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Reflection moderation in the U.S. Senate on Economics, Social, and Foreign Policy

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REELECTION MODERATION IN THE U.S. SENATE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND FOREIGN POLICY
REELECTION MODERATION IN THE U.S. SENATE ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND FOREIGN POLICY

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts

By

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Table of Contents

Abstract ....................................................................................................................... 1

Chapter 1

Introduction ................................................................................................................ 2
Literature Review ...................................................................................................... 5
Theory ....................................................................................................................... 10
Hypotheses ............................................................................................................... 13

Chapter 2

Measures .................................................................................................................. 14
Method ...................................................................................................................... 19

Chapter 3

Empirical Results ..................................................................................................... 23

Chapter 4

Conclusion ............................................................................................................... 37
References ................................................................................................................ 47
Appendix .................................................................................................................. 49
List of Tables

Table 1  *Standardized National Journal Ratings* .......................... 20
Table 2  *Senators Who Moderate on Economic Policy* .................. 24
Table 3  *Senators Who Moderate on Social Policy* ..................... 26
Table 4  *Senators Who Moderate on Foreign Policy* ................... 27
Table 5  *Z-Test of Significance Between Proportions* ............... 29
Table 6  *End of Term Voting Behavior of Democrats on Economic Policy* 31
Table 7  *End of Term Voting Behavior of Republicans on Economic Policy* 33
Table 8  *End of Term Voting Behavior of Democrats on Social Policy* 33
Table 9  *End of Term Voting Behavior of Republicans on Social Policy* 34
Table 10  *End of Term Voting Behavior of Democrats on Foreign Policy* 35
Table 11  *End of Term Voting Behavior of Republicans on Foreign Policy* 35
Abstract

This thesis investigates reelection moderation in the U.S. Senate on economic, social, and foreign policy between 1983 and 1994. I test 3 hypotheses based on the assumption that senators moderate their voting records when seeking reelection to appeal to the median voter. My hypotheses are: (1) Both groups of senators will moderate on economic policy, but a larger percentage of Democrats will moderate than Republicans. (2) A majority of Democratic senators will moderate on social policy, but only a small percentage of Republicans will moderate. (3) Less than a majority of both groups of senators will moderate on foreign policy, but a larger percentage of Republicans will moderate than Democrats. The percentages of moderating and non-moderating senators are compared to determine the extent of senatorial moderation. Democrats are moderating on economic and social policy. On foreign policy, the first two classes remain consistent over their six year terms, while the last two classes moderate. Republican voting records remain consistent in all 3 policy areas. These results provide the strongest support for the second hypothesis, with mixed evidence for the other two.
Chapter 1

Introduction

The House and Senate are different types of legislative institutions. The Senate, with its six-year terms and its allotment of two senators per state is structurally different from the House, which has two-year terms and membership that is proportional by state population. The smaller districts and shorter terms of House members were designed to insure that its members are in close contact with their constituencies. House members may have little voting leeway because an election is never more than two years away. Senators, on the other hand, are likely to display greater temporal variability in their voting records than House members because of their longer terms, and typically, more heterogeneous constituencies. Being unresponsive to constituency preferences may be less costly when an election is six, five, four, or even three years away. It is at the end of the term, as reelection approaches, that conforming to constituency preferences becomes more important, before this, senators may have considerable voting leeway.

The electorate is less attentive when reelection is three to six years away (Born 1991; Jacobson 1997). This is when senators may be more likely to vote in a manner that is discordant with constituency preferences. If senators vote differently depending on the attentiveness of the electorate, what is the resulting pattern? Specifically, is the roll-call voting behavior of senators systematically different at the end of their terms when compared to the beginning of their terms? These questions will be answered through the investigation of my research question: do senatorial voting records become more moderate as reelection approaches?
The theoretical orientation of the moderation hypothesis is derived from Downs’ *An Economic Theory of Democracy* (1957). In a two-party system, rational parties and candidates tend to converge toward the preferences of the median voter. This is the optimal strategy for obtaining votes in the general election. However, this movement is constrained by party identifiers who firmly hold more extreme positions and are more likely to vote than those who do not. The resulting picture of the electorate is one in which the majority of voters, who converge in the center, are not as vocal, nor as firm in their preferences as are the outliers.

Shapiro, Brady, Brody, and Ferejohn (1990) provide evidence that supports this premise. Specifically, party identifiers are more extreme than independent voters. Moreover, independent voters have ideological preferences that are at, or quite near, the median of constituency positions. The preferences of both party identifiers and independents influence senatorial voting records, with the former being more influential (Shapiro et al. 1990). As a result of the intensity of senatorial campaigns (Born 1991; Jacobson 1997), inattentive publics will become more attuned. However, the ideological positions of voters with less vocal preferences are harder to discern than those of party identifiers (Downs 1957). This constraint suggests that moderating shifts, when they occur, will not be extreme.

Identifying voting patterns in the U.S. Senate is key to developing adequate models of representation. If roll-call voting behavior consistently becomes more moderate during the end of a term, is that the only time senators are responsive? Such a scenario would imply that senators behave as trustees early in their terms and become instructed
delegates when seeking reelection. End-of-term moderating implies that elections provide accountability and an incentive for responsiveness, both of which are key to democratic theory. However, if senators have to moderate their voting behavior in order to help ensure reelection, does this mean that they are not accountable and responsive at the beginning of their terms?

Senators may be responsive in areas other than public policy. Accordingly, policy congruence is not the only component of representation (Eulau and Karps 1977, Pitkin 1967), but it is surely an integral part. McCrone and Kuklinski (1979) suggest that legislators are responsive to constituency preferences when two conditions exist. First, legislators must think of themselves as delegates, and second, constituents must send consistent messages. This is why I think it is important to investigate end-of-term shifting, when these conditions are most likely to occur. This is when the electorate is most attentive as a result of the intensity of reelection campaigns. In addition, senators want to show that they are doing a “good job” and may be more likely to pay attention to constituency preferences in order to achieve a reelection victory.

Other researchers have addressed the moderation hypothesis, but their findings have been inconsistent. Furthermore, previous studies do not provide conclusive answers because the moderation hypothesis was not adequately tested. All of the previous studies employ general measures of ideology. Such measures do not distinguish between policy areas. I shall endeavor to add to previous research by testing the moderation hypothesis in discrete policy areas. This approach will provide the resolution necessary to establish results that are more conclusive than those reported in the extant literature.
Literature Review

There are four approaches to the debate over the extent and character of moderation. The first is the median voter theorem (Downs 1957), which states that senators moderate their voting records to appeal to the median voter (Elling 1982, Wright and Berkman 1986). The second group claims that end-of-term shifting is toward the position of a likely opponent, not toward the preferences of the median voter (Bernstein 1991; Thomas 1985). Third, are Fiorina (1973) and Shapiro, Brady, Brody, and Ferejohn (1990), who investigate the two constituencies hypothesis. They argue that senators are primarily responsive to their own party identifiers and are less responsive to those who identify with the other party. This results in extreme policy stances, not moderation. Finally, the fourth approach makes no prediction about the direction of end-of-term shifting, only that senators become more responsive to constituency preferences as reelection approaches, even if that results in a more extreme voting record (Ahuja 1994; Amacher and Boyes 1978).

The Median Voter Theorem

To investigate the median-voter hypothesis, Elling (1982) employs Americans for Democratic Action (ADA) scores to measure the ideology of senators. The results indicate that considerable shifting in ideological positions occurs over the course of senatorial terms. Ninety percent of senators shifted their voting records throughout their terms with 47 percent shifting ten units or more. These voting shifts appear to be a function of the number of years remaining in a senator's term. Fifty-three percent of
senators shifted in a more moderate direction with 25 percent of those shifting ten units or more. Thirty-seven percent became less moderate, of those, 17 percent shift at least ten units. Elling (1982) finds support for the moderation hypothesis. However, he uses a highly aggregated interest group rating to measure ideology and fails to exclude senators not seeking reelection.

