Date of Graduation

5-2026

Document Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelor of Arts in Political Science

Degree Level

Undergraduate

Department

Political Science

Advisor/Mentor

Dr. Thomas Adam

Committee Member

Dr. Eric Button

Second Committee Member

Dr. John Davis

Abstract

This study examines why congressional term limit reform has not succeeded despite widespread public support. Although there has been sustained bipartisan approval across decades, term limits have not gained any meaningful institutional traction, raising a central question: Why do reforms with strong public backing fail to advance within Congress itself? Drawing on historical analysis, public opinion data, and original survey research conducted with Members of Congress, this study argues that the failure of congressional term limit reform is not the result of a lack of public engagement, but rather a consequence of institutional constraints that prevent public preferences from translating into policy. These constraints include incumbency advantages, congressional self-interest, and constitutional barriers. Survey findings indicate that legislators are aware of these dynamics, supporting the conclusion that resistance to reform reflects the incentives embedded within the institution rather than a lack of responsiveness. This study contributes to broader debates on representative governance by demonstrating that electoral accountability alone is insufficient to ensure a truly reflective government when institutional outcomes run counter to public will.

Keywords

term-limits; congress; political theory; democratic; representation

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