant is not yet a person. While this seems correct as far as it
goes, if we read on a bit further we are also provided with an instance of just the type of
interaction which sets the table for personhood – namely, that which precipitates the infant’s budding appreciation of the distinction between subject and object.

The idea is that, initially, the infant cannot differentiate between that which is himself and that which is not himself. Everything seems as though it is a part of the one. Upon continued failure to achieve immediate satisfaction, however, the infant begins to contrast those things over which he seemingly has some control with those things over which he seemingly has little or none – the pleasure associated with, say, sucking his thumb versus that which comes from feeding. This leads the infant to form a belief that there exists the subject (his own subjectivity) and, contraposed to this, the object (defined in terms of everything else set over, against himself – specifically, those things which he cannot control, firsthand). Once this dialectic unfolds, another soon follows, revealing to the infant that his subjectivity, itself, has both subjective and objective dimensions. With these insights achieved, we’re off to the races.\(^{139}\)

Devilish details set aside, Augustine is likely going to be onboard with important aspects of Freud’s anecdote – at least regarding the infant’s proclivity for conceptualization and his innate talent for abstract thought.\(^{140}\) Those with Wittgensteinian intuitions, however, are likely going to reject such an account on the grounds that, not yet being a member of any particular speech community, the infant cannot meaningfully use a sign such as “subject” (or any variant which refers to the concept \textit{subject}), even if only internally. The same, of course, goes for “object,” any variant of this, or any (supposedly) privately coined terms which we might be tempted to
posit as making up the internal discourse of a very young child. The reason is that such signs cannot be used under rules which admit of public survey and correction, since, clearly, the infant does not yet have the ability to take part in the linguistic practices which would allow for this to take place. As thought requires language, and as the infant has not acquired language or the ability to use it, the infant cannot hold such distinctions in thought.\textsuperscript{141}

I will not argue against the Wittgensteinian position here, and concede all pertinent points. Despite this, Freud's account can be used, if modified, to demonstrate the claim that there comes a time in the life of a young child when he begins to make certain distinctions (often, once more, in tandem), is simultaneously able to conceptualize these, and so, is able to think about them. Moreover, given what has been uniformly demonstrated by disparate schools of developmental psychology, it is uncontroversial that this is a direct result of interaction with, and consequently, communication with, some person or persons. In other words, \textit{pace} Hobbes, persons cannot spring up like wild mushrooms;\textsuperscript{142} \textit{pace} Freud, the interaction which facilitates personhood likely takes place later in childhood than initially believed, due to the child's then inability to conceptualize, and so, his inability to think.

Irrespective of exactly when this happens in the life of a young child, interaction with – and, following from this, successful communication with – persons is necessary for the child's development into a person, himself. Persons just \textit{are} social creatures. Persons just \textit{are} – to borrow from Thich Nhat Hahn – instantiations of “interbeing,” meaning, they
are connected to the *sangha* (community) all the way down. Whether one chooses to live an essentially communal life, or decides to become a modern-day ascetic hermit, there is no extricating the social from the individual. Even in living a life exclusively devoted to values antithetical to those held by society at large, one defines herself in terms of the negation of just those values, and so implicitly validates the importance that they have had and continue to have in defining herself as a person. More basic still, the social leaves an indelible stamp on the individual insofar as she continues to use language in some capacity – and so, to think.

Let’s call the social component of persons CPo. While, again, I take this to be the most basic of all conditions, I will close formal discussion of it here, and mention CPo only in passing throughout the remainder of the chapter. My reason for breaking off my treatment of the intersubjectivity requirement of personhood so relatively quickly is that CPo is now virtually universally accepted. For this reason, this condition stands in less need of explication with regard to its place in making sense of persons and selves than others. I now turn to agency.

### 2.1: Persons as Agents

Integrity is a particular state enjoyed by sufficiently harmonious and intact selves. And, selves are, at base, particular persons; or, if the reader prefers, a state of mental being which is possessed by particular persons. Since much of what makes up the guts and gristle of the self is coextensive with those things which make up its component parts *qua* person, it only makes sense to initiate our analysis with personhood. And, what
better way to clip the ribbon on discussion of the nature of personhood than by considering perhaps its greatest celebrant? Of the person, Kant writes:

The fact that the human being can behold the ‘I’ in his representations raises him infinitely over all other living beings on earth. Because of this he is a person, and by virtue of the unity of consciousness through all changes that happen to him, one and the same person – i.e., through rank and dignity an entirely different being from things, such as irrational animals, with which one can do as one likes.\textsuperscript{146}

As is the case with virtually everything that Kant has to say regarding persons, this passage is replete with strong normative considerations. Ascriptions of both agent-hood (and so, for Kant, moral responsibility) and patient-hood (and so, for Kant, moral rights) abound. However, if we gingerly remove this prescriptive chaff, we can locate the descriptive kernel which is partly constitutive of the concept at issue: the unity of consciousness had by means of self-reflection. (Or, according to some, self-reflection had by means of the unity of consciousness; or, according to others, the unity of consciousness had by means of self-reflection, and vice versa; or, to still others, the unity of consciousness and self-reflection, had independently of one another.)\textsuperscript{147}

As anyone who has slunk their way through the first Critique knows, for Kant this pair of conceptions is convoyed by a motley array of hearty metaphysical obligations the likes of which we, for both practical and philosophical reasons, have no business granting here. Fortunately, we need not buy the transcendental farm with Kant in order to appreciate what he is getting at regarding the base conditions of personhood. And, in fact, it is a prevailing view among contemporary ethicists, moral psychologists, and philosophers of mind, alike – including dyed-in-the-wool naturalists, such as Daniel
Dennett – that personhood amounts principally to these very requirements.⁴⁸

Comprising his own list of necessary conditions, Dennett provides each of Kant’s postulates, emphasizing rationality above all else: “The first and most obvious [condition] is that persons are rational beings. . . . The sixth [condition] is that persons are distinguished from other entities by being conscious in some special way [i.e., by possessing] self-consciousness of one sort or another.”⁴⁹ In breaking ground on the construction of our person, let’s also accept these as necessary conditions, and call them CP₁ and CP₂, respectively.⁵⁰

Conditions CP₁ and CP₂ seem to do us the intuitively-correct service of denying personhood to all inanimate objects. Shoes, ships, cans of ceiling wax, cabbages, California king-sized mattresses – each of these and like things are out of contention. So far, so good, since this meshes with both our prereflective and reflective thinking about what sorts of things definitely do not belong within this category. But, what about, say, the California kingsnake?

As rudimentary of a concept as we have given only these most indispensable of requirements, in introducing conditions CP₁ and CP₂ we already seem to have relegated the potential for personhood to among a tiny fraction of those species which populate our planet. As, so far as we can tell, almost all types of non-human animal are devoid of the capacity for rational self-reflection and the strong sense of self-consciousness affixed to this.⁵¹ This sets up the traditional dichotomy between persons and things gestured at by Kant in the passage above. And, I would argue, for those who hold to particular religious
convictions similar to those discussed in section 1.4, these characteristics are also
isomorphic with the distinction between those entities which possess (or are) souls and
those which do (or are) not.\textsuperscript{52}

Following these conditions is \textit{agency}, here understood as the ability to execute
controlled actions.\textsuperscript{53} For persons, an understanding of the connection between agency
and conditions CP\textsubscript{1} and CP\textsubscript{2} follows from the immediate recognition of the subjectivity's
agential capacities upon engaging in self-reflection. The ability to self-reflect, itself –
being under some description an intentional action as well any other – is among the more
obvious marks of agency that the person may perceive upon closely considering her own
experiences. And, of course, all manner of non-reflexive and non-coerced physical actions
show up to the agent as proper actions once this person observes the unequivocal feeling
of command associated with each.

We should note that while all persons are agents, the converse does not hold.
Some entity – again, the California kingsnake – is certainly an agent in the relevant sense,
but not a person, because it is not in possession of still other requisite characteristics.
Aside from, once again, lacking CP\textsubscript{1} and CP\textsubscript{2}, the snake does not possess a particular kind
of agency peculiar to persons. In making further sense of the distinction between these
distinct types of agency, a return to Kant will be beneficial.

Throughout his practical writings, Kant champions a particular conception of
agency as essential to reasoned, and so, moral action – namely, that which involves
autonomy.\textsuperscript{54} Once more, taken far enough down the Kantian rabbit hole, this notion
turns out to be too problematic for its worth. But, again, we need not go the distance with
Kant in order to enjoy the fruits of his philosophical labor. For our purposes, *autonomy*
will denote the ability – under the somewhat deflated description forthcoming – to freely
perform certain actions and to choose certain projects, to take part in those deemed
valuable, to periodically reassess one’s own evaluative criteria and to work to towards
change here, and finally, to achieve each of these things by means of a kind of reflective
endorsement on the part of the agent involving the evaluation of potential motivators.
Similar to the person’s acknowledgement of her agency, as such, connection between
autonomous agency and conditions CP1 and CP2 flows out of the agent’s immediate
understanding of her capacity for specifically reasoned action following self-reflection.
Let’s conjoin these characteristics, and call the necessity of persons being able to act
autonomously CP3.

With the introduction of CP3, we may better understand why few, if any, non-
human animal species have persons among their numbers. Both persons and California
kingsnakes act. However, only the person can act autonomously. I have already provided
a superficial explanation of what this comes to. But, a more psyche-specific rendering of
the nuts and bolts of the mechanism which allows for autonomous action might provide a
better understanding of the differences in kind regarding agency; and, additionally, set
the table for discussion concerning evaluation and project-driven motivation provided in
sections 2.3 and 2.4. Here, I borrow heavily from a schema popularized by Harry
Frankfurt.
Stated briefly, when one acts autonomously, she, in reflecting upon her stock of desires,\textsuperscript{155} considers which of these she would approve of moving her to act, she reflectively endorses\textsuperscript{156} that desire, and she sanctions its motivating her action. This self-reflection is typically triggered by some particularly heady first-order desire to attain some thing or to otherwise bring about some state of affairs. Prior to choice, will, and subsequent action, the person forms a second-order desire about some first-order desire – not necessarily, or even generally, in line with the particular desire which sparked this reflective process.

The formation of a corresponding second-order desire constitutes her consent to both the presence of the aforementioned first-order desire and, more importantly, to her being motivated in action by it. Insofar as this sanctioned desire successfully moves the agent to action, she acts autonomously. Where the motivating desire lacks this patronage, the agent does not act with autonomy.\textsuperscript{157} Of the pertinent distinction between kinds of desire, Frankfurt writes:

Besides wanting and choosing and being moved to do this or that, [persons] may also want to have (or not to have) certain desires and motives [i.e., to have second-order desires]. They are capable of wanting to be different, in their preferences and purposes, from what they are. Many animals appear to have the capacity for what I call ‘first-order desires’ . . . which are simply desires to do or not to do one thing or another. No animal other than man, however, appears to have the capacity for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in the formation of second-order desires.\textsuperscript{158}

A few pages later, and more specific to the point:

Someone has a desire of the second-order either when he wants simply to have a certain desire or when he wants a certain desire to be his will. In
situations of the latter kind, I shall call his second-order desires ‘second-order volitions’.  

With this distinction in tow, consider the actions of the California kingsnake as opposed to those performed by some autonomously acting agent – me. Driven by hunger and alerted to the presence of a furry little morsel, the snake finds itself with the desire to consume a pocket mouse. At once, the snake acts on this, its presently strongest desire. Similarly – although, I am certainly stripping down the complexity of the situation in order to establish the point – hankering for a snack, and recalling that there is a package of my favorite dessert in the kitchen cabinet, I desire to consume a chocolate chip cookie (or three). But, I refrain.

The difference at issue between the standing psychological states of myself and the snake involves my, *qua* person, ability to self-consciously and intentionally hesitate in order to form a somewhat removed further desire about which desire I would have inform my will, and so, motivate my action. Possibilities of first-order desires include, again, the desire to eat the cookies, the desire to refrain from eating the cookies and instead drink a tall, cool glass of water, the desire to refrain from eating the cookies and instead take a brisk walk around the block, etc. Let’s say that I form a second-order desire to desire not to eat the cookies, but to go for the walk instead. I abstain. I take the walk. I act autonomously.

Second-order desires, such as my desire to desire to take the walk in the place of eating the cookies, often follow from related beliefs about who agents take themselves to presently be, or, perhaps more routinely in cases involving attempts to stave off *akrasia*,
well-established desires regarding the kind of person that they would like to become. Augusto Blasi describes what is going on here in terms of enacting an auto-intercession of sorts:

The will is . . . conceived of as a person’s [second-order] desire that a first-order desire one finds oneself with be effective in producing action . . . The will is opposite of an impulse: it requires, and is constituted by, an intervention on oneself whereby the impulse is first separated, made an object, and then is either rejected or accepted, endorsed, and given support and energy by the agent. The dynamically related distancing and appropriation are minimally necessary for the will to be the will.162

Notice that once the desire is objectified, it may be evaluated by the person to whom it belongs. Then and only then does the agent form (or cease to form) the second-order volition deemed necessary to perform an autonomous action. Note too, that in objectifying the desire, the agent is, in a sense, momentarily distancing herself from it. We may be tempted to view this as an attempt to consider the desire from a neutral perspective a la Kant, but this is entirely inaccurate. The agent is merely retreating into a space of reasons – her reasons. Here, she may come to close the gap between herself and the desire to the point of complete identification with it, given that she goes on to form a second-order volition which corresponds to it. Or, she may reject the desire, effectively disclaiming it.
The mental actions performed by the kingsnake just prior to its striking at and consuming the mouse are, presumably, much different than the person’s. This is so with respect to both quantity and quality. Some would argue that these few mental events which take place in the mind of the snake immediately preceding action are, themselves, not proper actions at all, but instead are things which exclusively happen to the snake. This, of course, reduces the agency attributed to the snake in even greater proportion. Assuming this, however, is not necessary to accepting the primary point – namely, that the snake cannot act autonomously under any set of circumstances.

But, again, why not? What is it about the snake which makes it different in kind from persons? The snake is what Frankfurt calls a wanton: “[an entity] which does not care about [its] will.” In this case, the entity does not care about its will because its cognitive equipment is simply not sophisticated enough to take part in the self-reflection necessary to do so. Once again, the snake lacks conditions CP1 and CP2. As a result, the snake cannot remove itself from the immediacy of its strongest desire in order to evaluate it alongside those with which it competes. And so, the snake is controlled by such desires. I, on the other hand, am able to consider my desire to consume the cookies, and to weigh that desire against others which are likely more central to my existing self-conception. I may then either form a second-order desire that I will myself to eat the cookies – so, to act from a second-order volition, given Frankfurt’s nomenclature – or a similar, but opposing, second-order desire to refrain from performing this action and, once again, to take a brisk walk around the block instead.
I might, of course, walk out the door with the best of intentions, whistling *Walkin’ Tall* — only to find myself, minutes later, bustling ‘around the block’ with the aid of a short cut, returning to the kitchen in a sweat, fixing my eyes on the cabinet, removing the all too appealing package of Pepperidge Farm from its ironic nook between various flavors of fat-free rice cakes, and then scarfing down the little darlings. And, all despite the persistent presence of a second-order desire that I *not* eat the cookies.

Upon completing this action, I will likely feel “estranged” from the desire that motivated it. I might feel as though the desire was “imposed” on me from an “external” source. I may even experience a strong feeling of shame in reflecting upon my shortcomings and lack of stick-to-itiveness in the face of this first-order desire. Each of these feeds the tendency to self-alienation in its own way. And, assuming for the moment that that action caused me to violate what I refer to below as an identity-conferring commitment, my practical identity will be compromised, and my integrity potentially lost.

The kingsnake, on the other hand, has no shame. It cannot stand in judgment upon itself; because, most obviously, the snake has no self to judge. Likewise, the snake, as it is unable to take part in any semblance of an evaluative enterprise, cannot experience self-alienation in the face of any desire-action pair or its practical results. This, once again, is expected, as only persons may suffer this, and then, only persons who are selves. One can hardly be self-alienated if they do not possess the necessary values and commitments which constitute a self, not to mention the ability to evaluate such values.
and commitments against others. In this respect, and very likely only in this respect, we might say that the nonperson is fortunate.\textsuperscript{168}

It is wholly in virtue of the capacity for autonomous action – although, again, his conception of this is strengthened in certain very important ways which counter our own – that Kant asserts that all persons and only persons are proper moral patients. However, even in consideration of our own stripped-down conception of what autonomy ultimately comes to, we need not accept this controversial thesis in order to accept, with Kant, the much more intuitive notion that all persons and only persons are proper moral agents. Since a moral action must be a freely performed action, and, since only autonomously acting agents may act freely, it follows that only autonomous agents can take part in moral deliberation and perform morally-charged actions.

2.2: Agents in Time

In addition to perceiving the capacity for autonomous action upon self-reflection, there are other characteristics about the ways in which experiences are mediated which may become immediately known to persons in just this way. One factor is the perception of the passing of time. Next, then, we consider a pair of such considerations: first, the requirement that the person be temporally situated in all that she experiences; second, that the person be, in some facility, self-continuous within time and sometimes aware of this self-sameness by way of her reflective faculties.\textsuperscript{169} Bernard Mayo writes: A person is a continuant, something with a continuous temporal extension, in a much stronger sense than an ordinary material object (including his body) is. A material object
is only causally linked with its past and future. But a person is constituted by his past and future.\textsuperscript{170}

Let’s call this requirement CP4.\textsuperscript{171} In response to Mayo’s demand that the person be self-continuous, we should ask, in what respect?

The answer is provided negatively: persons are not continuous with their distinct temporal instantiations in the same way that material objects are. To return to Mayo, the person is not merely “causally linked with [her] past and future.” The continuity appropriate to talk of the persistence of persons involves those psychological components and their content which bring us back to CP1 and CP2. Given this, we may stipulate that the person must retain her identity from one moment to the next by means, in part, of a temporally-situated overlapping of certain mental events. And, she must, at least some of the time, be aware of this enduring sequence. These requirements describe a kind of psychological continuity that is both sustained through time and sometimes acknowledged by the person. Let’s call this conjunctive condition CP5.\textsuperscript{172}

To say a bit more about these conditions, CP4 demands that persons experience themselves as entities which have a partially known past, and who, upon reflection, see themselves as continuing to exist as the same subjectivity into the foreseeable future. To say, then, that the person is essentially temporal is just to say that her experiences – or, herself \textit{qua} subjectivity, for that matter – cannot be removed from a context within which she makes sense of them predominately in terms of previous events which she recalls, and
the anticipated furtherance of future projects. These are projects, of course, which have been informed by, and largely initiated in response to, these past experiences.

Closely following from CP4 – and, I argue below, standing with it in a relation of mutual support – CP5 demands that persons experience themselves as psychologically continuous across this temporal field. To say that the person enjoys psychological continuity across time is just to say that she self-identifies with the subjectivity in question from one moment to the next, and when – to use a well-worn spatial metaphor – she self-reflectively looks backwards via mental representations believed to correspond with her past, and forwards to an expected future. She understands the perspectively-congealed past to be, in some strong sense hers, and likewise with respect to her anticipation of what is to come. Irrespective of the innumerable changes that this subjectivity has undergone regarding both the nature of its mental content and the sophistication with which it perceives and assesses this, it persists. And, this persistence must be at some time acknowledged by this subjectivity. I now want to suggest that, like CP1-CP3, conditions CP4 and CP5 are intimately related to one another.

Although our uncontested intuitions tell us that as persons we live always, in some respect, in the now, a closer inspection demonstrates that the present is more or less a null piece in the language game regarding time and the ways in which we experience it. In truth, the person is situated between, and is in part constitutive of, events she has experienced in the past, alongside her anticipation of, and plans regarding, future prospects. Her semantic touchstones include mental reconstructions of past events – and
her recollection of the embodied subjectivity which she self-identifies conceived of as she remembers it being during those past episodes – as well as a variant of this subjectivity thought of as a continuation of this, and projected into the future. Again, this self-identified and self-identifying subjectivity is conceived of as the fulfiller of certain plans and projects about which the person is particularly passionate.173

Through prolonged self-reflection – now with an eye to person-specific mental events rather than to those naked experiential states purportedly perceived by Kant’s noumenal self – the individual understands the cumulative bearing that past experiences have had in shaping her as the person that she is, as well as her coming to care about what she presently takes to be of importance. At the same time, she experiences an immediate and unshakeable feeling that she is, first and foremost, an autonomous agent, unconstrained by ‘outside’ forces, past or present. As such, she understands herself to be independently in control of the actions which she has performed and which she will perform. So too, she views herself as the overseer of what projects she allows, in a much broader sense, to motivate and guide future actions.

Taken to their extremes, these self-understandings appear mutually exclusive. Taken within the proper context and with attention paid to the intrinsic connection shared between them, each provides great insight into what persons essentially are. From one vantage point, the person understands that she is by and large a product of what was, before. And so, the person that she presently is is principally a product of happenstance. From another perspective – also compelling, and equally cogent – she sees herself as
radically free to choose subsequent courses of action, and fully responsible for past actions, despite understanding the part played by unchosen past conditions in forging her practical identity. She views herself as an entity whose destiny is not at all left to the whim of contingency. And, paradoxically, she sees herself as a walking, breathing artifact. To conjoin these sentiments with the collective in mind: “History makes man and man makes history.”

The perceived authority over past first person experiences, taken in conjunction with the *sui generis* feeling of the complete identification with each temporal instantiation of this subjectivity, forms a perspectival link between the person given any sequence of moments which cannot be broken by the constant change of all else that surrounds her, and which, moreover, is only further disclosed by this opposition of outer flux and relative inner stasis. That this subjectivity is, in some sense, experienced as persisting from one moment to the next demands, again, a strong psychological continuity shared by these subjective instantiations. But, without this continuity it is also the case that this subjectivity would not experience things in an essentially temporal way. So, there is a circular relationship shared by conditions CP4 and CP5.

To expand upon this, if the subjectivity existing at any given time were not psychologically continuous with those which follow, rather than perceiving change (and so, what is taken to be the movement of time), each distinct subjectivity occupying this place – whose birth and death would seemingly arrive in adjacent instances – would merely experience what is *then* immediately perceived within the infinitesimal time slice
which is present directly before the subjectival baton is passed. Passed to whom? In a sense, to no one, since stand-alone subjectivities are not persons. That, of course, is in part the point, but also where the metaphor which makes this point breaks down. There would be no basis for the formation of memories, or – even more basic than that – distinctions made between things perceived from one moment to the next. This is because the subjectivity would be unable to identify with her temporally prior counterpart ad infinitum. And, due to this, the subject would have no access to those experiences which have already taken place. The subjectivity could not recall what had happened previously, because, stipulating the lack of psychological continuity, previously as a concept cannot be made sense of in this context, as that subject was not present before.

This understood, all mental content would be on par with a Humean impression. But, rather than a sponge which, so to speak, soaks up experiences for immediate cognition or later recognition through imagination, the subjectivity would be more accurately described as a window through which perceptions travel and instantaneously vanish; and the embodiment which is the ground of these subjectivities as the series of myriad windows, itself. As these subjectivities would be every bit as ephemeral as their corresponding experiential states are, there would be no hope for the retrospective reconstruction of these as memories, or even the qualia of which they otherwise might have been composed. More basic than that, imagination itself would be an absurd concept. With no stable psychological field within which self-reflection might take place
– *a fortiori* nothing but the immediate, fleeting experience to perceive – there could be no prospect for personhood, much less selfhood.

Conversely, insofar as time may be practically defined in terms of perceived change – change from what a moment ago the (wholly abstract) present to what is a moment later the (wholly abstract) present, essentially a series of immediately perceived recollections regarding the past, tempered with hopes and worries regarding the future – if we were to remove these points of reference, the subjectivity would be, by all reasonable accounts, content-less. This subjectivity would amount to little more than Kant’s noumenal self, and would be no more a legitimate candidate for personhood, as we mean to use the term, than it is. Given this, the subjectivity could not make sense of itself as self-identical and enduring, as the subject *in abstractum* could not make sense of itself, as such.

Again, to expand, but this time a bit more concretely, and from my own first person perspective: were it not for my being sufficiently psychologically continuous with past instantiations of my subjectivity, I would be unable to experience things as situated in time. This is because *I* would not be here as things change, but only, at most, as they are immediately perceived; and even then, only as one subjectivity existing for one moment. (I am using *I* for the sake of convenience, but truth be told there is no sense to make of the indexical in a context where a series of subjectivities lack psychological continuity.) The perceptions would be present before this subjectivity “standing” in a certain “place” (my immediate perspective), and then, a moment later, before another
completely different, psychologically discontinuous subjectivity “standing” in the same “place,” and so on. There could be no comparing notes on a thing experienced as it changes (or seemingly fails to) with the passage of time, because there is no continuity by which the subjectivities in question are linked.\textsuperscript{75}

One might worry that we are flirting with an equivocation on personal identity with personhood in introducing these components as requirements. However, I hold that while it is the case that conditions CP\textsubscript{4} and CP\textsubscript{5} are necessary conditions for personal identity, like Kant’s conception of unity of consciousness through self-reflection, these are also necessary for personhood, more generally, which is justification for their inclusion in the discussion.

2.3: Time and Value

To summarize, the conditions necessary for personhood include: CP\textsubscript{0}. sufficient interaction with persons and the socialization which follows from this; CP\textsubscript{1}. rationality and the ability to look inward; CP\textsubscript{2}. self-consciousness and the perceived unity of consciousness which adjoins this; CP\textsubscript{3}. the ability to act autonomously; CP\textsubscript{4}. the essential experience of oneself as existing in time, i.e., as a subjectivity with a known past and anticipated future; and, CP\textsubscript{5}. psychological continuity and, a close correlate of this, one’s self-identification with her subjectivity as it, to refer again to the spatial rendering, moves through time.

In segueing into discussion of the next requirement, allow me to elaborate a bit on my description of the ways in which the experiences of persons necessarily show up
against a temporal backdrop. In so doing, we will also put a bit more meat on the bones of our skeleton.

Before, I suggested that the person’s primary points of reference in making sense of her own subjectivity as persisting through time are mental reconstructions of past events in which she places a representation of her own (earlier) subjectivity, and – mediated by past experiences – projected future events to which she looks forward. There is a temptation to interpret this in a provincially Lockean way, as an account of persons traversing time which places ultimate importance on autobiographical true memories at the expense of other equally important factors. In attempt to resist this, I want to draw attention to how these memories typically present themselves to persons, and in what ways persons use these memories as a means to project their subjectivities into the future.

Imagine that the proto-person which we are constructing hears a particular song on the radio – Prince’s *Sign o’ the Times*. Through something like Aristotle’s Law of Contiguity, she is mentally ushered back to the day, twenty-eight years ago now, that she graduated from college. Her parents were present, front and center, for the ceremony, along with her baby brother, Ennis, her favorite aunt, Lis, and her maternal grandmother, Lola – who, by the way, took a Greyhound Bus all the way from Corpus Christi, Texas just to be there. No effort was made on the part of any of these attendees to hide the fact that they were as proud as they had ever been of her – aside from little Ennis ‘the menace,’ who was too distracted by the brightly colored regalia worn by those faculty members conferring degrees on the platform to pay attention to much else.
Upon encountering the recent graduate immediately following the procession, her father teared up; noticing this, her mother followed suit. Hugs between all were exchanged, and they then enjoyed a picnic lunch on the veranda of Graves Hall, overlooking the Union lawn. (Grandma Lola had prepared a generous batch of her famous cheese tamales to mark the occasion!) There, they had the good fortune of running into two of the professors who had been instrumental in our proto-person’s decision to major in gerontology, and about whom she had a great deal of admiration for, aside.

Over the glare of mortarboards bobbing in the afternoon sun and the magnificent aroma of various Tex-Mex entrees and sides, our proto-person and her family talked about potential job prospects that she had been looking into, and the likelihood that after taking a year off to pay back some loans she had incurred over the past four years, she would pursue work towards earning an MSW at Big State University. (Apart from Ennis, again, whose attention was still consumed by the parade of vibrant costumes and funny hats.) The ensuing conversation was accompanied by all of the optimistic excitement and merry-making generally associated with celebrations of this kind.

On the way home, our proto-person happened to hear on the radio what was at that time a very popular song, and one that she had recently become quite fond of – Prince’s *Sign o’ the Times*. She rolled down the windows of her jalopy, cranked up the volume, and belted out the lyrics. It was a wonderful day, and one she will very likely always remember.
I am having us imagine this episode in order to demonstrate that within our temporal framework – and so, within our cache of particular true autobiographical memories – there is an evaluative component hidden in plain sight. We never recall particular events, however seemingly mundane, and have that be the end of it. Recollection, for better or worse, is always laden with value and adjoining emotion. Likewise, we never look to the future from an evaluatively-detached place. We always do so with respect to the further completion of projects which are presently important to us, tasks which we find loathsome and which serve to prevent us from attending to our more cherished and identified with commitments, and so on. To describe persons as situated in time, and to leave it at that, then, is to omit that which in large part is the person.

Similarly, returning now to the person’s agential capacity, we never perform autonomous action out of the mere ‘giving in’ to whichever desire is the strongest – that, of course, is the point that Frankfurt intends to make in providing the distinction between first-order and second-order desires (and volitions). When we take part in the kind of practical deliberation necessary for reasoned action, we always do so from within an evaluative framework. We appraise desires in terms of our standing values, whether these disclose themselves to us in the form of categorical moral principles, other practical imperatives, or things of general importance. To describe persons as autonomous agents, then, and to have that be the end of it, is, once more, to miss what lies at the heart of this concept.
Closely related to CP3-5, then, is what I will refer to as the capacity for valuation and evaluation; or, more precisely, a condition stipulating that all persons value some combination of principles, people, events, activities, institutions, and other things. As is the case with the performance of controlled actions, there is a special capacity for valuation which is had by all persons and only persons. Charles Taylor nods to this here: What seems to be important about a person’s conception of self is that it incorporates a range of significances which have no analogue with non-person agents. For it is not just that we are aware of ourselves as agents that distinguishes us from dogs, say, it is more that we have a certain set of standards which apply to us as self-aware agents.¹⁷⁸

Two things should pop out at us. First, Taylor speaks of persons, in valuing, making use of an array of significances. So, in valuing, persons are also implicitly evaluating – and, this evaluation often involves the assessment of competing values, themselves. Second, the presence of values and axiotima paves the way for the institution of practical standards, moral and otherwise. These standards inform both the way in which the person views her world, and her interaction with it. Additionally, those things most valued by the person set ends for her in the form of various, often seemingly nonnegotiable, projects. Given this, we can see that rational agency shares an especially important connection with valuation and evaluation. As, those things most highly valued provide the motivational push necessary for one to act autonomously. To an unparalleled extent, second-order volititons are formed with these values – and the principles which
grow out of such values – in mind. Let’s call the person’s capacity for valuation and evaluation CP6.\textsuperscript{179}

As I have asserted in section 1.1, the account of integrated selfhood which I endorse involves an intersection of value and action – meaning, both the submission to an evaluative framework and subsequent judgments made within its hold are to be considered instances of proper action. For this reason, the agent is to be held responsible for her compliance with such frameworks, as well as for the actions which follow from this. This exposes a quasi-existentialist thread running through much of what I want to say about these matters.\textsuperscript{180} I will not temper this too much here, but I do concede that while the agent is to be held accountable for the tacit endorsement of her adopted system of values, such frameworks typically show up as straightforwardly given.\textsuperscript{181} These value systems seem so objectively \textit{there}, in fact, that they tend not to show up to persons at all. “The fish will, indeed, be the last to discover the water – unless he gets a metaphysical assist.”\textsuperscript{182}

While, again, I want to suggest that values and value systems are to be selected – and, must be explicitly endorsed by the agent in reflection – early in the person’s life, value systems simply are unchosen. To borrow a notion from Heidegger which sets this mood nicely, I was “thrown” into this world.\textsuperscript{183} I did not choose, say, which parents to be born to, nor which values that they would instill in me. Further, I did not choose the community in which I was raised, nor the particular significances it taught me to place on certain things as opposed to others. More than that, the values that I was given by my
parents and my community certainly seemed to be objectively real at the time that I inherited them. With this recognized, I would like to briefly discuss a concept central to the way in which such values generally show up to us. This phenomenon is one result of what Charles Taylor has termed *strong evaluation* on the part of persons.

There is an important distinction to be made, Taylor argues, between *strong* and *weak evaluation*; the former of which, he goes on to suggest, is a necessary condition for personhood.\(^{184}\) Aside from allowing for the wide range of differing measures of importance already mentioned, strong evaluation involves “the recognition of goods [by persons] which are seen to be intrinsically worthy.”\(^{185}\) So, there are some things which are determined to be good, as such, by persons. And, in returning to the array of significances we attribute to things, there are others which are judged to be more or less good – or, merely instrumentally good.

Elsewhere, and also related to the continuum of significances which it involves, Taylor suggests that strong evaluation is “concerned with [assessing] the qualitative worth of different desires.”\(^{186}\) That is, of differentiating between those desires which comport with what is taken to be intrinsically good, and those which do not. Still elsewhere, he further elaborates on the perceived givenness, and so apparent objectivity, associated with the values with which one finds herself, and on the nature of these values: Strong evaluation [involves] discriminations of right and wrong, better or worse, higher or lower, which are not rendered valid by our own desires, inclinations, or choices, but rather stand independent of these and offer standards by which they can be judged.\(^{187}\)
It is this unchosen “horizon”\textsuperscript{88} of values which makes the foremost series of evaluations regarding the person’s desires and subsequent actions even possible. Such values set final ends, and dictate projects and commitments. They provide meaning, in the strongest sense of the word. And, in affording reflectively-endorsed motivating reasons, they provide the push necessary to bringing about reasoned action.\textsuperscript{89} Without such frameworks, autonomous action could never occur – as, there would be no given evaluative criteria to inform the way we view ourselves or the world, and no initial rational motivation for any particular action. Harry Frankfurt puts it this way: “[A person] will not be in a position to inquire how he should live unless it is already the case that there are things about which he cares.”\textsuperscript{90} And, at least early on in the development of the person, these cared for things show up as factual indicators of what one should and should not care about, in a strong moral sense, regardless of what the person, in particular, desires.\textsuperscript{91}

Persons initially need unchosen ends, in some sense, in order to further choose final ends – and, the presence of unchosen ends necessitates this apparent givenness of a system of values. For this reason, even a first radical reassessment of what one values demands the existence of a system of unchosen values such that one may react to it in a practically innovative way. This is important for Taylor, as while the person’s system of values presents itself as, at least initially, objectively \textit{there}, he in no way wants to suggest there is not a place for reevaluation of this or consequent values or value sets; or, for supplanting a value or set of values with another, upon reflection. More than that, for
Taylor it is one of the responsibilities of the autonomous agent to periodically take part in reflection regarding just such reevaluation.

In reference to this, Taylor offers a description of self-reflection and consequent responsibility for evaluation – and so, for the state of one’s very self – similar to that which I have endorsed in section 1.2. He writes:

Radical revaluation [involves] a deep reflection, and a self-reflection in a special sense: it is a reflection about the self, its most fundamental issues, and a reflection which engages the self most wholly and deeply. Because it engages the whole self without a fixed yardstick it can be called personal reflection; and what emerges from it is a self-resolution in a strong sense, for in this reflection the self is in question; what is at stake is the definition of those inchoate evaluations which are sensed to be essential to our identity. Because this self-resolution is something we do, when we do it, we can be called responsible for ourselves.192

In other words, since the self and value are inextricably bound up with one another, and since self-reflective reevaluation of our standing background of values makes us responsible for these, then, in part by reevaluating these horizons, we reconsider who we now are – and, perhaps more importantly, who we want to become. In so doing, we make ourselves responsible for our selves.193 Martin Hollis writes: “An intelligent human being is consciously searching not only for means but also for goals. He is always in a state of becoming and the conscious search is a search for himself. The search is not a treasure hunt, however, since there is no pre-existent self to find. The search creates the self by bringing habits into harmony . . .”194 While Hollis paints the picture in terms of means and ends, the same is certainly true of the values which support these.
Let’s now briefly return to my staring-match with the cookies in order to demonstrate how valuation and evaluation come into play with respect to particular actions which comprise everyday life. Recall, I have a first-order desire to eat the cookies. This desire can be accounted for in a number of ways, each of which – barring the role in action potentially played by pure instinct – bottom out in some value or values. As stated before, perhaps my desire to eat the cookies is primarily rooted in an additional desire to alleviate a feeling of hunger. Here, the feeling of relief is the valuative motivator. (Not likely the whole story – if this were the case, I would be drawn to the rice cakes, also, which is not the case.) I wish to extinguish this displeasure, and determine that eating the cookies is the best means to this particular end.

Perhaps, on the other hand, my desire to eat the cookies is plainly and simply motivated by the strong feeling of pleasure that I associate with eating this particular brand and kind of cookie. I might not even be hungry, I simply desire the cookies for their attendant gratification, period. Additionally, I might be neither particularly hungry nor drawn to the cookies in consideration of the gustatory enjoyment associated with them, specifically. I might simply be looking for something – anything, really – to munch on while grading essay exams. In any case, some axiotimon or combination of axiotima – the cessation of displeasure associated with feelings of hunger, the direct and intentional bringing about of gustatory pleasure that I have come to associate with eating Pepperidge Farm cookies, the comfort typically coupled with eating any and all type of junk food
while grinding my way through a skyscraper of midterms – lie at the center of each desire.95

Now, since we have yet to traverse the bridge which connects first-order and second-order desires in the context of valuation and evaluation, we have only told the prologue to this story. As, value not only comes into play in making sense of desires to acquire things or to bring about states of affair, but also plays an indispensible role in informing second-order desires, and so, second-order volitions.

In our earlier discussion of Frankfurt’s account of autonomous action, I stipulated that I did not eat the cookies that I desired. Instead, I took a walk around the block. Why? My imagined self made this imaginary sacrifice because, upon engaging in self-reflection, it was clear to me that I desired to not have the desire to eat the cookies, but to have the desire to walk around the block. Cashed out in terms of practical identity and the role it plays in motivation: I, in some sense, desired to be (or to work towards becoming) the kind of person who would voluntarily choose to walk around the block, rather than eat cookies that I, for countless reasons, do not need.

What, then, is the source of this particular second-order desire? Once again, a particular value or values – the fact, for instance, that I value being the kind of person who has full command over his baser desires and, who, as a result enjoys a certain self-respect and dignity; or, the fact, say, that I value being the kind of person who places more importance on restoring his physical health than he does in scratching the ubiquitous itch of phantom hunger. I understand that my long-term health is directly
connected with such things as eating habits. And – given my sweet tooth and tendency to eat too much, too often, as it is – I understand that I must take direct action towards disempowering certain desires and punching up those which better fit with my standing, or ideal self-conception. 

Where do these values come from? To a large extent, again, they show up as given. I view pleasure (both mine and that enjoyed by others) as a good in and of itself. So, sometimes I choose to eat all of the cookies. And, the desire which motivates this is grounded in my valuing of pleasure, however myopic. Likewise, I pursue particular actions and events in order to maintain a certain level of self-esteem – not the other way around. Other times, I choose not to eat any of the cookies. And, the desire which motives this is grounded in, among other things, my valuing of personal restraint and the self-conception which bolsters this.

many other things are valued, justifiably or not, as goods in themselves. Further, my desires – and, especially those of the second-order variety – are generally informed and fueled by such values. Given this, it is those things that we value, and their more concrete instantiation in certain projects, which, alongside the agent, himself, co-steer the cart of autonomous action.