The median voter hypothesis is also tested by Wright and Berkman (1986), who use survey data to develop a 10 point liberal-conservative scale to measure the ideology of senators. They find that senators who are seeking reelection have more moderate voting records than their counterparts, who are three to six years away from reelection. In this study, Republicans are more moderate at election time than Democrats. Although this study only examines one year, Wright and Berkman (1986) provide further support that senators seeking reelection moderate their policy positions.

**Ideological Shifts Toward Opponents**

Bernstein (1991) employs *Americans for Constitutional Action* (ACA) scores to estimate the ideological positions of senators. He finds that there is strategic shifting at election time. Democrats who are at the left of the median voter and Republicans who are at the right move toward the preferences of the median voter. However, conservative Democrats and liberal Republicans become more extreme, moving away from the median voter. These results lead Bernstein to conclude that senators are not moving toward constituency preferences, but instead toward the ideological positions of their opponents.

Thomas (1985) uses *Conservative Coalition* support and opposition scores as his
measures of ideology. He finds that over the course of senatorial terms voting records of Republicans become more liberal, while the voting records of Democrats become more conservative. Also, the most moderate voting records are in the sixth year with the trend beginning after the third year. However, Thomas concludes that senators are not moderating, but instead moving toward the ideological positions of their opponents.

Both Thomas (1985) and Bernstein (1991) base their conclusions on small subsets of their samples. The majority of senators in both of their studies moderate as elections approach. However, since a small group of liberal Republicans and conservative Democrats become more extreme, they believe this indicates movement towards a likely opponent, not the median voter (Bernstein 1991; Thomas 1985). According to Bernstein and Thomas, the majority of senators only appear to be moving toward the median voter. They assert that senators are trying to ideologically place themselves between their opponent and the majority of voters (Bernstein 1991; Thomas 1985).

The Two-Constituencies Hypothesis

Fiorina (1973) uses two case studies of marginal switch districts to counter the idea that intense electoral competition will produce moderate legislators. Marginal switch districts are those in which a representative wins an election with less than 55 percent of the vote and then loses the next election by a similar margin. In the first study, switches in party control result in an average difference of 73 percentage points in Conservative Coalition scores. "In almost every case the Democrat replacing a Republican or the Republican replacing a Democrat gave the constituency an entirely different brand of
representation on major policy questions” (Fiorina 1973, 490). In the second case study, electoral turnover produces a change of over 60 percent in Conservative Coalition scores with a 50 percent change in support for a larger federal role. Fiorina uses this data to claim that intense electoral competition does not produce moderating legislators, but instead produces “flip-flopping” representation, from the liberal extreme to the conservative extreme.

Shapiro, Brady, Brody, and Ferejohn (1990) devise a modified two-constituencies hypothesis. They assert that the preferences of party identifiers and independents will effect senatorial voting records. Own party preferences have the strongest influence on voting records, however, depending on the number of independent voters, they will also have an effect (Shapiro et al. 1990). In addition, the ideological preferences of independents are approximately those of the median voter, which implies that they have a moderating effect. Unlike Fiorina (1973), Shapiro et al. (1990) allow for the influences of independent voters, but still accept the premise that legislators are primarily motivated by party identifiers.

End-of-term Responsiveness

Ahuja’s (1994) analysis does not predict the direction of ideological shifting. He uses data from the American National Election Studies to develop mean constituency preferences and Conservative Coalition opposition scores to measure senatorial roll-call behavior. Ahuja’s hypothesis is that senators become more responsive to their constituencies at election time, regardless of the direction of their end-of-term shifting.
The results suggest that senators who are running for reelection have mean ideological scores that are closer to constituency preferences than senators who are two and four years away from reelection. In addition, those senators who are two years away are closer to constituency preferences than senators four years away from reelection. These data lead Ahuja to conclude that senators become more responsive during the election season.

Amacher and Boyes (1978) investigate the proposition that as elections approach senators will display less "independent" voting records. They use Conservative Coalition scores to measure the ideological positions of senators. To estimate constituency preferences, they average the Conservative Coalition scores of House members in a particular senator's state. Results indicate there are no significant differences between senators who are 3-4 and 5-6 years away from reelection. However, senators who are 1-2 years away from reelection are more responsive to constituency preferences than either the 3-4 year group or the 5-6 year group. They conclude that more frequent elections will produce a more responsive legislature.

This discussion of the literature illustrates that there are no definitive answers to the moderation hypothesis. Elling (1982) and Wright and Berkman (1986) find support for the moderation hypothesis, however, their results are inconclusive. Wright and Berkman (1986) only investigate one election, which limits the generalizability of their results. Moreover, Elling (1982) includes senators who were not seeking reelection, which means that they have no incentive to moderate. Bernstein (1991) and Thomas (1985) find results that seem to support the moderation hypothesis. However, they
conclude that senators are not moderating, but instead are moving toward the ideological positions of their likely opponents, which may or may not be the same thing. Fiorina (1973) suggests that senators are only attentive to their party identifiers, while Shapiro et al. (1990) find that independent voters are also influential. Finally, Amacher and Boyes (1978) and Ahuja (1994) find that senators become more responsive to their constituencies, regardless of the direction of their end of term shifting. There is evidence both supporting and contradicting the median voter theorem. Therefore, there are compelling reasons to investigate the issue further.

**Theory and Hypotheses**

Earlier studies have relied on summary scores of ideology to measure moderation. These measures collapse discrete policy areas into one indicator, which does not offer sufficient resolution to adequately test the median voter theorem. I believe that senators may have reasons to moderate more in one policy area than in another, which is why I test the moderation hypothesis by employing multiple indicators in discrete policy areas. This allows me to clarify some of the inconsistencies of previous research through developing more specific hypotheses than have been previously tested.

The first hypothesis is in the area of economic policy. Jacobson (1997) suggests that economic conditions do influence the motivations of candidates. Particularly, when economic conditions are perceived to be poor, more qualified challengers from the opposition party will run (124-128). Shapiro et al. (1990) report that the preferences of independent voters have their largest effect on senatorial voting in the area of economic
policy. Therefore, I predict that incumbents will moderate to alleviate the economic concerns of independent voters, which are the functional equivalent of the concerns of the median voter (Shapiro et al. 1990).

This explains the need for incumbents to moderate on economic policy, but should there be differences in moderation between the parties? This aspect of economic policy has not been thoroughly addressed in the literature. However, one study provides some guidance on this question. Fiorina (1996) cites data from the 1984 American National Election Study (ANES) which lists voter policy positions in relation to their perceptions of party positions. On the two issues concerning economic policy, Democrats were twice as far as Republicans from the mean position of voters. Clearly there is great incentive for Democrats to moderate on economic policy since they are perceived to be much farther from the median voter than are Republicans. Because they are perceived to be farther from constituency preferences, I predict that a larger percentage of Democratic senators will moderate than Republican senators on economic policy.

In the area of social policy, Tatalovich and Daynes (1988) claim that because of the single-issue groups involved in social policy, legislative leeway is denied to politicians who desire to resolve moral or social issues through compromise and moderation. Social issues are often seen in terms of black and white or right and wrong, these “electoral pressures encourage Congress to represent traditional values in social regulatory policy” (Tatalovich and Daynes 1988, 218). However, they further observe that Republican party identifiers and the general electorate hold similar preferences on social policy (1988, 215). Thus, Republicans do not have as much incentive to moderate on social policy, because
they are already quite likely to be positioned near the median voter. Also, because of their association with conservative single-issue groups, their ability to moderate may be constrained. As a result, a majority of Democrats should moderate on social policy, while only a small percentage of Republicans will moderate.

