Date of Graduation
5-2022
Document Type
Thesis
Degree Name
Bachelor of Science in Computer Engineering
Degree Level
Undergraduate
Department
Computer Science and Computer Engineering
Advisor/Mentor
Nelson, Alexander
Committee Member/Reader
Huang, Miaoqing
Committee Member/Second Reader
Andrews, David
Abstract
The advancements of quantum computers brings us closer to the threat of our current asymmetric cryptography algorithms being broken by Shor's Algorithm. NIST proposed a standardization effort in creating a new class of asymmetric cryptography named Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC). These new algorithms will be resistant against both classical computers and sufficiently powerful quantum computers. Although the new algorithms seem mathematically secure, they can possibly be broken by a class of attacks known as side-channels attacks (SCA). Side-channel attacks involve exploiting the hardware that the algorithm runs on to figure out secret values that could break the security of the system. The third round of the PQC standardization put some emphasis on the algorithm's ability to mitigate side-channel attacks. In this work, two candidate KEM algorithms Kyber and Saber are analyzed through a multi-platform setup. Both unprotected and protected implementations on Cortex-M4 microcontrollers through masking are analyzed using the test vector leakage assessment with an oscilloscope and a ChipWhisperer tool
Keywords
Post-Quantum Cryptography, Side-channel Analysis, ChipWhisperer, Oscilloscope, Masking, Leakage assessment
Citation
Teague, T. (2022). Side-Channel Analysis on Post-Quantum Cryptography Algorithms. Computer Science and Computer Engineering Undergraduate Honors Theses Retrieved from https://scholarworks.uark.edu/csceuht/106
Included in
Computer and Systems Architecture Commons, Hardware Systems Commons, Information Security Commons, Numerical Analysis and Scientific Computing Commons, Programming Languages and Compilers Commons, Service Learning Commons, Theory and Algorithms Commons