I desire to desire not to eat any of the cookies, but to take a walk around the block. In doing so my action is authorized by this second-order volition. And the second-order desire to desire not to eat the cookies, but to take the walk, is informed by the aforementioned values regarding self-respect, physical health, and perhaps other things as well. Clearly, then, there is an undeniable, if not always direct, causal relationship between value and action. Similarly, there is an extremely sturdy bond between value and a certain kind of necessary inaction on the part of agents. As Frankfurt notes, there are some things which are so highly valued by persons – those things spoken of here in terms of care – that acting to their detriment is simply not within the power of the agent in question. He writes:

About certain things that are important to him, a person may care so much, or in such a way, that he is subject to a kind of necessity. Because of this necessity, various courses of action that he would otherwise be able to pursue are effectively unavailable to him. It is impossible for him to pursue them . . . He cannot muster the necessary power. What he cannot muster is the will. He is held in the grip of volitional necessity that renders certain actions impossible for him to use that capacity . . . When a person is subject to this sort of volitional necessity, it renders certain actions unthinkable for him. These actions are not genuinely among his options . . . He is prevented [from acting] by a volitional constraint.
Typically when we talk of agency in terms of necessity, inability, etc., we have stepped outside the bounds of discussion of autonomous action. But, in speaking of volitional necessity and consequent constraint, we happen upon a unique animal. Note that the reason that the agent is unable to marshal the will necessary to initiate action is that her own most treasured values are preventing her from doing so. In most cases, disruption of agency this severe would lead us to believe that something entirely alien is at work. Here, though, the agent desires, on some level, to perform a particular action, but she simply cannot summon the required oomph to do it, because the action in question – or its results, perhaps – conflict so harshly with her own most cherished values. It is not some ‘unauthorized’ desire or value which is tampering with her agency in this case; it is, again, those values and accompanying desires which lie at the very heart of who the person takes herself to be. That is, those values which she implicitly has, and explicitly would reflectively endorse – and, in some strong sense, is endorsing, in inaction. In a sense, then, it is the agent herself who is disallowing the action in question.

While it is true that in instances of volitional constraint the person cannot act, it is she, the agent, who cannot bring herself to perform a certain action based on her own values. Nothing perceived as external is meddling with the agent’s motivational set. She does not feel at all estranged from the value or values which disallow the action. In fact, in inaction, she comes, more than ever, to sanction the values which restrain her. To return to Frankfurt:

In cases of volitional necessity, the aversion is not only irresistible, it is also in some way endorsed by the person. Furthermore, endorsing the aversion
is something that he cares about . . . Although he may not know it, the fact is the constraint is imposed by his will. For this reason he experiences his submission to it less as a defeat than as a liberation.108

I desire to eat all of the cookies. I eat all of the cookies. I feel alienated from the desire which motivated the action. I stand at odds with the motivating desire to such an extent, in fact, that I feel as if it was imposed upon me, remotely. I feel ashamed of myself for yielding to this desire. And, even though I know better, I feel as though the action was in some way beyond my control. This, however, does not assuage my feelings of self-condemnation. Contrast this with the following scenario: I pick up the package of cookies, and before even a nibble, I sit down to a report on CNN.

This just in. According to multiple sources, the cocoa beans used in order to produce chocolate chips found in certain Pepperidge Farm cookies are reported to have been harvested under conditions of slave labor in a province just south of Hermosillo, in Sonora, Mexico. These ingredients were used in cookies sold in stores throughout the United States and Canada over at least the last thirty months. The higher-ups at Pepperidge Farms – including several members of the Rudkin family, the majority owners – were complicit and, in fact, worked to spread the practice in order to achieve a healthier bottom line for the company. The full report is still in the works, but, as of now, it looks as though the coerced labor involved constitutes some of the worst human rights violations on modern record. No members of the corporation’s board of trustees have made themselves available for comment. More to come as the story unfolds.
I put down the cookies. I cannot eat the cookies – not now. Here, I find myself in the clutches of volitional necessity. But, although my actions are, in some sense, beyond my voluntary control to a greater extent here than they were when I cookie-binged in the earlier imagined scenario, I do not suffer the same feelings of estrangement, shame, and powerlessness. This is primarily because I endorse, without qualification, the values which force inaction.

I cannot be in cahoots, however indirectly, with an outfit that would take part in such wicked practices. And, even though it is clear to me that the fat cats behind all of this will not be affected in the least by my inability to consume these cookies, I still cannot eat them, as I cannot allow myself be a party to such things. I stand in full approval of my state of volitional constraint.99 “Not only do [I] care about following the particular course of action which [I am] constrained to follow. [I care] about caring about it.”200

In introducing this evaluative component, we have finally reached the confluence of personhood and selfhood201 – as, I will detail in the pages to come, those persons who are unique selves possess this distinction in large part due to their commitment to certain projects to which they confer value, their acting in accordance with such commitments, and – extending from the person’s capacity for autonomous action – the formation of second-order volitions informed by these commitments. In approaching selfhood, we are just downstream from moral selfhood, defined primarily in terms of one’s specifically moral commitments.
I now turn to discussion of the nature of selfhood. In discussing the self, I describe that state of the mind as it exists in its most holistic form – relative psychic integration – and that state of the self which exhibits this – integrity. Following this, I consider moral selfhood, and moral integrity, specifically.

2.4: Evaluators as Selves

Before turning to discussion of projects, commitments, and the connection of each with value, let’s review, once more, what we have already said of persons, and now of selves. Those conditions necessary for the conference of personhood are: CP0. interaction with other persons and subsequent socialization; CP1. rationality and the capacity for self-reflection; CP2. self-consciousness and the unity of consciousness; CP3. the capacity for autonomous agency; CP4. situatedness in time; CP5. psychological continuity and one’s recognition of the selfsameness of her psyche as time passes; and, finally, CP6. the ability to value and to evaluate, and the actual valuing of certain projects. For the sake of brevity going forward, let’s call the conjunction of these conditions CS1 – as, since selves are particular persons, the conditions necessary for the conference of personhood are also necessary for selfhood.

In adding to CS1, let’s now consider a notion essential to the person qua self that has already surfaced a handful of times above – namely, the person’s participation in projects. Call the capacity to take part in projects, and the individual’s active engagement with some of these, necessary condition of selfhood CS2.
We should be careful from the outset to fix in our minds an important distinction between projects, generally speaking, and commitments. First, the latter are a subset of the former, cordoned off from the rest by a particular vigor shown towards the dedication to a project on the part of she who is committed; and, I suggest in the pages to come, a still smaller subset of commitments – those which I refer to as identity-conferring commitments – constitutes, in large part, any given person’s self. Second, the term project has been haphazardly used to denote this weightier concept commitment in various philosophical treatments of the nature of integrity, and, on occasion, to denote identity-conferring commitments, specifically. I will now discuss project, commitment, and identity-conferring commitment in turn, noting in detail the key features of each.

By project, I mean any significant activity, broadly construed, that a person values and takes part in on a typically, but not necessarily, long-term basis. Here, I also want to be careful with the term significant – as, Taylor uses this term frequently in discussion of strong evaluation. I do not mean to suggest, as he does, that one’s placing of significance on a particular project must involve anything like the conference of intrinsic worth to the project. Although, some projects certainly are appraised in this way by their participants. As the person values these projects, and as value often materializes in the form of reasoned action and autonomously enacted long-term activity, project-adoptions and project-participation also have a motivational component. Finally, taking part in projects involves the person’s loose identification with the project or some perceived
good connected with it. The degree to which this is felt will vary, of course, both with respect to the person in question, and the project, itself.²⁰⁶

Provided this open-ended understanding, leaning how to play Crazy Eights may constitute a project. Memorizing Sappho’s *Hymn to Aphrodite* may constitute a project. Collecting 45 rpm first-issued pressings of Little Richard’s “Long Tall Sally” may constitute a project. Distributing tracts to inform others about the Bahá’í Faith may constitute a project. Rebuilding the carbonator of a 1964 Chevrolet Impala SS may constitute a project. Figuring out what Giambattista Vico is up to in *the New Science* may constitute a project. Researching and writing a dissertation may constitute a project. Upholding certain defeasible principles may constitute a project. Upholding other seemingly indefeasible principles may constitute a project. Counting the blades of Bermuda grass on the front lawn of the arboretum surrounding Old Main may constitute a project,²⁰⁷ and so on. The essential characteristic of the project is that, once more, the person taking part values the activity, itself, or some good connected with it.

Those projects which are of greater value to persons than others often become what I will call *commitments*. Commitments require a special kind of dedication – though with it, a reasonable defeasibility – not found with participation in projects, generally. And, this devotion can involve no pretense or self-deception on the part of the person involved.²⁰⁸ This dedication is motivated primarily by the conference of greater relative value to the project. And – and, this will be expanded upon in the pages to come – those projects which the person takes, by and large, to be constitutive of who she is at her core
are what I will call identity-conferring commitments. These commitments require a distinctly ardent dedication which grows out of the explicit or implicit understanding that such projects are linked with the continued existence and wellbeing of the person’s self at any given time. Not surprisingly, then, the upkeep of these commitments motivates the greatest of fidelities on the part of the person committed, at least insofar as she wishes to maintain her present practical identity.

To fill in these concepts a bit more, allow me to share an anecdote from my years as an undergraduate. In the summer prior to my junior year of college, I took an elective course in the sociology of group dynamics. One morning early on in the term, we were given the following instructions: write down (in list form, if that helps) a summary of who you take yourself to be, at center. The instructor then went around the room, asking a smattering of students to read aloud what they had written. The point of the assignment, if memory serves correctly, was to demonstrate that our identity is primarily a relational affair.

*My name is Dixie – I’m the mother of two growing boys, Jim and Jeb, Jr., ages six and eleven. I’m the wife of Jeb Ledbetter, a Caddo Valley police officer. I’m the daughter of Earnest and Jocelyn Schaufhauser of Friendship, Arkansas, and the sister of Jolene Galloway and Randy Schaufhauser, of Friendship and Bismark, Arkansas. I’m also a member of the Social Hill Church of Christ, where I teach Sunday School to first- and second-graders, and provide piano accompaniment for the choir.*
For the most part, those who shared their self-reports offered something along these lines. There were, however, some of our number who seemed to cash out their identities in terms of ideologies to which they subscribed and felt particularly strongly about, and accompanying activities in which they regularly took part.

My name is Coy. I’m a Yellow-Dog Democrat, originally from Plain Dealing, Louisiana. I’ve lived in Arkansas for going on a dozen years, now. I’m double-majoring in Sociology and Human Services. Once finished with school, I hope to put my degree to work in the service of labor rights, specifically working with undocumented immigrant workers around the Louisiana-Arkansas-Texas convergence. I spend most of my spare time lobbying for progressive causes and volunteering for the Nevada County Democratic Party. I’m also an avid fan of the Ragin’ Cajuns of the University of Louisiana at Lafayette – the football team, in particular.

I remember finding it interesting that while most of my classmates intuitively grounded their identities in relationships, there were those who looked elsewhere – in some cases, exclusively – for the things which defined them as distinct selves. I wondered, then, if there was some fundamental difference in personality type at work, or whether this was merely a function of some other influencing factor, such as age or gender. Looking back, the differences in response seem somewhat superficial. Whether one describes herself primarily in terms of her relationships, political or philosophical positions which are of particular personal importance, activities about which she feels especially passionate, or some combination of these and other considerations, she is
actually talking about participation in projects. If we strip away those projects in which
the person takes part more casually, we are left with her commitments – projects, again,
upon which she places greater value, and so, to which she shows greater devotion. If we
then subtract those commitments which are, for one reason or another, presently
conceived of as being negotiable in the mind of the person, we are left with her collection
of identity-conferring commitments. And, here, I suggest, we have located that what is, in
large part, her self.\textsuperscript{212}

\begin{quote}
My name is Anja. I’m the third child in a family of ten – and, am extremely close to
my parents and my sister, Ang. I’m a devout Quaker, and regularly host meetings for the
local congregation in my apartment. As a Quaker, I’m a committed pacifist, and actively
support universal nuclear disarmament. I have two German Shepherds, Edmund and
Gottlob – my babies. When I find myself with free time, I enjoy playing Mahjong with my
neighbor, Sissy, watching Kung-Fu flicks of the 1960s and 70s, and reading southern gothic
literature – Flannery O’Connor is a particular favorite. Love her stuff.

Stipulating that the last few items mentioned here are projects with no
commitment attached, Anja may at any point discontinue taking part in these activities
without fear of losing an iota of personal integrity – so, without the threat of destabilizing
her self. Again, such provisional projects are entirely peripheral to the self. That said, if
Anja chooses to never again read, say, “You Cannot Be Any Poorer than Dead,” she may
without incident retain her core values and commitments, and so, remain who she is.
Mere projects aside, even if she chooses to break her commitment to hosting Quaker services in her home – stipulating that this is not an identity-conferring commitment, per se – she does not risk losing personal integrity as a result of this action, itself. While commitments are in some sense outgrowths of the self and tangible instantiations of the values which prop it up, insofar as these are not tantamount to who the person takes herself to be, they may also be suspended, renounced, or replaced. Walking away from some of these more important projects does not, in and of itself, undermine Anja’s integrity. Conversely, if she breaks some identity-conferring commitment – say, a tacit vow to always be there for her family in time of need, or her commitment to practicing Waiting Worship” – then the loss of personal integrity looms large. She teeters on the edge of losing her self, and so, of becoming someone else.

The self, once more, in large part just is a concurrence of identity-conferring commitments and the stance and resultant actions – motivated by values by way of second-order volitions – that are held to and performed by a person. So far as these particular commitments go, there is a special kind of active devotion necessary on the part of the agent. And, this loyalty grows directly out of a self-identification with the commitments, which is often, if not typically, accompanied by a sense of volitional necessity to take part in certain activities, and a self-imposed feeling of constraint which precludes one’s taking part in others.

Given her identity-conferring commitment to remaining a practicing Quaker, for instance, Anja will likely feel compelled to worship God in a way which she believes to be
right according to certain traditions and ideals, and at the same time to not take part in activities which run counter to her faith. She may even to an extent feel as though she may not take part in activities which tend to cause her to question her faith, however seemingly innocently.\textsuperscript{213} The same cannot be said of whether to ever again view \textit{The Iron-Fisted Monk}, or to swap Mahjong tiles on the porch with Sissy. It is primarily with these characteristics in mind that we are able to best distinguish projects from commitments, and garden variety commitments from identity-conferring commitments.

An additional example should help to make these distinctions a bit clearer – and, in particular, to shed light on the kind of devotion which separates projects from those more central commitments which principally make up the self. Here, the point is made negatively. In \textit{The Orchid Thief}, Susan Orlean tells the story of a man named John Laroche. For reasons that will become apparent, Laroche is an eccentric even among eccentrics. Orlean writes:

When [Laroche] was about nine or ten, his parents said he could pick out a pet. He decided to get a little turtle. Then he asked for ten more little turtles. Then he decided he wanted to breed the turtles, and then started selling turtles to other kids, and then he could think of nothing \textit{but} turtles and then decided his life was not worth living unless he could collect one of every single kind of turtle species known to mankind . . . Then, out of the blue, he fell out of love with turtles and fell madly in love with Ice Age fossils. He collected them, sold them, declared that he lived for them, then abandoned them for something else – lapidary, I think – then abandoned lapidary and became obsessed with collecting and resilvering old mirrors. Laroche’s passions arrived unannounced and ended explosively . . . When I first met him he lusted only for orchids, especially the wild orchids growing in Florida’s Fakahatchee Strand. I spent most of the next two years hanging around with him, and at the end of those two years he had gotten rid of every single orchid he owned and swore that we would never own another orchid for as long as he lived. He is usually true to his word. Years ago,
between his Ice Age fossils and his old mirrors, he went through a tropical-fish phase. At its peak, he had more than sixty fish tanks in his house and went skin-diving regularly to collect fish. Then the end came. He did not gradually lose interest: he renounced fish and vowed he would never again collect them and, for that matter, he would never set foot in the ocean again. That was seventeen years ago. He has lived his whole life only a couple of feet from the Atlantic, but he has not dipped one toe in it since then.

On the surface, Laroche's various projects show all the signs of what we would typically associate with commitment. He is described as being “unable to think of anything but” φ; as being “madly in love” with φ; as being “obsessed with” φ; as “liv[ing] for” φ; as “lust[ing] only for” φ.

More than being merely committed, at a glance we might go so far as to describe Laroche as an outright fanatic about φ. All of the surface indicators which would support this judgment seem to be there. However, upon closer inspection, Laroche falls short of even conditional commitment because of the fickle approach to these projects which his capricious abandonments reveal. True commitment involves the kind of devotion – a “distinctive tenacity” – that prevents its participant from pardoning himself willy-nilly, as Laroche seems to do habitually.

One must invest more than time and energy in taking part in a project in order to be considered truly committed to it. She must invest her practical identity, itself. She must declare herself to be, to some degree, in service of the commitment, all things being equal. Further, and more to the point with Laroche, she must have the intention of honoring the commitment, even when circumstances make doing so extremely difficult. And, the person may only justifiably break the commitment upon reflection and for
considered reasons. Finally, when one does find herself faced with a waning commitment, she must “intervene” and put forth an effort to “refresh” or “rekindle” the desire to keep it. We find no such effort in the case of Laroche.

The surest sign that no commitment exists here, let alone the implicit oath and intention to uphold it, is Laroche’s tendency to, to lift a turn of phrase from Christoph Fehige, change his projects “like he changes his socks.” One need not replace his existing projects each morning in order to be guilty of lacking commitment, though – as, Laroche clearly approaches some projects with incomparable passion, and for extended periods of time. However, in that he abandons these at the drop of a hat and for no conceivable reason, we cannot say that he was ever truly committed. In a certain sense, then, so far as we can tell from Orlean’s account, the only commitments that Laroche seems to make and sustain are those which come in the form of an unspoken renunciation of a past project about which he was at one time passionate.

Casual projects may be distinguished from commitments by the lack, on the part of the former, of a personal investment which involves, most importantly, a tacit pledge to uphold some commitment, and a seriousness with which the person approaches this. The committed person must have the intention of honoring this pledge, and she must demonstrate this by sticking to the commitment even in times of adversity, or, in other cases, in the face of sheer boredom. Moreover, breaking a commitment must be felt by the person in question. One cannot abandon a true commitment without feeling some sense of loss, even in those cases involving the realization that the commitment has
evolved into something which the participant is now averse to. (Or, even in those cases where the participant has evolved into one who stands at odds with the original project.)

To say, though, that commitment involves the intention to sustain the project even during times of relative hardship is not, again, to say that commitments can never be justifiably broken; nor, certainly, is it to say that such commitments should never be broken. There is a fine line between, on the one hand, an indefinite suspension of a project which betrays the fact that the participant was really never committed in the first place, and, on the other hand, a reasonable, and premeditated break. I will not offer necessary and sufficient conditions of what this distinction might come to. Primarily, this is because I am skeptical that this is the sort of thing which is best suited for such analysis. I will say, though, that any justifiable breaking of a commitment must involve reflection; a serious pause seems necessary.

Let’s call the capacity to make and keep commitments, and to keep them with the proper reverence, necessary condition of selfhood CS2.’

Having written at some length about the distinction between projects and commitments, I will now elaborate on the distinction between standard commitments and identity-conferring commitments. As stated, identity-conferring commitments are those which lie at the very center of who the person takes herself to be. For this reason, and stipulating that the person has not become to any significant degree reticent about her identification with the commitments, these typically show up as nonnegotiables. Further, they very often, but certainly not always, summon both volitional necessity and volitional
constraint. As, in a literal sense, if one were to intentionally act against her inmost identity-conferring commitments, she initiate the willful disintegration of her self.

Here, we arrive at the primary difference between commitments, in general, and identity-conferring commitments, in particular – namely, whereas the self is in some important sense connected with and invested in all commitments, the self just is the collection of identity-conferring commitments held to by a particular person, the system of values which buttress this, the accompanying evaluative process and adjoining second-order volitions, and the actions which follow from this assemblage. That said, the person can break a commitment, given that there is a good reason for doing so, and not destabilize the self. Conversely, since the self consists primarily of one's identity-conferring commitments, when she breaks a commitment of this nature, she begins to pull apart her own practical identity, undermining integrity. For this reason, one's reverential stance towards such commitments is crucial to her maintaining a particular self. Let's call the capacity to make and to keep identity-conferring commitments, and the actual making and keeping of some of these commitments, necessary condition of selfhood CS2.

To say that adopting an identity-conferring commitment involves the intention to sustain the project even during times of extreme hardship is not to say that such commitments should never be broken. A person's identity-conferring commitments are to be respected and adhered to only insofar as that committed person is interested in preserving her present self. We tend to think that this must always be the case. However,
we can imagine certain situations – and, I will detail examples of these in Chapter 3 – in which a person may wisely choose to work towards the intentional disintegration of her present self. Such a choice will follow from a nascent innovation in her values, and so, a change in the way she views the world, her self, and her ideal self.\textsuperscript{223}

Identity-conferring commitments, like all projects and commitments, are products of a person’s existing system of values. And, once again, as these evaluative frameworks tend to show up as given, the commitments which follow from them, here implicitly made, are typically seen as initially unchosen as well. As is also the case with values, though, the person cannot shirk responsibility for the identity-conferring commitments to which she pledges herself, or the actions which follow from these. Again, in reflectively endorsing certain identity-conferring commitments, the person, in a significant way, comes to own these commitments and becomes accountable for them in so doing. This is especially important since we are now talking indirectly about integrity – as, integrity necessarily involves speaking “in the first person” in authoring any action.\textsuperscript{224}

As the person’s identity-conferring commitments are in many ways the embodiment of her values, it should come as no surprise that these provide many of the same utilities. In commitment, we are moved to action. Behind the scenes, of course, our values and the second-order volitions which are rooted in these are giving the actual motivational push. However, we more often make sense of our autonomous reasons for acting in looking at our projects and commitments. In commitment, as with values, we also self-impose practical restrictions.\textsuperscript{225} Once more, our core values are tending shop
covertly – but, the story that the person tends to tell herself and others is that she simply
could not bring herself to perform a particular action because it directly conflicts with
some strongly held-to commitment.

Pushed a bit further, and we are often provided an account of autonomous action
given in terms of the self. *There’s no way I can possibly do that. That is simply not who I
am.* It is very often the case that the commitments with which we identify in this way
show up as categorical (specifically, moral) in nature. Other times, commitments are
wholly personal. For this reason, in further exploring integrity, we must consider the
personal vis-à-vis the moral; I attend to this in section 2.4.

Before concluding this section, let’s review once more. The requirements for
selfhood include CS1 and CS2′, where the latter refers to the person’s ability to commit to
and stand firmly by her identity-conferring commitments, specifically. This so because
the self, in large part, is the person’s collection of identity-conferring commitments. And, integrity just is the sufficient integration of identity-conferring commitments and
other relevant mental events, the person’s active ownership of these, and action
consistent with remaining true to such commitments.

The person of integrity will make, and hold to, some set of internally-harmonious
identity-conferring commitments. Insofar as her less central commitments and projects
go, she will also see to it that these do not undermine any one of her identity-conferring
commitments. Stipulating that the self which she presently is, is the self – for the most
part, at least – that she would like to sustain, she will guide her actions according to the
dictates of the identity-conferring commitments which in majority part constitute this self. And, she will eschew any actions or projects which tend to push in the opposite direction. Moral integrity – spoken of in some length, below – just is the healthy state of the sufficiently integrated moral self. And, so the same things may be said of the moral self, insofar as the person wishes to preserve it as it exists. I now turn attention to the nature of the moral self and of moral integrity.

2.5: Selves and Moral Selves

Here, I am interested in offering an account of personal integration, generally; and, more specifically, an account of the integration of the self with the moral self, and the preservation of this state in the face of seemingly impartial, moral reasons for action. Just as the self is composed largely of one’s values and identity-conferring commitments, the moral self is composed largely of one’s specifically moral values and moral identity-conferring commitments. And, just as a person may take part in, but eventually release herself from holding to certain nonmoral commitments without risking personal disintegration, there are counterparts to these which correspond to the specifically moral side of the personality.

A person may, for instance, tacitly commit to working at a local soup kitchen on Sunday evenings, but justifiably renege when she realizes that that time away from her children is having too adverse of an effect on them. In so doing, in fact, she may reaffirm a stronger commitment – an identity-conferring commitment, perhaps – that she always take care of her family to the greatest extent possible. To sharpen the point, she may
break the commitment simply because, say, a reading group in which she enjoys taking part moves its meetings to Sundays at seven o'clock. She would miss the discussions and fellowship that goes along with these if she continued to volunteer. Again, she may break this commitment without losing moral integrity assuming, again, that she is not violating any moral identity-conferring commitment in doing so.

Looking back, she might feel as if her decision is selfish, or even decadent – and, in deliberating, she may feel ambivalent. One who has made a true commitment, even if it is defeasible in her own mind, will, again, feel her breaking of that commitment, because these projects are just adjacent to the self, and can also help us in making sense of who we are. But, stipulating that she is not a moral masochist, she will likely not miss too much sleep over breaking the commitment after a while, let alone worry about outright self-betrayal – nor should she. However, as certain actions and activities are direct outgrowths of more general identity-conferring commitments – a commitment to promoting, for example, community welfare – she must make certain that in breaking some commitment she does not also undercut a sweeping identity-conferring commitment in a more indirect way.

Another person may choose to refrain from taking part in any activities which he deems supererogatory, generally. Such actions or activities, being merely potential projects for him, do not lie at the core of his moral identity, even if they are judged to have some component of moral worth. Here, the agent might feel the pull of his better nature to perform some optimific, but not required, action. But, this reason to act may be
justifiably overridden by any number of factors – even purely personal preferences – since, stipulating that this is the case, there is no identity-conferring commitment behind the call to perform the action.

Walking to work one day, Rita decides that it would be a morally good thing to do to pick up any recyclable items that she comes across, and to place them in the appropriate receptacles located just outside of her office. She performs this task once, then the following day, and then another. On the fourth day, for whatever reason, she simply does not feel like toting these things. Having made no commitment to do so – not even a commitment that may be overridden by competing morally-significant factors – her moral integrity is not at stake. She does not break out into a cold sweat over her inaction and pine for the days prior when her moral self was unblemished – when she was a good enough person, a person of integrity. At least, she shouldn’t. Retrospectively, Rita might wish that she had gone ahead and followed the pattern that she had been establishing. It is, after all, a good thing to do, and not overly burdensome. But, there is no sense in which she has ‘caved in’ by failing to take part in this project on a particular day. So, any regret which she feels will not be based on an actual a loss of moral integrity.

Javier goes to the mall during the holiday shopping season, and sees a bell-ringer raising funds for Oxfam. He places a folded twenty into the red bucket, tips his invisible cap, and goes about his business. Later that afternoon, he receives a mailer from Heifer International, asking for a donation. He chooses not to respond to this request. He does not, however, lose moral integrity in the process, because he has not violated any
particular moral commitment, much less an indefeasible moral identity-conferring commitment. Even if Javier had implicitly committed himself to giving some money to various, worthy charities, unless he feels a particular push from reasoned conscience to give to this charity, at this particular moment, he has not done anything to break that internal pledge. His moral self remains intact. This is so because, to borrow from Kantian terminology, he rightfully views the duty to give to charity as imperfect in nature, given the content of his commitment. Failing to give to Heifer International right there and then constitutes no threat to his integrated moral self – and so, all else being equal, no threat to the condition of his self.

Conversely, there are certain duties, arrived at by whatever criteria, which most of us take to be perfect. Some of us might take fair-dealing to be one such example. And so, often we make a commitment, perhaps an identity-conferring commitment, never to cheat anyone out of what is rightfully theirs, irrespective of what might result from this. Others of us might hold that it is never morally permissible to break a promise. So, again, we make an internal pledge that we keep our word regardless of the consequences. Most of us believe that it is never morally okay to intentionally harm an innocent person. And, no matter what fanciful predicament we might imagine ourselves in – be it involving overweight spelunkers stuck in the mouths of caves or large groups of commuters trapped aboard runaway trolleys – actions which involve such things are taken to be morally prohibited.
Much more generally, some of us hold that it is always morally required that we act to bring about the greatest satisfaction for the greatest number of sentient entities – or, that we reduce the greatest suffering possible. Others hold that we must always, in every case, treat rational beings as inherently valuable, and show each person her due respect. Still others hold that we must categorically follow the will of Jah according to the *Kebra Nagast*. In these and similar cases, allowing one’s own interests, or the interests of a significant other, to disproportionately sway decision-making and resultant action is forbidden. And so, many times moral identity-conferring commitments are indirectly betrothed to radical impartiality. But, given the obvious issues for preserving integrity which can attend the commitment to impartialist ethical systems such as these, where does the attraction to such moralities come from?

Like values more generally, moral values and their corresponding principles tend to show up to us as given. Initially, we do not choose to hold that, say, treating persons as ends in themselves is a moral requirement. For any number reasons, we simply find ourselves holding that this is the case. Again, once we reach the point in life where we are culpable for the values and principles that we adhere to, the onus is on us to either stick to these values – to reflectively endorse them, and to sincerely attempt to live up to their demands – or to work towards replacing them. But, this does not negate the fact that the values tend to show up, once more, as simply there. As stated before, it is this given axiological backdrop which informs our earliest deliberations about which more concrete moral commitments to make and to break. And, since constructing and preserving one’s
moral self is part and parcel of making, respecting, and acting on one’s moral
commitments, this web of values is an ancillary source of the moral self.

Our moral identity-conferring commitments and corresponding values, again, do
the work of all of: situating who we are morally, motivating moral action, enabling us to
evaluate other commitments and projects, and setting limits on what we may and may
not do, given the moral self we wish to create or sustain. While the system of values
which we use to construct our moral self is temporally prior to its initial construction, it is
often in terms of the self as opposed to values, per se, that we engage in practical
deliberation. *Could I live with myself if I stole from the till?* is, in some sense, a way of
asking *Can I retain the integrity of my present moral self if I steal from the till? Would I
remain the same self, morally speaking, if I performed this action – or, would stealing from
the register constitute an irreparable corruption of my present moral self?*  

So too, it is often in terms of the self that we ostensively teach children to engage
in practical deliberation when it comes to morally-charged actions. *You don’t want to be
the kind of person who puts others down, do you? Or: no, don’t do that – you know we don’t
put others down.* We are ostensively taught from an early age that there is an organic
connection between morality and the self. And, I would argue, that there is already an
unspoken aesthetic component at play here, also. *But, mom, why don’t I want to be the
kind of person who puts others down?* To quote a turn of phrase that I grew up with:
*Because that’s just ugly!* (An aesthetic evaluation smuggled into moral discourse.) This
sometime connection between the aesthetic and the moral will be discussed in great
detail in the following chapter.

In closing this section, I should say something about the elephant we have allowed
to quietly slip into the room in discussing moral selfhood and moral integrity – namely,
the concept moral, itself. And, given the inertial pull to describe integrity in terms of
virtue, I should also say something more about why I am flouting this tradition.²³⁰

First, what do I mean by moral? I want to tread carefully here, since, as you will
recall, I hope to offer an account of integrity and an accompanying response to Williams’s
objection, which appeal as strongly to those with moral realist intuitions as to those with
nonobjectivist intuitions. For this reason, I will be purposely vague – as, once more,
nothing concerning the existence of moral values, or the lack of these, will affect what I
have said or will say about the self, the moral self, or about personal or moral integrity. By
morality, I simply mean any principle or system of principles (or the decision-making
procedures which ‘discover’ these or construct these) which, upon reflection, seem
compulsory for some impersonal and impartial reason or reasons.

Given this all-inclusive conception of morality, each of the standard modern
ethical theories should feel right at home here. Again, the conception of integrity I am
advancing is intended to supplement practical reasoning and to provide a healthier
understanding of what selfhood comes to – it is not meant to inform any ethics
substantively, nor, again, is it an essentially ethical notion, itself. This, of course, opens up
integrity as it is understood here to an entirely different set of concerns.
In anticipation of this, I would now like to bite a particular bullet. Since I define integrity in terms of cohesion of value, second-order desire and volition, commitment, and subsequent action – and, in terms of an ownership of these by the moral agent – one might understandably worry that I have left no room at the table for the content of these things. This is correct. Given the conception that I am arguing for, one could very well be, say, an active member of Boko Haram and retain integrity. And, while this does fly in the face of accounts offered by many contemporary ethicists, I do not think we will find that our intuitions are actually being violated if we look a bit closer. To make this point, I would like to draw attention to a remark made by the historian Howard Zinn – ironically, a point made in order to scoff at the importance placed on the retention of personal integrity when measured against the demands of morality, but which clearly sheds light on integrity’s instinctive nonmoral standing.

In lecturing about the importance of standing up for principles of social justice, Zinn cites a review of an autobiography of Leni Riefenstahl – one of the most celebrated filmmakers of her time, but, due to her corroboration with Goebbels, one of the most reviled people in the history of cinema. He quotes the reviewer as saying, “[Riefenstahl] may have compromised her morality, but her artistic integrity, never.” Now, again, Zinn is derisively poking fun in order to demonstrate just how impoverished integrity can be if there is no good will at the helm. I am not going to say that Zinn is wrong – in fact, I could not agree more with his overall position. However, I take his point to also implicitly demonstrate that there is a plain divide between personal integrity (or, integrity
simpliciter) and moral integrity. Moreover, while the latter must be made sense of in terms of the former, the converse does not hold. On the understanding of the concept that I am endorsing here, Riefenstahl may well have been a person of great integrity, assuming that her identity-conferring commitments were bound up with her artistic endeavors, and that she never compromised these at the behest of the Reich. More controversially still, I am suggesting that Riefenstahl may have been a person of moral integrity, assuming, on her part, a sincere and sustained commitment to Nazism and its moral values.

I completely understand if, in thinking about committed Nazis being described as persons of integrity – a fortiori as persons of moral integrity – my readers find themselves holding their noses. I get it, believe me. But, I ask that those readers postpone their ultimate decision regarding the tenability of my position until I have had the opportunity to walk us through the last chapter. There, the fully-integrated person – so, the person of integrity – will be considered in still greater detail against a specifically moral backdrop, and an attempt will be made to synthesize each of the pieces which I have been forging here. Before turning there, let’s review what has been said of selves one last time.

Above, I have included detailed discussion of what I take, first, to be the necessary conditions of personhood; second, building on these, the necessary conditions of selfhood; finally, building on these, the necessary conditions of moral selfhood. Again, the person as self is one who displays those characteristics which make up CS1, and who is CS2′: capable of taking part in projects, and who takes part in some projects; is capable of
making and keeping commitments, and makes some commitments, at least some of which are identity-conferring commitments. Finally, the person *qua* self *qua* moral self is also capable of making and keeping moral commitments, specifically, at least some of which must be identity-conferring in nature.\textsuperscript{236}

In Chapter 3, I reintroduce IO with the person *qua* self at center stage. There, I look to respond to Williams’s argument with the self and moral self as act utilitarian in mind. I hope to show that by applying an action language approach to self-analysis alongside an aesthetically-informed brand of practical reasoning, the agent can retain integrity amid her commitment to act utilitarianism; and, she can work to restore that which has been lost.

Notes

\textsuperscript{137} It may be argued against the inclusion of CPo that the God of the Abrahamic religions, while generally conceived of as a person, could not have undergone anything like the socialization that I have described here. While orthodox believers would certainly balk at conceiving of God as, at some point, *coming to be* a person in part by interacting with others – the question to ask being, Which *others*? – certain facets of, at least, Judaism and Christianity perhaps lend themselves to the intersubjectivity necessary for personhood, so selfhood. Taking hermeneutic license, we might read the Torah as describing a God who, at least, takes on distinct personas. Some, for instance, have suggested that the different names of God present within the Hebraic tradition refer to the discreet natures of God – examples include, *Yahweh* (יהוה), denoting specifically God’s merciful nature; *Elohim* (אֱלֹהִים), denoting specifically God’s power; and, *Qanna* (קַנָּא), which denotes the jealousy and wrathfulness of God. There are at least sixteen different words in the Old Testament translated into English as *God* or *Lord*; and, there is a particular trait of the divine personality which is typically associated with each, singularly. So, some might argue, prior to the creation of – and so, preceding His interaction with – other entities, God’s personhood could have been sustained by the interactions between the different natures of God, alone. Similarly, it could be argued that prior to the creation of other persons,
God’s personhood could have been sustained by the interaction between the three traditional hypostases: the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. Still, this approach seems to face a problem of infinite regress, as stipulating that there must have been some first interaction among the various expressions of God, these would have already needed to have achieved personhood in order to further bring about and sustain personhood. Besides this, such speculation does nothing to explain the personhood of a *bona fide* monotheistic God such as Islam’s Allah.

A better approach to hold to CPo and to openness to the existence of God might be to bite one of two bullets. First, one might simply accept that God is not a person. One could still hold to the idea that the world has, in some sense, a divine Cause, but not necessarily attribute personhood to that Cause. Aristotle’s Unmoved Mover comes to mind. Second, but more problematic, one might stipulate that God is a person of a unique kind – and so, to hold that those criteria essential to natural, created persons are not required by supernatural, infinite persons. This, however, seems *ad hoc*.

138 Sigmund Freud, 1989b, p.12-14. Compare Freud’s account with Lacan’s, Nick Mansfield writes: “[According to Lacan,] Prior to the mirror-stage [again, between the ages of six and eighteen months], the child has no sense of itself as a separate entity. There is no understanding of the limits of the individual body, nor that there is necessarily anything external to it. The many surfaces that the child touches – the mother’s skin, clothing, carpet – are all felt to be part of a continuous, uninterrupted, limitless being, so amorphous and open-ended that it cannot be compared to anything as located, specific and defined as selfhood . . . In the same way that no surface with which the child comes into contact is felt to be necessarily alien to it, outside of the ‘self’, the child does not experience its body as its own, with a fixed perimeter and working as a unified system (2000, p.41-42).”

139 John Smith makes the point this way: “. . . we come to self-consciousness only through relations to another, starting with the things of the world and advancing to relations of person to person. I do not first have this intuitive knowledge of myself and then seek somehow to include you; on the contrary, the other has already been included since it is through contrast, comparison, sympathy and shared experience with others that I attain my own self-consciousness. [Josiah] Royce was fond of saying that before the appearance of Friday, Robinson Crusoe could know that he was not as tall as a palm tree, but not that he talked too much. Attaining self-consciousness is always a journey that takes us through the responses of other persons to ourselves before we can return home (1992, p.50).”

Similarly, Richard Sorabji argues that the attainment of self-consciousness on the part of the infant is also a cooperative product brought about with the help of some other person; he writes: “A dramatic change, many psychologists say, comes after 9 months . . . What these psychologists find . . . is that infants become aware of themselves as conscious
beings only as they become aware of their carers as conscious beings. What happens is they notice a divergence between their own attention and the carer’s attention. This can happen . . . in games of ‘look with mother’. The infant wants to align its gaze with its mother’s or carer’s, so as to be looking at the same thing . . . [This] has been called ‘shared attention’ or ‘joint attention,’ and may be unique to humans (2006, p.25).”

Wittgenstein writes: “Augustine describes the learning of human language as if the child came into a strange country and did not understand the language of the country; that is, as if it already had a language, only not this one. Or again: as if the child could already think, only not yet speak. And ‘think’ would here mean something like ‘talk to itself’ (2001, p.13e-14e, emphasis is the author’s own).”

