
Drew Cormac Medaris

University of Arkansas, Fayetteville

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A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts in Sociology

by

Drew Medaris
Old Dominion University
Bachelor of Science in Criminal Justice, 2012

May 2017
University of Arkansas

This thesis is approved for recommendation to the Graduate Council

__________________________
Dr. Casey Harris
Thesis Director

__________________________
Dr. Christopher Shields
Committee Member

__________________________
Dr. Douglas Adams
Committee Member
Abstract

Much of the prior research on white power groups focuses on very rare outcomes – criminal events, especially violent ones – without as much attention devoted to the more common or fundamental activities that often work to start the mobilization process for ethnocentric groups and the individuals associated with them. Broadly, the goal of the current study is to fill this gap in knowledge by integrating prominent criminological theories and themes drawn from the social movement literature in order to explore the geographic distribution and macro-level correlates of ideologically-motivated white power movement activities. Specifically, I implement content analysis techniques of open source and news media materials that geo-locate a wide variety of different white power events expected to signify support and/or mobilization (e.g., rallies), which I then aggregate and pair with demographic and structural measures drawn from the United States Census’s American Communities Survey. The nation-level results indicate that white power organizations target traditionally conservative and financially well-off medium sized towns that have relatively small foreign-born populations. The nation-level results are tempered by the wide variability found in the regional models, highlighting the secretive, grassroots approach typically employed by white power activists.
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Introduction

Amidst the backdrop of global diversification stemming from both immigration and domestic migration, far-right groups in the United States have proliferated since the election of Barack Obama in 2008 (SPLC Hatewatch 2012), just as far-right, fiercely nationalistic parties in Europe have increased since the 1990’s (Veugelers 1997, Taylor et al 2013: 65). Yet, despite such growth, there remains a relative lack of academic insight on contemporary racist, ethnocentric social movements (Blee 2002, Brustein 1996, Futrell & Simi 2004, McVeigh 1999). Historically, such movements received a substantial amount of coverage, with both the Third Reich and the varying incarnations of the Ku Klux Klan each seeing their own day in the academic spotlight. But as the prevailing cultural ethos has become more pronouncedly integrationalist and multicultural, ethnocentric movements are often treated as cultural throwbacks that do not warrant sociological understanding (Futrell & Simi 2004). While such stigma is understandable, leaving ethnocentric social movements untouched leaves a gap in sociological knowledge that has yet to be adequately addressed.

In contrast, ethnocentric political thought is far from being a historical artifact, although the issue remains whether such contemporary ethnocentric movements can be adequately understood through the lens of prior empirical studies. To that effect, the current study explores the social environment of the contemporary white power movement in the United States. Specifically, I ask two interrelated questions: (1) How are white power movement support events

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1 I use the terms “white supremacist” and “white power” interchangeably throughout the manuscript. Though there remains debate surrounding this terminology that cannot be settled here (e.g., white power” is most often used in discussing a social movement, while “white supremacist” is typically used in criminological contexts), the common theme shared among both groups is the belief that individuals of the white race are superior to those of all other races and should wield all social, economic, and political power.
I direct the focus of this study towards the contemporary white power movement for several reasons. First, white power is the most historically salient form of ethnocentrism the United States can offer. The arc of American history can largely be mapped by the struggles over the issue of race, including such historically contentious issues as the debate over federal and state’s rights in the form of race-based slavery, public education amidst racial segregation, and social welfare policy in the context of stratified poverty (Bonilla-Silva 2003). Second, the white power movement still exists despite its historical setbacks. This continuity allows the ability to inform my study from previous examinations of American white power while also allowing an understanding of white power in its contemporary and modern form.

The current study unfolds by, first, providing an overview of the social movements literature with an emphasis on the prominent gaps in knowledge regarding conservative movements. Second, a general overview of the hate crime literature is given with a particular focus on under-examined themes, including social movements, the radicalization process involved in hate crime, and the importance of location or context. Third, a review of sociological and criminological theoretical frameworks will be outlined that provide expectations for where (and why) white power groups should hold movement support events. Fourth, a walkthrough of the methods and statistical procedures and, finally, I outline the parameters of the current study, including data, methods, and results, followed by a discussion of the implication for the current study for the broader social movements and hate crime literatures.
Literature Review

Social Movements

The study of social movements has undergone a complex evolution in the way social scientists attempt to understand why people organize together to achieve collective action. Early conceptualizations of social movements were largely informed by the historical experiences of World War II with an emphasis on the supposed irrationality and mass hysteria of movement participants that contributed to the rise of National Socialism in Germany (Brustein 1998) and the National Fascists in Italy (Brustein 1991). By emphasizing the fear mongering and hysteria of 1920’s Germany and Italy, early social movement scholars suggested that people were willing to embrace both movements during times of severe unemployment as a result of emotional decisions that lacked inherent rationality (Jenkins 1983; Brustein 1998). That is, it was heavily suggested by early scholars of fascist movements that there could not possibly be a rational motive to join such groups.

Subsequently, the Civil Rights movement led social movement scholars to question the established emotional explanations for movement participation. The Civil Rights movement reoriented social movement research towards a more rational and nuanced approach that, in turn, has come to dominate by the study of similarly progressive movements. Perhaps due to the more agreeable positions of the Civil Rights movement (and others like it) during the 1960’s (McVeigh 1999), scholars began to emphasize the logic of movement participants and their responses to societal support and constraint as they sought to accumulate adherents and resources (McCarthy and Zald 1977). Societal grievances were seen as constants and, by extension, secondary factors in the formation of social movements (Jenkins 1983; McCarthy and Zald 1977). Instead, new emphasis was placed on entrepreneurs seizing on major interest cleavages.
and mobilizing the accumulation of resources needed for the collective action required to address them (Jenkins 1983).

A critical point to take away from this historical shift in the movement literature is that the success of a given effort is dependent on its ability to accumulate enough resources to achieve its desired goals (Jenkins 1983; McCarthy and Zald 1977). The deciding factor of movement success is, thus, how well the movement frames the conflict of interest at hand: how it aligns its own goals, ideology, and activities with the interests, values, and beliefs of the target audience (Snow et al. 1986). McVeigh (1999), for example, demonstrates that the Indiana Klu Klux Klan (KKK) of the 1920’s framed societal grievances in the Klan’s effort to mobilize support in pursuance of the Klan’s goals by appealing to the white, Protestant middle-class. By articulating the impending threat that both large-scale manufacturing and increased farm tenancy posed on middle-class economic well-being, as well as the growing cultural threat posed by non-whites and non-Protestants, the large pool of members and resources allowed the Indiana Klan to effectively impact presidential elections and federal legislative policy (McVeigh et al. 2004).

