Political Participation in America: The Role of Race, Ethnicity, and Gender

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POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF RACE, ETHNICITY, AND GENDER
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN AMERICA: THE ROLE OF RACE, ETHNICITY, AND GENDER

A thesis submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters of Arts

By

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Abstract

Equality in political participation in the United States requires that all citizens, regardless of their social status or demographic characteristics be allowed to participate in the system, regardless of income or education. However, studies have shown several variables – gender, race, income, and education -- significantly affect any one person’s pathway to political participation and expression. Using data from the 1992 Citizen's Participatory Study, I examine these effects, especially in terms of how these variables affect the participation of women. The findings show that education and income rarely have the “equalizing” effect in terms of political participation that is believed.
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION

Political Participation in America

Participation is the cornerstone of any democracy. Historically, most studies of political participation have analyzed voter turnout as the indicator of participation in the United States. Recently though, many studies of the American participatory process have focused on the fact that voting behavior has been in steady decline since the 1960's (Campbell, Converse, Miller and Stokes, 1960; Burnham, 1982; Teixiera 1987). Many of these studies presented evidence that the voting population that did go to the polls was unrepresentative of the whole electorate, as those who were voting were mostly white, upper class, and highly educated. Many democratic theorists prophesied that the "end was near for true participatory democracy in America" (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1997, p. 75).

While it is true that the United States lags behind other developed democracies in voter turnout, America leads other nations in terms of other forms of political participation, such as campaigning, giving campaign contributions, becoming active in the local political community, attending protests, and writing/phonning local, state, and nationally elected officials. If it is true that the vote is no longer the real measure of political participation, then matters become much more complicated. Citizens no longer have this singular, anonymous unit of input that counts equally (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1995, p.13). The comparison of how much political power and clout any group carries must now be measured in money, skill, and time.
Consequently, many of the latest studies concerning political participation have shifted the focus from voting turnout to the examination of various other forms of political participation. Specifically, many scholars are interested in using alternative forms of participation as the measure of how much political inequality exists among groups – particularly those groups that have been treated unequally for a long period of time, such as women, African Americans, and Latinos. Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995, p.15) define such inequality -- whenever a group of activists is unrepresentative of the public with respect to some politically relevant characteristic -- as 'participatory distortion.'

**Minority Political Participation**

Historically, women, especially minority women, have had unequal representation in the political process, mainly due to legal (and sometimes illegal) restrictions. If we are to believe just one of the basic tenets of participatory democracy-- that is, everyone has equal voice in the political process-- this situation becomes disturbing, especially when weighed with the knowledge that women (of all races combined) comprise half of the US population.

Previous research, especially that conducted by Sidney Verba and Kay Schlozman (1993, 1994, and 1995), along with various other collaborators, has focused on how political participation has been unevenly distributed along the lines of gender and race. They find that these differences stem from factors such as income and education, as well as the level of participation in non-political activities, especially those connected with religion. People with higher incomes have both more money and time to devote to political activity, and those with higher education levels are more likely to be concerned
with political issues, and become active about them. They find that the people with all of these factors in their favor tend to be White men.

**Explanations of Inequality**

This inequality problem – that White men control most political capital - can be examined from the standpoint of multiracial feminism, which "focuses on the intersectionality of gender, race, ethnicity and social class" (Lorber, 1998 p. 134). Lorber argues that these social statuses should not be examined alone, as they all construct a social location whose average inhabitant is both oppressed and privileged. The oppression may come from a social construction in which White men (as Verba and Schlozman can attest) hold the spoils of political power: better education, better jobs, and higher incomes.

The difference in the political participation rates of women and minorities, compared to men, is an important issue to multiracial feminism, since the most advantaged have greater control and influence over those in lower social locations on political policy. The ideas and values held by the most advantaged group have a stronger impact on political policy (Lorber 1998, p. 135). As Verba, Schlozman and Brady suggest, White men heavily influence every step of public policy, from agenda setting, to formation, to implementation.

Importantly, a woman located in a social group may not be as disadvantaged as a man in the same group may be (Lorber, 1998 p.134). African American women tend to have better education and hold better jobs than their male counterparts. As there are fewer resources to monopolize when groups are in lower social locations, men and
women tend to be more equal. But "as the group gains advantages, the men usually advance over the women" (Lorber, 1998, p. 134).

Also, Lorber (1998, p.134) notes that there is a different social “map,” or placement in the social structure, for men and women of the same racial or ethnic group, not unlike the different social map for Whites and non-Whites. The stratification on the map will include everyone from the very wealthy to those who just struggle: and the wealthy will tend to be White men, and those just surviving will be mostly women of color. If it is true that the wealthy and highly educated seem to be in control of policy concerns (both Lorber and Verba, Schlozman and Brady contend that it is), the concern now is how different are the political participation rates of women as compared to men in the same group.

Present Political Concerns

Assumptions made by multiracial feminists will suggest that African American women will have different policy concerns and advantages than African American men, since the women tend to have higher income and education. The same assumption holds true for White and Latino women, although for different reasons. Also, there should be some differences between the women in these ethnic categories. Both Lorber (1998, p.135) and Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1995, p. 197) suggest that women of each category bring some different policy concerns to the political arena, especially in the areas of abortion, health care, and education. Given the different resources for these women (White women have higher incomes, African American women have more intangible resources, such as non-political activities), the differences between genders in
the “pathways to political participation” could prove to be statistically significant. Money plays such an important role in politics, even more today in a post-McCain/Feingold world. Campaign contributors are often given preferential treatment by politicians. If this is true, then the preferred policies of White women, which may be different than those of African American women, are the policies that will be given the priority attention.

While Verba and Schlozman have examined how gender and race affect political participation, they have not examined how the political participation rates of White, African-American, and Latino women compare with each other. This paper will discuss such potential similarities and differences. In keeping with previous research, the variables that will be examined will include income, education, and level of participation in both political and non-political activities (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1993, p. 19). Three questions are posed: how do these three variables impact the political participation of women of these races? What are the significant differences within each group? Are there any similarities within the groups? Does increasing income and education “level the playing field” between White, African American and Latino women, in terms of their gender and political participation?

Given the results of previous studies, I expect to find substantial differences in the political participation rates among women of the three races. This is due to the fact that White women have some policy concerns, such as the issues of abortion, education, which, according to previous research and discussed later, affect them significantly more than minority women. Plus, I expect to find that there are large differences between women of different races in regard to overall political participation.
CHAPTER 2: POLITICAL HISTORY AND ENVIRONMENT

The Women's Movement and Suffrage

Ever since Abigail Adams implored her husband John Adams to "remember the ladies," as he headed off to draft the new Constitution, women have had to fight a seemingly uphill battle to procure the same political rights and recognition as men. Many of the limitations stemmed from society's recognition of the man as head of the household; a woman would effectively render her husband's vote null, it was argued, if she voted for a different candidate. Still, other political leaders felt that to give women the right to vote might contribute to their opponents' success (Conway, Steurnagel, and Ahern, p.8). Nonetheless, many states allowed women the right to vote in school board elections, as children's education was viewed to be more of the woman's responsibility.

When women's suffrage began to materialize, it was often due to political reasons other than the recognition of women's political equality. Wyoming was the first state to allow women to vote in all elections, a right granted by the territorial constitution in 1869, in hopes of drawing more women to settle there.

It would take the antislavery movement to move the fight for women's suffrage into high gear. Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Lucretia Mott, founders of the initial women's movement, were in attendance at the international anti-slavery convention in London in 1840. While women were welcome at the convention, they were told they could not be official voting delegates, which led to Mott, Stanton and other women to spend much of their time discussing the unfair social status of women. They vowed to change it.
Mott and Stanton organized the Seneca Falls Convention, in which women resolved to not only pursue the right to vote, but also to gain the right to an education, the right to manage their own property after marriage and to have custody of their children in the event of a divorce. Women were considered at that time to be too frail and mentally incapable of pursuing a college education. Women were also expected to give over ownership of any property they had upon marriage to their husbands, and in the event of a divorce, children often went to the father, as they also were considered property. Sixty-eight women signed the Declaration of Principles at the meeting (Baker 2002, p. 27).

Women who followed Stanton and Cady in the suffrage movement felt the best way to obtain these other rights would be to first obtain the right to vote. In 1869, Stanton and Susan B. Anthony formed the National Woman Suffrage Association, mostly due to the fact that Congress had not included the women's right to vote in the 14th Amendment. One specific goal was to procure the right to vote for women, as well as obtain social and economic rights. Lucy Stone quickly followed in establishing the American Woman Suffrage Association, whose sole goal was the enfranchisement of women. The two organizations finally merged in 1890 (Collins 2003, p. 97).

Opposition to women's suffrage was strong, and at times, better organized than the proponents. Southern political leaders, remembering the fierce participation of women in the antislavery movement, were staunchly opposed to granting women the right to vote. Many religious organizations, especially the Catholic Church and many fundamentalist Protestant Churches were also strongly opposed to women's electoral rights. Opposition even came from corrupt political bosses and anti-temperance forces
that thought the women's vote would lead to more honest government and support of outlawing liquor (Baker 2002, p. 48).

In 1918, Woodrow Wilson would give the 19th Amendment his full support, stemming largely from the lobbying of Carrie Chapman Catt, who was the president of the National American Woman Suffrage Association. It was not until 1919 that both houses of Congress voted to pass the amendment. The long drive for suffrage finally ended in 1920, with the ratification of the 19th Amendment, which was 80 years after Stanton and Cady began their mission to enfranchise women. Only one of the 68 signers of the Declaration of Principles was still alive to cast a ballot in 1920.

Women may have won the fight for political equality in the sense of "one person, one vote," but the struggle for women's rights was far from over. Women obtained the right to vote, and thus some measure of political equality, but the struggle for equality in other areas, such as employment, raged on. Women would again face discrimination as they entered the workforce.

**The “Glass Ceiling”**

The issue of pay equity has also kept women from reaching full political quality with men. Wage discrimination has occurred and continues to occur in several ways. The wage scales of jobs that are predominately filled by men are consistently higher than those jobs that are usually taken by women. Furthermore, men who are employed in areas that are typically considered to be "women's work" are usually paid better and promoted faster than are women. This problem has been addressed through the concept of pay equity and comparable worth. Many occupations (usually pressured by state laws
or threat of litigation) have evaluated the components of the necessary skills and abilities to perform a certain job. Components may include the amount of education needed to perform the job, the extent of responsibility, mental demand, and working conditions. These components are then assigned a point value. Following this, jobs should be paid according to the point scale, not the gender typically associated with the job. This has served to both alleviate some of the pay discrepancies, as well as draw attention to the areas in which comparable worth has not been addressed.

Women who are employed in the areas that are typically considered to be "men's work" average a better wage than those women in occupations that are typically considered appropriate for them, but this is due to the fact that those occupations tend to be in the higher end market to begin with. However, they rarely achieve the same pay rate as men in the same occupation. Women tend to be told as well that they can achieve the same success that men have in their occupations, given the fact that they have the same motivation, ambition, and capacity for jobs that have both prestige and power. However, they tend to "top out" in the occupation before men -- a circumstance that is known as the "glass ceiling" (Lorber, p. 226). The US Department of Labor defines the glass ceiling as "those artificial barriers based on attitudinal or organizational bias that prevent qualified individuals from advancing upward in their organization into management level positions" (Martin, p. 1). Further study by the Labor department finds that the glass ceiling is lower than previously thought - women tend to stop receiving promotions in middle management.

Once women are home, the inequality does not stop there. Having left their job at the end of the workday, women face the "second shift" of work at home. Society still
tends to view the mother/wife as the dominant caretaker and nurturer in the home, despite the gains that have been made in the workplace. Men are still viewed as the "junior partner" in domestic care, as they are still seen as the "dominant breadwinner." This attitude tends to prevail in society despite the fact that most families cannot live on the father's wages alone - the family simply must have two incomes to survive at the same level as in previous decades, due to the ever escalating cost of living (Collins 2003, pp. 106 -108).

