Date of Graduation
8-2019
Document Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Master of Arts in Philosophy (MA)
Degree Level
Graduate
Department
Philosophy
Advisor/Mentor
Funkhouser, Eric M.
Committee Member
Lyons, Jack
Second Committee Member
Minar, Edward H.
Keywords
Associations; Beliefs; Implicit Attitudes; Implicit Biases; Representation
Abstract
Since their inception, implicit attitudes have been defined as associative mental states, separate from beliefs, which are considered to be propositional in nature. Recently, several philosophers have challenged this distinction, arguing that implicit attitudes are actually unconscious beliefs. In turn, I argue that the attitudes detected by current experimental paradigms are blind to distinctions between implicit attitudes, which I define as the products of an associative learning mechanism, and unconscious beliefs, which are the products of a propositional learning mechanism. Specifically, I argue for a single-representational dual-attitude account of implicit bias.
Citation
Synoground, A. D. (2019). Implicit Bias and the Boundaries of Belief: A Single-Representational Dual-Attitude Account of Implicit Attitudes. Graduate Theses and Dissertations Retrieved from https://scholarworks.uark.edu/etd/3401
Included in
Cognitive Psychology Commons, Epistemology Commons, Personality and Social Contexts Commons, Psychological Phenomena and Processes Commons, Social Psychology and Interaction Commons