It is more difficult to make specific predictions in the area of foreign policy. In general, there is the commonly held belief that the American public is less interested in foreign policy than domestic policy because it is removed from their everyday experiences. Also, their policy preferences in this area are less firmly held than those on domestic issues (Erikson, Luttbeg, and Tedin 1988). Because of this, senators may be allowed quite a bit of leeway on foreign policy votes (Fenno 1978). However, Fenno (1996) also suggests that senators are very cognizant of their foreign policy votes at election time. Along these lines, Shapiro et al. (1990) find that foreign policy preferences of party identifiers have an influence on voting records and the preferences of independents have a small but significant effect. In addition, 1984 ANES data on defense spending show that Republicans are nearly twice as far from constituency preferences as Democrats, who are only eight-tenths of a point away from mean constituency preferences on a seven point scale. These studies indicate that Democrats have little need to moderate in foreign policy. For Republicans, this issue is more complicated. Because of the influence of party preferences and the relatively weak influence of independent voters (Shapiro et al. 1990), I expect less than a majority to moderate. However, since Republicans are further from constituency preferences, I believe that a larger percentage of Republicans will moderate on foreign policy than Democrats.
In sum, the hypotheses I test are:

Hypothesis 1: Both groups of senators will moderate on economic policy, but a larger percentage of Democrats will moderate than Republicans.

Hypothesis 2: A majority of Democratic senators will moderate on social policy, but only a small percentage of Republicans will moderate.

Hypothesis 3: Less than a majority of both groups of senators will moderate on foreign policy, but a larger percentage of Republicans will moderate than Democrats.

I refine the moderation hypothesis to test it by discrete policy areas. All of the previous studies test this hypothesis through the use of summary measures. Such scores collapse several policy areas into one overarching measure of ideology, which may mute the different positions a senator may take in separate policy areas. I believe my approach will offer the resolution necessary to clarify the findings in the extant literature that may have been confounded by inadequate measures of roll call voting. By testing the moderation hypothesis across discrete policy areas, I will be able to detect movement on the ideological spectrum that would have been missed in previous research designs. Therefore, since the moderation hypothesis has not been sufficiently explored, further investigation is warranted.
Chapter 2

Measures

How to measure roll-call voting has been a perplexing problem for scholars. This fact has contributed significantly to the controversy over whether moderation occurs. The measures used in earlier studies are limited in their ability to accurately assess variability in roll-call votes because previous researchers have relied on subjective ideological measures compiled by interest groups, survey data, or on measures that emphasize divisive votes (Ahuja 1994, Amacher and Boyes 1978, Bernstein 1991, Elling 1982, Thomas 1985; Wright and Berkman 1986).

Interest group measures are developed in a biased manner. These groups select a relatively small number of votes according to the particular group’s policy interests, then publish a list of how members of Congress voted and indicate what the group thought was correct (Poole 1981). Some groups record absences as an “incorrect” vote because their policy preferences were not supported. Rating a member of Congress in this manner only provides information on whether a legislator supports a particular group’s policy goals (Snyder 1992). Because of this subjectivity, interest group scores are inadequate measures for an objective investigation.

As a result of interest groups targeting certain issues, their scores are based on polarized issues and many votes are not even considered. These ratings tend to assign extreme scores to a large fraction of members and moderate scores to relatively few members, which produces bimodal distributions (Snyder 1992). Interest groups choose votes that are highly divisive and easily classify members of Congress as conservative or
liberal along the issue dimension of their particular interest (when in fact many are moderate). Thus, the ratings make the legislature appear more polarized than it actually is (Snyder 1992). Another criticism raised by Snyder (1992) is that comparisons of scores cannot be made over time. Interest groups use different issues each year to rate members of Congress. Rarely, if ever, are the ratings based on the same issues. A member of Congress may have an ADA score of 90 in one Congress, then a score of 75 in the next. In the latter year, the member appears to be more moderate than previously; however, an actual ideological change may not have occurred. Snyder (1992) suggests that recalculating scores after weighting roll calls to approximate a uniform distribution or using scaling techniques would improve these measures.

Fowler (1982) discusses similar criticisms about interest group measures, but also offers others. She claims that if used as the dependent variable, only the accuracy of the prediction is affected, but if used as the independent variable, both parameters will be influenced. She also found that interest groups were surprised that academia had used their scores. "... Each of the staff members interviewed expressed considerable surprise and some skepticism at the use to which scholars put their ratings, and none of them attributed much influence to the scores among the general public" (Fowler 1982, 403). In addition, interest group scores do not differentiate between policy areas and tend to emphasize economic interests (Fowler 1982). These ratings are also influenced by congressional requests. In one instance, a measure was revised to give a senator a more favorable rating (Fowler 1982). Both Fowler (1982) and Snyder (1992) provide evidence which suggests that many problems may arise when attempting to use interest group
scores as an objective measure.

Scholars frequently use interest group measures because of their availability and the precedent set by previous researchers. In an effort to avoid the problems of interest group measures, some researchers have used survey data to estimate ideology, but this is extremely costly. Wright and Berkman (1986) use survey data with an exceptionally large sample in their study and find impressive results. Even though their sample includes over 35,000 respondents, it is taken at one time point. As a result, they have identified much information about the 1982 election, but their results may not be generalizable.

In addition, through the use of congressional surveys, Wright and Berkman (1986) only identify self-reported policy positions, which are not measures of voting behavior. Self-reported policy positions may vary more than actual roll-call votes. Answering a hypothetical question or identifying a particular position may be easier to do in the abstract, than it is to place a recorded vote. Furthermore, a senator can frame an answer about a salient issue in the best possible light, whereas, a roll-call vote may not allow a senator such leeway. I want to use a quantifiable measure of overt behavior, not a possible future policy position which allows a member of Congress to appeal to their constituency without actually having to do anything.

Even more importantly, the measures used in previous studies do not differentiate between policy areas. Expecting to accurately measure voting variability and/or ideological shifting through the use of an indicator that does not distinguish between policy areas is theoretically unsound. The process of representation in the areas of economic, social, and foreign policies may be quite different. A vote on economic policy
will involve different considerations than a vote on social or foreign policy. As a result, a senator's record on economic policy may become more moderate, whereas a vote on social policy may become more extreme. Thus, these scores are moving in opposite directions. If not measured separately, there may appear to be little or no movement on the ideological spectrum. An indicator that does not collapse these two areas into one score will provide a more accurate picture. Instead of identifying a lack of, or a small ideological shift, a measure that differentiates between policy areas is more likely to identify a substantial shift in any given policy area.

To answer my research question, I need a score that measures senatorial action, not reported policy positions. A useful measure of roll call voting should also differentiate between policy areas. In addition, a satisfactory measure must adequately address the concerns outlined above by Fowler (1982) and Snyder (1992). The National Journal ratings, which have never been used to identify ideological shifting, meet all of these requirements.

The National Journal is a magazine of public policy. Its targeted audiences are lawyers, lobbyists, elected officials and bureaucrats. In 1981, the National Journal, in conjunction with The Baron Report, developed their ratings in an attempt to establish an objective method of analyzing congressional voting patterns. National Journal ratings attempt to avoid the value judgments of interest group rating systems (National Journal 1982). To illustrate the usefulness of these scores, I describe how the ratings were developed for 1994.

A panel of National Journal editors and reporters initially compiled a list of 52 roll
call votes for the Senate and classified them as either economic, social, or foreign policy votes (National Journal 1995, p. 86). The computerized roll call data was provided by Garrison Nelson, University of Vermont, while statistical analysis and data processing were conducted by the Social Science Computation Center of the Brookings Institution.1 The "yea" and "nay" votes were correlated and identified as liberal or conservative. Based on the degree to which these votes correlated with other votes in a particular issue area, they were assigned a weight of 1 (lowest) to 3 (highest). A higher-weighted score indicates a stronger correlation, which identifies a better example of a vote on economic, social, or foreign policy (National Journal 1995). For a complete list of these policy votes, see the Appendix.

The weighted votes from each issue area were combined to develop an index of liberal votes as a percentage of total votes. Voting records were then matched to the index, while absences and abstentions were omitted. If a member missed more than half the votes in any issue area, a score of "missing" was given and a percentile was not calculated in these instances. Members were then ranked from most liberal to most conservative. These rankings were used to develop liberal and conservative percentiles. Each member is given a liberal and conservative percentile score for each issue area. A liberal percentile score of 70 means a senator voted the liberal position more often than 70 percent of the members.