**African Americans, Suffrage and the Civil Rights Movement**

African Americans, both male and female, were not extended many of the rights that White men and women enjoyed until the 1960's, despite the fact that the 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments were designed to alleviate the political conditions in which African Americans lived. The main problem with the 15th amendment was the wording - it stated that the right to vote shall not be denied or abridged on account of race, color, or previous condition of servitude. This vulnerable wording allowed many states to pursue avenues of political discrimination. Many states instituted laws or codes that enabled them to restrict voting to White men (and later White women) through poll taxes, literacy tests, grandfather clauses, and patriotism tests. States who were challenged that they were illegally rejecting the 15th amendment argued they were not denying or abridging on account of race, but just wanted to guarantee that those voting were patriotic, intelligent, and financially invested in the political system. The Supreme Court accepted these arguments despite the fact that Whites were not required to meet these requirements (Lawson 1986, p. 46).
One of the more troubling acts of the Supreme Court was the method in which they effectively rendered the Civil Rights Acts of 1866 and 1875 null and void. These acts extended the Civil War amendments to protect minorities in areas of equal access to theatres, clubs, and hotels, as well as legal rights in the courts (the right to sue, the right to inherit property, the right to give testimony in court.) In 1873 the Supreme Court stated that there were two distinct citizenships in America - one national, one state. Therefore, these acts and the amendments were not state guarantees, only national. Ten years later, they would further state that the national government could not instruct private businesses to not discriminate (Stephenson 1911, p. 22).

The Supreme Court continued to be the policy making body that kept legal racism in place. The majority opinion in the landmark case of Plessy v. Ferguson established the "separate-but-equal" doctrine that would dictate Court opinions for decades. The opinion was so ingrained in the Court that not a single Justice would dissent from this precedent. However, by the 1920's, literal interpretation of the "equal" part of the ruling would begin the slow but steady progress toward more equality. Cases such as Sweatt v. Painter would challenge the fact that most facilities were not equal, and therefore they should not be forced to use them. Slowly, the Court began to accept this argument, and when the cases of Brown v. the Board of Education I and II came before the Court, the Justices finally declared that "separate-but-equal" could not exist - by its very definition, the fact that people must remain separate is in and of itself unequal. The National Guard would have to be activated in many states in order to uphold the Supreme Court's order to desegregate the schools "with all deliberate speed" (Lawson 1986, p. 34).
Economic Equality and Affirmative Action

The battle for equality in school attendance won, the civil rights movement turned its attention to achieving equality in other areas. The boycotts and civil disobedience advocated by Martin Luther King, Jr. attracted the attention of Presidents Kennedy and Johnson, who in turn promoted the expansion of civil rights. Johnson's promotion of the "Great Society" produced several results: the passage of the Voting Rights Act of 1965, which ended the de facto segregation in voting rights; as well as the passage of the 24th Amendment (banning poll taxes in any election) and the Fair Housing Act, which banned discrimination in the rental and sale of housing.

The economic equality of African Americans would also improve with political help. The passage of affirmative action programs assisted African Americans in receiving jobs and promotions that had been long denied to them. However, the Supreme Court and Congress has recently turned a more conservative eye toward the continuation of these affirmative action programs. Aided by Republican appointees to the bench, the Supreme Court has ruled increasingly in favor of narrowing the scope and purpose of affirmative action programs. In 1991, the Democratic controlled Congress attempted to address the changes made to affirmative action through a new Civil Rights Bill. After two attempts, President Bush finally signed the Civil Rights Act of 1991, which reversed 12 Court decisions that narrowed both affirmative action and civil rights. Yet, today, affirmative action is again under attack by the Republican vanguard, now led by an African-American woman, Condolezza Rice (Lawson 1985, p. 102).
Latinos and the New Economic Frontier

The Latino community has been in America for all of this country's existence, but until recently, had been contained mostly to Southwestern United States (California, New Mexico, Arizona). Since the 1920's however, many more Latinos have entered the US, looking for better jobs and wages. Many businesses welcomed them, as they were viewed as a source of cheap labor. Still, many people treated them with the same amount of discrimination as African Americans. Soon, Latinos found themselves living in the same poverty they sought to escape (Bakken and Farrington 2001, p. 154). One of the main blocks to their full integration into American society has been the language barrier, as they have had to learn a new language in order to operate in this society. One major effect of this has been the lower voter registration of the Latino community, as they sometimes cannot read or understand voting requirements.

One of the other problems that Latinos face is the assumption that they are illegal immigrants (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, p. 161). Many have stated that this has been the reason that they have chosen to not become involved in politics - out of fear that they will be seen as seeking "favors" or trying to impede the political process due to their disenfranchisement (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, p. 163).

In order to aid Latinos in their attempts to become more politically active, several states have redrawn district lines in order to give Latinos an edge in capturing House of Representatives seats. Latinos now constitute 9 percent of the House, but the legality of these districts is being challenged in the Courts, under the Shaw v. Reno decision that the drawing of district lines to enhance minority election falls under the same ruling of
"racial gerrymandering", which is illegal. Whether or not these district lines will remain is still uncertain.

The Future of Minority Voting and Participation

If we take into account how difficult it was for these groups to achieve voting rights, we might expect their participation in the voting booths to be higher. After all, minorities had to fight to gain their entry into this basic political right, unlike White men. Yet, their voting percentages have reflected national trends for the past few electoral cycles, in that there has been a downward turn in electoral turnout for these groups.

Still, in the past three presidential elections, the female, African American and Latino vote has been considered to be very crucial to Electoral College success, which is most likely a reflection of population growth (considering their voting levels are only slightly higher than the national average). As such, both Democratic and Republican candidates have courted these groups very heavily. Their political clout is being recognized. In 2000, both Gore and Bush made campaign speeches in Spanish.

- Republicans targeted radio stations whose predominant listener base was African American (97% of African American voters still voted for Gore). Both candidates sat for talks with Oprah Winfrey and the women of The View. Obviously, these groups are becoming a political force. From this, one could assume that the political participation rates of these groups should be on the rise, and it is. The important question now becomes who is participation in what ways, and how much (Judis and Teixeiria 2002, p. 56).
CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW

As mentioned previously, there has been a tendency for researchers in political science to focus solely on voting turnout as the measure of political participation. Voting turnout is easy to examine, thanks to state election returns and the work of the National Election Study (NES), which is a random sample of Americans of voting age where respondents are asked questions about their political outlook, personal characteristics, and participation in electoral campaigns. It is also assumed by many that voting is seen as a perquisite of being a good citizen, it is relatively easy, and it is considered a privilege by many, one which was fought for by many oppressed groups. The abolition of poll taxes and literacy tests (which should have especially increased the voting rates of African Americans), the growing availability of registration materials and ballots in Spanish (which should increase Latino voting), plus the availability of mail registration, longer pre-election registration periods, and the reductions in residency requirements and absentee voting should increase voter turnout (Teixeira, 1992, p.29, see also Downs 1957). Therefore, it is assumed by many that if voting turnout is high, then political participation is high. However, since the 1970’s, voting has been in steady decline.

This chapter will review several of the studies that discuss voting decline, and then will move into summarizing research in other areas of political participation, such as campaign volunteering and giving donations. A review of works, especially those done by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady, explaining the differences that education, race, and income on political participation follows. An examination of the theoretical concerns of multi-racial feminism concludes this chapter.
Declining American Voter Turnout

While many previous scholarly works have examined voting as the major, if not sole measurement of political participation, much research has been geared to explaining both why some groups vote more often, and explaining why voting is in decline. The reasons for declining voter turnout were the focus of studies conducted by Ruy Teixeira (1992) and Warren Miller and J. Merrill Shanks (1996), who used similar methods and data to examine the reasons for voting decline, but found different reasons for voting decline. Both studies used data from the NES. Teixeira theorizes that the reason US voter turnout has declined is due to the high costs of voting (e.g. knowing when and how to register to vote, the time actually spent registering, taking time off from work to go to vote, knowing the candidates/issues, etc), when weighed against the perceived low benefits of voting (e.g. "my vote doesn't really make a difference").

He concluded that these perceived low benefits, when contrasted with the high costs of voting, are the reason Americans no longer vote. Three trends in individual level characteristics have led to this voting drop-off. Gains in socioeconomic status (for both Whites and African Americans) actually drove voting turnout up. However, a substantial decline in "social connectedness" has depressed the perceived benefits of voting (see Putnam, year?). This decline is demonstrated through a younger, less married, secular electorate, who have a general disconnectedness from the political world (people believe less in government responsiveness, do not identify with either Democrats or Republicans, and are less likely to believe "that my vote will make a difference" (Teixeira 1992, p. 57).

Teixeira also challenged the notion that turnout has dropped the most among those who are poor. The reality of the situation is all groups - - the poor, the middle
class, and the rich - - are voting less. Between 1972 and 1988, voting fell 8 percent for those in the low income bracket, and fell 6 percent for those in the higher income brackets (Teixeira 1992, p. 31). Therefore, the "representativeness" of the electorate has not changed. Also, the decline in election turnout has had no effect on the outcome of election results (Teixeira 1992, p. 102). It also has not affected policy outcomes - the differentiation between the policy preferences of voters and nonvoters are not big enough to seriously alter the type of message elected officials are receiving about which policies are preferred, which Verba, Schlozman and Brady assert to be false.

In The New American Voter, Warren Miller and J. Merrill Shanks (1996) proposed different reasons for the decline in voting. While Teixeira stated that party identification (or lack thereof) is not a reason for the decline in voting (Teixeira, 1992, p. 29), Miller and Shanks argue that party identification (and thus the policies that each party prefers) is a powerful motivator to vote. The reason why voting has not declined more is that "party identification is only one of a host of themes relevant to vote choice, but it's the dominant predisposition in providing continuity in voters' perspectives and behaviors from one election to the next" (Miller and Shanks 1996, p. 512).

The authors also argued that one reason that voting is in decline is due to the "replacement" of voters from pre-New Deal (pre-1928) generation, who were considered to be "habitual" voters, with those of the post 1928 New Deal voters, who were not as likely to vote. Miller and Shanks investigated turnout among three different age groups: pre-New Deal (eligible to vote in 1928 or earlier), New Deal voters (first eligible to vote from 1932 to 1964), and post-New Deal (first eligible to vote in 1968 or thereafter). They conclude that "generational replacement" has been the major cause of voting
decline. This "generational replacement" is caused by "social dynamics that produce life
cycle effects on turnout that is tied to the level of engagement that marks a cohort's entry
into the electorate" (Miller and Shanks 1996, p. 93). In other words, political events
(New Deal politics, the Civil Rights movement) and political socialization are the reasons
why people will or will not vote (again, see Putnam 2000).

Based on these two studies, it seems that some of our accepted "truths" about who
votes and who does not vote need to be reconsidered, as does our assumption that voting
is the prime indicator of political participation. These studies offered some evidence to
the contrary. Evidently, while the poor do not vote as often as the wealthy, their rates of
turnout decline have mirrored those in other economic categories, at least according to
Teixeira. Further, according to Miller and Stokes, party politics is still thriving, not yet
completely turning voters off with the rhetoric and lack of true policy solutions, as the
media constantly claims. While these two studies provide interesting insights into voting
decline, there are two very serious flaws. First, like many of the other voting-as-political-
participation-measure studies, they do not provide any explanation as to why other forms
of political participation, such as campaigning, contributions, and attending rallies and
protests, have increased – or if there are similar participation 'gaps' across race and sex.
If Teixeira is correct that it is simply not cost effective to vote, then perhaps these other
forms of political activity provide more benefits. If Miller and Shanks are correct, then
should it be assumed that individuals are not socialized to vote, but to participate in the
political arena in other methods? Also, how much of the differences between women and
men (as well as across race) in levels of political participation other than voting can be
explained by variations in levels of education and income?
The second problem with these studies is that they tend to focus on the turnout of White men as the national norm. In the first edition of *The American Voter* (1960, p. 232) Miller, along with Campbell, Converse, and Stokes even go so far as to say the voting behavior of women and minorities does not matter, since it tends to be lower and has no serious impact on election results, which we know not to be true today.

This statement is indicative of a serious flaw in both political studies and public policy - there has been a general disregard for women and minorities, which has just recently begun to be addressed by both scholars and government representatives. The oversight is due largely because of data limitations, and the costs associated with conducting a nationally representative survey of minorities that has prevented a great deal of scholarly research into these questions. Even supposedly “groundbreaking” studies by Margaret Conway (cited in this paper) did not provide an adequate sample of African Americans and Latinos. The Verba studies were so important because of the oversample of not only women, but also African Americans (male and female) and Latinos (male and female).

**Feminist Democratic Theory**

As there is a tendency to assume away the needs and wants of subordinate groups, avenues to greater political power for women and minority groups must come in part from reconstructing the ideas of democracy to fit with the needs of the group. Greater political participation in the recent past has been more heavily influenced by White, middle class women than it has by women of color. Jane Mansbridge (1996) defines this need for the subordinate groups to become more proactive as "the feminist reconstruction
of democracy" (Mansbridge, 1996 p. 117). Democracies tend to change only when some mixture of power and persuasion act upon it to make the change happen.