Ludwig Wittgenstein, 2001, §243-§275

With both Hobbes and Locke in mind, Rousseau writes: “The philosophers who have examined the foundations of society have all felt the necessity of returning to the state of nature, but none has reached it . . . [They,] speaking continually of need, avarice, oppression, desires, and pride, have transferred to the state of nature the ideas they acquired in society (1987a, p.38).” And, later in the same work: “Were we to want to suppose a savage man as skilled in the art of thinking as our philosophers make him out to be; were we, following his example, to make him a full-fledged philosopher, discovering by himself the most sublime truths, and by chains of terribly abstract reason, forming for himself maxims of justice and reason drawn from the love of order in general or from the known will of his creator [?] . . . And to what extent could men mutually perfect and enlighten one another, when, with neither a fixed dwelling nor any need for one another, they would hardly encounter one another twice in their lives, without knowing or talking to one another. Let us consider how many ideas we owe to the use of speech; how much grammar trains and facilitates the operations of the mind (Ibid., p.47-48).”

Rousseau’s primary point is that nature does not produce learned ladies and gentlemen, whether egocentric, altruistic, on somewhere mid-spectrum; nature, by itself, cannot produce persons, generally. Whether ignoring this fact for the sake of convenience, or because the social contract theories of Hobbes and Locke were intended to be wholly hypothetical in nature, early modern philosophers tended to project themselves into State of Nature scenarios – that is, they have their readers imagine initial states of anarchy populated by fully instantiated persons of great intellect and prudence. The same, it seems, goes for, in this case, Augustine and Freud – and each, in his own way, projects himself into the position of the infant. Each writes as if the child is born with the possession of a somewhat sophisticated private language (and so, working conceptual scheme) which must be merely translated into the public language spoken by

143 In Sanskrit, संघ

144 Thich Nhat Hahn, 2013, p.12

145 Some philosophers have done us the service of not only discussing in detail the import of adequate socialization to personhood, but of breaking the condition down into its constituent parts. Daniel Dennett, for instance, includes in his discussion of personhood a group of considerations which are wholly social in nature: “The second [condition] is that persons are beings to which states of consciousness are attributed, or to which psychological or mental or intentional predicates, are ascribed . . . The third [condition] is that whether something counts as a person depends in some strong way on the attitude taken toward it [by others], a stance adopted with respect to it . . . The fourth [condition] is that the object toward which this personal stance is taken must be capable of reciprocating in some way . . . The fifth condition is that persons must be capable of verbal communication (1978, p.268-270, emphasis is the author’s own).”

As our purpose is to construct a suitable facsimile of the person and self, and since doing so does not require quite the attention to detail which Dennett offers, no more will be said about his social species of condition here, aside from implicit relevance with respect to how the agent comes to value and understand the source of her values. But, I ask that my reader not take this to mean that I do not appreciate the importance of these distinctions, and certainly of socialization, itself.


146 Immanuel Kant, 2006a, p.15, emphasis is the author’s own. You would be hard pressed to locate a passage within Kant’s practical philosophy which does not at least implicitly cash out personhood in moral terms. When it comes to his analysis of persons, the descriptive just is the prescriptive. Here are three additional examples, each from an independent work: “A human being has a duty to raise himself from the crude state of his nature, from his animality (quoad actum), more and more toward humanity, by which he alone is capable of setting himself ends; he has a duty to diminish his ignorance by instruction and to correct his errors. And it is not merely that technically practical reason counsels him to do this as a means to his further purposes (of art); morally practical reason commands it absolutely and makes this his end duty, so that he may be worthy of the humanity that dwells within him (1999b, p.518).”
And, elsewhere: “That which a man can dispose over, must be a thing. Animals are here regarded as things; but man is no thing; so if, nevertheless, he deposes over his life, he sets upon himself the value of a beast. But he who takes himself for such, who fails to respect humanity, who turns himself into a thing, becomes an object of free choice for anyone . . . Humanity is worthy of respect, and even though somebody may be a bad man, the humanity in his person is entitled to respect (2001b, p.147).”

And, still elsewhere: “The human being and in general every rational being exists as an end in itself, not merely as a means to be used by this or that will at its discretion; instead he must in all his actions, whether directed to himself or also to other rational beings, always be regarded at the same time as an end (2006b, p.37, emphasis is the author’s own).”

In the first of these passages, Kant suggests among other things that personhood is necessary for, and a close sequential relative of, moral agency. I agree with his assessment. For now, though, I will refrain from making any additional commitments about this before introducing discussion of the evaluative element of personhood in section 2.3 – for my money, the concept’s hallmark, and certainly where autonomous agency gets its normative thrust.

There seems to be no consensus among Kant scholars regarding which of these, if either, is temporarily prior to (or the cause of the other), or, on the other hand, whether they are necessarily mutually supportive. For our purposes, we need only note that both – the unity of consciousness, and the ability to rationally reflect – are partially constitutive of personhood.


It is worth noting that the kind of self-reflection which Kant has in mind requires nothing particularly ‘deep.’ The look inward, in other words, need not be laden with rich evaluative thoughts about one’s self or purpose. And, assuming commitment to Kant’s transcendental framework, inclusion of individuated thought in this type of reflection is erroneously attributed. That the subjectivity can reflect on its own nature qua rationality and recognize the intellect as a whole is both necessary and sufficient to ascertain the unity of consciousness perceived by the person’s most basic introspective capabilities, given orthodox Kantian thought. It should come as no surprise, then, that for many – especially those who do contemporary work in the relation between embodiment and
evaluation – Kant’s rational subjectivity is a lifetime away from personhood. But, of course, we have merely asserted that conditions CP1 and CP2 are necessary, not sufficient. See also Louis Sass (1988, esp. p.560), Lawrence Thomas (1988, esp. p.155), Joel Cupperman (1995, p.36), and David Carr (2002, esp. p.106-109).

Others worry about just what is being perceived during Kantian reflection. Because Kant’s noumenal self is wholly devoid of all concrete mental content, some will argue that there is nothing left to reflect on. To rehash an old saw for my own purposes, the Humean, say, will suggest that we are being asked to _Take away the trees so that we may perceive the forest_. This criticism, too, is compelling. For this reason, we may reasonably posit that the understanding of introspection used here, even in its most stripped down form, must involve the possession of and perception of some trace mental content of one kind or another.

Finally, there are those suspicious of the rationality component of personhood, altogether. Linda Zagzebski, for instance, has suggested that certain conceptions of what this amounts to have painted the requirement as much too strong. She writes: “One problem with using rationality as the defining property of personhood is that some of what is involved in being rational seems to be irrelevant to being a person, for example, the ability to perform mathematical calculations. We can easily imagine a race of intelligent beings who are resourceful and sensitive investigators of their environment, but who never develop mathematics. Moreover, persons certainly existed before they had the ability to engage in the kind of reasoning readers of this article are doing right now. It seems possible, then, for a being to be a person without having all aspects of rationality (2001, p.405).” Zagzebski seems to be arguing against accounts of personhood which require especially strong ascriptions of rationality to persons. I imagine she is, in part, doing so, because she holds that “there are serious problems with denying personhood to some humans,” and a rationality requirement of a certain weight would do just this (Ibid, p.404). While I do hold that rationality is required of persons, this does not necessitate the ability to solve complex mathematical equations or decipher papers published in academic journals. The ability which I have in mind requires engaging in practical reasoning, specifically – and, so, to perform reasoned actions according to the model advanced by Frankfurt, discussed below. One consequence of this requirement is that it does seem to exclude certain humans from consideration; some examples being: fetuses, infants, and those who subsist in a persistent vegetative state. It should be noted, though, that while these human beings are not to be classified as persons on the account that I offer, this does not necessarily mean they should not be considered moral patients; and so, deserving of moral consideration, perhaps, equal to that shown to persons.

However, as Jenny Teichman reminds us, philosophers have classified as persons entities as otherwise contrastive as “machines, chimpanzees . . . dolphins . . . [and] even a brain alone in a bottle (1985, p.176)” based on this same initial criterion. Later on in the same work, Teichman adds to this list “gods and disembodied spirits . . . and any other
rational natural species that might happen to exist (Ibid., p.181),” attributing the addition of these entities as persons to Augustine (who introduced the Latin persona – literally mask – into philosophical discourse to try to make sense of the Trinity, specifically), Boethius, and John Locke. See also Linda Zagzebski (2001) and Marya Schectman (2009, esp. p.68).

152 Of this, Jung writes: “St. Augustine distinguishes between the God-image which is Christ and the image which is implanted in man as a means or possibility of becoming like God. The God image is not in the corporeal man, but in the anima rationalis, the possession of which distinguishes man from animals (1978, p.38).” He goes on to quote Augustine at length: “The God-image is within, not in the body . . . Where the understanding is, where the mind is, there God has his image . . . but where man knows himself to be made after the image of God, there he knows there is something more in him than is given to the beasts (Ibid., p.38-39)."

Note that, for Augustine, the possession of these higher level cognitive capacities is necessary for personhood. Acceptance of this commits one to the possibility that one can be a human being but not be a person. While appreciative of the foundation laid by Augustine, Boethius, and others, St. Thomas Aquinas goes on to introduce a provision which stipulates that all human beings be categorized as persons, irrespective of their present cognitive ability; this, under the justification that such entities, while not rational themselves, are members of what he took to be a rational kind. See Jenny Teichman, 1985, p.181.

153 Daniel Dennett, 1984, esp. p.79-81

154 I am using autonomy in the standard way to denote one’s liberation of herself from the authority and causal control of anything reasonably perceived as alien (whether inwardly or outwardly originating), and so, not reflectively endorsed by the agent (Walter Kaufmann, 1973, esp. p.180; Joseph Boyle, Jr., 2001, esp. p.14; Catriona Mackenzie, 2007, esp. p.272-273). Or: in Kant’s own words, of “being one’s own master” to some extent (1999, p.535, emphasis is the author’s own; see also Susan Babbitt, 1996, esp. p.45); having the ability to “step back” (Thomas Hill, Jr., 1982, p.136; Amélie Oksenberg Rorty, 1987, p.60-61; Louis Sass, 1988, p.557; David Carr, 2002, p.105; Raymond Geuss, 2007, p.189; Christine Korsgaard, 2007, p.93-111) from our desires and other potential motivators in order to consider whether we do or do not approve of them; to view oneself, as a result of these things, as the “author” or “legislator” or “owner” of one’s actions (Peter Bertocci, 1978, p.77; Joel Whitebrook, 1992, p.99; Daniel Lapsley, 1996, p.232; David Carr, 2002, p.106; Howard Kamler, 2002, esp. p.136; Christine Korsgaard, 1989; 2008, esp. p.101-121). Autonomy has enjoyed a celebrated place in the history of modern moral thinking, at least since, once again, Kant. Autonomy (or Wille), for Kant, is “the property of the will [Willkür] by which it is a law to itself (independently of any property of the objects of
volition) (2006, p.47).” Now, this sets the table – according to many interpreters of Kant – for a *reductio* of Kantian moral psychology on the basis of the causal impotency of respect for the moral law, alone. Assuming the correctness of the longstanding Humean understanding of action as requiring a desire (or one of Donald Davidson’s pro-attitudes) and a complimentary belief, it has been argued that Kant’s account results in incoherency; since, again on many standard readings of Kant, to allow a desire to motivate action would preclude it from being performed autonomously, and so from having moral value. See Thomas Nagel (1978, esp. p.7-15), Francis Dunlop (1982, esp. p.5-6), Christine Korsgaard (1986, esp. p.8-9; 2007), and Adina Roskies (2003); and Immanuel Kant (2006b, esp. p.22-23).

Partially in response to this, some Kant scholars have offered a somewhat deflated interpretation of Kant’s conception of autonomous action, but much more congenial to standing intuitions about motivation. Christine Korsgaard, for example, writes: “The Kantian conception of autonomy or self-legislation is not that of some privileged expression of the self (the ‘existentialist’ misunderstanding of Kantianism), it is simply the obverse of the Kantian conception of heteronomy, which is a matter of relying on the law of another ‘authority’, which itself stands in need of, so cannot confer, vindication (2007, p.xiv).” Later in the same work, Korsgaard expands on this, this time talking in terms of free action: “[Freedom, for Kant,] is to be explained in terms of the structure of reflective consciousness, not as the (possibly delusory) perception of a theoretical or metaphysical property of the self . . . [Kant] defines free will as a rational causality which is effective without being determined by any *alien cause*. Anything outside of the will counts as an alien cause, including the desires and inclinations of the person (2007, p.96-97, emphasis is mine).” Earlier in the text, again speaking from within a Kantian framework, Korsgaard suggests that “to will an end . . . is to set yourself to be its cause (2007, p.36, emphasis is mine).”

Assuming this understanding of the will, one may act autonomously, for Kant, if one wills an action without the causal interference of “alien” influences. For Kantian purists, this includes desires, as such. It is my belief, though, that as the self, as further articulated below, is partly constitutive of certain desires and desired values (regarding their relation to certain commitments), the push it receives from these in acting, once endorsed by a second-order volition, does not originate from some foreign place; and, so, is compatible with the strongest kind of autonomy we can realistically hope to have.

By *desires* I mean those mental events which have the power, when conjoined with certain beliefs, to motivate action; so, as a necessary component of any account of how and why agents act (Michael Smith, 1995, esp. p.126). As far as motivation goes, I am not averse to the reader substituting in the place of desire other descriptions of the effects of such dispositions such as, and including, what Donald Davidson refers to as “pro attitudes.” These include “urgings, promptings, and a great variety of moral views, aesthetic principles, economic prejudices, social conventions, and public and private

155
goals and values insofar as these can be interpreted as attitudes of the agent directed towards actions of a certain kind (2001, p.4).”

In referencing desires, I include those dispositions to act which are not always being consciously deliberated about, i.e., background desires. Of the distinction between background desires and foreground desires, Philip Pettit writes: “A desire is present in the background of an agent’s decision if and only if it is part of the motivating reason for it: the rationalizing set of beliefs and desires which produce the decision. A desire is present in the foreground of the decision if and only if the agent believed he had that desire and was moved by the belief that a justifying reason for the decision was that the option chosen promised to satisfy the desire (1990, p.568).” This is illustrated nicely by an example provided by Michael Smith: “Consider . . . what we should ordinarily think of as a long term desire; say, a father’s desire that his children do well. A father may actually feel the prick of this desire from time to time; in moments of reflection on their vulnerability, say. But such occasions are not the norm. Yet we certainly would not ordinarily think that he loses this desire during those periods when he lacks such feelings, (1987, p.48).” This desire, like all others, can linger in the background, while still (potentially) motivating action.

156 I am using reflective endorsement in the standard way, to denote the idea that autonomous action requires that, provided the agent in question were to stop and reflect on some action, she would approve of performing this action. See Michael Ridge (2001, p.247-249) and Christine Korsgaard (2007, p.89, p.91, p.105). In section 2.1, I discuss reflectively endorsed action specifically in the context of Harry Frankfurt’s distinction between first-order and second-order desires (and volitions).

157 It should be noted that many of Frankfurt’s respondents believe that his analysis of autonomous moral action does not go deep enough. Christine Korsgaard, for example, holds that autonomous action cannot come down to the presence of certain desires about other desires. Raymond Geuss writes: “[For Korsgaard (2007),] if I use my second-order desires as my principles for endorsing or failing to endorse a given first-order desire (as a reason for action) I have broken off reflection prematurely. I should continue until I reach the purely formal principle embodied in the moral law (2007, p.192).” Speaking to her own Kantian intuitions on the subject, Korsgaard writes: “It is necessary to have some conception of your practical identity, for without it you cannot have reason to act. We reject or endorse our impulses by determining whether they are consistent with the ways in which we identify ourselves . . . For unless you are committed to some conception of your practical identity, you will lose your grip on yourself as having any reason to live and act at all. But this reason is not one that springs from one of those [merely contingent] practical identities [such as, e.g., being a mother to some particular children – Korsgaard’s own example]. It is a reason that springs from your humanity itself, from your identity.
simply as a human being, a reflective animal who needs reasons to live and act (2007, p.121, emphasis is the author’s own).”

While I am also drawn to cashing out practical deliberation and resultant motivating reasons in terms of practical identity, and in terms of the self specifically, I do not share Korsgaard’s belief that this must be made sense of in such universalistic, stripped down terms. The account of practical identity I endorse is one that is greatly individuated and relies almost exclusively on one’s contingent set of values and commitments.

158 Harry Frankfurt, 2007a, p.12

159 Harry Frankfurt, 2007a, p.16, emphasis is mine. See also Robert Noggle (1999, esp. p.314) and Augusto Blasi (2004, esp. p.342; 2005, esp. p.79). Note that Frankfurt is cashing out second-order volition in terms of agential will. In a similar vein, Hannah Arendt writes: “In order to will, the mind must withdraw from the immediacy of desire, which, without reflecting and without reflectivity, stretches out its hand to get hold of the desired object; for the will is not concerned with desires but with projects . . . (1978, p.77).” Note, also, the role played by what Arendt terms projects in her description of autonomous action. If we were to translate this into the Frankfurtian vernacular, we might say, in short, that projects are those things that we care about – and that those things that we care about are what typically give rise to second-order volitions. Much more will be said about projects and the work that they do, especially when taken in the form of commitments and identity-cofferering commitments, in sections 2.3 and 2.4.

160 The desire to rid oneself of hunger involves, I take it, agent-neutral value. For this reason, my desire to eat cookies, specifically, might best be made sense of in terms of agent-relative value, and my eating of these cookies, weakness of will. However, I think the example, without bringing in such specifics, makes the intended point.

161 Each of these desires might in part make up my cache of desires at any given moment.

162 Augusto Blasi, 2005, p.79


Shame is an important emotion to make sense of in the context of psychic disintegration, as it is often a sign that we have reneged on some commitment which is significant to our sense of self. John Kekes describes shame in just such terms: “Shame is caused by the realization that we have fallen short of some standard we regard as important. . . Shame is a sign that we have made a serious commitment, and it is also an impetus for honoring it, since violating the commitment painfully lowers our opinion of ourselves. . . Shame not only alerts us in our shortcomings, it makes us feel deficient on account of them. This feeling of deficiency, coming from such an unimpeachable source, is likely to be self-destructive. It tends to undermine our confidence, verge, and courage to navigate life’s treacherous waters. Thus shame threatens to diminish our most important resource. It jeopardizes the possibility of improvement by weakening the only agency capable of effecting it (1988, p.282).” See also Helen Lewis (1971), Carroll Izard (1977, esp. p.389), Michael Pritchard (1991a, esp. p.82-86; 95-96; 1991b, esp. p.169-171), Susan Purviance (1997, esp. p.200), John Rawls (2000, esp. p.388-390), June Price Tangney (2002, esp. p.98-105), and Michael Lewis (2003, esp. p.1187-1189).

Note that for Kekes (and others cited), the presence of shame is evidence that one has made (perhaps tacitly) and broken a commitment to herself, and suffers a loss of self-value in light of this. Rather than motivating us to strengthen resolve and fortify ourselves, shame often brings about an overall loss of sense of self-worth which can easily lead to an even greater degree of disintegration. Empirical studies seem to support Kekes’s intuition; see June Price Tangney, 1991; 2002, esp. p.99-105.

While also taking note of shame’s capacity for self-destruction, others – Freud for instance – seem to link the emotion not so much with one’s failing in her own eyes as much as, initially at least, one’s conception of herself as failing in the eyes of someone important to her. It is here that we have the internalization of, say, the parent in the form of one’s superego, followed by the violations of the superego’s (and so, the parent’s) moral requirements. See Sigmund Freud (1989b, esp. p.86-90, p.100; 1989d, esp. p.33), Ernst Tugendhat (1993, esp. p.5), Friedrich Nietzsche (1996, esp. p.323), and Michel Foucault (1997b, esp. p.207-208).

Some have argued that succumbing to akrasia, in general, and experiencing the feelings of self-alienation associated with this, are sufficient for assuming that a loss of integrity has occurred. Cheshire Calhoun, for example, writes: “. . . weakness of will [undermines] the individual’s ability to act on her actual or professed endorsements. The weak-willed person ends up not having ‘the will he wants, but one that is imposed upon him by a force with which he does not identify and which is in that sense external to him (1995, p.236).’” Compare with Alexander Nehamas (1983, p.406) and Lynne McFall (1987, p.6).

While I sympathize with Calhoun’s intuitions about the importance of sticking to one’s intentions, I do not hold that one necessarily loses integrity simply by acting against any particular second-order desire. Assuming that, say, refraining from eating the cookies
was part of some project of mine involving my overall health, and not a part of something stronger and more at the center of my practical identity – what I will later refer to as an identity-conferring commitment – then I have not necessarily acted in a way directly detrimental to the integration of my self. I might have acted in such a way in which I weaken certain commitments, which is not conducive to maintaining integrity. But, I have not done anything to directly undermine it, and I certainly have not lost my integrity, per se.

Calhoun also mentions that self-deception is essentially integrity-undermining. Here, I stand in agreement to a point. If a person does not have sufficient knowledge of what is motivating her actions – including those which come in the form of commitment, themselves – then her integrity is in a constant state of potential compromise. I do hold, however, that complete knowledge of self and motivation is impossible to achieve, even if this were desirable. Compare with Lynne McFall (1987, p.).

On the other hand, Santayana speculates that “Perhaps the true dignity of man in his ability to despise himself.” Quoted in Jeffire Murphy, 1972.

It is worth noting that the self’s embeddedness in time, and what follows from this, is a matter which many postmodernists have pointed to in emphasizing the essential lack of identity of the self with itself (or, of those selves with the same lineage which make up a sequence). Leonard Lawlor writes: “The postmodernist philosophers conceive the self as heterogeneous because they recognize that self-experience is conditioned by time. Because the self is conditioned by time . . . the self is always differentiated into past and future. In other words, the experience of time shows that self-experience does not originate with an identical self and it does not end with an identical self. The postmodernist self therefore is defined in this way: just as there is no transcendent measure for discourses, there is no identity constitutive of the self (or the subject). Instead of identity, I find, inside of myself, difference: ‘I is an other’ [attributed to Giles Deleuze]. The other in me turns the ‘I,’ the self, into a ‘we.’ But this ‘we’ is heterogeneous, and therefore not strictly a ‘we’ at all (2013, p.697).”

Bernard Mayo, 1978, p.31, emphasis is mine. See also Sidney Shoemaker (1970; 1999), Derek Parfit (1971; 1987), John Perry (1972), and Thomas Nagel (1986). As is the case with the consideration of personhood, generally, in introducing time, we find ourselves reluctantly at the threshold of metaphysical enquiry. In an effort not to beg any questions central to what is of importance here, I ask that we think of time as quantified change; and so, as being temporally situated as (at least potentially) perceiving change.

As is the case with CP0, it may be argued against the inclusion of CP4 that God, while certainly a person, exists outside of space and time – I thank Richard Lee for bringing this worry to my attention. My response to the objection to the inclusion of CP4 follows
directly from my inclusion of another, perhaps less controversial, condition, CP3: the necessity for personhood of the capacity for autonomous action. I would argue that actions, autonomous or otherwise, may only take place within a spatiotemporal context. And so, suggesting that God exists outside of such a reality would also suggest that God cannot be an agent in the necessary sense, and so, cannot be a person. Many theologians and philosophers will counter by suggesting that God is both a person and an agent, and, at the same time, exists outside of space and time. At this point, it seems that I and my imagined objector have run out of common ground with respect to shared intuitions about the concepts in question. And, while I am certainly in no position to simply state that my intuitions are correct, and hers incorrect, at the end of the day we must each stand by these unless we are given good reason not to do so. I do not feel as though I have good reason to reconceptualize my notion of agency in terms of requiring a spatiotemporal reality, and it is likely the case that the theologian will not feel as though she has good reason to reconceptualize her notion of divine agency minus these constraints.

172 See Samuel Scheffler (1982, p.231-238), Susan Wolf (1986b, p.704-705), and, for an equally unorthodox and influential take on this, Derek Parfit (1987, esp. p.302).

173 I want to tread carefully here, as what I have just described will strike those with strong Buddhist intuitions as a description of day-to-day life as lacking any significant kind of mindfulness. Nothing I have said above, or will go on to say, will hinge on interpreting this in this way; and, in fact, I am very sympathetic to the Eastern critique of Western mindlessness in action. However, while I concede that we may center ourselves ‘in the moment’ in sitting meditation, even the Dalai Lama himself has admitted that when out and about in the world, there is a tendency to always fall back into the interplay of past experiences and future plans.

174 Jean-Paul Sartre, 1974, p.25. For further discussion, see Peter Bertocci (1978, esp. p.39) and John Kekes (2006, esp. p.136-141). I take this to be a more or less accurate description, although certainly provided much too quickly and without nuance, of how the person understands her complex psychic essence – at least in the modern and contemporary West. However, I do want to affirm, once again, that over the past century or so the person has begun to undergo changes which are eating away at the agential facet of her self. As section 1.1 involves discussion of this, I will not rehearse those positions again. I will, however, briefly remark on what I take to be something of a curiosity regarding this change: As already stated, I believe there is good reason to assert that persons today have been to some degree stripped of their agential identity. As this emaciated part of the person’s self-conception stands contrary to that which allows the person to understand herself as “thrown” into the world, and all of the understood deterministic ramifications which may follow from that, we might be tempted to assume that this could be of some
aid to the person’s sense of self-integration. After all, we seemingly have taken the punch out this particular inner conflict by disempowering that side of ourselves which demands that persons be fully autonomous and independently-directed agents.

However, I hold that this oversimplification of our self-understanding is actually detrimental to the person’s self-conception; as, taking the air out of that element of the person by which she makes sense of herself in terms of agency, we are opening her up to feelings associated with a much greater sense of disunity by negating any sense of significant control she might have felt she had regarding her mental life. The person now feels alienated from certain mental events to an even greater extent, because she feels – through this perceived loss of agency – that she has had and will have no say in much of what goes on within her own mind, including those things which work to motivate action. This kind and degree of self-alienation, I would argue, is much more injurious to a person’s sense of self-integration than is the necessary and relatively inoffensive conception of herself as both the product of contingency, and simultaneously a free agent acting in the world.

In all, I do not believe that this latter conception of self requires any more redescription than moral psychologists have already provided. In the contemporary literature involving discussion of the various shapes of compatibilism and, more importantly, its assemblage of peripheral concerns, philosophers have more or less reconceptualized these experiences and the psychology which underpins them in such a way that these issues have been dissolved on the whole.

Perhaps an example will help: Moments ago I was looking at a pair of deer antlers mounted on the wall of my grandfather’s living room. I am able to recall this experience largely on the basis of my being psychologically continuous with the subjectivity that perceived the antlers. Imagine, now, that I and the subjectivity which directly followed my own do not share this continuity. Even stipulating that each experiences virtually the same thing – in this case, say, being appeared to tan-ly – the experience would not show up for either subjectivity as temporally situated. Since the subjectivity has the experience and then, because there is no psychologically continuity with the following subjectivity, blinks out of existence, there is no perception of change.

Similarly, were it not for my being temporally situated, I would not be privy to change; and, if I were unaware of change, I would be unable to determine that I remain the selfsame person from one moment to the next. There would be no sense to make of one moment to the next. To return to the example: I look at the antlers from one angle, cock my head and notice the light glancing off of the various tips. I understand that I am experiencing a change in perspective which came about in a moment’s passing. And, upon reflection, I experience that I experienced this change. Against this backdrop of perceived change, I am able to come to see that I – as a certain embodied and psychologically continuous subjectivity – remain. For these reasons, again, I want to
suggest that temporal-situatedness and psychological continuity are mutually supportive of each other.

176 John Locke, 1979

177 I confess that this is a particularly Hallmark-y moment – and so, is an exceptional example of what might make the intended point. However, it is not different in kind from other, less poignant experiences.

178 Charles Taylor, 1985a, p.263; see also Taylor, 1985b. Some might argue that, as unusual as it is, persons sometimes cease to find significance in the things which they once judged to be of the greatest importance to them. Or, in still rarer cases, persons sometimes cease to find significance in anything – and so, allow the otherwise ubiquitous system of values that Taylor has in mind to fall away. John Kekes writes of just such instances: “Loss of religious faith, the death of a deeply loved person, the recognition that our commitments were based on self-deception, the realization that the goal we have devoted our lives to pursuing is hollow, the discovery that the case we have made our own is irremediably tainted with evil are such experiences [of suddenly realizing that what we valued before no longer matters]. The result is that we grow indifferent, unconcerned, cease to care; life becomes a boring tedious burden. The connection between the will and meaning has been broken (1986, p.76-77).” Tying similar cases to the person’s conception of their own self, Owen Flanagan writes: “Persons in identity crises are in some significant way careless. It is because they have lost the capacity to care or are numb to caring that they are unmoved, that their agency is immobilized (1996, p.153).”

I concede that such cases occur, but point that this is merely the exception which proves Taylor’s rule – and, moreover, that these are actually examples of damaged personhood. Note too, with these atypical instances involving the devaluation of virtually everything that life has to offer, there is mention by both Kekes and Flanagan of the obstruction of agency by lack of things valued. This further points to the inherent connection between value and action introduced above, and elaborated on below. This is underscored by R. M. Hare: “. . . what we are concerned about comes out in what we do; to be concerned about something is to be disposed to make certain choices, certain efforts, in the attempt to affect in some way that about which we are concerned. I do not think that anybody has ever been completely unconcerned about everything, because everybody is always doing something (1972a, p.35-36, emphasis is the author’s own).” See also Peter Railton, 1984, esp. p.168.

179 In the vast literature on the relationship between value, evaluation, and personhood, what Taylor refers to as the capacity for things to show significance for persons is designated by many other names, including but not necessarily limited to: things mattering to persons (R. M. Hare, 1972, esp. p.33-38; Peter Winch, 1972, p.190; John Smith,

Of course, the degree to which persons care for things, are devoted to things, etc., may vary greatly, all depending on both the thing, say, cared for and the person doing the caring. And, at least as far as some of the citations above go, the differentiation in terms is sometimes used to denote this range in degree of value. But, by and large, each of these gets at the heart of what it means to value something in a significant way. Hereafter, then, these terms will be used interchangeably unless otherwise noted.

Marjorie Greene writes: “[For Sartre,] the values by which I live depend not on divine fiat or metaphysical necessity but myself alone. Contrasted with such awareness is bad faith, the stultification of freedom in the enslavement to an ‘objective’ truth or a consuming passion . . . The values by which I live are totally, absurdly mine (1952, p.266).” See also Joseph Catalano (1990, esp. p.105-111), Jean-Paul Sartre (1992; 1999; 2001, esp. p.296, p.307-308), and Charles Guignon and Dirk Pereboom (2001). Compare with Charles Guignon’s reading of Heidegger (2003, esp. p.182-188) and with Thomas Nagel’s reading of Nietzsche (2009, esp. p.33-37).

John Kekes describes this aspect of value in just this way: “One significant feature of our system of values is that we find it simply given. We are born into it and grow up in it, and in the course of our upbringing we learn about . . . [the] interpretation [of values], and their relative importance. We no more make a conscious commitment to it than we make one to locomotion, perception, or to sleeping and eating. These are just parts of our lives, some of the prevailing conditions of living, and normally we have no choice about them. We learn them as we learn our mother tongue. They are what they are, and they provide the possibilities they do. We start with and continue to be guided by them, at least during the early part of life (2014, p.50).”

But, where, more specifically, do values comes from? What is the actual source? Speaking in terms of individual conscience, and anticipating Freud, Nietzsche says that this about the likely wellspring of moral values: “The content of our conscience was everything that was during our childhood regularly demanded of us without reason by people we honoured or feared. It is thus the conscience that excites that feeling of compulsion (‘I must do this, not do that’) which does not ask: why must I? – In every case in which a thing is done with ‘because’ and ‘why’ man actions without conscience; but not yet for that reason against it. – The belief in authorities is the source of conscience: it is

182 Jerome Bruner, 1987, p.32

183 Martin Heidegger, 1962

184 Charles Taylor, 1985b, p.40

185 Charles Taylor, 1985a, p.266

186 Charles Taylor, 1985b, p.16

187 Charles Taylor, 1989, p.4

188 Charles Taylor, 1989, p.27; 2003, p.37

189 Compare this with what Peter Railton describes as being “committed to ends as such (1984, esp. p.141-147).”

190 Harry Frankfurt, 1992, p.17

191 It is for this reason that critics of Taylor’s – Owen Flanagan, in particular – have described his strong evaluative account as cashing out “[all] motives in life in specifically ethical terms . . . broadly construed (1996, p.145).” See also Cheshire Calhoun, 1991, esp. p.234.

192 Charles Taylor, 1985b, p.42, emphasis is mine; see also Taylor, 1985b, p.39

193 Some respondents – again, most notably Owen Flanagan (1996, esp. p.142) – have argued that Taylor places much too much emphasis on strong evaluation; and that this is not essential to personhood. Whether it is or is not necessary for personhood, it seems to me that something approximating strong evaluation is at least necessary for the development that takes place in childhood in which one becomes a person.

194 Martin Hollis, 1977, p.67. Compare Hollis’s reading of Dewey, here, with Patrick Hutton’s reading of Foucault: “[For Foucault,] the quest for self-understanding is a journey without end. Even in the deepest recesses of our psyches there are no experiences which, if evoked, will reveal our true identities . . . We are condemned to the quest for meaning whose meaning is that our human nature is continually being reconstituted by
the forms that we create along the way. The responsibility to create meaning and values anew is a perpetual task but nonetheless the foundation of all human endeavor (1988, p.140)."

I should note that while these examples are more at home within a hedonistic framework, I certainly do not mean to suggest that pleasure and the alleviation of displeasure are the only things of value to persons. I am very sympathetic with pluralistic accounts of values and of their sources. See Thomas Nagel, 2005b, esp. p.131-132.

Note that in each of these cases I have attached my valuation of the various axiotima to my valuation of creating a certain self. To some extent, then, I am placing the cart ahead of the horse, as we have yet to introduce selfhood, as such. However, as this linkage is important to my overall conception of personal integration, I thought this should be pointed out. There is much more on the connection between value and the self to come.

Harry Frankfurt, 1993, p.20-21, emphasis is the author’s own. See also Helen Haste (1990, p.319), Harry Frankfurt (2004, esp. p.46-50; 2006a, esp. p.43-47; 2007c, esp. p.181-184; 2007d, esp. p.86-87), Michael Bratman (2006, esp. p.78-80), and John Kekes (2014, esp. p.53), and compare with Bernard Williams’s (1993) notion of “moral incapacity.” Aside from the part played in volitional necessity and constraint, values also set more general limits within the person’s practical life, giving her the friction necessary to make reasoned choices. This prevents the agent from falling into what Frankfurt refers to as a kind of “volitional debilitation.” More to our point, commitment to certain values over others, and the more concrete commitments which follow from this, affords the agent a great sense of stable practical identity.

Frankfurt writes: “We very commonly assume that whenever our freedom is expanded, our lives are thereby enriched. But this is true only up to a point. Reducing the grip of necessity may not in fact enhance our enjoyment of freedom. For if the restrictions on the choices that a person is in a position to make are relaxed too far, he may become, to a greater or lesser extent, disoriented with respect to where his interests and preferences lie. Instead of finding that the scope and vigor of his autonomy are augmented as the range of choices open to him broadens, he may become volitionally debilitated by an uncertainty both concerning how to make decisions and concerning what to choose. That is, extensive growth in the variety of a person’s options may weaken his sense of identity . . . Unless a person makes choices within restrictions from which he cannot escape by merely choosing to do so, the notion of self-direction, of autonomy, cannot find a grip. Someone free of all such restrictions is so vacant of identifiable and stable volitional tendencies and constraints that he cannot deliberate or make decisions in a conscientious way . . . for his will has no determinate character (1993, p.17-19).” See also John Kekes (1983, esp. p.514-515), Diana Meyers (1989, p.52), James Griffin (1992,

198 Harry Frankfurt, 1993, p.21

199 Once more, as I hold the endorsement of values and systems of values to be a proper action, the agent is responsible for her acceptance of these. So, even in the face of volitional constraint, the agent must be held responsible for her own inaction.


201 For ease of reference, I am including the necessary conditions of personhood as Appendix II, p.319.


204 Some philosophers – Susan Wolf, for example – hold that for projects to be truly meaningful for those that take part in them, they must be viewed as objectively valuable. For example, Wolf argues that a project which consists of making handwritten copies of War and Peace (1997, p.211) simply for the sake of doing so cannot confer any significant meaning to the life of she who takes part in such an ongoing activity. As, this project is not sensible upon reflection. While this and like projects are, of course, extremely atypical – likely just because most persons do not enjoy taking part in them, and so have little reason to adopt them as projects – I do not want to beg any questions against such activities, and will make no assumptions about what sort of project content may provide meaning to particular persons. For discussion of the typically subjective nature of the value conferred to personal projects, and the subjective value sets which, in turn, grow out of participation in these, see Thomas Nagel (1986, esp. p.167-168) and Loren Lomasky (1987, esp. 27-28).

205 See Loren Lomasky (1987, p.26) and Susan Wolf (1997, p.209)

John Rawls, 2000. Rawls is, of course, making a completely different point about the sometimes uneasy causal relationship between desire-fulfillment and well-being. But, the example came to mind, and I believe it is a good one to emphasize, once again, the lack of necessity for anything like the conference of intrinsic value to a project.


As stated, in the literature on personal integrity, this concept shows up under a number of different names, including projects (Bernard Williams, 1973; Bernard Mayo, 1978; Peter Wenz, 1979; S.I. Benn, 1984; Loren Lomasky, 1987; Mordecai Nisan, 1990; Bernard Williams, 1999d; Charles Guignon and Dirk Pereboom, 2001; Samuel Scheffler, 2004; John Kekes, 2008), ground projects (Bernard Williams, 1973, 1999d; Edward Johnson, 1982; George Harris, 1989; Elizabeth Ashford, 2000; Peter Railton, 1984; Lisa Rivera, 2007), basic projects (George Harris, 1989), central projects (Richard Rorty, 1999c; Robert Noggle, 1998), unconditional commitments (John Kekes, 1983, 2014; Lynne McFall, 1987; Victoria Davion, 1991), self-directed commitments (John Kekes, 1986 and 1988b), substantive commitments (Marcel Lieberman, 1996), integrity-underwriting commitments (Richard Prust, 1996; Robert Noggle, 1998), identity-conferring commitments (Mark Hébert, 2002), and core commitments (Christine Korsgaard, 2007), and deep commitments (Peter Railton, 1984, p.167). Here, I will use Hébert’s term, identity-conferring commitment, uniformly throughout the balance of this dissertation to denote the idea behind each of these terms.

It is worth noting that certain implicit commitments with the efficacy of acknowledged identity-conferring commitments may be held to, but unknown to the person – I thank Richard Lee for bringing this to my attention.

Owen Flanagan has written disapprovingly of such accounts: “There are sociological arguments according to which I am just a bunch of roles melded together in the here and now . . . [Given this understanding,] a self is no more than a name like ‘the university,’ which names nothing in particular, but on a disparate collection that seems to possess, but invariably lacks, any more than nominal unity (p. 6 1996c).” I agree with Flanagan’s criticism, and also believe that in many accounts of personal identity which permeate the soft sciences, too much credence is extended to tribalism in its various forms.

Of course, if we then go on to remove one’s identity-conferring commitments, we are left with, for all intents and purposes, nothing. This basic understanding of the self as a layering of disparate ‘skins’ goes back at least as far as the Upanishads, where the self is compared with an onion which is at center hollow. As briefly discussed in section 1.5, sitting meditation has been prescribed as a method by which we may come to see the true nature of self as lacking an essence – to come to behold and accept our anātman. Linking
this up with the metaphor of the onion, Joel Cupperman writes: “[To meditate is] to peel away layers of personality, like the peeling of an onion . . . But the image of an onion might give us pause. After all, what it left when all of the layers of the onion have been removed? (1995, p.26).”