National Journal ratings overcome the shortcomings that have been cited for interest group ratings (Fowler 1982, Snyder 1992). Following the suggestion of Snyder

1 Votes were subjected to principal components analysis which dropped four votes that were unrelated to the others, which typically reflected regional and special interest rather than general ideology.
(1992), weighted roll calls and scaling techniques have been employed by the *National Journal*. These techniques provide a more accurate picture of roll call voting in Congress and a score that is comparable over time. *National Journal* scores also address the concerns of Fowler (1982). They are objective measures that were designed to analyze congressional voting in discrete policy areas. Because of these desirable properties, I believe that the *National Journal* scores provide a solid foundation from which to generalize about shifts in the voting behavior of U.S. Senators.

**Method**

I investigate the behavior of senators from four “classes.” A “class” is defined as any set of senators that were elected or reelected in a given year, served a full term, have relatively complete voting records, and sought reelection. Each of the four “classes” of senators are divided by party and coded: elected in 1982 = class 1 (n=26), elected in 1984 = class 2 (n=26), elected in 1986 = class 3 (n=27), and elected in 1988 = class 4 (n=21). A senator elected in 1982 could also be included in the class of 1988, otherwise a senator belongs only to one class.

The measure of my dependent variable, the *National Journal* rankings, is reported in the form of liberal and conservative percentiles. For easier use, these scores are converted into the standard scale of 0-100 by subtracting the conservative percentile from 100, adding it to the liberal percentile score and dividing by two.\(^2\) Table 1 (below) has an

\(^2\) For example: In 1992 Phil Gramm (R-Texas) had a conservative percentile score of 89 in social policy and a liberal percentile score of 0. To convert into a liberalism scale of 0-100 take 100 - 89(conservative percentile)=11 + 0(liberal percentile) and divide by 2 = 5.5. Ted Kennedy (D-Mass.) had a conservative percentile score of 0 in social policy and a liberal percentile score of 89. The conversion: 100 - 0 = 100, 100 + 89= 189, 189/2 = 94.5. On the scale 0 equals absolutely conservative and 100 equals absolutely liberal. In social policy Gramm has a 5.5 and Kennedy has a 94.5.
### Table 1

**Standardized National Journal Ratings**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Liberal %</th>
<th>Conservative %</th>
<th>Standardized</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Econ.</td>
<td>Social</td>
<td>Foreign</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1983</td>
<td>Sasser (D)</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>71</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Sasser (D)</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>80</td>
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<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>Sasser (D)</td>
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<td>56</td>
<td>70</td>
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<td>Sasser (D)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2017</td>
<td>Kerrey (D)</td>
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<td>74</td>
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<td>2018</td>
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<tr>
<td>2023</td>
<td>Lugar (R)</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2024</td>
<td>Lugar (R)</td>
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<tr>
<td>2025</td>
<td>Lugar (R)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2026</td>
<td>Lugar (R)</td>
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<td>29</td>
<td>24</td>
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<tr>
<td>2027</td>
<td>Lugar (R)</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
example of the liberal and conservative percentiles in each policy area and their conversion into the standardized scores.

I compare the averages of senatorial voting scores, which are my dependent variables, for the first four years with the averages of the last two years of individual senatorial terms. I expect voting behavior to vary over time. Therefore, my independent variables are, in effect, the years of a senator's term. Since the level of analysis is the individual, I am able to identify every senator who moderates by policy area and the extent to which they moderate. If the mean scores of the first four years are more extreme than the last two years, this indicates that moderation has occurred. End-of-term moderation is defined as movement toward the mid-point of the National Journal scale. In order to generalize about moderation, the number of senators who moderate and by how much are reported by class and as an aggregate of the four classes.

In addition, I compare the percentages of moderating senators with the percentages of senators whose voting records do not change as elections approach and those whose records become more extreme. It is important to identify the behavior of moderating, as well as non-moderating senators to understand end-of-term shifting. Finding that 50 percent of one class of senators have voting records that become less extreme at the end of their terms may be an indication that moderation is occurring. However, if the other 50 percent of senators become more extreme at the end of their terms, the evidence of moderation is not conclusive. Comparing these percentages is how

---

3 The mid-point of the National Journal scale (50) is the median of senatorial voting records. Since I do not utilize constituency data, this mid-point represents an approximation of the median of constituency preferences (see Elling 1982; Thomas 1985).
I will be able to determine if senators are, in fact, moderating. I also include a test of significance between two proportions for each policy area. This allows me to determine if there are actual differences in the degree of moderation between Republicans and Democrats.

Previous studies have considered a moderating shift as any movement on the ideological spectrum toward the median voter. A movement of only one point is even classified as a shift (Ahuja 1994, Amacher and Boyes 1978, Bernstein 1991, Elling 1982; Thomas 1985; Wright and Berkman 1986). In order for movement to be considered a shift in my study it must be at least five points. Movement of less than that could easily be the result of chance or measurement error. Since the intent is to identify intentional movement, the five-point criterion is well suited to the goals of this analysis.

I also use a more accurate measure of roll-call voting than has been previously used (Ahuja 1994, Amacher and Boyes 1978, Bernstein 1991, Elling 1982, Thomas 1985, Wright and Berkman 1986). *National Journal* scores differentiate between policy areas, providing a more resolute test of my research question: do senatorial voting records become more moderate as reelection approaches? By using a more refined measure and developing theoretical expectations for each policy area, I believe that this thesis will expand existing research.
Chapter 3

Empirical Results

In this chapter, I report the findings of my research. First, I examine the percentages of moderating senators and report the results of the tests of significance between the proportions of moderating senators from each party. Then, I compare the percentages of moderating senators with non-moderating senators to determine which groups are moderating, which are remaining consistent, and which are becoming more extreme. This allows me to discern whether reelection moderation is meaningful. Each section begins with the aggregate results for the four classes for each policy area. After determining whether there is support for my hypotheses for that policy area at the aggregate level, I analyze the results by class. I include the results at the aggregate level for control. It provides a group with a large sample size and helps to eliminate any anomalies that may occur during a particular election cycle, which may confound my results.

Economic Policy

My first hypothesis posits that both groups of senators will moderate on economic policy, but a larger percentage of Democrats (since they are perceived to be farther from constituency preferences) will moderate than Republicans. The aggregate of the four classes (see Table 2 below) reveals that a majority, 55 percent, of Democratic senators moderate on economic policy. The mean shift toward moderation for these senators is 13.8 points. In other words, these results show that a majority of Democrats were, on
average, nearly 14 points more moderate on economic policy during the last two years of their terms than in the first four. For Democrats, in the area of economic policy, a majority of senatorial voting records become more moderate as reelection approaches.

The results for Republicans are less conclusive. On average, 32 percent of Republican senators are more moderate at the end of their terms than at the beginning on economic policy. The mean shift toward moderation for these senators is 9.8 points. Fewer Republicans Moderate than Democrats, but one-third do appear to be engaging in reelection moderation on economic policy.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 2</th>
<th>Senators Who Moderate on Economic Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRATS</td>
<td>55%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Shifts of Moderation</td>
<td>13.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPUBLICANS</td>
<td>32%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Shifts of Moderation</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These results remain consistent when analyzed by class. At least 50 percent of Democratic senators from each class moderate their voting records. In fact, 60 percent of the Democratic senators in class 1 become more moderate as elections approach, by a mean shift of nearly 13 points. The mean shifts toward moderation for each class of Democratic senators range from 12.2 points in class 3 to 17.7 points in class 2. The large percentages of moderating Democratic senators suggest that they may be quite far from median constituency preferences during the first four years of their terms.

In none of the four classes do a majority of Republican senators moderate on economic policy. The highest percentage of Republicans who moderate is in class 2 with
43 percent, while only 20 percent moderate in class 3. The range of mean shifts toward moderation for Republicans on economic policy are 7.4 to 12.3 points. These findings imply that at election time a majority of Republicans may already be positioned quite near median constituency preferences on economic policy.