Mansbridge argues that women and minorities must use this mixture of power and persuasion to make the democratic process more equal for them. Exclusion from the same economic, social, and political power resources of White men has caused them to rely more heavily on persuasion. Women and minorities need to work now to develop their power base, if they are to share equally in the democratic process.

Mansbridge has proposed a democratic theory that fits well with the theories on multiracial feminism that suggest that social location inhibits the access to political power. If Mansbridge is correct that the battle for equality in the political sector cannot be restricted to just the formal institutions of politics, where should the battle begin? Some recent research done in political science directly addresses the issue of where and how greater political power and participation may be gained for subordinate groups.

Empirical Research in Race, Ethnicity and Gender

Like Teixeira and Miller and Shanks, most studies about political participation tended in the past to focus on voter turnout, and tended to marginalize women and minorities' participation. Yet, two major competing theories have emerged which explore and attempt to explain both minority and overall participation in politics.

Who Participates and Why?

Steven Rosenstone and Mark Hansen (1993) have proposed the mobilization theory of participatory decline in which they argue that the reason most citizens do not involve themselves in the political arena is that they are not organized to do so by the
candidates, incumbents and other holders of political capital. In 1993, they published *Mobilization, Participation and Democracy in America*, the culmination of a 10-year study in which they examined the questions of who participates in American politics when others do not, and why.

Rosenstone and Hansen theorize that some groups will be targeted for mobilization for several reasons. First, politicians, parties, and other activists target people they know. They are close at hand and more likely to respond in a positive manner due to their personal relationship with the activist. They are also more likely to target people that are centrally positioned in social networks, as they are also visible and are in contact with a higher number of people (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, p. 31).

Secondly, politicians and activists are more likely to target people whose actions are more likely to produce the political outcomes they desire. They will also ask for participation from people who are likely to respond to their request, which means people who have responded positively to previous requests. Thus, since political activists cannot afford to mobilize everyone, they target those in this pool of known activists, and it becomes unlikely for any group outside of those aforementioned to be selected for mobilization (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, p. 31).

Predictions regarding who will be mobilized follow from this. Those who are employed are more likely to be contacted, especially in large companies, where there are likely to be many people of roughly the same demographic make-up. People care about their jobs and continued employment, so they are more apt to respond to political causes geared toward that. Those who belong to non-political organizations are likely to be mobilized, as are the leaders of those organizations. Finally, the authors argue that the
highly educated, the wealthy, and those who strongly identify with a political party are more likely to be contacted, since they have more resources and tend to already be participants (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, p. 241).

According to other studies, this strong identification with a political party is particularly important to mobilization. Wielhower and Lockerbie (1994, p. 225) found that when parties are active in engaging potential voters, voter turnout increases. Not only does voting increase when an individual is contacted by the party, but other forms of political participation, such as contacting political officials, increase as well.

Rosenstone and Hansen found support that those who are more likely to be mobilized for political participation are those who are highly educated, have high levels of income, and are members of non-political organizations. In short, since these are the groups that are targeted for political participation by activists, the authors conclude that the main reason that disadvantaged groups such as the poor and minorities do not participate as much in politics is because they are not asked (Rosenstone and Hansen 1993, p. 242).

**Which Came First?**

Rosenstone and Hansen have concluded, then, that the reason we tend to see more political participation from those with more education, income, and interest in non-political activities is due to the fact they are sought out and asked to participate more by those in elected office or other political apparatus. Sidney Verba and Kay Schlozman (1993) have also recently explored of the political participation rates, both with society as a whole and focusing on minorities. Like Rosenstone and Hansen, they find education, income, and participation in non-political organizations to be strong motivators for
political participation, but these findings have different reasons and significance. Their research supports Mansbridge's claims that women and minorities have been left out of the more powerful forms of democratic participation, but disagree with Rosenstone and Hansen that those who have the resources to participate will do so because they are asked. Instead, it works in the other direction. Those with greater education, income, and participation in other civic matters will be more active in politics, with or without an invitation. As Mansbridge would assert, Verba, Schlozman and Brady find that these resources tend to belong to White men.

Race and Political Participation

During the 1950's, the political participation of African Americans was substantially lower than Whites, due in most part to restrictions and barriers to their participation. Poll taxes and literacy tests were part of these forms of legal barriers erected by states after the passage of the 15th amendment. After significant civil rights legislation repealed these restrictions, the participation rates began to rise in some areas. Before this, voting by African Americans had been less than a third of that of Whites. African American voting hit an all time high during the first few years after the Voting Rights Act of 1965. In the late 1970's, voting participation of African Americans began to diminish, and now that decline is comparable to those of Whites. Latino participation is hindered by the obstacles of language and legal status, especially now, given the recent large influx of immigrants. Also, voter turnout for Latinos is in decline. The following table (Federal Election Commission 1998) demonstrates this trend. Given the fact that most minorities had to fight for their right to vote without hindrances such as poll taxes
and grandfather clauses, we should expect to see voting increase, especially after the passage of significant legislation in the mid to late 1960’s that ensured the right to vote for all people, regardless of race or ethnicity.

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Clearly, voting is in decline amongst all groups. Verba, Schlozman, Brady and Nie are interested in the rates political participation, outside of voting, as it is obviously no longer the most expressive form of political opinion and involvement (Verba, et. al, 1993 p. 459). They examine the political participation rates of two groups: African-Americans and Latinos, as compared to Whites. They ask whether African Americans, who have a long history of social, economic, and political discrimination, and Latinos, who are relatively new to the American population through immigration, share the same resources for political participation (Verba, et. al, 1993 p. 455). This is an important area for study, because if a group is not active because they lack the political resources enabling participation, then the political equality of the nation is threatened, especially since African Americans, Latinos, and Whites vary greatly in their attitudes on political matters, party affiliations, and needs for governmental policy and assistance.

Their study uncovered that Whites and African Americans have some significant differences in forms of political participation, such as campaign contributions. In the current political system, campaign contributions occupy a significant position, owing much to the high costs of television advertising costs. Therefore, whenever a group can
make significant campaign contributions, they have a stronger chance of influencing public policy.

There is a more significant gap in Latino participation. They are substantially less likely to participate than either Whites or African Americans in any area of political activity. This becomes noteworthy due to the aforementioned reasons of accessing the political system. Since most of the growth in the Latino population is occurring through immigration and first-generation births in America, this group needs to be lobbying for more governmental policies aimed at assisting their transition.

**Resources in Political Participation**

Verba, et. al argued that political resources were an important prerequisite for participation. They defined those resources as those skills and attributes that give a person the ability to participate effectively in the political arena. These include education, income, time, and command of the English language. Civic skills - those skills that are derived from participation in non-political organizations, work and church - were also assessed.

Obviously, education and income are important political resources. Income translates into not only the ability to make campaign contributions, but also to be able to carry out other avenues of political participation, such as running for office. Education usually translates to a higher paying job, and develops skills needed for both work and community involvement. Hence, the correlation between education and income is circular.
Time is a commodity that, unlike education and income, cannot grow. Each person has the same 24 hours delegated to them each day. Having more “free time,” or time that is not committed to paid work, enables people to assign themselves to other avenues of political participation, such as volunteering for a campaign or writing letters to newspapers or Congressional members. Any activity that utilizes time is likely to diminish the amount of time that is given to political activity. Having young children in the home is a good example. When a person has children to care for, they must make choices on what activities he or she will be involved in, and often sacrifice, due to their parental commitments.

Whites are still ahead of African Americans and Latinos in education, despite the tremendous gains made by the two latter groups since the 1960’s. Whites are still more likely to finish high school and college. This gives Whites the advantage, since education helps develop skills that are relevant to politics, such as the ability to speak and write well, as well as given the advantage of obtaining jobs with higher earning potential (Verba, et. al, 1993 p. 466-7).

Not surprisingly, they also discovered huge disparities in income levels of Whites, African Americans, and Latinos. Minorities have substantially lower levels of family income than Whites do, mainly due to the education gap. Concerning time, however, the authors found very little discrepancy. Latinos have a little less free time, but it is not significantly different. The socio-economic variables seem to have little, if any, independent relationship to free time (Verba, et. al, 1993 p. 469).
When it comes to language, Latinos are at a distinct disadvantage as compared to African Americans and Whites. The authors feel that this is due to the high number of immigrants that have just recently become American citizens (Verba, et. al, 1993 p. 470).

To assess civic skills, respondents were asked about involvement in non-political organizations, if they were employed, what type of job they held, and if they took part in activities at church. In this regard, respondents were asked if they had participated in four different activities in the past in connection to work, church or volunteer activities: written a letter, gone to a meeting where they took part in a decision, planned or chaired a meeting, or given a presentation or speech. These civic activities give people a chance to practice skills that are relevant to political participation. When a person engages in these activities at work or a volunteer organization (charities or church), they are then more comfortable when asked to engage in behavior to benefit a political candidate or cause, such as writing letters or making phone calls asking for money, or making a presentation to a local neighborhood group as to why they should vote for a candidate or referendum.

The study found that although they are as equally likely to have jobs as are African Americans and Latinos, Whites are much more likely to have jobs where they are able to practice these skills. When it comes to non-political organizations, though, the gap narrows. While African Americans are not as likely to be involved in these organizations as Whites, when they are, they are as involved in the aforementioned activities, especially church. Latinos are far less likely to belong to organizations, and less likely to participate in these terms when they do (Verba, et. al, 1993 p. 477).

In regard to church affiliation, African Americans are more likely to belong to a church than Whites, and are also more likely to be very active in the church in areas they
can practice these skills. The study gives credit to the Baptist church in particular, for driving up African American participation. Baptist churches are more likely to engage parishioners in activities that benefit the church as a whole – organizing church events, holding fundraisers, etc. Most parishioners in these churches are “plugged in” to one or more of these types of activities, as soon as they join the church. These activities will require the parishioner to make phone calls, write letters, request money, and make speeches and presentations on behalf of the church. This type of work develops these skills, which is then transferable to the political sphere. While Latinos are less likely to be members of a church, when they are, they are more likely than Whites to attend. Still, at church they are not as involved in skill producing activities. They tend to be Catholics, and the Catholic church does not engage its members in activities as much as the Baptist church. In Catholic churches, only “elder” members, or members who have been with the church for a significant amount of time, are usually asked to assume roles of development or leadership. The avenues for developing these political skills are not as strong. Thus, Latinos are disadvantaged when it comes to all three spheres of work, church, and non-political organizations, as well as in education, language, and income (Verba, et. al, 1993 p. 478).

In summary, Verba, Schlozman, Brady, and Nie have found that Whites still hold a lot of political advantages over African Americans and Latinos. Whites are still more educated, and tend to hold jobs where they will be able to practice skills necessary to political participation. They make more and larger campaign contributions than do African Americans and Latinos, which is statistically important, for two reasons: donors to political campaigns tend to influence public policy more than those who do not donate;
secondly, the socio-economic status of these two groups are hindered by racism and less access to the higher paying jobs. However, African Americans are gaining advantages, especially in the area of political skill, due largely to activity in the Baptist church. Latinos are still the most politically disadvantaged group, lagging behind Whites and African Americans in education, language, income, and non-political participation.

**Gender and Political Participation**

As there are differences in political participation and race, there are differences in the ways men and women approach politics and participation. One only needs to examine the past 3 presidential elections to ascertain that there are differences in male and female preferences in governmental action. Clinton’s success was due in part to the fact he addressed many “women’s issues,” such as health care, affirmative action, and education. Bush and Dole focused more on “men’s issues,” such as defense and tax policy. Clinton’s success in 1992 and 1996 suggests that there may be significant policy differences between genders. In their 1997 book *Women and Political Participation: Cultural Change in the Political Arena*, Margaret Conway, Gertrude Steuernagel, and David Ahern examined the increasing political participation of women as an element of cultural change. Changing attitudes about gender roles and identity as well as appropriate political behavior for women have lead to this increase in the political participation of women. The changes in political participation are often characterized by a difference in political orientation (defined by these authors as a change in attitudes and preferences). Men and women tend to have different policy preferences and issue agendas. The authors put forth two different explanations for these differing political orientations
between the genders. One possible explanation for the different policy preferences is the
differential treatment of men and women in the framing and interpretation of laws and of
government rules and regulations (Conway, Steuernagal and Ahern 1997, p. 35). Subtle
forms of discrimination (the "glass ceiling") still exist, although federal and state
governments have taken steps to eliminate the more overt forms of sexual harassment and
discrimination. Another possible explanation for the differences is religion, as beliefs do
affect political orientation. Many evangelical religions are based on a patriarchal
authority that would demand women to be less supportive of "women's issues" such as
abortion and governmental assistance to improve the socioeconomic position of women
(affirmative action, governmental supports for childcare).