More central to the current study, a host of macro-structural studies similarly focuses on how various social movements frame their cause, while also identifying the contextual conditions under which a given frame might seem most attractive. Certainly, how a movement group couches its goals and identity can encourage support of a particular demographic subgroup at the expense of another, giving movement support observable patterns (Snow et al. 1984; McVeigh et al. 2004). McVeigh’s study of Klan frames (1999) incorporates a geospatial component to examine which specific areas of Indiana prove to be most receptive of Klan rhetoric, as Klan support is not evenly distributed. Rather, McVeigh finds that the Indiana
counties most at risk of increased immigration, large manufacturing, and increased farm tenancy had significantly larger Klan membership rates as compared to counties without such conditions.

This demography-oriented approach to the study of social movements has a comfortable niche in the movements literature, as it helps compliment the qualitative studies of movement formation that typically dominates the field. The sociological understanding of fascism, for example, has been greatly enhanced by the demographic study of several fascist movements and their structural correlates. Locating the structural correlates of the Nazi movement, for example, challenges conventional arguments on the role of the mass hysteria on the rise of National Socialism in 1930’s Germany. Whereas prevailing conceptions of the Nazi movement pays little attention to pragmatic social and economic concerns, Brustein (1998) demonstrates that significant Nazi support existed at the intersection of large Protestant populations, high rates of unemployment, and a preponderance of lower-middle class families. In short, the Nazi movement was patterned by discernable and logical geography. Similarly, Parkin and colleagues (2015) use the distribution of Tea Party movement events to show that the structural incentives to Tea Party support are much more complicated than wealthy white families who resented increases in taxes.

Despite these contributions, many established social movement researchers lament the paucity of information on ethnocentric white power movements and stress the need for additional empirical scholarship (McVeigh 1999; Blee 2013). Again, considerable academic rigor has been applied to progressive movements and both McVeigh (1999) and Blee (2013) speculate that, perhaps, the goals and rhetoric of ethnocentric movements deter academic interest to the detriment of social science. Yet, other areas of scholarship have explored white power groups –
though in unique ways – and from different angles. I turn now to the most prominent of these literatures, the criminological study of hate crime.

_Hate Crime_

The study of hate crime, which is commonly defined as words or actions intended to harm or intimidate an individual because of his/her perceived membership in or association with a particular group (Craig and Waldo 1996), is a relatively new and burgeoning literature. While broad in definition and encompassing a wide range of ideological motivations, the vast majority of the hate crime literature has been devoted to offenses involving racial bias, a focus that should be unsurprising given the centrality of race in American institutions (Bonilla-Silva 2003). The empirical study of anti-race hate crime has taken the form of both scholarship focusing on the individual perpetrators of hate crime as well as community-contextual research.

Regarding the former, individual-level research emphasizes that hate crime functions differently than other crimes. For example, when comparing far-right homicides to common homicides, far-right offenders are more likely to be white, male, and acting in groups. Similarly, far-right homicide victims are more likely to be non-white, male, and have no previous relationship to the offender(s) (Gruenewald and Pridemore 2012). While homicide may be an extreme form of far-right criminality, such patterns largely mirror those of hate crime assault offenders and victims (Craig and Waldo 1996). These empirical results provide a stark contrast to common violent crimes in terms of the large racial disparity between offender and victim, the group nature of hate crime, and the stranger relationship between offender and victim (Gruenewald and Pridemore 2012).

Regarding the latter research trajectory, the individual-level characteristics of hate crime often play out similarly on the aggregate-level, where hate crimes are seen as a tool of the
majority to keep minorities from threatening the established order (Corzine et al 1983; King 2007; King et al 2009; Disha et al 2011; Beck and Tolnay 1990; King 2007). That is, hate crimes are intended to send a message to an opposing group rather than necessarily settling personal debts (Blalock 1956). Indeed, some of the earliest hate crime studies focused on lynching in the Reconstruction Era South and results from this line of work show lynchings to significantly increase where the black population is relatively large and the economic well-being of working-class whites is most threatened. The implication of such findings suggests that the white community can feel sensitive about both the large black populace and the potential economic competition that black farmers may offer, both of which are seen as antagonistic to their own interests. A community with such tense undercurrents becomes a social powder keg: members of the white community will use whatever excuse presents itself to reassert their social and economic superiority, including lynchings (Blalock 1956; Beck and Tolnay 1990; Corzine et al 1983).

More recent studies of anti-race hate crime emphasize the threat to community identity, rather than material competition or questions over social ascendancy. Several empirical studies show a correlation between hate crimes and the recent influx of non-whites into a homogenous and collectively efficacious white community (Lyons 2007, 2008; Grattet 2009; Green et al 1998a). The rhetoric for such community concerns may not be stated in explicitly racialized terms but several studies clearly indicate that a hostile defense of a community is clearly a racialized issue. As such, white residents commit anti-race hate crimes on community outsiders primarily out of a desire to enact perceived neighborhood sentiments on new non-white residents that do not fit the community identity (Lyons 2008). Likewise, other recent studies point to the strong correlation between elevated rates of hate crime and the presence of hate groups, regardless of the economic
condition of a given community (Adamczyk et al 2014; Mulholland 2013). Altogether, these studies indicate that hate crimes and inter-racial conflict cannot be completely encapsulated by socioeconomic reasons, and that collective identities are a significant part of the puzzle.

Overall then, the current study draws on the intersection of two separate but related literatures: (1) empirical research on social movements and (2) criminological scholarship focused on anti-race hate crime offending. On the one hand, social movements scholars have noted a shortage of empirical work devoted to ethnocentric race-based movements, especially as it regards the geographic distribution and correlates of white supremacist activities. On the other hand, criminologists working in the field of hate crime have studied such groups, but have focused almost entirely on the criminal outcomes that mark the most extreme end (i.e., the lethal hate crime) of the white supremacist movement. In contrast, social movements scholars would argue lethal violence is often the culmination of a long process that includes ideological reinforcement and resource mobilization, wherein context plays an important part. Yet, both literatures point to prominent sociological and criminological frameworks that guide expectations regarding the types of places in which white power support events are likely to occur. I turn to these theoretical lenses now.