Social Policy

The hypothesis on social policy states that a majority of Democratic senators will moderate, but only a small percentage of Republican senators will moderate. The aggregate of the four classes (see Table 3 below) shows that 57 percent of Democratic senators moderate on social policy. The mean shift among these senators toward moderation is 11.8 points. In short, these data indicate that more than a majority of Democratic senators are, on average, almost twelve points more moderate during the last two years of their terms than in the first four years. It appears that Democrats moderate on social, as well as, economic policy as reelection approaches.

Aggregate level results on social policy reveal that few Republican senators moderate as reelection approaches. Only 16 percent moderate on social policy, with a mean shift among those who moderate of 8.4 points. As reelection approaches, only a small percentage of Republicans become more moderate. These findings suggest their closeness to median constituency preferences and their ties to single issue groups effectively limit the need and/or ability of Republican senators to moderate on social policy.
Table 3  
**Senators Who Moderate on Social Policy**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRATS</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>58%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Shifts of Moderation</td>
<td>11.8</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>12.7</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPUBLICANS</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Shifts of Moderation</td>
<td>8.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>9.3</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The analysis by class yields similar results. In each class, at least 53 percent of Democratic senators moderate, with the largest percent (59 percent) moderating in class 3. The mean shifts toward moderation range from 9.6 points in class 3 to 13.7 points in class 4. The percentages of senators moderating and the magnitude of their shifts indicate that the policy positions of most Democratic senators, during the first four years of their terms, may not be consistent with the policy preferences of the median voter. This may be why so many of them moderate their voting records as reelection approaches.

In none of the four classes do a majority of Republican senators moderate. In fact, in class 4, no Republicans moderate. Class 3 has the largest percentage of Republicans that moderate with 30 percent. The range of mean shifts toward moderation among Republicans on social policy is 6.4 to 9.3 points. As reelection approaches, it appears that very few Republicans moderate their voting records on social policy. Among those who do, the moderating shifts are relatively small.

**Foreign Policy**

My hypothesis on foreign policy posits that less than a majority of both groups of senators will moderate, but a larger percentage of Republicans will moderate than
Democrats. The aggregate level results of the four classes (see Table 4 below) indicate that 46 percent of Democratic senators moderate on foreign policy. It is in the area of foreign policy that the smallest percentage of Democratic senators moderate as reelection approaches. Moreover, Democrats have their smallest aggregate mean shift toward moderation in this policy area at 10.9 points.

In the aggregate, 36 percent of Republican Senators moderate on foreign policy. The mean shift among those who moderate is 11.3 points. Again, as in the previous two policy areas, fewer Republicans than Democrats are moderating as reelection approaches. However, at the aggregate level, more Republican senators moderate on foreign policy than in any other area. This is also the only policy area where Republicans have a larger mean shift than Democrats.

### Table 4

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Senators Who Moderate on Foreign Policy</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Foreign Policy</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEMOCRATS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Shifts of Moderation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REPUBLICANS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mean Shifts of Moderation</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

When foreign policy is analyzed by class, more variation is present than in the areas of economic and social policy. Sixty-five percent of Democratic senators moderate in class 3. This is the largest percentage of moderating senators in any of the classes for all three policy areas. However, only 25 percent moderate in class 2, which is the lowest percentage of Democrats in any policy area. The mean shifts toward moderation for Democrats range from 6.79 points in class 2 to 13.6 points in class 1. One possible
explanation for the disparity may be the hostilities in the Persian Gulf, which started at the end of the terms for senators in class 3. This was a highly salient issue. The electorate became more attentive to foreign policy issues and encouraged bipartisan efforts in the Senate, which resulted in more moderate voting records on both sides of the aisle.

There are also variations present when looking at the individual classes of Republican senators. Based on the aggregate level analysis, foreign policy is the area in which the largest percentage of Republicans moderate. However, this higher percentage of moderating Republican senators can be attributed to the anomaly of class 3, in which 60 percent of Republican senators moderate. The other three classes have moderation percentages that are very similar to the previous findings for economic and social policy.

These data indicate that a larger percentage of Democrats moderate than do their Republican counterparts on economic and social policy. Less than a majority of Republicans are moderating on economic policy, while only a small percentage moderate in social policy. In addition, less than a majority of both groups moderate on foreign policy as expected, but a larger percentage of Democrats moderate than Republicans. These findings provide solid support for my second hypothesis, but suggest that hypotheses 1 and 3 need further refinement.

The problem with relying solely on these findings is that there is no control for the differences in class sizes between the two parties. For example, in class 4 there are 12 Democrats and 9 Republicans. On economic policy, I expected a larger percentage of Democrats to moderate than Republicans. The results for class 4 seem to support my hypothesis, as 50 percent of Democrats and 22 percent of Republicans moderate.
However, if there had been a larger number of Republicans, would a greater percentage have moderated? Without a test of significance, I cannot discern if the differing percentages of moderating senators between the two parties are actually different. I employ a z-test of significance between proportions of moderating senators from each party to test my three hypotheses (see Table 5 below).

### Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Economic</td>
<td>2.34***</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>1.97**</td>
<td>1.3*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social</td>
<td>4.12***</td>
<td>1.82**</td>
<td>2.35***</td>
<td>1.44*</td>
<td>2.82***</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foreign</td>
<td>0.64</td>
<td>0.86</td>
<td>-0.59</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>1.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*** Alpha level ≤ .01; ** Alpha level ≤ .05; * Alpha level ≤ .1

The hypothesis on economic policy posits that a larger percentage of Democratic senators will moderate than Republican senators. At the aggregate level, the difference between the percentage of moderating Democrats and Republicans is statistically significant at alpha ≤ .01. When analyzed by class, the results are less conclusive. For classes 1 and 2, the difference between the percentages of moderating senators is not statistically significant, which may be a result of a small number of moderating Republicans. However, the results for classes 3 and 4 are statistically significant at alpha ≤ .05 and alpha ≤ .1, respectively. Although the results for two of the classes are not significant, the evidence indicates that over the time period being tested (1983-1994), a larger percentage of Democratic senators moderate than Republican senators on economic policy.

The expectation on social policy is that a majority of Democratic senators will
moderate, while only a small percentage of Republican senators will moderate. The results at the aggregate level are statistically significant at alpha ≤ .01. In addition, the differences between the percentages of moderating senators is significant in each of the four classes (alpha levels for class 1 ≤ .05; class 3 ≤ .1; classes 2 and 4 ≤ .01). These findings indicate that from 1983 to 1994, a majority of Democratic senators moderate on social policy, but only a small percentage of their Republican counterparts moderate.

The hypothesis on foreign policy states that a larger percentage of Republican senators will moderate than Democratic senators. The initial findings do not support this expectation. Although the reported percentages indicate that a larger percentage of Democrats moderate than Republicans, this difference is not statistically significant. In fact, at the aggregate level, as well as for each individual class, none of the differences in percentages of moderating senators are statistically significant.

In summation, there is some support for the first two hypotheses. A larger percentage of Democratic senators, when compared to their Republican counterparts, do in fact moderate on economic and social policy. However, fewer Republicans moderate on economic policy than expected. On social policy only a small percentage of Republicans moderate, which is consistent with my expectations. The expectation in the third hypothesis, that less than a majority of senators would moderate, is supported. However, contrary to expectations, Democrats and Republicans moderate at roughly equal percentages on foreign policy.