To examine whether or not these assumptions are true, Conway, Steuernagal, and
Ahern used data from the annual survey from the National Opinion Research Center.
This survey, done on an annual basis and using the same wording for the questions every
year, analyzes the patterns of men's and women's political orientation and viewpoints on
a number of policy issues. As expected, women are much less supportive than men of
defense spending, the death penalty, foreign aid, and increases in spending on science and
technology. Women are more supportive than men in areas of childcare, education, and
increases in governmental spending on aid to the poor (welfare, food stamps), college
loan assistance, environmental improvement, the homeless and abortion rights.

The authors also found significant differences in the support for affirmative action
policies. Men tend to be significantly less supportive of affirmative action policies than
women. However, the degree to which men are opposed to affirmative action policies
depends on age - younger men (18-29) are much more supportive of affirmative action
programs (55% say they support them) than are men in the 65+ age group (only 39% support). Support for the programs also depends on situation - men are more supportive of programs to help women and minorities gain education and initial employment, but do not feel it should be used for promotion practices. Women of all age groups tend to be supportive of such programs for education, employment, and promotion (Conway, Steuernagel, and Ahern 1997, p. 47). This is a significant difference, because most men (at least those men who are White) are not in need of the protections that are supplied by affirmative action programs. Women and minorities are the ones in need of these programs, and if they have fewer avenues to political activity, then the likelihood that these programs can continue is lessened. However, if younger men are more supportive of these programs than older men, the "generational replacement" effect would actually strengthen these programs.

Conway, Steuernagel, and Ahern (1997, p. 81) also found that employment and education affect the political participation of men and women. If men and women are employed, they tend to be more politically active (defined here as participating in at least one political activity per year). The more education both men and women have also impacts their political participation - the higher the educational attainment level, the more political activity. Like Verba, Schlozman and Brady, they attribute this to the fact that those with higher levels of education tend to be more interested in politics and have developed skills necessary for successful participation in politics (the ability to deal with bureaucracy, write well, speak well, etc.) (Conway, Steuernagel, and Ahern 1997, p. 85).
Policy Preferences and Political Participation

While Conway, Steuernagel, and Ahern (1997) have found some compelling differences in the political attitudes of women and men, their study does not demonstrate how these differences really affect participation, except to weakly demonstrate that income and education will increase participation. Do these different policy preferences and attitudes affect the manner and amount to which women (and men) participate in the political arena? Also, Conway, Steuernagel and Ahern do not measure differences in policy preferences among White, African American, and Latino women, which could be significant, given the fact that these groups often require different services from the government.

Sidney Verba and Kay Schlozman have done the (arguably) definitive study on the nature of political participation differences between men and women. Having explored the differences in differing participation among racial and ethnic minorities, Kay Schlozman, Sidney Verba, and Nancy Burns (1994) turn their focus to the political participation gaps between men and women. Verba, Schlozman, and Burns (1994) explored whether a gender gap exists in respect to the resources that enable participation. Previous literature suggested that women’s expanding role in society - still responsible for the majority of household and child maintenance, but also now holding employment outside of the home - drains women’s ability to participate in terms of time and energy to devote to political causes. They also expect to find that women also lack the money to participate, in terms of campaign contributions. Reasons for this include the fact that women still do not earn as much as men, as well as the rise of single women headed
households. Even in two income families, men still tend to control how that money is spent (Schlozman, Verba, and Burns, 1994 p. 964).

To discern whether these paths to political participation are gender specific and whether there is a gender gap, Schlozman, Verba, and Burns again employed data from the Citizen Participatory Study. They began by considering the same variables as in the previous study: participation in non-political activities, free time, and income. Then, they examine these variables to determine whether the pathways to political participation differ for men and women, and determine whether these differences would remain if women had the same amount of political resources as men (Schlozman, Verba, and Burns, 1994 p. 965).

Schlozman, Verba, and Burns found that there are hardly any differences in the participation of men and women in voluntary non-political activities. The only striking difference is in church participation, as women are more likely to be regular church attendees and are also more likely to give time to educational, charitable, and social activities associated with their church. Men will be as active in church when serving on the board or holding an official position. But, as demonstrated, church participation does increase civic skills necessary to political participation. Once active in non-political activities, women are more likely to transfer those skills to the political arena (Schlozman, Verba, and Burns, 1994 p. 970).

Schlozman, Verba, and Brady also examined whether there are gender differences in the resources of time, money, and civic skills needed for political participation. Men and women have differing responsibilities in work and family situations that will affect these variables. Women usually earn less money, and they spend more time on childcare
and household maintenance, so it would be expected that women would contribute less time and money to politics.

Verba, Schlozman, and Burns (1994, p. 973) also find that when it comes to time, there is very little difference between men and women in terms of the amount of free time that each gender really has to dedicate to activities outside the home or work. The only factor that lessens the availability of free time is the presence of pre-school children in the home, but this impacts both genders. Thus, very little difference in the time each gives to political activities. The amount of free time only matters when determining how much time will be given to political activities, once one is active in this area.

When it comes to money, though, women give significantly lower amounts to political causes than men. Not only do they give less, they are less likely to give contributions in the first place. This is statistically important since political contributions occupy such an important position in politics.

Thus, Verba, Schlozman, and Burns have found that the paths to political participation are not as different as previous research suggested. Men and women participate in non-political activities at about the same level, although women are slightly more likely to transfer their skills developed there to the political arena. Both genders have equal time to donate to politics. However, women do make fewer and lower campaign contributions to political candidates and causes.

*Gender and Divergent Political Avenues*

Previous studies of gender and political participation, like those discussed above, have focused on how much participation, in terms of quantity, there is from each sex, rather than the nature, or quality, of their participation. The particular characteristics of
participation could become important. Do men participate via different avenues than women? Do they expect to gain different benefits from their political participation? Do they participate politically for different reasons? When people have different reasons for participation, it affects the quality and quantity of the rate of participation. A woman who is lobbying for stronger penalties for repeat offenders due to the fact that her daughter has been murdered by a serial rapist may bring different tone and passion to her participation than a man. A man may bring a different point of view to a discussion with House members over the benefits of a certain tax break than would a woman; the man may focus on positive benefits (i.e., promotes business expansion) while women, more motivated by social concerns, may wonder over the effects on public schools. As suggested by the previous research above, men and women are definitely motivated by dissimilar policy concerns.

Kay Schlozman, Sidney Verba, Nancy Burns and Jesse Donahue (1995), examined the hypothesis that men and women who are active in the political arena derive different gratifications from taking part in the political process, and that men and women also bring different policy concerns to the process (Schlozman, et. al, 1995 p. 267). Previous literature has suggested that, as women are seen as more altruistic and maternal, this will affect the policy concerns that they have. Schlozman, et. al, expected to find that women are more likely to tie their participation to community concerns, as well as child and family issues, human welfare, consumer, and environmental issues. They also expected to find women participate to derive civic gratification, or a feeling as having "done their duty for community or country" from their participation. This reason for political participation is opposed to the material gains, defined by the authors as career
advancement or help with a personal issue, expected from men (Schlozman, et. al, 1995 p. 273).

Schlozman, Verba, Burns and Donahue (1995, p.274) actually found, contrary to their expectations, that there were no significant gender differences in the type of political activities men and women are undertaking. Men are slightly more likely to make campaign contributions, contact public officials, and work informally to solve local problems than are women. Women are also slightly less likely to belong to an organization than men are, especially if they take political stands. The findings for their second questions are similar. They find no statistically significant gender differences in how important issues such as children and youth (except in education), basic human needs, the environment, or crime or drugs figure into issue-based participation. The authors did, however, find exceptions in the areas of education and abortion. Women are motivated into political activity by these two concerns at much higher rates than are men.

There were significant differences when Schlozman, Verba, Burns and Donahue (1995) compared women differentiated by socio-economic advantage. Women that are relatively advantaged (defined by the authors as those who have had at least a year of college and have a family income of 50,000 or greater) are more motivated by the abortion issue than are men. Those women who are socio-economically disadvantaged (defined by the authors as those who have no more than a high school education and whose family incomes are no more than $20,000 per year) are more motivated by the issues of basic human needs. Both groups are motivated by education concerns (Schlozman, et. al, 1995 p.286).
Thus, the authors found that there was statistically little difference in the satisfactions and concerns that are derived from political participation. However, income levels do play a significant role in what will motivate some women. Those women at the higher ends of the income spectrum will be more motivated by issues such as abortion, while those at the lower levels will be more motivated by issues of basic human need.

Schlozman, Verba, Burns, and Donahue (1995, p.287) conclude this article by stating that it is no longer valid to ask whether men and women differ in their levels of political participation. One must begin to ask “Which men? Which women?” Indeed, that must be the question. A study must now take into consideration the significance of race and gender together. Obviously, men and women hold different policy preferences and political attitudes. It is also assumed that there are different policy preferences and political attitudes among the races as well. What is characteristic for African-American women may not (and most likely is not, if this evidence is correct) be the same for White or Latino women. As democracy is based on the idea of the equal worth of all citizens, these differences in political equality need to be identified.

**The Policy Concerns of Multiracial Feminist Theory**

As Verba, Schlozman, and Brady have discovered, there are disparities in the levels of political participation among White, African American, and Latino men and women. As demonstrated, White men hold most of the political capital in America. However, this research also shows that the inequality in resources needed for political participation exists at varying levels and intensities for White women and both African America men and women. Most of these disparities occur in matters of income and
education. While Verba, Schlozman, and Brady do discuss the political relevance of these varying levels, they simply demonstrate that they exist. In short, the bulk of their examination focuses on a symptom, not the cause. They do not undertake any examination of the social stratification that may cause these inequalities to exist in the first place.

The Theory of Multiracial Feminism

Multiracial feminism developed out of socialist feminist thinking which focused on the capitalist patriarchy and how political economy shaped the subordination of racially ethnic women (Zinn and Dill 1994, p. 136). Multiracial feminism extended this to an examination of how gender, race, ethnicity, and social class are components in a hierarchical social system in which upper class, White men and women systematically oppress both women who are in lower classes, as well as men who are of disadvantaged races, ethnicity's and religions. Together these factors form a social location that cannot be examined alone. Oppression may be experienced at varying levels and intensities in these differing social locations, given the fact that there may be multiple systems of domination as the cause of the oppression. A person's race, class, and/or gender will be experienced differently depending on the social location (Zinn and Dill 1994, p. 138). The social location of a man or a woman of the same racial, ethnic, or social class standing may differ in types of oppression - a woman in one social group may be able to get a job more easily than a man of the same group may, due to different racial or ethnic discrimination. As equality increases between men and women in a certain group, though, men tend to monopolize more of the resources (Lorber 1998, p.134)
Lorber (1998) states that there are different social maps for each of these groups. One map that would show all groups would distribute these groups as clusters around the map, with a clear pattern emerging: White men tend to be the wealthiest, and those "just getting by" tend to be women of color. The rest of the groups will also be scattered among the bottom levels of the hierarchy. This is politically significant since the ideas, values, and policy preferences that are held by the dominant group in the hierarchy tend to dictate political agendas.

Multiracial feminism examines "the intersectionality nature of hierarchies at all levels of social life" (Zinn and Dill 1994, p. 138). Theories of intersectionality stress the fact that women will experience oppression at differing levels, "due to class, race, global location, sexual preference, and age. The variation of these intersections qualitatively alters the experience of being a woman - and this alteration, this diversity, must be taken into account in theorizing the experiences of 'women'" (Ritzer 2000, p. 337).

Intersectionality also recognizes that there is an ability through power and politics to form methods that allow those who are dominant to suppress and control those in subordinate positions, which is the central point of oppression in multiracial feminism.

Ritzer (2000, p. 337) states that:

In social practice, dominants use differences among people to justify oppressive practices by translating difference into models of inferiority/superiority; people are socialized to relate to difference not as a source of diversity, interest or cultural wealth but evaluatively in terms of "better" or "worse". As Lorde argues, this "'institutional rejection of difference is an absolute necessity in a profit economy which needs outsiders as surplus people." These ideologies operate in part by creating a "mythical norm" against which people evaluate others and themselves; in the United States society this norm is "white, thin, male, young, heterosexual, Christian, and financially secure. This norm not only allows dominants to control social production (both paid and unpaid); it also becomes a part of individual subjectivity—an internalized rejection of difference that can operate to make people devalue themselves, reject people from different groups
and create criteria with in their own group for excluding, punishing and marginalizing group members.

