Date of Graduation

5-2022

Document Type

Thesis

Degree Name

Bachelor of Science in Computer Engineering

Degree Level

Undergraduate

Department

Computer Science and Computer Engineering

Advisor/Mentor

Nelson, Alexander

Committee Member/Reader

Huang, Miaoqing

Committee Member/Second Reader

Andrews, David

Abstract

The advancements of quantum computers brings us closer to the threat of our current asymmetric cryptography algorithms being broken by Shor's Algorithm. NIST proposed a standardization effort in creating a new class of asymmetric cryptography named Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). These new algorithms will be resistant against both classical computers and sufficiently powerful quantum computers. Although the new algorithms seem mathematically secure, they can possibly be broken by a class of attacks known as side-channels attacks (SCA). Side-channel attacks involve exploiting the hardware that the algorithm runs on to figure out secret values that could break the security of the system. The third round of the PQC standardization put some emphasis on the algorithm's ability to mitigate side-channel attacks. In this work, two candidate KEM algorithms Kyber and Saber are analyzed through a multi-platform setup. Both unprotected and protected implementations on Cortex-M4 microcontrollers through masking are analyzed using the test vector leakage assessment with an oscilloscope and a ChipWhisperer tool

Keywords

Post-Quantum Cryptography, Side-channel Analysis, ChipWhisperer, Oscilloscope, Masking, Leakage assessment

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