Keywords
torts, personhood, disenfranchisement, legal personhood, autonomy, self-expression, human dignity
Abstract
Perhaps more so than ever, legal personhood is contested. Part I of this Article lays out an overview of existing tort theories exposing the limitations of existing paradigms. This positions the reader to consider in Part II the core assertion of this paper: that a fundamental role of torts is to define personhood. As such, it explores the idea that a principal project that each tort case and litigant is engaged with is not truly about money, property, or even pain per se—it is about determining who is seen.
Recommended Citation
Melissa Mortazavi,
Torts and Personhood,
76 Ark. L. Rev.
(2023).
Available at:
https://scholarworks.uark.edu/alr/vol76/iss3/3