In general, multiracial feminism focuses on how theories of intersectionality may be applied toward women. Zinn and Dill (p. 139) make the argument that men of disadvantaged races, ethnicities, and classes, as well as women, experience differing forms of oppression and opportunity. Rose Brewer, Cecelia Conrad, and Mary King (2002) demonstrate that race can become “gendered,” and men who are of different races (especially non-Western) become feminized. This feminization may lead to a form of sexual discrimination that is indiscernible from racial discrimination: “discrimination based on gendered visions of race may explain the exclusion of Asians, male and female, from management positions for lacking ‘leadership’ qualities” (Brewer, Conrad and King 2002, p.10). Thus, multiracial feminism should be extended to include these men, as they are just as oppressed (although perhaps in different ways) by those at the top of the social hierarchy.

An examination of two different examples can demonstrate how this plays out in everyday life. Ian Ayes (1994) did an experiment to demonstrate this theory in action. They sent 4 different people into a car dealership to inquire about buying a certain vehicle. The study used one White man, one White woman, one African American man, and one African American woman. The White male was sent in first, and quoted a price for the vehicle. It is assumed that this is the true price of the car. The White woman is sent on a few hours later to ask the same price of the vehicle. It is slightly higher than the price that was quoted to the White male just a few hours earlier. Next, the African American man goes into the dealership and is quoted a price that is higher than the one
the White woman was asked to pay. Finally, the African American woman is quoted the highest price for the vehicle. Ayes (1994) concluded that “a revenue-based explanation might be based on inferences the sellers make about blacks' or women's willingness to bargain. If a customer is believed to be averse to bargaining, it may be inferred that they would be less willing to bargain elsewhere. Thus, a seller could offer a higher final price,” as minorities and women are taught not to argue with the dominate class, that being White males. This demonstrates that on a daily basis, minorities (especially when it is a minority woman) experience a different level of oppressive techniques that is not faced by the dominant class.

We can clearly see also how appears in the legal system. A 1996 study by the nonprofit Center on Juvenile and Criminal Justice reports that while African Americans and Whites use illegal drugs at about the same rate, African Americans are arrested, charged, and tried for drug charges at a rate 5 times higher than that for Whites. African Americans were charged under California’s “three strikes” law at a rate of 17 times higher than Whites. The lead investigator of the study, Vincent Schiraldi, states that this demonstrates the principles of multiracial feminism:

I am not accusing judges or district attorneys of being Ku Klux Klan members. I am talking about a subtler form of institutional racism. And the difference to me is that more young white men were under the control of the criminal justice system, we would not be passing 'three-strikes' [laws] or building more prisons. We would be funding education, jobs and drug treatment.

This inequality does not extend only to African American men. A 1997 study by the U.S. Department of Justice found that women were over represented among low level drug offenders who were non-violent, had minimal or no prior criminal history, and were not principal figures in criminal organizations or activities, but nevertheless received
sentences similar to “high level” drug offenders under the mandatory sentencing policies. The bottom line is that White males are arrested, charged and tried less than women and minorities, and serve less time when they do go to jail. Multiracial feminism demonstrates how this occurs, as in general White males are the ones who set law and policy in the United States. Members of this race and gender then reap the benefits and rewards of this agenda setting.

Multiracial feminism also "explores the interplay of social structure and women's agency," which examines the methods in which women are able to carve out viable lives for not only themselves, but also for their families and communities. Women, especially women of color, have been able to use many different methods to do this, from outright protest to subtler but yet determined methods. These methods of putting their respective agendas on the social stage becomes politically important, as these subordinate groups tend to have less influence unless they can capture the attention of both the dominant group and those in political power (which are often one and the same).

Thus, this theory explains the reasons for the inequality in political participation that Verba, Schlozman, and Brady have found. Multiracial feminism explains how the race, ethnicity, and gender of a person form a social location in which oppression and domination may be experienced at different levels and intensity. This not only affects affecting paths to political participation, but the entire social structure in which a person resides. While this theory focuses more on women, it should include men of disadvantaged races, as they are often as oppressed as women.
CHAPTER 4: ANALYTICAL FRAMEWORK

Restatement of Theory and Introduction of Hypotheses

Multiracial feminism argues that race, ethnicity, and gender form a social location that must be examined as a whole, since these social statuses form a social location that experiences multiple systems of domination. A "mythical norm" is often created by the dominant group in societies, by which all others outside the norm are judged. This allows for the exclusion and domination for those outside the norm (in this case, women, African Americans and Latinos). In the United States, this norm is white, wealthy, and male. As a result, White men tend to be the dominant group in America.

This domination is experienced in all realms of society, but especially in politics. As demonstrated in the literature review, White men tend to dominate in both avenues of politics, as they both set the political agenda and public policy through their occupation of legal and governmental offices, and they tend to control more of the resources needed to actively engage in politics. This leads to the marginalization of the issues faced by women and minorities.

However, women and minorities have made great strides in obtaining more equality for themselves. Much of this owed to the growing income and education levels of women and minorities. The work done primarily by Sidney Verba and Kay Schlozman demonstrates that there is some correlation between an increase education and income with rising political participation. Some of their evidence suggests that when education and income rise, levels of political participation equalize amongst White, African American and Latinos.
Hypotheses and Propositions

H1: I expect to find that greater income tends to make women of all races more politically active; and

H2: I expect to find that increasing education tends to make women of all three races more politically active.

Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1994) have demonstrated that increasing income tends to correlate to increasing political participation, as do Rosenstone and Hansen (1993), although they reach those conclusions for different reasons. Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) conclude that people with higher levels of income will be mobilized by the parties and candidates to be participants. Verba, Schlozman, Brady (1994) insist that those with more income gravitate toward political participation for personal gain and out of a personal interest. Conway, Steuernagel, and Ahern (1997) have found support for this supposition as well. The research done by both Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1994) indicate that increasing education increases political participation, although again for differing reasons above.

H3: I expect to find that the education variable tends to favor white women.

H4: I expect to find that the income variable tends to favor white women.

Both Rosenstone and Hansen (1993) and Verba (1994) find that the variables of income and education tend to favor Whites. As Zinn and Dill state (1994), there is a different social location for racially ethnic women, and they are kept at this location by upper class, White men and women. White men and women, according to Zinn and Dill (1994), systematically oppress both women and men who are in lower classes, as well as those of minority religions, races, and ethnicities. Lorber states that White men (and
thus their wives) tend to be the wealthiest and most educated in society, and this statement is supported by Verba, Schlozman and Brady's (1994) data.

H5: I expect to find that African American and Latino women participate at similar levels as White women at the higher income levels; and

H6: I expect to find that African American and Latino women participate at similar levels as White women at the higher education levels.

While White women will benefit the most from rising income and education, at higher level of income and education there will be an equalizing effect for all races. Theories of intersectionality suggest that people, especially women, tend to face discrimination and restrictions at varying levels due to class and race. While one cannot change his or her race, one can change social class, though higher education and income. If intersectionality theories are correct, then we should see African American and Latino women participate more at higher levels of income and education. This effect should be higher for African American women.

H7: I expect to find that regardless of income and education, Latino women tend to be slightly less participatory than African American women.

The Latino culture is still very steeped in traditional roles for men and women. Latino women will tend to see that men should be the ones to “handle” the families’ political involvement. Latinos are disadvantaged, according to Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1994), in all spheres that can drive political participation – work, involvement in
non-political organizations, income, language and education. This, coupled with the fact that Latino participation is lower overall for both genders, should support this hypothesis.

**H8:** I expect to find that there are statically important differences between women of the three races in the way they participate in politics.

Multiracial feminism suggests that each of these groups encounter different oppressions and have different levels of income, education and opportunities to develop civic skills. Thus, the types of political participation which a member of a group will undertake should be different. Verba, Schlozman and Brady's (1994) data suggests that there is quite a large difference in income, jobs and education for these women. I expect to find that White women give more campaign contributions, work on more political campaigns, and actually run for office more than African-American women, which is significant. Lorber has demonstrated that the ideas, values, and policy preferences that are held by a dominant group in a hierarchy control the political agenda.

**H9:** I expect to find that White women have higher levels of all forms of political participation than African-American or Latino women.

Verba, Schlozman and Brady have found that Whites tend to be more politically active than other races. If this is true, then White women should be more politically active than their African-American and Latino counterparts.

*Summary of Hypotheses*

| Hypothesis One: Increasing income makes all women more politically active. |
| Hypothesis Two: Increasing education makes all women more politically active |
Hypothesis Three: Income increases White women’s political participation more.

Hypothesis Four: Education increases White women’s political participation more.

Hypothesis Five: African American and Latino women participate closer to the same levels as White women at higher income levels.

Hypothesis Six: African American and Latino women participate closer to the same levels as White women at higher education levels.

Hypothesis Seven: Latino women are the least participatory.

Hypothesis Eight: There are compelling differences in the way women of the three races participate.

Hypothesis Nine: White women are more politically active overall.

**Main Concepts and Variables**

*Voluntary Political Participation*

This paper will focus only on voluntary political participation. By voluntary I mean political participation that was undertaken through no means of coercion or obligation, and activity that received no payment of services (in other words, it is activity that is not an extension of a person's paid employment). Political participation is defined as any human activity that is undertaken as a means of influencing or having an effect on governmental action, by either affecting the implementation of public policy or influencing the selection of people who make public policy. This participation may take the form of voting, campaign work, making campaign contributions, contacting a public official, attending a protest, and informally working in the community for a political cause. The difference between these aforementioned forms of political participation is important, since each type requires different types of resources and supplies different types of rewards for the participant.
Forms of Political Participation

Voting simply refers to the human act of going to the polls on election day and casting a ballot in accordance with one's political preferences. Campaign work is any human activity that is undertaken during a political campaign—such as making phone calls, stuffing envelopes, engaging in "door to door" canvassing, putting up signs, or other activities that are designed to influence the votes and preferences of other people. These activities are mostly voluntary, and receive no pay.

Making a campaign contribution involves the voluntary donation of a private citizen's personal funds to a political campaign. Contacting a public official is any human activity that involves phoning, writing, or speaking to a public official in order to either sway his or her opinion on matters of public policy, or to ask that new public policy be initiated. Attending a protest is a human activity that involves attending an organized meeting with the clear goal of expressing disapproval at or influencing public policy or opinion.

Informal work in the community for a political cause is human activity that seeks to influence a person's neighbors or members of their peer group to undertake political activity for a certain cause (which generally will benefit the group or community).

Non-Political Activity

Voluntary activity in both the religious and secular domains outside of politics affects political activity on several levels. This paper will examine some of those activities as they are often a politicizing experience. Certain activities, such as serving on the PTA, helping with church fund drives, or serving on a neighborhood committee, may
develop organizational and communication skills that are then directly applicable to political participation. Some organizations that count on volunteer work, such as churches, also often encourage volunteers to become politically active for certain causes. Work in organizations that take strong political stances, such as the National Rifle Association, is not included, as the line between political and non-political activity here is so blurred.

Measures of Political Resources

All of the above forms of political participation require the participant to give some form of a resource: time, money, or skill. Time is measured in hours - how many hours do political activists spend on the above activities of voting, attending protests, contacting public officials, and campaign work. Money enters the activity of making campaign contribution -- activists were asked by the researchers of the Citizen's Participatory Study (whose data will be used in this study) how much they gave to a political cause or candidate. Skill is very difficult to measure - it is too subjective on both the part of the participant and the researcher. Thus, this paper will measure skill in the context of the usage of skills - the amount of letter writing and organizing meetings that allow a person to practice these skills.

Demographic Variables

As this paper will examine the political participation rates of White, African-American, and Latino women, both in comparison with each other and men in each group, the definitions of race, ethnicity and gender are important. As data was gathered
for the Citizen Participatory Study, respondents were asked for their race, ethnicity, and
gender. Thus, for the purposes of this paper, race, ethnicity, and gender are self-defined:
each respondent placed himself or herself in the category in which they most identified.
For race, respondents were asked if they classified themselves as Anglo-White, African-
American, Latino (all encompassing for those of Mexican, Puerto Rican or Cuban
descent). The term "race" or "ethnicity" was used, because African-Americans tend to
identify themselves as a racial group, and Latinos tend to identify themselves as an ethnic
group. This does restrict the term "ethnicity" for the purposes of this study (Verba,
Schlozman, and Brady, p. 99). Nationality sub-group differentiation (Irish-American,
Italian-American) will not be examined here. Respondents were also asked which sex
they were: male or female.