Still, there remains an unanswered question. Which groups of senators are actually moderating? The percentages of senators displaying reelection moderation has
been reported. In addition, the differing percentages of moderation between parties has been tested. However, it is easy to show that a larger percentage of Democrats moderate than Republicans if the former moderates and the latter does not. To fully answer the moderation question requires comparing the percentages of moderating senators, with those whose voting records remain consistent (no end-of-term shift, or one of less than 5 points), and those whose voting records become more extreme. If 50 percent of senators moderate their voting records, it would appear that reelection moderation is occurring. However, if the other 50 percent become more extreme, the evidence is less conclusive. But, if 50 percent moderate, 30 percent remain consistent, and 20 percent become more extreme, then there is solid evidence of reelection moderation. Comparing these percentages allows me to discern if reelection moderation is actually occurring.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Policy</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Extreme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats (56)</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 1 (15)</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>13%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 2 (12)</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 3 (17)</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>6%</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 4 (12)</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>25%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On economic policy (see table 6 above), comparing the percentages of moderating and non-moderating senators shows that Democratic senatorial voting records typically become more moderate as reelection approaches. At the aggregate level, as well as for each individual class, the predominant end-of-term voting behavior of Democratic senators who are seeking reelection is to become more moderate during the last two years of their terms. For all of the classes except class 3, Democratic senators who moderate
do so at a ratio of 2:1 or greater when compared to those whose voting records stay the same and those whose records become more extreme. Even in class 3, more senators moderate than become more extreme or stay the same. This clearly indicates that between 1983 and 1994, Democratic senators moderate on economic policy at the end of their terms.

Comparing the percentages of moderating and non-moderating Republican senators on economic policy (see Table 7 below) indicates that they behave differently at the end of their terms than Democrats. At the aggregate level, a larger percentage of Republican senatorial voting records remain consistent (45 percent) as reelection approaches than become more extreme (23 percent) or more moderate (32 percent). Equal percentages of Republican voting records become moderate and remain consistent in classes 1 (36 percent) and 2 (43 percent). In addition, the same percentage (40 percent) of voting records become more extreme and remain consistent in class 3. In class 4, an overwhelming majority (67 percent) of Republican voting records remain unchanged during the last two years of their terms, when compared with the first four years. Also in class 4, only 22 percent moderate and just 11 percent become more extreme. The data indicate that Republican senatorial voting records tend to remain consistent throughout their terms on economic policy.
Table 7
End-of-Term Voting Behavior of Republicans on Economic Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Economic Policy</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Extreme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republicans (44)</td>
<td>32%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>23%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 1 (11)</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 2 (14)</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 3 (10)</td>
<td>20%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 4 (9)</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>67%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For Democrats on social policy, as on economic policy, the predominant end-of-term voting behavior is to become more moderate than they had been during the first four years of their terms (see Table 8 below). Even fewer Democrats become more extreme as reelection approaches (18 percent) on social policy than on economic policy (25 percent). At the aggregate level and for each individual class, a majority of senators moderate. Clearly, Democratic senators are engaging in reelection moderation on social and economic policy.

Table 8
End-of-Term Voting Behavior of Democrats on Social Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Policy</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Extreme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats (56)</td>
<td>57%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 1 (15)</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>27%</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 2 (12)</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>17%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 3 (17)</td>
<td>59%</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 4 (12)</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing the percentages of moderating and non-moderating Republican senators on social policy reveals that they behave differently at the end of their terms than Democrats (see Table 9 below). Only in class 3 does the percentage of moderating senators (30 percent) equal the percentage of those whose voting records become more
extreme. In every other class, the percentages of voting records that remain consistent as re-election approaches and those records that become more extreme exceeds the percentage of senators who moderate at the end of their terms. Again, a larger percentage of Republican senatorial voting records remain consistent at the end of their terms (45 percent) than those that moderate (16 percent) or become more extreme (39 percent). However, a larger percentage of Republicans become more extreme at the end of their terms on social policy (39 percent) than on economic policy (23 percent).

Table 9
End-of-Term Voting Behavior of Republicans on Social Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Social Policy</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Extreme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republicans (44)</td>
<td>16%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>39%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 1 (11)</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 2 (14)</td>
<td>14%</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 3 (10)</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>30%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 4 (9)</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>44%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

At the aggregate level on foreign policy (see Table 10 below), more Democrats moderate (43 percent) than remain consistent (36 percent), or become more extreme (21 percent) at the end of their terms. Although a larger percentage of senators moderate than any other end-of-term behavior, not as many are moderating when compared to the percentages that moderate on economic and social policy. In classes 3 and 4, the results are consistent with the findings in other policy areas. A larger percentage of senators moderate than become extreme or remain the same. In classes 1 (40 percent) and 2 (42 percent), a larger percentage of senators have consistent, rather than moderating or more extreme, voting records as re-election approaches. On foreign policy, Democrats display two patterns. In the earlier classes their voting records tend to remain consistent and in
the later classes, Democrats tend to shift toward moderation.

Table 10

End-of-Term Voting Behavior of Democrats on Foreign Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Policy</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Extreme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Democrats (56)</td>
<td>43%</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>21%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 1 (15)</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>40%</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 2 (12)</td>
<td>25%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 3 (17)</td>
<td>53%</td>
<td>24%</td>
<td>24%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 4 (12)</td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>42%</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A comparison of the percentages of moderating and non-moderating Republican senators on foreign policy (see Table 11 below) indicates a decisive trend. Except for the anomaly of class 3, more than 50 percent of Republican senators in each class remain consistent at the end of their terms. Although a larger percentage of senators moderate than become more extreme on foreign policy, typically, Republicans are characterized by an absence of end-of-term shifting.

Table 11

End-of-Term Voting Behavior of Republicans on Foreign Policy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Foreign Policy</th>
<th>Moderate</th>
<th>Same</th>
<th>Extreme</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Republicans (44)</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 1 (11)</td>
<td>18%</td>
<td>64%</td>
<td>18%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 2 (14)</td>
<td>36%</td>
<td>50%</td>
<td>14%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 3 (10)</td>
<td>60%</td>
<td>30%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Class 4 (9)</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td>56%</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By comparing the percentages of senators who moderate, who remain consistent, and who become more extreme, a clearer picture of end-of-term voting behavior is developed. On economic and social policy a majority of Democrats tend to engage in reelection moderation. On foreign policy there are two discernable patterns. The first
two classes of Democrats tend to remain consistent, while the last two classes tend to moderate as reelection approaches. Republican voting records, on the other hand, tend to remain consistent in all three policy areas. However, a larger percentage of Republicans moderate on economic policy than become extreme, while a larger percentage become more extreme than moderate on social policy. In fact, very few moderate on social policy. On foreign policy, the majority of Republicans remain consistent at the end of their terms.

In summation, a greater percentage of Democrats moderate than Republicans on economic and social policy, while both moderate with about the same frequency on foreign policy. However, reelection moderation is not practiced equally by both parties. Over the time period under investigation (1983-1994), Democrats appear to be moderating as reelection approaches on economic and social policy, but in only the last two classes on foreign policy. On the other hand, the majority of Republicans do not appear to be moderating in any policy area. Their voting records tend to remain consistent over their six-year terms.
Chapter 4

Conclusion

This chapter begins with a review my research question and three hypotheses. Then, I explain why the National Journal ratings are uniquely suited as a measure of roll call voting for this thesis and describe the method used to investigate the moderation hypothesis. I also summarize my findings and discuss their importance. In addition, I explore the normative implications of my research. In conclusion, I discuss the directions that future research should take.

In this thesis, I investigate whether senators moderate their voting records as reelection approaches. This question is explored by developing a theoretical orientation based on Downs’ *An Economic Theory to Democracy* (1957). The median voter theorem states that the optimal electoral strategy is to appeal to the preferences of the median voter which, in effect, results in end-of-term moderation. I refine the moderation hypothesis to be specific to particular policy areas. This allows me to answer my research question across discrete policy areas, instead of in terms of general ideology. I believe that this results in a clearer understanding of moderation in the U.S. Senate.

My hypothesis on economic policy is that senators from both parties will moderate, but a larger percentage of Democrats will moderate than Republicans. Both groups will moderate to appeal to the preferences of the median voter. However, since Democrats are perceived to be further from constituency preferences, the expectation is that more Democrats will moderate than Republicans. On social policy, a majority of Democrats are expected to moderate, but only a small percentage of Republicans are
expected to display end-of-term moderation. A majority of Democrats are expected to moderate because they are perceived to be further from constituency preferences than Republicans on social policy. In addition, Republicans may be constrained in their ability to moderate because of close ties to conservative single-issue groups. On foreign policy, less than a majority of both groups of senators are expected to moderate. American voters may be less attentive to foreign policy issues because they are removed from their everyday experiences. However, a larger percentage of Republicans are expected to moderate than Democrats because the literature suggests that Republicans are perceived to be further from constituency preferences.