Making a similar point about things which are loved and the part that loving plays in practical identity, and connecting this with volitional constraint, Harry Frankfurt writes: “If someone loves nothing, it follows that he has no ideals. Now an ideal is a limit. A person’s ideals are concerns that he cannot bring himself to betray. They involve constraints that, for him, it is unthinkable to violate. Suppose that someone has no ideals at all. In that case, nothing is unthinkable for him . . . He is amorphous, with no fixed identity or shape . . . He lacks a personal essence . . . For this reason, there is no such thing for him as genuine integrity (1993, p.25).” Compare this with John Kekes (1982, p.366) and Larry May (1996, p.134-135).

We may construe Frankfurt’s point in terms of concepts friendly to our chosen framework along these lines – if some person has no identity-conferring commitments – i.e., no (what are presently taken to be) nonnegotiables – there is no normative space in which he may act autonomously. This person, if we may even call him that, is (or has) certainly no self.

Of this facet of commitment, Cheshire Calhoun writes: “See- ing to the persistence of one’s commitment . . . involves refraining from putting oneself in the way of temptation, refraining from cultivating activities, attitudes and ways of life that are incompatible with sustaining one’s commitment, repressing commitment-threatening emotions and desires, and resisting the live option of reconsidering the reasons for having the commitment. That is, commitment entails readiness to engage in a set of refusals” (2009, p.619, emphasis is mine). While I agree with much of what Calhoun says here, I disagree with the portion of her quote which I have placed in italics. I do not take the reconsideration of undergirding reasons for one’s commitment to be incompatible with its preservation; moreover, as I will be grounding integrity largely in the making of and keeping of commitments, I believe that keeping a commitment in this way is incompatible with integrity. I will discuss for reasons for holding to this position in the pages to come.

Susan Orlean, 2008, p.3-4

Loren Lomasky, 1987, p.28

Laroche need not be unyielding in allegiance to something in order to be committed to that thing. However, because Laroche is only ‘shallowly sincere’ in as far as, say, collecting fish goes, he cannot be said to be truly committed to this activity. Gabrielle Taylor writes: “To be committed to some view or project does not of course mean that one must inflexibly and forever hold just this view or pursue just this aim. It would be a grave flaw
in any account of integrity if it implied that a person of integrity is incapable of change and development. But although he can of course come to see that he has been misguided, that he has attached too much importance to this and too little to that, he cannot change his commitment just when he feels so inclined. He must see a reason for changing them, otherwise he does not count as having been committed at all . . . Neither the hypocrite nor the shallowly sincere is true to his commitments because neither can be said to be relevantly committed at all. By contrast, it might be said of the weak-willed that although he has commitments he is not always true to them. He lets others manipulate him into positions in which he does not really want to be, and finds himself accepting as true what he knows or suspects he really wants to reject . . . He is the moral coward (1981, p.145-146).

According to Taylor, it is not only the shallowly sincere person who falls short of true commitment, but also both the self-deceived person and the weak-willed person. Regarding the former, she writes: "A person is not committed to some project if he self-deceptively takes himself to be so committed. The case of self-deception is the most important and fundamental case of lack of integrity: it combines the features of the other cases . . . Like all other characters who are not true to their commitments [the self-deceived] deceives others; like the shallowly sincere he is blind to relevant evidence, and like the weak-willed he acts on reasons which, given what he believes to be his commitments, he himself would regard as insufficient reasons for action were he to think clearly about the matter (1981, p. 146-147).” See also Béla Szabados (1992).


218 Cheshire Calhoun, 2009, p.619

219 Christopher Fehige, 2001, p.63

220 Strangely, then, Laroche’s self – insofar as we can tell from just what we are told in Orlean’s account – is constitutive of never, ever again, under any circumstances, φ-ing again. This is a peculiar network of identity-conferring commitments. But given the proper value, a self could be made up exclusively of renunciation and the commitment to abstain from those things intended to be permanently set aside. Taken to the extreme, the selves of certain ascetics may be described in just such ways, given the unlikely fact that their abstinence is not parasitic upon commitment to some positive project or set of values.

221 In footnote 68, above, I suggested, against Susan Wolf, that the conference of intrinsic value – or even very strong objective worth – is not necessary for one to undertake a
project and find meaning in participation in it, even when the project is acknowledged as being completely inconsequential by this person. One might adopt a project as seemingly trifling as, to return to Rawls's example, counting the blades of grass which make up a particular lawn. If the person taking part in such an activity finds some reward in it, even in the face of its essential frivolity, then I would argue it is, to some extent, a meaning-providing activity for that person.

Not surprisingly, philosophers have made arguments similar to Wolf's about commitments. Roger Trigg, for example, writes: “The fact that I am committed to some cause shows that I believe that the cause is a good one and worth supporting. It also shows that I believe it to be important in some way. In other words . . . there is an ‘evaluative’ element in commitment. I cannot commit myself to something I believe to be utterly trivial or totally bad. It may be both, but in so far as I commit myself to it of my own accord I cannot realize that it is either (1973, p.43-44).”

As is the case with projects, generally, I do not hold that the person who commits herself to something must find it to be either objectively good or necessarily important to any extent. I can imagine persons committed to projects which consist of trivially immoral actions; and, I can imagine them acknowledging both the badness and the objective worthlessness of their projects while standing firm in this commitment. This is not to suggest, to return to Trigg, that there is no evaluative component present. It is just to suggest that, perhaps, the person is (to step back a level of commitment) committed to a perverse value system which runs counter to what she takes to be the objective good. In this case, she may acknowledge that there are objective good values, and so objectively good and important projects which coincide with those; but, in committing herself to rejecting those, she chooses to perform wicked and trivial actions.

---


223 We might imagine an agent attempting to head this change of heart off at the pass – and, while such cases raise issues of their own, they do provide some intuitive support for the notion of the disintegration of a self (sustained by adherence to one set of values and commitments) followed by a reintegration of a different self (sustained by adherence to another set of values and commitments). Consider Derek Parfit’s example of the 19th century Russian aristocrat: “Let us take a nineteenth-century Russian, who, in several years, should inherit vast estates. Because he has socialist ideals, he intends now, to give the land to the peasants. But he knows that in time his ideals may fade. To guard against this possibility, he does two things. He first signs a legal document, which will automatically give away the land, and which can only be revoked with his wife’s consent. He then says to his wife, ‘If I ever change my mind, and ask you to revoke the document, promise me that you will not consent’. He might add, ‘I regard my ideals as essential to me. If I lose these ideals, I want you to think that I cease to exist. I want you to regard your husband, then, not as me, the man who asks you for this promise, but only as his
later self. Promise me that you will not do what he asks (1973, p.145, emphasis is the author’s own).” See also Derek Parfit, 1987, p.327-329.

---

**224** Lynne McFall, 1987, p.6

**225** Thomas Nagel puts it this way: “There is nothing regrettable about finding oneself, in the last analysis, left with something which one cannot choose to accept or reject. What one is left with is probably just oneself, a core without which there could be no choice belonging to the person at all. Some unchosen restrictions on choice are among the conditions of its possibility (1978, p.23).”

**226** For ease of reference, I am including the necessary conditions of selfhood as Appendix III, p.320.


**228** In cases such as a general commitment to act utilitarianism, seemingly innocent actions such as, say, purchasing wrapping paper when one could give the money used there to, say, the Salvation Army is morally impermissible. This demandingness and the impartiality it grows out of, of course, lie at the heart of IO.

**229** It is certainly also the case that we mean something like *Could I stand the pangs of conscience if I were to φ?*, here. But, I would argue that the negative feelings associated with an attack of conscience are also in some important respect connected to our conception of who we are and who we see ourselves as in the eyes of significant others. This, again, definitely seems to be the case when shame enters into the equation.

**230** See footnote 9 of the Introduction for preliminary discussion of why I take integrity not to be best made sense of in terms of virtue.

**231** Compare with Walter Kaufmann (1973, esp. p.180-181) and John Doris (2002, esp. p.18). Moreover, one could be a member of Boko Haram and retain specifically moral integrity, assuming we evaluate this from a certain distance. It might well be the case that we would immediately label this person’s set of ethical principles as, to borrow from
Jonathan Bennett (1974), a “bad morality” – but, as a bad morality is a morality, the disciplined instantiator of such a morality may be said to have, in some sense, retained moral integrity in acting.

Howard Zinn, 2001

Nancy Schauber has argued a similar point: “When we praise a person for her integrity, what we are really admiring is one who is steadfast in the name of worthy moral principles (often in the face of adversity). This is integrity identified with virtue generally (because it is a commitment to what is best), and is in fact a special case of ‘integrity as steadfastness.’ But the core of integrity, some kind of steadfastness, is not by itself admirable. A steadfast person may be worse than someone more inconsistent. This second conception of integrity is broader, including moral but also other sorts of commitments (1999, p.120, emphasis is the author’s own).” See also Patricia Anne Murphy (2002, esp. p.10-11).

Lynne McFall writes: “When we grant integrity to a person, we need not approve of his or her principles or commitments, but we must at least recognize them as ones a reasonable person might take to be of great importance and ones that a reasonable person might be tempted to sacrifice to some lesser yet still recognizable good . . . Whether we grant personal integrity, then, seems to depend on our own conception of what is important. And since more of our conceptions are informed if not dominated by moral conceptions of the good, it is natural that this should be reflected in our judgments of personal integrity (1987, p.10-11, emphasis is the author’s own).”


If Riefenstahl was committed to these values, then we can all agree that she was committed to what Jonathan Bennett (1974) straightforwardly refers to as a “bad morality.” But, that’s a different issue altogether. We can, I believe, make sense of persons having resolve and the harmony between moral identity-conferring commitments which
are necessary for moral integrity while radically disagreeing with their moral intuitions, values, and the commitments they make and stand by, themselves.

236 For ease of reference, I am including the necessary conditions of moral selfhood as Appendix IV, p.321.
Chapter 3

3.o: Introduction

In the previous chapter, I discussed the nature of persons, of selves, and of moral selves. There, I explained the relation in which each of these stands to the others, focusing on the person *qua* self’s capacity for autonomous action, valuation, evaluation, and commitment. I suggested that it is principally one’s identity-conferring commitments which comprise the person *as* a distinct self. I explained integrity in terms of this fluctuating, but coalescing, state of mental events. I then suggested that it is primarily in terms of specifically moral identity-conferring commitments, and those values which inform these, that we define the moral self – that part of the self which operates exclusively in moral space. Finally, I defined moral integrity as the partial consolidation of certain morally-colored mental events.

In section 3.1, I extend this discussion with a more detailed treatment of what active identity-conferring commitment looks like. Here, I draw particular attention to the potential for discord between personal and moral values, principles, projects, reasons for action, and these very commitments. In order to illustrate this tension more concretely, I introduce an autobiographical sketch provided by Richard Rorty – an account which nicely demonstrates the incongruity that can come to exist between personal and moral values, commitments, and reasons, and so, between the person’s self and moral self.

More specifically, I discuss the ways in which adhering to the dictates of an impartialist ethics – act utilitarianism – can threaten to undermine integrity according to
Bernard Williams and those who share his leanings. Here, I discuss the doctrine of negative responsibility, and connect this up with Williams’s concerns regarding the overall soundness of utilitarian theory. Finally, I reintroduce IO, now playing this off of the accounts of selfhood and moral selfhood provided above, and embodied with details from Rorty’s vignette – as, these, taken together, will serve to frame much of the remainder of the dissertation.

In section 3.2, I serve up a notoriously hard case for act utilitarianism, especially within the context of the sufficient psychic integration of moral agents – namely, I consider acts of irregular political violence as these are required by a utilitarian calculus. Here, I raise the questions: Can the person who takes part in acts of optimific violence – acts of terrorism, specifically – retain integrity? Can she preserve moral integrity? In answering, I explore the concepts moral death and moral monsters, ultimately contrasting each with psychic disintegration. I close by demonstrating that whether an agent is an already unwavering utilitarian or a consciously lapsing nonconsequentialist, she can take part in consequentialist revolutionary activity and be a person of both integrity and moral integrity.

In sections 3.3 and 3.4, I provide my own account of psychic reintegration by means of the moral agent’s joint-adoptions of action language and practical aestheticism, each to be applied to the indefinitely long internal dialogue which takes place between the agent as ‘analyst’ and as ‘analysand.’ This, I explain, involves a two-pronged treatment perhaps best construed as a kind of self-analytical talking cure. Discussion of this will
also include more palpable renderings of integrity, moral integrity, and the willful processes of psychic disintegration and reintegration which persons sometimes engender. Finally, I revisit some of the questions pertaining to personal commitment and integrity raised in section 3.1, and personalized moral commitment and moral integrity raised in section 3.2. Throughout, I return to Rorty’s vignette and to extended reimaginings of its central figure.

In section 3.5, I close by offering summary and some last thoughts regarding the dissertation as a whole. I now turn to section 3.1, and to Rorty.

3.1: Utilitarianism and Disintegration

Reflecting on his childhood, Richard Rorty writes:

I grew up knowing that all decent people were, if not Trotskyites, at least socialists . . . So, at 12, I knew the point of being human was to spend one’s life fighting social injustice. But I also had private, weird, snobbish, incommunicable interests . . . A few years later, when my parents began dividing their time between the Chelsea Hotel and the mountains of northwest New Jersey, these interests [centered on] orchids. Some 40 species of wild orchids occur in those mountains, and I eventually found 17 of them. Wild orchids are uncommon, and rather hard to spot. I prided myself enormously on being the only person around who knew where they grew, their Latin names and their blooming times. When in New York, I would go to the 42nd Street public library to reread the nineteenth century volume on the orchids of the eastern US. I was not quite sure why those orchids were so important, but I was convinced that they were . . . I was uneasily aware, however, that there was something a bit dubious about this esotericism – this interest in socially useless flowers . . . I was afraid that Trotsky would not have approved of my interest in orchids.\textsuperscript{241}

Those unfamiliar with the incessant demands of act utilitarianism will likely find Rorty’s recollection puzzling, if not disconcerting; and, they will almost certainly find the supposition that one ought not to indulge in such interests violently at odds with their
own moral intuitions. It is easy to imagine the incredulity that Rorty’s account induces in those who are not of the consequentialist cloth.\textsuperscript{242} Disapproving of a child’s interest in the classification of orchids? How could anyone possibly find a single thing wrong with such an endearing hobby? In answering, we need only consider one of many polarizing aspects of act utilitarianism – its marriage to \textit{negative responsibility}. Or, in the words of Bernard Williams, the position that if I am ever responsible for anything, then I must be just as much responsible for things that I allow . . . as I am for things that I myself . . . bring about. Those things [which may be brought about by the actions of other agents] also must enter my deliberations . . . [and] on the same footing [as actions which I intentionally perform, myself].\textsuperscript{243}

Like all flavors of consequentialism, act utilitarianism ascribes value to states of affairs rather than to actions, themselves. “The values of actions [are] ential ways consequ. . . and not intrinsic.”\textsuperscript{244} Accordingly, it is the responsibility of the utilitarian moral agent to act such that she always brings about the best possible state of affairs irrespective of any feelings which she might have regarding how this is most expediently realized, much less what this entails in terms of the constant interruption of her own pet projects.

It would seem, then, that the young Richard Rorty (hereafter Richard,) had good reason to worry about a chastising Trotsky. After all, those countless hours spent perusing a dog-eared copy of Lindley’s \textit{Folia Orchidacea} could have – and so, morally speaking, should have – been put to use, to wax Marxian, \textit{changing the world}. The fact that his
preoccupation with orchids is not in itself proscribed in no way absolves Richard, from
moral negligence, given a commitment to act utilitarianism. This is so because in
allowing precious time to be consumed by bourgeois fancy, Richard, ipso facto failed to
attempt to right innumerable wrongs brought on by those whose projects make the lives
of the already downtrodden worse still.

Put another way, there is nothing unsavory about Richard’s choice of pastime,
itsel. Nor is there anything morally wrong, per se, with any similar avocation, all things
being equal. Provided that value cannot be conferred to actions, activities, or projects,
themselves, no consequentialist could consistently suggest otherwise. However, when
participating in an activity impedes a moral agent from helping those in need, such
undertakings become morally prohibited in the context of that particular actuality –
which, unfortunately, is our actuality. For the utilitarian Trotskyist, there will always be
more proletarians to empower and more capitalists to obstruct.

In practically every case, then, the utilitarian will find that she cannot, in good
conscience, pursue those projects which are of a singularly personal importance. Again,
this is due to the fact that she views all causal connections as being, to defer to Williams
once more, “on the same level, [such that] it makes no difference . . . whether the given
state of affairs lies through another agent or not.”245 Since allowing others to bring about
suffering is tantamount to directly causing it, justifying time spent on trivia simply
because one finds reward in such things seems virtually impossible.246 The world, after all,
works weekends. While the utilitarian is off enjoying her favorite “socially useless” hobby,
society is going to hell in a proverbial handbasket. And, given that time spent on
recreational activity contributes indirectly to this, such distractions must be placed on the
backburner, indefinitely.\textsuperscript{247}

\textit{But,} goes the usual response, \textit{it is certainly not obvious that agents who pursue their
own interests, when related activities do not directly constitute harm or nuisance to others,
are at fault in any way. Furthermore, performing an action which causes suffering to others,
and standing by while others perform such actions, are certainly not one and the same
thing. To suggest otherwise is to ignore the special relation in which each person stands to
her own intentional actions.}\textsuperscript{248}

It is here that the traditional debate which takes place between the
consequentialist and the nonconsequentialist tends to devolve into an argy-bargy of
mutual question-begging with respect to locus of value.\textsuperscript{249} To the nonconsequentialist’s
assertion, the act utilitarian can only offer a rebuttal along the lines of the following: \textit{But, it is obvious that those agents who pursue their own interests in spite of working to bring
about an overall better state of affairs are morally blameworthy. If one is in a position to
prevent harm, but chooses not to, then she is morally responsible for the consequences of
her callous inaction. And, if ‘common sense’ morality does not square with this, then we
should rethink the trust which we place in it. We must not let our intuitions, however alluring their warm and welcoming familiarity may be, usurp reason – especially when it comes to ethics.}
This difference of opinion may be reformulated along the following lines: given that the nonconsequentialist tends to locate moral worth within actions themselves, the decision to forfeit some innocuous project, such as, say, working to become the most learned of all adolescent floriculturists, in order to, say, mobilize the working poor, is seen, in its meatiest interpretation, as acting from an imperfect duty. More often, such projects are taken to be altogether supererogatory. Conversely, given that the consequentialist places moral worth within states of affairs, sacrificing such personal projects is – provided, of course, that an alternative action is likely to more effectively increase utility – morally mandatory. One should, the utilitarian would suggest, rein in his selfish enthusiasm for orchids, and get to work; he should, as Stokely Carmichael would put it, Organize! Organize! Organize!

Having hastily drawn this line, I admit that apologies to those standing on either of its sides are in order. It is certainly the case that each of these positions is compatible with a much greater degree of nuance and compromise than my presentation allows for. However, for the sake of brevity, I feel that this conversation needed to be taken to its logical conclusion in as few steps as possible, so that we may abandon this impasse, quickly retrace our steps, and return to that point of departure central to the topic at hand.

I am suggesting, in other words, that it is well beyond the purview of this dissertation to offer even a first pass at settling the fundamental disagreement between the consequentialist and the nonconsequentialist regarding locus of value – and so, with
regard to the doctrine of negative responsibility.\textsuperscript{250} Here, I make no attempt to convince the partisan nonconsequentialist that there are some \textit{prima facie} morally-neutral projects which the agent must forgo in the name of moral rectitude. For the time being, I take it for granted that there are such projects, and that a commitment to orchidology may be one of these.\textsuperscript{251} This follows from a much more basic assumption which, for the sake of the larger discussion, I will now make with the utilitarian – namely, that those actions which are likely to produce the most desirable of all states of affairs are morally required, and that those which fail in this endeavor are morally forbidden.\textsuperscript{252}

In positing this, I am, for the time being, affording a wholesale legitimacy to act utilitarianism. And, for now, I am asking that we look at things with blinkered utilitarian eyes. Given these things, I am also suggesting that, provided certain extreme circumstances present themselves, it may be demanded of the moral agent that she act contrary to personally-intuited or socially-derived nonconsequentialist moral precepts. For example, provided that the hedonic calculus calls for this, the rule \textit{It is impermissible to intentionally harm innocents} should be suspended. For those with conservative moral proclivities, this will certainly feel unnatural. Remember, though, for the purpose of responding to IO, we want to put ourselves inside the head of the committed utilitarian. And, as Williams reminds us, “if the reasons for [performing a particular action] are . . . strong enough, then utilitarians will say that the fact that the act is morally distasteful is certainly not an adequate reason against doing it in this case.”\textsuperscript{253} Central to the following discussion, again, will be optimific acts of political violence, specifically.\textsuperscript{254}
In response to this, we might imagine an eavesdropping nonconsequentialist blurting out from the other side of the contemporary moral mainstream: *But, surely the vow made to oneself not to harm innocents is different in kind from a commitment to achieve excellence regarding something as relatively inconsequential as the ins and outs of orchid taxonomy – the former, of course, being categorically-binding and non-negotiable, and the latter, neither of these. Even Richard would understand this, if he would only remove his utilitarian blinders.*

While certainly in no position to be persuaded by this, any right-minded utilitarian will feel its force and silently sympathize. It is fair to ask, then: Are there some moral principles or commitments which must not be superseded by *any* other commitments given that the agent wishes to remain psychically intact and morally unsullied – one’s commitment to act utilitarianism, included? To ask the question another way, is act utilitarianism fundamentally incompatible with integrity? Is it incompatible with moral integrity? Conversely, might the utilitarian – among whose nonconsequentialist commitments is that she not harm others *and* among whose possible actions include the harming of others as the exponentially utility-increasing thing to do – act in accord with her consequentialist values while somehow retaining integrity? Or, would we do better to consider the matter from an altogether different vantage point: Might integrity, itself, be something akin to a bourgeois luxury? Something which the committed utilitarian should toughen up and ‘shrug off,’ along with other extravagances of privilege such as the study of orchids?
These are difficult questions to consider, let alone to answer. Rather than attempt to do so, the utilitarian might be tempted, with J. J. C. Smart, to simply hope amongst hope that she is never faced with an optimific action which requires her to abandon those nonconsequentialist principles about which she feels the most strongly. Doing so, of course, provides cold comfort, and does little to assuage the queasiness brought on by considering the possibility that, in a world such as ours, one fairly easily might find herself within the clutches of just such a dilemma. I would even suggest that if the utilitarian Trotskyist does not find herself in such precarious situations – at least within the margins of deliberative imagination – then she has not taken her commitments and their potential ramifications entirely seriously.

To be sure, we should not tread glibly over the commitment to refrain from harming others. Political violence is, as is the case with violence more generally, always to be a last resort. Any cursory study of history, however, suggests that in some instances political violence is not only the most judicious method by which to realize a more just social arrangement, but the only way. It is in the face of this harrowing fact that we locate the roots of the Maoist epigram: Power does not concede power.

With these things in mind, I raise these questions once more: Can the utilitarian perform acts of political violence while retaining integrity? Can she do so while retaining moral integrity, specifically? If so, should she abandon act utilitarianism in recognition of a Williams-styled objection to the theory? In returning to Williams and his critique, let’s review IO:
1. In order to possess a sufficiently cohesive self, one must preserve an adequate integration of certain mental events.

2. In order to preserve this degree of integration, one must make some personal commitments with the intention of keeping these, even when doing so flies in the face of the demands of morality; as, this is in large part constitutive of sufficient psychic integration. Therefore, 3. In order to possess a sufficiently cohesive self, one must make some personal commitments with the intention of keeping these, irrespective of all other considerations (from 1-2).

4. One must possess a sufficiently cohesive self (from intuition).

5. Therefore, one must make, with the intention of holding to, some personal commitments (from 3-4).

But, 6. Strict adherence to any given impartialist moral theory at least potentially requires that the adherent break any or all of her personal commitments, at any time.

So, 7. Stipulating that the agent adheres to an impartialist ethics, her integrity may be compromised at any moment (from 2 and 6).

8. As adherence to impartialist moral theories are incompatible with making personal commitments with the intention of keeping them sans phrase; and, since adhering to such theories is incompatible with an agent’s retaining her integrity (6-7); such theories are to be rejected as viable
moralities. Therefore, in Edward Harcourt’s words, “so much the worse for act utilitarianism.”

Against Williams, I hope to demonstrate that act utilitarianism and integrity – and so, the sufficient but contingent integration of mental events which I am referring to as the self – are not only compatible with one another, but, supposing a core commitment to the former, potentially coextensive. Given my assumption of the legitimacy of act utilitarianism, that which follows is not intended to serve as an outright defeater to Williams. This is, in large part, because in according a thoroughgoing acceptance of act utilitarianism, I have clearly afforded myself a fortune in collateral that he would not be willing to match. Rather than a knock-down rejoinder, then, what I offer here might be better thought of as an internal buffer which can insulate the utilitarian from becoming seduced by Williams’s position and its invitation to warrantlessly efface her existing moral intuitions and commitments.

Said another way, I intend to offer a position designed to help protect the utilitarian from the inducement of comprehensive restatements about value – and with this, a line of argument which demonstrates that there is no necessary conflict between integrity and act utilitarianism, assuming precedent commitment to and wholehearted acceptance of the latter. I will set these points aside for now with the promise that sufficient explanation will be provided for each as the balance of the project unfolds. Given the abstract nature of the preceding discussion, I would like to close this section by bringing things back down to earth a bit – by returning attention to our embodied person
qua self, Richard, This will both allow me to make good on my promise to discuss the nature of commitment and conflict in a still more tangible manner, and supply the conditions necessary for fruitful discussion of psychic disintegration in the following sections.

Recall that, among other things, persons are agents who value and who evaluate. And persons qua selves are valuing and evaluating agents who take part in projects, who make commitments, and who make and hold to some identity-conferring commitments. Among Richard’s projects are studying orchids and improving the world according to act utilitarian principles – again, by proxy of his commitment to Trotskyism. Of course, Richard very likely has other values and interests which take the more tangible form of projects, as well. To provide a couple of examples, in the article cited above, Rorty also mentions Richard’s childhood fascination with Tibet in general, and with the Dalai Lama, in particular.262

In order to fill Richard out a bit, let’s take some liberties and attribute additional project-participation to him. Let’s say that he greatly enjoys constructing academic genealogies of American philosophers, listening to The Adventures of Ellery Queen, playing Pinochle with his Uncle Sidney, and visiting the Bronx Zoo with his parents. Aside from these projects, Richard also takes part in others which are more abstract in nature, and, in part for this reason, are largely unspoken. He might, in fact, not even be completely aware of some of these as projects. For a few such instances, let’s stipulate that Richard values scholarship, showing kindness, and being a good son to his folks –
and, let’s assume, he tries his best to routinely put these unsaid projects into practice in everyday life.

Since Richard_y is a person *qua* particular self, there are some projects to which he is committed. That is, there are some projects upon which he places more value than others, and so, which he views as more important than these. And, as a particular self, Richard_y must also hold to some commitments which are identity-conferring in nature. That is, he must be strongly devoted to some projects by which he makes sense of himself as an individual self. (These conditions are reflected in premises 1-3 of IO.) Building on these conditions, let’s consider commitments, generally, and assert that Richard_y is committed to act utilitarianism, to showing kindness, to being a good son, and to studying the taxonomy of orchids. Those things which make up mere projects – writing to the Dalai Lama, reading books by and about C. S. Peirce, playing Pinochle, etc. – are completely negotiable, and may be easily set aside if these come into conflict with an existing commitment. If listening to *The Adventures of Ellery Queen* one evening, say, were to somehow interfere with spending needed quality time with mom and dad, say, the former could – and very likely would – be put off for another day.

Remember, though, commitments may be suspended just as other projects are, and without dire psychological repercussion. So too, what were once existing commitments can be supplanted by what were once merely projects. While commitments aid us in making sense of our values, our reasons for action, and, to a lesser extent, ourselves, these projects are far from inviolable, as a standing commitment can be
broken, or replaced by another commitment or project, without leading to a loss of integrity. Identity-conferring commitments, on the other hand, demand a special kind of reverence – at least, as stated before, insofar as the individual committed wishes to retain integrity, and so, to preserve his existing self.

Let’s now specify that Richard’s identity-conferring commitments include acting in order to maximize utility and being a good son. The conjunction of these and all additional identity-conferring values and commitments largely is Richard. It is this constellation of special projects and their underpinning values which allows us to differentiate Richard, qua self from others, and, more importantly, which allows him to make sense of his own reasons for action, and so, to act consistently and autonomously at any given time.

To suggest that this is principally who Richard is is to indirectly require that there be no substantive disharmony between his identity-conferring commitments. The integration necessary for a healthy cohesion of the self and accompanying values, reasons, and autonomous actions, requires that one’s identity-conferring commitments not stand at significant odds with one another. The justification for this should be evident: if two or more identity-conferring commitments provide reasons for mutually exclusive actions, then the agent can no longer fully identify with both, much less act on the pair. Once such a divergence is discovered, the person must choose which commitment to hold to, and then act on this. In doing so, he is briefly disintegrating his self – as, he is necessarily undermining one of his identity-conferring commitments. At the same time,
he is reaffirming exactly who he is, and so, instantaneously creating and fortifying a replacement self which matches up with his practical ideal. To better explain this, let’s get back to Richard, and highlight one conflict among his commitments.

Among Richard’s commitments are: first, that he always act in such a way that utility is maximized, and second, that he earmarks some of his time for the study of orchids. Being self-attentive, he comes to recognize that there is a practical conflict afoot. Recall, Richard describes himself as being “uneasily aware . . . that there [is] something a bit dubious about [his] interest in socially useless flowers.” His unrest is the result of a recognition that a commitment to act utilitarianism will not accommodate a simultaneous commitment to orchidology – since, again, there are always additional ways in which the world can be improved, and his utilitarian commitment is unrelenting in the face of these. As his moral project involves an inbuilt precedence provided that the world is not as maximally happy as it can be; and, as the world is likely never to be as maximally happy as it can be; then, there can be no justifiable allocation of time for nonconsequentialist diversions such as the study of orchids. (These statements are reflected in premises 6-8 of IO.)

This conflict leads to a splintering in regard to Richard’s values, his reasons for action, his potential actions, and – of course, given that we are once again talking about the moral vis-à-vis the personal – his self and his moral self. Insofar as Richard, sides with his moral values and commitments, he becomes alienated from studying orchids, the reasons which he has for taking part in this project, and that segment of the self which
these, in part, constitute. Insofar as Richard’s, sides with his strictly personal values and commitments, he stands estranged from his broader utilitarian project, from his specifically moral reasons for acting, and from the moral self. Ideally, Richard would prefer to walk the line. But, of course, this is impossible, given the fixed contention of these particular projects. His self is fragmenting, and in an irreconcilable way.

Describing disintegration of the psyche, generally, Freud writes: “If we throw a crystal to the floor, it breaks; but not into haphazard pieces. It comes apart along its lines of cleavage into fragments, whose boundaries, though they were invisible, were predetermined by the crystal’s structure.” The same is true of the fragmentation at issue. When things are at an even keel, the self appears to the agent as if it were a whole, even though this is certainly not literally the case, and perhaps not so in the more figurative sense propounded above. Practical conflict highlights the hairline fissures which actually always separate discrete values, projects, and commitments; and, practical necessity, by forcing a choice, breaks the previously set self apart along these very lines in an irremediable arrangement. In order to initiate the self’s reintegration, Richard must either act on his utilitarian commitment, reaffirming that aspect of his self in the process, or he must act on his commitment to the study of orchids – signifying that that is actually who he is at his core.

Earlier, we stipulated that the commitment to act utilitarianism was identity-conferring for Richard, while his commitment to orchidology was not. Given this – and, assuming that he desires to sustain his existing self – let’s now say that Richard does, in
fact, choose to swear off the study of orchids in the name of standing by his commitment
to utilitarianism. Has he preserved integrity in doing so? If so, in what way did this
decision facilitate this? Conversely, does act utilitarianism’s incompatibility with
competing projects somehow assure that its adherent cannot retain integrity in acting in
accord with its prescriptions? Many have suggested – again, Williams, Stocker, and
company – that this magnitude of demandingness, itself, indicates a flaw fatal to act
utilitarianism. But, why should this be the case? Moreover, how does this criticism tie in
with IO?

The demandingness of act utilitarianism reveals its essential impartiality – that is,
that utilitarianism is cased within what are necessarily objective, impersonal values, and
so, shows no respect for the personal. We come to see, then, that, by itself, act
utilitarianism can only provide purely objective and impersonal reasons for action which
derive from purely objective and impersonal utilitarian commitments. Such
commitments, even if superficially identity-conferring, can never allow the self to set,
because, in their impartiality, these inevitably stand at variance with the personal – and
so, with the self. Since act utilitarianism is implacable with respect the impositions it
places on the moral agent, it does not allow for rival project-participation – and so, it does
not allow for rival commitment. Given that room must be made for personal values and
commitments, act utilitarianism is an unsound moral theory. Or, so the standard
nonconsequentialist story goes.
The conflict at issue for Richard, lies between personal values and the commitments supported by these, and their moral counterparts. In other words, here the self is being pulled apart by, on the one hand, what Richard deems to be categorically binding reasons for action, and on the other, what he personally finds important, but dispensable. Let’s now press act utilitarianism a bit, and reconfigure our subject. Let’s imagine that Richard grows up, becoming an adult that we’ll call Richard. While Richard retains some of the identity-conferring commitments first adopted by Richard – the commitment to utilitarian principles and to being a good son, for two instances – most of his childhood projects have fallen by the wayside. Richard has forgotten the rules of Pinochle, and he has not visited a zoo in decades. Richard has also added to his stock of identity-conferring commitments over the years. In addition to other commitments, he strongly identifies with the moral pledge to never intentionally harm innocent persons. So, Richard largely is that self committed to maximizing utility, to making certain that he does not harm others, etc., and who incidentally, say, enjoys reading Chekhov, eating authentic Indian food, and roaming around the Dada wing of the Louvre.

As was the case with Richard, before, Richard may uncover practical conflicts between a pair of his projects, between a project and a commitment, and between commitments – he might even discover that there exists an incongruity between discrete identity-conferring commitments. Let’s stipulate that this is the case, and assert that Richard finds himself in a situation in which he correctly determines that taking part in an act of irregular political violence will very likely lead to the realization of a significantly
overall better state of affairs in the world, but that this will almost certainly cause harm to innocents.

Richardₐ’s Trotsky-infused commitment to act utilitarianism clearly requires that he perform this action. Here, the discord lies between what seem to be essentially moral commitments – one general, the other specific. As was the case with Richardᵧ, Richardₐ must make a choice. Should he reaffirm his commitment to overall utility in the face of his commitment to never harming others? Or, should he defer to the importance of nonmaleficence and buck his commitment to act utilitarianism? In either case, why should he make this particular choice? With either choice made, can integrity be preserved, or is he inevitably and permanently torn? With either choice made, can moral integrity be preserved?

Much of what will make up sections 3.3 and 3.4 involves an attempt to demonstrate how integrity can be accounted for in both the case of Richardᵧ (where there exists a moral-personal conflict) and in the case of Richardₐ (where there exists a moral-moral conflict); and, how aesthetic reasons can help to guide each through his own practical dilemma. Before turning to this discussion, though, I would like to digress in further exploring acts of optimific terrorism as these relate to the psyche of the disintegrating moral agent. As stated before, consequentialist justifications for such actions provide an especially hard case for act utilitarianism, generally, and for the retention of integrity, specifically.
3.2: Disintegration and Moral Death

A person possesses integrity – where integrity, again, just is the state of the sufficiently, though tenuously, unified self – only if he actually makes and honors some identity-conferring commitments. Given this, it should be obvious why Richard a might balk at writing off integrity as simply one more ‘luxury’ which he must abdicate in the name of the greater good; that which he is denying himself, is, after all, his self. Still, there are those who claim to have made this sacrifice, and for purely consequentialist reasons. These persons survey IO, nodding affirmatively at Williams with each premise, and then, without disputation, accept what he intended to be an impracticable result of embracing utilitarian theory.

Recall, IO asserts: if one commits to act utilitarianism, then he must, for all intents and purposes, abandon any competing commitments along with the self which they, in part, comprise; it is not the case that he should forfeit these; hence, the moral agent should reject act utilitarianism. Williams’s point is only strengthened in considering that the commitments to be set aside may come in the form of the moral, or, worse still for the tenability of utilitarianism, an amalgamation of the moral and the personal – nonconsequentialist moral projects stemming from objective values, but commitments with which the agent identifies personally.

Since the agent’s existing self is inextricably bound up with these commitments; and, since some of these commitments are both morally and personally charged; in allying solely with act utilitarianism, some have gone so far as to suggest that that he is, in
effect, committing a kind of “suicide.”\textsuperscript{269} As, suspending the hybrid commitment to, say, never commit murder would “in the case of the morally normal, destroy [the person]”\textsuperscript{270} and “disintegrate” the self.\textsuperscript{271} This is sometimes cashed out in terms of the agent undergoing what Kant refers to as \textit{moral death}.\textsuperscript{272} But, what is moral death, in the sense at issue? And, how does this concept figure into the larger discussion about psychic disintegration?

\textit{Moral Death} is sometimes used to denote the barren normative reality of those who suffer from certain psychopathologies – psychopathy and sociopathy, providing the quintessential expressions. Jeffrie Murphy writes

Though psychopaths know, in some sense, what it means to wrong people, to act immorally, this kind of judgement has for them no motivational component at all. They do not \textit{care} about others or their duties to them, have no concern for others’ rights and feelings . . . and do not know what it is like to defer one’s gratifications out of \textit{respect} for the dignity of another human being. Quite significantly, they feel no \textit{guilt}, \textit{regret}, \textit{shame}, or \textit{remorse} . . . They are paradigms of individuals whom Kant would call the ‘morally dead.”\textsuperscript{273}

From Murphy’s analysis of the antisocial, specifically, we can extrapolate the following about the morally dead, generally: she who is morally dead does not experience the world in the value-laden way that the rest of us do; because of this, both her motivating reasons and her system of practical checks and balances are qualitatively different than ours; and, because of \textit{this}, her actions can be abominable. While there are genetic, bio-chemical, and environmental factors which explain why this is so for the antisocial, the otherwise “normal” agent has a vastly different backstory directly rooted in
the intentional performance of abhorrent actions – actions, in many instances, backed by the best of intentions.

In order to better understand what precipitates moral death in this setting, let’s consider an observation made by Lynne McFall: “. . . we all have things we think we would never do under any imaginable circumstances . . . And if we do that thing . . . we are not the persons we thought; there is nothing left that we even in spite refer to as I.”

Typically, the actions which are unthinkable for the average person are the same as those considered odious by the society to which she belongs. For her, undergoing moral death would be a byproduct of, again, committing murder. But, in committing murder the individual does not perish either mentally or agentially; she continues to experience a mental life on par with others, and she certainly acts. So, what exactly does moral death entail for the agent, practically speaking? And, once more, how are we to connect this up with psychic disintegration?