The impact of education and income on political participation will be measured,
as well as the level of participation in non-political activities (as Verba states that these
translate into political skills). Education was measured in terms of the grade level
obtained by the respondent. Income was defined as the average yearly income, based on
all earnings of all household members (see attached appendix for the method in which the
Citizen Participatory Study categorized these divisions).
CHAPTER 5: DATA AND METHODS

This study will use the data collected by the Public Opinion Laboratory of Northern Illinois University and the National Opinion Research Center in Chicago during the last 6 months of 1989. The Citizen Participatory Study involved a two-stage survey of the voluntary political activity of American citizens. The first stage of the survey was conducted as a short (15-20 minutes) telephone interviews with 15,053 nationally represented, randomly chosen adults. The telephone interview gathered information about voluntary activities, both political and non-political, as well as basic demographic information.

The second stage of the survey was conducted as in-person interviews. To select respondents for the second stage interviews, the sample of 15,053 people was reweighted to account for several factors. In the first stage interviews, there was a slightly disproportionate share of women. The sample was then classified according to race, ethnicity, and gender, as well as by level and type of political activity. African Americans, Latinos, and political activists were oversampled, and the data regarding their responses weighted to render a nationally representative sample. From these respondents, longer (two-hour) interviews were conducted with 2,517 people. During these interviews, respondents were asked about their activities both in the political and nonpolitical arena. For political activity, respondents were asked questions about their voting history, involvement in community activity or problems, campaign work, campaign contributions, and contacting public officials. Respondents were also asked their reasons for activity or inactivity, especially in the areas of policy preferences (motivated into action by certain issues - abortion, childcare, military issues, or means-
tested benefits) or personal motivations (wanted to run for office, wanted to further their career, etc.). Respondents were also asked about participation in non-political activities, such as church, community groups, and jobs, as well as their income and education levels.

Despite its age, the oversampling and weighting of this data are one of its strengths for the purpose of this study, as it will examine subgroups within the American population. This data has been weighted to make it representative of the American public by setting the effective sample size to 2,517. The authors explain the reason for doing so is that "reweighting by the reciprocal of the sampling weights ensures statistically unbiased estimates of means, regression coefficients, and other standard statistics" (Verba, Schlozman, and Brady 1995 p. 536).

Alternative data sources, such as the data available from the National Election Study (NES) or the General Social Survey (GSS) do not have a strong representative sample of either African Americans or Latinos - the 1996 NES polled only 207 African Americans, as compared 1,454 Whites. A category for those of Latino or Hispanic ethnicity is not listed, and one can only assume that they are categorized under "Other." While this data could be weighted, the data available from the Citizen's Participatory Study has already been weighted. The NES also does not offer the full spectrum of the political and social activities available through the Citizen's Participatory Study.

The main weakness of this data from the Citizens Participatory Study is that it was collected in 1989-1990. New research does suggest that the political participation of women, African Americans, and Latinos has risen significantly over the past decade, and is credited to some extent to Clinton's successful election campaigns in 1992 and 1996.
However, given the fact that more recent data is so unrepresentative of these groups, I feel that this is the best data set to be used. Also, I am comparing and contrasting my findings against the framework developed by Verba, Schlozman and Brady, so it is best to use the same data, so as not to skew results.

Methodology

This study will use a combination of multivariate ordinary least squares regression and multivariate logistic regression analysis. The multivariate ordinary least squares regression will be used to compare the individual level determinants of political activity among men, women, African Americans, Latinos, and Whites when the dependent variables are continuous. When the dependent variable is continuous, or approximately continuous, then OLS will allow me to isolate the impact of certain independent variables, such as gender or race, while controlling for the impact for other independent variables, such as income and education. Since the theory of multiracial feminism argues that differences between men and women will change with the fluctuations in income and education (among other variables), it is necessary to control for the impact of these variables on participation when examining differences among men, women, and minorities. Multivariate logistic regression will be used to compare the individual level determinants of political activity across men, women, African Americans, Latinos and Whites when the dependent variable is dichotomous or limited, since the use of OLS in the case of limited dependent variables is inappropriate (King, Keohane, and Verba 1994).
As such, several models will be used in this study. Many of the models will examine only one independent variable on one dependent variable (i.e. what is the average impact of education on Latino voting?). Many other models will examine the average effects of several of the independent variables on several facets of political participation (i.e. how does income and education affect the overall (campaigning, making donations, writing letters, protesting) political participation of African American women). This will enable me to control for many fluctuations in the impact of these variables across race and gender, which will be important for this study, as I am examining political participation from the standpoint of multi-racial feminism.
CHAPTER 6: FINDINGS

Verba, Schlozman and Brady found that the impact of income on political participation was significant between men and women and between the races, although they did not examine potential differences across class, race and gender at that time. Also, income and education had a significant impact on voter turnout as well (see literature review). Using their data, we can see early indicators of significant differences between the women in each of these races, especially when income and education differences are introduced.

First, I present the findings on voting correlated with race, education and gender with two different approaches. To begin, I examine the impact of income and education on voting in tables that demonstrate the frequencies of voter turnout among White, African American and Latino women, grouped according to the level of income or the level of education. Second, I test the impact of education, income, gender, and race on voter turnout in an interactive regression model.

Next, I present the findings on campaign contributions and campaign volunteerism, again correlated with race, income, and education. These variables are examined in a regression model.

**Voting According to Income and Gender**

One independent variable in my investigation is the average yearly household income reported by the respondent, which is then broken into several different categories. Verba, Schlozman and Brady divided the categories for income into divisions for every 5,000 dollars in income. In most of these 5,000 dollar divisions, there is not a significant
difference between groups, until one reaches a certain threshold. For the purpose of this study, I have divided the groups into 5 categories: poor (average income under $20,000 per year), lower middle ($20 – 34,999 per year), middle (35,000 – 59,999 per year); upper middle (60 – 99,999 per year), and upper (100,000 and above per year), since these are the income divisions that Verba, Schlozman, and Brady (1993) used in their analyses.

In addition, respondents were asked to classify themselves according to race, and were asked how often they voted in national elections: never, rarely, some, most, or all. The questions asked if the respondent was registered to vote and if they had voted in local, state, and national elections. The actual questions asked by Verba, Schlozman, and Brady are contained in the appendix.

**Findings in Voting Frequency Tables: Income and Race**

The first method of examination involves the frequency of voting behavior. Respondents were asked how frequently they voted in national elections, and these reports are further divided by race. Table 1 clearly demonstrates the validity of Verba, Schlozman and Brady’s assertion that White women tend to vote more than African American or Latino women. Here, we see that not only do White women vote more often, but their participation rates increase according to levels of income. Poor White women have a low voting record, voting in most elections only 18.86% of the time, and voting in all elections only 39.63% of the time. The lower middle class votes nominally more with 20.99% voting in most elections, and 48.06 in all elections. Middle class women vote in most elections at the rate of 22.27%, and increases to voting in all
elections 62.44% of the time. Upper middle class women vote in most elections 18.09% of the time and in all elections at the 66.66% level. As shown in the table, these percentages are consistently trending upward when correlated with income to the point that 74.54% of White women in the upper class vote in all elections, demonstrating that income should positively influence voter turnout.

Comparing these frequencies with those of African American women, the hypothesis that African American women will vote more once we control for income is supported in Table 1. In the middle, upper middle, and upper income levels, African American women do vote at only slightly lower levels than White Women in the same income groups. African American women at the middle income levels vote in most elections at 17.54%, and in all elections at 50.87%. At the upper middle income level voting rises to 25% of African American women voting in most elections, but decreases nominally to 45% in all elections. The upper income level show only a 2% difference between White and African American women who vote in most elections, and only a 9% difference between White and African American women in voting in all elections.

However, poor and lower income African American women are more likely to vote at these income levels than White women, which is significant. At the poor income level, 27.73% of African American women vote in most elections, and 47.89% in all elections, which is about 10% more than White women. At the lower middle income level, 68.62% of African American women vote in all elections, which is slightly more that 20% higher than the voting rates of White women. One potential reason for these patterns may be that African Americans perceive that there are certain benefits to be accrued by voting, especially particularized benefits to African Americans and women.
that are viewed as the cornerstone of Democratic party values (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1993; Judis and Teixeira 2002).

As shown in Table 1, Latino women are the least likely to vote, at any income level (controlling for the fact that there is only one respondent at the upper income level). Their highest level of voting takes place at the lower middle income level (see Table 1), but even this rate is lower than any voting levels of both White and African American women. At the poor income level, 43.05% of Latino women never vote. Only 11.11% of Latino women vote in most elections, and 27.77% in all elections. It improves only slightly at the next levels, as only 7.31% of Latino women vote in most elections, and 36.58% in all elections at the lower middle income level. This is actually the highest level of voting in all elections. Voting decreases slightly when Latino women reach the middle income level, as 15.78% of Latino women vote in most elections and 31.57 in all elections. At the upper middle income level, voting in most elections improves (57.14%), but declines again when voting in all elections to 28.57%.

**Findings from Regression Analysis: Income and Race**

The frequency rates of voter turnout across income classifications appear to support the arguments/hypothesis of multicultural feminist theories. In fact, I found that as education and income increase, the rates of voting by White and African American women both tend to rise and correlate more closely with one another. However, African American women tend to vote more that White women at lower income levels, which may support some multiracial feminist claims that oppressed groups will find certain outlets from which to lobby for equality (Judis and Teixeira 2002, p. 109; Baker 2002,
Latinos tend not to vote regardless of their income and education levels. One possible explanation for the low participation level for Latino women is their tendency to still be more “traditional” in the roles they take in society and family, which includes leaving political matters to men (Bakken and Farrington 2001, p. 177).

The problem of simple analyses based on frequencies and other descriptive statistics is that revealed patterns may result from spurious relationships. For example, an apparent bivariate relationship between income and participation may be a spurious relationship masking a true a correlation between ideology and participation – particularly if ideology and income are related. Consequently, in this section of the investigation I conduct multiple-regression analyses in order to better isolate the impact of income among White, African American and Latino women. To do this, I regress voter turnout on several control variables including how religious they feel they are, if they have children at home, if they are married, where they place themselves on a liberal/conservative scale (from extremely conservative to extremely liberal) and whether or not the respondent is employed (see appendix for further discussion of coding and variables). I also include interaction terms between income, gender and race to test to see of the impact of income significantly varies across race and gender of respondents – as predicted by multiracial feminist theories. These additional variables are added as “interactive” variables in order to test the impact, or significance of income among each group (i.e. African American women) on the dependent variable. For example, the interactive variable “woXinc” indicates the average impact of a one unit increase in income among White woman, holding everything else constant. The interactive variable “blkXinc” measures the average impact of income on political participation among
African American males, holding everything else in the model constant. The interactive variable “woXbl” serves as a two-way interactive control variable for the impact of being an African American woman – regardless of income. Importantly, this variable does not examine the impact of income within this group. The interactive variable “wXbXinc,” however, is a three-way interactive term measuring the average impact of a one unit increase in income on political participation among African American women, holding everything else in the model constant.

In Table 3 we see that, as previous literature implies, family income is positively associated with increased voting. In fact a one unit increase in family income is associated with a .06 increase in the dependent variable, holding everything else in the model constant. Further this effect is statistically significant at the .0003 level.

White women are not any more likely to vote as White men, which is the base of comparison here, as evidenced by the “woman” and “woXinc” variables. In other words, the impact of income on political participation appears to be the same among White men and women. Additional levels of income, once controls are made for other variables included in the model, does not have a significantly different impact on the probability of engaging in political activity among White women compared to White men.

However, despite the apparent relationships presented in the simple frequency tables, the regression model does not find that the impact of income is significantly different among African Americans. Table 3 clearly indicates that none of the interactive variables are statistically significant, which means that the impact of income does not appear to significantly vary among these groups. In other words, the effect of income is
statistically the same across all groups. The apparent patterns identified in the frequency
tables must be driven by factors other than income. This regression model does indicate,
however, that age and income do have a significant impact on voting, as both are
significant at the <.0001 level, but the impact of income does not vary across racial
groups or between men and women. We should not assume that age is correlated with
race either, as studies have shown that across the board, people tend to vote more as they
get older, regardless of other factors (see Rosenstone and Hansen 1993; Verba,
Schlozman and Brady 1993).

Table 4 shows the interactive regression model for Latino women and income.
Similar to the interactive regression model for African American women, the interactive
variable “woXinc” measures the impact of being a White woman and a one-unit increase
in income, holding everything else in the model constant. The interactive variable
“laXinc” measures the impact of income among Latino men, holding everything else in
the model constant. The interactive variable “woXla” serves as a two-way control
variable for the effects of being a Latino female regardless of income level. The
interactive variable “wXIXinc,” however, is a three-way interactive term measuring the
impact of income among Latino women.