**Theoretical Framework**

My goal in this section is to draw broadly from existing criminological and sociological theory at the macro-level, as well as note overlap with prominent movement framing perspectives, in order to generate expectations as to where white power groups are more or less likely to engage in support events. While white power social movements and hate crimes might not necessarily align in every instance in real life, prominent theoretical perspectives implemented in the sociological study of social problems broadly – and the hate crime literature
specifically – provide significant leverage in thinking about the geographic distribution of support events.

**Minority Group-Threat**

Minority group-threat is the understanding of hate crime as a function of the real and perceived encroachment of minority groups relative to the majority group (Corzine et al 1983). In its broadest form, minority group-threat theory emphasizes that discriminatory acts are expected to increase, as the relative size of a minority group increases because the majority feel that its power is eroding and, in turn, seek to re-exert dominance by implementing discriminatory policies and/or condone discriminatory acts perpetrated by citizens (Corzine et al 1983). Though historically focused on tension between blacks and whites (Blalock 1956; Beck and Tolnay 1990), others have extended this to include Latinos and other minorities, as well (Disha et al 2011; Stacey et al 2011).

Minority group-threat has received substantial support over the years. For example, Quillian (1995) notes the strength of group-threat theories is their ability to routinely capture levels of prejudice and discrimination such that the size of the racial minority population (especially the black population) has continually been shown to be a significant predictor of both discriminatory practices and hate crimes. Likewise, Corzine et al (1983) finds that the number of lynchings increases substantially when black people comprise a large percentage of the population, while Disha, Cavendish, and King (2011) found areas with sizeable Muslim communities are the same areas most likely to experience anti-Muslim hate crime. Reflecting broadly on the most prominent themes of this theoretical perspective, Disha and colleagues point to an increasingly normalized “us versus them” approach to anti-Arab/Muslim hate crime, with a
significant spike in the number of people attacking Muslim communities in the wake of the 9/11 attacks.

Understanding white power movements with a minority group-threat framework would then predict communities with larger racial or ethnic minority populations to be most likely to host white power organizations. Theoretically, the white majority could tacitly or explicitly endorse a white power movement if they thought the movement would ensure their economic, cultural, and political hegemony. Likewise, there is both real and symbolic value in white supremacist groups holding rallies or leafleting in more diverse locales: in such areas, racial minorities can be visibly proposed as a threat to the established white majority and rhetoric of white supremacy may resonate to a greater extent. That is, while the size of the racial minority population can pose a threat to white political power anywhere, an economic competition framework would point social movements research towards economically distressed areas with sizeable minority populations. In summary, minority group-threat would expect support for white power movements to be greatest in communities that are vying for political and economic ascendency with a significant minority population.

Defended Neighborhoods

As a closely related framework, the defended neighborhoods framework shares many similarities to minority group-threat. In this perspective, hate crime is still a function of inter-group threat, but where minority group-threat finds hate crime in areas with large minority populations, defended neighborhoods argues that hate crimes are most likely when a predominately white community with strong informal ties experiences a recent, and relatively small, in-migration of racial outsiders. Such communities may be motivated to victimize racial minorities to defend white homogeneity from the threat posed by racial invasion (Lyons 2007).
In contrast to minority threat models predicated on economic competition, defended neighborhood frameworks emphasize that there is no correlation between white unemployment or white economic strain and crime targeting minorities (Lyons 2008). Rather, defended neighborhoods suggest the most salient perceived threats are high levels of collective efficacy, social capital, or a sense of identity. Indeed, several qualitative studies paint a picture of young white men feeling as if they have the tacit consent of the community to target racial newcomers for acts of intimidation and prove themselves as “down with the program” of hating the appropriate enemies and idealizing the correct community identity (Grattet 2009). Quantitative examinations support such contentions: homogenous white communities with strong group cohesion experience a rise in hate crime when an influx of racial minorities reaches approximately 10 percent of the community’s population. Interestingly enough, homogenous white communities with low levels of collective efficacy experience no significant increase in hate crime regardless of the racial composition of the population influx (Grattet 2009).

For the current study, defended neighborhoods would predict white power organizations to hold support events in more homogenously white neighborhoods with strong collective efficacy, rich in social capital, and a well-defined (white) identity that are experiencing relatively minor influx of racial minorities (Green et al 1998a, 1998b; Lyons 2007, 2008; Grattet 2009). The attractiveness of such places for white power rallies and leafleting rests more on their concern about the potential loss of identity and social capital than economic or political currency. As such, these communities, in dealing with small number of “racial invaders,” rather than a large minority population, may be more attractive locales for gathering movement support because the white power movement can then follow a stronghold approach (rather than minority group-threat’s emphasis on heterogeneous competition). The stronghold approach would imply
that the movement would ostensibly act as a vanguard organization to protect a bastion of white identity and collective efficacy.²

Social Disorganization

A social disorganization approach to hate crime provides a contrast from either of the two perspectives above. Where defended neighborhoods are largely predicated on homogenous white neighborhoods with strong collective efficacy resisting the in-migration of minorities, social disorganization focuses on the breakdown of collective efficacy by widespread poverty, high residential mobility, and racial heterogeneity (the latter shared to some degree with minority group threat theory). Building on the early observations of the Chicago School of sociology, poverty, residential mobility, and racial heterogeneity are thought to collectively produce an environment with very little material or social capital that leads to a community’s lack of group cohesion (Shaw & McKay 1942). In turn, the breakdown in collective efficacy results in an inability of the community to achieve collective goals, such as the reduction of crime. Crime is, then, hypothesized to stem from a lack of informal social control.

For my purposes here, white power advocates may seize on the manifestation of social disorganization and the lack of informal control to rally support. Without social control, crime—both violent and nonviolent—is expected to flourish as local institutions fail to provide a check on criminal behavior. On the most serious end of the offense spectrum, a disorganized community is expected to experience hate crimes not as specific subsets of violent behavior, but as an integral portion of the overall violent criminal behavior in the neighborhood (Grattet 2009; Lyons 2007). Put simply, where hate crimes serve a specific purpose in otherwise crime-free

² An additional relevant component of defended neighborhoods is that such strongholds of white identity provide a target-rich environment for white power activists. Even if concerns of a loss of community identity were removed from the social equation, the simple abundance of white people could itself provide a strategic rationale for holding white power events.
defended neighborhood contexts, they exist mostly as another facet of the violence-prone social landscape of socially disorganized areas.