In answering these questions, let’s return to Richard. Like the rest of us, Richard carries an unspoken commitment never to commit murder; and, let’s stipulate, this commitment is one with which Richard, like most, identifies personally. If Richard were to break this commitment, he would, in a sense, be taking a pair of lives: the biological life of his victim and his own as a moral entity. Linking this talk up with talk of the loss of moral integrity, performing this action would subvert an identity-conferring moral commitment so central to Richard,’s moral self that it would suffer irreparable damage and irrevocable psychic exile; speaking in terms of the loss of integrity, generally, in
losing his moral self, Richard, could simply not survive *qua* self, as his moral personality constitutes an irreplaceable component of this. In committing murder, Richard has *corrupted* himself in the term’s most literal sense – he has become morally *broken*, and essentially so.

As stated before, this transformative action need not be motivated by malicious intentions, as we have all heard the old saw about good ones. With the well-meaning consequentialist in mind, Elizabeth Anscombe writes: “. . . if someone really thinks, in advance, that it is an open question whether [some commonsensically morally repugnant action] should be quite excluded from consideration – I do not want to argue with him; he shows a corrupt mind.” *ad hominem* jabs aside, Anscombe is saying something substantive here. For the nonconsequentialist, corrupt minds are necessarily *irrational* minds; and, irrational minds are *monstrous* minds. Bridging these concepts, W. G. MacLagan writes:

> If there really *could* be an instance of *sheer* corruption the individual concerned would not retain the status of a moral being . . . It would, of course, still be true that we ought not to speak of him as ‘merely as animal’: we should do better to call him a monster. And as a monster not only would he not require to be treated with more respect than a brute, but he would lose his title even to such considerations as brutes deserve.

In becoming a moral monster, the individual gives himself over to unadulterated irrationality. And, in so doing, he not only relinquishes his claim to autonomy – and so, to moral agency – but, according to some, to moral patienthood, also.

To tie the components of this discussion together, for the psychologically “normal,” there are certain actions which are simply inconceivable. Typically, these are
actions which violate identity-conferring moral commitments with which the agent 
identifies in the most literal of senses, and which his society holds as sacrosanct. If the
agent were to perform any such action, intentionally betraying her inmost moral
convictions, she would mar the moral self permanently, becoming essentially
disconnected from this facet of her identity in the process. The performance of corrupting
actions is the spawn of practical irrationality, the dual possession of and acceptance of
which sinks the agent deep within the void of the subhuman.279 In self-corrupting
through the intentional performance of viciously irrational actions, the agent qua self dies
morally. But something survives this ordeal – the agent qua moral monster. In committing
murder, Richardₐ becomes Richardₘ – that agent capable of virtually anything, given the
right motivation.280

But, what motivates monsters? In the case of the antisocial, motivation bottoms
out in whatever pro-attitudes are on hand, however wicked. The desire for pleasure
associated with perceived grandeur, or the alleviation of displeasure associated with
feelings of powerlessness; vices such as wrath, greed, jealousy, and licentiousness; a
savage blood-lust, or unbridled lust, generally. Any and all of these can motivate the
psychopath to act – and, can motivate him to perform any action, no matter who gets
harmed collaterally. Monstrous actions are born out of correspondingly monstrous
desires and dispositions, and from a lack of check on the part of the agent’s inefficacious
conscience.
Setting aside the antisocial, some nonconsequentialists have suggested that another potentially monstrous motivator is the inclination to maximize utility, itself. They reason this way: since any and all morally deplorable actions are 'on the table' for the wide-eyed consequentialist – “punishing, killing, torturing, or deliberately harming the innocent” – act utilitarianism is inherently monstrous morality. Here, the moral monster just is the morally dead utilitarian; he who has no scruples. And, to return to our preferred framework, the morally dead utilitarian just is the essentially disintegrated and selfless, where the irreversibly damaged and displaced piece of the psyche is the moral self.

Having now established a working understanding of both moral death and moral monstrosity, let’s return to an abbreviated version of IO, slightly amended for discussion of specifically moral commitments: if one commits to an inherently monstrous ethics, then he must, for all intents and purposes, abandon any competing moral commitments along with the moral self which they, in part, comprise; it is not the case that he should forfeit these, as this leads to moral death; so, since act utilitarianism is an inherently monstrous ethics, the moral agent should reject it.

We might think that this rendering of IO is a slam dunk. Surely, our gut tells us, we cannot waive our most deep-seated moral commitments – and so, our moral lives – even if doing so may potentially lead to the greatest net happiness. Waiting patiently at the crest of this reductio, however, is the committed consequentialist who considers moral death merely one additional means to the end of achieving a better overall state of
affairs. If act utilitarianism is incompatible with moral integrity, then so much the worse for the moral self. Let’s call this bullet-biter the fanatic. While certainly a rare breed, we need not talk about the fanatic in wholly abstract terms, as he periodically occurs throughout the pages of a history so horrendous that any improvement is preferable to the status quo. “This walking dead man . . . has seen so much agony he prefers victory to survival.”

The anarchists, Sergei Nechaev and Alexander Berkman come to mind. Berkman writes: “I am not conscious of any personality in matters pertaining to the Cause. I am simply a revolutionist, a terrorist by conviction, an instrument for furthering the cause of humanity.” Implicit here is the understanding that an active commitment to utilitarian political violence necessarily involves a forfeiture of the self, since no person may dirty his hands to the extent required by this project with the expectation of keeping his psyche intact. For Berkman, where competing identity-conferring commitments run counter to utilitarian values and reasons for action, then “integrity be damned,” and the self right along with it.

In much the same spirit, Nechaev writes: “The revolutionary . . . is a doomed man. He has neither his own interests, nor affairs, nor feelings, nor attachments, nor property, nor even name. Everything in him is absorbed by a single, exclusive interest . . . by a total passion – revolution.” Here, again, we have a concession that there can be no reconciliation of active commitment to revolutionary consequentialism with integrity.
And, again, if we are forced to choose between these, we must relinquish our claim on individual selfhood in favor of increasing utility.

Perhaps the best historical example of collective thinking of this kind comes from the Ishutin Circle – a clandestine cell made up of Leftist Ultras active in and around mid-nineteenth century Moscow. This society was named for its founder, the Russian socialist and would-be practitioner of tyrannicide, Nikolai Ishutin. Paul Avrich writes: “[Members of Ishutin’s organization] renounced all personal pleasures and led rigorously ascetic lives, sleeping on floors, giving all their money to the cause, and devoting all their energies to the liberation of the people.”

Within the Circle was a subgroup known as *Hell,* made up of the most committed of the most committed. Each member considered himself . . . cut off from normal society, and dedicated entirely to the revolution. He [was required to] give up his friends, his family, his personal life, even his name in total self-effacement for the cause. In Ishutin’s words . . . he must ‘live with one single exclusive aim’, the emancipation of the lower classes. To accomplish this every means was permitted, including theft, blackmail, even murder, not to speak of fraud, deception, the denunciation of innocent people, or the infiltration of rival secret societies to gain control over them . . . The main object was the assassination of the tsar and his officials. The deed once done, the terrorist must carry out the ultimate gesture of self-annihilation by squeezing a pellet of fulminate of mercury between his teeth [physically disfiguring himself and committing suicide, simultaneously].
If we failed to appreciate the marked eccentricity of the fanatic before, considering such accounts surely does the trick; these might also, however, leave us with more questions than answers. But, we're certainly not the first to find ourselves puzzled by this living, breathing anattā. Attempting to make sense of the psychology of such persons, Ivan Turgenev worked out a prose poem entitled “The Threshold.” I include this in its entirety here:

I see a huge building. The front door is wide open; behind the door – deep gloom. A girl stands before a high threshold . . . a Russian girl. The impenetrable gloom chills the air; and together with an icy breath, a solemn, hollow voice issues from the depths of the building.
—O you, who wish to come across this threshold, do you know what awaits you?
—I know, the girl answers.
—Cold, hunger, hatred, ridicule, contempt, humiliation, imprisonment, disease, and death itself.
—I know.
—Total alienation, loneliness.
—I know, I'm ready. I'll endure all sufferings, all blows.
—Not only from enemies – but from kin, from friends?
—Yes, from them, too.
—Very well, are you ready to sacrifice yourself?
—To be a nameless victim? You will perish and no one – no one will even know whose memory to honor!
—I need neither thanks nor pity. I don't need to have a name.
—Are you prepared to commit crimes?
The girl bowed her head . . .
—I am even prepared to commit crimes.
The voice did not immediately continue its questioning.
—Do you know – it is said at last – that you might lose faith in your present beliefs, you might realize that you deceived yourself and sacrificed your young life in vain?
—I know this, too. And yet I want to enter.
—Enter!
The girl strode across the threshold – and a heavy curtain closed behind her.
—Fool! —hissed someone.
—Saint!—came from somewhere, in reply.  

Possessionless. Interestless. Loveless. Nameless. Faceless. Utterly, selfless. But, again, why must this be the case? The explanation for the fanatic’s renunciation of selfhood is twofold: First, once more, there is an intuition at play here that no person may perform truly monstrous acts and come out on the other side morally unscathed and psychically unbroken. In performing acts of utilitarian terrorism, the moral self is surrendered, leading to a sustained disintegration of the self, simpliciter. Second, insofar as one is truly committed to consequentialism on its terms, it is morally impermissible to invest oneself in competing projects and commitments. Possessions, interests, loves, names, faces – these things, drawn together to form the nucleus of the individual self, can only draw attention away from one’s guerilla aspirations. Utilitarianism is a jealous god. We cannot serve both her and ourselves.

We are told to choose, then: Integrity to the detriment of utility, or utility to the detriment of integrity. While Williams and fellow nonconsequentialists claim that we should clearly opt for the first horn of this dilemma, the fanatic and his comrades are equally confident in their recommendation of the second. I want to suggest that for the amply dedicated act utilitarian, this dichotomy is illusory. This agent, I argue, may only preserve integrity in remaining loyal to his consequentialist convictions; and, he certainly may do so without undergoing moral death. Before providing my argument for this, however, I would like to address the other side of the coin.
As stated, I take the disjunction – that the moral agent may either preserve integrity or remain actively committed to act utilitarianism, and not both of these – to present a false choice. My mediation of these on behalf of the consequentialist hinges upon his conscious acceptance of act utilitarianism as the commitment with which he identifies. That is, my response is based on his utilitarian fanaticism. For the moment, however, I will suspend this assumption, and recognize, with Williams and the nonconsequentialist, that most persons, by far, are not fanatics about any philosophically sophisticated form of consequentialism.

Let’s place the average individual – our old friend, Richard_a – within the brambles of the dilemma introduced above: Richard_a has an unspoken identity-conferring commitment never to intentionally harm innocents, but, if he performs a series of terrorist acts, it is almost certainly the case that he can make the world an immeasurably better place. Let’s assume, now, that he chooses, to the detriment of his nonconsequentialist values and commitments, to attempt to maximize utility in just this way; the potential positives, he reasons, are just too great. In acting, Richard_a certainly initiates the disintegration of his present self – that self which is, in part, made up of a once seemingly unconditional moral commitment not to willfully harm others. I readily concede this – he has lost integrity.

However, both the nonconsequentialist and the Ishutin-styled fanatic provide problematically incomplete descriptions of what has happened following Richard_a’s actions. While a self has been disintegrated, another has, at once, taken its place. To hold
that in engaging in utilitarian violence one must become a non-self – a mere *weapon*
 wielded for revolutionary purposes – is to succumb to a particularly noxious form of bad faith. To suggest that engaging in such acts leads to *moral death* is to intentionally look past the existing motivational psychology of the agent. Rather than the obliteration of selfhood, we find in the performance of acts of optimific terrorism both the disintegration of a self and the reintegration of a self, in unison – both the death of a self and the birth of a self, the latter *in* the former. Frantz Fanon describes this in phenomenon here:

> Decolonization never goes unnoticed, for it focuses on and fundamentally alters being, and transforms the spectator crushed to a nonessential state into a privileged actor, captured in a virtually grandiose fashion by the spotlight of History. It infuses a new rhythm, specific to a new generation of men, with a new language and a new humanity. Decolonization is truly the *creation of new men.*

In the preface to this same work, Sartre writes: “[For the colonized and subjugated,] killing a European is to kill two birds with one stone, eliminating in one go oppressor and oppressed: leaving one man dead and the other man free.” He who acts for consequentialist reasons – again, granting that he was not already a stalwart utilitarian – not only retains a self, but, according to those with utilitarian intuitions, generates a morally superior successor through deliberative and deliberate psychic reintegration. And, he reintegrates psychically by affirming the maximization of utility as the identity-conferring commitment by which he makes sense of his self. It does not matter what Richard’s social station was prior to acting. If he was the one of the oppressed, then he is transformed into a utilitarian liberator; if he was one of the *de facto* oppressors, again, he
is transformed into a utilitarian liberator. Given this, the nonconsequentialist’s talk of moral death is misplaced.\textsuperscript{297}

While Williams does not seem to go so far as to suggest that the commitment to revolutionary utilitarianism must lead to outright moral death, he certainly does convey that the change which takes place necessitates a kind of moral perversion whereby the agent becomes radically and immutably alienated from his authentic self and his “ground” values – so, whereby integrity is lost, and that this, itself, is necessarily a bad thing. This need not be the case, either. Keeping in mind the same dilemma, and assuming, again, that the agent autonomously chooses to act from utilitarian values and for utilitarian reasons, it is conceivable that he may act to bring about a consciously chosen transformation of the self which exhibits, in his mind, moral improvement rather than decay. John Dewey describes this process here:

\begin{quote}
Wants compete; we are drawn spontaneously in opposite directions. Incompatible preferences hold each other in check. We hesitate, and then hesitation becomes deliberation \ldots At last a preference emerges which is intentional and which is based on consciousness of values which deliberation has brought into view. We have to make up our minds, when we want two conflicting things, which of them we really want. That is choice \ldots Now every such choice sustains a double relation to the self. It reveals the existing self and it forms the future self \ldots The resulting choice also shapes the self, making it, in some degree, a new self \ldots Consequently, it is proper to say that in choosing this object rather than that, one is in reality choosing what kind of self one is going to be.\textsuperscript{298}
\end{quote}

In unpacking Dewey’s account, let’s once again return to Richard\textsubscript{a}. Richard\textsubscript{a} desires both to refrain from harming innocents and to maximize utility. Each of these desires reflects a corresponding identity-conferring commitment which he presently embraces as
a part of his self. Unfortunately for Richard, he finds himself in a position to appreciably decrease the amount of suffering in the world, but where accomplishing this involves taking part in terroristic activity likely to harm a number of innocent people. As with any pair of mutually exclusive commitments, Richard cannot retain immediate allegiance to both of these projects in acting. He must choose one over the other, and so he deliberates – given the available choices and their likely consequences, hopefully long and hard.

In thinking things through, Richard is indirectly evaluating his existing self. He is scrutinizing his standing desires, values, projects, and commitments, and the relation in which each stands to the others. He is also reevaluating these – the first step in the process of conscious self-transformation, and a necessary component of the preservation of integrity, more generally. Let’s say that he decides, however reluctantly, to side with his utilitarian commitment. Here, Richard has consciously initiated the process of psychic disintegration. He understands that his impending utilitarian project stands at variance with his identity-conferring commitment to nonmaleficence. In practically reaffirming his commitment to utilitarianism, he is eo ipso discarding his commitment to nonmaleficence. And, since the self largely is one’s identity-conferring commitments, in discharging this commitment, he is choosing to become a new self – a self which values utility above all else.

Where Richard is torn between commitment to nonmaleficence on the one hand, and to utility on the other, he chooses the latter. In doing so, it does not seem at all
obvious that he has made a choice with which he \textit{qua} self cannot survive; nor does it seem that he has become necessarily estranged from his true self and its values. Rather, he has chosen to become a different self – a self capable of standing behind \textit{this} choice, and, in fact, principally defined in terms of staying true to the values which motivated it. This, alone, does not demand that Richard\textsubscript{a} has become corrupted, per se, given that he has autonomously chosen to act for what may be broadly construed as the right reasons, morally speaking. To suggest otherwise would be to beg the question against act utilitarianism and its conception of the Good. In acting on his utilitarian commitment, then, Richard\textsubscript{a} becomes Richard\textsubscript{u}, not Richard\textsubscript{m}.

Kai Nielsen makes the same point in taking stock of the values and motivations had by, and subsequent actions performed by, characters from Gillo Pontecorvo’s \textit{The Battle of Algiers}. He writes:

[In the film] we saw Algerian women – gentle, kindly women with children of their own and plainly people of moral sensitivity – with evident heaviness of heart, plant bombs which they had every good reason to believe would kill innocent people, including children; and [on the other side of the conflict] we . . . saw a French general, also a human being of moral fiber and integrity, order the torture of Arab terrorists and threaten the bombing of houses in which terrorists were concealed but which also contained innocent people, including children. There are indeed many people involved in such activities who are cruel, sadistic beasts . . . But the characters I have referred to . . . were not of this stamp. They were plainly moral agents of a high degree of sensitivity, and yet they killed or were prepared to kill the innocent.\textsuperscript{300}

The same can be said of Berkman or Ishutin – or Richard\textsubscript{a}. Each performs actions believed to be morally requisite according to a utilitarian calculus. Each recognizes the tremendous moral weight of these actions, and thoughtfully considers what are likely to
be their cataclysmic results. These agents, like those depicted in the film, are persons of integrity, and are certainly neither *morally dead* nor *monstrous*. They are, in fact, motivated strictly by moral reasons, and are working in order to disempower who they take to be the true monsters. Given these things, some might even call them moral saints.301

Of course, the nonconsequentialist will view this portrayal as begging the question against her own conceptions of the right and the Good – and, if in the right mood, she might quote Nietzsche to the utilitarian fanatic: “Whoever fights with monsters should see to it that in the process he does not become a monster.”302 Remember, though, in responding to Williams, we are keeping ourselves firmly embedded within the act utilitarian’s deliberative perspective.

In closing this section, I will now reclaim my earlier assumption of the general correctness of act utilitarianism on behalf of the agent, and respond to Williams in considering that case where Richardu is a confirmed devotee of revolutionary consequentialism. Once again, he is given the choice between adjuring the harm of innocents and maximizing utility. Given Richardu’s commitment to act utilitarianism, he seemingly has little recourse but to, in Williams’s words, “just forget about integrity, in favor of such things as a concern for the general good.”303 But, *must* he “just forget about integrity” in acting in order to achieve this end? In fact, has he, in remaining faithful to consequentialism, done so? I think that the answer must be *no* to both questions.
For a heartily committed consequentialist like Richard_u, allegiance to the utilitarian project is *the* identity-conferring commitment of which he is made. Where any other commitments run counter to utilitarianism; and, assuming that Richard_u wishes to preserve his existing self; then, these competing projects must be sidelined. In this light, if Richard_u were to practically commit to nonmaleficence, then he would, by Williams’s own admission, lose integrity, which is a *no-no*.

It is with this in mind that I turn one of Williams’s chief criticisms regarding the proper jurisdiction of utilitarianism against his own position. Given a case where one is forced to act for either utilitarian reasons or for competing nonconsequentialist reasons, Williams suggests that the utilitarian will admonish the agent who chooses the latter for floundering in a kind of “self-indulgent squeamishness.” However, Williams notes – and, I take his observation to be completely accurate – “the most [that the utilitarian’s reproof] can do . . . is to invite [the nonconsequentialist agent] to consider . . . the question from a utilitarian point of view.” It seems to me that, where the committed act utilitarian is concerned, a similar complaint can be lodged against Williams. In other words, the most that Williams’s own critique can do is to invite the committed utilitarian to reconsider whether he should stand by utilitarianism or, instead, affirm some competing project. That said from the perspective of Williams – that is, from a place where integrity is prized above most all else – the committed utilitarian agent should opt for utilitarianism.
To put this another way, Williams suggests the following: the utilitarian will accuse she who refuses to maximize utility for the sake of keeping her hands clean of submitting to an impermissible selfishness. She should, the utilitarian will argue, ‘suck it up,’ set her own moral inclinations aside, and work to bring about the best results given the situation at hand. But, Williams responds, the most that this rebuke can do is to prod the agent to reconsider things from a utilitarian point of view. The same, though, can be said against Williams. The nonconsequentialist will accuse he who maximizes utility in spite of dirtying his hands of submitting to an impermissible selflessness. He should, the nonconsequentialist will argue, place greater value on his personal projects and, certainly, reevaluate his moral priorities. But, the most that this rebuke can do is to ask that the utilitarian reassess his moral projects with an eye toward trying on nonconsequentialism for size. But, to remain consistent, Williams must hold that the committed utilitarian should not compromise his values unless he sincerely chooses to do so following extended deliberation.

Seen from this side of the divide, it is Williams who plays the devil-on-the-shoulder of the act utilitarian, and not act utilitarianism which is the devil-on-the-shoulder of the vulnerable nonconsequentialist. And so, ironically, it is Williams who threatens to undermine the integrity of the act utilitarian, and not act utilitarianism which hovers as the eager seducer. Having pointed the finger at Williams, I do not want this to be mistaken for an unqualified accusation. As stated throughout each of the previous chapters, one necessary condition of integrity is the routine reevaluation of core
values and commitments. Given this, critiques such as Williams’s do the utilitarian the invaluable service of inviting him to, again and again, reconsider the validity of his moral values and commitments. At the same time, so long as Williams is highlighting a shortcoming on the part of act utilitarianism exclusively, it should be pointed out that this can be attributed to all moral theories.

To sum up, the one-time intuitive pluralist who commits to, and acts on, utilitarian principles – even where these acts include the otherwise morally impermissible – does not become morally dead or monstrous. Since this agent acts from conscience and for deliberated-upon moral reasons, in affirming her consequentialist commitment in action, she is choosing to become a utilitarian self. So, while there is self-death, there is an immediate self-birth; and so, while integrity is lost, there is immediate psychic reintegration. On the other hand, where the moral agent is an already-committed utilitarian, integrity is preserved by standing firm with the identity-conferring commitment to maximize utility. In either scenario, act utilitarianism is shown to be compatible with integrity.

While the arguments and analyses advanced in this section offer a first, substantial step towards controverting IO, these more or less make up a collective prologue only. This is so because it has been demonstrated above that act utilitarianism is merely in principle compatible with the retention of the integrated self. Thus far, we have been looking at things from the outside of the moral agent, in. In fully responding to Williams, we must look from the inside, out. This means situating ourselves not just within the
general perspective of the utilitarian moral agent, but, amid his quarrelling desires, values, projects, and commitments, and the feelings of estrangement and self-estrangement which sometimes accompany a clash between these – so, within the agent’s self. In the following section, we situate ourselves within the subjective perspectives of the moral agents, Richard, and Richarda. Here, I hope to show how – in coopting versions of action language and practical aestheticism – the individual agent, with personal motivational pulls in tow, can retain integrity while being actively committed to act utilitarianism, whether competing values and projects are personal, moral, or hybrid.

3.3: Action and Reintegration

Richard is that person who is committed to the study of orchids and to act utilitarianism. And, as stated, each of these commitments is identity-conferring for him. Since act utilitarianism is inflexible, active commitment to this is incompatible with active commitment to orchidology. Because of this practical irreconcilability, Richard is pressed to make a choice in acting. And, because of this, alongside the account of selfhood advanced before, in actively choosing between identity-conferring commitments, Richard is also pressed to make a concurrent decision regarding who he is, at center. Either resolution leads to a disintegration and simultaneous reintegration of the self. If Richard chooses to reaffirm, in practice, his commitment to the study of orchids, he effectively proclaims that this is who he is. If, on the other hand, he chooses to reaffirm, in practice, his utilitarian commitment, he effectively asserts that this is who he is. His conflict lies between the personal and the moral.
Richard\textsubscript{a} is that person who is committed to nonmaleficence and to act utilitarianism. And, as with Richard\textsubscript{y}, these identity-conferring commitments undergird him as a self. Once more, since act utilitarianism is uncompromising in its expectations, active commitment here is incompatible with active commitment to nonmaleficence. So too, then, Richard\textsubscript{a} is forced to make a practical determination between his identity-conferring commitments. In choosing between these, he is invariably settling on who he will become, also. If, on the one hand, Richard\textsubscript{a} chooses to affirm, in practice, his commitment to nonmaleficence, he proclaims that \textit{this} is who he \textit{is}; and vice versa with the decision to reaffirm the utilitarian program. His conflict lies between competing moral commitments\textsuperscript{308}

In either instance, and in all such instances, IO maintains that act utilitarianism should be rejected by the agent, since commitment to the theory will not allow for integrity on his part. This is so for Richard\textsubscript{y}, goes the argument, because strict allegiance to utilitarianism disallows participation in those personal projects which are principal to his overall sense of self – and so, integrity, as such, is undermined. This is so for Richard\textsubscript{a}, goes the argument, because this commitment disallows ongoing participation in nonconsequentialist moral projects important to his specifically moral self-conception – and so, moral integrity is undermined.

Against this position, it has been demonstrated above that each agent \textit{can}, provided that certain axiological factors are so, retain integrity amid active commitment to act utilitarianism. But, truth be told, we have only scratched the surface in adequately
answering Williams, there. This is in part because the anecdotes pertaining to Richard, and Richard, provided up until this point are patchy, at best; and, this is so because, thus far, I have only put these to use in fleshing out my conceptions of commitment, of selfhood, and of integrity. In responding earnestly to IO, we need to delve a bit deeper into the fictitious lives of these two. We need to consider how each is affected by his respective practical conflict, and how we, in his place, might actively work towards healing the fragmentation which results from this while respecting his commitment to act utilitarianism. This requires us to go straight to the hearts of our friends, Richard, and Richard. But, how is this enquiry different in kind from our consideration of these agents in sections 3.1 and 3.2?

Above, I alluded to how Richard can sustain his commitment to act utilitarianism, while retaining integrity. If Richard was previously an intuitive nonconsequentialist, but presently feels himself drawn to act utilitarianism, he can – upon deliberation – reevaluate and decide to become an integrated utilitarian self in placing this newfound commitment on its proper valuative pedestal. Sure, he held to other commitments prior to making this decision; orchidology, for one. But, as such projects will inevitably bump heads with the unyielding dictates of act utilitarianism, then so much the worse for his orchids, right?

If, conversely, Richard is an inveterate act utilitarian, then what might present itself as a particularly thorny dilemma for others, should show up as a veritable no-brainer for him. If maximizing utility leaves no time for nonconsequentialist activities,
and given that Richard\textsubscript{y} wishes to preserve his present identity, then – once again – so much the worse for the orchids. There it is, all nice and neat. Nice. Neat. But, missing much of the point.

Above, I demonstrated how Richard\textsubscript{a} can hold to a commitment to act utilitarianism, while retaining moral integrity. If Richard\textsubscript{a} approaches the stipulated situation from an incipient utilitarian place, he might – again, following the called for contemplation – choose to act for utilitarian reasons and against dwindling, say, deontological values and commitments. He might find himself, in other words, resolved to becoming an integrated utilitarian through making, in practice, an active commitment to act utilitarianism. Where existing nonconsequentialist values and projects diverge from his utilitarian values, then so much the worse for nonmaleficence – under the imagined circumstances, at least.

If, on the other hand, Richard\textsubscript{a} arrives at this fork as an already dyed-in-the-wool utilitarian, then, insofar as he wants to retain his standing identity, the outcome is more or less foredrawn. He can only preserve moral integrity by practically reaffirming his utilitarian convictions. Once again, we have shown that the agent can, in principle, adhere to act utilitarianism while retaining moral integrity; but, as with our analysis of Richard\textsubscript{y}, we miss much of Williams’s intended point.

So, what’s missing? I would argue that what we have failed to consider is the actual conflict experienced by each agent. The feelings of prolonged forlornness on the part of Richard\textsubscript{y} for having to abandon a project which, for him, is of tremendous personal
importance. The throes of uncertainty and prescient remorse on the part of Richard for having to set aside what are among his strongest nonconsequentialist moral convictions. The enfeebling sense of alienation and self-alienation on the part of both agents as the deliberative process degenerates into unavailing rumination. In responding to Williams it will not do to simply demonstrate from afar how integrity and commitment to act utilitarianism can, in abstractum, fit together. We must explain how, from the subjective perspective of the agent, these can remain in harmony as he lives his life on a day-to-day basis.

In the remainder of the dissertation I offer a more substantive response to Williams, by demonstrating that, given the reflectively-endorsed presence of certain consequentialist values, a commitment to act utilitarianism is perfectly congenial to integrity in just this way; and, that this is so whether this commitment frustrates competing personal, moral, or hybrid projects. In answering Williams, I will appropriate an action language orientation in order to reconfigure certain mental events experienced by the agent, alongside an aesthetic framework with respect to practical reasoning – these being, in practice, synthesized into a kind of self-analytical talking cure intended to treat the disintegrating utilitarian agent. Or, better stated, a practical corrective intended to allow the disintegrating agent to treat himself.

This self-applied analysis will take the shape of thinking in the classic Socratic sense of the notion – as “a talk which the soul has with itself about the object under its consideration.” And, this thinking will ideally result in practical judgment in the classic
Socratic sense of this concept – as “when [the soul’s discursive components arrive] at something definite . . . [that is,] when [the soul] affirms one thing consistently and without divided counsel.” More specifically, this thinking towards judgment will involve the agent *qua* analysand offering a prereflective description of his experiences – of his desires, values, evaluations, commitments, etc. – which inform deliberation and action. Following this, the agent *qua* analyst will provide a healthier redescription of these same mental events refracted through the lenses of action language and aesthetic values about the self. Now, to return to Richard, and to put to work the first of these theoretical instruments.

In experiencing the push to action from his purely subjective values and projects, Richard tends to identify most strongly with his commitment to orchidology. This project is extremely important to him, and so, to his sense of who he is. He can’t quite put his finger on why the orchids are so alluring, but that they are is undeniable. He experiences a unique sense of peace when thinking about them, and, in appreciating their beauty firsthand, he feels, for lack of better way of stating it, *at home* with himself. Orchidology lies very near the center of Richard’s identity, hence the project’s preeminence among his cache of commitments. It’s no wonder, then, that he feels plainly estranged from commitments which require that he discontinue participation in this activity.

Richard both wants to study the orchids and he *wants to* want to study the orchids. Put in terms of identity, he *wants to* want to be the kind of self who enjoys this
project. Turning his back on it would amount to, in a very real sense, turning his back on his existing self – a self which, most of the time, he feels good about and wishes to preserve in action.

At the same time, in sustaining his commitment to this project, he feels an unease in the pit of his stomach – a nagging discomfort rooted, it seems, in noting the abundance of time which he devotes to the orchids. Despite his best efforts to convince himself otherwise, he eventually comes to accept that this anxiety is bubbling up from his conscience.

When it comes to right and wrong, Richard strongly identifies with act utilitarianism. That *One should always act in such a way that utility is maximized* seems patently obvious to him, objectively true, and categorically binding. He has felt this way, more or less, ever since he can remember. When he first read Trotsky’s *Permanent Revolution* as a teenager, there were no scales to fall from his eyes. He was the choir to which the Soviet expat was preaching, and he felt overjoyed to learn that there was a kindred spirit out there speaking Truth to Power so unreservedly, waving the consequentialist flag.

Richard, both wants to maximize utility and he *wants to* want to maximize utility. Again, said in terms of identity, he *wants to* want to be the self who is motivated by utilitarian values. So, it should come as as no surprise that he feels alienated from commitments which detract from this all-important moral initiative. In failing to comply with the demands of act utilitarianism, he is betraying his moral self. And, in betraying
his moral self, he is, once again, undermining his self – a self which, at its best, matches up very closely with his guiding practical ideal.

So, what should Richard do? Ignoring the matter certainly won’t help. In doing so, he will only find himself being haphazardly dragged around by whichever project flexes the most motivational muscle at a given time. Here, he will lose autonomy, becoming, to borrow from Harry Frankfurt, “volitionally fractured.”\textsuperscript{311} Besides, the commitments, themselves, seem to be demanding that he determine a preference. When studying his orchids, he increasingly finds his conscience taking him to task. \textit{I should be working to maximize utility,} after all, \textit{not trekking around the Kittatinneys searching for botanical specimens.} Meanwhile, when handing out IWW pamphlets with the Young Socialists, he feels resentment for not having the freedom to pursue other interests. \textit{I should be allowed to enjoy a little nonoptimific fun,} he feels – even Kropotkin took a vacation once in a while. These experiences lead to increased psychic distress, as what were once slight feelings of estrangement and self-estrangement soon balloon into lingering moods shaped by exasperation.

More and more Richard reconciles himself to the fact that he cannot remain actively committed to both act utilitarianism and to orchidology. He also recognizes that in denying either commitment, he is ultimately undercutting who he is. He must choose between the projects. But, even if he could bring himself to do so, what is the correct choice to make? More basic, is there a correct choice to be made? And, if so, what all should he take into consideration in making this choice? Finally, how can integrity be
preserved when, either way, he is essentially cutting bait with his existing identity? In answering, I will situate myself within the subjective place of Richard, — within his mind, as he faces this conflict. What would he feel? How would he likely respond to these emotions? How might I respond in a healthier way? Which commitment would I side with, and why?

To begin with, I would certainly feel altogether torn — at least when initially considering the dilemma and its forced choice. Interestingly, though, I might soon find this sense of brokenness morphing into a sequence of temporary perspectivally-based faux reintegrations, as I consider my projects from within the confines of each commitment, one commitment at a time. Looking at things from a particular side of my self — that is, considering things from either the personal or the moral — I experience a pronounced alienation from its opposite facet, but a oneness with my current resting place. If I am engaged in my utilitarian project, but hear the seductive song of the sirenic orchids, I stand estranged from my personal commitment and its disruptive temptations. Conversely, if I am fully occupied with the orchids, but feel the untimely sting of conscience commanding me to spurn that project, I stand estranged from my moral commitment. And, of course, the same goes for other values, commitments, and activities which more indirectly inform my self-conception.

The thing to note here is that each commitment or corresponding value can disclose itself to me as an “alien guest” — as imposing itself on me, from outside. So too, corresponding desires, whether first- or second-order — can take this form as well. I can
both want to maximize utility and want to want to maximize utility, while, in a different respect, neither wanting to maximize utility nor wanting to want to maximize utility.

Here, it is I who seemingly lack the desire to maximize utility, and yet, somehow, within the figurative space that makes up my self, the desire – my desire – is clearly present, encroaching upon my present concentration. The same is the case for all other motivational content friendly to this and other commitments experienced under similar sets of circumstance.

In my more self-aware moments, I recognize that in bouncing between identification with this commitment, then that one, I am standing at odds with my self, within my self, even though such instances of estrangement are experienced piecemeal. As I regain my footing between commitments, though, the façade created by this polar integration quickly fades, and I find the feelings of alienation and self-alienation magnified, becoming even more unbearable than before. Once again, I am torn – I am disintegrating. What can I do to stave off the feelings of alienation and self-alienation which accompany this state? What can I do to move towards some kind of a practical resolution?

Here, I initiate Socratic thinking: I work towards deciding what to do, and so, who to become. And here, I recognize that, before all else, I must reclaim ownership of the mental events which I have been subconsciously forsaking in the name of interim relief. I need to remind myself that I am in direct control of – and so, responsible for – my existing desires, values, commitments, and so on. I need to remind myself that “nothing
has entered [me] from without,” and that that “is why [I am] so weak in [my] defense; [I am] using one part of [my] force to fight the other part and . . . cannot concentrate the whole of [my] force as [I] would against an external enemy.”\textsuperscript{314} Sustaining this recognition will, for a short time, draw together the constituent parts of my self, allowing me to get my evaluative bearings, at which point I can better make an autonomous decision about which commitment to reaffirm, and so, which self to move towards integrating and fortifying. I will argue, here, that Roy Schafer’s \textit{action language} can serve as an indispensable tool to this end.\textsuperscript{315}

Recall from section 1.3, action language is a technique sometimes implemented in psychoanalysis\textsuperscript{316} whereby a patient is led to redescribe apparently “reified”\textsuperscript{317} mental content as proper \textit{actions} – as orchestrated \textit{events}, as opposed to stagnate mental states. The idea is that certain analysands suffer, in part, from having lost sight of the fact that the presence and relative standing of mental events such as desiring, valuing, committing, and the like, is largely up to them.\textsuperscript{318} They have forgotten that these events are \textit{actions performed}, rather than mental content merely discovered – and so, that these are events for which they are responsible.\textsuperscript{319} Even the emotions which we typically experience as essentially happening \textit{to} us, and the temperaments which we most often take to be simply \textit{there}, are to be “redefined”\textsuperscript{320} in this way.\textsuperscript{321} Any and all mental events are candidates.

As the analysand begins to share with her analyst the makeup of her mental life – what she finds herself wanting, how she feels about this, how these desires and emotions
square or fail to square with her values and commitments, and so forth – he assists her in
shifting from a passive to an active voice. He helps the analysand to reconceive of each of
these events as an action performed by her, and so, over which she has direct control.
Desires do not simply occur, he reminds her; she desires. Values do not present
themselves sans evaluator, he claims; she evaluates. Commitments are not given; she
commits. Feelings of self-alienation are not merely here; she self-alienates. Selves do not
blink in and out of existence; she integrates, disintegrates, and reintegrates, and
disintegrates again. Here, virtually everything experienced within the mind is recast as an
action or series of actions performed by the analysand.

Following the analyst, in self-treating I must first come to realize that I am the
controller of those desires, values, and commitments which fail to cohere. And so, I am
responsible for my own present state of psychic disintegration, as well as for bringing
about reintegration through committed action. But, how can this shift in perspective help
me to soothe the discomfort of alienation and self-alienation? And, more importantly,
how can this help me in initiating the reintegrative process?

In thinking, I qua analysand present certain perceptions about the mental events
which comprise this quandary to myself qua analyst. In return, I qua analyst redescribe
these in terms of action. In coming to understand that I, myself, am the source of the
desires, values, and commitments at issue, I come to identify with the lot of these, even as
they stand in opposition to one another. Here, I am reminded that it is I who value the
study of orchids – that, while drawn to them naturally, perhaps, I had and have control
over where this project shows up within the hierarchy of my practical identity. I can choose either to give in to this, or to work to sap its power. In the same way, it is I who value maximizing utility. And, again, while I might have come to embrace the utilitarian project for any number of reasons, it is I who choose to or choose not to regard this commitment above others. I choose to value these things. I choose to participate in these projects. I choose to commit to them, or to renege. And, it is up to me to choose between them once I recognize that they are incompatible. I am the agent, and these are my actions.322

In reconsidering things in this way, those feelings of estrangement and self-estrangement experienced before begin to wane. I no longer consider one project from the relative perspective of another; and so, I no longer project onto that activity an adversarial role. This allows me to, however temporarily, ‘sit among’ my projects tranquilly, appreciating each, without, in practice, committing to any one over the others. In establishing this deliberative haven, I come to, once again, recognize that I am supremely in control over the ordering of these projects, and so, that it is up to me, and only up to me, to determine which may stay and which must go. I am reminded that these were not forced upon me, nor could they have been – and, that these commitments only have the power which I lend at any given time. I valued them, and, if the circumstances call for it, I can devalue them.323

While certainly helpful, this reorientation is not intended to serve as a panacea for psychic disintegration. By itself, all that the application of action language can accomplish
is this facilitation of a renewed sense of control concerning my present stock of mental events. Despite this improvement, I remain fragmented, because I remain committed, however nominally, to irreconcilable projects. Still, it is worth emphasizing, once more, the benefits of reorienting through action language – in redescribing my mental events in terms of action, I have succeeded in establishing a deliberative space much more conducive to reevaluation and autonomous choice. Here, I stand freed from those unhealthy conceptions of desire, value, and commitment as sovereign outliers with programs of their own. And, here, I ready myself for autonomously choosing between these.

