Date of Graduation

7-2026

Document Type

Dissertation

Degree Name

Doctor of Philosophy in Economics (PhD)

Degree Level

Graduate

Department

Economics

Advisor/Mentor

McGee, Peter

Committee Member

Gaduh, Arya

Second Committee Member

Bhattacharya, Puja

Keywords

Whistleblowing, Crime, Experimental Economics

Abstract

This dissertation comprises three essays on how institutional strength, enforcement practices, and cognitive load affect behavior. The first essay presents a laboratory experiment that varies the extent to which an individual in a position of authority can interfere with the outcome of whistleblowing, holding all other monetary incentives fixed. Strengthening institutions raises whistleblowing rates, lowers theft, and reduces the rate of bribe offers, while leaving authorities’ acceptance of bribes unchanged when they face no punishment for accepting them. The second essay studies the end of stop and frisk in Chicago following the 2015 ACLU-CPD settlement agreement, which cut annual investigatory pedestrian stops from roughly 700,000 to 100,000 by 2016. Using the Augmented Synthetic Control Method with large U.S. cities as donors, the analysis finds that the reform produced a significant increase in violent crime, driven by murder and larceny-theft, and a marginally significant increase in property crime. Burglary and motor vehicle theft, which typically occur in private settings, show no significant effect. The murder effect dissipates by 2019 while the larceny-theft effect persists. The results show that the null finding from New York City does not extend to a city with substantially higher rates of violent crime. Lastly, the third essay examines the impact of cognitive load on team strategic sophistication. While teams under no load outperform individuals, teams under cognitive load perform significantly worse than individuals under load. Together, the three essays address how institutions, policies, and cognitive factors affect behavior.

Included in

Economics Commons

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