The work of Lyons (2007) perhaps provides the best illustration of social disorganization’s utility. Pitting social disorganization against defended neighborhoods in examining the structural causes of hate crime, Lyons differentiates between anti-white and anti-black hate crime and finds hate crime in general is correlated with both disorganization and defended neighborhoods structural variables. However, results differ by victim group: anti-white hate crime occurs most often in disorganized communities that experience high levels of other forms of violent crime, while anti-black hate crimes occur most often in organized, overwhelmingly white communities.

The theoretical value of social disorganization for this paper rests on its ability to explain the distribution of white power support events if they are more likely to occur in extremely racially diverse communities with no strong group attachment. The empirical support behind the increased likelihood of anti-white hate crimes might be serve as the central theme for white power framing: a white power organization can act as protectors for the under-siege whites (Lyons 2007). The racial and ethnic diversity of socially disorganized communities may leave whites as the racial minority, rendering them vulnerable to the rhetoric of organizations who champion white ascendancy. A white power organization can offer the white populace a way out from criminal victimization and poverty and promise to restore them to their “proper” place in the racial hierarchy. A social disorganization approach to predicting white power support events would then point to poor, highly transient, racially diverse populations where a white power organization could market to a marginalized white populace.

*Synthesis*
While not always geographically co-located, hate crime and white power social movements share similar geo-spatial theoretical underpinnings. Hate crimes can and do exist without white power movements and vice versa; however, there remains a clear connection between a prevalence of anti-black hate crimes and the potential presence of a white power organization. Thus, the same underlying sentiment of racial intergroup conflict and community instability may drive both social phenomena. As outlined above, several of the most prominent hate crime theories imply that minority group presence should exacerbate inter-group tension in white communities with a sizeable racial minority population that actively competes with whites for economic and political advantage, increasing the likelihood for white power movement support events. Similarly, those communities with more deleterious social conditions and weakened collective efficacy (per social disorganization theory) could look to white power movements for relief and escape. Finally, homogenous white communities with greater collective efficacy (per defended neighborhoods) may be more likely to be chosen by white supremacist groups for rallies and leafleting given the impending influx of minorities into such locales.

The synthesizing of multiple existing theoretical frameworks to explain largely reactionary social movements dovetails with the broader ‘power devaluation’ framework created to help explain reactionary social movements. McVeigh (1998) emphasized that losing power is not enough to spark a massive mobilization of resources, but that a reactionary social movement needs to frame the power devaluation in compelling terms and provide a clear agenda to rectify the grievance (McVeigh 2001, 2004). The frame alignment between the movement’s rhetoric and people’s reality plays a prominent role in determining where people are inclined to join a movement. In McVeigh’s original study, immigration, farm value, industrialization, and various
other variables predict Klan membership rates in Indiana during the 1920’s, the heyday of the Ku Klux Klan. Most of Indiana’s white Protestant middle-class likely experienced some sort of loss in terms of economic or political exchange but not all suffered to the same degree. The difference in degree significantly affected the successful framing of Klan rhetoric (McVeigh 1999). For instance, a county with a rise in immigration but with robust agricultural production is not as likely to mobilize for the Klan’s rhetoric of the plight of struggling farmers as in places with both immigration and weak agricultural production.

Attempting to emulate McVeigh’s multifaceted approach, I use the criminological theories of place outlined as they dovetail with the broader power devaluation framework. Instead of solely relying on a single theory to explain white power group involvement, each theory of place can be used concurrently to capture a more complete picture of white power activity. That is, each theory separately captures the macro-structural correlates of white power support while, collectively, complementing each other.

The Current Study

Recall, the two key research questions for the current study are: (1) How are white power support events (rallies, leafleting, and protests) geographically distributed? and (2) What are the macro-structural correlates of white power support events? Below, I describe the key sources of data, operationalization of key measures, and analytic techniques employed to address these questions.

Sources of Data

Data for the current project are drawn from three key sources. First, information on white power social movement support events for the years 2012-2015 are taken from the Southern Poverty Law Center’s (SPLC) Hate Watch database. An organization was considered to be a part
of the white power or white supremacist movement if the group publicly advocated for any form
of white empowerment, white separatism, white nationalism, or white supremacy (SPLC
Extremist Files served as a guide). While the SPLC publishes quarterly reports of hate group
support activity in the United States, along with notable hate crimes that have been reported,
several researchers note the limitations and vulnerabilities of using SPLC data (Freilich 2003;
Kaplan 1997; Mulholland 2013). Regardless, the SPLC remains a valuable resource if only for
its virtual monopoly on the publicly available information on American far-right groups. These
data were constrained to include only events for each year that fell under the categories of
leafleting and rallies (protests were included under rallies in these data) and totaled 103 events
for these years.

As a second source of data, additional events for the 2012-2015 period were culled from
news articles contained in the LexisNexis Academic databases. Following prior research
(Adamczyk et al 2014), I constructed a list of search terms with which to search for articles from
local and regional media sources. All articles were included that contained the terms “rally,”
“leaflet,” “speech,” “protest,” “counter-protest,” or “demonstration,” as well as at least one of the
following terms: “hate group,” “white supremacist,” “anti-race,” “Ku Klux Klan,” “Aryan,”
“Neo-Nazi,” “skinhead,” “white nationalist,” or “anti-immigrant.” These search terms yielded
2,888 news articles from which I was able to identify an additional 45 events beyond those
collected from the SPLC database. At the same time, this second database also provided a means
of verifying the SPLC data in that many events were recorded in both sources.

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3 Alternatively, similar searches in Google News archives did not produce substantially
different results.
4 Additional search terms for more specific white supremacist movements (e.g., Odinism,
Christian Identity, etc.) were employed in supplemental searches. However, the addition of these
more specific terms did not yield any additional articles than in the terms listed here. As such, I
utilized the more parsimonious filter for the final sample.
Third, I pair the white power event data with macro-structural characteristics drawn from the United States Census and American Community Survey (ACS) for the year 2010. It should be noted that the community data is lagged several years behind the white power movement support events in order to provide appropriate temporal ordering.