This choice will bring about both psychic disintegration and reintegration – in deciding, in practice, I will deliberately implode that self which was problematically committed to both the orchids and to act utilitarianism, and a uniform self, defined in terms of committing to the one project over the other, will take its place. But, again, redescription through action language will not deliver me, per se, in this capacity. I must make the choice. And, while action language can assist me, it is not equipped to do the heavy lifting. I must choose – and, I must choose between values and commitments to which I am forcefully attracted. So, again, what should I base this decision on? And, given my attachment to the values and projects at issue, how can I set one aside while retaining integrity?

The answers to these questions, I hope to show, lie within the symphonization of aesthetic evaluation and practical reasoning. Before segueing into detailed discussion of
The motivational psychology of Richard\textsubscript{a} is complicated in a way that Richard\textsubscript{y}’s is not. With the latter, we are, as stipulated, dealing with a clear-cut personal-moral conflict. Whereas, with the former, we are not only dealing with a moral-moral conflict, but one whose discordant components are also tinted with the personal. Put another way, while is it certainly so that Richard\textsubscript{a}’s commitments to maximize utility and to refrain from harming innocent persons are moral in nature, he also feels a strong personal affinity with each. And so, each is example of what I have been referring to here and there as a hybrid commitment – that is, an identity-conferring project powered by both the objective and the subjective.

When it comes to objective values, Richard\textsubscript{a} identifies most strongly with his commitments to act utilitarianism and to nonmaleficence. These projects lie at the core of who he takes himself to be, morally.\textsuperscript{325} As with act utilitarianism, Richard\textsubscript{a} has valued nonmaleficence all of his life. He carries with him no philosophical account grounding either of these moral projects, and does not seem to need one. If pushed, he might tell you that it is simply a brute fact that we should always work in order to realize the greatest good for the greatest number, and that we should avoid harming innocents at all costs. To his thinking, these rules apply to all competent persons, all the time. Aside from considering these commitments objectively, he values adhering to these projects personally, and cannot imagine himself violating either. As expected, then, those values
and projects which demand that he part ways with these commitments are immediately discredited in his mind. Unfortunately, Richard_A finds himself in a situation in which active commitment to both is impossible – in harming others, he can immeasurably improve the state of the world. Something's got to give.

Richard_A both wants to maximize utility and he wants to want to maximize utility. Richard_A both wants to refrain from harming innocents and he wants to want to refrain from harming innocents. Speaking in terms of identity, he wants to want to be a utilitarian non-harming self. Turning his back on either commitment will amount to self-betrayal, as, both commitments are identity-conferring for him. And yet, he must choose between these. What should he do? In answering, I will once again take the position of our subject, putting myself in the place of Richard_A.

Like Richard_A, I will feel utterly torn in coming to terms with my situation. And, in attempting to find relief from such feelings, I will, playing the part of moral ostrich, pursue faux integration by burrowing deep within the hold of one of my commitments, against the other – and then within that other, against the first. Like my younger counterpart, though, I soon recognize that this is getting me nowhere fast. I, too, must choose. But, how can I choose between these projects – projects connected to both the moral and the personal?

I cannot imagine contravening either commitment without undermining my self. No matter what good might come of it, how could I possibly live with myself after intentionally harming innocent people? My stomach turns at the very thought of it. On
the other hand, if I am in a position to boundlessly improve the lives of a multitude, I should attempt to do this – shouldn’t I? As with Richardy, I will likely become lost for a time within the demands of these competing projects, eventually resurfacing in practical turmoil. And, there is a very good chance that I will find myself feeling increasingly disempowered in relation to these values and commitments, which might, depending on the credence that I place on such experiences, have an adverse effect on deliberation and autonomous action. If I do not choose soon, time constraints will force my hand – in which case, I will certainly lose autonomy. So, utility through the intentional harm of others, or nonmaleficence at the expense of the alleviation of greater suffering? Which good is greater? Which evil is the lesser of the two? And, can the performance of either action facilitate lasting psychic reintegration?

First things first, I must emancipate myself from servitude to my values and commitments. This, once more, involves the application of action language to Socratic thinking. I qua analysand presently feel as though these mental events have taken on a life of their own – that they are the agents, and that I am their attendant, doing all that I can to please both. But, the analyst reminds me, these values do not exist independently of my valuing. These commitments do not exist independently of my committing. Similarly, the emotions which I feel as a result of engaging this conflict are ways in which I am choosing to deal with the matter; I can choose to feel differently about it if I decide to do so, given that I do the work. I can choose to value one of these projects over the other, I can choose to commit to one or to neither, and I can work to feel a certain way about all of this. I am
the agent – so, the desires, reasons, values, projects, and commitments which make up my practical life are completely up to my direction.

Again, reclaiming this power allows me to ‘sit among’ my values and projects. Here, I can more peacefully, but commandingly, consider these, and work towards making a decision about which to reaffirm and which to discard. As with Richard, this redescription of mental events through the application of action language will not, in and of itself, bring about psychic reintegration. However, it does provide the environment most propitious to this.

As of now, I remain in a state of psychic disintegration. While I have a renewed sense of agency, I continue to be volitionally pulled apart because of sustained attachment to, and ambivalence regarding, my commitments to nonmaleficence and to act utilitarianism. In bringing about reintegration, then, I must finally make, in practice, this hard choice. As stated before, I believe that the implementation of practical aestheticism is key. In the following section I provide discussion of this, while further self-treating in the place of Richard, and then Richard. Before moving on, though, I would like to briefly explain one additional way in which the self-analytical approach that I am advancing can help the agent in merging the components of her psyche – here, I have in mind self-fortification as a corollary of narration. Schafer writes:

Analysands . . . tell the analyst about themselves . . . In making interpretations, the analyst retells these stories. In retelling, certain features are accentuated while others are placed within parentheses; certain features are related to others in new ways or for the first time . . . The end product of this interweaving of texts is a radically new, jointly authored work or way of working. One might say that in the course of analysis, there develops a
cluster of more less coordinated new narrations, each corresponding to periods of intensive analytic work on certain leading questions.\textsuperscript{326}

Here, Schafer portrays psychoanalysis as an essentially narrative process, and one in which the autobiographical account produced is co-authored by the analysand and the analyst. In this cooperative effort, the analysand provides the loose story – an account involving certain practical alternatives, how she feels about these, the desires which might motivate them, the relation in which these desires and other mental events stand to existing values and commitments, and so on. Meanwhile, the analyst assists the analysand in shaping what is said into a cohesive sequence of events in which the patient is cast as the agential protagonist.

In telling her story, the analysand gathers those portions of the self which have been surreptitiously expelled, and reorders them. Certain values and commitments become \textit{hers} through this valuative and evaluative process. And so, these values commitments become \textit{her} through this valuative and evaluative process.\textsuperscript{327}

The self-analysis prescribed for the moral agent can have a similar effect. In telling \textit{her} story – in this context, inwardly – the agent can subsume what often show up as disparate sources of value and motivation under one roof. Values present become \textit{my} values; commitments made become \textit{mine}. In turn, these values, commitments, and the reasoned actions which they motivate, become \textit{me} – and, rather than what might otherwise seem like a disjointed mess, \textit{my} events become \textit{my} life.

Given what I have said about the self here and throughout, I suppose this goes without saying, but I’ll say it – I’m not suggesting, with the narrativity theorist, that the
self just is the story which we tell about ourselves. That grants the narrativity much too much power, in my opinion. I’m merely claiming that telling such stories aids us in making better sense of who we are in terms of values and commitments, of whom we would ultimately like to become in acting on these, and – directly related to each – which actions we definitely should and should not perform. This can help us in working towards, in some instances, pulling ourselves together, and in others, purposely taking ourselves apart. As with its primary end, though, this happy byproduct of action language, specifically, and analysis, generally, can only support the agent in achieving sufficient psychic reintegration. I turn now to discussion of action language’s coefficient in this: an aesthetic reorientation with respect to practical reasoning.

3.4: Reintegration and Aesthetics

Having reclaimed agency by means of the application of action language to self-analysis – and, as a result if this, having reclaimed those mental events necessary for autonomous valuation, evaluation, revaluation, and subsequent action – Richard, and Richard, have taken the foremost step in preparing to reintegrate psychically. However, one formidable obstacle remains in the path of each. A weighty choice must be made: for Richard, between his identity-conferring commitments to orchids and to act utilitarianism; and, for Richard, between his identity-conferring commitments to nonmaleficence and to act utilitarianism. Concurrently, a choice must be made in the case of both with regard to selfhood.
So, which course of action and corresponding identity should be chosen by each? What is the justification for choosing one commitment-identity pair over the other? And, in forfeiting some commitment with which the agent is so intimately connected, can he, in choosing, reintegrate to the point where his feelings of estrangement and self-estrangement significantly dissipate long-term? In answering these questions, we turn to discussion of what I will refer to as practical aestheticism – and, to a French postmodernist’s unconventional reading of the Greco-Roman ancients.

Foucault writes: “The principal target of [an early Stoic ethics] was an aesthetic one . . . The reason for [living as a Stoic] was the will to live a beautiful life, and to leave to others the memories of a beautiful existence.” Elsewhere, he writes: “The will to be a moral subject [was,] in Antiquity, mainly an attempt to . . . give one’s life a certain form in which one could recognize oneself . . . as a personal work of art.” With these passages, Foucault draws our attention to one way in which Greco-Roman moral motivation is glaringly dissimilar from modern moral motivation. In the case of the former, the moral supervenes on the aesthetic.

Put another way, in determining how she will live her life – which values she will instill within herself, which actions she will perform, and so on – the Stoic chooses to uniformly behave in what she takes to be a morally upright way. But, on top of recognizing that this is the objectively correct way to live, she chooses to live this way in deeming it a beautiful life. Put in terms of identity, she chooses to live this life because she desires to craft, and to preserve in future action, a beautiful self. For Foucault’s
Stoic, then, moral motivation coincides with personal motivation. Her moral reasons for action just are personal reasons. Given this, she does not fall prey to the emphatic psychic disharmony characteristic of Williams’s disintegration or Stocker’s schizophrenia; and, for this reason, she does not experience the crippling forms of alienation and self-alienation sometimes symptomatic of this more recalcitrant fragmentation.

Let’s contrast the Stoic’s motivating reasons with those had by the modern moral agent. In asking the contemporary consequentialist why we must always act in order to maximize utility, she is likely to reply with something along the lines of, *This is simply required. That’s that. If you really want me to, I can unpack Mill’s ‘proof,’ and offer explanation of why pleasure is the greatest good. But, to make a long story short, it is, and so, we should always act as its agent.* When asking a devout Kantian why he faithfully arranges his actions in accordance with the categorical imperative, he might respond with something like, *It’s the universal moral law – it applies to all rational beings, all the time. No exceptions.* When asking an orthodox Muslim why she chooses to live in line with sharī‘ah, she might simply point out that, *These rules were handed down to the Prophet by Allah – it’s all right there, in black and white, in the hadiths.*

In each of these cases – and, in most instances involving firm adherence to an impartialist ethics, whether philosophically, religiously, or intuitively grounded – motivating moral reasons are bound up with what is believed to be objective moral fact. Since the objectively moral is *prima facie* the impersonally moral; and since, left alone, impersonal and personal values more often than not bifurcate; then, psychic
disintegration, and resultant estrangement and self-estrangement, loom large for each of these agents. In order to counteract a trending threat of disintegration and alienation, such agents would do well to follow the Stoic’s lead in acclimating moral motivation along practical aesthetic lines. In demonstrating what I have in mind, let’s return to, Richard, and Richard. As I did above, I will take the place of each, reconvening self-analysis.335

Up to this point, I, Richard, have reoriented myself through the application of action language, having redescribed my desires, values, and commitments in terms of proper actions. In so doing, I have reestablished ownership of and control over these formative mental events. This allows me to survey them from a place of renewed power and relative peace. As things stand, though, I remain in a state of worsening disintegration, because I maintain commitment to both orchidology and to act utilitarianism. The time has come to choose between these projects – to choose between the selves associated with each. I choose act utilitarianism. And so, I choose to reaffirm my utilitarian self. In acting on this commitment, I further disintegrate my already fragmented self, but I instantaneously prop up a consistent, coherent replacement. As before, there is a temptation to say that that’s the whole story. But, once again, we need to delve deeper.

In reaffirming my utilitarian commitment, I mean to say a last farewell to orchidology. However, given that this project is integral to both my present self and to my present self-conception, this is much easier said than done. More than that, in making
this choice, it appears as though I am obliterating the personal for the impersonal, full stop. While staying true to my moral convictions, I am offering up my inmost personal commitment, and all such commitments, on the altar of maximal happiness. How can I make this sacrifice, and not fall into irreconcilable pieces? Surely I will pine for this project after the fact; and, just as surely, I will bitterly resent what I come to see as an objective usurper opposed to the personal in all forms. Once again, I’m torn – becoming alienated from my moral commitment, and so, from my moral self. It seems that in relinquishing the personal, I am permanently disassembling my self in such a way that I can’t possibly put Humpty Dumpty back together again.

Here, I qua analyst will, once more, emphasize my part in all of this. These are my desires, values, and commitments, and this is my practical dilemma. Like my valuing of the orchids, my valuing of utility did not fall from the sky. I’m responsible for the presence of these mental events. And, my general attraction to utilitarianism is not unaccounted for, either – it, too, is inarguably mine. Understanding this, I find myself in a space most conducive to deliberation. But, the practical conflict remains, staring me down. It is here – in self-analytically working towards a decision – that I supplement action language with practical aestheticism. While what follows is both a somewhat condensed and overly formal rendition of things, I imagine the ensuing internal dialogue going something like this:

Richard, as Analyst (hereafter Analyst): Clearly you’re drawn to act utilitarianism. You look upon committed utilitarian revolutionaries like

258
Trotsky with the greatest reverence. You value maximizing utility so much, in fact, that you were just on the cusp of setting aside all competing interests in order to devote yourself to this completely. But, why?

**Richard, as Analysand** (hereafter Analysand): Well, because maximizing utility is simply the morally required thing to do. There’s really nothing more to say.

**Analyst**: But, there is. If this were the case, and all that’s the case, there would be no accounting for what motivates your moral actions. Beliefs alone won’t cut the mustard, here. There must also be desires, values, pro-attitudes of some kind, providing the motivational push which causes you to act on your moral beliefs.

**Analysand**: Well, yes, that’s true. I value maximizing happiness and minimizing suffering above just about all else – maybe above *all* else. And, of course, there are desires which correspond to these values.

**Analyst**: What kind of desires?

**Analysand**: The desire to become a more consistent utilitarian, for one. I look at those who put their all into furthering social justice, and, as you said before, I feel tremendous admiration for them. I’d like to become more like them. Most of the time, at least – when I’m not absorbed with my orchids and other projects, that is.

**Analyst**: Who are these utilitarians that you look up to?
Analysand: Oh, just off the top of my head, my folks, my Uncle Sidney, Trotsky, Sidgwick, Mill and Harriet Taylor. Contemporarily, Peter Singer.

Analyst: And, these are your practical ideals?

Analysand: Yes, I guess I do look at them in that way – I’d very much like to become more like these people. And, at my best, I’m emulating them, attempting to internalize what I imagine motivating them.

Analyst: What is it about these individuals, specifically, that attracts you?

Analysand: Aside from rehashing their commitment to utilitarianism, it’s hard to say. That I guess. Well, that, and that they’re living up to – or least doing their best to live up to – the standards they’ve adopted. I admire that more than I can put into words. They’re certainly flawed – they’re human, after all. But, more often than not, they live by their ideals, and each has done a lot to alleviate suffering.

Analyst: Would it be fair to say that you view these persons as being beautiful selves – in the sense that you are personally drawn to them as practical ideals? And, that you’re attracted to their life choices, in part, in a personal rather than a merely objective way?

Analysand: Beautiful selves? Yes. You could say that, I suppose. In my mind, they’re beautiful persons, living beautiful lives. And, yes, their commitments, and the actions which flow out of these, resonate with me in a deeply personal way.
**Analyst**: And, you would like to more actively commit to utilitarianism for these reasons, at least partly – in order, in other words, to live what you take to be a more beautiful life, yourself? That is, in order to become a more beautiful self?

**Analysand**: While I haven’t thought about it in just those terms, I can appreciate what you’re saying. And, yes, those things are true. My utilitarian commitment is personally important to me, and resides at the center of my self-concept. In a way, I feel the most myself – or, at least the best version of myself – when taking part in this particular project. And, despite the sacrifices associated with it, I take great pleasure in living as a utilitarian, when I don’t fall short of demands. Which, I admit, is all too often.

**Analyst**: On the other hand, you feel a similar connection to your orchids. You value the orchids. You want to study them, and you want to study them – just as you want to want to become the best utilitarian agent that you possibly can.

**Analysand**: Oh, definitely. Orchidology is something that I grew up with, and something which remains important to me – and, it’s certainly something that I’d always miss if it were taken away. But, I do understand that I can’t remain committed to both projects. Not given the present state of things, and not given the brand of utilitarianism which I find the most
compelling – or, to go back to your phraseology, the type of utilitarianism which I find, in practice, the most *beautiful*.

**Analyst**: But, dabbling in both, you *are*, in a way, choosing – you’re choosing the orchids. Well, I guess you’re not choosing. But, you’re certainly letting the orchids be chosen *for* you, right?

**Analysand**: Yes, I get that. And, if I *were* to choose the orchids, *I* should choose the orchids. I shouldn’t let the circumstances do the choosing for me. I know that much. I’m definitely taking the easy way out by failing to actively *choose* the orchids. If I’m going to go that route, *I* should choose this project. And, I do love this project more than almost anything.

[...]

**Analyst**: So, orchidology it is, then?

**Analysand**: No. As difficult as it is to set this commitment aside, I’ve decided that increasing utility is not only more important than the orchids are, but it’s more important than the orchids are *to me*.

**Analyst**: Meaning what?

**Analysand**: Meaning, I’ve taken stock of my desires, values, and commitments – and, I’ve thought a great deal about the self I’d most like to *become*. And, I’d most like to become that consequentialist self whose sole project is relieving the pain of others. I’ll always appreciate the time that I spent with my orchids. And, there will very likely always be a void within
me where this project once stood – a space that utilitarianism simply can’t fill. But, I choose to live the life of an act utilitarian. And so, I choose to create and sustain an act utilitarian self. I’ll guide my actions in this commitment by considering beautiful utilitarian selves like those mentioned before. And, I’ll recreate myself, in part, in the image of these persons as I see them.

Analyst: But, in choosing utilitarianism – the essentially impersonal – over your orchids – the essentially personal – aren’t you giving up on reintegration, in that you’re denying yourself any present and future projects which are subjectively appealing and meaning-making? Aren’t you, in other words, giving up your very self, in sacrificing the personal, and giving up on any prospect for achieving an integrated self, going forward?

Analysand: Not according to what you pointed out before?

Analyst: What’s that?

Analysand: You asked me if, in addition to being attracted to utilitarianism for objective reasons, I was drawn to this way of life for personal reasons. For reasons stemming from my evaluation of utilitarians as, as you put it, being beautiful selves, and as living beautiful lives.

Analyst: So?

Analysand: So, I am drawn to utilitarianism in this way. And, given this, the reasons for my choosing to live as a utilitarian are largely – perhaps
primarily – *personal*, as opposed to being exclusively objective and impersonal. I want to become a better utilitarian, and I *want to* want to become a better utilitarian. More than anything else. And so, I will find personal fulfillment in this project. In acting on this, I am acting in order to, by definition, *self-fulfill*.

**Analyst:** Utilitarianism it is, then.336

What, in particular, has taken place in this exchange that we need to take note of? And, what work is practical aestheticism doing, here?

At the outset, we find Richard, in a state tending to disintegration, and, we can infer, experiencing the effects of estrangement and self-estrangement. In initiating self-treatment – again, we’ll stipulate – he first takes renewed ownership of those mental events which are standing at odds with one another. Next, he begins to reevaluate his existing values and commitments, focusing on the two stand-out projects: orchidology and utilitarianism. Richard considers the relative value that he confers to each of these, how they relate to his existing self-conception, and how they fit in with, or fail to fit in with, his idea of moral rectitude.

Despite a confidence on his part that he *should*, in a moral sense, choose utilitarianism over orchidology, the fact that he has not already actively recommitted betrays an uncertainty – and, a reluctance which grows out of the assumption that to commit wholeheartedly to act utilitarianism is to altogether forfeit the personal. Here, Richard qua analyst demonstrates to Richard qua analysand that this is not necessarily
so, drawing attention to some important factors that our patient has failed to take into consideration: that in addition to being drawn to utilitarianism for objective, impersonal reasons, Richard finds himself personally drawn to this ethics and to the life-choices which go along with it; in other words, that Richard doesn’t merely consider utilitarianism an objectively correct ethics, but a beautiful ethics and accompanying lifestyle, to boot.

Moreover, in addition to being objectively attracted to the utilitarian agent, Richard finds himself enchanted by the idea of someone sincerely pledging themselves to improving the state of the world to the greatest extent possible. Put another way, Richard does not merely consider the utilitarian moral agent an objectively upright person, but a beautiful self. Given these things, we can infer the following on behalf of the analysand: First, it is not so that a commitment to act utilitarianism necessarily clashes with all personal identity-conferring commitments – assuming, as in Richard’s case, that the commitment to act utilitarianism, itself, is the commitment with which one most strongly identifies. Second, so far from not being wholly incompatible with the personal, a commitment to act utilitarianism is, for some, the vehicle by which they can most successfully take part in aesthetically-guided self-fashioning. And so, despite what Williams and others have suggested, Richard can actively commit to act utilitarianism while retaining integrity.

In order to make the point another way, let’s return to IO. Recall that premise (6) of IO states: Strict adherence to any impartialist moral theory requires that the
adherent break any or all of her personal commitments, at any time. Since integrity requires that all persons make, with the intention of keeping, some personal commitment, some of the time; and since, at first glance, it seems that impartialist moralities will not allow for this; then, those committed to such moralities seem to be in trouble. However, those who advocate premise (6) have failed to take into consideration the potential for overlap between the impersonal and the personal, which can result from a reorientation of practical reasoning along aesthetic lines. Once we take this into consideration, it no longer seems to be the case that allegiance to act utilitarianism necessarily requires that Richard, contravene all personal commitments. In fact, he can only act upon his utilitarian commitment in acting upon his most cherished personal project, as these are one and the same. Once Richard, comes to recognize this, he is well on his way towards restoration and relative contentment.

With a little self-doctoring, then, Humpty Dumpty reassembles himself. But, this is a dissertation in moral philosophy, not fairy tales – so, unfortunately, while there is a happier than before, there is no Happily Ever After. Richard, has chosen to sacrifice his commitment to the orchids. And, as this was identity-conferring for him, he will, at least for a time, languish in this forfeiture. Again, in coming to this decision from an aesthetic perspective, the desires and values which motivated it have been significantly personalized. Given this, Richard, will not fragment across the personal-moral fault nearly to the extent that he otherwise might have. This means that he also will not experience the sometimes incapacitating forms of alienation and self-alienation speculated about.
above. He chose utilitarianism, and he chose it for the most personal of reasons – he chose to become a utilitarian self, because, in his eyes, this is the beautiful self he most wants to embody.\textsuperscript{339}

Still, a love not requited isn’t always a love easily lost. The orchids may return in attempt to woo Richard, back into their good graces. What should he do in order to ensure that we will not cave in in the face of this, involuntarily losing integrity, and threatening the self that he has autonomously chosen to create and sustain? A better question might be, What should he definitely not do? In the interest of neither enabling this suspended project nor, as a consequence, fragmenting in a more pronounced way later on, he should not repress those desires associated with it – he should not, to borrow once more from Frankfurt, designate these as outlaws. In explaining why this is so, let’s return to Freud a final time, and to his analysis of the Rat Man.

\textit{Rat Man} is the case-name given by Freud to a patient who sought his counsel regarding symptoms associated with what is now known as obsessive-compulsive anxiety disorder. To summarize: the Rat Man suffered from intrusive thoughts regarding the torture\textsuperscript{340} of the two people he loved the most – his father and his fiancée.\textsuperscript{341} Following such thoughts, the Rat Man felt compelled to perform mental rituals in order to both “protect” these would-be victims from their terrible fates, and to punish himself through a kind of ceremonial self-shaming. Freud surmised that all of this was rooted in conflicting thoughts which the patient had regarding both persons, the negative of which he had been denying to himself. This led to a partitioning of the self associated with those
negative thoughts and feelings. – a subconsciously-motivated splitting.\textsuperscript{342} Sharing the details of his plight during a session, Freud recalls that the Rat Man suddenly broke off his story in order to assure me that these [antagonistic and violent] thoughts [towards both his father and his fiancée] were entirely foreign and repugnant to him, and to tell me that everything which had followed in their train had passed through his mind with the most extraordinary rapidity. Simultaneously with the idea there always appeared a ‘sanction,’ that is to say, the defensive measure he was obliged to adopt in order to prevent the phantasy from becoming fulfilled.\textsuperscript{343}

In his particular instance, we’re dealing with especially bullish instantiations of estrangement and self-estrangement – as, the desires being quarantined were those which involved the intentional mistreatment of those that the Rat Man most cared about. Still, in considering Freud’s account, we can cull practical lessons which apply to virtually all of us some of the time.

One thing that we can certainly take away is an understanding that to castigate a mental event is often to empower it. With this in mind, let’s return to Richard.\textsubscript{y}. Having been enamored with orchidology, it is almost certain that the desire to renew this project will rear its head again, if it ever really ’leaves’ in the first place. Committing to utilitarianism over the orchidology does not magically constrain the latter in its appeal. Understanding that a potent desire to reup this project might materialize at any moment; and, further understanding that even merely placating this desire could lead down the primrose path towards disintegration; there is a temptation on Richard’s part to
forcefully disown it. For reasons already detailed, this is a misguided strategy. While Richard\textsubscript{y} should not give in to temptation here, he also should not relegate his tempter as something wholly foreign or illegitimate. Instead, he should own the desire, while not allowing it to dictate his actions.

Additionally, we can take this away from the Rat Man – aside from empowering it, to actively disown a mental event is often to more straightforwardly initiate a disintegration of the self. This is ironic, as we imagine Richard\textsubscript{y} renouncing his desire to practice orchidology in order to prevent this outlier from bringing about that very psychic state. However, as we recall from our discussion of action language, disowning a mental event – however potentially harmful we might consider it to be – will only more directly lead to a kind of fragmentation. Here, the agent, himself, is unwittingly doing the very dirty work that he intends to avert.

Having taken a hard look at what Richard\textsubscript{y}’s self-treatment might look like, let’s now turn attention to Richard\textsubscript{a} and see if we can’t also provide him with some relief and an outline for reintegration. As I did with Richard\textsubscript{y}, I will take the place of Richard\textsubscript{a}, reconvening self-analysis.

Up to this point, I, Richard\textsubscript{a}, have reoriented myself though action language, having redescribed each of my relevant mental events as proper actions. This, we recall, allows me to reaffirm both my ownership of these events, and my control over these events, setting the table for effective practical deliberation and autonomous choice. These conflicting desires, values, and commitments are mine. I empowered them, and I can
disempower them. Despite this first step towards psychic consolidation, I remain in a state of disintegration, since I remain committed to both nonmaleficence and to act utilitarianism; and, since I find myself in a position to drastically improve the lives of a multitude of people, but can only realize this state of affairs in harming a number of innocents.

With the clock ticking away, I have to choose. And, as with Richard{	extsubscript{v}}, in choosing between alternative commitments, I am also choosing between selves. I imagine the remainder of self-treatment going something like this:

**Richard{	extsubscript{a}} as Analyst** (hereafter Analyst): It’s apparent that utilitarianism is important to you. But, it’s equally clear that you can’t imagine yourself harming innocents, even if it’s in the name of diminishing suffering for untold others. But, this is what utilitarianism requires in your case.

**Richard{	extsubscript{a}} as Analysand** (hereafter Analysand): Yes, that’s right. I’m presently in a position to significantly improve the lives of countless people. But, in order to do so, I’d necessarily have to harm innocent people in the process. For obvious reasons, I can’t wrap my mind around bringing myself to do this. I feel literally sick at the thought of it. But, at the same time, I feel as though I’m copping out. If I don’t act, I also understand that I’m allowing the door to close on bettering things in such a far-reaching way – and so, I’m allowing the circumstances to decide for me.
**Analyst**: This is a terrible dilemma. Could you live with yourself if you took part in these revolutionary activities – knowing the totality of their consequences, I mean?

**Analysand**: I’ve asked myself the same question again and again. I don’t know. But, I also don’t know if I could live with myself knowing that I could’ve helped so many, but failed to do so because of personally intuited nonconsequentialist values and commitments. On the other hand, when I seriously consider what all will result from this action, I don’t see how I could remain morally intact in bringing it to fruition.

**Analyst**: It’s true that you will be undermining your identity-conferring commitment to nonmaleficence in acting. But, it’s also true that you will be reaffirming your commitment to act utilitarianism – and so, you will be immediately reintegrating yourself in terms of utilitarian values. Right?

**Analysand**: Yes, I suppose so.

**Analyst**: So, if you were to perform this action, you would not become perpetually disintegrated. Instead you would finally deconstruct the existing pieces of yourself, immediately reforming these into a unified utilitarian self.

**Analysand**: That makes sense. But wouldn’t I be reintegrating into a monstrous self, given the nature of the action in question?
**Analyst**: That all depends on who you ask, I guess. There’s definitely no shortage of people who would agree with that evaluation. But, this is a question to pose to yourself. In order to make it more concrete, rephrase the question in this way: Is Trotsky a monster? He, after all, took part in revolutionary activities which led to the harm of innocents.

**Analysand**: I see what you’re getting at. And, no, of course I don’t think of Trotsky as a monster. I admire him a great deal. And, while I certainly don’t condone everything that he did, I can think of actions which he performed that both led to the harm of innocents, and which I believe are morally sound. Morally required, even. At the same time, I think about someone like Trotsky – someone who basically sacrificed his entire life for the betterment of the majority – and, I imagine he must’ve been in constant states of alienation and self-alienation in giving up everything that mattered to him, personally.

**Analyst**: And so, you also wonder whether in devoting yourself to consequentialism as wholeheartedly as he did, you might enter a state of perpetual fragmentation and self-estrangement for those reasons, too?

**Analysand**: That’s right. That’s another concern – a far second, of course, to my worries about the legitimacy of the violence and the gravity of all that goes with that.
**Analyst**: I actually think that *that* should be your only concern. The fact that maximizing utility, in this case, also involves intentional violence to others.

**Analysand**: That’s certainly my primary concern, and the real reason for serious pause. But, how is that my only real concern of the two?

**Analyst**: Let’s think about the second worry that you just mentioned. You believe that in dedicating yourself to act utilitarianism, your attention will become cordoned off from all other projects – and, that’s true. But, you seem to mistakenly believe that in making this moral commitment your one and only, you also disconnect from the personal wholesale.

**Analysand**: Yes, that’s the way things look to me. I’m not saying this is a good reason not to become a full-on utilitarian self. I’m simply saying that in doing so I would seem to relinquish all that is of personal importance to me in the bargain – all that has to do with *me*. *Myself*. I would be committing what Huey Newton calls *revolutionary suicide*. Sacrificing my own life, figuratively, for the greater good.

**Analyst**: But, is this accurate? Think about it this way – as I said before, you are clearly moved by utilitarian values and have an obvious admiration for committed utilitarian agents like Trotsky. Right?

**Analysand**: Yes, that’s right.
**Analyst**: Consider what you’re actually admitting to here. You hold to identity-conferring utilitarian values and commitments. And, based on these, you have existing desires to maximize general happiness into which you are so invested that you’ve considered revoking your longstanding commitment to nonmaleficence in order to act on these exclusively. Who or what are *you*, if *you’re* not these values and commitments? These values and commitments that you claim to be essentially ‘self-undermining’?

**Analysand**: I see what you’re saying. There’s a sense in which the personal and the moral blend together for me – that in conceiving of myself in terms of my voluntary utilitarian commitment, I, in fact, am standing by those values which are most *me* – that just are *me*.

**Analyst**: Yes, but more than that, you seem to look to other utilitarians as guideposts, in a way. Markers by which you can make sense of yourself, morally. Is it safe to say, then, that these agents provide something like practical ideals for you? Persons you look to as paragons of excellence in further molding your own character?

**Analysand**: Certainly. Aside from merely admiring the Trotskys and Mills of the world, I do look to them as role models in a very definite way. Not necessarily in the mold of a WWJD? kind of thing, but, also not essentially different from that, either.
Analyst: Is it also safe to say, then, that your admiration for these persons sometimes crosses over into the purely personal? That in other words, you see them as beautiful selves, living beautiful lives, who you’d like to emulate for more than purely objective reasons?

Analysand: Sure, I’d say that. The life of service is a beautiful thing – the most beautiful thing. And so, these moral saints are certainly beautiful selves, as far as I’m concerned.

Analyst: In that case, in actively reaffirming your commitment to act utilitarianism, aren’t you also actively reaffirming your conception of the beautiful self?

Analysand: That’s one way to put it.

Analyst: And, in constructing what you take to be a beautiful self, aren’t you acting for reasons which are extremely personal?

Analysand: Yes.

Analyst: In that case, it seems like there is significant – if not potentially total – overlap between your moral and your personal values, commitments, and reasons for action. So much so, it seems, that concerns about an impoverished personal life are misplaced. So, again, the real dilemma comes down to whether or not you could and should bring yourself to take part in this revolutionary activity.

[...]
**Analyst:** Utilitarianism it is, then.

For the sake of relative brevity, and in the face of the enormity of the predicament itself, I’ll break off the self-analysis here. And, I’ll raise the questions which we asked and answered in the case of Richard_{y}, above: What, of particular importance to us, has taken place in this exchange? And, what work is practical aestheticism doing, here?

As with Richard_{y}, we come to Richard_{a} as he is tending towards disintegration – a major difference being that the latter is falling apart amidst a considerable moral dilemma. Here, one gut-feeling suggests that the utilitarian end justifies the means, and another that the cost of human life is too great even when taken in order to bring about the betterment of many more such lives. In order to break the stalemate, Richard_{a} begins to sift through the layers of consequence that his action and inaction may bring about. In self-treating, he isolates two issues which must be resolved before he can come to a practical decision. The first, and most obvious, has to do with the moral standing of the action, itself. While Richard_{a} is an intuitive act utilitarian, he has very understandable misgivings about what is required, here. The second issue – much more manageable – has to do with certain impositions and their connection with identity. Here, Richard_{a} raises the demandingness problem, again. Let’s consider these in opposite order.

Setting aside the action in question, Richard_{a} raises a “second worry” – namely, again, that in devoting himself to act utilitarianism, he will relinquish any claim on his self and personal satisfaction. Once more, this assumption is based on his conception of utilitarian ethics as it is taught in textbooks, as opposed to how it can be lived. Here, the
analyst redirects the analysand by drawing attention to the former’s personal feelings about utilitarianism and utilitarians. As with Richard_y, aside from taking act utilitarianism to be the objectively correct moral theory, Richard_a also views it as a beautiful ethics which adjoins a beautiful lifestyle; and, following from these, an ethics whose devotees are beautiful selves. Coming to this revelation, Richard_a sees that in choosing to commit to act utilitarianism, he is not sacrificing his self. Rather, he is working towards becoming the self that he most wants to be.

As it turns out, then, Richard_a, like Richard_y, stands in as a counterexample to IO premise (6). Since – let’s stipulate – his act utilitarian project is the identity-conferring commitment with which he makes sense of himself, this commitment to an impartialist ethics certainly must leave room for the personal in some instances. The commitment to act utilitarianism does not necessarily preclude one’s commitment to what is personally satisfying. Thus, in committing to utilitarianism for, at least in part, personal reasons; and, in acting for utilitarian reasons thereafter; Richard_a’s integrity is preserved.

To sum up, through self-treatment Richard_a comes to understand that his commitment to act utilitarianism is not nearly as one-sided as he had imagined. That, when considering his utilitarian values and commitment from an aesthetic perspective, these can disclose themselves as personal – and that, given this, the reasons for action which flow out of his commitment can also show up as motivators friendly to a robust subjective existence. In maximizing utility, Richard_a is also actively cultivating what he takes to be an integrated beautiful self – the quintessential personal project.
But, what about his initial worry? Is working to maximize utility, in this case, the morally right thing to do?

Unfortunately, this is just as up for grabs as it ever was – as, neither an action language reorientation nor practical aestheticism can provide any help at all in ascertaining moral truth. Our self-analytical technique cannot tell us what we should, in a moral sense, do. For these reasons, the imagined self-treatments and resultant deliberations of Richard₁ and Richard₂ could have just as easily produced the opposite results.³⁴⁴ But, this certainly isn’t a knock against the use of these tools in facilitating the reintegration of the already-committed, if momentarily ambivalent, utilitarian agent. My claim is that these can be used in tandem to this end – and so, in looking to answer less modest practical questions, the agent must look elsewhere.

So, our talking cure cannot aid us in determining right from wrong. But, can we use it more indirectly to this end? In other words, can we use our aesthetic reorientation in order to determine what the truly beautiful – and so, truly morally excellent – self looks like? Again, the answer is no. When it comes to such evaluations, different persons are going to hold extremely different conceptions of what beautiful selves amount to. This is because, naturally, different persons are going to be drawn to very different practical ideals. Some might suggest that, say, Solon and Pericles³⁴⁵ represent the epitome of lived beauty – others, oddly enough, will point to Leslie Van Houten and Johnny Mathis.³⁴⁶ Meanwhile, there’s no consensual criteria which we can effectuate in settling this dispute. John Kekes writes: “There is no ideal of personal excellence that any particular person is
required by reason to hold . . . There are usually many reasonable ideals about how one
might live . . .”\textsuperscript{347} \textit{a fortiori} with regard to \textit{beautiful} ideals. While you’re drawn to Alyosha
Karamazov and Helen Keller, I might gravitate towards real-life antiheroes, Iceberg Slim
and Valerie Solanas. There’s no accounting for taste, as they say.

This, I would argue, is perfectly okay, though. We do not need our aesthetic
perspective to make objective determinations – that’s against the very spirit of the thing.
For our purposes, we need this outlook to \textit{personalize} the \textit{impersonal}, in order to help up
reintegrate the disintegrating. And, with regard to this function, I argue that practical
aestheticism is extremely constructive.

But, can it help those such as Richard\textsubscript{a} who are desperately hung up on the barrier
which divides consequentialism and nonconsequentialism? Can approaching his dilemma
through an aesthetic lens aid him in coming to a practical conclusion – and, in a way in
which he chooses the utilitarian alternative? I think so.

I can imagine a self-treating and deliberating Richard\textsubscript{a} coming to terms with the
fact that he does, in fact, want to recommit himself to act utilitarianism – concluding
that, even in \textit{this} instance, the greatest happiness of the greatest number is the most
important thing. And, I can imagine Richard\textsubscript{a} coming to this conclusion, in part, in
recognizing that beautiful selves, for him, are utilitarian selves – and, that utilitarian
selves must be \textit{steeled} selves prepared to do what in any other set of circumstances would
be morally repellant.
You and I might disagree with Richard – With regard to his understanding of what is morally good. With regard to his evaluation of practical beauty. And, certainly with regard to the plans which flow out of these. But, those are different conversations for a different time.

3.5: Concluding Thoughts

I will close by providing some final thoughts regarding the conclusions drawn throughout. Here, I will briefly revisit some of the more important stops made along the way, framed by a return to the text which motivated much of this dissertation: Bernard Williams’s *A Critique of Utilitarianism*.