Previous studies do not investigate the moderation hypothesis across policy areas. Instead, earlier researchers rely on a summary measure that collapses several policy areas into a general measure of ideology. I believe this approach has confounded prior efforts to resolve the debate over moderation. The nature of representation is too complex to be explained by relying on a measure of general ideology. A roll-call vote on economic policy may involve different considerations than a vote on social policy. Therefore, it is necessary to investigate representation along several dimensions.

I employ a measure that has not been previously used to investigate the moderation hypothesis. The National Journal ratings that I use are an objective measure that was designed to analyze roll-call voting. In addition, this measure overcomes many of the inadequacies that have been noted for interest group scores (Fowler 1982; Snyder 1992). However, for my purposes, one of the most important benefits of the National Journal ratings is that they are reported in three discrete policy areas. These scores are
calculated in the areas of economic, social, and foreign policy. This enables me to investigate the moderation hypothesis across policy areas. Because I differentiate between issue areas, I am able to develop three policy specific hypotheses, which result in a more refined test of reelection moderation.

This approach permits me to offer a more detailed answer to whether senators moderate their voting records at election time. I find that a larger percentage of Democrats, do in fact, moderate on economic policy than Republicans. Democrats are clearly engaging in reelection moderation, while Republicans are not. On economic policy voting, Republican senators tend to remain consistent over their six-year terms. On social policy, expectations are supported as a majority of Democrats moderate as reelection approaches, while only a small percentage of Republican senators engage in similar end-of-term voting behavior. Again, as in economic policy, Republicans tend to remain consistent over their six-year terms. Although Republican senatorial voting records tend to remain consistent, the second most common end-of-term voting behavior is to moderate on economic policy and to become more extreme on social policy. On foreign policy, the first two classes of Democratic voting records tend to remain consistent and the last two classes tend to moderate, while all four classes of Republican voting records tend to remain consistent throughout the six-year terms.

The moderating behavior of Democrats implies that over the time period under investigation (1983-1994), they were further from constituency preferences than Republicans. This indicates that there is a discordance between Democratic party elites, the party rank-and-file, and the general electorate, which requires Democratic senators to
scramble at election time. The evidence shows that Republicans tend to remain consistent in their voting behavior, which implies they are already quite near median constituency preferences.

Previous studies do not offer the detailed findings that are provided here. Differentiating between policy areas has enhanced this investigation. Being able to clearly identify the difference between voting records becoming moderate, more extreme, and remaining consistent helps to clarify end-of-term voting behavior. Also, the emphasis placed on developing different expectations for Democrats and Republicans has proven to be beneficial, as evidenced by the fact that they display different voting behaviors across policy areas throughout their senatorial terms.

The results on social policy are perhaps the most interesting findings presented. It appears that Democratic senatorial voting records may be more extreme than median constituency preferences during the first four years of their terms. This may be why so many of them engage in reelection moderation. Republicans, on the other hand, appear to be more closely attuned to constituency preferences on social policy. This is consistent with the assertions of Tatalovich and Daynes (1988), who claim that Republican party identifiers and the general electorate hold similar preferences on social policy. As a result, on social policy senate Republicans tend to remain consistent over their six-year terms. In addition, the Republicans who do not display end-of-term voting consistency, tend to become more extreme. This may be the result of close Republican ties to conservative single issue groups.

McCrone and Kuklinski (1979) suggest that legislators are responsive to
constituency preferences when two conditions exist. First, legislators must think of themselves as delegates and second, constituents must send consistent messages. I believe that end-of-term shifting behavior is a reflection of these conditions. During a reelection campaign, voters are more likely to be attentive and to be sending clearer signals of policy preferences. In addition, since senators are trying to stay in office, they are more likely to represent constituency preferences.

My research suggests that senators are in fact responsive, especially when the electorate is attentive. Democrats moderate because they are farther from constituency preferences than Republicans. Their end-of-term moderation is an attempt to appeal to the preferences of the median voter. The lack of moderation of Republican senators implies that they have voting records that are already quite near median constituency preferences, hence, their consistent voting records. At a minimum, elections may provide the accountability necessary to cause representation to occur.

This is when representatives are paying attention to the represented and trying to win their approval. In addition, during intense election campaigns is when the electorate is probably most attentive. Even if many Americans are inattentive, senators behave as if they believe their voting records are being watched (Arnold 1990). At least in the areas of economic and social policy, it appears that Democratic senators believe that their voting records are important at election time. However, it also suggests that senators are more responsive when the electorate is attentive. If this only happens during the election cycle, then who is at fault, senators or voters? Policy representation is a two way process and it requires the efforts of both the representative and the represented.
I believe that one of the most significant contributions of this research is that it suggests new directions for future investigations of representation. The proposition that senators become more responsive at election time implies that they are unresponsive early in their terms. While this suggests that senators are trustees early in their terms and become delegates toward the end of their terms, I believe that such an inference provides an oversimplified and inaccurate picture of representation in the U.S. Senate.

If reelection is a tantamount concern, then every vote, even some seemingly inconsequential ones, involves the calculus of what it means "back home" (Arnold 1990). Senators who ask such questions are concerned with at least the appearance of responsiveness. In fact, I believe senators are rarely unresponsive. If it appears that a senator is unresponsive, it is probably because we are asking the wrong questions and looking to the wrong constituencies.

Elaborating on this idea will require linking constituency preferences to senatorial voting records. This approach has been attempted (Ahuja 1994, Bernstein 1991; Wright and Berkman 1986), however, delineating the preferences between the personal, primary, reelection, and geographical constituencies (Fenno 1978) has not been attempted by those testing the moderation hypothesis. I believe that early in a senatorial term, when it appears that senators are less responsive, they are not being unresponsive, but instead are responding to their personal and primary constituencies.

It is theoretically unsound to compare a general constituency measure of ideology to senatorial voting records during the first four years of a term to investigate policy congruence. This constituency may contain many individuals that only become attentive
during reelection campaigns. Therefore, these individuals are probably not sending consistent messages about policy preferences and are inattentive at the beginning of a senator's term. Voting records from the first four years of a senator's term should be linked to a constituency of attentive voters. Party activists are this attentive constituency.

Since these voters are more attentive, these are the people to whom a senator is most likely responding. During the early years of a term, the general public is less attentive. As a result, senators are responsive to the party identifiers who are attentive and perhaps sending more defined messages regarding policy preferences. Fenno (1978) refers to these individuals as the personal and primary constituencies. These votes are necessary for a primary election victory and responsiveness to this constituency may even lessen the chances of drawing a challenger in the primary.

The picture becomes more complicated at election time. This is when the general public becomes more attentive. Although voters from the personal and primary constituencies are part of the reelection constituency, unless they comprise a majority of the electorate, it becomes necessary to appeal to the voters who only become attentive during election campaigns. They are found in the middle of the ideological spectrum, hence the need to moderate. However, a senator is still constrained by the preferences of their party identifiers. As a result, moderating, in an attempt to appeal to the median voter, is tempered by the need to satisfy the policy preferences of party identifiers.

The move to the middle is clouded by uncertainty. The preferences of the general electorate are harder to discern than those of party activists, whose preferences are probably clearer and whose votes are more certain. This is where the problem lies.
win reelection, the voters in the middle must be won, but a senator is constrained from moving too far to the middle because the more ideological voters cannot be lost. Therefore, a political tightrope must be walked in which a senator gambles with the certainty of the personal and primary constituencies against the uncertainty of the reelection constituency.

If senators consistently become more moderate at the end of their terms, the assumption can be made based on the moderation hypothesis that they are appealing to the median voter to win reelection. If ideological movement is required to satisfy the policy preferences of the median voter, then during the first four years of their terms, senators have not been consistently representing these preferences. Either they are behaving as independent agents (e.g. trustees), or they are responding to a different constituency. My research suggests it is the latter.