Unit of Analysis

The unit of analysis for the current study is the county, which has a number of advantages. First, white power rallies and leafleting are relatively rare and counties (a) capture enough of these rare events to provide meaningful analysis while also (b) allowing for the inclusion of the full range of structural covariates. While some have suggested focusing on specific communities rather than counties for extremist activity (Fitzpatrick et al. 2016), the result is a narrower geographic focus with fewer events. Second, while Census tracts may (or may not) be optimal for the community-driven hate crime frameworks, the SPLC Hate Watch Reports list incidents by county but rarely, if ever, list the exact location of the incident by neighborhood or town/city. The Lexis-Nexis media articles suffer from the same limitation. As such, counties represent the smallest unit of analysis for my outcome of interest given the sources of data employed in the current study. Third, counties allow for the inclusion of more rural communities that would be absent in analyses using metropolitan statistical areas, census tracts, or other urban-centric geographic units.

Dependent Variables

The current study utilizes two dependent variables. First, I record whether a county had a white power rally or leafleting event during the years 2012-2015 as tracked in either the SPLC or open source media data (dummy variable with presence of event coded as 1). Second, I capture whether a county had either of two types of events (again, coded as dummy variables: rallies or
leafletting events. The purpose of these latter two variables is to disaggregate the overall presence of white supremacist support into two of the most prevalent forms it takes in face-to-face rallies and more impersonal leafletting.

Key Independent Variables

The independent variables in this study are informed by existing empirical research and both the hate crime and social movement theories outlined earlier. Building on Shaw and McKay’s (1942) social disorganization theory, I include variables for residential mobility, measured as the percent of the population who have moved within the same county in the past year. Racial and ethnic minority, calculated as percent of the population that is non-white (a variable that each theoretical frameworks shares), is used as a measure of racial and ethnic heterogeneity as defined by prior research (Beck & Tolnay 1990; Corzine et al 1983; Disha et al 2011). A disadvantage factor (encompassing percent of the population below the poverty line, percent of households headed by a female with children under eighteen, and percent of the population unemployed) is used to mitigate problematic multicollinearity often associated with multiple measures of socioeconomic disadvantage. The three component variables provided a factor with an Eigenvalue of 2.10, well above the accepted threshold of 1.00, indicating that the factor provides value as a composite over the individual measures and explains approximately 70 percent of the shared variance among the three measures.

Additionally, I tap into minority group-threat by including foreign born, operationalized as the percent of the population born outside the United States. Specifically, this measure is intended to tap into the salience of foreign born Hispanics (Parkin et al 2015) and foreign born Muslims (Disha et al 2011) as engendering group threat. Republican voting, measured as votes for John McCain in the 2008 Presidential election, is included as measure of political
competition (Corzine et al 1983). It is expected that traditionally socially conservative areas will be most sensitive to an increasing racial/ethnic minority population (King et al 2009).

Finally, while defended neighborhoods still utilizes the racial and ethnic minority variable, it also posits a negative relationship such that predominately white neighborhoods “defend” themselves from minority encroachment, especially in more affluent contexts (Green et al 1998; Lyons 2008). As such, I include median household income (logged) as a way to examine these well-off and collective efficacious white neighborhoods (Lyons 2008).

**Basic Demographic and Geographic Controls**

In addition to the substantive variables listed above, several demographic variables are also included as controls for the statistical models. Percent of the population living in an urban area and the population density (logged) are included to account for the tendency for many social events to occur in more populous and densely inhabited locales. Finally, geographic region is also controlled for using dummies for the Northeast, Midwest, and West region (South is the reference) to capture any regional effects.

**Methods**

I begin my analysis by, first, providing descriptive statistics for those counties that have experienced a white power movement event as compared to those counties that have not. The goal here is to describe the overall distribution of white power events (including a geo-spatial map) and the essential characteristics of those counties that have and have not had a rally or leafleting event occur. Second, I examine a correlation matrix of the major independent variables that will be employed in subsequent multivariate models with specific attention to the identification of any variable groupings that might be collinear and/or require dimension reduction through a factor analysis. At the same time, the correlations also provide some initial
insight into which socio-structural characteristics are associated with support events and which are not.

Third, I construct multivariate regression models predicting each of the dependent variables described above. The methodological approach largely hinges on the rarity of white power movement events: between 2012 and 2015 less than 4 percent of counties experienced such an event (see descriptive statistics below). Given the binary nature of the dependent variables and the rarity of social movement events, I employ penalized maximum-likelihood logistic regression. Advocated by King and Zeng (2001), these models correct for the underestimation of rare events that typical regression cannot by generating approximately unbiased variance estimates of logit coefficients and their variance-covariance matrix (see also Adamczyk et al 2014).

Finally, as a supplement to these primary models predicting whether an event occurred or not, negative binomial regressions are constructed in order to predict the number (count) of white power events in those counties in which at least one occurred.

**Results**

*Descriptive Statistics and Correlations*

To begin, Figure 1 geo-locates all counties that had at least one white supremacist support event for the time period. Figure 1 thus allows the distribution of events to be visually examined for specific patterns and to contextualize where they have taken place in recent years.

(FIGURE 1 HERE)

I note the following. First, white power movement events are more prevalent in some regions (e.g., the South) than in others (e.g., the West or mountain regions). That is, as a whole, white supremacist groups are more likely to hold rallies or distribute leaflets in some areas of the country than in others. Second, there are clusters of events that roughly correspond with (a) the
Black Belt, a sub-region within the South known for its historically large black population, and (b) large metropolitan areas in the northeast and heartland of the United States (e.g., Philadelphia metropolitan area, New Jersey, Pittsburgh, and Kansas City). As such, the takeaway from Figure 1 is that there appears to be significant regional variation in the prevalence of white power rallies and leafleting.

Turning to the descriptive statistics of the sample, Table 1 provides breakdowns of the key variables (means and standard deviations) for those counties experiencing a white power support event (N = 119) and those that have not (N = 3,020). The focus here is on the difference in mean values for the focal independent variables across both groups. I find the following.