Similar to the findings with African American women, the effect of family
income is statistically the same across all groups. According to Table 4, the regression
model demonstrates that the interactive variable of income on voting for Latino women
just misses being a significant factor at the 0.0778 level. At least at conventional levels
of statistical significance (i.e., a two-tailed significance test with p<.05) there are no
differences in the impact of income among Latino women compared to White men. It is
important, however, to note that a one-tailed test of significance does reach conventional levels of acceptability (i.e., p<.05) which would indicate that the impact of income among Latino women is actually significantly less than the impact of income among White males. In other words, even when income levels rise among Latino women, they still do not reach the levels of predicted political activity of White men once we control for the effects of the other variables in the model. Contrary to the predictions of multiracial feminism, even when Latino women reach the highest levels of income, they are still predicted to vote less than similarly situated White males. Regardless, I do not want to overstate this finding because I am committed to the most conservative tests of statistical significance and want to, in general, rely on the two-tailed levels of significance. The patterns, however, are worth noting and will be raised again in the conclusions.

As in the previous regression model, education, age are both significant factors at the <.0001 level, and the effect of family income is still significant to voting at the .0006 level. Thus, the regression model demonstrates that any correlation found in the frequencies measuring the impact of rising income on voting, when race is a factor, is not supported. All groups are affected by the level of family income, education and age at similar levels.

**Voting According to Education and Gender**

While income is certainly an indicator of social class, and therefore an important part of testing the hypotheses of multiracial feminist theories, another important variable indicating social status that must be considered is education. While education and
income are certainly associated, there are important differences in their effects and some extremely educated individuals do not have high incomes, and some individuals with very high incomes possess very little education. Consequently, in the next section of the analysis, I will examine the hypotheses of multiracial feminism by using education as an indicator of social class. I hypothesize that increasing education will significantly lessen the difference in voter turnout among White, African American and Latino women.

While Verba, Schlozman, and Brady separated education levels by every grade possible in elementary through high school, and then per year attendance at college, they combined these into 5 different levels for their regression models. For manageability, I have kept these divisions in the frequency tables.

Respondents were asked what was the last grade or level of education that they had successfully completed. The divisions are as follows:

Level 1: No High School Diploma
Level 2: High School Diploma
Level 3: Some College, but no Diploma
Level 4: College Degree Obtained
Level 5: Post College Degree obtained (Master's, Ph.D., JD, M.D. are all combined).

**Findings from Voting Frequency Tables: Education and Race**

According to Table 5 increasing education appears to have a substantial relationship with the voter turnout of White and African American women. With each new level of education, percentages of voter turnout increase. White women at the lower education levels are slightly more likely to vote than African American women, demonstrating that there may be some significant differences in voter turnout according to race alone. Only 21.88% of White women with an education level of 0 vote in both
most or all elections, compared with 21.43% of African American women in most
elections and 28.47% of African American women in all elections at the same education
level. At education level 3, most (66.67%) African American women vote in most
elections, yet the percentage declines considerably to only 6.67% of African American
women voting in all elections. The percentages for voting in all elections at this
education level for White women is 60% and 50% for Latino women, so there may be a
negative relationship among African American women at this level of education. Most
significantly, the more education African American women attain, the more similar are
their rates of voting when compared to White women. At education levels 3, 4 and 5 for
African American women and White women, there is always some level of voting, and
the levels of voting in most or all elections is much higher than the national normal
voting rates. At education level 4, there is only a 0.18% difference in the voting turnout
of White women and African American women, and at education level 5, there is only a
difference of 4.76% in the voting turnout between White and African American women.

For Latino women, though, the effect of education on voting is significantly less.
At the lower levels of education (0, 1 and 2), it is clearly demonstrated in Table 6 that the
voting rates of Latino women are comparable to those of both White and African
American women, which does demonstrate the negative effect of lack of education on
voting. However, as the education levels rise for Latino women, their voting percentages
do not climb as much as it does for White and African American women (At education
level 3, 50% of Latino women vote in most or all elections, but this decreases to only
33.33% of Latino women voting in most or all elections at education level 4. The sample
included only one Latino woman at the education level 5, and she voted in every election,
but that frequency cannot be considered to be significant, since the n for that sample group is only 1 (a problem that I will return to in the conclusions).

Intriguingly, when women of all three races reach the highest level of education (level 5), voting decreased among them all. One reason for this could be the all sample number at this level, or as studies have shown (see Verba, Schlozman, and Brady), women at this level often have employment that requires more time than other occupations, leaving less opportunity for political participation (again, another problem that I will return to in my conclusions).

*Findings from Voting Regression Models: Education and Race*

The regression models in this part of the analysis are similar to the previous multivariate models examining the impact of income. Thus, in Table 7 the interactive variable “woXedu” measures the impact of education among White women, holding everything else constant. The interactive variable “blkXedu” measures the impact education among African American males, holding everything else constant. As before, the interactive variable “woXbl” serves as a two-way control variable for the impact of being an African American women regardless of education level. In addition, the main variable of interest is the three-way interaction term between “wXBXedu” which measures the impact of education among African American women.

The interactive model displayed in Table 7 demonstrates that education alone is statistically significant. The model indicates that increasing education is positively associated with increased voting. In fact a one unit increase in education is associated with a .15 increase in voting. In other words, increasing education by several years is
estimated to increase voting by 1 until (or one race) controlling for sex, race, religion, and income. Clearly, education plays an important role in predicting who will vote and who won't.

Examining the interactions with race, however, the interactive model demonstrates that education does not have a significantly different impact among African American women. The parameter estimate for the impact of education among African American women is only significant at the .28 level – far from any conventional level of statistical significance. Regardless, age is still a significant variable here, as in the previous model.

Table 6 contains the interactive regression model for Latino women and education. The regression model for education and interactive variables measures the same independent variables as before, except that where the model tested for income interactions it is now testing for education interactions. Thus, in Table 6 the interactive variable “woXedu” measures the impact of education among White women and the interactive variable “laXedu” measures the impact of education among Latino men. As before, the interactive variable “woXla” serves again as two-way control for the effects of being a Latino woman regardless of education level. Finally, the interactive variable “wXIedu” measures the impact of education among Latino women.

This interactive model demonstrates that education does not have a significantly different impact among Latino women. However, in this model, the effect of education among White women is significant. This model demonstrates that for every one-unit increase in education, White women are more likely to vote, as the model shows this education variable to be significant at the 0.02 level. In other words, the model indicates
that, at least among White women, the effect of education is significantly different from the effects of education among White men. While increased education is associated with increased voter participation among both White men and women, similar increases in education are predicted to have a greater impact among White women. It is interesting to note that while the impact of income was found to be similar among White men and women, the impact of education appears to be quite different – even in the face of controls for many related variables. Apparently, increases in voting among White women may be attributed to increases in education more than increases in levels of income. I will return to the implications of these findings in the conclusion.

Overall, the model also demonstrates that age and family income are also significant predictors of voting behavior.

**Campaign Volunteerism and Education**

Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1993) found a significant link between education and campaign volunteerism. Whenever a person increased in education, that person was not only more likely to vote, but also to volunteer time to a political campaign. Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1993, p. 433) explain this increase in volunteerism when education increases:

> Education has a significant direct role with respect to each of the participation factors. It affects the acquisition of skills; it channels opportunities for high levels of income and occupation; it places individuals in institutional settings where that can be recruited to political activity; and it fosters psychological and cognitive engagement with politics.

The measure of campaign volunteerism in this study is how many hours a person donated to a political campaign. Thus, it is measured as a unit of time. Time is a commodity that
is, in essence, limited equally for the rich and the poor, as there is the same amount of
given time in a day for everyone. However, wealthier individuals can “buy” more
personal time, in terms of hiring household help or childcare. Therefore, significant
differences may be found in the effects of education and income across race and sex for
this type of political behavior.

In the previous investigation of the impact on race and gender on voter turnout, I
examined both frequencies and regression models. In the next section of the manuscript,
I will present only the multivariate regression models in an effort to save space
(descriptive statistics and frequencies are available by request).

_Campaign Volunteering and Education: African American Women_

Depicted in Table 8 is the interactive regression model examining interactions
between race and education and their impact on campaign volunteering. The model
indicates that education is not a significant factor for African American women when
predicting their levels of volunteering for political campaigns. For every unit increase in
education for African American women, the effect is far from any conventional level of
statistical significance. In fact, none of the variables tested, including whether or not the
respondent has young children at home (which was more significant in Verba’s model)
seems to impact how much time an African American woman will donate to a political
campaign.
Campaign Volunteering and Education: Latino Women

Table 9 contains the interactive regression model for Latino women and the impact of education on campaign volunteerism. This interactive model demonstrates that education alone is a significant predictor, which is consistent with findings in previous models. For Latino women, though, the model demonstrates results very similar to the model examining African American women and campaign volunteerism. Latino women demonstrate no increase in campaign volunteerism when education increases.

Overall, looking at campaign volunteerism, I find that education does not have the significant effect that I predicted. In fact, none of the variables tested in the education model proved to be significant, which was not the case in Verba’s study.

Campaign Contributions and Income

Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1993, p. 259) found significant differences in the area of campaign contributions where race and gender were concerned. Overall, men tend to give more money than women when it comes to campaign contributions. Whites also tend to make more political contributions and give substantially more money than do African Americans and Latinos when contributions are given (Verba, Schlozman and Brady 1993, p. 236). Those in the higher income brackets are also much more likely to give than those in lower income brackets. Yet, Verba, Schlozman and Brady do not examine if campaign contributions equalize as incomes rise between the two sexes and the three races.
Campaign Contributions and Income: African American Women

The model presented in Table 9 demonstrates the impact of income on whether or not the respondent made campaign contributions. The model uses the same interactive and independent variables as the previous models. Respondents were asked how much money they had given to a political campaign. Actual questions asked are available in the appendix.

According to this model, the main effect of family income is a significant predictor for whether or not a respondent to the survey gave money and a significant predictor of how much money they gave. The interactive terms, however, are not significant at conventional levels of statistical significance. In other words, the impact of income on the amount of campaign contributions that respondents gave did not significant vary across sex and race. The impact of income was a significant predictor of giving but did not have different effects across groups.

Other significant factors in this model include education, which has been significant in many of the previous models. For every one-unit increase in education, we should expect a .11 increase in giving campaign contributions. The test variable of RELIGIOSITY, which tests for the ‘religiosity’ of a respondent, is very significant in this model. Similarly the ideological variable is very significant — indicating that conservatives were more likely to give money than were liberals in this survey.

The variable for having children at home (CHILDREN AT HOME) is also statistically significant in this model. This likely addresses the fact that those with children at home have less disposable income to use on campaign contributions, since the
impact is negative. For every one-unit increase in children at home, we should expect campaign contributions to decrease .12 and this effect is significant at the 0.048 level.

**Campaign Contributions and Income: Latino Women**

In Table 10, we see that family income is again a significant predictor of campaign contributions. Similar to previous models, however, we see that the impact of income is similar across groups. The effects of additional income have similar impacts among White women, Latino males, and Latino females.

Other significant factors in this model include education, which has been significant in most of the previous models. For every one-unit increase in education, we should expect a .10 increase in giving campaign contributions – holding everything else in the model constant. Religiosity of the respondents is also important in this model, as is the ideological perspective of the respondent. As before those respondents who were the most conservative and the most religious were predicted to have contributed more – holding all else constant. The variable for having children at home (CHILDREN AT HOME) is also statistically significant in this model. For every one-unit increase in children at home, we should expect campaign contributions to decrease .12. This is statistically significant at the 0.05 level.

Overall, however, contrary to what I expected based on the theories of multiracial feminism, I did not find that increases in income had significantly different impact among women who were also a member of a minority group. There are several reasons why this current study may have been unable to fully uncover the relationships predicted by multiracial feminist theory. I return to these potential problems in the conclusion.
CHAPTER 7: CONCLUSIONS

Summary of Findings

It is clear from previous research done in this area that education and income have strong effects on political participation. Most prior studies have demonstrated that the "participation gap" between men and women and the gap between races, especially Whites and African Americans is narrowing (see literature review). There are many reasons for these trends that have been presented in prior work. Women of all races are becoming better educated and earning more income. More women and minorities are beginning to successfully run for political office, which is also increasing their political participation. African American women tend to be more employed and earn more income than African American men, which Verba, Schlozman and Brady state is key to their increasing mobilization.