I opened Chapter 1 by discussing psychic disintegration generally, drawing from Freud’s theory of the fragmented psyche and his patented talking cure. There, I suggested that we might use these implements as patterns for, in turn, better understanding the problem of integrity and for treating the disintegrating moral agent. Following this, I initiated discussion of psychic disintegration and integration from within a specifically philosophical context by offering my formulation of Williams’s *Objection from Integrity* (IO).

As I stated at the outset, Williams has surprisingly little to say about what he takes integrity to be – especially given the work that it is supposed to do for him. Because of this, what I intended to accomplish above, in part, was the fleshing out of a conception of integrity which is Williamsian in spirit. In offering my own account, I first looked to take
what I could from Williams, himself. While his *Critique* is cluttered with casual references to the concept, he gestures towards a strict understanding of integrity only twice.

First, he writes: “Because our moral relation to the world is partly given by [our moral feelings], and by a sense of what we can or cannot ‘live with,’ to come to regard those feelings from a purely utilitarian point of view . . . as happenings outside one’s moral self, is to lose one’s moral identity; to lose, in the most literal way, one’s integrity.”

And, several pages later: “[To ask the agent to act in order to maximize utility at all times,] is to make him into a channel between the input of everyone’s projects . . . and the output of optimific decision; but this is to neglect . . . the projects and attitudes with which he is most closely identified. It is thus, in the most literal sense, an attack on his integrity.”

Taking these passages into consideration in the context of his larger discussion – along with things said by and about Williams, elsewhere – I formed my own working definition of integrity in terms of sufficient integration of the self. Happily, and in part, I’m sure, because it this is my extrapolation, this notion of integrity is very much at home with my own intuitions about the connections between value, commitment, autonomous choice, action, and identity.

Following my initial discussion of these concepts, I went on to further fill in my understanding of the self, of those events which comprise it – primarily identity-conferring values and commitments, or what Williams refers to as ground projects – and to introduce the pair of reorientations which I later put to work in helping the
disintegrating moral agent to self-analytically reintegrate: action language and practical aestheticism. I closed the chapter by critically appraising the two extremes of psychic integration, *psychic perfection* and *psychic disarray*.

In Chapter 2, I cataloged the necessary conditions of personhood, of selfhood, and then of moral selfhood, emphasizing the importance of the capacities for valuation, evaluation, and revaluation. Following Williams, I suggested that it is largely involvement with certain *projects* that allow us to make sense of our own practical identities; and, that those projects to which we confer the most value, and so, with which we most directly make sense of ourselves, are our *commitments*. As Williams points out, we can commit ourselves to things as varied as “a person, a cause, an institution, a career, [our] own genius, or the pursuit of danger”\(^{351}\) – virtually anything that is valuable and meaning-making, broadly construed, is fair game. I closed this chapter by suggesting that it is principally in terms of *moral* identity-conferring commitments and accompanying values that we understand the moral self.

Having discussed in detail what selfhood and moral selfhood come to, I opened Chapter 3 by reintroducing the problem of psychic disintegration in the face of a commitment to an impartialist ethics. Here, I introduced two full-fledged selves, in Richard\(_y\) and Richard\(_a\) – a pair of moral agents committed to act utilitarianism, but simultaneously committed to competing nonoptimific projects. Recall that Richard\(_y\) was committed to orchidology, which he valued greatly and found personally fulfilling; and, that Richard\(_a\) was committed to nonmaleficence, to which he was both objectively and
subjectively drawn. In order to push our moral theory, I stipulated that in the case of each – as with Williams’s George and Jim – a utilitarian calculus determined that forfeiting the nonoptimific project in the name of maximizing utility is “obviously” the right thing to do.\textsuperscript{352} But, Williams suggests, performing these actions – and, more basically, uniformly acting in order to maximize utility – is incompatible with the preservation of one’s integrity.\textsuperscript{353} Why?

Williams responds to the question by raising and answering one of his own: “What projects does a utilitarian agent have? As a utilitarian he has the general project of bringing about maximally desirable outcomes.”\textsuperscript{354} Note that the committed utilitarian seemingly has a project: utility-maximization. This is because the present state of affairs will not allow for his participation in secondary, nonoptimific projects. Richard\textsubscript{y} cannot remain committed to both orchidology and to act utilitarianism (on act utilitarianism’s terms); likewise, Richard\textsubscript{a} cannot remain committed to both nonmaleficence and to act utilitarianism (on act utilitarianism’s terms). And so, the utilitarian calculus required each to relinquish his nonconsequentialist project.

To this, Williams objects: “How can a man . . . come to regard as one satisfaction among others . . . a project or attitude round which he has built his life, just because someone else’s projects have so structured the causal scene that that is how the utilitarian sum comes out?”\textsuperscript{355} Answering with the average Joe in mind, he just can’t. I readily concede to Williams that those whose identity-conferring commitments are bound up with nonconsequentialist values and projects cannot actively commit to act utilitarianism.
without losing integrity, i.e., without destabilizing their very selves. However, it is misleading to conclude from this that an active commitment to act utilitarianism is essentially integrity-undermining. The average Joe might very well willfully disintegrate following a change of heart, immediately reintegrating as a solidified utilitarian self. On the other hand, the uncommon Joe – a Richard_y or a Richard_a – might find himself already wed to his utilitarian commitment in such a way that to act against it would be to undermine his integrity.

But, in devoting their lives exclusively to the betterment of the majority, haven’t Richard_y and Richard_a lost something important to individual selfhood? Haven’t they become cogs in the utility machine? Williams writes:

Let us . . . go back to the agent as utilitarian, and his higher-order project of maximizing desirable outcomes. At this level, he is committed only to that: what the outcome will actually consist of will depend entirely on the facts, on what persons with what projects and what potential satisfactions there are within calculable reach of the causal levers near which he finds himself . . . He is the agent of the satisfaction system who happens to be at a particular point at a particular time . . . His own decisions as a utilitarian agent are a function of all the satisfactions which he can affect from where he is: and this means that the projects of others, to an indeterminately great extent, determine his decision.

There is certainly a sense in which the steadfast utilitarian agent is merely adhering to the requirements of the utilitarian calculus. And so, his decisions are dependent upon the actions of others in a direct way. However, his decision to respond to the utilitarian calculus in the first place is his own. While the agent qua utility-maximizer must follow through with what will lead to the greatest happiness for the greatest number, and while this is informed by the actions and inactions of others, he has
autonomously chosen to act in order to bring about the greatest happiness for the greatest number. Moreover, insofar as he has made this decision from an aesthetically-charged place, this choice of lifestyle and of self is extremely personal. If, at some point, the agent comes to value other things over utility, he can, and should, reevaluate his commitments and consider working towards becoming a different self – a project potentially facilitated by the kind of two-pronged self-analysis considered above.

Back to this ‘talking’ self-treatment. I have given some indication of what that might look like, in reorienting one’s thinking through both the application of action language and of practical aestheticism. But, what’s the ‘prescription,’ here? How often should the moral agent take part in this therapeutic dialogue? As often or as seldom as it is likely helpful. During those times when the agent is struggling with feelings of agential impotence in the face of his own conflicting desires, values, projects, and commitments, the application of action language might be of use; during those times when the agent is struggling with feelings of alienation and self-alienation due to the demandingness (and specific demands) of a chosen impartialist ethics, the application of practical aestheticism might be use. And certainly, I hope I have shown, both can be used together to effectively treat outright psychic disintegration in the face of a practical dilemma. This is the case no matter what one’s default morality consists of.

Since my solution to the problem of the disintegration suffered by the modern moral agent borrows so heavily from psychoanalysis, I think it us only fitting to close with something native to that setting. So, I am going to offer a kind of disclosure – or, put
more accurately, to point out that this dissertation, itself, serves in this way. Nietzsche has observed that philosophical studies belong to a species of “confession.” These treatments, he goes on to say, may be read as “unconscious memoirs,” often betraying the anxieties peculiar to their authors.

In this same spirit, Stuart Hampshire has noted that, on the whole, there are only two inducements for doing philosophy. The germane of which, in this case, is the seeking of a kind of salvation. Coupling these, we might view one’s longstanding philosophical preoccupations as exposing the complexion of his own sources of agitation, as well as revealing his intuitions about the sources of a hoped-for fix.

I think there is a lot to be said in favor of these observations. And, given that I don’t take relative novices like myself to be an exception to either, this dissertation may be construed as something very personal; and so, as a consultation regarding, and a prescription intended to remedy, a problem which I can appreciate firsthand. At the same time, I certainly hope that some of what I have said here might be of use (or, at least of interest) to all of those who take seriously impartialist ethics, selfhood, and integrity – and, who are attuned to the sometimes contentious association of these.

Notes

I am using the term act utilitarianism in the standard way to refer to that moral theory which, to borrow from Bernard Williams, suggests that “the [morally] right action is that which out of the actions available to the agent brings about or represents the highest degree of . . . happiness [in that particular instance] (1973, p.86).” Rather than using the
term act utilitarianism, Williams, himself, refers to this as one instance of “direct” utilitarianism (Ibid., p.81).


I am in no way suggesting that one’s commitment to Trotskyism (or any brand of Marxism, for that matter) necessary leads one to adopt act utilitarianism (or any brand of consequentialism, for that matter) as her own moral code. So too, I am in no way suggesting that one’s commitment to act utilitarianism (etc.) necessary leads one to adopt Trotskyism (etc.) for her own socio-political ideology. There are many Trotskyists who are not act utilitarians, and there are certainly many more act utilitarians who are not Trotskyists. I am using the example of Trotskyism as an ideological and practical commitment because Rorty mentions it, specifically, in his anecdote. I am sticking with act utilitarianism, again, as it is generally held to be the most egregious violator of individual integrity of all mainstream modern moral theories. Melding the two will provide a hard case, such that if what I have to say about the retention of integrity on the part of he who is both a committed and Trotskyist and a committed act utilitarian is compelling, it will likely hold also for many similarly difficult cases – and certainly for those involving what are taken to be lesser violators of integrity, such as Kantianism and contractarianism.

I will add, though, that Trotskyism (and Marxism, more generally) meshes well with act utilitarianism; and it seems that Trotsky thought along these lines without coming right out and saying so. He writes: “A means can be justified only by its end. But the end in its turn needs to be justified. From the Marxist point of view . . . the end is justified if it leads to increasing the power of man over nature and to the abolition of the power of man over man (1966, p.40).” Bentham (2011), Mill (2006), and other utilitarians, of course, would each argue that Trotsky has stopped short here, suggesting that the institution of the power of humankind over nature, and the abolition of the oppression of one class of persons by another class of persons, are worthy ends only insofar as these states of affair lead to the greatest happiness for the greatest number of sentient beings. Albert Camus – a later-life opponent of both Marxism and act utilitarianism – links the two here: “In the Marxian perspective, a hundred thousand corpses are nothing if they are the price of happiness of hundreds of millions of men. But the sure death of millions of men for the hypothetical happiness of the survivors seems too high a price to pay (1964, p.36).”
I am using the term *violence* in a standard way, in order to denote those actions, according to Virginia Held “[which] usually sudden, predictably and coercively inflicting injury on a person (1984, p.606).” And, by political violence, I mean any “violent action against individuals or groups for political or social reasons (Ibid., p.607).” See also Robert Paul Wolff (1969) and Virginia Held (2004, esp. p.62-28).

I am using the term *terrorism* in a standard way, in order to denote those activities which involve, according to Charles Tilly, “[the] asymmetrical development of threats and violence against enemies [and bystanders] outside the forms of political struggle routinely operating within the current regime . . . (2004, p.9)” Regarding the desired ends of terrorism, Tilly adds: “In addition to whatever harm [terrorism] inflicts directly, it sends signals – signals that the target is vulnerable, that the perpetrators exist, and that the perpetrators have the capacity to strike again. The signals typically reach three different audiences: the targets themselves, potential allies of the perpetrators, and third parties that might cooperate with one or the others. Although some users of terror . . . operate on the theory that destruction of evil objects is a good in itself, most terror supports demands for recognition, redress, autonomy, or transfer or power. Considered as a strategy, terror works best when it alters or inhibits the target’s disapproved behavior, fortifies the perpetrators’ standing with potential allies, and moves third parties toward greater cooperation with the perpetrators’ organization and announced program (Ibid., p.9).” See also Jeremy Waldron, 2004.

Compare what Tilly has said above regarding the intended audiences of terrorism with the testimony provided by anarchist terrorist Émile Henry during his capital trial; Henry was found guilty of murder after a bomb which he planted at the Carmaux Mining Company detonated, killing several police officers: “I wanted to show the bourgeoisie that henceforth their pleasures would not be untouched, that their insolent triumphs would be disturbed, that their golden calf would rock violently on its pedestal until the final shock that would cast it down among the filth and blood. At the same time, I wanted to make the miners understand that there is only one category of men, the anarchists, who sincerely resent their sufferings and are willing to avenge them. Such men do not sit in parliament like Monsieur Guesde and his associates, but they march to the guillotine (1986, p.193).”

See Sigmund Freud (1999, p.3-17) and Stanley Jackson (1999, esp. p.98).

Richard Rorty, 1999, p.6-7. Recall from section 2.4 that the self is sufficiently rational; capable of deep self-reflection and self-knowledge; capable of perceiving the unity of consciousness; capable of autonomous action; temporally-situated and aware of this; psychologically-continuous and aware of this; capable of valuing and evaluating; capable of taking part in projects, and is a person who takes part in some projects; capable of making and keeping commitments, and is a person who makes and keeps some
commitments, at least some of which are identity-conferring commitments; and, insofar as she has a moral self, is capable of making and keeping moral commitments, and is a person who makes and keeps some moral commitments, some of which may be identity-conferring commitments.

We can tell from the brief excerpt provided above that RR is certainly a self. Among his projects, and perhaps his commitments, is the study of orchid variety in the northeastern United States; among his commitments is the bringing about of an overall better state of affairs throughout the world according to Trotsky’s system of values. And, the fact that in choosing to spend time studying orchids as opposed to furthering his Trotskyist project causes him to feel pangs of conscience seems to suggest that his morality is intrinsically connected with his social-political beliefs and commitments, and that, perhaps, his commitment to this exists in form of an identity-conferring commitment. I will speculate further – and, in some instances, make stipulations for the sake of making certain points – about RR’s set of values, projects, commitment, and the like, as this chapter goes on.

It should be noted here that, in *Trotsky and the Wild Orchids,* Rorty is arguing against the “single-mindedness” which would require a choice on the part of his childhood self – a “purity of heart” which he describes as “the attempt to will one thing . . . gone rancid (Ibid., p.13).” While in most cases – perhaps in his own – it is certainly so that one need become an outright fanatic about any one commitment to the detriment of all other values and projects, when it comes to act utilitarianism, hard choices like this must be made due to the theory’s demandingness. More will be said about this, connected with negative responsibility, and the section proceeds. Compare this point with Richard Rorty, 1999b, esp. p.39-71.

\[242\] I am using the term *consequentialism* in the standard way to refer to that normative theory which, to borrow from David Sosa (1993) suggests that “It is right for S to do A . . . iff no total state of affairs that would be a consequence of S’s doing any alternative to A would be better than the total state of affairs that would be a consequence of S’s doing A.” My focus here will be on hedonistic consequentialism, exclusively – more specifically, act utilitarianism.


\[243\] Bernard Williams, 1973, p.95. Here, he elaborates on the distinction between personal responsibility as it is more commonly understand, and negative responsibility: “There are certain situations in which the causation of the situation, the relation it has to what I do, is in no way remote or problematic in itself, and entirely justifies the claim that the situation is a consequence of what I do: for instance, it is quite clear, or reasonably clear,
that if I do a certain thing, this situation will come about, and if I do not, it will not. So from a consequentialist point of view it goes into the calculation of consequences along with any other state of affairs accessible to me. Yet from some, at least, non-consequentialist points of view, there is a vital difference between some such situations and others: namely, that in some a vital link in the production of the eventual outcome is provided by someone else’s doing something. But for consequentialism, all causal connexions are on the same level, and it makes no difference, so far as that goes, whether the causation of a given state of affairs lies though another agent, or not (Ibid., p.95, emphasis is the author’s own).”

Elsewhere, Williams writes: “The basic bearer of value for Utilitarianism is the state of affairs, and hence, when the relevant causal differences have been allowed for, it cannot make any further difference who produces a given state of affairs: if S1 consists of my doing something, together with consequences, and S2 consists of someone else doing something, with consequences, and S2 comes about just in case S1 does not, and S1 is better than S2, then I should bring about S1, however prima facie nasty S1 is. Thus, unsurprisingly, the doctrine of negative responsibility has its roots at the foundation of Utilitarianism; and whatever projects, desires, ideals, or whatever I may have as a particular individual, as a Utilitarian agent my action has to be the output of all relevant causal items bearing on the situation, including all projects and desires within causal reach, my own and others. As a Utilitarian agent, I am just the representative of the satisfaction system who happens to be near certain causal levers at a certain time. At this level there is abstraction not merely from the identity of agents, but, once more, from their separateness, since a conceivable extension or restriction of the causal powers of a given agent could always replace the activities of some other agent, so far as Utilitarian outcomes are concerned, and an outcome allocated to two agents as things are could equivalently be the product of one agent, or three, under a conceivable redistribution of causal powers (1999d, p.4 emphasis is the author’s own).


244 Bernard Williams, 1973, p.84.

245 Bernard Williams, 1973, p.94.

246 Aside, of course, from taking into account the agent’s “upkeep” as an effective utilitarian agent. Even the cog in the machine needs to be greased once in a while.
However, this routine maintenance cannot justify overindulgence in any essentially personal projects to which the agent feels connected.

247 Conceding that this is necessary to avoid or alleviate burnout on the part of the moral agent.

248 Williams writes: “A feature of utilitarianism is that it cuts out a kind of consideration which for some others makes a difference to what they feel about [cases such as those involving George and Jim]; a consideration involving the idea . . . that each of us is specially responsible for what he does, rather than for what other people do. This is an idea closely connected with the value of integrity (1973, p.99).” And, elsewhere he writes: “Utilitarianism strikingly abstracts from [the separateness of persons] . . . persons lose their separateness as beneficiaries of the Utilitarian provisions, since in the form which maximizes total utility, and even in that which maximizes average utility, there is an agglomeration of satisfactions which is basically indifferent to the separateness of those who have the satisfactions; this is evidently so in the total maximizations system, where the agglomeration occurs before the division (1999, p.3).” See also Nancy Davis (1980, esp. p.22-25)

249 In using the term nonconsequentialism, I mean to refer to those normative theories which, to borrow from Kai Nielsen (1972, p.219) “[maintain] that there is a privileged moral principle or cluster of moral principles, prescribing determinate actions, with which it would always be wrong not to act in accordance with no matter what the consequences.” While little hinges on this, I specifically have in mind here action-based systems of ethics (e.g., deontological and contractual moralities) as opposed character-based systems of ethics (e.g., virtue-based and care-based moralities).

250 An undertaking which, for my two cents, is likely to be perpetually stymied by the nature of the conflict, itself.

251 This is not to suggest that embracing act utilitarianism – or, for that matter, showing the theory some degree of sympathy – is a necessary condition for conceding that there are some projects which should be abandoned in the name of morality. Williams (1973), for instance, writes: “What if [performing the optimific action] conflicts with some project of mine? This, the utilitarian will say, has already been dealt with: the satisfaction to you of fulfilling your project . . . [has] already been through the calculating device and [has] been found inadequate. Now in the case of many sorts of projects, that is a perfectly reasonable sort of answer.”

252 Or, depending on one’s interpretation of the theory, those actions which are intended to bring about or are likely to bring about the best overall state of affairs.
253 Bernard Williams, 1999f, p.40.

254 I have chosen to concentrate on acts of political violence for numerous reasons. Among these are: First, since our working example is committed to Trotskyism, the possibility that he might be called to perform such actions does not seem especially far-fetched. Second, irregular political violence – especially since the agent understands that his actions could unintentionally cause harm to the innocent – provides an extremely hard case. There are historical examples, cited in passages to come, of radicals who, while beholden to a kind of revolutionary consequentialism, seem to admit in print that their own actions, and like actions, are incompatible with integrity as personal integration; Third and finally, acts of irregular political violence, unlike the fictitious thought experiments often favored by philosophers, are actual and are constantly being performed throughout the world, for good or bad – and so, I believe that these are matters which should be considered much more often in the analysis of moral systems and their applications.

255 Other nonconsequentialists would not even bother to lodge a response at this point based on what the utilitarian’s deliberations apparently betray about him, more generally – Elizabeth Anscombe writes: “. . . if someone really thinks, in advance, that it is open to question whether such an action . . . should be quite excluded from consideration – I do not want to argue with him; he shows a corrupt mind (1958, p.17).”

256 Smart writes: “Even in my most utilitarian moods I am not happy about this consequence of utilitarianism [i.e., about its allowance of what are, all things being equal, morally repugnant means to the morally best end]. Nevertheless, however unhappy about it I may be, the utilitarian must admit that he draws the consequence that he might find himself in circumstances where he to be unjust [or otherwise what is commonsensically taken to be immoral in his actions]. Let us hope that this is a logical possibility and not a factual one. In hoping thus I am not being inconsistent with utilitarianism, since any injustice [or otherwise unsavory consequences of optimific actions] causes misery and do can be justified only as the lesser of two evils. The fewer the situations in which the utilitarian is forced to choose between the lesser of two evils, the better he will be please (1973, p.71).”

Harry Frankfurt seems to be equally hopeful, but more optimistic: “There is no reason why a utilitarian with a specific set of personal values should not make to them a commitment that is just as wholehearted as his expectation that he will never encounter circumstances in which maintaining those values would require him to sacrifice well-being . . . Without jeopardizing integrity in any way, someone who is committed to a principle of conduct may acknowledge that circumstances are conceivable in which it would be reasonable for him to violate the principle and in which he would indeed violate
it. For if he is full convinced that none of those circumstances will occur, he will be equally convinced that his principle will never require him to perform actions that his commitment forbids (2007, p.180).” Unfortunately for the utilitarian, these very circumstances are immediate and around every corner.

257 Elizabeth Ashford describes our situation as being in a constant state of moral bad luck: “. . . the source of the extreme demandingness of [act utilitarianism] is that the current state of the world is a constant emergency situation; there are continually persons whose vital interests are threatened and, given modern communications, the relatively well-off are continually able to help them . . . We might consider these extreme situations, in which agents’ objective integrity is threatened, to be cases of moral bad luck. The threat to integrity in the current state of the world can be seen as arising from the fact that we have moral bad luck to be living in a constant emergency situation, which results in an irresolvable conflict between fundamental moral and personal commitments . . . Utilitarianism makes this conflict explicit, by emphasizing the moral seriousness of omissions. According to utilitarianism, when an agent fails to help another’s urgent interests in order to pursue her own less serious interests, this should be seen as constituting a trade-off (albeit a passive one) between her and the other person’s interests . . . [The] acknowledgement that in the current state of the world agents’ objective integrity is inevitably threatened, I suggest, is entirely appropriate. When agents’ pursuit of their ground projects conflicts with their saving others’ vital interests, this poses a problem for agents leading integrated good lives which should not be viewed as resolvable . . . [A] plausible version of utilitarianism would not threaten agents’ objective integrity if the state of the world were different (2000, p.430-436).” I agree. But, of course, the world is permeated with suffering – and, there is no real prospect for the kind of drastic improvement that Ashford is speculating about. See also Loren Lomasky 1987, esp. p.29.

258 As Kai Nielsen reminds us: “Violence is an evil never to be engaged in lightly and to be reprobated under normal circumstances. If there is a nonviolent way of attaining an end, then it is, everything else being equal, to be used rather than the violent alternative (1977, p.522)” And elsewhere: “Political violence, like violence generally, is in need of a very special justification . . . Bombs maim and kill. Violence gives rise to suffering and acute distress. Violence is plainly an evil and if it is ever justified it must be justified as a choosing of the lesser evil. My argument is that sometimes it is the lesser evil. When violence is a response to severe and protracted injustice and oppression, when there is extensive and reliable evidence for believing that no non-violent means for correcting the situation will be available in a reasonable length of time and when we have good grounds for believing that the proposed violence will (everything considered) cause less suffering and degradation than the present injustice and oppression is causing, then the course of violence is justified (1982, p.25).” Nielsen goes on to admit that making certain that each
of these conditions hold is much easier said than done. For the purposes going forward with our argument, then, we will simply assume that these conditions are the case.


260 And, mutatis mutandis, a buffer which shields the committed Kantian, contrarian, divine command adherent, etc.

261 After reviewing the literature extensively, Spencer Carr and Howard Kamler come as close to anyone to expressing the position which I advance throughout section 3.2; although Carr goes a bit further than I am willing to, calling Williams’s position an outright “nonstarter (1976, p.241).” He suggests that if a moral agent has standing utilitarian commitments (“U-commitments”), then acting for reasons which flow out of these (“U-reasons”) cannot lead to a loss of integrity. Carr writes: “The utilitarian is not so much asking [the agent] to act against his continuing project as he is urging him to adopt a more utilitarian project. And this is what [the agent] does if he comes to accept U-reasons as legitimate grounds for modifying his position (Ibid., p.243).” Compare this with what Howard Kamler says: “While Williams wants to dismiss utilitarianism as a serious contender for the moral life . . . he has actually set up a false dichotomy in the first place. The fact of the matter is, a fully moral individual might very well be a utilitarian and someone immersed in the personal point of view. Quite simply, she would be the individual who has made her utilitarian perspective another of her most deeply held life concerns and projects. That is, she identifies with utilitarianism. And if it turns out that she so identifies with it to the point where it is near the top of her personal value hierarchy, she would do all in her power to make certain that she not compromise the principle. For to do that would itself be a terrible blow to her (utilitarian) self (2002, p.133, emphasis is the author’s own).” Not to nitpick, but I would suggest to Kamler that, given the demandingness of utilitarianism, this commitment would require preeminence, not merely a special place within the pecking order.

I believe that what Carr and Kamler say is correct, so far as it goes – and, I will expand upon these positons throughout the following section. However, given the essentially impartial and impersonal nature of utilitarian values, reasons, and commitments, I believe that something additional must be brought to the table in order to forestall psychic disintegration long-term for the utilitarian moral agent – and, this something else is the action language orientation and aesthetic approach to practical reasoning that I discuss in sections 3.3 and 3.4.


263 In very rare cases involving pronounced ambivalence, autonomous choice might become impossible. Harry Frankfurt describes such instances: “[Where an agent cannot
seem to choose between opposing objects of love, he becomes] *volitionally fractured*. His will is unstable and incoherent, moving him in contrary directions simultaneously or in a disorderly sequence (2004, p.92, emphasis is mine).” While deliberate choice between two possibilities is not feasible here, inaction often forces a decision made on behalf of the agent. Elsewhere, Frankfurt makes this same point, but specifically in terms of conflict between second-order volition: “If there is an unresolved conflict among someone’s second-order desires, then he is in danger of having no second-order volition; for unless this conflict is resolved, he has no preference concerning which of his first-order is to be his will. This condition, if it is so severe that it prevents his from identifying himself in a sufficiently decisive way with *any* of his conflicting first-order desires, destroys him as a person. For it either tends to paralyze his will . . . or it tends to remove him from his will so that his will operates without his participation. In both cases he becomes . . . a helpless bystander (2007a, p.21, emphasis is the author’s own).” And, still elsewhere talk about this is terms of a lack of wholeheartedness: “Another sort of division occurs when there is lack of coherence within the realm of the person’s higher-order volitions themselves. This . . . is a matter of . . . whether the highest order preferences concerning some volitional issue are *wholehearted* . . . In the absence of wholeheartedness, the person is not merely in conflict with forces ‘outside’ him; rather, he himself is divided (2007b, p.165, emphasis is the author’s own).” See also Harry Frankfurt, 2007c, esp. p.178.

In truly Shakespearean circumstances, there is always a third and more drastic option to tragic practical dilemmas; “Suicide . . . could be chosen [autonomously by the agent], rationally and deliberatively, as an act expressing one’s uncompromising commitment to [two or more discrepant values or projects] and one’s indignation at a world that offers only such intolerable alternatives (S. I. Benn, 1984, p.34).” Here, the agent is in no way *volitionally fractured*, in Frankfurt’s sense of the term; in response to what we judges to be an impossible choice between two things, he both refuses to choose *and* refuses to allow his inaction constitute a choice on his part. He autonomously chooses, instead, to take his own life as a form of rebellion against the very circumstances with which he is presented. See also Jean-Paul Sartre, 1999, esp. p.64-66.


265  Sigmund Freud, 1989c, p.73.

266  The very same questions can and should be posed irrespective of whether we stipulate that Richard chooses to affirm his commitment to act utilitarianism or his commitment to the study of orchids.

267  I am discussing integrity in terms of necessary conditions as opposed to both necessary and sufficient conditions here because the focus of much of what follows will be placed on commitment, specifically. It is worth noting, though, that integrity as I am unpacking
involves other factors – valuation, evaluation, revaluation – as well. See Chapter 2 for detailed discussion of all components of integrity.

268 Williams’s own fictitious accounts of George and Jim provide great examples of devotion to such moral/personal hybrid commitments: the commitment never to take part in research which could produce innovations in chemical and biological weapons on the part of George, and the commitment never to intentionally kill an innocent person on the part of Jim. See Chapter 1, footnote 39 for initial discussion of these. While certainly moral commitments, these also show up for George and Jim as deeply personal – that is, as commitments with which each agent makes sense of himself as the individual self that he is.


272 Kant writes: “It matters not that a man lives long . . . what matters is, that so long as he lives, he should live honorably, and not dishonour the dignity of humanity. If he can no longer live in that fashion, he cannot live at all; *his moral life is then at an end* (2001b, p.150, emphasis is mine). And elsewhere, Kant writes: “[Moral feeling] is the susceptibility to feel pleasure or displeasure merely from being aware that our actions are consistent or contrary to the law of duty . . . No human being is entirely without moral feeling, for were he completely lacking in receptivity to it he would be morally dead; and if (to speak in medical terms) the moral vital force could no longer excite this feeling, then humanity would dissolve (by chemical laws, as it were) into mere animality and be mixed irretrievably with the mass of other natural beings (1999b, p.528-529, emphasis is mine).”

There are two things to note: first, in the initial quote (from Georg Ludwig Collin’s lecture notes from the winter semester of Kant’s course in 1785-1785, included in Kant’s *Lectures on Ethics*), it sounds as if Kant believes there actually are those who are morally dead; as, there are certainly persons who, according to his conception of this, routinely disrespect both their own humanity and the humanity of others, which is the criterion he offers here. Meanwhile, in the second quote (from his *Metaphysics of Morals*, first published in 1797), he seems to be talking about moral death in purely theoretical terms – as if the morally dead are a possibility, but not an actuality. Here, he also holes in on a lack of receptivity to moral feeling as a criterion. It is unclear whether this demonstrates a change of mind on Kant’s part, a discrepancy in what Kant stated versus what Collins recorded, or something else, entirely. Second, we should note that that in his allusion to the rational human devolving into an irrational animal, Kant establishes a strong
connection between what he refers to here as moral death and what others refer to as moral monstrosity.

273 Jeffrie Murphy, 1972, p.286-287, emphasis is the author's own. Similarly, Michael Pritchard writes: “Psychopaths . . . lack moral integrity because they lack moral concern entirely, having no guilt feelings, remorse, or concern for doing anything other than what they have an impulse to do . . . Psychopaths seem unable to feel shame. It is not clear what it would mean for them to act in ways they regard as ‘beneath their dignity’ . . . because they seem not to regard themselves in terms of dignity at all (1991a, p.87).” See also Adina Roskies (2006), and Jeanette Kennett and Steve Matthews (2008, esp. p.228).

274 Lynne McFall, 1987, p. 12. Speaking of this specifically in terms of integrity, McFall writes: “An attitude essential to the notion of integrity is that there are some things that one is not prepared to do, or some things that one must do. I shall call this the ‘Olaf Principle, in honor of e. e. cummings's poem about Olaf, the ‘conscientious object-or.’ This principle requires that some of one’s commitments be unconditional (Ibid., p.12, emphasis is the author’s own).”

275 The English words corrupt and corruption are derived from the Latin work corrumpere, meaning “to break entirely,” which is, itself, derived from the Latin rumpere (root of the English word rupture), meaning “to break” (Eric Partridge, 1958, p.575). See also Gabrielle Taylor, 1981, p.144.

276 Elizabeth Anscombe, 1958, p.17, emphasis is the author’s own. Dovetailing with this, Anscombe writes elsewhere: “If you really wanted to corrupt people by direct teaching of ideas, moral earnestness [on the part of the teacher] would, in fact, be an important item of equipment . . . [It would be] indispensable (2006, p.162).” Of course, the moral earnestness would presumably involve a seriousness about the subject which is accompanied by an error on the part of the teacher regarding the nature of moral goodness.

277 W. G. MacLagan, 1955, p.221, emphasis is the author’s own. Compare with Daniel Haybron: “The evil person is something of an alien, lying somewhere between the human and the demonic. We call her, not coincidentally, a monster. The appellation ‘evil’ thus serves to distance its subjects from the rest of us, to emphasize the profound moral and psychological gulf between them and us (2002, p.13 emphasis is the author’s own).” See also Alan Donagan (1978, p.188).

278 Recall, Kant holds that moral death involves the agent devolving “into mere animality and be mixed irretrievably with the mass of other natural beings (1999b, p.528-529).”
Since these “other natural beings” lack rationality, they cannot be moral agents or moral patients, for Kant.

279 Connecting these up, Harry Frankfurt notes that “rationality belongs distinctively to the essential nature of a human being. If we regard a judgment or a choice as opposed to human nature – that is, if it strikes us as unnatural or inhuman – we are inclined to think of it as a defect of reason (2007, p.186).

280 While these notions – moral death and moral monstrosity – are extremely interesting, there does not seem to be a standard story about exactly how the agent becomes corrupted in these ways. We cannot point to psychopathology; as, Kantians who talk about moral death in terms of, say, sociopathy seem to describe this disorder as the very instantiation of a kind of moral death and corruption, not its cause. In the case of the psychologically “normal,” it seems as though moral death is something which the agent brings upon herself – again, through the performance of some particularly reprehensible action with which she has misgivings – the performance of the action being, itself, a consequence of irrationality on the part of the moral agent. But, is this practical irrationality, itself, a part of the corruption, itself? Is it the hallmark of moral death? Or, on the other hand, is it a merely part of what leads to moral death and monstrosity? Also, why talk in such permanent terms? Recall that Kant, himself, describes moral death as the individual “irretrievably” following into thing-ness (1999b, p.528-529). Why think that moral death in the form of moral corruption is something that the agent cannot recover from? Why can’t the agent reform her moral self and bring it back into coherence with her self? I will set these questions aside and will not return to them here, but would like to point out that these concepts – while, again, potentially very useful within moral and moral psychological discourse – need some sorting out.

281 Alan Donagan, 1978, esp. p.188.

282 Kai Nielsen, 1972, p.219-220.

283 While there are certainly crucial differences between IO and what we might refer to as IO$^m$, it is not necessary to conceive of this as, itself, a stand-alone argument; and, I will consider it an abbreviated reformulation of IO where the integrity at jeopardy, here, is essentially moral integrity – and so, where the psychic integration at issue is that retained by the moral self. Since the moral self just is the moral component of the self, simpliciter, then disintegration of the moral self – spoken here in terms of moral death – also necessitates a disintegration of the self. IO$^m$ merely points out that act utilitarianism can undermine individual integrity in more than one way: it can attack the individual's personal integrity by forbidding personal projects such as Richard’s commitment to the study of orchids; and, it can attack the individual’s moral integrity by forbidding moral
commitments such as Richard’s vow never to harm innocents. Recall from the opening pages of this section, also, the personal and moral sometimes blend together. These are cases where the moral agent perceives objective reasons for performing an action (or refraining from doing so), and personally connects with and, so, identifies with performing this action (or refraining from doing so). Where a moral theory demands that the agent perform this action against both personal and moral commitments, then the self is facing a two-front encroachment, and both integrity and moral integrity are threatened.

On a related topic, it should be noted that performing what are taking to be monstrous actions – again, murder, torture, actions of indiscriminate violence – is not necessary for the loss of integrity, even for Williams. One can lose integrity by – returning to Richard, for the moment – breaking one’s commitment to studying orchids. Assuming this were an identity conferring commitment – or, for Williams, a “ground project” – breaking the vow to study orchids will constitute a loss of integrity. Performing a monstrous action is also not sufficient for the loss of integrity. However, given certain persons with certain commitments, caving in to performing these actions certainly can constitute the loss of integrity; and, given the nature of the actions at issue, this can make for an especially tragic case of psychic disintegration.

284 I am borrowing this term from Mikhail Bakunin’s description of Sergei Nechaev as “one of those young fanatics who know no doubts, who fear nothing [who are] believers without God, [and] heroes without rhetoric (Paul Avrich, 1974, p.9, emphasis is mine).” Aside from its Bakunian pedigree, I feel like fanaticism captures the single-mindedness required for one to be a true blue devotee of any impartialist ethics – “the purity of heart,” to borrow from Kierkegaard, “to will one thing (John Kekes, 1983, p.502, emphasis is mine).”

R. M. Hare describes him this way: “The fanatic . . . is not loyal to a group of people but to an ideal. He thinks, for example, that some . . . state of affairs in the world is so superlatively good that it ought to be pursued at whatever cost to anybody, including himself and his nearest and dearest (1972, p.79).” In the case of the act utilitarian this state of affairs is, of course, cashed out in terms of maximum happiness. There are competing foci of fanatical valuation, some of which are especially despicable: “It is said that Himmler, after visiting one of the extermination camps which his policy brought into being, and having seen with his own eyes the terrible things that he had been doing, returned shaken by the experience. But, because he was a fanatic, he got over this feeling of revulsion. In a speech made afterwards to his subordinates . . . he said that a good Nazi ought not to succumb to these feelings of distaste; there was a duty to be done, and the good Nazi, like any good soldier, ought to be prepared to put up with any experiences, however disagreeable, at the call of duty . . . [The Nazi] had an overriding ideal which was stronger than any fellow feeling humanitarian compunction he might have had about the sufferings he was inflicting upon the Jews (Ibid., p.78).” To extrapolate from this
especially stomach-turning case, the militant act utilitarian must also not succumb to competing feelings, values, projects, etc., if he wishes to stand by his identity-conferring commitment.

Some have included within their definition of fanaticism a component of vicious close-mindedness with respect to the reevaluation of one’s principle commitment, and the consideration of other values and projects, alongside an unwillingness to change no matter what. Annette Baier, for example, describes the fanatic as “one whose objects of care are so important to him that he [will] not risk scrutinizing them (1982, p.273).” And, Mark Hébert writes: “[Fanaticism is] characterized by a refusal to abandon one’s principles even when compelling reasons existing for doing so (2002, p.26).”

While I agree that fanatics can display this kind of obstinacy and consequent rigidity, I am not using the term in order to emphasize this characteristic. I understand fanaticism, again, to involve a strict, but potentially defeasible, single-mindedness about value – the kind of practical focus that true adherents of any impartialist ethics or competing worldview display. Gregory Trianosky described what I have in mind this way: “. . . in each moral-choice situation, the act utilitarian must forgo active commitment to all his other projects. [Act utilitarianism] asks each of us to become a person with . . . one single, all-consuming commitment: the maximal promotion of human well-being (1986, p.284).”