Future research should investigate how senators interact with each of their constituencies at different periods throughout their terms. This study suggests that making a distinction between the primary, reelection, and geographic constituencies may add to our understanding of patterns of moderation as well as to the nature of senatorial representation. Senators may be representing their personal and primary constituencies during the first four years of their terms, which results in voting records that are more extreme than general constituency preferences. As reelection approaches, senators may need to appeal to voters in the wider geographic constituency to attract enough support to build a reelection coalition, which necessitates moderation to attract the median voter.

Verification of these proposals would alter present conceptions about
representation. It would imply that senators receive more constituency "control" than is suggested by Arnold's (1993) *Alternative Control Model*. First, messages come from members of the primary constituency throughout senatorial terms, then as elections approach, senators might also receive messages from their geographic constituency. One of Arnold's (1993) assumptions is that legislators are "monitored" by activists, challengers, and interest groups that act as policing agents and inform the public when legislators go awry. This would need to be expanded to include same party activists who are an attentive public that probably have outcome (or policy) preferences that are more extreme than those of the general electorate. Same party activists probably "monitor" in the way that Arnold (1993) suggests, but also encourage some policy extremism.

Moreover, these party activists probably have clearer outcome, as well as, policy preferences, which may result in more defined messages being sent to legislators. This would imply that senators behave more as instructed delegates than as Arnold's (1993) "controlled agents". To discern whether these assertions are accurate will require linking the appropriate constituency (personal, primary, reelection, and geographic) data to the corresponding period during a senator's term. One possible approach would be to use constituency data from same party identifiers to attempt to establish a link to the first four years of a senator's term.

In sum, this thesis has shown that over the time period under investigation (1983-1994), Democratic senators engage in reelection moderation on economic and social policy. On foreign policy their voting records tend to remain consistent over their six-year terms in the first two classes, while senators in the last two classes display moderating.
behavior. Republicans display different end-of-term voting behaviors than their Democratic counterparts. They are not moderating. In all three policy areas, Republican senatorial voting records tend to remain consistent throughout their terms.
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### Economic Votes

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Voting Action Description</th>
<th>Vote Date</th>
<th>Vote Result</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>31</td>
<td>Table a proposal to emphasize private-sector jobs for summer employment programs for youths. Feb. 8</td>
<td>50-43</td>
<td>L-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>32</td>
<td>Approve a new federal program to aid students seeking jobs. Feb. 8</td>
<td>62-31</td>
<td>L-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>48</td>
<td>Amend the Constitution to require a balanced budget by 2001, with provision for a waiver by a three-fifths vote in both the House and the Senate. March 1</td>
<td>63-37; failed to receive the required two-thirds vote</td>
<td>L-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>Confirm the nomination of William B. Gould IV as a member of the National Labor Relations Board. March 2</td>
<td>58-38</td>
<td>L-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55</td>
<td>Table a proposal to reduce to $1.5 billion the authorization for the national competitiveness program. March 10</td>
<td>49-43</td>
<td>L-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>78</td>
<td>Freeze domestic spending levels for the next five years. March 24</td>
<td>32-667</td>
<td>L-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>82</td>
<td>Approve the fiscal 1995 budget resolution, including a deficit of $174 billion. March 25</td>
<td>57-40</td>
<td>L-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>118</td>
<td>Table a proposal to require Davis-Bacon Act wage requirements for contractors on federal drinking water projects. May 18</td>
<td>52-46</td>
<td>L-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>152</td>
<td>Require that half of air traffic controllers be from the group fired by the Reagan Administration in 1981. June 16</td>
<td>29-65</td>
<td>C-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>189</td>
<td>End debate on a motion to consider a bill that would bar employers from hiring permanent replacements for striking workers. July 13</td>
<td>53-46; failed to receive the required 60 votes</td>
<td>C-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>220</td>
<td>Table a proposal to reduce fiscal 1995 transportation spending to $13.6 billion. July 21</td>
<td>72-28</td>
<td>L-2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>260</td>
<td>Eliminate $135 million in community development grants from the Housing and Urban Development Department. Aug. 4</td>
<td>27-71</td>
<td>L-1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>288</td>
<td>Require that all health insurance policies cover preventive services for children. Aug. 16</td>
<td>55-42</td>
<td>L-3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix (Continued)

Social Votes

25 Authorize $30 million for school choice programs in low-income areas. Feb. 8. (41-52) L-2

28 Prohibit federally financed distribution of condoms, contraceptives or drugs without parental consent. Feb. 8. (34-59) L-3

50 Table a proposal to delay compliance for pesticide-safety regulations for farm workers. March 9. (35-65) C-2

92 Confirm Rosemary Barkett as an appellate court judge. April 14. (61-37) L-3

99 Table a proposal to establish a privacy protection commission for electronic data and fair information practices. May 4. (77-21) C-1

106 Express the sense of the Senate in opposition to "racial justice" provisions assigned to prevent discrimination in death penalty cases. May 11. (58-41) C-2

112 Approve a conference report establishing federal penalties for individuals who obstruct or block access to abortion clinics. May 12. (69-30) L-2

115 Table a ban on penalties against communities that cannot afford to comply with the Safe Drinking Water Act. May 17. (56-43) L-3

124 Instruct conferees to insist on mandatory minimum prison sentences for certain drug offenders. May 19. (66-32) C-2

126 Instruct conferees to insist on a mandatory prison term for the use of a firearm during a state criminal offense. May 19. (51-47) C-1

127 Bar federal funds for the Martin Luther King Jr. federal holiday commission. May 24. (28-70) L-2

191 Prohibit the expenditure of federal funds to change population control laws in other laws in other nations. July 14. (42-58) L-3

223 Table a proposal to prohibit the Legal Services Corp. from aiding legal challenges by the poor against welfare reform. July 21. (56-44) L-3

230 Table a proposal to prohibit the National Endowment for the Arts from financing certain projects. July 25. (49-42) L-3

236 Deny federal assistance to local school systems that prohibit voluntary prayer in public schools. July 27. (47-53) L-3

244 Prohibit agencies receiving education funds from encouraging or supporting homosexuality as a lifestyle. Aug. 1. (63-36) C-2

295 Approve the crime bill. Aug. 25. (61-38) L-3

Appendix (Continued)

Foreign Votes

3 Table a proposal to express the sense of Congress in favor of establishing an

6 Require a full accounting of the U.S. prisoners of war and missing-in-action
before the United States lifts its trade embargo against Vietnam. Jan. 27. (42-
58) L-1

11 Table a proposal to require that nations of the former Soviet Union provide
collateral before receiving bilateral and international loans. Jan. 28. (60-33) L-2

14 Extend immigration-law protections to certain oppressed Russian Jews and
evangelical Christians seeking entry into the United States. Feb 1. (85-15) L-1

16 Express the Senate's sense that the President urge further progress by China in
meeting most-favored-nation trade standards. Feb. 1. (61-39) L-3

17 Table a proposal barring U.S. security assistance to nations that vote with the
United States on fewer than 25 per cent of U.N. votes. Feb 2. (66-34) L-2

46 Confirm Stobe Talbott as deputy secretary of State. Feb. 22. (66-31) L-3

64 Transfer $513 million from the ballistic missile defense program. March 22.
(40-59) C-3

111 Require the President to terminate the U.S. arms embargo of Bosnia at the
request of that nation. May 12. (50-49) C-2

130 Confirm Derek Shearer as ambassador to Finland. May 24. (67-31) L-3

132 End debate on the nomination of Sam W. Brown Jr. as head of the delegation
to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe. May 25. (56-42;
failed to receive the required 60 votes) C-3

164 Table a proposal to delay construction of a nuclear-powered aircraft carrier.
June 23. (35-61) L-3


179 Strike $150 million in funds earmarked to maintain the production line for the

273 Prohibit funds to expand the MILSTAR military satellite communications system Aug 10.
(38-62) C-2


277 Increase funds for antiballistic missile capabilities for the Navy's Aegis cruisers. Aug. 10.
(38-60) L-3