Yet, according to my findings, neither education and income are the significant predictors of political participation for women of any race – or at least the impact of these variables is no different than their effect among White men. Given increases in education and income, we should expect to see similar increases in political participation among similarly situated men and women. Of course, to the extent that women fall behind men in income and (especially) education, when levels of these resources even out we should continue to expect greater participation among women and minorities. Regardless, my findings suggest that, in general, the impact of education and income is similar across sex and race.

Given the previous research I expected to find that increasing income and education would not only consistently drive voting and other forms of political
participation upward, but also would have an “equalizing” effect – as women earned more money and became better educated, the racial differences would greatly narrow. This is due to the theory of multiracial feminism, which discusses the fact that oppression is felt at varying levels, due to race, class and gender.

Overall, I found support for hypothesis one. I hypothesized that increasing income would make women more politically active. This is certainly supported by the frequency tables, and while the regression model specifically testing for income does not show a significant correlation, the further models do demonstrate significance for the variable of family income, which demonstrates the significance of this variable. The significance of this is challenged by the fact that African American women actually vote more at the lower income levels that do White or Latino women.

In hypothesis two, I expected to find that increasing education makes all women more politically active. The frequency tables demonstrate that education is significant, as White and African American women consistently vote more as their education increases. This is not the case for Latino women. The regression model finds limited support for this proposition.

Hypotheses three and four sought to demonstrate the effects of multiracial feminism. Multiracial feminism cast the White race as being dominant over other races. If this is the case, then I should have found that any increase to the resources of the women of the dominant class gives them a significant advantage over other women. While rising family income and increasing education does increase political participation, it does not grant a significant advantage to White women.
Hypotheses five and six sought to demonstrate that African American women and Latino women would increase their political participation as their “class” status rose through increased education and income. Multiracial feminism suggests that class status can either impede or support a person’s ability to lobby for more equality. These models tested whether or not women would make more campaign contributions if their incomes rose, and volunteer more time to political campaigns if their education level increased. Family income was a significant variable in both these models, suggesting that increasing income does play a significant role in political contributions. However, these variables of income and education were not found to be significant when tested in an interactive model with being a woman and a member of that particular race, which means that increasing income is not that strong of a factor in increasing their political participation. In these models, the more significant variables were the person’s religiosity, how liberal or conservative they consider themselves to be, and if the respondent had young children in the home.

In hypothesis seven, I expected to find that Latino women, despite gains through income and education, still lag behind White and African American women in terms of their overall participation. This hypothesis is supported by all frequency tables and regression models in which variables concerning the participation of Latino women are introduced. Latino women certainly are the most disadvantaged of these groups, in terms of political participation.

Hypothesis eight sought to examine the different paths that White, African American and Latino women take in political participation. Latino women vote the least, make fewer campaign contributions, and volunteer less time to campaigns. None of these
models show a method in which Latino women rival White or African American women in political expression. White women do tend to make more campaign contributions and do more campaign volunteering at the upper income and education levels. African American women trail behind Whites in that area, but do vote a significant level, especially at the lower income levels, where White women tend to vote the least.

Yet, I still expected to find that White women still hold the most political capital (hypothesis nine). The frequency tables show that White women will vote more as their income and education rises. Some support was found that White women are more likely to participate in campaign contributions and campaign volunteering.

In the following table, I summarize the Hypotheses and the evidence found to support or disprove the hypothesis.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Hypothesis</th>
<th>Evidence</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis One: Increasing income makes all women more politically active.</td>
<td>Supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis Two: Increasing education makes all women more politically active</td>
<td>Supported by frequency tables. Not supported by regression tables.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis Three: Income increases White women’s political participation more.</td>
<td>Not Supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis Four: Education increases White women’s political participation more.</td>
<td>Not Supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis Five: African American and Latino women participate closer to the same levels as White women at higher income levels.</td>
<td>Tenuous support found for family income.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis Six: African American and Latino women participate closer to the same levels as White women at higher education levels.</td>
<td>Not Supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis Seven: Latino women are the least participatory</td>
<td>Supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis Eight: There are compelling differences in the way women of the three races participate.</td>
<td>Supported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hypothesis Nine: White women are more</td>
<td>Supported by frequency tables. Tenuous</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
**Problems with Current Research**

These results must be considered preliminary for several reasons. First, there are too few females at the highest levels of income and education for accurate comparisons. For example, there was only one Latino woman in the study who has a high level of income, and only one Latino woman with a high level of education. Therefore, we need to wait until women make further advances before we are able to detect with some accuracy whether or not the impact of education and income significantly vary across sex and race. Also, since women still face glass ceilings then in a sense, Verba’s study was premature. Women are gaining, but have not reached equality in education or income – particularly given the large number of women in the population.

We must also be concerned with the fact that the data is over 10 years old. As noted below, women and minorities have made significant advances in terms of political power and clout.

**Areas of Further Research**

Some of the findings here challenge traditional thinking and empirical research. As noted above, it appears from some of these findings that women and minorities are not as participatory politically as one would expect to find. However, the data used here was collected in 1990. In the elections of 1992 and 1996, the votes of women and minorities were considered to be linchpin of Clinton’s phenomenal success in those elections. In the 2000 election, the “women’s vote,” the “Latino vote” and the “African American vote” replaced the “labor vote” and the “religious vote” as the ones to attract to the platform.
Bush and Gore both reached out to these voter bases, often at the expense of alienating their core votes. Both presidential candidates made speeches in Latin neighborhoods in Spanish. Both courted the women’s vote with strong stances on education while distancing themselves from defense issues (Teixeira and Judis 2002).

The Republican party acknowledged the power of the African American vote by several methods. Their new “compassionate conservative” message sought to change long-held views in the African American community that the Republicans were not sympathetic to their problems. They also targeted their radio advertising in urban areas to stations that predominately attracted African American listeners (Teixeira and Judis 2002). It is obvious that these voting blocks are now seen as crucial to both parties.

Despite the Republican’s best efforts to woo these minorities to their side, Ruy Teixeira and John Judis (2002) argue that the political participation of women, Latinos, and African Americans will drive the Democratic Party into majority status by the end of this decade. According to these authors, we should expect the stronghold that the Republican party has had in Congress and the White House in the past 25 years to come to an end, and mostly it will be due to the increasing participation of women, African Americans, Latinos, and Asian Americans. These groups have gained in the attainment of professional jobs, which should make them more able to participate, and they have kept their core Democratic values. They have migrated to urban areas, and these factors have created “ideopolises” that will promote the core values of the now-centrist Democratic Party.

It is evident through the actions of politicians and the arguments of respected scholars that the political participation of women and minorities is crucial to the
American political system today. The weakness of many of these hypotheses in this study should not be seen as discouraging news for organizers of minority politics. It is obvious that this study needs to be redone using new and current data. Then, we shall receive a better picture of the state of political participation of women and minorities. Current trends definitely show that these groups have political power today.
# VOTING FREQUENCIES
## INTERACTIONS WITH RACE AND INCOME

### TABLE #1

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Poor</th>
<th>Lower Middle</th>
<th>Middle</th>
<th>Upper Middle</th>
<th>Upper</th>
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<td><strong>African American Women</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
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<td>17.64</td>
<td>0.77</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>16.66</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most</td>
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<td>11.76</td>
<td>17.54</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>16.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>47.89</td>
<td>68.62</td>
<td>50.87</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>66.66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>White Women</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>20.28</td>
<td>13.25</td>
<td>5.67</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>5.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>6.13</td>
<td>3.86</td>
<td>3.05</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some</td>
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<td>11.6</td>
<td>4.36</td>
<td>7.61</td>
<td>5.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Most</td>
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<td>20.99</td>
<td>22.27</td>
<td>18.09</td>
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<td>All</td>
<td>39.62</td>
<td>48.06</td>
<td>62.44</td>
<td>66.66</td>
<td>74.54</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Latino Women</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
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<td>17.07</td>
<td>31.57</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>8.33</td>
<td>9.75</td>
<td>5.26</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>8.33</td>
<td>21.95</td>
<td>15.78</td>
<td>14.28</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
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<td>Most</td>
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<td>7.31</td>
<td>15.78</td>
<td>57.14</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>27.77</td>
<td>36.58</td>
<td>31.57</td>
<td>28.57</td>
<td>100</td>
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### VOTING FREQUENCY
INTERACTIONS WITH RACE AND EDUCATION

**TABLE #2**

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<th>educ = 4</th>
<th>educ = 5</th>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>African American Women</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Never</td>
<td>19.34</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>13.33</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rarely</td>
<td>7.14</td>
<td>6.36</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>6.25</td>
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<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Some</td>
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<td>5.56</td>
<td>0</td>
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<td>Most</td>
<td>21.43</td>
<td>17.27</td>
<td>66.67</td>
<td>18.75</td>
<td>27.78</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>28.47</td>
<td>31.82</td>
<td>6.67</td>
<td>68.75</td>
<td>66.67</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

|                 |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| **Figure 10:**  |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| White Women     |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Never           | 33.33    | 13.88    | 6.67     | 5.08     | 0        | 0        |
| Rarely          | 4.17     | 6.41     | 4.44     | 1.69     | 1.3      | 0        |
| Some            | 13.54    | 9.96     | 8.89     | 3.95     | 3.9      | 25       |
| Most            | 21.88    | 20.28    | 17.78    | 17.51    | 23.38    | 25       |
| All             | 21.88    | 44.84    | 60       | 68.93    | 71.43    | 50       |

|                 |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| **Figure 11:**  |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Latino Women    |          |          |          |          |          |          |
| Never           | 35.82    | 30.51    | 0        | 0        | 0        | 100      |
| Rarely          | 8.96     | 3.39     | 0        | 0        | 0        | 0        |
| Some            | 8.96     | 16.95    | 0        | 33.33    | 0        | 0        |
| Most            | 4.48     | 8        | 50       | 33.33    | 0        | 0        |
| All             | 19.4     | 23.73    | 50       | 33.33    | 100      | 0        |
Interaction Regression Model
Interactions with Voting and Income
African American Women

Table #3

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Parameter Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>Pr &gt; t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Intercept</td>
<td>2.26437</td>
<td>0.22571</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>educ</td>
<td>0.16698</td>
<td>0.02323</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>age</td>
<td>0.02132</td>
<td>0.00236</td>
<td>&lt;.0001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>black</td>
<td>-0.06497</td>
<td>0.33048</td>
<td>0.8442</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>woman</td>
<td>0.11562</td>
<td>0.18380</td>
<td>0.5294</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RELIGIOSITY (respondent committed to Christ)</td>
<td>-0.01883</td>
<td>0.07578</td>
<td>0.8038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Faminc (Total household income of family members)</td>
<td>0.06410</td>
<td>0.01788</td>
<td>0.0003</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>woXinc</td>
<td>-0.02394</td>
<td>0.002218</td>
<td>0.2807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>blXinc</td>
<td>-0.02809</td>
<td>0.04005</td>
<td>0.4832</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>woXbl</td>
<td>-0.05269</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>wXbXinc</td>
<td>0.03260</td>
<td>0.05117</td>
<td>0.5241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIBCON (liberal/conservative scale)</td>
<td>0.01949</td>
<td>0.02726</td>
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<tr>
<td>married</td>
<td>0.02015</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>unemp</td>
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<td>0.2145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHILDREN AT HOME (how many children R has living at home)</td>
<td>0.04983</td>
<td>0.03173</td>
<td>0.1166</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

R-square = 0.1426
Adjusted R-square = 0.1344
### Interaction Regression Model
#### Interactions with Voting and Income
#### Latino Women

**Table # 4**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>Parameter Estimate</th>
<th>Standard Error</th>
<th>Pr &gt; t</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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R-square = 0.1437
Adjusted R-square = 0.1355
# Interaction Regression Model

## Interactions with Voting and Education

### African American Women

### Table # 5

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R – square = 0.1434
Adjusted R-square = 0.1351
## Interaction Regression Model

Interactions with Voting and Education

Latino Women

### Table # 6

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### Interactive Regression Model

**Interactions with Campaign Volunteering and Education**

**African American Women**

Table # 7

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R-square = 0.0520

Adjusted R-square = -0.0048
Interactive Regression Model
Interactions with Campaign Volunteer Work and Education
Latino Women

Table # 8

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R-Square = 0.0513
Adjusted R-square = -0.0056
Interactive Regression Model
Interactions with Income and Campaign Contributions
African American Women

Table #9

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R-square = 0.2450
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## Interactive Regression Model
### Interactions with Campaign Contributions and Income
#### Latino Women

**Table # 10**

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R-square = 0.2413
Adjusted R-square = 0.2169
Bibliography


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