So, as far as values and commitments go, utilitarianism demands that we see the world monochromatically. But, since, as stated, I believe that the committed and not self-deceived act utilitarian can possess integrity; and, since the act utilitarian is a kind of moral fanatic; and since, integrity requires the routine reevaluation of values (see Chapter 2); then, the integrated fanatic can and must reevaluate. Having said that, being a fanatic is neither necessary nor sufficient for being a person of integrity; however, given act utilitarianism’s perfect demandingness, being a fanatic about utility is a necessary but insufficient condition for adhering to utilitarianism on its terms.

Suspicious of the practicality of fanaticism, John Kekes writes: “. . . it is inadvisable to be fanatical about our attitude to life. Being independent, wholehearted, or creative does not require that we should be relentless in performing all of our actions in that style . . . Clenched teeth and grim determination kill the enjoyment of the activities they accompany . . . Those who are truly independent, wholehearted, or creative can afford to take a holiday from being themselves (2008, p.39).” I won’t argue with what Kekes is saying about these particular ways of live one’s life; but, the act utilitarian simply cannot ‘take a holiday’ from being an act utilitarian and remain the same self qua act utilitarian. Given its demandingness, this life-project will not allow for this. So, any act utilitarian who claims to be such and claims to adhere to the theory on its terms, is either in error about what the theory required or is self-deceived.

The blueprint for the worldview espoused by these and other radicals was drawn up by Nikolai Chernyshevsky, in his 1864 novel, *What Is To Be Done?* (1989), a supporting character in which is Rakhmetov. Paul Avrich writes: “Rakhmetov was the literary prototype of the new revolutionary, a man possessed and living a pure ascetic life, subjecting himself to intense physical privations in preparation for his revolutionary role. To harden himself he eats raw meat and sleeps on a bed of nails. He has no personal life, no wife, no friends, no family ties that might deflect him from his purpose. He adopts a deliberately brusque manner of conversation and behavior both to cut himself off from conventional society and to avoid wasting time on empty words and formalities. He uses his money not for personal needs but to help the impoverished students and the revolutionary cause (1974, p.7).” For a much more critical take on members of the same movement, see Fyodor Dostoevsky’s *Demons* (1994). See also Claudia Verhoeven (2009, esp. p.40-42).

Alexander Berkman, 1970, p.9-10. Among Berkman’s revolutionary activities was an unsuccessful attempt on the life of the Pittsburgh-based iron magnate and financier, Henry Clay Frick. For more on Berkman, see Volume II of Emma Goldman’s *Living My Life* (2013).


Philip Pomper, 1979, p. 90. As an interesting historical footnote, Eldridge Cleaver mentions Nachaev’s tract specifically in *Soul on Ice*: “I fell in love with Bakunin and Nechayev’s [*sic.*] *Catechism of the Revolutionist* – the principles of which, along with some of Machiavelli’s advice, I sought to incorporate into my behavior. I took the *Catechism* for my bible and, standing on a one-man platform that had nothing to do with the reconstruction of society, I began consciously incorporating these principles into my daily life, to employ tactics of ruthlessness in my dealings with everyone with whom I came into contact (1968, p.12).” The Berkeley branch of the Black Panther Party went on to publish at least three editions of the *Catechism* in pamphlet form between 1969 and 1971, each which featured an Introduction written by Cleaver (Paul Avrish, 1974, p.29).

Paul Avrich, 1974, p.7.

What better home for moral monsters in the minds of the oppressors than Hell? George Jackson thought so, at least: “This monster – this monster they’ve engendered in me will return to torment its maker, from the grave, the pit, the profoundest pit. Hurl me into the next existence, the descent into hell won’t turn me. I’ll crawl back to dog his trail
forever . . . I’m part of a righteous people who anger slowly, but rage undammed. We’ll gather at this door in such a number that the rumbling of our feet with make the earth tremble . . . I’m going to charge them like maddened, wounded, rogue male elephant, ears flared, trunk raised, trumpet blaring. I’ll do my dance on his chest, and the only thing he’ll ever see in my eyes is a dagger to pierce his cruel heart. This is one nigger who is positively displeased. I’ll never forgive, I’ll never forget, and if I’m guilty of anything at all it’s of not leaning on them hard enough. War without terms (1994, p.222).”

292 Paul Avrich, 1974, p.7-8. The list of those activists and revolutionaries who have adopted this, in its most literal sense, self-effacing posture in living up to their moral commitments is long and varied. To provide just a few more examples, Stenza Razin writes: “Young men of education must become not the people’s benefactors, not its dictators and guides, but merely a lever for the people to free itself, the unifier of the people’s own energies and forces (Paul Avrich, 1974, p.10, emphasis is mine).” Enrico Fenzi writes: “I wanted to count as little as possible . . . to disappear into the function assigned to me (Alison Jamieson, 1990, p.513-514, emphasis is mine).” About Fenzi and other members of the Red Brigades, Alison Jamieson elaborates: “The decreasing contact with ordinary life and ordinary people was . . . a necessary precondition for the next stage of BR terrorism. As time passed the gap between ‘us’ and ‘them’ widened, ‘they’ were no longer men and women with everyday emotions but a series of ‘functions’ operating within an inimical homogenous mass which was ‘the enemy’. It was possible to wound and kill because both aggressor and victim were depersonalized, the victim through his function and the attacker through the collective identity of the group in whose name he or she was firing a gun (Ibid., p.514, emphasis is mine).”

From a slightly more positive, but equally self-disregarding place, Huey Newton, writes: “By having no family, I inherited the family of humanity. / By having no possessions, I have possessed all. / By rejecting the love of one, I received the love of all. / By surrendering my life to the revolution, I found eternal life (Huey Newton, 1995).” Some years after publishing this poem, Newton asked that members of the Black Panther Party refer to him simply as the servant (Hugh Pearson, 1995), further relinquishing his selfhood in the name of service to the greater good. Also playing off of the dialectical themes of immortality through self-immolation, Velupillai Prabhakaran has been quoted as saying: “The death of a liberation hero is not a normal event of death. This death is an event of history, a lofty ideal, a miraculous event which bestows life. The truth is that a liberation fighter does not die . . . Indeed, what is called ‘flame of his aim’ which has shone for his life, will not be extinguished. The aim is like a fire, like a force in history, and it takes hold of the others. The national soul of the people has been touched and awakened (Jonathan Spencer, 2000, p.126).” Of course, as is the case with the others, the liberation hero may only perform his liberatory function by first denying himself – so, denying his self. And, the sense in which he lives on is as one of many who sacrificed themselves for the
collective greater good, subsumed within what might be best thought of as a kind of secular worldsoul.

Some have commented on the revolutionary’s hostility to selfhood in terms of a proclivity for ecstasy in the classical sense of ἕκστασις, traditionally transliterated as ekstasis. Ekstasis literally means to stand outside of, or to be removed from, oneself. William May writes: “Terroristic action [sometimes becomes] an end in itself – with a momentum of its own. It stood outside the ordinary arena of political means and ends. This is but an extreme instance of what we might call ecstatic, frenzied, terrorist overkill . . . The ecstatic [in this context means] to stand outside the limits of normal consciousness or to stand free of the restraints and limits of everyday behavior. Terrorism – whether of the established regime or the revolutionary left – is characterized by this ecstatic element (1974, p.285).” This stepping outside of oneself in terms of stepping outside of normal consciousness dovetails with some of what I will have to say about moral monsters below.

I think it is interesting that Turgenev chose to focus on the image of the threshold, as this definitely brings to mind a crossing of the Rubicon which complements in any interesting ways talk of persons leaving their moral lives for an altogether different place – of becoming moral monsters.

Philip Pomper 1995, p.78-79. It is certainly easy to fall into a kind of self-deception about the extent to which a person is living up to a commitment which demands these things. For this reason, many radical organizations have safeguards in place to ensure that members stand by their commitments. Consider, for example, the Weathermen: “‘Weather’ mothers who were suspected of devoting too much time to their babies . . . were told to give the revolution first priority. There were even cases in which they were ordered to give their babies to other, less committed, members of the organization, so that they could devote all of their energies to the cause. Public sessions of self-criticism were frequently held. Persons who could not conform fully to the rigid authoritarian line dictated by the ‘[Weather] Bureau’ were scolded by the whole group; they were forced to confess and to admit their mistakes . . . The ordeals of these ‘deviants’ were not stopped even in cases of nervous breakdown. If a terror campaign against the outside world were to start soon, there could be no room for compassion or exaggerated sensitivity (Ehud Sprinzak, 1998, p.69).”

Frantz Fanon, 2004, p.2. We should note that Fanon is writing about the colonized persons’ creation of new selves through decolonization, specifically – and, more specifically still, about the role which revolutionary violence necessarily plays in this creative process. Michael Sonnleiter writes: “[Decolonizing] violence, from Fanon’s perspective, becomes functional as a last resort of the colonized to defend their personalities and develop self-respect (1987, p.290).” Or, to put a sharper point in things,
revolutionary violence serves as a way for the colonized person to *create* a superior self worthy of both respect from others and self-respect. It transforms the oppressed from an “it” – an object of the colonist – to an “I” – the liberated as proper subject. This process is sometimes referred to as a *cleansing or purifying or purging* of those negative aspects which made up the oppressed person. Put in a folksier way, Steve Biko writes: “You are either alive and proud or you are dead, and when you are dead you can’t care anyway (2002, p. 152).”


*pace* Fanon, I think the very broad picture painted here has near-universal application, and that the sociopolitical landscape and choice of revolutionary violence are incidentals as far as the creation of new selves, as such, goes. See also William May (1974, p.290-291), Messay Kebede (2001, esp. p.548-552) and Claudia Verhoeven (2009, esp. p.42).

296 Jean-Paul Sartre, 2004, p.lv. As is the case with Fanon, Sartre is making a much more particular point than I am. But, as with Fanon, I do believe that, resituated, talk of the *death* of and *birth* of selves nicely expresses what I want to say. *pace* both Fanon and Sartre, I do not think that violence, revolutionary or otherwise, is in any way a necessary component of conscious self-transformation. In fact, I believe that one of the more unfortunate aspects of radical Left philosophy over the past two centuries is its all too frequent fetishism of violence.

297 Thomas Nagel describes what is happening this way: “Someone who finds himself convinced of the truth of a morality that makes impossible demands on him . . . may be able by a leap of self-transcendence to change his life so radically from the inside that service to this morality . . . becomes his overwhelming concern and his dominant good . . . From the point of view of someone facing the prospect of such a leap it naturally seems like a terrible sacrifice or even a form of self-immolation. But that is by the standards of a good life as defined by his preconverted condition. If the leap is successful,
what constitutes a good life for him will be different when he lands on the other side and harmony will be restored. The problem is to find the strength to make the leap, given the very different personal values he now has. If his sense of alienation over the clash between his morality and his life is acute enough, this may help provide the needed impetus; but obviously such conversions, like others, are painful (1986, p.206).”


Of course, since the utilitarian calculus calls for this action, the suffering brought about by the latter is not commensurate with the suffering alleviated by the former.


I borrow this term from Susan Wolf, who describes the moral saint as that person whose “every action is as good as possible [and] who is as morally worthy as can be . . . A necessary condition of moral sainthood would be that one’s life be dominated by a commitment to improving the welfare of other or of society as a whole (1982, p.419-420).” She goes on to point out that “. . . if the moral saint is devoting all of his time to feeding the hungry or healing the sick or raising money for Oxfam, then necessarily he is not reading Victorian novels, playing the oboe, or improving his backhand (Ibid., p.421).” We could studying orchids to this list. Wolf’s point is that while no particular nonconsequentialist project is necessary for leading a fulfilling life, some one such project is. She finds the moral saint bland and boring and not at all well-rounded, and expresses relief in the opening paragraphs of her treatment that that neither she nor anyone about whom she cares is, or is striving to become, a moral saint (Ibid., p.419). Interestingly, Wolf’s claims are not based in moral theory, per se – and, in fact, might be interpreted as a kind of collective aesthetic criticism of moral sainthood. See also M. W. Jackson (1988, esp. p.5-8) and Edward Lawry (2002, esp. p.4-5, 8-11). While Wolf’s position is not a formulation of IO, given its congeniality towards the aesthetic, I briefly return to her in section 3.4.


[306] As explained in section 3.1, engaged commitment to act utilitarianism is discordant with virtually all activity which does not fall within its dominion aside from occasional
participation in those projects which ‘maintain’ the individual *qua* maximally efficient moral agent; these are activities, themselves, actually come under the same authority, though indirectly. Here, the originally barked orders to take part in recreational projects are softened a bit in having been relayed down the chain of command. To provide an example, it might be the case that Richard, could justifiably spend *some* of his time on studying orchids, granted this would lead to his bringing about the best possible state of affairs overall. Sometimes, in other words, the cogs in the machine require a bit of grease. Let’s state, for the sake of argument, that act utilitarianism will not allow for this particular activity in case of Richard – or, his commitment to act utilitarianism will, at the very least, not allow for him to engage in orchidology to nearly the extent that he would prefer.

307 Invariably, there are other things at issue for Richard – additional values, projects, commitments, etc., to keep in mind. But, for the purposes of simplifying discussion of an *extremely* complex matter to the greatest extent possible, I am focusing on this binary conflict, only. And, the same will go for Richard and his conflict between competing moral commitments.

308 Or, depending on Richard’s feelings, between the moral and the hybrid personal-moral; between the hybrid personal-moral and the moral; or, the stickiest of each of these possibilities, between the hybrid personal-moral and the hybrid personal-moral. I explore this later.

309 In the *Theaetetus*, Plato’s Socrates states: “*[Thinking involves] a talk which the soul has with itself about the objects under its consideration . . . It seems to me that the soul when it thinks is simply carrying on a discussion in which it asks itself questions and answers them itself, affirms and denies. And when it arrives at something definite, either by a gradual process or a sudden leap, when it affirms one thing consistently and without divided counsel, we call this its *judgement*. (Plato, 1997e, p.210, emphasis is mine).”

Expanding upon this, Hannah Arendt writes: “Nothing perhaps indicates more strongly that man exists *essentially* in the plural than that his solitude actualizes his merely being conscious of himself . . . into a duality doing the thinking activity. It is this *duality* of myself with myself that makes thinking a true activity, in which I am both the one who asks and the one who answers. Thinking can become dialectical and critical because it goes through the dialogue of *dialegesthai*, which actually is a ‘traveling through words,’ a *poreuesthai dia tōn logōn*, whereby we constantly raise the Socratic question: What do you mean when you say . . . ? except that this *legein*, saying, is soundless and therefore so swift that its dialectical structure is somewhat difficult to detect . . . The criterion of mental dialogue [for Socrates] is no longer truth . . . The only criterion of Socratic thinking is agreement, to be consistent with oneself, *homologein autos heautō*. Its opposite, to be in contradiction with oneself, *enantia legein autos heautō*, actually
means becoming one’s own adversary . . . To Socrates, the duality of the two-in-one meant no more than if you want to think, you must see to it that the two who carry on the dialogue be in good shape, that the partners be friends. The partner who comes to life when you are alert and alone is the only one from whom you can never get away – except by ceasing to think . . . It is characteristic of ‘base people’ to be ‘at variance with themselves’ (diapherontai heaitos) and of wicked men to avoid their own company; their soul is in rebellion against itself (stasiazei) (1978, p.185-189).” Note that the criterion for success in reaching a judgment is agreement between two interlocutors – the two sides of the thinker doing the thinking. The same will be true for our thinker – success in judgment will depend on agreement between the thinking agent qua analyst and the thinking agent qua analysand. See also James Blachowicz, 2000, p.184-185.

It doesn’t hurt, of course, that he was a red diaper baby.


Sigmund Freud, 1955a, p.141.

When staring down a more domineering instantiation of utilitarianism – and, in suffering the moral dissociation which follows – I might even find myself feeling as though my commitment to act utilitarianism was somehow foisted upon me by Trotsky, himself.

Sigmund Freud, 1955a, p.142.

Interesting, none other than Richard Rorty, himself – the quintessential proponent of pragmatic redescriiption – has written critically of Schafer’s attempt to reform, redescribe within, and resituate Freudian psychoanalytic theory. He writes: “Attempts [such] as Shafer’s . . . to ‘depositivitize’ or ‘humanize’ or ‘hermeneuticize’ psychoanalysis . . . are parts of a larger attempt to ‘place’ psychoanalysis, to transcend and distance it. I am somewhat suspicious of such attempts, because I think psychoanalysis to be used rather than transcended. We need to get closer to it rather than to distance it, to live with its terminology rather than to translate that terminology into another, less specific, loftier vocabulary . . . [The psychoanalytic vocabulary should be] a vocabulary to be lived with an used, one with which other vocabularies were going to have to mesh . . . [Freudian] explanations work . . . Schafer is doubtless right that the use of ‘action language’ in a clinical psychological situation helps make it more difficult for a patient to sluff responsibility off onto psychic components. But . . . the fact that it is handy for therapeutic purposes not to let the patient get away with blaming psychical mechanisms does not, in itself, give a reason for eliminating mechanisms from the analyst’s own explanation of what the patient is doing (1980, p.181-184).”
So, if it is not broken, there is no need to fix it; and, Rorty suggests, from the analyst’s perspective, Freudian metapsychology is not broken. The analyst can redescribe the analysand’s experiences in terms of action, to the analysand, if this is helpful – but, there is no need to abandon the classical psychoanalytic scaffolding when considered ‘beyond the couch.’ It is important to note, though, that Schafer holds that Freud’s vocabulary is broken when it comes to looking at things from the perspective of certain patients. Stanley Leavy writes: “[By using Freudian language, the analyst collaborates] unwittingly with the unconscious demand of the patient to be recognized as a victim of circumstances outside of his control, an innocent bystander in a world he never made. In this position of being patient as sufferer and endurer, the reality of agency, of being the agent, of being the doer, is lost (1983, p.46).”

It is also important to note that Schafer and his disciples are certainly not the only psychoanalytic school to take leave of the classical Freudian vocabulary. Ernest Wolf writes: “What differentiates contemporary psychoanalytic self psychology from traditional psychoanalytic thinking? . . . Our specific method for collecting data is prolonged empathetic immersion in the inner life of analysands . . . Instead of taking about id, ego, and superego, we talk about experiences of selfhood: about feeling whole versus feeling apart, feeling empty, feeling scared of losing oneself feeling proud or ashamed of oneself, etc. . . . Instead of thinking about the classical mechanisms of defense, we think of defensiveness as maneuvering to avoid fears of losing one’s self, shame of self’s failures, etc. (1993, p.58, emphasis is mine).”

Since we are looking at things chiefly from the perspective of the analysand – and, more basically, since we are looking to psychoanalysis as a model, rather than taking part in it – we do not need to concern ourselves with Rorty’s criticism. But, again, it is interesting, given the source.

While certainly a psychotherapeutic method, Schafer’s action language orientation does have philosophical ancestry. He writes: “I have chosen to develop an alternative to the eclectic language of mechanism, force, structure, etc. [i.e., an alternative to classical Freudian metapsychology]. It is an action language . . . in developing it I have used, as best I could, certain ideas from modern philosophical writings on existentialism, phenomenology, mind, and action; e.g., by Binwanger, Sartre, Wittgenstein, Ryle, and others (1976a, p. 7-8).”

Roy Schafer, 1980a, p.62.

It is well worth noting that just as the action language orientation is not intended to be put to use for all analysands taking part in psychotherapy, our analogue is not intended to be put to use for all moral agents taking part in deliberation – but, only those experiencing a potentially debilitating conflict between a commitment to impartialist ethics and competing identity-conferring commitments.

316
317
318
Schafer writes: “We shall regard each psychological process, event, experience, or behavior as some kind of activity, henceforth to be called action, and shall designate each action by an active verb stating its nature and by an adverb (or adverbial locution), when applicable, stating the mode of this action . . . We must understand the word action to include all private psychological activity that can be made public through gesture and speech, such as dreaming and the unspoken thinking of everyday life, as well as all initially public activity, such as ordinary speech and motoric behavior, that has some goal directed or symbolic properties (1976a, p.9-10).”

Elsewhere, Schafer writes: “The terms of Freudian metapsychology are those of natural science. Freud, [Heinz] Hartmann, and others deliberately used the language of forces, energies, functions, structures, apparatus, and principles to establish and develop psychoanalysis along the lines of a physicalistic psychobiology. It is inconsistent with this type of scientific language to speak of intentions, meanings, reasons, or subjective experience . . . [so,] reasons become forces, emphases become energies, activity becomes function, thoughts become representations, affects become discharges or signals, deeds become resultants, and particular ways of struggling with the inevitable diversity of intentions, feelings, and situations become structures, mechanisms, and adaptations. And, in keeping with assumptions of thoroughgoing determinism, the word choice has been effectively excluded from the metapsychological vocabulary (1976b, p.103).”

And, still elsewhere: “The main idea in action language is to speak of the person rather than the mental apparatus and to formulate the propositions in which the person figures as a unitary agent in the sense that there is one person who is the doer of the actions that are being described or interpreted along psychoanalytic lines. Action language represents an effort to avoid the fragmentation of the person into independently acting subagencies, which occur in Freud’s metapsychology and which occurs in the psychology of the self (1980b, p.84).”

Connecting the import placed in these and similar passages on responsibility and free agency, Roy Calogeras and Toni Alston write: “Implicit in all action-language tenets . . . is the support given to a type of freewill doctrine; that is, [for Schafer,] the person is viewed as having conscious control over his choices. Mental actions are seen as the result of the person’s creation of his own destiny, making his own decisions and choices, and manifesting his own adjustment to reality through his own behavior actions (1980, p.690).” See also Louis Sass (1988, esp. p.567).


Schafer provides the following examples: “‘She is lethargic’ [should be construed as] ‘She behaves lethargically’. . . Instead of saying, ‘A change was occurring in his attitude from friendliness to belligerence,’ we might now say, ‘He changed from acting friendly to acting belligerently’ (1976a, p.11).”
And, elsewhere: “[Examples of disclaimed actions,] ‘I couldn’t seem to shake off the sad feeling about my childhood’ [and] ‘My anticipation of today didn’t let me go to sleep’ . . . How different the world seems when the mental actions just cited are being claimed by the analysand rather than disclaimed. Examples: ‘I continued to review my situation sadly no matter how much I thought I wanted to conceive of it in other ways’ [and] ‘I kept on anticipating today so excitedly that I never did relax enough to go to sleep (1980a, p.74-75).’

And, still elsewhere, moving into the treatment of actual disorders, “. . . neurotic persons . . . are not [to be] understood as passive sufferers or victims, as the conventional use of the word patient instructs us . . . Rather, neurotics are more usefully viewed as unconsciously arranging their lives in such ways that they repeatedly and more or less obscurely continue to enact certain prototypical scenes, conflictual courses of action, and crises of childhood . . . [Whereas] Freud showed the neurotic to be the agent of the neurosis,” action languages redescribes the agent’s neurotic behavior as the collective actions performed by the agent (1980b, p.65, emphasis is the author’s own).


322 While I certainly want to emphasize my own say over the presence and standing of those desires, values, projects, etc., which make up my self, this rediscovered power is not something which I should abuse. From time to time, certain mental events will present themselves (speaking in action language: actions which some facet of my self performs) which do not cohere with my autonomously chosen values and commitments. These might come in the form of new projects and values or, perhaps somewhat more likely, those which were set aside due to their failure to square with present identity-conferring commitments. There is a temptation to dig in, and to lock these under the jail in a draconian fashion. For reasons which I bring up in the next chapter (see my discussion of Freud’s Rat Man), this extreme approach will likely only lead to greater fragmentation and alienation. In order to avoid this, a firm but gentle approach must be taken. Again, more on this below.

323 “. . . the person as [Schafer’s] doer of action cannot be compelled by anything ‘inner’ or ‘outer’ or ‘above’ or ‘below’ to do anything (Roy Calogeras and Toni Alston, 1980, p.690).”

324 To be clear, this space in not one of complete neutrality with respect to desires, values, projects, commitments, etc. Such a space does not exist as far as I am concerned. Even if it did, retreating into it would be to relinquish all autonomy, as truly disinterested practical decisions are essentially arbitrary practical decisions, and since arbitrary decisions cannot be endorsed reflectively. The space which I have in mind, instead, is one in which I simply allow myself to reclaim authority over my psychological set, and so, over my self.
The practice of using discourse as a way by which one can both make sense of and alter the self is certainly nothing new, of course, and predates psychoanalysis by thousands of years. To mention just one precursor to this – one in which the discourse is written, and, at times, to oneself – Foucault writes: “One of the tasks that defines care of the self [used since Greco-Roman Antiquity] is that of taking notes on oneself to be reread, writing treatises and letters to friends to help them, and keeping notebooks in order to reactivate for oneself the truths one needed (1997c, p.232).”

And elsewhere, Foucault writes: “[The ancients’] use of books of life [ὑπόμνημα – transliterated as hupōmnemata], as guides for conduct, seems to have become a common thing for a whole cultivated public. One wrote down quotes in them, extracts from books, examples, and actions that one had witnessed or read about, reflections or reasonings that one had heard or that had come to mind. They constituted a material record of things read, heard, or thought, thus offering them up as a kind of accumulated treasure for subsequent rereading or meditation . . . To capture the already-said, to collect what one has managed to hear or read, and for a purpose that is nothing less than the shaping of the self (1997b, p.209-211).” For an example of just this sort of book, see Marcus Aurelius’ Meditations (1964).

Some hold – though, under a somewhat different description – that this kind of discourse and ‘co-authoring’ lies at the very center of the enculturation which allows us to become persons. In these earliest instances, the ‘interlocutor’ is typically the mother of the subject. Ernest Wolf writes: “The properly attuned mother will think of her newborn as a person, play with it, talk to it, address it by name. We might metaphorically speak of a baby’s emerging self as made of many constituents – partly of memories of images, thoughts, and feeling emanating from within, partly of other memories that have their origin from outside – all held together by the glue of the caregiver’s responsiveness . . . The caregiver is a selfobject who, by providing appropriate selfobject experiences, evokes the child’s experiences as being a self. Withdrawing the selfobject experiences before the child has irreversibly and cohesively established the evoked self results in a deficient structure or sometimes in fragmentation of the self (1993, p.60).” Meanwhile, Dan McAdams speaks of the self being “jointly authored” by the subject and “her defining culture or cultures (1997, p.63-64).”

Alasdair MaClntyre writes: “I can only answer the question ‘What am I to do?’ if I can answer the prior question ‘Of what story or stories do I find myself a part?’ (1984, p.216).”

Michel Foucault, 1997a, p.254.

Michael Foucault, 1988, p.49. It should be noted that Foucault would almost certainly balk at the idea of rehabilitating utilitarian motivation along aesthetic lines. He – like, Nietzsche, his predecessor in championing care of the self – was critical of rule-based moralities, in general, and of utilitarianism, in particular. Richard Wolin writes: “For Foucault . . . both Christian and Kantian ethics are ultimately heteronomous inasmuch as both require the subordination of moral conduct to externally contrived sets of principles. Against this doctrine Foucault extols ‘pagan technologies of the self’ . . . which are concerned with moral action as an end in itself and hence free of normalization (1994, p.260).” The same certainly goes for consequentialist moralities. I hope to show, though, that an aesthetic outlook can help to reshape utilitarian moral motivation in a way which personalizes utilitarian reasons, values, and commitments – ultimately homogenizing these. See also John Rajchman, 1986, esp. p.168.


As stated, this is certainly not a standard interpretation of what the Greco-Roman moralists were up to – especially the Stoics. But, this is beside the point. Whether Musonius Rufus took part in this kind of conscious identity-molding has no bearing on our use of this approach in treating the modern moral agent.

All that I mean by the beautiful life, is the life which the individual is attracted to personally. All that I mean by the beautiful self, is the self which the individual is attracted to personally. While this certainly feels subjective, it needn't be viciously so. One can be attracted to a practical ideal which she takes to be objectively good just as easily as another can be attracted to a practical ideal which she takes to be purely
subjectively good. In fact, I take it that the Stoic was drawn to her ideal in recognizing its objective moral goodness.

Aside from worries about the overly subjective nature of this, some might frown upon its seeming self-centeredness. On this view, the agent chooses to live her life according to a certain ethics in large part, and in some instances solely, because she views this life-choice as beautiful, and so, a means why which she can construct a beautiful self. While the cultivation of individual identity is certainly at the center of this account of motivation, I don’t take this self-interestedness to be vicious, necessarily. And, at risk of falling into the blame-sharing game, it seems like most standard virtue accounts of ethics hone in on the self in motivating action in this or similar ways.

David Schmidtz writes: “. . . eudaimonism is the theory that the central task of ethics is not to say which acts are right but rather to say which ways of life are good . . . What is interesting about eudaimonism . . . is that it plausibly represents a sophisticated kind of self-concern as the core of morality. Obviously, this is not to say that eudaimonism finds no place for concern for others. However, it has a distinctive way of explaining how and why concern for others is part of being moral. Concern for others is nonbasic; that is, it enters the theory in terms of the role it plays in a good life (1997, p.109).”

And, writing in defense of this aspect of such ‘self-centered’ theories, Neera Badhwar writes: “. . . self-interest is not exhausted by an interest in the kind of psychological, social, or material rewards [generally cited as examples by rational-agent accounts of value] – feeling virtuous, becoming famous, gaining wealth, etc. A person may also have other, more fundamental, interests – most notably, the interest in being true to himself and affirming the values central to his sense of himself, i.e., the interest in integrity and self-affirmation. The values in question may be intellectual, or artistic, or moral; but if the interest in preserving or affirming them is part of a person’s conception of his overall interests, there is no principled way of denying that this interest also is a form of self-interest . . . Once the notion of rational self-interest has been disentangled from its calculating and instrumentalist associations, and expanded to include the more fundamental interests in self-affirmation and integrity, it becomes both possible and plausible to argue that [the moral agent’s] acts were simultaneously altruistic and self-interested . . . [and] most of the researchers agree that by acting altruistically, rescuers satisfied their interest in self-affirmation (1993, p.101-102). This seems right to me – there seems to be no reason to cast an essentially non-viscously self-centered ethics, or account of motivation, and necessarily selfish, and so, as unmoral or immoral. See also David Holley, 2002, esp. p.10-11.

334 This is not to suggest that the moral fact, itself, is sufficient for motivating action. Assuming that something like the standard Humean account of motivation is correct, there must be a correspondent desire present, also. But, such desires often do not show
up for agents as, in any sense, deeply personal. And, so can lead to fragmentation, and so, to alienation and self-alienation.

Interestingly, Foucault suggests that psychoanalysis, itself, is a technology of the self with an ancient bloodline of its own. Patrick Hutton writes: “Whereas Freud provides a method for investigating the internal workings of the psyche, Foucault seeks to show how the method . . . is an ancient technique of self-fashioning that has over the centuries shaped the mind externally . . . Psychoanalysis is from a historical perspective a late addition to that enterprise, born of a long but erratic lineage of techniques of care for the self (1988, p. 121)” And, later in the same work: “The Freud who descends from the genealogy of psychoanalysis in Foucault’s deconstruction is not the creator of a new method but an inventor whose genius it was to bring together into a unified theory medical discourse the techniques of self-analysis used and then discarded by past societies of Western civilization. Like the therapists of our own society, these earlier practitioners regarded the care of the self as a serious and salutary pursuit, even if they expressed their commitment to it in an ethical or religious rather than a medical vocabulary. The question that Foucault asks of Freud is why he seeks to discover the truth about the self through these techniques, whereas his predecessors had been content to search for a method of self-care (Ibid., p.134-135).”

While I have admittedly spiced this up for the purposes of keeping my readers’ attention, I can imagine the inner dialogue of the agent going something like this. Of course, the discourse which takes place there will not be nearly as conversational as this imagined back-and-forth between analyst and analysand. But, this is okay – again, this is just a model. It is also very likely that the agent’s Socratic thinking will not be substantially made up of the practical epiphanies experienced by R_y, here, and by R_a below. This form of self-analysis is intended to reorient, and then to remind. So, once the agent comes to look at her moral commitments through the lens of action and aesthetics she needn’t relearn the practice’s lessons anew with each go. Once she comes to understand what action language and practical aestheticism can do for her – that is, the ways in which these can change her perspective, and so, help her to reintegrate and to stave off those feelings of alienation and self-alienation – this analytical technique which brings these together is better thought of a way to issue reminders that her moral commitments are hers, and that they needn’t show up as purely objective.

This is what Foucault refers to as a “technology of the self.”

Since I have already offered a formulation of IO above, I will not do so again here. In order to review the argument in its entirely, it can be found in Chapter 1, p.30, in Chapter 3, p.201, and as Appendix I, p.304.
While certainly not talking about moral motivation in terms of Foucault’s practical aestheticism, Peter Singer, himself, comes close to making this point, as here he describes moral reasons bottoming out in something like self-conception. He writes: “When I stand back from my day-to-day ethical decisions and ask why I should act ethically, I should seek reasons in the broadest sense . . . If my search is successful it will provide me with reasons for taking up the ethical point of view as a settled policy, a way of living. I would not then ask . . . whether each particular right action is in my interests. Instead I do it because I see myself as an ethical person. In everyday situations, I will simply assume that doing what is right is in my interests, and once I have decided what is right, I will go ahead and do it, without thinking about further reasons for doing what is right. To deliberate over the ultimate reasons for doing what is right in each case would impossibly complicate my life; it would also be inadvisable because in particular situations I might be too greatly influenced by strong but temporary desires and inclinations and so make decisions I would regret later (1999, p. 326).”

I’ll spare my readers the gruesome details, but – no surprise given his moniker – the method of torture in question involved rats.

For the sake of brevity, I’ll restrict my comments about this case to the Rat Man’s thoughts regarding his father.

David Velleman writes: “The Rat Man desperately loved and violently hated his father, and his personality was consequently divided . . . into distinct loving and hating selves. Freud cites this division to explain the Rat Man’s symptoms, which often involved repeatedly doing and undoing an action, or thinking and contradicting a thought . . . The Rat Man’s problem was not so much ambivalence as his response to it. What caused the Rat Man’s neurosis . . . was the means by which he sought to cope with the battle between love and hatred within him – namely, by repressing his hatred and acknowledging only his love. This repression is what allowed the two elements to survive unmixed and hence to continue pulling the patient apart so violently in opposite directions (2007, p.343).” Here, Velleman is criticizing Frankfurt’s conception of wholeheartedness, specifically – worry, justifiably I believe, that relegating certain desires, values, etc., to the status of outlaws actually has the potential to lead to greater psychic fragmentation later on.

Sigmund Freud, 1959a, p.305. See also David Velleman, 2007a, esp. p.343-346.

Tipping my decidedly pluralist hand, I’m very sympathetic to either of these alternative outcomes. And, in the interest of full disclosure, I found myself hoping that Richard, and Richard, would somehow come to side with their nonconsequentialist projects off and on as I completed Chapter 3.


Bernard Williams, 1973, p.103-104, emphasis is mine.

Bernard Williams, 1973, p.116-117, emphasis is mine.

Aside from retelling Chandler’s *The Big Sleep* as faithfully as possible, this is also my attempt to work out some of the kinks of the source material, remember.

Bernard Williams, 1973, p.112.


To Williams’s credit, he does not take this as a knock-down defeater to act utilitarianism. He writes: “Perhaps, as utilitarians sometimes suggest, we should just forget about integrity, in favour of such things as a concern for the general good (Bernard Williams, 1973, p.99).” But, of course, he implies that if we *must* choose between integrity and utilitarianism – and, we must – then, the preservation of integrity is of greater importance.


Bernard Williams, 1973, p.116. In the following paragraph Williams again reminds us of just what is at stake here. He is not merely pointing out that to act against one’s identity-conferring commitments is to court sadness and discontent – although that is true, also. He is suggesting that it is estranging, (and on my reading) self-estranging, and potentially disintegrating. He writes: “The point here is not, as utilitarians hasten to say, that if the project or attitude is that central to his life, then to abandon it will be very disagreeable to him . . . The point is that *he is identified with his actions as flowing from projects and attitudes which in some cases he takes seriously at the deepest level, as what his life is about* . . . It is absurd to demand of such as man, when the sums come in from the utility network which the projects of others have determined, that he should just step aside from his own project and decision and acknowledge the decision which utilitarian calculation requires. *It is to alienate him in a real sense from his actions and the source of his actions in his own convictions* (Ibid., p.116, emphasis is mine).” And earlier: “[In its connection with negative responsibility, act utilitarianism] abstracts from the identity of the agent, leaving just a locus of causal intervention in the world (Ibid., p.96).”

357 Attributed to Hampshire by Bernard Williams in conversation with Alex Voorhoeve, 2007, p.197.
Appendix I: The Objection from Integrity

1. In order to possess a sufficiently cohesive self, one must preserve an adequate integration of certain mental events.

2. In order to preserve this degree of integration, one must make some personal commitments with the intention of keeping these, even when doing so flies in the face of the demands of morality; as, this is in large part constitutive of sufficient psychic integration.

Therefore, 3. In order to possess a sufficiently cohesive self, one must make some personal commitments with the intention of keeping these, irrespective of all other considerations (from 1-2).

4. One must possess a sufficiently cohesive self (from intuition).

5. Therefore, one must make, with the intention of holding to, some personal commitments (from 3-4).

But, 6. Strict adherence to any given impartialist moral theory at least potentially requires that the adherent break any or all of her personal commitments, at any time.

So, 7. Stipulating that the agent adheres to an impartialist ethics, her integrity may be compromised at any moment (from 2 and 6).

8. As adherence to impartialist moral theories are incompatible with making personal commitments with the intention of keeping them sans phrase; and, since adhering to such theories is incompatible with an agent’s retaining her integrity (6-7); such theories are to be rejected as viable moralities. Therefore, act utilitarianism should be rejected.
Appendix II: Necessary Conditions of Personhood

P is a person only if:

1. P is rational.
2. P is (potentially) self-conscious.
3. P is (potentially) autonomous in her actions.
4. P exists in time and has knowledge of herself existing in time.
5. P is psychologically continuous and (potentially) aware of this.
6. P can and does value and evaluate.

These conditions (1-6) correspond to CP1-CP6 in Chapter 2, above.
Appendix III: Necessary Conditions of Selfhood

S is (or possesses) a self only if:

1. S is rational.

2. S is (potentially) self-conscious.

3. S is (potentially) autonomous in her actions.

4. S exists in time and has knowledge of herself existing in time.

5. S is psychologically continuous and (potentially) aware of this.

6. S can and does value and evaluate.

7. S makes and keeps some identity-conferring commitments

These conditions (1-7) correspond to CS1-CS2'' in Chapter 2, above.
Appendix IV: Necessary Conditions of Moral Selfhood

S possesses a moral self only if:

8. S is rational.

9. S is (potentially) self-conscious.

10. S is (potentially) autonomous in her actions.

11. S exists in time and has knowledge of herself existing in time.

12. S is psychologically continuous and (potentially) aware of this.

13. S can and does value and evaluate.

14. S makes and keeps some identity-conferring commitments which are moral in nature.
Bibliography


Carter-Sanborn, Kristin. “‘We Murder Who We Were’: Jasmine and the Violence of Identity.” American Literature 66, 3 (1994): 573-593.


______. “The Importance of What We Care About.” In *The Importance of What We Care About: Philosophical Essays*, by Harry G. Frankfurt, 80-94. New York: Cambridge University Pres, 2007d.


______. The Ego and the Id. Translated by Joan Riviere. New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 1989d.


345


351


372


Torisky, Eugene V. “Integrity and Supererogation in Ethical Communities.” Presented at the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy, in Boston, Massachusetts from August 10-15, 1998.


378