(TABLE 1 HERE)

First, and most notably, the counties that experience an event have higher mean proportion of their populations comprised of racial and ethnic minorities and are more densely populated, urban locales (as well as places with slightly larger foreign born populations) than non-event counties. For example, the mean percent minority in event counties is 24.7 but only 20.0 in counties with no white supremacist support events. Counties with events are also more residentially mobile (8.9 versus 7.1 percent mobility) and have more female-headed households (7.7 versus 6.6), but have slightly less poverty than non-event counties (13.6 versus 15.0). Unemployment, Republican voting, and median household income vary to lesser degrees – that is, counties in which white supremacist support events occurred had similar employment, voting, and income patterns as those where no events occurred.

Second, there is considerably more variation across counties among those that did not have a white power support event as compared to those that did. Indeed, for every measure included in Table 1, all of the standard deviations were larger for the sample of non-event
counties than the event counties (despite the larger sample size for non-event counties). In short, there is greater similarity among the group of counties for which a white supremacist event occurred than in the other counties in the United States.

As an instructive next step, Table 2 displays the correlation matrix of key variables. Here, the emphasis is on the one-to-one association between white power support events and each of the focal independent variables. I note, first, that with the exceptions of the disadvantage factor, Republican voting, and the percent foreign born, all variables have a statistically significant association (and in the positive direction) with white power support events. In short, counties with higher median household incomes, more minorities, greater population density, more residential mobility, and with more people living in an urban area are more likely to have a white power support event take place within them. White power support events have the strongest correlation with population density and urbanicity with scores of .220 and .174, respectively, while the percent racial/ethnic minority has a statistically significant bivariate relationship with white power events that is weaker (r = .052).

(TABLE 2 HERE)

Second, multicollinearity does not seem to be an issue, especially with the inclusion of the disadvantage factor in lieu of the disaggregated variables. Disadvantage shares a moderate correlation with percent racial/ethnic minority (r = .532), though additional diagnostics for the multivariate models below confirm multicollinearity is not a problem (see below). Likewise, the percentage of the population living in an urban area and population density share a correlation of .628, which does not appear overly problematic.

*Multivariate Analysis*
The goal now is to examine the macro-structural predictors most strongly associated with the likelihood of a white power support event taking place, controlling for all other macro-social characteristics simultaneously. To that end, Table 3 presents the results from the penalized maximum likelihood logistic regression results for the nation as a whole and then broken down into Northeast, Midwest, South, and West regions. As Figure 1 demonstrated above, regional variation appears to be a prominent feature of white power support events and the penalized logistic regression models have been formatted to accommodate for such variation.

(TABLE 3 HERE)

The results of the nationwide regression models presented in the first column find, first, that median household income, Republican voting, residential mobility, and population density all significantly increase the odds of a white power event taking place. Specifically, residential mobility and Republican voting marginally increase the odds of an event by 1.8 percent and 14.9 percent, respectively (OR=1.018, p<.05 and OR=1.149, p<.001, respectively). In contrast, a one unit increase in logged population density results in a nearly doubling of the odds of an event taking place (OR=1.721, p<.001). Likewise, a one unit increase in logged median household income yields 4.5 times greater odds of a white power support event occurring (OR=4.497, p<.05). Interestingly, the percent foreign born decreases the odds of an event by around 8 percent (OR=0.920, p<.01), while disadvantage, percent racial/ethnic minority, and urbanicity are all statistically unassociated with the likelihood of a white supremacist rally or leafleting event taking place. Taken as a whole, the nationwide results suggest that more populous, well-off, traditionally conservative, and residentially mobile counties with a smaller foreign-born population are more likely to host white power social movement events. Interestingly, given the
nonsignificant variables, these locales are more populous without necessarily being urban areas, or places with larger/smaller racial/ethnic minority populations.

Turning to the region-specific models (columns 2-4), I find, second, that there is considerable variation across regions as to the predictors of white power movement events. That is, there are unique socio-structural predictors of the likelihood of a white supremacist support event across different areas of the country. For example, within the Northeast region (and in stark contrast to the nationwide results), the relative size of the racial/ethnic minority population is positively and statistically significantly associated with the odds of a white power event (OR=1.137, p<.05), as is population density (OR=1.914, p<.01). In contrast, among counties in the Midwest, only Republican voting (OR=1.064, p<.05) and population density (OR=2.461, p<.01) are significant predictor of white power events, while the southern counties are more likely to experience an event as median income (OR=7.441, p<.05), residential mobility (OR=1.149, p<.01), and population density (OR=1.449, p<.001) increase. Finally, the West’s only significant predictor of the odds of a white supremacist movement event is population density (OR=2.094, p<.05).

Overall, the regional results paint a complex picture. Population density is the only variable that consistently and significantly increases the odds of a white power support event. Outside of that, the aggregate nationwide results largely miss the regional complexities of where white power movements direct their efforts (i.e., where they hold rallies or distribute leaflet materials). The percent racial/ethnic minority is only significantly associated in the Northeast, for example, whereas median household income increases the odds of an event only in the South (thus driving the effect of median income for the nation as a whole). Put simply, the nationwide results mask important regional variation in the context of white power mobilization.
Supplemental Models

As a supplement for the logistic regression, I now estimate a series of negative binomial regression models predicting the number of events for those counties that had at least one. Results are provided in Table 4. The shift in dependent variables from the penalized logistic regression (predicting whether any event occurred) to negative binomial models (predicting the number of events that occurred) is strategic in that I am now examining whether certain structural characteristics are associated with a greater/lower number of movement events. The negative binomial results are broken down into event type to examine the contextual features of both rallies and leaflets together (column 1), rallies alone (column 2), and leaflets alone (column 3). The key finding is that, across all three categories, the percentage of the population that is foreign born, population density, and urbanicity are all significantly associated with fewer numbers of white power support events. These three variables are also the only significant variables, with the exception of residential mobility for the leaflets only category. In short, places with more foreign born persons, greater population density, and more people living in urban areas have fewer white supremacist support (among those counties with at least some white power activity).

(TABLE 4 HERE)

In summary, the negative binomial results complement the logistic regression results whereby the size of the foreign-born population is negatively associated with the odds of an event and the overall number of events. Similarly, both models agree on the primacy of population density, though the opposing directions of the relationship (positive for logistic, negative for negative binomial) deserve attention. In conjunction, the two sets of models would suggest that counties that are more densely populated are more likely to have at least one event,
but that the chances for repeated events are reduced as density increases. Plainly, white power rallies and leafleting are expected to both occur and reoccur in small to mid-sized population centers with small foreign born communities.

**Discussion and Conclusion**

Using three years’ worth of Southern Poverty Law Center and Lexis-Nexis data to find white power movement events conjoined with demographic data from the American Community Survey, this study examined the macro-structural characteristics associated with rallies and leafleting in support of the contemporary white power movement in the United States. Connecting previous research in both the hate crime and social movement literature, my goal has been to understand where white power organizations hold rallies and distribute leaflets. My primary findings were, first, that rallies and leafleting events by white power organizations are geographically widespread. Where white power events are stereotypically expected to be concentrated in relatively limited areas (i.e., the South or the proverbial “backwoods”), this study found white power events in 35 states that ranged from small, rural towns to large, metropolitan areas. The results would indicate that the scope and breadth of the contemporary white power movement in America is much larger, and more complex, than is often acknowledged.

Second, I found that certain structural factors of communities influence the likelihood of a white power movement event happening. Looking at the nation as a whole, communities were more likely to have a white power movement event if the community was a medium-sized town, wealthy, traditionally conservative, residentially mobile, and lacking a foreign-born population. Despite the belief that white power activists function only on the margins of society (Futrell & Simi 2004), the results of this study would indicate that white power activists make concerted efforts to engage mainstream conservative communities.
Third, I found that white power mobilization varies widely by region. For example, the percent racial/ethnic minority mattered only in the Northeast, whereas median household income only mattered in the South. That is, communities with greater numbers of racial and ethnic minorities were more likely to have rallies or leafleting events in the Northeast, whereas events in the South were more likely to occur in wealthier communities regardless of racial/ethnic composition. Clearly this would suggest that white power mobilization does not conform to a national standard or particular set of criteria. The regional results, then, would temper the national results by indicating that the real story is unfolding in highly localized attempts to sell white power rhetoric.

While white power mobilization is seemingly quite atomized, the regional results still present probable findings given the characteristics of each region. The salience of percent racial/ethnic minority in the Northeast makes sense given that New York City and Boston are major immigration hubs. The larger numbers of immigrants likely provide more exposure to racial and ethnic minorities, along with the corresponding political points to be gained from real (or imagined) racial tensions. Similarly, the salience of conservative voting in the Midwest may reflect the conservative-leaning social concerns that are often associated with Midwestern farm country. The large effect of median household income in the South could be an attempt to capitalize on the prejudices (and resources) of the moneyed Southern communities.

Collectively, all the theoretical frameworks incorporated into this study provided some leverage for understanding how sentiments of threat in some contexts might translate to movement outcomes. For example, the relative size of the minority population in the Northeast was linked to a greater likelihood of an event occurring (consistent with minority group threat), whereas wealthier white counties across the nation and in the South were similarly linked to
greater likelihood of rallies and leafleting (per the defended neighborhoods framework). Likewise, the statistical significance of residential mobility (nationally and in the South) provided some support for the social disorganization framework, despite the relative non-significance of socioeconomic disadvantage across the board. Meanwhile, Republican voting (nationally and the Midwest) was linked to greater likelihood of support events, demonstrating that feelings of threat manifested through conservative political action also increased the likelihood of white supremacist support events when all other macro-structural characteristics were held constant.

While there is some support for each of the theoretical frameworks, none independently explain the geographic distribution of the white power mobilization alone; indeed, the national-level results paint a picture of white power activists attempting to graft their own ideology onto existing socially conservative populations by harnessing already existing sentiments of social threat. By focusing on medium-sized towns that are traditional Republican strongholds, wealthy, residentially mobile, and more bereft of foreign born individuals, white power activists seem to follow the traditional path to success that most other right-wing movements have taken in the United States. Similar movements have emphasized the “American Heartland” model of movement mobilization (that is, white and non-urban) with the Tea Party (Parkin et al 2015) and the Klu Klux Klan (McVeigh 1999) being notable examples.

At the same time, the degree of regional variation observed in the current study paints a much more complicated picture on the local level, one perhaps best explained by the decidedly grassroots organization of most white power movements. As other scholars have noted (Futrell &

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5 For the sake of ideological purity, I tested for a threshold effect on the percent racial/ethnic minority. Prior research on defended neighborhoods (Lyons 2008) indicates that threat primarily manifests during the initial influx of community outsiders. Statistical analysis conclude that no such threshold effect influences the incidences of white power movement events.
Simi 2004), contemporary white power organizations often invoke a decentralized organizational practice, for reasons that often blend concerns of security with pragmatic movement success. Principally, the overarching necessity for decentralizing is the current political atmosphere that “criminalizes” white power ideologies: the stigma of white power not only reduces activists to “wackos of the fringe” but also invites investigation and infiltration by law enforcement (Futrell & Simi 2004). White power organizations thereby respond with decentralized power structures in order to contain any breaches by law enforcement: independent cells can be compromised without compromising the entire organization.

More central to the results of this study, decentralized, grassroots movements have pragmatic applications outside of security concerns: namely the adaptability of local, grassroots activists to match ideology and resource acquisition to surrounding contextual features. As white power activists mobilize on their own accord within their own communities, they have the benefit of framing their message to the concerns of the local citizens. A high-ranking member of a white power organization explicitly supported such notions of local activism by saying, “Our agenda is to organize people to campaign in LOCAL elections, and build a power base across the country that eventually can lead to real-world power.” (original emphasis, personal correspondence, May 3, 2016). Other contemporary right-wing movements have been similarly observed to hold preferences for grassroots activism, with ethnographic analysis of the English Defense League, an anti-Muslim movement group in England, perhaps providing the best parallel (Taylor et al 2013: 65-81). Such small-scale activism can explain why specific contextual features matter more or less across different regions of the United States – that is, why larger populations of racial or ethnic minorities can be vital to white power mobilization in the Northeast, median household income in the South, and traditional Republican voting in the
Midwest. Plainly, each local chapter of white power activists are making strategic decisions as to which features of their context they need to capitalize on and/or which specific demographic subgroups are most vulnerable to white power rhetoric.

**Support from Qualitative Data**

Indeed, a more qualitative analysis of the data collected from this project demonstrates that white power appeals for social support largely fall into two complementary categories: (1) opportunistic activism based on a relevant and heavily-covered media events or (2) appeals to a given white community framed by recent demographic shifts. As an example of the first, the communities beset by media coverage of the shootings of Trayvon Martin in Florida and Martin Brown in Missouri saw white supremacist rallies and leafleting within the data (and time period) collected for the current study. These racially-charged events were interpreted by white power activists to be prime moments to emphasize white racial solidarity, largely by white power groups offering to protect white communities from any form of retaliation by perceived racial enemies. Local white power groups made their presence known in both situations by offering small rallies and distributing literature to white communities, but even distant white power groups saw the rhetorical potential of the event and distributed their own literature about protecting white communities from perceived threats.

Regarding the second category, without the benefit of media-relevant events, white power activists appear to focus on demographic shifts and the potential threat they pose. Notably, the 2013 National Socialist Movement rally in Odessa, Texas was explicitly meant to draw attention to the plight of white communities in the face of a perceived influx of Hispanic immigrants. According the American Community Survey, the metro population of Odessa increased by 8,000 residents between the years of 2010 to 2013, 7,000 of which were Hispanic.
While this ostensibly confirms the rhetoric of the National Socialist Movement, whether this demographic shift actually harmed the white community is more likely an issue of perception, rather than demography. Taken together, white power groups tend to focus on broad national support when highlighting a heavily-covered media event, but tend to focus on much more local concerns when left to their own propaganda skills.

Limitations and Future Research

Overall, this study provides some insight into the mobilization strategies that contemporary white power organizations make in their day-to-day operation. Undoubtedly, this study is not without limitations and consequent avenues for future research. Most glaringly, this study is not a true longitudinal examination of the greater white power movement. A larger sample and extended demographic information would provide greater leverage in determining if specific macro-structural features attract the white power movement, particularly how they grow/shrink with broader community changes. There are also notable gaps in media coverage that could be mitigated in future research. The LexisNexis news articles used to locate white power events come from relatively large newspapers, leaving some of the more remote areas potentially absent from this study if their papers did not contribute to the LexisNexis database (or did not record the events at all). Relatedly, other types of white power events are missing entirely. For example, attempts at locating hate rock concerts, a popular social event for white power skinheads, have been difficult to complete given their sporadic performances and the lack of any real infrastructure for concern planning.

This study assumes that movement support is primarily the result of pragmatic and rational decisions directed toward the costs and benefits of white power goals. However, recent social movement scholarship has highlighted the importance of collective identity that may
outweigh material concerns. Collective identity is, undoubtedly, a crucial factor of mobilization, but quantifying collective identity lies beyond the scope of the current study. Interviews or qualitative examinations of white power rhetoric employed in conjunction with contextual factors would add significantly to extant literature in this regard. Likewise, comparisons of white power groups across countries could help to further determine what global trends are leading to a rise in white power activity, both in the United States and Europe.

The number of far-right groups is on the rise both in the United States and across Europe, with a corresponding increase ethnocentric rhetoric (SPLC Hatewatch 2012; Veugelers 1997). As the world continues to struggle with the economic inequality and demographic changes of globalization, far-right groups will only continue to grow. Understanding the structural factors of where ethnocentric movements draw support could help stabilize the communities most susceptible to far-right rhetoric. The current study provided some answers to how ethnocentric movements mobilize but my hope is that this project will spur future research in similar veins.
References


### Table 1. Descriptives of Key Variables by County

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<th>Experienced an Event</th>
<th></th>
<th>No Event</th>
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<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
<td>Mean</td>
<td>Std. Dev.</td>
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<td><strong>Independent Variables:</strong></td>
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<td>14.986</td>
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<td>(2.098)</td>
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<td>(3.392)</td>
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<td>10.662</td>
<td>(.243)</td>
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<td>8.300</td>
<td>(1.751)</td>
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<td>17.759</td>
<td>(14.041)</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>1.000</td>
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<td>.052</td>
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<td>(6) Foreign Born</td>
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<td>.003 ^</td>
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<td>.014 ^</td>
<td>.373</td>
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Note: ^ not significant at p<.01
Table 3. Penalized Maximum Likelihood Logistic Regression Models Predicting White Power Support Events for the United States as a Whole and By Census Region

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<th>Midwest</th>
<th>South</th>
<th>West</th>
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<td>(6.636)</td>
<td>(15.141)</td>
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<td>1.064*</td>
<td>1.001</td>
<td>1.005</td>
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<td>(.026)</td>
<td>(.010)</td>
<td>(.027)</td>
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<td>.949</td>
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<tr>
<td>(.011)</td>
<td>(.026)</td>
<td>(.039)</td>
<td>(.014)</td>
<td>(.052)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>N</td>
<td>3,139</td>
<td>251</td>
<td>1,055</td>
<td>1,421</td>
<td>421</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: Odds ratios are presented with standard errors in parentheses for ease of interpretation.
* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
Table 4. Negative Binomial Regression Models Predicting the Number of White Power Support Events for the United States as a Whole (N=119)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>(1) All Events</th>
<th>(2) Rallies</th>
<th>(3) Leaflets</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Independent Variables:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disadvantage Index</td>
<td>.954 (.104)</td>
<td>.840 (.227)</td>
<td>1.007 (.337)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Median Household Income (ln)</td>
<td>.877 (.298)</td>
<td>.851 (.681)</td>
<td>.804 (.337)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Republican Voting</td>
<td>.998 (.004)</td>
<td>.990 (.007)</td>
<td>.997 (.004)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Racial/ethnic Minority</td>
<td>1.004 (.006)</td>
<td>1.007 (.012)</td>
<td>1.001 (.005)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign Born</td>
<td>.943*** (.011)</td>
<td>.935** (.024)</td>
<td>.953*** (.012)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residential Mobility</td>
<td>.965 (.029)</td>
<td>1.021 (.043)</td>
<td>.941* (.024)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Control Variables</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Population Density (ln)</td>
<td>.651*** (.035)</td>
<td>.677** (.090)</td>
<td>.636*** (.045)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urbanicity</td>
<td>.974** (.008)</td>
<td>.947*** (.010)</td>
<td>.982*** (.005)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: All models include an exposure term for the total population in each county and are estimated with standard errors clustered by state. Incident rate ratios are displayed for comparability to the logistic models in prior tables.

* p<.05, ** p<.01, *** p<.001
Figure 1